RECENT CASES ON REMEDIAL LAW 2013 2014

8/10/2019 RECENT CASES ON REMEDIAL LAW 2013 2014

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The third partys possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a

presumption which may be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of

the property. Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of the adverse possession by the

third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the

opportunity to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property only after he has

been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with the time-honored principle of dueprocess.

a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed property, who claims a right

superior to that of the original mortgagor, is given no opportunity to be heard on his claim. It

stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of

a mere ex parte possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary

ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.

3. TEODORO DARCEN, MAMERTO DARCEN, JR., NESTOR DARCEN, BENILDADARCEN-SANTOS, AND ELENITA DARCEN-VERGEL,Petitioners,

v.V. R. GONZALES CREDIT ENTERPRISES, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,VERONICA L. GONZALES, Respondent

TOPIC: CONSENT AND KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTES WAIVER TO INTERPOSE ADVERSE CLAIM

Ratio:

- The long-settled rule in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is that

after consolidation of ownership of the foreclosed property, it is the ministerial duty

of the court to issue, as a matter of right, an ex partewrit of possession to the

buyer. The mere filing of an ex partemotion for the issuance of the writ of possession wouldsuffice, and no bond is required. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a

sheriffs sale of real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession

after the one-year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs

final certificate of sale.

- Nonetheless, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex partewrit of

possession ceases once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the

property, who is a stranger to the mortgage and who claims a right adverse to that

of the debtor/ mortgagor, and is holding the property in his possession adversely.

- BUT BUT BUT IF petitioners had always known about, and had consented to, the

extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their father, and were able to file their Opposition52to

the said petition, wherein they asserted that they are co-owners of the properties, being heirs,

furthermore waiver by them of their shares therein in favor of their mother. they cannot now

be permitted to interpose an adverse claim in the subject mortgaged lots and defeat

the writ of possession issued to the respondent company.


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4. RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., Petitioner,

vs.

GERRY CENTENO, Respondent.

TOPIC: Whether a successor-in-interest is an adverse 3rdparty - NO

Ratio:

- the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser

in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function,17unless it appears

that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the

mortgagor.

In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada,19the Court held that the phrase "a third party who is

actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor" contemplates a situation in

which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-

owner, tenant or usufructuary.

- In this case, respondent acquired the subject lots from his parents, Sps. Centeno, on March

14, 1988 after they were purchased by petitioner and its Certificate of Sale at Public Auction

was registered with the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City in 1971. It cannot therefore be

disputed that respondent is a mere successor-in-interest of Sps. Centeno.

Consequently, he cannot be deemed as a "third partywho is actually holding the

property adversely to the judgment obligor" under legal contemplation. Hence, the RTC had the

ministerial duty to issueas it did issuethe said writ in petitioners favor.

5. Laguya v. People

TOPIC: Defines privileged communication as a defense in libel cases.

The rule in libel is that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if true

(truth is not a defense), unless made with good intention and justifiable motive. This

presumption of malice, however, does not arise when the defamatory imputation is made in a

privileged communication. The first of two forms of this is a private communication made by

any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty. (The second form,

not involved in this case, is fair comment or report of a legal or official proceedings.).

The Laguya decision held that for the exception to apply, the private communication must have

been made to an officer, board or superior who has an interest or duty in the matter and whohas the power to furnish the protection being sought by the communicator. It did not apply in

the present case where the communicator addressed the memorandum involved not only to

such superior but also to other persons who were neither his superior nor vested with power or

authority over the matter.

Speaking through Justice Mariano C. Castillo, the First Division said:
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As further held in Brillante (483 Phil 568 [2004]), the law requires that the defamatory

imputations made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged must be communicated

only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged and who

have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement.

6. MARY ROSE A. BOTO, Complainant, v.SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTORVINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V. MANABAT ANDASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS,Respondents.

TOPIC: DELAY IN PROSECUTION DUE TO LATE FILING OF COMMENT

SHORT Facts:

- Boto alleged that on January 13, 2012, the Information2charging her with libel wasfiled before the MeTC; (RTC DAPAT DIBA)

- that on the same day, the MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest;3

that on January 25, 2012,she posted bail4and was informed that the arraignment and trial were scheduled on February13, 2012; that before the scheduled arraignment, she filed the Motion to Quash5theinformation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the crime of libel falls within, the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and not with the MeTC and that there was nocrime as internet libel; that acting thereon, the MeTC, instead of dismissing the case, issued theOrder6requiring the trial prosecutor to file his comment within ten (10) days, which he failed todo so, prompting the MeTC to extend the period to file for 5 months delaying the proceeding.

Ratio:

- De Dios candidly admitted that inadvertence attended the filing of the information for libelwith the MeTC. He did not, however, proffer any justification or explanation for the error. Hedid not claim that the mistake was either typographical or was a result of the application of adefault form or template. In the Court's view, it was plain carelessness. As no malice can beattributed, he merely deserves a reprimand.

- As for Manabat he should have been more cautious and careful in reviewing the report andrecommendation of his subordinate. He should not have approved the information and its filingin the wrong court considering that his office was very knowledgeable of the law that

jurisdiction in libel cases lies with the RTC.

- As for Villena Indeed, He, however, mishandled the case which prejudiced the complainant.

Villena should have even initiated the move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lackof jurisdiction. Instead of taking the initiative, he even opposed the motion to quash theinformation.

- It has been held in a plethora of cases that when the law or procedure is soelementary, not to know, or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes grossignorance of the law, even without the complainant having to prove malice or badfaith. FINED (10,000), and REPRIMANDED


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7. PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO and RUPERTO ESTANISLAO, Petitioners,vs.SPOUSES NORMA GUDITO and DAMIANO GUDITO, Respondents.

TOPIC: unlawful detainer

Ratio:

-. this Court is not persuaded with petitioners insistence that they cannot be evicted in view ofSection 6 of P.D. 1517, which states

SECTION 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas.Within the Urban Zones legitimatetenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on theland and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the lastten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to

purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms andconditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land ManagementCommittee created by Section 8 of this Decree. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, petitioners cannot use P.D. 1517 as a shield to denyrespondents of their inherent right to possess the subject property. The CA correctly opinedthat "under P.D. 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, the lessee is given the right of first refusalover the land they have leased and occupied for more than ten yean and on whichthey constructed their houses. But the right of first refusal applies only to a casewhere the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party .

If the owner of the leased premises do not intend to sell the property in question but seeks toeject the tenant on the ground that the former needs the premises for residential purposes, thetenant cannot invoke the land reform law

8.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL ENOJAS Y HINGPIT et al., G.R. No. 204894,

March 10, 2014

Remedial Law; Admissibility of text messages as evidence. As to the admissibility of the text

messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts earlier Resolution applying the

Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by thetestimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them:

TURO NI BRONDIAL TO SAMIN DAGDAG LANG

EPHEMERAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION, refers to text messages, chatroom messages,

telephone calls, and audio/video streaming not recorded or retained. These can be proven by


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testimony of people who were party there to and have personal knowledge of such

communication.

Remedial Law; Arrest without valid warrant is not a ground for acquittal. Accused lament that

they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming that this was so, it cannot

be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that mayhave been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest.

9.SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC.,PETITIONER,vs.SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXYS. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR.,MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, ANDANTONIO V. AGCAOILI,RESPONDENTS.

Ratio:

Issue on Prejudicial question if case is pending in an administrative agency

Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raisesa prejudicial question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performancein the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminalcase for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary toSan Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak ofbecause no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specificperformance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend theproceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524of PresidentialDecree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an actioncivil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdictionover the action was exclusive and original.

Issue on Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable

That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB,instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action forspecific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. Thissituation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation

of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that thedoctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicialadjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge ofsuch agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation isthat the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts areno longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts.
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RECENT CASES ON REMEDIAL LAW 2013 2014

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