REDACTED – FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION EXHIBIT A DECLARATION OF JOHN KWOKA Ex A... · 3 Kwoka et al....

REDACTED – FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

EXHIBIT A

DECLARATION OF JOHN KWOKA

REDACTED - FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20554

fu the Matter of

Business Data Services in an futem et Protocol Environment

fuvestigation of Ce1iain Price Cap Local Exchange CaiTier Business Data Services Tariff Pricing Plans

Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange CaiTiers

AT&T Corporation Petition for Rulemaking to Refo1m Regulation of fucumbent Local Exchange CaiTier Rates for futerstate Special Access Services

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

WC Docket No. 16-143

WC Docket No. 15-247

WC Docket No. 05-25

RM-10593

DECLARATION OF JOHN KWOKA

June 28, 2016


TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. futroduction ................................................................................................ ............................. 1

A. Qualifications ................................................................ ................................................ . 1

B. Assigmnent ................................................................................................ .................... 2

C. Summary of My Major Conclusions ................................ .............................................. 2

II. Economic Foundations for Competitive Markets ................................ ................................... 2 A. First Best Method for Identifying Effective Competitors .............................................. 3

B. Second Best Method for Identifying Effective Competitors ........................................ .4

III. Competition in Business Data Services ................................................................ .................. 6

A. The Rysrnan Repori ................................................................ ....................................... 7 B. Fmiher Examination of FCC Data ................................ ................................................. 8 C. Additional Analysis and Evidence ................................ ................................................. 9

1. Mean and Median Prices by Service and CaITier.. .............................. ..................... 9

2. Regression Results ................................................................ ................................. 12

3. [BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL] [END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL] Discounts in Competitive Markets ......................................... 12

4. Sprint's Network Vision Program ................................ ......................................... 14

5. Concentration and Entry Conditions ................................ ...................................... 15 D. Summary of Competitive Conditions in Highband BDS Markets ............................... 16

IV. Conclusions ................................................................................................ ........................... 16


1

I. INTRODUCTION

A. QUALIFICATIONS

1. My name is John Kwoka. I am the Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of

Economics at Northeastern University. My areas of teaching and research specialization

are the economics of industrial organization, antitrust, and regulation. I have previously

taught economics at George Washington University and the University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill, and held visiting positions at Northwestern University and Harvard

University. My past non-academic positions include service at the Federal Trade

Commission, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and the Federal

Communications Commission, where as Special Assistant to the Director of the Common

Carrier Bureau, I assisted in developing price cap plans for AT&T and the LECs. I am

currently on the Board of Directors of the Industrial Organization Society and am affiliated

with the International Competition Network. I am a past General Editor and remain on the

Editorial Board of the Review of Industrial Organization, and am a member of a number of

other professional organizations in economics and antitrust.

2. I have authored or co-authored more than 75 scholarly articles on the economics of

industrial organization, market power, strategic behavior, and business practices generally.

I have authored two scholarly books. The more recent of these is Mergers, Merger

Control, and Remedies, published by MIT Press, which has just been selected as the Best

Antitrust Book of 2015. I am also co-editor of a widely-read casebook entitled The

Antitrust Revolution, now going into its 7th edition. I have been the recipient of other

awards, including the first Distinguished Service Award of the Industrial Organization

Society in 2012 and the Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship in 2014. I hold a

PhD in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania. My full curriculum vitae is

attached to this declaration.

3. In addition to my scholarly work, I have served as consultant on numerous competition and

regulatory matters to agencies and private parties both here in the U.S. as well as in other

countries and at the international level.


2

B. ASSIGNMENT

4. In its Tariff Investigation Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, this

Commission has reset its regulatory role for business data services (BDS). Among the

several necessary determinations is the question of whether the markets for BDS services

are competitive or not, and if some are not competitive, what would be an appropriate test

to distinguish the two. Further, once the latter have been identified, the NPRM seeks to

establish an appropriate regulatory framework to ensure maximum consumer benefit

consistent with regulation that is technology-neutral, fosters entry, and is designed to serve

an evolving marketplace.

5. There seems little dispute in the record that DS1 and DS3 services lack sufficient

competition to bring prices to competitive levels. I have been asked by counsel to Sprint

Corporation to analyze the further question as to whether highband BDS is competitive. In

this task, I have drawn on my understanding of the Commission’s stated goals, the

economics of competitive vs. noncompetitive markets, the report authored by Prof. Marc

Rysman, earlier filings by Sprint in this matter, and the declarations of Dr. Chris Frentrup,

of Mr. Ed Carey, and of Mr. William Zarakas and Dr. Jeremy Verlinda in this proceeding.

I reserve the right to modify my conclusions to the extent that additional relevant

information comes to light.

C. SUMMARY OF MY MAJOR CONCLUSIONS

6. Based on a wide variety of evidence, I have concluded that prices for highband business

data services are above competitive levels, and by a significant amount.

II. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPETITIVE MARKETS

7. Most real world markets involve sellers whose products differ to varying degrees due either

to their varying attributes or their different geographic locations. A useful empirical

approach to analyzing the nature of prevailing industry competition is to investigate which

firms in practice matter to price determination. That is, which firms affect pricing by other

sellers and in the overall market? If price is significantly affected by the presence or

absence, or the size, of another seller, it normally would follow that the other firm is in the

market. Furthermore, among firms that matter in this sense, some may matter to different


3

degrees: those “farther away” in product or geographic space are likely to affect pricing to

a lesser degree. I denote competitors that matter as “effective competitors” and outline

various methods for identifying them.

A. FIRST BEST METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE COMPETITORS

8. The perspective of effective competitors as “firms that matter” has been validated by

economic research and relied on in policy matters. This perspective was a key component

of the case brought by the Federal Trade Commission against the proposed Staples-Office

Depot merger some fifteen years ago.1 There, data were compiled across numerous

geographic locations which differed in terms of which retailers of standard office supplies

operated in each location. Then a statistical model related Staples’ price for a standard set

of products to dummy variables for the presence or absence of each of the two other two

office superstores (Office Depot and Office Max) and various other types of retailers.

9. The results of the estimation showed that Staples’ price was lower in the presence of Office

Depot and Office Max, but that other retailers did not affect that price. From this it was

inferred that the relevant market consisted of just those three retailers: these three

interacted in price setting but were not constrained by any other sellers.

10. Together with co-authors, I have recently published an article on pricing in the airline

industry that is based on the same principle, namely, that if the presence of a particular

rival carrier significantly affects other carriers’ pricing, then that rival is an effective

competitor and in the relevant market.2 This article established the importance of specific

low-cost carriers such as Southwest, Air Tran, and JetBlue to pricing by the so-called

legacy carriers, as well as the significant degree to which each low-cost carrier constrains

the pricing of other low-cost carriers. Much as with the empirical work in the Staples case,

this exercise helped to distinguish competitors that mattered more from others that matter

less or not at all.

1 https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/9710008/staples-inc-office-depot-inc

2 John Kwoka, Kevin Hearle & Phillippe Alepin, From the Fringe to the Forefront: Low Cost Carriers and

Airline Price Determination, 48 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 247 (Mar. 10, 2016) (“Kwoka et al. 2016”).


4

11. The essence of this methodology is that it allows for an effects-based determination of

which sellers represent effective competitors, i.e., which firms matter. Any and all possibly

relevant firms might initially be included in the empirical analysis, permitting the data to

identify which firms are important to pricing and which are not. This is especially useful

where characteristics of the sellers vary in ways that may or may not matter for purposes of

determining the market. This methodology thus allows the various competitors to have

effects that differ in magnitude. Rather than pigeonholing each seller as either all-in or all-

out of the market, each is essentially weighted according to its competitive importance.3

B. SECOND BEST METHOD FOR IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE COMPETITORS

12. In some instances, this detailed empirical approach may not be possible. Data may be

lacking, or the quality of the data too poor, or it may be difficult to identify suitable

comparison markets and firms. The result is likely to be ambiguous empirical results and

uncertainty about their implications. The alternative, second best, approach would rely on

the available evidence and understanding from other sources and markets, and apply them

to the market in question. Relevant to this inquiry would be both economic theory and

empirical verification. Since these sources are well known, I will sketch them and their

implications only briefly.

13. Several strands of economic theory make clear that firm numbers and concentration matter

to the price outcome in a market. The workhorse Cournot model has the straightforward

property that equilibrium price in the market rises as firm numbers decline, cet. par.4

Standard game theory models, such as the so-called “trigger pricing” model, also imply

that firm numbers matter, since firms’ ability and incentives to cooperate increase as

numbers decline. This model also demonstrates the importance of other factors to the

determination. These factors include such things as firm size inequality, discount rate,

3 Kwoka et al. 2016, among others, does precisely this: it allows carriers serving nearby airports and carriers

poised to enter specific routes to exercise competitive constraints on pricing by incumbent carriers.

4 Another workhorse model―Bertrand―does not have such clear implications with respect to firm numbers.

In its unrealistic homogeneous product version, moving from one to two firms is sufficient to yield the

competitive price. In the more realistic differentiated product version, the key is the degree of substitution

rather than firm numbers, although the latter may be related.


5

detection lags, lumpiness of orders, product heterogeneity, and cost asymmetries, among

other things.5 In addition, all models recognize the importance of entry conditions.

14. The implication of all these models is that firm numbers matter, but the degree to which

they matter may vary depending on other factors, including rivals’ characteristics. None of

these theories yields a bright-line value for the number of effective competitors that

generally suffices for a competitive equilibrium.

15. These implications are broadly confirmed by a vast amount of empirical work in

economics. Early studies that related market concentration to profits suffered from well-

documented flaws, but a large and more recent body of work that has focused instead on

the relationship between price and concentration (or shares or firm numbers) in specific

markets has come to essentially the same conclusion: firm numbers (or shares or

concentration) are in fact related to market price.6 There is little dispute that a highly

concentrated market will generally support a higher price.

16. There are, of course, cases where that might not be true. Markets without any entry

barriers have an equilibrium that is essentially the competitive outcome.7 Industries that

are fully cartelized will show the same price regardless of the number of sellers that happen

to serve one of the separate markets.8 And in any event the magnitude of price increase

over competitive levels will be affected by entry conditions, demand elasticity, and the

other factors listed above.

5 See Massimo Motta, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004) (providing a fuller explanation

and proofs).

6 This literature is summarized, inter alia, in Jeffrey Church and Roger Ware, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION:

A STRATEGIC APPROACH (2000), ch. 12 and Stephen Martin, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN CONTEXT

(2010), ch. 5 (“The consensus is…that the price-concentration literature answered the question…: “[I]t is

clear that concentration does raise price’.” [citing R. Caves]).

7 These so-called “contestable markets” also require the incumbent firms to be slower in changing price than

the entry period for an outside firm. While theoretically interesting, no such extreme-case markets in fact

exist.

8 Thus if OPEC were a perfect cartel that adhered to a uniform price at which to sell crude oil, different

consuming countries might be supplied by varying numbers of OPEC members, but all at the same price. A

regression of the number of suppliers on price would show no apparent effect, but that would not prove that

the price was competitive.


6

17. Perhaps more helpfully, this empirical literature offers some insight into the relationship

between the number of sellers and the elevation of price over competitive levels. No one

should be surprised to learn that the necessary number for competition is not often as large

as twenty, nor should anyone expect it generally to be as small as two. There is no

universal number; rather, it varies with the characteristics of the particular market. With

those caveats, let me cite one such study among a great many. Reiffen and Ward study

generic drug pricing and report that prices fall with greater firm numbers at least through

five competitors and perhaps up through as many as eight.9 Other studies variously find

the need for at least three or four competitors and not infrequently more.10 In short, one

should not be surprised to find that a number of effective competitors such as four or five

or six may be necessary to ensure that price resembles that under competition in a market.

III. COMPETITION IN BUSINESS DATA SERVICES

18. With the above as background, I now turn to my analysis of competition in business data

services. This Commission has stated that its “data and . . . analysis suggests that

competition is lacking in BDS at or below 50 Mbps in many circumstances, and that

competition is present in BDS above 50 Mbps in many circumstances.”11 In partial

support, it offers a White Paper by Dr. Rysman, who was commissioned to “examine

whether, and if so, where, there is market power in this industry.”12

19. I begin with a discussion and interpretation of the results reported in Dr. Rysman’s White

Paper and then turn to other sources of information.

9 David Reiffen and Michael Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. OF ECONS. AND STATS. 37

(Feb. 2005). In a recent working paper, I have reported the results of a meta-analysis of merger

retrospectives showing higher prices from mergers up to the point where there are more than five remaining

“significant competitors.” See John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False Positives or Unwarranted Concerns? (Coll. of Soc. Scis. and Humanities: Northeastern

Univ., Working Paper, 2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782152).

10 See Declaration of Stanley M. Besen and Bridger M. Mitchell nn.69-71, appended as Attachment 1 to

Comments of Sprint Corporation, WC Docket No 05-25, RM-10592 (filed Jan. 27, 2016) (citing to studies

by R.M. Lamm, by R. Hungria-Gunnelin, and by L. Brannman, J.D. Klein, and L.W. Weiss that discuss the

need for competition).

11 Business Date Services in an Internet Protocol Environment et. al., Tariff Investigation Order and Further

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 16-54, WC Docket Nos. 16-143, 05-25, 15-247, RM-10593, ¶ 271

(rel. May 2, 2016) (“May 2016 FNPRM”).

12 Dr. Marc Rysman, Empirics of Business Data Services, White Paper, at 211 (April 2016), appended as

Appendix B to May 2016 FNPRM (“Rysman White Paper”).


7

A. THE RYSMAN REPORT

20. Dr. Rysman states that his approach is similar to that employed in the Staples merger

proceeding. In a series of regression models explaining ILEC prices, he introduces various

numbers and types of possible competitors, and examines which are effective in

constraining these prices. He acknowledges that this methodology cannot actually

determine whether adding competitors truly eliminates market power or how much would

be necessary to do so. Rather, this serves only to detect the existence and extent of market

power. He states the latter is indicated when added competition lowers price.

21. I believe this approach to be sound, and the statements made by Dr. Rysman that are cited

above to be correct. It is worth noting his acknowledgment that while this methodology

can establish degrees of market power, it cannot determine the price consistent with its

complete absence. Moreover, it should be noted that while finding an effect from an added

competitor does reveal market power, not finding such an effect does not necessarily imply

the absence of market power. I previously suggested one theoretical reason for this,

namely, that full coordination in pricing by sellers who do not all serve all markets would

find no statistically significant price difference where all sellers operate vs. where only

some subset might operate.

22. For this reason, I would agree with Dr. Rysman’s description of many of his results for

highband service as “inconclusive” and “muddled and conflicting.” As I will discuss, both

weaknesses of the data and aggregation problems appear to be responsible for Dr.

Rysman’s findings and “inconclusive” results.13 While it is not possible to fully resolve

the data and aggregation issues, even partial resolution moves beyond Dr. Rysman’s results

and both brings some clarity to the question of whether there is market power in highband

services and helps to document the presence of market power.

13 For this reason, I believe that another of Dr. Rysman’s statements, even with qualifiers, goes too far. Rysman

White Paper at 212 (“[T]he results of this study would suggest that regulation of higher-end products is

perhaps not necessary.”).


8

B. FURTHER EXAMINATION OF FCC DATA

23. There seems no disagreement about the “noisiness” of the FCC data. Dr. Rysman notes

numerous steps taken to clean the data and make them usable for his analysis. It is not

clear, however, whether his methods for resolving such issues as contract duration, multi-

location customers, bundling, and nonlinear pricing are sufficient, or whether perhaps they

even introduce other problems in the final data base. What is clear is that even after his

efforts to control for these factors, Dr. Rysman’s data remain quite noisy, and his results

remain “inconclusive.”

24. That is not to say, however, that his regressions clearly establish the absence of competitive

concerns in highband. Indeed, some of his reported results do show an effect from added

competition, whereas others do not. If there truly were no effect, one might expect more

consistency in the negative finding. By contrast, evidence of competitive effects in some

cases but not others might well indicate that aggregation issues, or model specification

matters, or simply data errors are at work. And indeed, as demonstrated in the Declaration

of Mr. Zarakas and Dr. Verlinda, filed in this proceeding and discussed infra, there is good

reason to believe that data errors and aggregation issues create problems here.

25. First, Dr. Rysman’s regression analysis of pricing data uses all observations on ILEC prices

as the dependent variable. But the Zarakas-Verlinda Declaration finds that there are

substantial carrier-to-carrier differences in reported prices.14 In some cases these are so

large as to cast doubt on whether they are economically meaningful price differences;

rather, they might be due to differing interpretation and reporting procedures. As a result,

pooling the observations across carriers seems likely to create a “mix-and-match” data set

reflecting varying numbers of observations from the different carriers, rather than

consistently reported prices from all carriers. Confirming this, as will be shown,

disaggregation by carrier significantly improves the clarity of the findings.

26. A second disaggregation reported by Zarakas-Verlinda also proves helpful – this by

bandwidth product. As the Zarakas-Verlinda Declaration demonstrates, it would appear

14 See Declaration of William Zarakas and Jeremy Verlinda (“Zarakas-Verlinda Declaration”), attached at

Exhibit D in Comments of Sprint Corporation, WC Docket Nos. 16-143, 05-25, 15-247, RM-10593 (filed

June 28, 2016) (“June Sprint Comments”).


that different bandwidths are subject to different competitive forces, likely due to their

different uses, customers, and environments. Dr. Rysman disaggregates DS 1 and DS3 and

his results ce1iainly show this, but he pools all observations for highband services. This

pooling of products with possibly different competitive environments also makes it less

likely to find clear results. For this reason, when Dr. Rysman repo1is inconclusive results,

it does not follow that the number of suppliers of highband services does not matter.

Rather, it may be the case that competition matters, but at the level of a more naiTowly

defined product than the highband category that Dr. Rysman analyzes . The Zai·akas

Verlinda findings seem to con oborate that such is the case, with quite different

implications for appropriate regulatory policy.

C. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND E VIDENCE

27. ill this section, I offer five types of evidence regai·ding competition in highband service.

Despite possible weaknesses in some of this evidence, I am satisfied that they collectively

establish that competition in highband matters - that it is not sufficiently strong or

pervasive to bring prices chai·ged by the ILECs into confonnity with competitive levels.

The bases for this conclusion are as follows:

1. Mean and Median Prices by Service and Carrier

28. As I noted previously, aggregation appears to play a role in the reported prices for

highband service. This seems evident from the data shown in the Zai·akas-Verlinda

Declai·ation and reproduced here as Table 1. Disaggregating by caiTier and bandwidth

product reveals a general-but not invai·iant-pattem in which the median price per circuit

declines as the ILEC faces at least one competitive provider in the census block, and then

again as additional competitive providers are present. 15 To be cleai-, these data ai·e noisy: in

a few cases a higher price appeai·s to be associated with a greater number of competitors,

but that must be seen as an implausible and uninfo1mative result.

29. To take the single most common service and caiTier [BEGIN IDGHLY

CONFIDENTIAL]

15 Median prices may be more reliable than mean prices, which are more subject to error-driven outlier data points. Similar conclusions nonetheless hold using mean prices.

9


•

[END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL]

31. I conclude that there is substantial, if somewhat noisy, evidence that added competition

reduces the price of highband service. The sign patterns as the number of competitors rises

are not random. Rather, they generally decline as competition strengthens, as would be

tm e where there is market power, thus meeting the test aiiiculated by Dr. Rysman.16

16 Rysman White Paper at 211. ("The goal of these regressions is to test whether prices fall when there is local competition. If so, I take this as evidence of market power in the BDS industry, where there is not competition.")

10


Table 1

Median ILEC Circuit Average MRC by Carrier by Bandwidth By Number of Competitive Providers in Circuit's Census Block

[BEGIN IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL]

• - - - - - -• - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -- • - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -• - - - - - -• - - - - - -- - - - - - -• - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - -

[END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL]

11


2. Regression Results

32. Regression analysis helps to isolate the distinctive roles of paiiicular causal vai·iables in

data such as those I have just repo1ied. For this reason, regressions are impo1iant analytical

tools. Unfortunately, the regressions repo1ied by Dr. Rysman for all highband products

proved to be, in his words, "inconclusive." Here, too, it would appear that a major

contributing factor to this finding is aggregation. When regressions are nm on individual

well-defined products, the effects of competition emerge more cleai·ly. This possibility was

originally suggested by the Declaration submitted by Dr. Jonathan Baker in this

proceeding, which broke out high-bandwidth circuits into vai·ious bandwidth ranges,17 and

has now been more fully explored and repo1ied in the Declaration of Mr. Zarakas and Dr.

Verlinda.

33. The latter declai·ation repo1is the results of rnnning the same regression model and on the

sam e data as that which Dr. Rysman used, but for a paiiicular bandwidth service and a

specific caiTier.18 They show that for the major product sold by [BEGIN IDGHLY

CONFIDENTIAL] [END HIGHLY

CONFIDENTIAL], the number of competitors matters. Price per circuit almost always

declines with a second and a third competitor, but not always significantly. Cumulatively,

prices are between 8.5 percent and 25 percent lower when there are three or more

competitive providers in the census block. All of these estimates come from more fully

specified regression models that control for buyer chai·acteristics and demographic

vai·iables- factors that help clarify the effects of competition itself. I take these results as

cleai· evidence of the effect of competition and hence the existence of mai·ket power.

3. [BEGIN IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL] [END IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL] Discounts in Competitive Markets

34. While econometric analysis is useful to ensm e statistical significance, simpler, more direct

methods also document the fact that the prices of Ethernet services vary with the intensity

17 Declaration of Jonathan B . Baker on Market Power in the Provision of Dedicated (Special Access) Se1vices, Docket 05-25 & RM-10593 (filed Jan. 27, 2016).

18 See Zarakas-Verlinda Declaration, Table 3 and the discussion in that declaration.

12

•

•

•

• • • •

•


of competition. I m1derstand from (BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL)

·- -

--

...................................

-13

• REDACTED - FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

[END IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL]

Both, however, confinn the lack of competition and the existence of above-competitive

pricing for important BDS products, and do so based on the caITiers' own understanding

and behavior.

4. Sprint's Network Vision Program

38. Additional insight into the effect of competition on pricing is provided in the Declaration of

Dr. Chris Frentrnp, Senior Economist for Sprint Nextel, in this proceeding. As he

describes in his Declaration, sta1t ing in late 2010 Sprint put out for bid its requirements for

Ethernet backhaul over all of its 38,000 cell towers.27 The need to do this was to upgrade

capacity on its towers in anticipation of greater smaitphone and other uses. Accordingly,

its requirements specified the same technology, the saine capacity, and the saine te1m .

Sprint received bids from ILECs, CLECs, and cable companies, with vaiying numbers of

bids at each site. As Dr. Frentrnp recounts, [BEGIN HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL].

[END IDGHLY CONFIDENTIAL]

39. Dr. Frentrnp analyzed the relationship between the bid price for this standai·dized service

across all sites vs. the number of bidders at each site. He found [BEGIN HIGHLY

CONFIDENTIAL]

• •

27 Declaration of Chris Frentmp, attached as Exhibit Bin June Sprint Comments ("Frentrup Declaration").

14


• [END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL]

5. Concentration and Entry Conditions

41. Finally, there is abundant evidence that for the vast majority of possible markets, the

number of actual competitors is not five or fom or even three. Data summarized in the

NPRM demonstrate this point rather clearly.

(1) Table 3 of the NPRM repo1is that, at the building level, only 23 percent of locations

have any competition at all.28 That is, 77 percent are served only by the ILEC.

(2) Table 4 in the NPRM repo1is an alternative scenario with a generous assumption

about possible cable-based provision of BDS. It remains the case that 87 percent of

locations could be served by at most two providers.

(3) Table 5 of the NPRM broadens the possible market to the census block. Even with

the generous assumption that any provider in the block can serve all buildings, Table

5 repo1is that approximately 70 percent of census blocks are served by at most two

providers.

42. While high concentration is generally associated with a non-competitive outcome, that

result is not necessarily proven in any paiiicular instance. One factor that can mitigate this

effect is ease of entiy. It is for that reason that the Table 5 results - which show limited

competition anyway - are contingent on whether or not a competitive provider in the

census block, for example, can quickly and cheaply connect to any building in that block

where the customer is located. That seems unlikely.

28 In this discussion, I exclude UNE-based provision as effective competition, for all the reasons explained in the NPRM itself. See May 2016 FNPRM, ,, 57, 228, 237 .

15


43. As the NPRM itself declares, " [B]oth costs and conditions exist within the BDS market

with enough significance in any measure of a geographic market to deter rapid competitive

entiy or expansion ... "29 These costs and conditions are self-evident: capital costs, sunk

costs, lead times, distance and access, and scale economies. 30

44. Significant enh'y baITiers increase the significance of concentration measures in any

market. Such is the case here, resulting in a more confident prediction of anticompetitive

effects from high concenti·ation and small numbers of effective competitors.

D. SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS IN HIGHBAND BDS MARKETS

45. The collective weight of the above evidence leads me to conclude that competition in

highband service is not sufficient to bring price down to competitive levels. Key evidence

includes simple examination of product prices by the number of competitive providers,

coIToborated by regressions on well-defined products and caITiers; [BEGIN IDGHLY

CONFIDENTIAL] [END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL] own

differential pricing by competitive conditions; Sp1int's documented pricing experience

when it has sought service in areas subject to different degrees of competition; and the very

high levels of concenti·ation, not offset by ease of entiy , that characterize the vast majority

of customer locations.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

46. From all of the above evidence, I conclude that the number of competitors in well-defined

highband markets has an important effect on the prices charged by the major ILECs. Since

the vast majority of customer locations are served by either just the ILEC or at most a

single competitive provider, I conclude that highband services are not generally subject to

sti·ong enough competition to yield prices purged of market power.

29 See May 2016 FNPRM, iJ 224. 30 See Declaration of Ed Carey, appended as Exhibit A to Sprint Corporation Opposition to ILEC Direct Cases,

WC Docket No. 15-247 (filed Feb. 5, 2016); Draft Declaration of George Kuzmanovski, appended to Comments of XO Communications, LLC, WC Docket No. 05-25, RM-10593 (filed Jan. 27, 2016); see also Declaration of David Sappington,, 16-18, 25, appended as Attachment 1 to Reply Comments of Sprint Corporation, WC Docket No. 05-25, RM-10593 (filed Feb. 19, 2016) (discussing entry baffiers).

16


4 7. While the exact parameters of the market that would purge highband prices of market

power are not entirely obvious in these results, I think the evidence is consistent with two

propositions:

(1) The number of "effective competitors" necessary for competition may be on the order

of three to five. The exact number likely varies with the strength of the competitive

force exe1i ed by each such provider, and that in turn would appear to depend on its

proximity to the building where the customer is located and perhaps other factors.

(2) The extent of supracompetitive prices may lie in a range at least as high as 15-20

percent, and perhaps twice that amount or more. [BEGIN IDGHLY

CONFIDENTIAL]

[END HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL] Other pricing evidence is consistent with these

facts on the ground.

17


KWOKA CV

Curriculum Vitae

John E. Kwoka, jr.

Address: Department of Economics Phone: 617-373-2252301 Lake Hall Fax: 617-373-3640Northeastern University Email: [email protected], MA 02115 Web: www.ios.neu.edu/j.kwoka/

Current Positions:Neal F. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Economics, Northeastern UniversityBoard of Directors, Industrial Organization SocietyEditorial Board, Review of Industrial OrganizationAdvisory Board, Journal of Industrial and Business EconomicsBoard of Directors and Senior Fellow, American Antitrust InstituteNon-Governmental Advisor, International Competition Network

Previous Academic Positions:Professor of Economics, George Washington University, 1981-2001

Columbian Professor, 2001Research Professor, 2001-2003

Faculty Associate in Public Policy, George Washington University, 1983-2001Visiting Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1994-95Visiting Associate Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, 1980-81Assistant Professor of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1972-75Instructor, Lecturer in Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1970-72

Previous Non-Academic Positions:Member, Advisory Council to the Competition Commission of Mauritius, 2012Guest Scholar, Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics, University of Amsterdam,

Fall 2008ENCORE Fellow, University of Amsterdam, 2003-09Fellow, Center for Business and Government, Kennedy School, Harvard, Summer 2000Founder and Co-Director, GWU Research Program on Industry Economics and Policy,

1996-2001 Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution, 1995Special Assistant to the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications

Commission, 1987-88Economist, Economic Policy Office, Department of Justice Antitrust Division, 1985Economist, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 1975-81Economic Policy Fellow, Brookings Institution, 1975-76

1


Previous Professional Positions:General Editor, Review of Industrial Organization, 2001-04Vice President, Southern Economic Association, 2000-02Senior Research Scholar, American Antitrust Institute, 2000Associate Editor, Journal of Industrial Economics, 1990-95, 1998-2001Editorial Board, Review of Industrial Organization, 1983-2001President, Industrial Organization Society, 1998-99 Board of Editors, Journal of Media Economics: 1987-96 Advisory Board, Antitrust Law and Economics Review: 1985-90

Education:Ph.D. in Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 1972A.B. in Economics, cum laude, Brown University, 1967Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1963 (transferred)

Books:Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Retrospective Analysis of U.S. Policy, MIT

Press, 2015

The Antitrust Revolution, co-edited with Lawrence J. White: 6th ed., Oxford University Press, 2014 5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2009

Translated into Chinese by Ping Lin and X. H. Zang, Economic Science Press ofChina, Beijing (2008)

4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2004Translated into Chinese by Ping Lin and X. H. Zang, Economic Science Press of

China, Beijing (2008) 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 1999 2nd ed., HarperCollins, 1994 1st ed., Scott, Foresman, 1989.

Power Structure: Ownership, Integration, and Competition in the U.S. ElectricityIndustry, Kluwer, 1996.

Articles:“From the Fringe to the Forefront: Low-Cost Carriers and Airline Price Determination,”

with K. Hearle and P. Alepin, Review of Industrial Organization, forthcoming.

“The Changing Nature of Efficiencies in Mergers and in Merger Analysis,” AntitrustBulletin, September 2015.

“Predicting Merger Outcomes: The Accuracy of Stock Market Event Studies, MarketStructure Characteristics, and Agency Decisions,” with C. Gu, Journal of Law & Economics,

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August 2015.

“Structure, Conduct, Policy, and Performance: The ‘Simple Model’ of F. M. Scherer,”Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, March 2014.

“Rockonomics: The Ticketmaster-Live Nation Merger and the Rock Concert Business,”in The Antitrust Revolution, J. Kwoka and L. White, eds., 2014

“Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions and MergerOutcomes,” Antitrust Law Journal, v. 78, n. 3, 2013.

“Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement,”with Diana Moss, Antitrust Bulletin, December 2012

“Mergers That Eliminate Potential Competition,” Research Handbook on the Economicsof Antitrust Laws, Einer Elhauge, ed., Edward Elgar, 2012.

“Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of the Antitrust and Regulatory Update,” Reviewof Industrial Organization, December 2011

“The Cost Structure of Regional Transmission Organizations,” with Daniel Greenfield,Energy Journal, v. 32, n., 2011.

“Price Spikes in Energy Markets: ‘Business by Usual Methods’ or StrategicWithholding?” with Vladlena Sabodash, Review of Industrial Organization, May 2011.

“The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: Evidence from an AirlineMerger,” with Evgenia Shumilkina, Journal of Industrial Economics, December 2010.

“Incentive Regulation, Service Quality and Standards in U.S. Electricity Distribution,”with Anna Ter-Martiroysan, Journal of Regulatory Economics, December 2010.

“Do Mergers Improve Efficiency? Evidence from Restructuring the U,S. Electric PowerSector,” with Michael Pollitt, International Journal of Industrial Organization, November 2010.

“Divestiture Policy and Operating Efficiency in U.S. Electric Power Distribution,” withMichael Pollitt and Sanem Sergici, Journal of Regulatory Economics, June 2010.

“Competition Policy and the Transition to a Low-Carbon, Efficient Electricity Industry,”with Diana Moss, Electricity Journal, August-September 2010.

“The U.S. Auto Industry Under Duress: Fit, or Finished?” Competition PolicyInternational, Autumn 2009.

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“Restructuring the U.S. Electric Power Sector: A Review of Recent Studies,” Review ofIndustrial Organization, May 2008.

“Eliminating Potential Competition,” Issues in Competition Law and Policy, DaleCollins, ed., American Bar Association, 2008.

“The Proposed Merger of United Airlines and US Airways,” in A Revolucao doAntitruste no Brasil, Cesar Mattos, ed., Sao Paolo, Editora Singular, 2nd ed., 2008.

“Making Markets Work,” with Kamen Madjarov, Electricity Journal, November 2007.

“F.M. Scherer,” in Pioneers of Industrial Organization, W.G. Shepherd and H. W. deJong, eds., Edward Elgar, 2007.

“The Role of Competition in Natural Monopoly: Costs, Public Ownership, andRegulation,” Review of Industrial Organization, August-September 2006.

“Electric Power Distribution: Economies of Scale, Mergers, and Restructuring,” AppliedEconomics, Nov. 2005.

“The FTC and the Professions: A Quarter Century of Accomplishment and Some NewChallenges,” Antitrust Law Journal, 2005.

“Networks and Natural Monopoly,” in Network Access, Regulation, and Antitrust, DianaMoss, ed., Routledge, 2005.

“Freight Railroads,” with L. J. White, in Network Access, Regulation, and Antitrust,Diana Moss, ed., Routledge, 2005.

“The Comparative Advantage of Public Ownership: Evidence from U.S. ElectricUtilities,” Canadian Journal of Economics, May 2005.

“Dynamic Adjustment in the U.S. Higher Education Industry,” with Christopher Snyder, Review of Industrial Organization, May 2004.

“A Study in Merger Enforcement Transparency: The FTC’s Cruise Merger Decision andthe Presumption Governing High Concentration Mergers,” with Warren Grimes, web publishedat www.antitrustsource.com, May 2003.

"The U.S. Automobile Industry: Overtaking an Oligopoly," in Industry Studies, LarryDuetsch, ed., Prentice-Hall, 3rd ed., 2002; 2nd ed., 1998; 1st ed.,1993

“Twenty-five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric Power,” Loyola UniversityChicago Law Journal, Summer 2002.

4


“Governance Alternatives and Pricing in the U.S. Electric Power Industry,” Journal ofLaw, Economics, & Organization, April 2002.

“Vertical Economies in Electric Power: Evidence on Integration and Its Alternatives,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, May 2002

“Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and ProspectiveCompetitors,” Case Western Reserve Law Review, Fall 2001.

“Automobiles: The Old Economy Meets the New,” Review of Industrial Organization,August 2001.

“The New Industrial Organization and Small Business,” with L. J. White, Small BusinessEconomics, February 2001.

"Commitment to Competition: An Assessment of Antitrust Enforcement Budgets," IOSPresidential Address, Review of Industrial Organization, June 1999.

"Manifest Destiny? The Union Pacific-Southern Pacific Railroad Merger," in TheAntitrust Revolution, with L. J. White, 4th ed., 2004; 3rd ed., 1999.

"Herfindahl Concentration with an Import Fringe and with Supply Constraints," Reviewof Industrial Organization, August 1998.

"Transforming Power: Lessons from British Electricity Restructuring," Regulation,Summer 1997

"The Price Effects of Bidding Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction'Knockouts'," Antitrust Bulletin, Summer 1997.

"Altering the Product Life Cycle of Consumer Durables: The Case of Minivans,"Managerial and Decision Economics, January/February 1996.

"The Sales and Competitive Effects of Styling and Advertising Practices in the U.S.Automobile Industry," Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1993.

"Implementing Price Caps in Telecommunications," Journal of Policy Analysis andManagement, Fall 1993.

"Regulation and Deregulation American Style," Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Fall 1993

"The Effects of Divestiture, Privatization, and Competition on Productivity in U.S. andU.K. Telecommunications," Review of Industrial Organization, no. 1, 1993

5


"The Effects of Divestiture, Privatization, and Competition on Productivity in U.S. andU.K. Telecommunications: A Briefer Reply," in Review of Industrial Organization, 1993.

"Market Segmentation by Price/Quality Schedules: Some Evidence from Automobiles,"Journal of Business, October 1992.

"The Output and Profit Effects of Horizontal Joint Ventures," Journal of IndustrialEconomics, September 1992.

"The American Antitrust Revolution," Consumer Policy Review, July 1992.

"Price Squeezes in Electric Power: The New Battle of Concord," Electricity Journal, June1992.

"Productivity and Price Caps in Telecommunications," in Price Caps and IncentiveRegulation in Telecommunications, M. Einhorn, ed., Kluwer, 1991.

"Price Cap Reform in Telecommunications: A Penny Saved..." Regulation, Winter 1991.

"The Effect of Market Growth and Contraction on Industry Price-Cost Margins," EasternEconomic Journal, July-September 1990.

"The Private Profitability of Horizontal Mergers with Non-Cournot and MaverickBehavior," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Fall 1989.

"International Joint Venture: General Motors and Toyota," in The Antitrust Revolution,J. Kwoka and L.J. White, eds. Scott, Foresman, 1989; 2nd ed., HarperCollins, 1994.

"Design Criteria for Incentive Regulation," in Report of D.C. Public Service Commissionon Symposium, "Competition and the Regulation of Telecommunications Services in the Districtof Columbia," December 1988.

"Accounting for Losses: The Great Detroit Newspaper War," Journal of MediaEconomics, Fall 1988.

"Cooperation vs. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business," with DavidRavenscraft, Economica, August 1986.

"Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis," withFrederick R. Warren-Boulton, Antitrust Bulletin, Summer 1986.

"Messy Merger Guidelines: A Comment," Antitrust Law and Economics Review, 1986(No 2).

6


"The Herfindahl Index in Theory and Practice," Antitrust Bulletin, Winter 1985.

"Markets: A Magical Mystery Tour of Current Policy," Society, November/December1984; reprinted in Thomas Swartz and Frank Bonello, Taking Sides (Duskin, 1986).

"Market Power and Market Change in the U.S. Automobile Industry," Journal ofIndustrial Economics, June 1984.

"Market Share Distribution and Industry Performance: A Reply," Review of Economicsand Statistics, May 1984.

"Output and Allocative Efficiency Under Second-Degree Price Discrimination,"Economic Inquiry, April 1984.

"Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services," American EconomicReview, March 1984.

"The Limits of Market-Oriented Regulatory Techniques: The Case of Automotive FuelEconomy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1983.

"Self-Regulation in Optometry: The Impact on Price and Quality," with R. Bond, J.Phelan, and I. Whitten, Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 7, Nos. 2/3, 1983.

"Monopoly, Plant, and Union Effects on Manufacturing Wages," Industrial and LaborRelations Review, January 1983.

, reprinted (in Spanish) in El Mercado de Trabajo y la Estructura Salarial, Centro dePublicaciones, Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Madrid, 1988.

"Regularity and Diversity of Firm Size Distributions in U.S. Industries," Journal ofEconomics and Business, October 1982.

"Does the Choice of Concentration Measure Really Matter?" Journal of IndustrialEconomics, June 1981.

Effect of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: TheCase of Optometry, with R. Bond, J. Phelan, and I. Whitten, FTC Staff Report, September 1980.

"Establishment Size, Wages, and Job Satisfaction: The Trade-offs," in The Economics ofFirm Size, Market Structure and Social Performance, Conference Proceedings, Federal TradeCommission, July 1980.

"EIS Market Share Data: Nature, Reliability, and Uses," Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 47,No. 3, 1979.

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"The Effect of Market Share Distribution on Industry Performance," Review ofEconomics and Statistics, February 1979.

, excerpt in Donald Watson and Malcolm Getz, Price Theory in Action,(Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

Market Shares, Concentration, and Competition in Manufacturing Industries. FTC StaffReport, August 1978.

"Regional Distribution of the 'Subsidy' Under Federal Milk Market Regulation," in FarmSize and Regional Distribution of the Benefit Under Federal Milk Market Regulation. FTC StaffReport by David R. Fronk, May 1978.

"Pricing Under Federal Milk Market Regulation," Economic Inquiry, July 1977.

"Large Firm Dominance and Price-Cost Margins in Manufacturing Industries," SouthernEconomic Journal, July 1977.

"The Organization of Work: A Conceptual Framework," Social Science Quarterly,December 1976.

"Federal Milk Market Regulation: The Multiple Pricing System," Proceedings,Conference on Milk Prices and the Market System, Community Nutrition Institute, Washington,D.C., January 1976.

"Optimal Policy When Effects on Distribution are Unknown," with James C. Ohls, PublicFinance Quarterly, April 1975.

Book Reviews:Economics of Beer, edited by Johan Swinnen, Journal of Wine Economics, 2013.

Mergers and Productivity, edited by Steven Kaplan, in the Journal of EconomicLiterature, June 2002.

Costs and Productivity in Automobile Production: The Challenge of Japanese Efficiencyby Melvyn Fuss and Leonard Waverman, in Review of Industrial Organization, June 1994.

The Economics and Regulation of United States Newspapers by Stephen Lacy and ToddSimon, in Journal of Media Economics, no. 1, 1994.

Profits and the Stability of Monopoly by M. A. Utton, in The Antitrust Bulletin, Summer1987.

The Japanese Automobile Industry by Michael Cusumano, in Journal of Economic

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History, June 1987.

Industrial Organization by Kenneth Clarkson and Roger Miller, in Antitrust Law andEconomics Review, 1985 (No. 3).

Power and Market: Government and Economy by Murray Rothbard, in SouthernEconomic Journal, October 1978.

Monographs:“The Direct Costs and Benefits of US Electric Utility Divestitures,” with T. Triebs and

M. Pollitt, EPRG Working Paper 1024, Cambridge University, Sept. 2010.

“The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: Evidence from an AirlineMerger,” with Evgenia Shumilkina, SSRN:http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id 1275841

“Investment Adequacy Under Incentive Regulation,” Northeastern University Departmentof Economics Working Paper 09-001

“Industry Restructuring, Mergers, and Efficiency: Evidence from Electric Power,” withM. Pollitt, Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 07-001

“Restructuring the U.S. Electric Power Sector: A Review of Recent Studies,”Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 06-005

“The Role of Competition in Natural Monopoly Industries: Costs, Public Ownership, andRegulation,” Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 06-001, January2006

“Eliminating Potential Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and ProspectiveCompetitors,” Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 05-007, June2005

“The Federal Trade Commission and the Professions: A Quarter Century ofAccomplishments and Some New Challenges,” American Antitrust Institute Working Paper 04-04, October 2004

“Electric Power Distribution: Economies of Scale, Mergers, and Restructuring,”Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 04-005, Sept. 2004

“The Attack on Antitrust Policy and Consumer Welfare: A Response to Crandall andWinston,” Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 03-008, June 2003

9


“Dynamic Adjustment in the Higher Education Industry, 1955-1997,” with ChristopherSnyder, Northeastern University Department of Economics Working Paper 03-007, May 2003

“Unilateral Withholding: Market Power and California’s Electricity Crisis,” GWU Centerfor Economic Research Discussion Paper 01-01, May 2001

“Price Caps for Postal Service: Some Lessons and Some Limits,” GWU Center forEconomic Research Discussion Paper 00-03, April 2000

“The Industrial Organization and Small Business,” with L. White, GWU Center forEconomic Research Discussion Paper 00-02, March 2000

"Reform of the Electric Power Sector in Britain," GWU Center for Economic ResearchDiscussion Paper 96-02, December 1996.

"The Origins and Purpose of Public Enterprise," GWU Center for Economic ResearchDiscussion Paper 96-01, December 1996

"Privatization, Deregulation, and Competition: A Survey of Effects on EconomicPerformance," World Bank PSD Occasional Paper No. 27, September 1996.

"Vertical Integration and Its Alternatives for Achieving Cost Efficiencies in ElectricPower," GWU Department of Economics Discussion Paper D-9601, March 1996.

"The Price Effects of Buying Rings: Evidence from 'Knockouts' in Real EstateAuctions," GWU Department of Economics Discussion Paper D-9503, March 1995.

"Public vs. Private Ownership and Economic Performance: Evidence from the U.S.Electric Power Industry," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper 1712,February 1995.

"Ownership, Competition, and Price Performance of Electric Utilities," GWUDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper D-9408, October 1994.

"Lengthening and Strengthening the Product Life Cycle: The Case of Minivans," GWUDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper D-9212, November 1992.

"The Sales and Competitive Effects of Styling and Advertising Practices in the U.S.Automobile Industry," GWU Department of Economics Discussion Paper D-9109, March 1991.

"Policy and Productivity in the U.S. and U.K. Telecommunications Industries," GWUDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper D-9004, April 1990.

"Regulation American-Style: Heavy-Handed, Light-Handed, and (Sometimes) Off-

10


Handed," March 1990.

"Unleashing Market Forces: Lessons from Deregulation of U.S. Industry," February1990.

"Accounting for Losses: The Great Detroit Newspaper War," GWU Department ofEconomics Discussion Paper D-8809, February 1988.

"Antitrust Policy and Foreign Competition," GWU Department of Economics DiscussionPaper D-8711, November 1984.

"Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis," with F.Warren-Boulton, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Discussion Paper EAG 86-14.

"Market Segmentation by Product Quality: Some Evidence from Automobiles," GWUDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper D-8603, May 1986.

"Industrial Contraction and Sunk Costs as Constraints on Concentration," GWUDepartment of Economics Discussion Paper D-8502, June 1985.

"Market Power from Horizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures," GWU Department ofEconomics Discussion Paper D-8413, January 1985.

"Cooperation vs. Rivalry: Price-Cost Margins by Line of Business," with D. Ravenscraft,Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 127, June 1985.

"More on Market Share Distribution and Industry Performance," GWU Department ofEconomics Discussion Paper D-8210, September 1982.

"Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services," GWU Department ofEconomics Discussion Paper D-8209, September 1982.

"Behavior of an Auto Firm Under the Fuel Economy Constraint," FTC Bureau ofEconomics Working Paper No. 28, June 1980.

"Output Under Second-Degree Price Discrimination," FTC Bureau of EconomicsWorking Paper No. 21, October 1979.

"Does the Choice of Concentration Ratio Really Matter?" FTC Bureau of EconomicsWorking Paper No. 17, October 1979.

"The Diversity of Firm Size Distributions in Manufacturing Industries," FTC Bureau ofEconomics Working Paper No. 12, February 1978.

11


"The Effects of Market Shares and Share Distribution on Industry Performance," FTCBureau of Economics Working Paper No. 2, March 1977.

Other:AAI Award for Best Antitrust Book of the Year, 2016

Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship, 2014

ABA Antitrust Section Economics Grant Program recipient, 2012-13

Distinguished Service Award, Industrial Organization Society, 2012

Principle organizer and Chair of Local Organizing Committee, International IndustrialOrganization Conferences, Northeastern University, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015

Award for Meritorious Service, Federal Trade Commission, 1980

"Antitrust Analysis and the 'Cooperative Core': It's the First Two Market Shares ThatCount," interview by Charles Mueller, Antitrust Law and Economic Review, 1983 (No. 4) and1984 (No. 1).

Numerous interviews, quotations, and references in business and popular press.

Appearances before congressional and state legislative bodies.

Pro bono work on antitrust and regulatory matters.

Membership in: American Bar Association Antitrust SectionAmerican Economic AssociationEuropean Association for Research in Industrial EconomicsIndustrial Organization SocietyInternational Competition NetworkSouthern Economic Association

March 2016

12



VERIFICATION


I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the

foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on June ?j 2016

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