Reconstructing Education

Reconstructing education

Teacher education and supply in post -Apartheid South Africa by Devi Pillay

Introduction

After much debate and pressure from various stakeholders in education, the South

African government has recently revealed tentative plans to reopen teacher training

colleges in the next few years, institutions that were closed down during the 1990s.

Why were these institutions closed in the first place, and why does the government

feel the need to reverse its decisions? This paper will address both of those

questions.

This paper addresses the reconstruction of teacher education by the post-Apartheid

ANC government in the latter years of the 90’s. The term “teacher education” will be

used throughout this paper to refer to the process of training teachers for the

primary and secondary school systems. This paper specifically looks at the decision to

close down all existing teacher training colleges and/or integrate them into existing

tertiary institutions such as universities and technikons.

This paper will cover the context of education in South Africa and the Apartheid

legacy. It will then go on to analyse what was problematic about the teacher

education system, how the government dealt with that and the resulting policy. This

paper will then look at the consequences of that policy and on higher education and

on society as a whole. Lastly, this paper will situate and analyse the decision and its

fallout in terms of a model of policy making in South Africa.

Why is it important to address teacher education and provision?

Teacher education is specifically important within the context of post-Apartheid

South Africa. Education was and is central to the African National Congress’s (ANC’s)

mandate as a vehicle for change and as a basic right; having enough teachers who

are able to teach is central to fulfilling such policy. Furthermore, teaching as a

profession has a unique place within the South African social context that makes this

system particularly important to address.

In 1994, the ANC took over an education system that was fragmented, unwieldy, and

still bore the legacy of the Apartheid regime. Above all else, the system represented

the geopolitical imagination of Apartheid. The South African education system has

always been racially segregated and unequal. This was entrenched by the institution

of Apartheid from 1948 onwards. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 racially (and often

tribally) segregated all schools with the express intention of delivering low-quality

education for non-whites in order to subjugate and entrench white authority, as

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Devi Pillay: Reconstructing Education

well as to direct non-whites into skills and jobs that were needed but not wanted by

white people. Most non-white people, if they did have access to education, did not

have access to or fulfil the criteria to enter tertiary education.

The country was semi-federal in nature, with a national government overseeing

provincial government. Separate areas known as “Bantustans” or “Homelands” had

been set up as supposedly autonomous, independent tribal homelands, although

that was far from the truth. These homelands were supposedly self-governed, but

kept under the thumb of the Apartheid government. They were used to separate and

isolate different African ethnicities, and the structures and systems of government in

those homelands were weak, under-resourced and corrupt.

The ANC government at this time has just come out of an oppressive regime and thus

all policy making is highly politicised. The field of education in particular was a matter

of national political concern. Education was a tool used by the Apartheid government

to oppress and subjugate non-whites; consequentially, poor and unequal education

was often a catalyst for change during the struggle years (e.g. Soweto uprising of

1976, various student movements) and has never been far from the discourse of

democratic reconstruction.

Since its coming to power, the ANC government has had a direct mandate to ensure

equitable, quality education as promised in the 1996 constitution, directly in their

election platform, and their own repeated emphasis on education as the major

means of reconstructing social structures based on inequality.

An adequate supply of good teachers is necessary for any education system to fulfil

its task; the role of the educator, especially within a third world economy and within

a school system often severely lacking in resources, cannot be overstated. Not only

to teachers provide knowledge and education – opportunities for advancement and

success – but they are often community figures and play important roles in the lives

of children who often have no support structures at home. In order for the ANC to

create a fair and equal society, its education system must be functioning.

Simply put, South Africa needs capable teachers.

In order to analyse teacher supply in reconstruction, we first need to understand the

system under Apartheid.

The teacher education system by 1994

Gordon explains the system of teacher education (2009, p. 11):

“By the end of the apartheid era, there were 19 different departments responsible

for teacher education in South Africa. Thirty-six partially autonomous universities

and technikons provided teacher education. They were structured along racial

and ethnic lines, and were administered by various national and provincial

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authorities: White teacher education was in provincial hands (i.e. in the colleges)

for primary school teacher training, and in the hands of the universities and

technikons for high school teacher training. Teacher education for coloureds and

Indians was left to coloured and Indian colleges of education for primary school

teachers, to the University of the Western Cape for coloured high school teachers,

and to the University of Durban-Westville for Indian high school teachers. The

training of African teachers was more complex because of the emergence of the

Bantustans. Colleges overseen by the Department of Education and Training

(DET) and Bantustan departments of education were responsible for training

African primary school teachers. Many teacher education colleges were

established in the Bantustans – a total of about 120 by 1994. African secondary

school teachers were mainly trained in the Bantustan-based universities.”

There were thus many, widely varying institutions that trained teachers. Different

homeland governments and different national and provincial departments were

responsible for different institutions. Most primary school teachers training was done

through specifically dedicated colleges spread across the country; these also catered

for secondary school teachers, but they were mostly trained via bigger universities

and technikons.

A teaching degree from a teachers college took between one and two years to

complete. Teacher education colleges were directed mainly at training primary

school teachers, with an emphasis on method, contact learning and transmission of

information. Teaching was considered a vocation, not an academic discipline. It was,

in many circumstances, seen as part of secondary education, not tertiary education,

and because most of teacher training colleges were in rural areas and had low

entrance requirements, they were often the only available form of higher education

for black South Africans.

The colleges were incredibly expensive to the state because they were often small,

isolated, had low enrolments and had low pupil-teacher ratios. Colleges did not

charge high fees as their students could not afford these. In 2000, “the cost to the

state of funding a teacher education student through a university or technikon was

R10 000 (albeit with high costs being incurred by individual students); by comparison,

the cost to the state of funding such a student in a college of education was R40 000

(though with low if not negligible costs for individual students).” (The Departments of

Basic Education and Higher Education and Training, 2011, p. 22)

There was little cohesion between colleges, information systems were often non-

existent and the system was unmanageable. The uneasy place of teacher education

colleges as between secondary and tertiary education, and the confusion over

responsibility between national and provincial departments, made the system

unwieldy and difficult to coordinate. (The Departments of Basic Education and Higher

Education and Training, 2011). Problems of policy implementation, control and

accountability compounded confusion and ineffective governance.

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The system was also incredibly uneven – though some were performing excellently

and producing good teachers, most were badly underperforming, with some teaching

little more than the matric (final year of high school) syllabus. (Chisholm, 2010, p. 18)

(Gordon, 2009, p. 17). Many teachers were produced, but they were often poorly

trained and ill-equipped to deliver.

About two thirds of the colleges were in rural areas and the large majority catered to

black students (Chisholm, 2009, p. 10). Most poorly performing training colleges

were black dominated rural schools. Popular perception of these training colleges

were that they were lesser, low-quality, and used by the Apartheid government to

prevent non-whites gaining real tertiary education. Geopolitically and socially, the

colleges were remnants of an oppressive system and often reinforced the

synonymous divides between white and non-white and high- and low-quality.

The policy process

It was clear that the system needed radical attention. The South African Department

of Education (DoE) underwent a series of steps that resulted in the closure and/or

integration of all colleges.

A brief timeline of policy making

The National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI), while negotiations were taking place

between the Apartheid government, the ANC, and other actors to establish

democratic rule and a new constitution in 1990-1992, embarked on a project of

national policy debate that involved almost all stakeholders, working groups and

various civic representatives and organisations. They critically analysed available

policy options and did not recommend closing the colleges, as this would be a waste

of existing resources (Gordon, 2009, p. 14). They did recognise the deeply

problematic nature of the system and identified three possible models: regional

clusters of colleges; an Institute of Education; or an Education Development Centre.

The Centre for Education Policy Development was established in 1993 to develop

education policy, and acknowledged the need for long term, systemic change but

also the need for some immediate redress (The Departments of Basic Education and

Higher Education and Training, 2011, p. 20).

The NEPI report was used as the basis of the ANC’s Policy Framework for Education

and Training (1994, known as “The Yellow Book”), which declared the need to

restructure the entire system. It proposed centralisation, with the national

government responsible for high education. Teacher education should ensure “unity

of purpose and standards across the sector” (The Departments of Basic Education

and Higher Education and Training, 2011, p. 19). At this point the emphasis was on

regaining control and regulation of the system, and to defragment and centralise

teacher education, not on closing the colleges.

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The first White Paper on Education and Training (1995, the “Teachers Audit”)

problematized the system: high costs, fragmentation, lack of collaboration,

inadequate governance and administrative systems, the poor quality of teaching and

learning, and low output rates. Furthermore, despite some centres of excellence, the

Teachers Audit characterised most institutions as poorly performing, often

duplicitous, and excessive relative to South Africa’s needs.

With aims to achieve “higher quality, greater integration, less duplication, better

planning and more accountability” (The Departments of Basic Education and Higher

Education and Training, 2011), the government began a process of rationalisation for

teacher training colleges.

The process was set in motion by the 1998 report The Incorporation of Colleges of

Education into the Higher Education Sector: A Framework for Implementation.

Provinces began to respond: colleges were closed, funding and bursaries withdrawn,

and colleges began to be integrated into larger universities and technikons. This

policy allowed for teacher education colleges to remain autonomous if they met

certain standards and had a minimum of 2000 full time students. It became readily

apparent that no college would be able to meet these criteria, and further problems,

such as dropping enrolment and competition from the private sector, exposed

administrative and management weaknesses that decreased the viability of these

institutions.

By 2001, the DoE was ready to announce that all teaching colleges had been

successfully incorporated into the higher education system. This meant that they

were all either absorbed into universities and technicians or closed down. Excess

staff and teachers were laid off, given severance packages, and relocated to

academia, departmental jobs and other places in the labour market. 120 teacher

training colleges had been merged into university departments and technikons, of

which there were only 21 by then (Jansen, 2004).

Goals of the DoE regarding teacher education

So what were the problems identified by the ANC government that lead to the

closing of teacher education colleges? They can be summarised under the headings

of cost, quality and coordination as identified by government documents (The

Departments of Basic Education and Higher Education and Training, 2011, pp. 18-23),

generally in agreement with the rest of the literature circa 2001. I will add the issue

of teacher supply and a final, overarching problem of equity and Apartheid legacy.

I. To save money and cut spending. Facing large inherited debts and an

inefficient system, emphasis was placed on lowering costs and increasing

efficiency. Cost is the most frequently cited and heavily stressed factor in the

decision to close down the colleges: they were simply inefficient.

II. To increase the quality of teacher education. Low quality graduates were

seen as a fault of the system and not as individual colleges performing

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poorly. It was believed that universities and technikons – as academic

institutions – would turn out better, more professional teachers. The DoE

also believed teacher education needed to be redirected away from

vocational training and towards subject and theoretical expertise.

III. To increase coordination, control and cohesion. The teacher education

colleges were poorly run, both internally and qua the management role of

the proveniences/homelands/state. There was confusion and ambiguity

regarding government’s role and responsibility, and there was virtually no

coordination or cohesion within the system. This made it very difficult to

manage and fix, especially because information systems and data were often

non-existent.

IV. To ensure that teacher supply was matched to demand. Teacher supply per

se was not a concern for the ANC government. Working with predictions that

school enrolments would not experience a boom, as in other democratised

African countries, redistribution of teachers from over-supplied (urban,

white) areas to under-supplied (rural, black) areas took priority over the

production of more teachers. In fact, it was assumed that teacher training

colleges were producing too many teachers (Chisholm, 2009). Furthermore, it

was accepted that there was an oversupply of primary school teachers

(mostly taught in teacher education colleges) relative to secondary school

teachers (who were trained in tertiary institutions.) Thus teacher training

colleges were not providing the teachers needed by the system.

V. To increase equality in the higher education system and eradicate remnants

of the oppressive education structure of Apartheid. The persistent images

that teacher training colleges were poorly performing black institutions

producing poorly performing black teachers, and vice versa for universities,

was seen as damaging and oppressive. Furthermore, the spread and make-up

of the system was seen to reflect the geopolitical imagination of the

Apartheid government. It was a priority of government that a) this inequality

was addressed and b) that more black and rural people were given access to

universities and not funnelled into weak colleges.

The system was simply seen as an inefficient one. The teacher education colleges

were not producing the teachers needed by the DoE.

The drive to incorporate teaching colleges into universities and technikons was

meant to reduce excessive costs and inefficiency, by ingraining small, isolated,

expensive colleges into larger institutions which were more efficient. This was also

supposed to increase coordination by reducing the number of institutions and

putting them under the umbrella control of the national government. This

coordination and control, in turn, was supposed to increase quality as well ensure

that the kind of teachers needed (secondary school, maths and science, etc.) were

produced. Lastly, this was an attempt to rewrite the legacy of Apartheid in the

tertiary education system, and get rid of ‘second class black institutions’ by

professionalising and privileging education as an academic discipline.

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Evaluation

How did the policy play out?

It is important to note that this policy was implemented in tandem with a) the

general restructuring of higher education and b) efforts to rationalise and redeploy

“excess” teachers to undersupplied regions.

Costs

Money is saved as there are far fewer institutions with far higher student-teacher

ratios. However, the process of incorporating colleges into the higher education

system was difficult and costly. Most training colleges and buildings were reused as

other educational facilities such as secondary schools to avoid wasting resources;

nevertheless, a large amount of instructors and staff had been retrenched and a lot

of institutional knowledge was lost. Costs to individual students in universities are

significantly higher than teacher training college fees and living expenses;

nevertheless, the new system is much less of a drain on the national budget.

Quality

Very poorly performing colleges were shut down. However, consistently good

institutions were also lost. The shift to universities has not made any great impact on

the quality of teaching in South Africa. Bloch says, “The move has not in itself raised

the professional capabilities of teachers. If it has led to new and expansive teacher

training strategies, this has not been introduced by government or teacher training

institutions themselves” (2009, p. 101). On average, South Africa has not seen a great

rise in the quality of teachers produced, although the level is more even. There are

far less teachers of incredibly poor quality being produced, but teacher training in

universities has not changed much or improved. This is despite the conviction of the

DoE that universities, as academic institutions, were far superior in quality and

output.

Teacher education at universities rather than colleges has been criticised. Among the

criticisms is that universities do not prepare students well for practical situations

(controlling large classes, for example). The 2006 report of the Ministerial

Committee on Teacher Education on a National Framework for Teacher Education in

South Africa also acknowledges that the capacity of the system to train primary

school teachers has been harmed. (Chisholm, 2009, pp. 24, 31)

Coordination

Teacher education had shifted from a fragmented, uncoordinated, inefficient system

into a centralised system of fewer, larger, multi-disciplinary higher education

institutions. The 1996 constitution and further legislation placed control over tertiary

education in the hands of the national government, resolving for the first time the

ambivalence around who was responsible for teacher education provision (Pratt,

2001, p. 9).

At the same time, higher education was undergoing restructuring of its own and

these universities and technikons gained more independence than previously. They

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were no longer micromanaged by provincial governments. They were under the

general eye of the national DoE which created norms and standards and general

policy, but did not manage the implementation of its plans.

Some of the fallout of the increased autonomy to universities was that education

faculties kept running ‘business as usual’ (The Departments of Basic Education and

Higher Education and Training, 2011, pp. 21-22). This meant that secondary

education was catered for to the detriment of primary education. It meant that very

often institutions simply ignored national norms and standards and set independent

curricula. Given their poor financial situation, education departments often opted to

offer lucrative short-term “upgrading” programmes at the expensive of teacher

education in the areas most needed. This means that teacher training within

universities has not changed much, despite the DoE’s efforts to coordinate and run

the system, and sometimes did not provide the programmes and thus teachers that

were needed.

This problem persists well into today, with the national government taking policy

charge of higher institution, but divorcing itself of management of implementation

responsibilities. The system itself is less fragmented and confusing, but the

institutions themselves are more autonomous – in a way, the system is more

decentralised (Sayed, 2004).

The restructuring of universities and technikons themselves, in related policy

decisions, left education departments at a disadvantage relative to other disciplines.

They were fiscally at a disadvantage, and were low in order of priority within higher

education institutions. Compounding this, “funding did not follow function” (The

Departments of Basic Education and Higher Education and Training, 2011, pp. 21-22).

The budget for these education faculties was substantially less than had been

expected and often did not go to where it needed to be. Higher education

institutions had little more money to fulfil their new obligations and extended

functions. As a result, the costs of studying education became much higher, and the

integration process was far less effective given the lack of funds. This policy set up

weak education faculties and departments.

Teacher supply and access to education

Enrolment in teacher education drastically decreased from 71 000 (or 80 000) in 1994

to 15 000 in 2000 (Gordon, 2009, p. 21). Fewer institutions were offering teacher

education and barriers to entry were much higher. Attempts to increase equality in

higher education by government, such as enforcing stringent quotas, also decreased

enrolment (Chisholm, 2010, p. 16). This meant that white students were less able to

study education while black students often did not enrol or dropped out. Older, more

experienced white teachers took the retrenchment packages offered by the

redeployment scheme and further weakened teacher supply (Bloch, 2009, p. 101).

Crucially, the absorption of these colleges into universities did not take into account

what was the only universally agreed upon strength of the teacher education system:

its far reach and spatial spread.

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Centralised university education became too expensive for students, especially when

combined with transportation and living costs in urban environments. They are

concentrated in urban areas, which are difficult to get to from rural areas which are

far away and lack decent, affordable public transport. They are certainly not

compatible with the reality that many youths also need to earn and support their

families.

Lastly, the shift to university education changes the curriculum, putting the emphasis

on theory and academics rather than straight-up teacher training. Many South

Africans, socioeconomically disadvantaged, coming out of a poor schooling system,

and without educational resources, have neither the marks to get into these

universities nor the ability to cope with that curriculum – even if they would have

made decent teachers. This decreases enrolment and increases the dropout rate.

By closing down local, rural colleges, even if they were remote and inefficient, the

DoE drastically decreased access to teacher training – which was, for many, the only

vehicle available to higher education. Teacher training and, for many, higher

education has become far less accessible (Paterson & Arends, 2009) (Chisholm,

2009).

Teacher attrition is stable at 5-6% per year – far higher than the rate at which

graduates are entering the school system (The Departments of Basic Education and

Higher Education and Training, 2011, p. 31). Only around a third of the teachers the

system needs to be producing per year (20 000) are being produced (Chisholm, 2009,

p. 23).

Social implications

This decision didn’t take the unique position of teacher training colleges in rural

communities into account. Because teacher training colleges were often the only way

to gain qualifications for rural non-whites, they were popular and respected

institutions which were embedded in communities (Sayed, 2004, p. 248). Teachers

had special status as the highest educated persons in many small towns and villages,

and teaching often was a de facto way of accessing other qualifications and jobs

(Pratt, 2001, p. 3).

Now, as a result, many youths in rural areas are cut off both from teacher training

and from any chance to gain higher qualifications. The deeper implications of this are

that those rural areas are left without the important teacher figure that used to be

cornerstones of those communities. Furthermore, those rural areas are left without

teachers. Enrolment in teacher education across the country dropped. It dropped

most drastically in those provinces that did not have enough teachers to begin with.

Local supply is incredibly important to recruit and retain teachers for rural areas

(Paterson & Arends, 2009, pp. 101-103).Forcing teachers to teach in public schools in

rural areas in exchange for financial support in their studies (a measure that has been

tried in order to deal with scarcity in these areas) tends not to work as teachers will

leave as soon as the required time is over: there is lack of dedication, continuity and

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investment. Those that are willing to staff rural schools tend to be those that are now

disenfranchised from the system and unable to study teaching.

In essence, the problem had shifted from too many (under qualified) teachers in the

wrong places to not enough teachers, especially where they are needed the most.

Effectiveness

In summary:

The system is less expensive.

Extremely poor quality colleges closed; quality of present graduates not

significantly improved.

The system is definitely better coordinated and less ambiguous. Some

problem of confusion of responsibility and poor control remain.

The system is now not producing enough teachers to match demand.

The higher education system less racially segregated. Teacher training has

been elevated in status.

Access to teacher training and tertiary education as a whole is significantly

lower for poor, rural students.

Communities are left without significant teaching institutions and important

teacher figures.

Efficiency

This policy did address the major goals of the government at the time – costs, quality

and coordination. Even if these things are currently less than perfect, they have been

significantly improved. However, failure to recognise the unique social place of these

institutions led to the compounding of problems of teacher supply and education

provision. So even if this policy was effective – it did what it was meant to do – it was

not efficient.

The benefits are: costly, inefficient colleges of varying quality do not exist anymore,

coordination and cohesion has increased somewhat, and symbolically ‘second class

black education’ has been eradicated. However, the costs are much larger, and

continue to grow. Not enough teachers are graduating from the system to staff

schools. Teacher quality is not significantly higher. The government has recently had

to reintroduce bursaries and try to attract foreign teachers to staff schools; there is a

scramble to try to provide more, better teachers and the problem is only worsening.

This policy has exacerbated the problematic lack of teachers willing to teach in rural

areas. This is again contrary to the point of teacher education and supply. The system

is inefficient as it is not producing the teachers that are needed. It is important to

note that denying access to higher education for rural youths is again contrary to the

mandate of the DoE. It is counter-productive to its own goals (explicitly stated as

wanting to ensure equality in the system and remove the legacy of Apartheid), and

prevents the development of skills and socioeconomic capacity in communities that

need it most.

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The functionality of the system has been compromised. This policy has proved to be

very costly for education. The government now has to deal with a teacher education

system unable to support the school system, decreased access to education, and

various other problems described above – all long term problems requiring long

term, comprehensive solutions.

The policy process was a slow one, and the government certainly didn’t shut down all

training colleges off the bat. The initial plan was not to get rid of the training college

system, but as reconstruction continued, it became apparent that none of these

institutions were viable according to the DoE’s criteria. Many still protest at the

description of the “closure” of these colleges – they weren’t necessarily closed, they

were assimilated (Chisholm, 2010). The distinction is not important in considering the

consequences but it is important in considering the intentions of the government.

The DoE issued an ultimatum to teacher education colleges: if they wanted to be

autonomous, they had to be cost efficient, high quality and procure high enrolments.

What is important is that this integration policy operated as a blunt instrument,

intended increase efficiency of the system. Colleges were eliminated or assimilated

into the new system when they were inefficient, not developed and strengthened.

There were no incremental improvements, no mechanistic policies aimed at

improving these institutions, no cognisance of their role in the education system.

They were, in the government’s words, rationalised. This policy simply got rid of

institutions seen to be liabilities.

Additionally, and more importantly, it was a big blunt instrument. This restructuring

was a radical move that completely overhauled the system. The major implication of

this is that trial and error were not possible. Institutions and staff with knowledge,

experience, and community links were lost and restarting a system of teacher

training colleges, as is currently proposed, would involve huge costs. Where, for

example, would the DoE find enough teachers to staff these colleges? What will

happen to the institutions that now use those college facilities? The radical overhaul

of the system has essentially committed the DoE to a certain path with significant

problems and drawbacks. Deviating from the path to other alternatives is possible,

but incredibly difficult and costly.

This paper argues that the decision to close the teacher education colleges was not

cognisant of the needs of the system, nor the greater social function of those

colleges, and that this policy, in addition to other restructuring within tertiary

education, has greatly decreased enrolment in teacher education programs,

compounding teacher supply problems in South Africa.

Having enough competent teachers is an absolute necessity for transformation and

redress in South Africa. As a country with injustice and inequality entrenched in every

party of society, education is the only way to a) break the poverty cycle and provide

opportunities to the disadvantaged, b) to create long-term socioeconomic change

and c) to educate a new generation of citizens. This is especially important because

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those school pupils who feel abandoned and disenfranchised by the education

system are unlikely to become constructive and productive members of society;

instead, an angry country is likely to become even angrier.

How did this happen?

Conflicting mandates

After the realisation of democracy in 1994, the ANC government, as heroes,

liberators, and champions of democracy, was facing huge expectations, which often

conflicted. In education policy the government was supposed to improve efficiency,

to improve quality, to provide redress and justice, to foster unity (i.e. not frighten or

disenfranchise the white privileged minority while still redistributing privilege and

resources) and to ensure economic growth and development. The government was

in a tense position re: policy where any given choice was a trade-off, usually between

equity and redress, and socioeconomic stability, and highly constrained by

concessions made in the negotiation process with the Apartheid government.

This means that the government at the time had to be very careful about being

politically correct, and had to be seen to be making symbolic changes to the country.

Sometimes things like precise and mechanistic change (slow and incremental) were

traded off for broad policy moves: change for the sake of change. This is what

happened here.

Lack of experience, expertise and operational space. It needs to be noted that the

ANC had no governing experience or capacity to speak of. As a liberation movement,

the ANC was inheriting a system created to entrench systemic inequality and

injustice. When they came to power in 1994 they had to dismantle structural

inequality and rebuild systems so that they could be equitable and fair. Their capacity

to do this was hampered by the following:

As a liberation movement, the ANC was not a body capable of running

governmental structures, particularly not structures unfamiliar to

them. The ANC was highly politicised and characterised by networks of

trusted comrades. The ANC was a movement based upon fighting

oppression and tearing down oppressive structures, which are not the

same things as policy making and implementation.

As a movement wishing to be constructive and reconciliatory, they

spoke in a language of symbols and hope. This was a movement based

on the fight for democracy and equality, but it was primarily a

movement based on bringing down the Apartheid regime. The ANC

did not have policies and plans for fixing the country.

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Lowering costs was a high priority. The ANC had also inherited a large amount of

debt from the Apartheid regime and controlling and cutting spending and trying to

be economically efficient were very important. At the same time, from 1996

onwards, government was implementing the overarching macroeconomic Growth,

Employment and Redistribution Policy (GEAR). GEAR redirected South African public

policy away from redistribution and development and towards efficiency,

competitiveness and affordability (Pratt, 2001, p. 12). The political climate ushered

in by GEAR did not favour capacity building, institutional strengthening and human

resource development, which would be expensive, long-term policy; instead the

costs of teacher education colleges shaded them as a burden and a problem to be

solved.

Alternatives were not properly considered. Gordon (2009, p. 23) finds: “it may have

been the case that some colleges could have become autonomous higher education

institutions if given sufficient funding and assistance to develop over a five-year

period, but that this option was never publicly explored. There was not enough

funding available to increase enrolments dramatically or to develop the capacity of

college personnel.”

Other stakeholders were preoccupied elsewhere or unable to engage. The South

African Democratic Teacher’s Union (SADTU), a very powerful, very politically

involved force that often had the ability to influence legislation, was preoccupied

with policy directly concerning schools and the curriculum (Chisholm, 2010, p. 18).

The colleges themselves were not much involved in the discussion and had no

platform of engagement as a unified system – they were simply isolated institutions.

The lack of cohesion between the colleges meant they had no voice or bargaining

power and, as a system or as a collective, did not enter discussions.

The government was preoccupied with symbolic policy. Jansen (2001, p. 42)

describes period of policymaking in the early 1990s as “projecting the symbolism of

policy making – that is, contending actors seeking to establish broad symbolic

positions in education policy ahead of South Africa’s first democratic elections. The

symbolism of this position did not require detailed policy proposals, simply broad

statements of intent or values.” Jansen continues: “We search in vain for a logic in

policy making connected to any serious intention to change the practice of education

on the ground… Every single case of education policy making demonstrate in

different ways the preoccupation of the state with settling policy struggles in the

political domain rather than in the realm of practice” (2002, p. 200).

Policymaking in the period directly following Apartheid was not policy making

concerned with implementation and implementable plans. South Africa’s rush to

declare symbolic positions and overhaul structures was a direct attempt to avoid

path dependency and deconstruct the social and political structures that entrenched

Apartheid. Thus incremental change and support for systems seen as props of the

Apartheid regime was often out of the question. Radical change that got rid of or

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rebranded these systems, made easy by broad, symbolic statements, was

unavoidable.

Beyond a concerted emphasis to differentiate the new government and policies on a

symbolic level, there was simply a lack of capacity to change up-and-running,

entrenched political systems. Those systems had to be divorced from Apartheid

(symbolic positioning, again) but changing their foundations and mechanisms was an

enormous job that the ANC had a) committed itself to do and b) did not have the

capacity to do. All they could do at that point, I would argue, was make symbolic

distinctions. This is highly problematic as it is often confused with and touted as

change.

If the symbolic shift to (supposedly) non-racial, urban academic institutions from

racially divided “second class” rural teaching colleges had not further entrenched

inequality and lack of access to education, perhaps this could be called progressive

change. It was rather a superficial, radical policy shift for symbolic purposes that did

little to nothings to affect constructive and reconstructive consequences.

The government did not identify/predict teacher supply as a problem. Enrolment

turned out to be a much bigger problem than the government had predicted. As

stated beforehand, distribution of teachers across the country was considered the

real problem, not the actual supply of teachers. Efforts at rationalisation and teacher

redeployment in 1996-1997 failed (Chisholm, 2009). Contrary to predictions,

enrolment in schools did boom. Many “excess” teachers were offered retrenchment

packages – usually taken by the more professional and experienced teachers in the

system, further destabilising the profession (Bloch, 2009, p. 101).

Not only did redistribution just not work, but the government had underestimated

two things: student enrolment and teacher attrition. Student enrolment was much

higher, as was demand for teachers. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS pandemic (around

13% of all educators were found to be HIV positive 2008) meant that not only was

there increased mortality in the teaching profession, but that illness often left

teachers absent, demoralised and incompetent (Paterson & Arends, 2009, p. 97)

Another factor to note is teacher migration, part of the problematic brain drain in

South Africa: working in public schools is not attractive, because of poor pay and

poor socioeconomic conditions of those schools, and migration abroad or to the

private sector removes some of the best teachers from the supply of educators.

A model of South African policy making

The post-Apartheid South African government was not a functioning bureaucracy.

Policy makers were former liberators and politicians with virtually no governing

experience or skill. Consistent with these we see a preoccupation with change and

symbolic position, as well as the very real constraints faced by a government

inheriting such a country.

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What is evidenced is a lack of comprehensive cognisance of the functioning of

education as a system, and a lack of understanding of the social impacts of these

institutions. Implementation and broader consequences beyond “the system does

not perform well” weren’t thoroughly considered – although discussed, the idea of

strengthening teacher training colleges was privately dismissed, and never officially

tabled. Furthermore, the DoE’s focus on the practicalities of the system – costs,

efficiency, coordination – narrowed the discussion to how well those institutions

performed and were administrated, and ended up ignoring the social function of

those training colleges.

Policy making in South Africa, far from being a rational problem solving process, is

quite consistent with the idea of the Garbage Can model of policy making (March,

1994, pp. 198-206): problems, solutions and policymakers were often disconnected

from each other, and the policy that ended up being implemented was very much

dependent on its time context. Other important things that were happening in

education, such as the school curriculum OBE overhaul, drew SADTU and other

important actors away from the policy process surrounding the teaching colleges.

Furthermore, the process took so long and was implemented in incremental stages,

that there was always something more important happening to draw attention away

from other education-related stakeholders.

The choice opportunity where the decision was made thus ended up consisting of

politicians (who were interested in broad symbolic policy) and bureaucrats (who

were interested in efficiency and cutting spending). The problems identified ended

up being divorced from issues of teacher supply. In fact, problems were attached to

solutions in a vacuum: the practical issues faced by colleges were seen as

independent of every other function of these colleges. Only a few options were seen

as viable by those actors, and there were no voices arguing for other paths. Given

these actors, problem definitions and solutions together, the resulting policy was

predictable. Unfortunately, the elements in “the garbage can” were too limited.

Furthermore, almost all the actors involved in this policymaking process were

politicians, activists, liberators – who dwell in the symbolic realm. Von Holdt (2010)

looks at the tension between nationalism and bureaucracy in post-Apartheid South

Africa and the uneasy spectrum of effectiveness that exists. Having inherited a

foreign, Western state apparatus, and being a nationalistic liberation movement, in

some cases (the revenue services, the treasury) South African bureaucracies can be

highly inefficient. In other cases, effectiveness is “unravelled by the ‘hidden

transcripts’ of informal nationalist practices” (von Holdt, 2010, p. 23). Inherited

bureaucracies can function well, but politics tends to take over all functions of state

operators, and the result is ‘empty’ policy, such as the on discussed in this paper.

Von Holdt’s analysis finds a number of elements that hamper effectiness and

bureaucracy in the South African government. Two are specifically relevant here:

“face” and budgetary rituals. By “face”, von Holdt emphasises once again the

importance of symbolic positions and the culture of deference to authority that has

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grown within government structures – meaning that when decisions are made, they

are made by political elites with specific nationalist priorities, which usually take the

form of rhetoric divorced from implementation (von Holdt, 2010, pp. 16-18). When

speaking of budgetary discipline, two things are important: 1) budgets are drawn up

in ministerial offices with little to no relevance to the reality of the institutions

concerned and 2) the government has a preoccupation with minimising expenditure

that signals service delivery as secondary. This appears to come from the idea that

government should be efficient and effective, but is perverted when this becomes an

obstacle to true change and advocates efficiency for the sake of efficiency (von Holdt,

2010, pp. 19, 23)

Policy in this case, and systemically across the South African political system, is

characteristically top-down, and somehow separated from implementation and

planning (Jansen, 2002). A common refrain is that the national plans and policies are

good but somewhere, somehow, implementation goes wrong. This is because the

South African policy model does not take the capacity of concerned actors, and the

reality of how those institutions work. It rather responds to problems by asserting

normative dominance and looking for “silver bullets” – large, one-size-fits-all policies

developed by politicians at the ministerial level.

Particularly, in this case, we see a lack of a “plan of action”. The closure/integration

of the teaching colleges was a policy that was never quite intended but happened

anyway, evolving out of a narrowly focused drive to make the system more efficient.

This policy was developed independent of other system wide policies in education,

such as redeployment and redistribution of teachers, such as school curriculum

changes, and there was no comprehensive plan to deal with teacher supply at the

same and for the sustainable future.

At a time when the post-Apartheid government needed to implement long-term

structural changes, they rather applied sometimes superficial, isolated problems that

targeted specific problems. This meant that low quality teacher education colleges

were seen as an isolated problem that needed to be solved. No investment was

made to realise the important role of these colleges and to increase output – a policy

solution that would have required intense systems analysis and complex policy and

implementation to get all institutions on track. Instead, a grand overarching policy –

“if they can’t be autonomous, integrate them” – was implemented, one that was

neither cognisant of what caused the problems in these institutions nor the

fundamental role played by them.

Policy advice

This is not a paper that, like some loud voices in South African politics, argues for the

reopening of teacher training colleges. While initially, it may seem like a good idea so

simply reverse dangerous decisions of the past, I have a number of objections.

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The reconstruction of tertiary education has narrowed the available policy options

and has made reversing decisions incredibly costly. Where are the teachers and

lecturers to staff these colleges? Where is the money? Colleges were

underperforming, but the causes of poor performance were not addressed. How do

we make sure these colleges do well? Reopening the colleges would be a

monumental task to undertake, particularly without knowledge and thorough

evaluation of the system.

The government, and particularly the DoE, has a history of simply being unable to

deliver. Current institutions and systems are not functioning smoothly (Chisholm,

2010). These institutions have the resources and capabilities to produce; however

proper goals and policy are needed in order to ensure that they are fulfilling their

role within the greater educational system. I would argue that reforming the current

system would be less costly and more effective than reopening the colleges. The

policy choice to integrate the system has unfortunately committed us to this path.

Lessons to be learned from this analysis for future application:

I. The rural/urban divide is stronger than ever. Higher education provisions

must be made for those that (arguably) need it the most.

II. Teacher training institutions (should) do more than simply supply teachers.

They were once important institutions in communities, provided local,

dedicated teachers, and were highly respected avenues to greater

opportunities. Removing these in favour of large, urban, education machines

severely underestimates the social place of these institutions.

III. Enrolment in education training must be stimulated, and the quality of

education training must be improved, in order for teacher training to do its

job.

IV. Broad symbolic gestures – while important for nascent democracies – have

the capacity to ruin functional, if problematic systems. Incremental,

mechanistic approaches to policy, fixing systems and institutions, and not

falsely separating policy from implementation are important. To ‘fix’

education policy, we must identify the correct goals and identify

implementable steps to improve their goals (and so, must be cognisant of

resources and capabilities).

V. Costs should not be a problem unless resources are wasted. Investment in

institutional strengthening and building will ultimately create a better

system, but inefficient, ineffective programs are a drain on the budget.

The best direction from here would be to critically analyse the institutions and

structures we have now, and create realistic plans of action to improve their

functioning. The importance of a healthy supply of good teachers cannot be

underestimated. Ensure that existing facilities are operating properly; this should be

an expert, mechanistic plan, guided by goals and values but not made up of them.

National government is ultimately responsible for this sector and should not divorce

itself from its operation.

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Secondly, it is important to increase access to (specifically teacher) education in rural

areas. Opening colleges is a possibility but, if decided upon, needs to be done

carefully and purposefully, to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.

Pilot programmes with plenty of evaluation, trial and error and feedback to create a

workable model would do best. The conceptual existence of training colleges has

hardly ever been questioned; in fact, it is almost universally recognised that the

system was theoretically helpful and supportive to social structures. What

determines their viability is and always has been efficiency and performance. Cost is

not a problem, per se, as long as these colleges achieve what they are meant to.

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Reconstructing Education

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