ReductionReduction

• Nomological Reduction– 1-1 relations– Many-1 relations (supervenience)

• Functions & mechanisms?

• Emergence– The problem of epiphenomenalism

• Attribute dualism (synchroncity)• Substance dualism

Mechanistic viewpointMechanistic viewpoint

• Isn’t the whole question of reduction misguided?

The ‘Location’ problem of The ‘Location’ problem of MetaphysicsMetaphysics

• Ain’t this a bunch of philosophy of mind? Whatever happened the the philosophy of science?

• Metaphysics asks “what exists?” or “what kinds of things exist?”

• So, take the case of color:

Folk theoryFolk theory

• I see colors on surfaces – in fact, I cannot see a surface unless I see its color.

• According to ‘folk’ theory, colors are those properties that are found on the surfaces of opaque objects or permeating the volumes of liquids. They are revealed by light, cause well-known contrast effects with other colors, appear to shift in different illumination conditions, etc…

Scientific theory…Scientific theory…

• There is no property that (a) is found on the surface of opaque objects or permeating volumes of liquids, is revealed by light, causes contrast effects, shifts in different illumination conditions, etc.

• Therefore…

Metaphysics:Metaphysics:

• Folk theory is wrong. 1. Therefore, we either revise our folk

theory to give up that which is ‘at the edges’, or

2. We dump the whole lot and claim that color terms refer to nothing (that is studiable by science)

Let’s take (2)Let’s take (2)

• Color terms refer to nothing that is studiable by science:

1. Color terms refer to something that is real, but escapes the terminology of modern science (empirical properties / trope theory)

2. Color terms refer to nothing, and should be replaced by scientific terms (eliminitavism)

3. Color terms refer to sense-data, which are non physical (attribute dualism?)

4. Color terms refer to emergent properties – properties that emerge from physical properties but are not reducible to, nor identical with, physical properties (emergentism)

Let’s take (1)Let’s take (1)

• The intuition of that colors inhere in objects is too strong to give up w/out overwhelming evidence, so let’s drop the requirement that the physical properties must , themselves, change in contrast effects, and allow that the physical properties can appear to change in contrast effects.– Then, science says ‘have we got a property

for you…’ SSRs.

Diagram of the dialecticDiagram of the dialectic

Folk Theory

Scientific evidence

Revise folk theory Reject folk theory

Common-sense functionalism

Eliminativism Attribute dualism

Empirical properties

Emergentism

Other options: the Other options: the DualismsDualisms

• Substance: – Material stuff has certain properties

essentially: extension– Spiritual stuff has certain properties

essentially: thinking– Nothing extended can think, nothing

thinking can be extended. Therefore, they are different substances.

– (Descartes)

In this dialectical formIn this dialectical form

• According to ‘Folk’ psychology, thought has the property of being intentional (being about something in the world).

• Science tells us that there is no physical property that accounts for internationality.

• Therefore, thought just can’t be physical.

Diagram of the dialecticDiagram of the dialectic

Folk Theory

Scientific evidence

Revise folk theory Reject folk theory

Common-sense functionalism

Eliminativism Attribute dualism

Substance Dualism

Emergentism

?

So what is thought?So what is thought?

1. Nothing – there’s just neurons 2. Spiritual states that emerge from

physical states.3. Properties of physical states

which are nonetheless not physical

4. Something entirely different.

Diagram of the dialecticDiagram of the dialectic

Folk Theory

Scientific evidence

Revise folk theory Reject folk theory

Common-sense functionalism

Eliminativism Attribute dualism

Substance Dualism

Emergentism1 2 3

4

Diagram of the dialecticDiagram of the dialectic

Folk Theory

Scientific evidence

Revise folk theory Reject folk theory

Common-sense functionalism

Eliminativism Attribute dualism

Substance Dualism

Emergentism1 2 3

4

DolphinsDolphins

• Folk theory tells us that dolphins have the property of being fish.

• Science tells us that fish have the properties of having gills, laying eggs, not producing milk, being cold-blooded etc.

• Dolphins have none of these properties. (there is no fish-property that accounts for their behavior)

• Therefore, folk theory is wrong. Dolphins can’t be fish

So what are dolphins?So what are dolphins?

1. Nothing – they’re just biological creatures

2. Creatures that emerge from fish but are not reducible to fish

3. Properties of fish which are nonetheless not fish

4. Something entirely different.

Why does this sound so Why does this sound so crazy?crazy?

1. Recall the argument for dualism:– According to ‘Folk’ psychology, thought

has the property of being intentional (being about something in the world).

– Science tells us that there is no physical property that accounts for internationality.

– Therefore, thought just can’t be physical.

And the dolphins:And the dolphins:

• Folk theory tells us that dolphins have the property of being fish.

• Science tells us that fish have the properties of having gills, laying eggs, not producing milk, being cold-blooded etc.

• Dolphins have none of these properties. (there is no fish-property that accounts for their behavior)

• Therefore, folk theory is wrong. Dolphins can’t be fish

The differenceThe difference

• ‘fish-property’ ≠ ‘physical property’• There might be other properties

(like ‘mammal-property’) that accounts for the dolphin’s behavior.

• But can there be other ‘physical properties’ that account for the mind’s behavior?

And here’s the rub:And here’s the rub:

• The dualist must say: No. We know everything about the physical world, and intentionality just ain’t in it.

• I think that the correct course of action is to take the Dolphin lesson seriously:– Revise the folk theory in light of

empirical evidence to a point.

The Point:The Point:

• No matter how much science may protest, I’m not going to give up the theory that I think. Beliefs and desires are real, and anything that tells me otherwise:– Behaviorism: just dispositions to

behave– Elimintivism: just neuronal activity.

• Is, for that very reason, wrong.

So, commonsense So, commonsense functionalismfunctionalism

• Tells us that commonsense steers revisions to folk theory in light of completed explanations. – Whenever someone says ‘that’s the only

explanation’ or ‘there is no possible explanation for that’, stop reading. They’re not doing science.

– Whenever someone abuses language (I.e. colors are experiences, psychophysical colors are SSRs), yell and scream.

– BUT, be prepared to revise and modify your theories in light of excellent evidence.

How’s all this supposed to How’s all this supposed to work?work?

• Lewis: Suppose that we are in a bad murder mystery.– The detective says: the murderer met

with Y yesterday, he is short, he wears bad shoes, etc.

– The uniform officer says: this guy, joe, met with Y yesterday, is short, wears bad shoes, etc.

– We conclude: the murderer is Joe.

• Folk theory specifies the what X is by specifying its functional role.– Pain is that internal state that is typically

caused by bodily damage, typically causes behavior away from the source of the damage except in the case of masochists, and typically causes a host of other beliefs and desires, for example: the belief that the stimulus is dangerous, the desire not to come in contact with the stimulus again, etc.

• Science tells us:– The internal state that is typically

caused by… causes… and has the following internal relations… is brain state C.

– Therefore, pain is brain state C.

Why this works.Why this works.

1. It refrains from imposing metaphysical theory on science: ie. Science can say that the realizer of a particular role is a state, a mechanism, a cookoo clock, whatever.

2. It identifies pain in terms of its function, and therefore, allows for the possibility of multiple realizability: I.e that octopuses have pain, but have a very different physiology.

3. It works on a number of levels (Life = DNA, aid to combustion = Oxygen, Color = SSR, Action at a distance = gravitational force)