Reargue Les Pendence
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Transcript of Reargue Les Pendence
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On March 8, 2010, Judge Jennings ruled plaintiff’s filed les pendence was to be
vacated. Thereby, deciding plaintiff’s cause of action for relief is devoid of probable
cause. This determination is in effect that a reasonable suspicion, supported by
circumstances are sufficiently strong to justify a prudent and cautious person's belief that alleged
facts of grievance corresponding to ownership are probably not true.
The decision (exh ) said:
“The Notice of Lis Pendens dated December 10, 2008 filed by the plaintiff Delmo L.
Zanette . . . is hereby discharged pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-
325b for the reason as presently pleaded in plaintiffs Substituted Revised Complaint
filed in this court on October 2, 2009 the plaintiff seeks only monetary damages and a
judicial, dissolutions of the above two Connecticut limited liability companies which
own’ those properties, which claims are exclusively limited to personal property and
cannot "affect real property", as that term is defined in Section 52-325 (b) of the
Connecticut General Statutes. . .See also Wheeler v. Polasek, 21 Conn. App. 32 (1990).
Essentially, Judge Jennings determined that plaintiff’s law suit does not correspond to a dispute
over the parties’ rights, interests and privileges to ownership of property. Even when the court
knew the outrageous unconscionable and one sided nature of the bargain contained in the May
27th agreement. Especially, with considering that defendants’ refer to the agreement as legally
justifying their claim of ownership. Instead of showing that they paid any money for the
conveyance; since they feel their influence of the court should enforce their ownership in
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substation of the fact that they not only did not pay any money, but looted the assets and equity
of the property for over a million dollars, to then loot plaintiff’s valuable personal property.
This is where instead of our courts protecting the rights of an innocent, vulnerable.
Yet, Judge Jennings in accordance to 52-325b, decided upon the consideration of the facts before
him, that probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim was not established . . . This is on the
basis of an amended complaint by plaintiff’s attorney that was not signed or known by plaintiff,
but was articulated by plaintiff’s attorney Mark Katz who exercised total control.
Since Katz signed the pleadings in substitution of plaintiff’s determination and even did not
provide him with any copies of the legal papers. Insomuch as Katz’s isolation of plaintiff from
determining his legal agenda conformed to his malicious activities of working to further the
agenda of the opposition. Simultaneously Katz intentionally sabotaged plaintiff’s ability to
prevail in court. Such as where the prior complaint Katz composed stating the cause of action
was fraud was substituted
Judge Jennings determined plaintiff’s action lacked ‘probable cause’ to the negative application
of 52-325b (2) Burden of proof at hearing. Order of court:
“52-325b (2) order such notice of lis pendens discharged of record if (A) probable cause
to sustain the validity of the plaintiff's claim is not established or (B) in an action that
alleges an illegal, invalid or defective transfer of an interest in real property, the initial
illegal, invalid or defective transfer of an interest in real property occurred sixty years or
more prior to the commencement of the action.
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However, it raises serious questions as to why Judge Jennings ruled without expressing interest
to view the instruments corresponding to the recording of title. Since, damages sought due to the
breech of the agreement and the adjudicated dissolution of the LLC’s unequivocally corresponds
to affect the sale of the properties. control the property have a direct bearing on parties control
the sale and the distribution of the equity. Correspond to the rights of parties corresponding
The relief sought was § 34-207 ‘Judicial dissolution’ of the LLCs would have a direct bearing of
interest of ownership since the formation of the LLCs was the factor of appropriating 50%
ownership. This was in good faith by plaintiff without any consideration whatsoever. Thus the
action of the dissolution of the LLC’s on the basis of defendants’ bad faith and unfair dealings
would revert back to the status quo where plaintiff was the sole owner of the properties.
§ 34-208. “Winding up of the business and affairs” of the LLC’s on the basis of defendants
improper conduct. Whereby, the statue provides outside of: “(2) settle and close the business of
the limited liability company;” but “(3) dispose of and transfer the property of the limited
liability company; (4) discharge the liabilities of the limited liability company; and (5) distribute
to the members any remaining assets of the limited liability company.
This action provided in 34-208 clearly affect the sale and distribution of the equity created from
the sale. Thus, it is beyond belief as to what Judge Jennings was going by to make such a
determination that the litigation does not affect the disputed properties. In fact the case law
referred to his decision could not even be read into ditmus to be considered applicable to this
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matter, e.g: Wheeler v. Polasek, 21 Conn. App. 32 (1990) contained no dispute on the matter of
the established mutual ownership of the same property. Instead the cause of action stated:
“This action was brought by the plaintiff for an accounting of partnership assets, breach
of fiduciary duty, damages for management fees and damages for misrepresentation
under the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”
The courts rightfully found that the action did not affect the mutually owned property. Since
Wheeler’s complaint was against the partnership itself and based on violations to the Uniform
Partnership Act, as found in General Statutes § 34-39. Thus for judge Jennings to refer to this
case as to what he based his decision upon makes no legal sense and establishes his ruling was an
arbitrary and capricious decision of a partisan nature.
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