Rebels and Population Control: (Somalia and Nigeria in Comparative

Perspective)

Will RenoNorthwestern University

www.willreno.org, reno@northwestern.edu

In the first instance:

•How do different forms of rebel—non-combatant relationships emerge?

•What are the consequences for rebel recruitment and organizational cohesion in war zones?

Known #1: Military resources can generally be used by a combatant to establish control over areas regardless of the population’s political predisposition, which in turn generates a threshold of collaboration over time (Kalyvas).

Example: Abu Musab al Zarqawi & the Omar Brigade – practitioners in Iraq of Kalyvas’s theory of control (through targeted assassinations). This affects how rebels manage resources & capitalize on information.

Known #2: Prewar community institutions matter-a theory of social order in civil wars to explain how different forms of rebel governance emerge (Arjona)

Weak local institutions -> culus regio, eius religio; the people follow the ruler’s choice

Strong local institutions -> rebels at bay. Institutions matter over resources & rebel strategic motivation.

Another known: Pre-existing networks (political parties, religious associations, student & veteran groups, etc.) shape the initial organization of rebel groups (Staniland).

Networks are re-purposed for war. They shape the organizational options for how rebels build their own ranks & institutions at the local level

A Puzzle: Why would rebels who exercise control refrain from discriminate use of violence?

Why would rebels with (apparent) organizational resources fail to utilize them?

No more holiday from history: changing center of gravity of the state—rebel relationship

Nascent nation-states guerrilla rebels

Industrializing states urban insurgency

Periphery state-building Maoist “liberated zones”

Periphery Patronage states fragmented rebels

Add a research question: If rebel fragmentation is the dominant mode, where does cohesive rebel organization come from?

State collapse is a distinct context for conflict: Blurring the rebel-government distinction

Pre-conflict states of reciprocal infiltration & violence

Patronage state regimes infiltrate social networks as an alternative exercise of authorityPatronage politics supplemented with violence: Use of “creative tension” to undermine collective actionReverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime… which works if hierarchy is maintainedA disruption – usually externally determined Fragmentation rebel war

STATUS – OTHER ARMED GROUPS – SOUTH SUDAN

LEGENDThe locations/areas on this map are approximate. Names, sectors, locations,

alignements, affiliation are to be verified.

ADONGFORCE

John Mankoer100 (413)

17

DINNIFORCES

Hassan Doyak200 (500)

32

MOBILEFORCES

Vincent Kuany500 (866)

10

BALKOKPOP. DEF.

Hassan Doyak200 (500)

30

KALTOKFORCES

Gabriel Mding Fon50 (250)

31

CHAYOTFACTION

Saddam Chayot400 (950)

21/22

NASIRPOP. DEF.

John Jok100 (300)

20

CHOL GAGAGROUP

Hassan Doyak100 (500)

23

NASIRGROUP

Gordon Kong400 (3500)

7

AKOBOFORCES

Timothy Juoc300 (650)

34

SSLM/AGabriel Yoal Doc

500 (700)33

PIBORDEF. FORCEIsmael Konyi1000 (4000)

40/41

SIMONGATWICH

Simon Gatwich150 (2000)

35

BORGROUP

Kelia Deng Kelly100 (230)

46

BOYA/DIDINGAFORCES

Mahamed Losek50 (180)

47

LAFONFORCES

Kamal R. Beligo50 (100)

48

EDF-SSDF(EDF II)

Fabiano Odongi500 (2850)

43

TOPOSAFORCES

Chief Lokipapa50 (600)

44

W. EQUATORIADEF. FORCE

xxx50 (150)

50

BAR EL JEBELFORCES

Paulino Lonyombe500 (950)

45

W. EQUATORIAPOP. DEF.

Steward Soroba50 (100)

49

MUNDARIFORCES

Clement Wani400 (4900)

39

JEBELFORCES II

John Both Tap500 (1350)

12

DOLEIBFORCES

Thomas Mabor100 (1127)

9

NATIONALPEACE FORCE

El Tom El Nur100 (3000)

36

FANGAKFORCES

Gabriel Tang500 (3350)

11

AWEILGROUP

Abdel Bagi200 (1500)

37/38

GADET’SFORCES

Peter Gadet100 (350)

5

SSUM/APaulino Matiep

500 (2500)1

THE UNITEDFACTION

James Othow500 (2116)

14

PARIANGFORCES

Samuel Mayiek300 (1500)

4

MABANFORCES

Musa Birima50 (250)

29

AKOKAFORCE

Thon Amum100 (410)

15

ALLAK DENGFACTIONAllak Deng500 (150)

27

ABOYGROUP

Paul Aboy100 (300)

8

MELUTPEACE FORCE

William deng2000 (300)

26

SOBATFORCE

Simon Yei300 (500)

19

MUSA DOULAFACTIONMusa Doula

500 (300)28

RENKPEACE FORCE

Chol Al Ahmar100 (400)

24

CHOL LEWISFACTIONChol Lewis200 (1227)

25

SSIM/APeter Dor400 (1900)

3

STATUS – OTHER ARMED GROUPS – SOUTH SUDAN

(K-7)

Aligned with SPLA.Aligned with SAF.

Reportedly aligned with SPLA. To be verified.Mainly aligned with SAF. Some sub-units aligned with SPLA.

Part of SSDF (prior to the Juba declaration). Associated, but not officially an integrated part of SSDF. Sometimes referredto as Central Equatoria Defence Forces. SSDF originators (Khartoum Peace Agreement).Originated from Anyanya 2

Mainly emerged after the Juba declaration. Splinter groups/re-hatted PDF. Originated from SPLA

SAF garrisons/locations. SAF/OAG/PDF/MI-elements often co-located.SPLA deployment areas/locations.

SABRI ACHOLFORCES

Sabin Achol100 (445)

16

SSDF – ABYEYThomas Thiel

50 (600)

6

The desert of the real

Two Kinds of RebelsTown Rebels: Riek Machar, political insider, at his “rebel” HQ last April

Bush Rebels: I don’t know who he is, but he is socially isolated

* What is R.M.’ reading? Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States, Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail

Notes on Data & Measurement

• Bad data example: How much territory did Boko Haram control in early March 2015? (52,000 km² [Telegraph], 30,000 km² [WSJ], 20,000 km² [Guardian] – how is territorial control conceptualized and how does territory matter?

• Imputed intentions and goals: What’s up with Boko Haram and the caliphate? Are shared flag and media formats the same thing as affiliation with ISIS?

• Faulty conceptualization: What and who is “Shabaab” at a particular time and place?

A model of armed group control in collapsed state conflicts

Symmetric Conflict Asymmetric Conflict

Town Rebels

Bush Rebels

Violence: Indiscriminate-predatory to maintain resource controlInformation: Indirect - signal presence to a wide audience

Violence: Selective- to gain control of resources Information: Direct - manage to conceal actions & protect civilians

Violence: Indiscriminate –to hollow out state & protect resource access Information: Indirect – signal state incapacities

Violence: Discriminate (high) – bid to isolate & control civilians (foquismo) Information: Direct - conceal action & intimidate civilians

Another Two-by-two

Symmetric: [Collapsing states and competitive mutual state-rebel infiltration]

Asymmetric: [FMT, advisors, intervention forces arrive]

Town Rebels Somali warlords

Establishment Bokos

Post-2009 Bokos

Bush Rebels Pre-2012 Shabaabs

Country Shabaabs

Bad Shabaabs[i.e., Kenya Shabaab]

And the importance of ground checking concepts

Al Shabaab Rabbit Hole

Boko Haram Rabbit Hole