Recasting Social Democracy in Europe: "Nested Games" and Rational choices in the Strategic...

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ABSTRACT

The a r t i c l e i s an at tempt to so lve a " ra t i dna l choice" puzzlewi th a "nes ted games" answer. The da ta i s d r a ~ ~ r o m four s o c i a l

democrat ic p a r t i e s , alII o f which face a nUmberl ofl r a the r s im i l a r

s t r a t e g i c dilemmas and I pol icy cho ices . Whi le l a l l four of t hesecases eventual ly found : the i r way to a " v o t e - m a ~ i m ~ z i n g " s t r a t egy ,each par ty undertook a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t journeyl The Spani sh PSOEand th e Swedish SAP a d j ~ s t e d t h e i r pol icy pos i t ior ts and e lec to ra ls t r a t egy r e l a t i v e l y smoothly and with little i n t r a -pa r t y tu rmoi l .

Not so th e Br i t i sh Labopr Par ty and th e G e r m a n ! s p ~ . Both par t i e ssu f fe red i n t e rna l s t r i f e , defec t ions and e lec to ra l l o s ses . Why• I I Isuch d ~ v e r g e n c e s ? The nes ted games approach al iows us to focus onth e s t r a t e g i c choices of i n t r a -pa r t y p layers a n hbw t h e i r choices

a re shaped by i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g s . The a r t i c l e sugges ts t h a tth e prefe rences and pos i t ion o f th e unions r e p r ~ s e h t i n g workers indecl in ing and u n c o m p ~ t i t i v e i ndus t r i e s ins ide I these par t i e sexp la ins , to a l a rge e x te n t , the degree o f d i f f l c u i t y in adjus t ing

to new e lec to ra l condi t i ions . The more entrenched I r e p re s e n ta t i ve sfrom such unions a re irt th e par ty , the more res i s t ance t he r e wi l l

be to pol icy a d j u s t m e n t ~ and s t r a t e g i c changes u n f ~ v o r a b l e to t he i rmembers and union organ iza t ions . I· I

II

I

II

I



I 1

I I

Recas t ing SQcial DemQcracy in EurQpe; "Nested GameS" and Rat iona l! I, I

Choices in th e s t r a t eg ic Adaptat ion Process. I I

A ll ma jQr working I class-based par t i e s , soc i a l demoqrat ic ,

I i I

s o c i a l i s t o r otherwise , I face s im i l a r se t s Qf d i ] ~ ~ a s . On the one

I I'hand, they are r equ i red Ito respond to changing ec.onomic cond i t ions

. I: I

which c u r t a i l t h e i r a b i l i t y to increase governmJntal expendi tures .

socia l democracy faces In "ef f ic iency challenge" I ~ r i m the pol i t i ca l

, , : Ir i g h t , not only in terms o f whether the w e l f a ~ e s t a t e funct ions

I I ! I

e f fec t i ve l y o r squander i t axpayers ' money f r i v O l ~ U , l Y b u t a l so from

i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t s which succeeded in p o r t ~ a y i n g governmentalI I! I .

i n t e rven t ion in th e ecpnomy as a drag on e c o l o m ~ c growth. (Offe ,

1984; scharpf , 1987) Redis t r ibu t ive s oc i a l demJcra t ic po l i c i e s

, I! I

are no longer popular ,when the extens ion of b e n ~ f its to working

I I I

c l a s s groups through soc i a l , incomes and i ndus t r i a l po l i c i e s are

viewed as detr imental Ito both economy and t fe ~ a j O r i t y of the

e l ec t o ra t e .I I

On th e o t h e r hand working c lass -based p a ~ t i r s are forced to

respond to soc i a l changes in terms Qf a s h i f t . ~ . w a I Y from t he b lue -I ! I

c o l l a r , unionized workforce to a much more het,erolgenous base both

I I I

in terms o f occupa t io , and values . (Dunleavy jndl Husbands, 1985;

Przeworski and spraguel ' 1986) White -co l la r w q ~ k ~ r s , s tuden t s and

I I · !

profess iona l s a re aSI, if not more, impor tant as e l e c t o r a l

I I: I

c ons t i tuencies than b l ue -co l l a r workers . The "pos t -mate r i a l "! I, I

chal lenge to working qlass -based par t i e s may ' fary from count ry to

I ! I

count ry in seve r i t y , blut th e he a r t of th e mat te r i s no t whetherI, I

" p o s t - ~ t e r i a l i s t s " e l i s t or not b ~ t h e ~ socia l d ~ o c r a t i c



2

par t ies can adapt Jo new pol i t i ca l demands and issues ra i sed by

• I" I • I k 1groups o u t s ~ d e of the blue-co l l a r b a s e . ( K ~ t s c h e l t , 1990; Mer e ,

1990) As Adam ~ r z l w o r s k i notes , not only is soc ia l democrat ic

policy a t s t a k ~ , \ I bu t i t s ent i re e lec tora l and po l it i c a l

I ' . . \ . 1 d t 's t r a t e g y . ( p r z e w o ~ s ~ ~ , 1985) W h ~ c h groups shfuld s o c ~ a emocra ~ par t ies appeal td : ,Jts t rad i t iona l base or other soc ia l groups?

This s tudy I,is'l I an at tempt to explain \ a "ra t iona l choice"

puzzle . Given tJatl"lvarious working class-bJsed pa r t i e s are faced

, "1 I i I . , I dw ~ t h s ~ m ~ a r s e t ~ of s t r a t e g ~ c q u e s t ~ o n s , why do they respon so

di f fe ren t ly to t h ~ S ~ \ chal lenges in t he i r a d ~ u s t m e n t process? The

d\ 1\ . . ,I" 't's t u y focuses on four maJor soct.aj, d e m o c r a t ~ ' c p a r t ~ e s an B r aan ,

Germany, Spain ~ n I Sweden. All four p a ~ t i e s have undergone

' t t ' t J . I 1 . I d . I' h ' ,ad JUs men s ~ u e ~ r e lec tora s t r a t e g ~ e s an po ~ c c o ~ c e s ~ response to soc ia l ~ ~ economic change. TheJe i s in fac t only one

"ra t iona l " choicelir i l terms of e lec to ra l s t raJegy for these pa r t i e s

i f we pos i t t h a t Jo l l t i c a l par t ies want to wJn e lec t ions and adopt

,., L \ , , d d \ 't' tvot e - m a x ~ m ~ z ~ n g s:... r a t . e g ~ e s an or e r to 0 ,so. Now, as no1 ,I '

surpris ing t ha t lall! four par t ies have irldeed discovered th e

i l I. , I '1 d 'e 1ect ora11y most p r o m ~ s ~ n g s t ra tegy . However, s o c ~ a an e c o n o m ~ c condi t ions have deeh

lsuch t ha t t h i s s t ra teJy has been the only

, t ' 11 \ .J • 1 h ' f I, r. - t 'o r g a n ~ z a ~ o n a y r a t ~ o n a c o ~ c e or some t ~ m e . nua ~ " f I I I , 1 h' It ' . th t .t hs u r p r ~ s ~ n g , rom a ' ; - a t ~ o n a c o ~ c e " perspec ~ v e , ~ a as

I I . , \, dt ak en some 0 f theS

Ip a r t ~ e s a very long t ~ m e to d ~ s c o v e r and a op t

the vote-maximizing l l ec to ra l approach. Ea6h party has taken a

d i s t i nc t route to tWe same des t ina t ion . The Spanish s oc i a l i s t

Party (PSOE) adoptedJhe ra t iona l , vote-maXimilzing s t ra tegy in 1982



3

without much i n t e rna l ,urmoi l or e lec tora l d e l ~ c 1 i o n s . Swedish

Socia l Democrats (SAP) have mad€ th e change t o r the s t ra tegy in a

s imilar ly smooth t ransiFion. The German SOCial: oLmocratic Party

. d d . f f . It .SPO) , on the othe r hand, has exper1ence maJor I l 1 1CU 1es 1n

. . i / . . /1 I . harr1v1ng a t the r a t onal s t ra tegy . The Br1t1sh. Labour Par ty as

I II Ihad th e roughest of t i m ~ s e lec tora l ly and organiza t iona l ly in i t s

. . .1 t t . 1981 I i Ipath t 0 a vo t e-max1m1Z1r9 s ra egy S1nce . I I

The research quest ion i s : why do some. IPart ies adjus t

I I :re la t ive ly smoothly to Inew economic and soc i a l 17onditions whereas

othe r par t i e s experience grea t s t i ck i ness in ' t J e i r ef for t s toI l i I

adjus t? Why do some par t i e s take so much longer to see the l i g h t

I / Ithan others? Why do they seem unconcerned abouf massive e lec to ra l

losses and pursue e lecJora l s t r a t eg ie s and P O l i ~ i L s a t t r a c t i v e to

I I Ionly a smal l sec t ion of the e lec tora te? The ~ ~ e s i s developed in/ ' I ' /t h i s a r t i c l e focuses on the s t ra teg ic choices a 'c t i rs with in soc i a l

democratic par t ies f lce when deal ing with !I their int ra-par ty

opponents. The a r g u m e ~ t i s tha t adaptat ion iSI :m1re d i f f i cu l t fo r

par t i e s with a s t ronJ organiza t ional connection to b lue-co l la r

. . d I . . . Id

. d I . Iii If'un10ns 1n ec 1n1ng 1n us t r1es an re at1ve y, smooth or par t1es

. th t . It ' l ' d d f I i I. . d l' .W1 a grea e r ozqarn.aa a.ona an epen ence rom una.ons an ec a.m.nq

I I! iindus t r ies .

I I i I

The fol lowing a ~ t i c l e deals with only 0ne explanat ion .

I I !

Explanat ions focusing Ion s t ruc tu ra l i m p e d i m e n ~ s to e lec to ra l and

pol icy adjustment are/ 'mentioned br ie f ly as aJe those focusing on

r a t iona l vote-maximizat ion. Both schools of th./

oug /

h t a re dismissedI , .I ' lI

since they can eXPlail one type of response hi' b t the other in a

! I :



5

I .(thereby losing the i r character as a work1ng class lpar ty) .

! I i I

On the other hand, Isocial democratic part ies fjace a ser ies of

I IIpolicy dilemmas which I overlap with the i r eriect10ral strategy

problem. Policy preferences re f lec t the in terests , of whoever theI . I !

intended voters are . I I f the party r e m a i ~ ~ jWedded to i t s

t radi t ional policies (commitments to welfare statel· expansion, jobI I i

protect ion, economic grrwth, wage e g a l i t a r i a n i s ~ ) lit i s l i k e l ~ ' to

remain stuck with i t s I'established base but l i t t i e support fromI' I

't d Ld Li ,Igroups beyond 1. oncel the party eC1 es to P I ~ s l e new po 1c1es,

it i s l ike ly to appeall to new social groups ~ ' : l t le ss so to i t s

t radi t ional base. The Ichoices social democratic Ja r t i e s face areI I I I

i l lus t ra ted in the f o l ~ o w i n g four matrix box: I i [I , I

Table I : I Electoral Strategy I

Recapture working class Appeal to other groups

I 1I

Appeal on I -Workerism - S o c ~ a l Democracyt radi t ional -Socialism II

Iolic ies '

I

Policy i i i

I It rategy I

Appeal on -Popular -Rainbow Coali t ionnew polic ies Authoritarianism - ~ o v e r n m e n t

FiarfY Strategy

Adapted from: Ivor Crewe, "The Decline of Labor and the Decline ofLabour", paper p r e s e n t ~ d a t the APSA, San Franbispo, August 1990.

! I I

Some of these pojl i.cy and elec tora l s t ra teJy choices offe r

I i

al ternat ives . I f a p a ~ t y chooses to appeal to i t s establ ished base

II •I '

with t radi t ional pol ic tes , then the party may I ~ so ei ther with a

penchant for social ism (nat ional izat ion , econdmia autarcky, s ta teI I I

planning) or with polic ies designed to pro tec t fa i l ing indus t r ies ,, I I

jobs and the soc ia l w ~ l f a r e programs which were Idesigned to helpI i

I I



6\

I

workers in such in 'dustries while maintaining capi ta l ism. I f a

par ty chooses to a ~ J e a l to new soc ia l groupJ with new pol ic ies it

may do so by e i the rl

\appealing to the soc ia l pro te s t movements and

environmental is t giJups ( to build a "rainl)ow" coa l i t ion as the

Dutch Social is t p a r t ~ (PvdA) has done), or ~ may experiment with

a very broad range ~ pol ic ies designed to a t t r a c t the white co l l a r

workers, professioriAls and " p o s t - m a t e r i a l i ~ t " voters . (Wolinetz,

1988; Crewe, 1990) \ ~ "government par ty" skrategy of fe r s a vas t

range of pol ic ies d ~ l s i g n e d to a t t r a c t as b r ~ a d a range of soc ia l

.I 11

d . a 1 th par yroups. It may anc u e envazonaentIl'

po 1C1es. . f et '

1S

threatened by a Grlen Party; it may p r o ~ i d e for l i be r t a r i an

pol ic ies i f a l i b e r ~ ~ par ty competes with sodia l democrats for the

• \ I \ I ,1ntended e lec tora l t a rge t . The "government party" s t ra tegy 1S

, I

reminiscent of Lipse i ' s "end of ideology" because soc ia l democracy,.,ab andons any pretens10n of be1ng a work1ng c lass party and adopts

. .. t h Illi I l' . I ., d' t' ta c 1aSS1C ca c -a i po 1CY potpourr1. However, 1 t 1S 1S 1nc

from the soc ia l dem6dratic "catch-al l" s t r a t lgy of the 1950's and

60' s s ince it appeall,s to groups outs ide of \ the white and blue

co l la r working c l a s ~ e s . The aim i s to bJ i ld an even broader

I

I I I

soc ia l /e lec tora l coai l i t ion than soc ia l democracy by offer ing

"something fo r! I

ever,yone" to match the\

e lec tora l appeal of

conservat ive parties':. I I,

II. h th I .th 1 1 ' .ppea1s t 0 the work1ng c la s s , weer W1 0 d po 1C1es orI I

wi th new ones (such I as "law and order" , Jence the subheading

popular author i t a r i Jn i sm) , are l ike ly lo be e lec to ra l ly

I I \counterproduct ive. (Crewe, 1990) Since the .t r ad i t iona l working



7

c lass base has shrunk, re l iance on the old ' base i s only a

"ra t iona l " s t ra t egy i f ti lhe par ty means to be a h e ~ r e s e n t a t i ve ofI ,

the blue-co l l a r working c lass with no pretensionis of captur ing

' t · I ,I I I· 't I ! , k ' tpo l ~ c power v ~ an/e ec tora m a J o r ~ y. P f ~ e ~ o r s sugges s

t ha t working c lass par t i e s gave up any pretension f represent ingi 1

purely one c lass as soon as they enteffd I parl iamentary

competi t ion. (prZeWOrSkij', 1985) Socia l d e m o c r a c ~ , i s the at tempt to

I ' Iprovide pol ic ies fo r groups outs ide of the working c lass as well as

I II

a broad coa l i t ion between white and blue-co l l a r J o r ~ e r s . ( K e S s e l m a n , I i

1982)I ;, '

As the fol lowing typology ind ica tes , the , f o ~ r par t ies under

, 't· I I • t II I t t '~ n v e s t ~ g a r.on a l opted fo r the 'governmen par ty I t s ra egy ~ I i; I

recent years . However I' two par t ies meandered ir.om "social ism" toI I

"soc ia l democracy" to t he i r f ina l des t ina t ion . Labour t rave l led inI i

ldissar ray ; the Spanish jPSOE underwent a s imi la r t fansformat ion in

a much less div i s ive anr more coherent manner. I (h i German SPD and

the Swedish SAP moved I from t r ad i t iona l soc ia l democracy to th e

"government par ty" s t ra tegy , but also on diverJenJ paths . The SPDI I I

underwentcons iderable! internal upheaval whereas ~ h SAP underwent

l i t t l e in te rna l f i9ht i ig over the s t ra tegic C h ~ ~ 9 ~ . Table I I : Electora l s t ra teg ies I

Strategy 1: Socialism s t ra tegy 2:1 Sopial Democracy

Labour 1 9 7 9 - ~ 7 Labour119174-79

PSOE 1975-'78 PSOE I 1979-82SAP 19/75-82

SPD 1'19,74-87I

s t ra tegy 3: P o p u l ~ r s t ra tegy 4:1 Government par tyA u t h o r i ~ a r i a n i s m ! I StrategyL a b o u ~ 1 ~ 8 8 - p r e s e n t PSOE 1 ~ 8 2 - p r e s e n t

SAP . 1 ~ 8 2 - p r e s e n t SPD 1 88-present



8

The Case of s t i cky ITransformations; Bri t i sh Labour and Germany's

\

Both L a b o u ~ and the SPO e x p e r i e n c ~ d a very d i f f i c u l t, I

It ransformat ion f ~ o m \ t h e i r pOlic ies of the 1950 's to 70'S to th e

I \ \ . I Ott d tgovernment party! s t ra tegy . Both p a r t ~ e s were c o m m ~ e 0

t r a d i t i ona l s o c ~ a l i \ democratic s t r a t eg ie s and appealed to a

combination of b l u ~ \ and white co l la r worke+s throughout most of

th i s per iod . r n l t J l 1970 's both par t i e s sJ f fe red major i n t e rna l

upheavals in t e b m ~ \ of in t ra -par ty s t r U g ~ l e S leading to the

defect ion of s ing l f i J an t groups of ac t i v i s t s , par ty po l i t i c ians andI i I

vote r s . (Koelble , ~ 9 9 i ) The s t ruggle revolved around the i s sue of

which soc i a l g r o ~ p s \ a n d in te re s t s th e par t J ought to represent :

ithose in deClinibg II indus t r i es who were a ~ V e r S e l Y af fec ted by

economic t r a n s f o ~ a i l o n or those in ~ h PublJc and pr iva te sec tors

who were doing r e ~ a t J v e l Y wel l and/or those JhO were concerned not

l't ' th ' \ II . t .floJUs w ~ s s u e s of e c o n o m ~ c growth bu l e-s ty e ~ s s u e s (environment, femJnilm, c iv i l r igh t s , d e f e n S ~ ) as wel l .

The I n t e r n a ~ : . Istruggle over party I policy. personnel

appointments and ~ a ~ ~ y ru les was so severe In both cases t h a t it

lead to th e emergJncW of chal lenging par t i e s Iformed by the losers

I II \of th e s t ruggle and subsequent defec tors . (Koe]ble, 1987: 1991) The

I \ I

e lec to ra l defea t s b f both Labour and th e SPO lin 1983 and 1987 can

l I \ :

be a t t r i bu ted , a t l e a s t par t i a l ly , to the emergence of these smal l

par t i e s . The S O c i ~ 1 1 b e m o c r a t i c Party (SOP) In Bri ta in emerged as

a r e s u l t of theI i \

leftward d r i f t of the:

Labour Party towards a

I I \ Is oc i a l i s t economic iporicy, whereas the Green Party responded to th e

I



dominance of the party lleadershiP in the SPO W h i ~ ~ JOOk issues sue:

as environmental protecfion, the nuclear protesh mtvement and the

peace i ssue l e s s se r ious ly than the soc ia l m o v e ~ e n f supporters in

Ithe I to . The I , "1SPO thought they 0 igh t r e s u l t of Fre organ1zat10na

and e l ec t o ra l s p l i t in both cases led f" ') a I cOlli·nterproduct ive

I , ,

outcome: e l ec t o ra l defea t and a long per10d of conservat1ve

I I I

government. I I 1

Both part ies haVer since thei r electoral d1feats in 1987 .

lr e t h o ~ g h t t h e i r policy packages and e lec to ra l s t r a t eg ie s . The SPO,I! I

has become fa r more rec,eptive to the i ssues of hhe soc i a l p ro t e s t

,I ,. ' , tIl'movement and has 1ncorporated an Lnnovatn.ve em,·:"Zilonmen a po 1CY

I I !

platform in to i t s par ty program.(Padgett , 19891)1 IEqUallY, Labour

adjusted i t s policy stJategy. The Labour Party ,OliCY Review of

1989 could wel l be mistlken for the po l i c i e s o f ~ ~ r e d by th e Socia l

I I i IDemocratic Party in 1981 , sp iced up with pol ic ies designed to

I II I

a t t r a c t homebuyers, upwardly mobile whi te -col la r workers and

I I Iprofess iona l s ! (Crewe, 1990) In othe r words'l b i th pa r t i e s a re

at tempt ing to recapture l o s t vote r s via the government par ty

i " h! . I ' ts t ra t egy •. Th e sec re t 10 success , 1 t 1S oped, l i s a non-SOC1a 1S

economic pol icy ( l e s s I in te rvent ion in the economy, more marketI i i I

mechanisms, temp£red erivironmental po l i c i e s , a: l e s s ac t ive soc i a l

I I 1

and incomes pol icy , I less progress ive taxat1.'on to s t imula te

III

investment and economic growth) coupled with a commitment toI I i I

represent not only those in te re s t s in soc ie ty ~ h i b h have sufferedI I I I

as a r e s u l t o f economic adjustment bu t also thoJe sec tors which

I I I I

have benef i t t ed . Never the less , th e journey towards t h i s so lu t ionIII I

I I

I



10

.1

I !II,

was extremely d ~ f f ~ c u 1 t and marked by a long per iod out of

I ! I I

government, externa l I chal lenges and in te rna l I discord .I 'I II II

The Case of Smooth Transformat ions: the Spanish PSOE and Sweden's



11

I

to a d jus t to changing in l ternat ional market condi t ions by lowering

I i I

product ion cos t s ( l e S j s oc i a l expendi ture , II!e sl's wages, l ess

t axa t ion progre s s iv i t y ) . (T i l ton , 1990) Th e s t rugg le was won by th e

I I 'adjus tment proponents , u t not a t th e expense 19f organ iza t iona l

d i s in t e g ra t i on o r s i gn i f i can t e l ec t o ra l losses 1 ( ~ S I of th e t ime of

w r i t i ng ! ) . Simi lar ly the remarkable t r a n s f o r m a , t ~ o n o f the PSOEI I I I

from a s o c i a l i s t to a s oc i a l democrat ic to a mild ly I reformist par ty

I I I

in Spain d id no t invd1lve se r ious defec t ions . (Gi l le sp ie , 1988 ;

II IWill iams, 1988) The e l ec t o ra l s t ra tegy deve10ped by Fel ipe

I I I I

Gonzales and h is CIOSejt advisor Alfonso G u e r l ~ a i was acepted by

almost a l l sect ions Of! the party with 11 t t l e I ~ P i ' S i t ion . (Share.

1989) I I

Orthodox Explanat ions; St ruc tura l Limits o r Correc t and In c o r re c t

I II I

I Choices II I

Two approaches dbminate the f i e ld of 'Icom,'parative par tyI I ,

p o l i t i c s . Since t h i s essay i s supposed to be an e f f o r t in theory

I I I I

app l i ca t ion r a t he r than c r i t i que o f o ther approaches, I w i l l only

I ! I

br i e f ly descr ibe t h e i r major hypotheses and s ~ o r l t c o m i n g s . Many

Ir

I '

authors have argued t h a t par t i e s depend on thel . r soc i a l base .I" I I I I' ,Butle r and Stokes sugges t t h a t l.f th e soc t af base dec anes an

I II I

numbers, as has done I the working c l a s s , t h e ~ th e e l e c t o r a l

performance o f th e par ty i s going to dec l ine as ~ e l l . ( B u t l e r and

I I ' IStokes , 1969) While n o t a l l authors agree with t h i s cor re l a t i on ,

, I i I

the re are many who view, par t i e s as essen t i a l l y I ' t r ~ p p e d - if n o t in• I I

a soc i a l base then in r n economic cont rad ic t ion . I Przeworski and

I I Io thers have sugges ted t h a t soc i a l democracy i s r ea l ly noth ing more

I

I



12

I

than an i n a d e ~ a t e working c lass response to capi ta l i sm.

(Przeworski , 1 9 8 ~ ) bocia l democracy dependsl on a ce r t a in type of

I , I " f thOwelfare capi t a l i m and once the econceu.c u n d e r p ~ n r & ~ n g s 0 as

! I I"s tage of capi ta l i sm" d isappears , so does the "soc ia l democrat ic

1984) expl 'c o m p r o m ~ s e . " (Offe, ! such approaches I a ~ q u , t e we11 th e

I ! \ \ , fproblems of Labour and SPO, but do l ess well w ~ t h th e success 0

I : I 'h i t ' d ' thPSOE and SAP. U S I ~ a l l Y these p a r t ~ e s are c arac e r ~ z e e e r as

untypica l of w o r k i ; n ~ blass based par t i e s ( the Ispanish "se l l -ou t" o r

Scand " It.iI. or on th e b'1nk 0f decI '1ne.naV1an excep 10na11sm)

I \ \

Other authors d isagree with the notion t ha t pa r t i e s are

wedded to t he i r s o b i ~ ~ base. Ivor Crewe mainJains t h a t the dec l ine

. I ,I Iof the Labour p a r t \ ~ i s not due to s t ruc tu ra l s h i f t s in the

i l , I. (e 1ec t ora te or the soc1al base bu t due to b e h a v ~ o r a l reasons. Crewe,

1990) Simply puJ, ! ~ h e par ty has fa l len o J t of favor with the

e lec tora te becaus l ~ l l · s pol icy pos i t ions do \ no t correspond with

. . I I I· f I ' 'tpopu1a r oparn.on , (Crewe, 1990) The par ty 1S out 0 ane r 1

. , I I j . If th 1 t ' .represen t s m 1 n o r 1 ~ y 1nteres t s of a sect10n 0 e popu a 10n 1n

declining regions lnd I industr ies of Bri ta in . fhe party can reverse

i t s fortunes i f it! ad6p ts a be t te r , more su i tab le pol icy package.

· d I II· 'hi", ,Gos t a Esp1ng-An e r senessen t1a l ly agrees W1t !th1s po1nt of V1ew 1n

h . Lvs i f th J il " , 1 d I. . 1 '1S ana YS1S 0 . scandanavaan SOC1a emocrat1c par t1es . Po 1CY

choices a re crucJa i I in explaining why s o ~ e pa r t i e s do well

I I I Ie lec to ra l ly and others do not .(Esping-Andersen, 1985)

Each approach! o t ~ e r s a powerful a n a l Y S i ~ of par ty behavior .

While both approacJeJ lcan adequately expla in J i t he r the dec l ine of

, 'I I Isome part1es o r the success of others , each approach has a problem.



13

For the "soc ia l base" argument the f ac t t ha t the Spanish and

SWedish s oc i a l bases hive shrunk j u s t as much11a, th e German o r

Bri t i sh b lue -c o l l a r working c l a s s i s i n c o n v e n i e ~ t . l · The e l ec t o ra l

I I i

success of these par t i e s desp i t e a shrinkage in l th ie i r t r ad i t i ona l

cons t i tuency appears t J lend suppor t to th e ~ e s i s t h a t par t i e s

which a d jus t to socib-economic change q u i C ~ 1 1 wi l l survive

e l ec t o ra l l y . However, ~ dec l ine of Labour andlkPD are n ot simply

"wrong pol icy choices" bu t are expl icable only J i t J a r e fe rence to

th e heterogenizat ion o f l t h e i r e l e c to r a t e s and t J Jesu l t ing s p l i t s

, th ' t ' t I ' II b I th t 'W1 1n no JUs th e I t rade un10n movements a t e par 1es

themselves over which e l ec t o ra l cons t i tuenc ies l in Je res ts ought to

be shaping pol icy p r i o ~ i t i e s . ( D u n l e a V Y and H u s ~ ~ n d s , 1985)

Both approaches ignore an impor tan t v a r i a J ~ e i - th e i n t ens i t y

and outcomes of in t ra -p l r ty conf l i c t s over e l ec t b ra l s t r a t eg ie s and

ho i t' , 1 d d II th ' , 1po I 1CY c 01ces . Par 1es are not s1mp y epen en t on e1 r SOC1a

bases . Nei ther a re t he J capable o f simply a d o P t ~ ~ g i vote-maximizing

s t r a t eg ie s s ince they a ~ not pure ly r a t i ona l , i l e c to r a l machines.

1

Rather , they c o n s i s t ! o f ind iv idual p layers II iwll.o engage in a

' , I · ImuIt1tude of 1nt ra -pa r ty as w ~ l l as ex te rna l c a l c u l a t i ons . The

, r I

' , h d , I d Ii h ' .Iques t 10n 1S: w 0 e te rnunes party s t ra tegy a.n,. po cy c o rcesI I i

ins ide th e p o l i t i c a l 'par ty? What are t h e i r Imajor p o l i t i c a l

i n t e r e s t s and aims? wAiCh s e t of incent ives a l rhey most l ike ly

to respond to? Which I arena of in te rac t ion 1, the par ty or theI :

I :

e lec to ra l arena - ar 'eI they more in te res ted in? How are these

groups affec ted by the l n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s l ~ f t h e i r respec t ive

par t i es?I :



i 14

Nested Games I i OrgJnizat ioos and Intra-par ty Actors

George TSebeliSibroVided a powerful meanJ of analysing reasons

why par t ies sometibes opt for c o u n t e r ~ r o d u c t i v e e lec to ra l

s t ra tegies . (TSebeJ i ,11990) The "nested game+ approach s t ipula tes

tha t po l i t i ca l p a ~ t i 1 s are complex organizat ions in which party

ac t iv i s t s and po l i l i J l ans in te rac t and qui te f k e ~ u e n t l Y clash s ince

. I i \ , • l't' 1 t , E hthey are m o t ~ v a t e d by d ~ f f e r e n t r a t ~ o n a ~ e f o r ac ~ o n . ac

I II , f ,I t' . A t' . tt ype 0 f ac tor responds to a d ~ f f e r e n t se t 0 rncen ves . c V1S S

are mostly c o n c e r h e ~ 1 with par ty pol icy : pol i t ic ians are mostly

concerned with thel s h ~ i v a l of the party as In e lec tora l ly viable

l, t' I ,I I d t' rt' th , d t ft·'o r g a n ~ z a ~ o n . In s Q c ~ a l emocra ~ pa ~ e a ~ ype 0 ac or ~

of grea t importanJe:, \union members. (Koelble II 1987; 1991 ) Trade

, , I I I ., i f th 'um.orusns are most .concerned w th the representa t on 0 ea r

, ,1 1 t, 's e c t ~ o n a l ~ n t e r e s t s . , I A ll groups, of course, IShare an ~ n t e r e s In

winning elect ions siAce t ha t i s the means by which each group

' h I I, , t l th d t h ' hobta lns or opes to o b t a ~ n what ~ wants, bu e egree 0 w ~ e lec tora l victory ~ s l ~ a l u e d by each group d i ~ f e r s . Each type of

t ' t h ' I II t . d ' I 't t' hac or ~ an a pa1rtn hen f ~ s herse l f ~ a s ua aon w e r e

s t r a t e g ~ c calculat ions are s t ruc tured not only by a given se t of

in te re s t s but by o t l e ~ \ c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such as Jompeting arenas ( the

e lec tora l versus t h lh s t i tu t iona l ) and the i nJ t i tu t iona l design of

1:1 I

the par ty . l

Socia l democrJt iJ par t ies contain blue-cb l la r , White-col lar ,

profess ional and s \ t u ~ e n t i n t e res t s . They dontain profess iona l

I , t " . t \: ,Id

" Ipo ~ c ~ a n s , ~ e r e s t groups r e p r e s e n t a t ~ v e s an a c t ~ v ~ s t s from a I

of these diverse inh1erests. Electoral s t JategieS and pol icy



15

I .

. I I

preferences vary according to which coal i t i ?n l of in te re s t s

I. ' I t b thdom1nates the par ty . Cons1derable d1sagreemen s i etween ese

, ' 'h 11,1 tgroups may eX1st , but the leve l to wh1ch t ese greemen s are

I i)d1sa

car r i ed into par ty policy and e lec to ra l s t ~ a t e g y depends on

I II Ilin s t i tu t iona l design of the par ty and the exte,nt to which each

l' l. "I '1 d h ' d d broup perce1ves 1t s 1n t e res t as be1ng he pe or a.n e re yI I: )

bringing th e conf l i c t ihs ide the par ty to bear ~ p o n i t s e lec to ra l

lI, , Lvs i t hf l h t 'per f ormance. As TsebellJs notes an m s ana YS1S 0 e ques 10n w yI I I '

par ty ac t iv i s t s in the ' Labour Party commit "POlitii c a l su ic ide" ,

I I !

incent ives for ac t ion ih Labour are s t ruc tured I I ~ n Isuch a way as to

mak e conf l ' t between Pr11t1c1ans, , an "t on1y poSS1 eC ' d act1v1s s!nqt ' b l

but encourage them i f the ac t iv i s t s can f ind aWjY of bui lding a

I ' Icoa l i t ion with t rade unionis t s to enhance t h e ~ , r ipower resources

I I I I

over pol icy making and personnel decis ions . (Tsebel is , 1990)

Electora l c o n s i d e r a t i o ~ s are le ss important t 4 1 ~ e ac t iv i s t s who

play an in te rna l r a t h ~ r than e lec to ra l game • Equally, par ty

l

I ; I

leaders in th e SPD have) an in s t i tu t iona l incent11vei to ignore loca l

chal lengers as long as ~ e s e chal lengers do n o t l ~ a l e an ex i t option

in terms of a viable chal lenging par ty totbe l e f t of theI I I

SPD.(Koelble, 1991; Kitsche l t , 1988) I I

1 I I

Ins t i tu t ions s t ruc ture the way in which ,po]icy i s made and

t 'b t d t I h'" I I ) l 't ' 1 rt'power d ' r1 u e hroughout t e 1nst1tut1on. II Pi 1 1ca pa 1esS

are organiza t ions with ' l ldifferent forms of i n s t i . t u ~ i o n a l s t ruc ture

. I I I

and accordingly varied/ dis t r ibu t ions of powerti ~ h Labour Party

exhibi ts a ra ther unusual organization in W h ~ " h l decision-making

power over pol icy, peJsonnel and f inance i s l f'he hands of the

1 I I

I I

I



16

It rade union movement. (Minkin, 1978) As long as party leaders have

union suppor t , th ly ' Jre v i r tua l ly immune from pressure of the par ty

a c t i v i s t s or s e c t ~ o ~ J l in t ra -par ty in te re s t s •. However, should they

f a l l o u t of favor! w ~ t h the majori ty of the hnion l eadersh ip they

have no othe r inst l i th l iona l protec t ion . The JomPlete dependence of

Labour Party l e a b e ~ ~ in both Parl iament knd par ty was amply

demonstrated in t h i ~ 7 9 - 1 9 8 1 l e f t i s t coup inJ ide Labour. (Kogan and

Kogan, 1982) U h i ~ h l eaders and l e f t i s t ! ac t i v i s t s formed a

l ' t ' ,1:1 If' 1 d tcoa 1 10n a g a 1 n s t l t ~ e hapless Callaghan group 0 SOC1a emocra s

which was held r e s p ~ h s i b l e fo r the aus t e r i t ) programs of 1976 to

1 7 h ' h th I, ii" . til ( 't h d9 w 1C e u n ~ o n movement d1sl1ked 1n ense y. Gourev1 c an

Bornstein, 1984) II

In s t a rk cont ras t to Labour 's OrganizaJional s t ruc tu re , the

\ I I 1PSOE, SAP and SPO 'are fa r more cent ra l i zed and hiera rch ica l .

I i I IPolicy and personnel I appointments are made ~ par ty leaders , no t

, , I 1.1 , \ ' ,

sect.i.onat 1 n t e r e s t g r o u p s oucs i de of the par ty or act1 v1s t s •

,Ii i, , tHowever, th e dom1nance of the par ty l eaders over par ty act1v1s s

and union i n t e r e s t l ~ f r iLs somewhat among these pa r t i e s . The PSOE

, h t ' d b l I, , ,I k . .1S C arac er1ze y a r e l a t 1ve l y small a c t 1 v 1 ~ t base , a wea un10n

representation w i t h i ~ l t h e party and overwhelming centralized power

s t ruc ture in which p ~ r t y l eaders dominate. (Me1kel, 1989) Both gPO

and SAP have a l a r g ~ \ member",'lip with a s i g t U c a n t union hase.

Party ~ c t i v i s t s cah ~ n do i n ~ l u e n c e l eadersdiP oacis ions t h ~ o u g h ' '1 I, I I l' I,the1r 1nvo vement 1n the loca , reg10nal off1ces and, of course ,

' h ' I ' 1 f eepresent a t I 1,1. i n the 19he s t po 1cy-mak '1ng organs 0 thsome 10r

Ipar ty . (T i l ton , 1990;

I

Koelble, 1991)1

I



17

Both SPO and SAP a ~ also par t ies with consi jerable t i e s to"I , II i 1 t 'the respectl.ve uruon movements. The organl.zat ona connec a.on

bet' I. I: I. . t '

ween unl.on and party )l.S, however, nowhere nea! :a , l.ntl.ma e as l.n

the Bri t ish case. In Germany federal law prohibits the expl ic i tI· I

merging of pol i t ica l part ies with in te res t groups such as unions.

The SPO has no off ic ia l l connection to the u n i o n ~ +though many of

i t s ac t iv is t s and leaders have union credent ials . In Sweden, SAP

'nd the um on movementI are connected an"Is mu,'11ar way - um.on

l

leaders and ac t iv is t s also tend to be active w i i ~ i , the party . At

the local level , t rade ~ n i o n s often form the b , ~ i , and membership

of the party. However"at the national level the pol icy decision

k i d I 'd' t ' II Itt' .ma l.ng process oes no, l.nvolve l.rec unl.on r i ~ r i s e n a l.on as l.n

the Labour Party Annual I Conference. Policy decisions are taken by

I I Iparty leaders and delegates, not t rade union lead.erls. Both par t ies

I IIare hierarchies in which party leaders have a good deal of

I IIdecision-making power la t the expense of act i f i is ts and in te res t

I I I

group representat ives.

The PSOE, mostly as a resu l t of i t s ~ x i l e from spanish

pol i t ics during the Franco era, has only very l10sL organizational

1 II Iconnections to the Spanish union movement. (Sha:t1 11988) While the

I ie, I

spanish union movementlwas instrumental in organ.iiing a local base

II Ilfor the PSOE in the 1 S r the unions and ~ 'Iparty are quite

1970

IIdi s t inc t ent i t ies • T ~ PSOE even a l ienatedt>arl ts of the union, I ! I

movement when it agreid to the "Moncloa pacti'l iJn which it gave

support to the conservat ive Suarez government to impose aus ter i tyI . I

measures to enhance ecdnomic growth and s t a b i l i ~ ~ the t rans i t ion toI I II I !

I 1



18

a democratic regime in 1978 • (Share, 1988) The PSOE affords i t sI I I I

leadership cadre t h !greatest degree of organizational independence

and policy makinJ Jdwers and provides relativelY l i t t l e influence

to the party a c t i ~ i ~ ~ S , even less to i t s trade union constituency.

(Gillespie, 1988)\ \ I I

The crucial l s ~ ~ e i s tha t O r g a n i z a t i o n a ~ structure determines

,I \ \ , , dO' tthe degree to w h ~ b h party leaders control a c t ~ v ~ s t s an u n ~ o n ~ s s

inside the par tJ . I \ This degree of contrbl impacts s t ra tegic

thinking. Acti v i b t ~ \ , polit ici 'ans and unionists agree tha t it is

, t t t .I

i,l,"h

' I t ' t h 10~ m p o r an 0 w ~ POI s ~ t ~ o n s w ~ t h ~ n t e o r g a n ~ z a ~ o 0 s ape po ~ c y .

ll l dh ~ a 0' to shape electora s t ra t egy an pol' a ~ ose p o s ~ t ~ 0 n ~ c ' t0

maintain th is a b i ~ i ~ ~ whereas those out of I[ower hope to obtain

influence. The s J r u ~ t u r e of the party shapes the opportunities by

which these aims a ~ e l , ~ u l f i l l e d . I f a player i s "out" of power, she

faces the choice b 1 t ~ l e n cooperating with thode in power to achieve

a t l eas t some of h l r : ~ n d s ( i . e . l imited vOicelof opposition) or to

challenge those in p c i ~ e r (loud voicing of OPPoLition and the th rea t

of exi t ) . For . L . . a b ~ J r Party ac t iv is t s willlng to challenge tne

social democratic ~ e a b e r s an opportunity aroJe in 1979 to build a

coal i t ion with t r a ~ e hnion in teres ts who had It he power to replaceI I I

1 I 1 Ithe "old guard". Such an opportunity does not exis t for PSOE, SAP

ior SPO e.ctivists wbo lfind themselves in a Pokition where, to get

10k

, III t' w °th 1ead I ~ 1y t 0some c o n c e s s ~ o n s , aoopera ~ o party ers most e

\ i I Iwin them concessioms unless they are able to swamp the party with

' ' t ' \ \ 0 \ 0new act av i s s an s u f f ~ c ~ e n t numbers to take over the e n t ~ r e , t ' f i I . \ 0 0o r g a n ~ z a l.on rom the bottom upwards. T h ~ s s t rategy as u n l ~ k e l y to



19

I

succeed s ince it no t only involves th e mobil izat ion of many new'I

II

I. , ' t h thmembe rs bu t also a g r j a t dea l of prot rac ted I ~ C l l . Vl.sm Wl. e

in ten t ion of changing ~ a r t y personnel and pol icy . (Koelb le , 1991)

I I : IMost par ty ac t iv i s t s dOl not have the pat ience f ~ such a longterm

I I I I, I I

I I I

s t r a t egy .

Nested Games I I ; Preferences« Elec tora l s t r a t eg ie s and Policy

I I I

ChoiceI I

For party ac t i v i s t s , t r ade unionis t s and po l i t i c i ans pol icy

I I I

pr i o r i t i e s vary. They ~ l share , as Mayhew suggests , a des i re to

I

!I I

win e lec t ions and enact 1900d pol icy . (Mayhew, 197 4 ) IThey agree t ha t1

1

th e exte rna l mission of a par ty i s to win powej lb i t they disagree

lover the ex ten t to which winning e lec t ions ought to be placed over

I I I

th e othe r important var iab le ; good pol icy . Fur ther , they d i f f e r

· . t . fl d 1 . d d . I ! h . h t fover th e de f a.m, a.on 0 goo po a.cy epen l.ng I upon w l.C se 0

I I : I

preferences and in te re s t s they represent . I I i

Assuming t h a t p! r ty po l i t i c i ans o r l e a d e ~ s want to win

I IIe lec t ions and make good pol icy ( in t h a t order of preferences) then

li i i I

it i s poss ib le to argue I t h a t po l i t i c i ans are mos. t. l i ke ly to chooseI I

I I I

the "government par ty l l r s t ra t egy . It i s i ndee l l s i r i k ing t h a t th e

par ty l eaders in each 0lf our cases were most inc.l ined towards t ha tI: I

s t r a t egy . In th e s ~ the par ty l eadersh i f i l roup of Vogel,

Lafonta ine , Rau even Brandt favored such a s t r a t egy . In th e SAP,

I I! I

Palme and Erlander; in the PSOE, Guerra and GO.nza les ; in Labour

lI : I

Hatters ley and KinnOCj (eventual ly) favored II a combinat ion of

po l i c i e s aimed a t as broad an e lec to ra l const i fuency as poss ib le .

I , : I

There a re , of course , examples of l eadersh ip f igures who d id not o r

I I I

I II

I I



20

do not agree wi h s u c h a s t ra tegy , but these pol i t ic ians have

committed t h e m s e l v J ~ to represent ing not thJ e lec tora l aims of the

par ty but the s e h t l ~ n a l in te re s t s of e i theJ a group of ac t i v i s t s

, I I I f f t" ) ,( f . ~ . Tony Benn as i'spokesperson for Labour 's 'new Ie o r u n ~ o n in teres ts . II brueia l in t ra -par ty vaJiable i s in how fa r+

t ' 't d i , ! I . t t bl I t block or h;ndero ~ v ~ s an u n ~ o n ~ eres s are a eo.

po1 t . i"c i.ans f rom a d!opt '~ n such a s t ra t egy ' f ' t does not favorI i

t he i r policy pre eriJnces and tangible in te re s t s .

II . ii, h· th t')

While the Ja i Ju la t ions fo r po l i t i c i abs are predominantly

affected by the e lec tora l arena( c o m p e t ~ t

on w ~ 0 e r par~ e

,

par ty ac t iv i s t s t ,nd1to be more affected by oJganizat ional fac tors .

Act ivis t s vOlunt leJ \ t he i r t ime to the paJty for a var ie ty of

I, i I

reasons. Ei the r t h ~ y plan to become pol i t ic ians themselves, in

~ h th II '1 1 I d h i d . , ,wh ' case ey a ~ most l ~ k e y to support ea e rs ~ e c ~ s ~ o n s ~ \ \ I

order to be rewarded by those in power, orI

they are there for

pol icy reasons. J f ~ b they again face the pJoblem of get t ing what

I I Ithey want - cooper,ate

with the leaders or oppose and chal lenge. I f

opposition i s e h o ~ e ~ l a s a s tra tegy then ae t iF i s t s have to map out

a s tra tegy of how ~ o ~ so without being p u n i ~ h e d . It i s d if f i eu l t

to chal lenge the JstWblished e l i t e in h ie rardhica l pa r t i e s such as

SPO, PSOE and sJ Jlthout a grea t dea l of l internal turmoi l andI I I .

r e t a l i a t ion . In ~ e ~ d e r s h i p dominated pa r t i e s , ac t i v i s t s a re more

l ike ly to t ry and Ico'dperate with those in p o ~ e r than to chal lenge

them. Act iv i s t s ~ e ~ ~ to have suppor t from lhe unions fo r t h e i r

'f h I i I I ,po1 " t ey hope' to successful ly chal lenge the par ty e l t e .~ c ~ e s t 1 f d ' t ' .The s t ra e g ~ c c aI II cul 'atn.ons 0 t ra e uru.cna, s s an soc i a 1



21

I

democratic par t i e s il complicated by l oya l t i e s to t h e i r, I i I

organiza t ion . Trade unionis t s may share both i n t e rna l and externa l

missions of a c t i v i s t s alnd/or po l i t i c i ans , bu t ~ ~ also concerned

I IIwith the fa te of the unions preferences and i n t e ~ e s t s . A t r ade

li t " . 1 t i 11 t' t .unionis t not on l y par Lc i paties an e ec ora compe l. a.on

I I i I

c a l c u l a t i ons , i n t r a -pa r t y s t r a t eg ic calcula t ions . bu t a l so in a s e ti I

of intra-union, interrunion and u n i o n - c a P i t ~ 1 I relat ions and

confl icts . As DunleaVYI and Husbands in the sr i f i sb case and Kern

and Schumann in the German case show, union i n t ~ r l s t s are highly

I I i I

fragmented and heterogeneous. (Dunleavy and Husbandsl, 1985: Kern andI I I I

Schumann, 1984) Uuionis t s represent ing workers in dec l in ing

indus t r i es exhib i t a v e ~ y d i f f e ren t view of the ~ . o i l e of the s t a t e ,I ;

the p o l i t i c a l par ty and the union m o v e m e l ~ ithan unionis t s

represent ing blue o r w h ~ t e c o l l a r workers in highly com pet i tive and

I IIwel l -paying sec tors .

I IIReturning to t ab le 1, unions in declini .n g o r endangered

I I i l

i ndus t r i a l sec tors arel

most l ike ly to preferi

i a " soc ia l i s t " o r

"worker is t" s t ra tegy t pro tec t th e jobs and lib.ene f i t s of t he i rI '

workers . It i s no t s u r ~ r i s i n g t h a t th e Nationall

~ n l o n of Miners in

I 'Bri ta in , fo r i n s t ance ,

I

Ica l led fo r a rad ica l i za t ionI

of th e Labour

Party . Arthur scargi l l i l supported the radical l ~ ; t lin Labour in i t s

I ' I

ba t t l e with the soc i a l I democrats. While not , ~ e ~ union becomes

"worker is t" o r inc l in id towards "socia l ism" I ~ i t s indus t r i es

dec l ine , they are most l l ike l Y to favor protecr i ion o f both t he i r

. d t d h i I . .an us ryan t e WOrjfOrCe and, above " ':

I

tihel.r own um.on

organiza t ion . (Golden, 1r90) Extending welfar i sTibenef i t s i s l i ke ly

I

!



I

, I

II 22

" Ito be one of the i r maJor pr i o r i t i e s .

Unions r e p r e ~ e ~ ~ i n g white-col la r w o r k e r ~ and those act ing on

behalf of an i n t e J n ~ ~ i o n a l l Y compet i t ive and 'lhighlY paid workforce

,J:I , I, , d dare f a r 1ess 11.kely to support protect1.on1.sm o r an ee wage

equal iza t ion P O l ~ C ~ ~ s . ( D U n l e a v y and HusbJnds, Esping985;

'I : I , " I , t 1Andersen , 1985 ) Worker1.st or soc1.al1.st st ra teg1.es are no a ways

, th Lnt; I U I , 1 'k 1l.n e l.n e res t s of such a workforce. Such un1.ons a re more 1. e yI I ' I

to suppor t pol ic ieb d ~ S i g n e d to increase comp1t i t iveness , to reduce

tax burdens on I t ~ L i r workers, to encoJrage adjustment to

lnt;t '

1 dl

, 1,1 d I ) h un i.n erna 1.0na con l1.tl.ons.(Kern an Schumann, 1984 Suc un1.ons are

I, I '

Ii,th

a 1so more l .kely' to suppor t a s t ra tegy of adJustment y e

p o l i t i c a l par ty ~ \ a t t r ac t o ther soc ia l ~ r o u p s and mainta in

' 1' , , J th S d ' he 1ec t ora 1 c o m p e t 1 . ~ 1 . v e n e s s . The ~ u r r e n t r 1 . f ~ between e we loS

blue-co l l a r union: ~ J g a n i z a t i o n , the LO, anb some white co l la r

, I I

workers organized in ' l the Teo over th e wage-earner funds i s a good

example of t h i s tybeihf in t ra-union r i V a l r y . ( ~ o n t u s s o n , 1987) The

I ' I I

l.cy f "th'l

ese argeo I , pre erences 0 f' some uru.ons W1. an th t wo 1 uru onI i I I

organizat ions are lit', l idS over such f u n d a m e n ~ a l i ssues concerning

working c l a s s p r e f : e r ~ , n c e s and s t r a t eg ie s . I

Not a l l unionls ~ I , a l l in to one category o th e othe r as neat ly

I i I Ias th e researcher Imight hope. The German metalworkers union (IG

Metal l ) or th e B r i t l ~ h miners (NUM), fo r in l t ance , conta in bothI: I

d 1" I, f' Iwork e rs an compet "1.1t':ove and ec l.n1.ng annd u s t r ~ e s o r l.rms. These

I IIunions sUffer from i n t e rna l dissent ion oV$r su i t ab l e pol icy .

, , I I

Further , the re are \a n ~ u m b e r of fac tors which may lead unions no t to

'I ' I '

advocate pol ic ies faJorable to the in te rna t iona l pos i t ion of t he i r

i



23

I

i ndus t r i e s . For ins tance , one can imagine a s i tua t ion where an

I I I I

indust ry i s doing poorllY but has succeeded i l l , lOSing out the

unions from organiz ing I the workforce. In such et scenar io, the

'tt t' II, It ' t fun10n may no share the concerns and pro ec 10n1st sen 1men s 0

I I i lthe owners. Alternat iVejY' unions in com pe t i t ive l tn ius t r ie s may not

share f ree t r ade prefer jnCes i f they a re s u s p e c l ~ e l to lead to th e

weakening of th e union. The surv iv a l of the union as an

, " I, ,II dl " thorgan1zat10n 1S the most 1mportant var1able eterm1n1ng e

I I ! I

ca lcu la t ions of t r ade union a c t i v i s t s and l eade rs . (Golden, 1988)

I I INever the less , unions dOl tend to suppor t e i t h e r I ~ economic pol icy

geared towards interna1t ional compet i t iveness l i r lone aiming a t

protect ionism and th e con t ro l o f markets and P ~ O d r c t i o n . Unions

' , . 1" , l id ' .represent 1ng b l ue -co l l a r workers 1n dec 1n1ng i i s t r 1 e s are more

l i ke ly to suppor t a IIwoikeristtt or even t t s o c i a l i i ~ t t l pol icy s t ra tegy

than unions represent ing profess ionals , white ~ o l l a r workers and

' t 't ' I, d t .worke rs an compe 1 1ve 1n us r i.ee , II

In t r a -pa r t y Coal i t ion ,U i ld ing I! I

The pol icy ChOiies and e lec to ra l s t r j r e j i eS of soc i a l

democratic par t i e s r e f l ec t the dominance of d iverse i n t r a -pa r ty

I II Icoa l i t i ons . The osc i l l a t i on of pol icy from slicilalism to soc i a l

democracy to the government par ty s t r a t egy in the PSOE' s case

I I Ir e f l e c t s the sense of I uncer ta inty among the F ,a iY leaders as to

which pol icy di rec t ion might work in a newly es tab l i shed democracy.

While party s t ra te9 isFs needed time to f i ~ r Ian appropriate

s t r a t egy , the absence of an in t ra -par ty b l ue -co l l a r i n t e r e s t group

al lowed the pa r ty l e a d ~ r s to adopt th e vote-Jax lmiz ing s t r a t egy

I I I

II



I 24

r e l a t ive ly qUiCkl!y And unencumbered. Once it became c l ea r tha t

conservat ive and i i ~ l r a l par t i e s had not capJured the middle c l a s s

I I, I I

vote , the PSOE: qui te r a t i ona l l y went a'ifter t h i s e lec to ra l: I

const i tuency with,I ~ l i c i e s qui te u n a t t r a c t i ~ e to the blue-co l l a r

workers and t h e i r ! u ~ l o n s . ( W i l l i a m s , 1988) I

The Labour p l r J ~ , on the o the r hand, addpted pol ic ies favored

by unions O r g a n i Z ~ n ~ workers in decl in ing ihdus t r i es a f t e r 1979.

I "I • , t d th I d . CIn Labour blue-co l l a r ~ n t e r e s t s d o m ~ n a e e Tra e U n ~ o n ongress

I I I

I I(TUC) and the Labour Par ty Annual Conference. Only a f t e r two

I :1 I

massive e l ec t o ra l defea ts has the par ty a d o ~ t e d a pol icy packageI I I 'I. h

favoz:able of grouPls ~ t h e r than blue-co l l a r workers . P a r t ~ a l l y , t e

s h i f t i s also eXPlicJble by a s h i f t within t h union movement away

from blue-co l l a r J o i ~ e r . The TUC has l o s t o ~ e r 4 mil l ion members

since 1979 most of ~ h o m were blue-collar . iThe dominance of the

blue-co l l a r unions i J fading in the TUC and, , thereby, in Labour.

I I I 'The SPO and I SAP cases are somewhat l ess c lea r cut . Both

I. I I d d . tpar t ~ e enJoy th e support of the broa e r t r a e u n ~ o n movemen. In

both par t i e s , bluJ-ddl l a r in te re s t s are s t r O ~ g l Y rep resen ted . The

Swedish LO, the b ~ u ~ L c o l l a r union O r q a n i z a t ~ o n , has fo r decades

dec i s i . filii l' ( . It! ). . 1 1een a e c ~ s ~ v e ~ uence on SAP po ~ c y . T on, 1990 S ~ m ~ a r y,

blue-co l l a r i n t e r J s ~ J a re s t rongly r e p r e s e n t ~ d within th e German

t r ade union federk t ibn (OGB). (Markovi ts , 1 9 ~ 6 ) In cont ras t to

Sweden, however, i h ~ ~ e i s no union assoc ia t ld spec i f i ca l ly with

I' ::

I •

I

I • d 1b lue-co11a r ~ n t e r e s t s s rnce German una.ons .are ozqana ae a ongI '

sec t o ra l or i n d u s t + i ~ ~ l i nes . How then can w I

expla in the absence

of s ign i f i can t opJ,oslJtion to th e new policy 'lin Sweden eventhough



25

· I

the re i s a s i gn i f i can f b lue -c o l l a r presence l i1 the SAP and

r e l a t ive ly s t rong o P P o s ~ t i o n in Germany where t h i ~ e ~ s apparent ly ,

no spec i f i c b lue -c o l l a r organizat ion with in th e I SPO?

,I I IThe puzzle can be solved by a br i e f "ana lys i s of theIIIevelopment with in the unions and th e re la t ionship between unions

I . f II I t I' fand par ty . Although th e LO may have 1n luenced par y po 1Cy o rI ! I

some t ime , it does notl dominate t he pa r ty h i e ~ a r r h Y . LO i s an

i n t e r e s t group increaSirglY chal lenged by g r o u P I ~ sluch as the Teo,

representa t ive of whi teTcol lar workers , for in f luence upon th e SAP

l eadersh ip . A g r a d U a ~ s h i f t towards pUbl ic l ~ e t i c e and white

co l la r unions has taken place in th e Swedish union movement,

weakenen1ng t he LO. I ron1cal ly , th e LO has b I ! a1 u t th ' h ' f t! rought 00 1S s 1

with i t s s t rong support! of extending th e PUbl ic l feJ tor and thereby

the growth o f pubH,c sec ror , White -co l la r w o r k e r ~ T eJsPing-Andersen., I

1990) I II

More important , however, i s th e pol icy or ien ta t ion of the LO

I I! I

concerning th e i n t e r e s t s of decl in ing i n d u s t r i e ~ a n r t h e i r workers .

The LO committed i t s e l ~ to economic and f i s l ~ l P O l i C Y designedn

to discourage th e s u r v i ~ 1 1 a l of decl in ing i n d u s t r l ~ s (Mart in , 1984)

II

The defense o f dec l in inrindus t r ie s i s no t a parfiCUlarlY impor tan t

i tem on th e LO's agenda: th e secur ing of b e n e ~ i t s to workers

. . ' . II I ha f f ect e d by dec l i.ne 1S paramount. (M1lner, 1989)1 I T!hrough a o s t of

II

Ieducat ional , soc i a l and economic po l i c i e s the I t rans it ion from

i ndus t r i a l decl ine to i ~ t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v ~ n e s , s i s accelera ted, I ! I

by SAP po l i cy . (steinmo'l 1989) The b l ue -co l l a r Iiec tor in Sweden i s

l e s s committed to defending decl in ing i ndus t r i a l i n t e r e s t s or wage

I I,



26

I I .

sol idar i ty than s 0 m ~ l w h i t e col lar unions. I

In the SPO, l ~ u m b e r of pr9dominantly blue-col lar industr ia l

unions formed parl bk the coal i t ion s u p p o r t ~ n g Helmut Schmidt as

. I : I I , 'd l ' ,chance11or dUrl.ng: t,ge 1970' s , Blue-collar I um.ons an ec l.nl.ng

industr ies do not ddminate the SPO, but through the i r power in

unions such as

1 ~ J energy, mineworkersl, construction and

metalworkers u n i o t s ~ ! t h e Y have been able tol r e s i s t par ty policy

changes unfavorablr ~ t he i r indus t r ies . p a r ~ i C U l a r l Y on 'the issue

of environmental policy, union representatives from these unionsI I I

were instrumental \i n blocking attempts· to re ta in the Green vote in: ' ,

the party during I ~ ~ 1970's and recaptuJing it with policy

• , I ': I I

conceas rcns an the: early 1980's. The blue-col1l.ar sector prolonquedI ' I

't 'f l ,: . I ,I. S an uence an rthe SPO through l.t s supporrt for Johannes Rau,

minister presidenJ df North-Rhine westPhalia l (and SPO chancellor, : I

candidate in 1987) I, the heartland of declining industr ies . I t has

only recently l o s t ! s ~ ~ e of i t s influence Withih the party hierarchy

II I Iaf te r the electoral defeats of 1983 and 1987.

I n 11 part l.es, II , bIll 'r l .nterests have decI 'aned an ue-co

't I ! I ,I .l.mpor ance. HoWeViter,1 the more establl.shed blue-col lar l .nterestsI ' I

representing d e C l i n i ~ g industr ia l in teres ts l were within theseI I '

par t ies , the moreld{fficult the t rans i t ion ~ a vote-maximizing

II : Istrategy was for the Iparty concerned. The absence of a powerful

I I:

blue-col lar r e p r e s b n t ~ t i o n in the PSOE leadetship cadre explains

I I I I

the par ty ' s very rapid' adoption of the "government party" stra tegy.

The dominance of ~ l J ~ - c o l l a r in teres ts in e ~ d a n g e r e d indus t r ia l

sectors in Labour e ~ ~ l a i n the par ty ' s a d j U ~ t m e n t di f f icu l t i es ,



" , t' 1:1 t' b t 27par t 1cular ly S1nce 197,. The organ1za 10na sepera 10n e ween

blue-col lar unions and white co l l a r in teres ts , ~ ~ l a , s commitment

I I i I

to discourage decl in ing tndus t r i es and fos t e r i n l ~ s i r i a l winners as

well as the rap id growth o f white co l la r sec tors !anld incorpora t ion

lo f former b l ue -co l l a r ~ o r k e r s in to t h i s sector! . in Sweden expla in

. I I I l

th e SAP's ab i l i t y to adapt r e l a t ive ly smoothly. IThe organ iza t iona l

entrenchment of b lue -c + la r in teres t s unt i l q u i l ~ e [recently in the

SPO l eadersh ip cadre help us unders tand why th.e ISPO had such aI I !

d i f f i c u l t t r ans i t i on flrom soc i a l democracy tlo th e "government

I I! I

party" s t r a t egy . In th e SPO's case the addi t ion of Eas t GermanI ! !

b l ue -co l l a r workers in l c r i s i s may ind ica te al i fu r t he r round of

I ! I I

adapta t ion problems s ince it i s l i ke ly tha t I ~ h Eas t German, :1 . I

economic c r i s i s wi l l adV e r se l y a f f e c t the blue-co l l a r sec tors in aI I I I

uni ted Germany. I

S Conc I US10ns: Qrgan1zat10ns an h 'me , I" d C 01ces I

!

This a r t i c l e u t i l i z e s a novel approach in comparative

I IIpo l i t i c s , th e nested games t hes i s . It rep resen t s pnly a f i r s t and

I II !

t en t a t ive s tep in an at tempt to analyse in t ra -par ty po l i t i c s in a, I I I

much more r igorous and formal manner. The alrgument holds t h a t

I I I I

soc i a l democratic par t f e s are searching fo r ai njw po l i t i c a l and

e lec to ra l s t ra tegy and I that the ab i l i t y of IIconi,erativell elements

( in t h i s case unions r ~ p r e s e n t i n g workers in dec l ining i ndus t r i e sI I I I

. . I

which do no t want to Isee a s h i f t away from If r j d i t i ona l aocLa l

democrat ic o r even s oc i a l i s t pol ic ies ) i s an i m p o ~ l t a n t var iab le inI I 'I I I

expla in ing why some par t i e s adopt a vote-maximizing s t ra tegy

Lckl h th!' , , I I, f I. t d ' t tqua,c Y w ereas 0 e r part1es experaence s1gn1 a.can a JUS men

I I



i

I 28II

problems. The at i i l i : ty of such conservat ive groups i s def ined by

the Organizat ionJ, l I J t ructures of the par ty \and th e re la t ionsh ip

. between b l u e - c o l l ~ r l ~ n t e r e s t s (par t i cu la r ly 6niOnS) and the pa r ty

ea h ' \ mo.re offl .ce-seekl .ng I l ' t " con 11 de rs ap , The ii, , par ty po l. a.c i ans t ro

e l ec t o ra l s t r a t e ~ JAd pol icy decis ions , the Imor e l i ke ly the pa r ty

t d t I i.\ I , f l 0 , , 0l.S 0 a op v o t e - ~ a X I m l . Z l . n g s t ra tegl .es . The more l.n uence unl.ons

' d 1] .i I 'd '1 h I "thO t thepresen t l.ng ec l.nl.ng l.n us t r l .a sec tors a ~ Wl. l.n a par y e

more d i f f i c u l t th1e i Ja r ty ' s t r ans i t i on to t J e "government party"

s t r a t egy . A f i J a ~ I word of warning: raPib adjus tment to new

elec tora l c o n d i t l 1 n ~ Idoes not guarantee e l e c J r a l victory. The SAP

and PSOE face s t i f f ~ i e c t o r a l t e s t s ( p a r t i a l li due to th e defec t ion

of groups t h a t h a v ~ l ~ f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of t hL i r vote-maximizat ion

' ) hil l " be d ' ·1s t ra t egy. l.n t e pext s e t of elect l .ons whl.le La ur an SPD may l.n

! I If ac t recover from the abysmal performances of the 1980 ' s .

The a r t i c l e J ~ s o qua l i f i e s Olson 's largument concern ing

organ iza t iona l a d a p ~ l t i o n . (Olson, 1982) m h l e th e Labour case

appears to v i n d i c l t ~ l o l s o n ' s po in t t h a t too lmany i n t e r e s t groups

"clog up" o r g a n i z ~ t l b n a l adjustment , the S A case shows t h a t if

organiza t ions a d a ~ t ! I to changing c o n d i t i o n ~ then they remain

t ' t ' h \ lid s h 'l . f t by a 1 1 f o u ~ I par t l .es to a vote ompe l. ave , T e , gra ua l ,

I I \. \maximizing s trateq¥ also suggests tha t part ie s do learn from past

e r ro r s and adjUstJ ~ ~ e n if t h a t process i s la painfUl one. The

a r t i c l e a l so SUggJstW t h a t while Downs may b vindica ted th rough

th e eventua l adap t J t{ ln o f a l l four p a r t i e s , t he d ive rgen t pa ths to

' " iIt 'd ' . I "a vo t e-maxl.ml.zl.ng ou come a re a n l .catl .ve t h a t ratl .onall . ty fo r

po l i t i c a l pa r t i e s lis! no t merely a ques t ion 6f winning votes but



. 29

. . I . t dth I dba I so of competl.ng l .nternal l .nteres s an games p aye y

I I

po l i t i c i ans , a c t i v i s t s ~ n union is t s .I . I

I

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I I ' ICrewe, Ivor , "The Decld.ne of Labor and the Decline of Labour",Paper presented a t the American P o l i t i c a l ScieQce Associa t ion

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Esping-Andersen, Gosta , The Three Worlds of Welflare cap i ta l i sm,Pr inceton , Pr ince ton Univers i ty press , 1 9 9 0 .

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The Minda de Gunzburg ICenter for European Studies is an interdiscIplinaryprogram organized within the Harvard Faculty of Arts and S g e n c ~ s and

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Since its establishmentJ1969, the Center has tried to orient students towardsquestions that have been Ineglected both about past developments i eighteenth- and n i n e t e e ~ t h - e e n t u r y European societies and ab6ut the present.The Center's approach iJ comparative and interdisciplinary, +ith k strong

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