Real World Strategies - Global Campaign for...

WorldStrategiestowards Education for All

by2015

Real

Commissioned by the Global Campaign for Education, 2010

A Project Documentation & Assessment Report

A STORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY ADVOCACY

Authors

The report was researched and written byKate Moriarty, with regional case studiesresearched and written by Barbara Fortunato(Asia and Pacific), Omar Ousman Jobe(Africa) and Ilich Leon Ortiz Wilches (Latin America and the Caribbean). The Colombian case study was researchedand written by Yenny Carolina Ramirez.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge with thanks the RWS documentation andassessment reference group – Jill Hart,Giovanna Modé, Solange Akpo, LimbaniNsapato and Raquel Castillo – for theirguidance and support in the research andediting process.

Special thanks

A special thanks goes to all members of thenational education coalitions in Africa, Asiaand Latin America who gave their time toshare the stories of their work.

A further thank you is required to everyoneelse who participated in this research processincluding staff at the GCE Secretariat, boardmembers of GCE, and the external researchparticipants from INGOs, the UN andgovernments.

A final thank you is needed for theGovernment of the Netherlands for thefunding of the costs involved in the researchand production of this report.

Publication informationDesign by Sandra Clarke, S37 Design

Printed by Reynolds Press

Cover photo: João Zinclar/CLADE

Fábi

o P

osse

bom

/Agê

ncia

Bra

sil

FOREWORD 3

Foreword

The Global Campaign for Education welcomes the opportunity to share thisdocumentation and assessment report on the Real World Strategies II project. Over thepast five years, GCE has collaborated with our regional network members in Africa,Asia and Latin America to successfully carry out this project, providing strong, flexiblesupport for the work of national education coalitions. We invite you to explore theanalysis of RWS II achievements and challenges in Part 1, and to read and learn fromthe 12 case studies in Part 2. The final part of the report succinctly summarisesrecommendations for national coalitions, regional networks and the GCE Secretariatand Board.

RWS II has provided crucial support to national education coalitions who advocate forthe right to education in local, national, regional and global spaces. National coalitionsand regional networks have used the RWS II funding provided by the Government ofthe Netherlands to take diverse and creative action on education: reaching out toinvolve excluded children, youth and adults directly in campaigning; engaging withnational election and budget processes; and taking the bold new step of using legalaction to challenge violations of the right to education. Through RWS II, coalitions have strengthened their abilities to conduct robust research work, such as the Education Watch publications, providing persuasive evidence to governments to showthem the real state of education and pressing for the changes in policy, practice andbudget allocations that will make a difference to the lives of girls, boys, women and men in their country.

The evidence gathered for this report points to the overall conclusion that RWS II hasbeen a success. The report does not shy away from the flaws and challenges the projectexperienced, but presents these openly for learning. The case studies and analysispresented on the following pages bring to light “a multitude of achievements, some big, some small” and they point to the urgent need to sustain the gains made, not just in coalitions’ own capacities, but in the real world. Coalitions do not exist for their own sake, but to make positive change for fellow citizens, by advocating for educationfor all, a right that faces even greater threat in the current climate of austerity.Education coalitions can and do make a difference. But they cannot do this withoutresources. Thus, ongoing donor support is imperative.

This report highlights how, in the lead author’s words, “projects such as RWS II are the foundations for building a strong, democratic global movement of activists, whotogether will be able to demand the change that is needed to achieve EFA”. With lessthan five years to 2015, we need to pursue the EFA agenda agreed in Dakar withrenewed determination. Let us take inspiration from the learning in this report, andreaffirm our belief that, despite the complexities and challenges of the real world, civilsociety, governments and donors can together transform society so that everyonebenefits from education.

Kailash SatyarthiPresident, Global Campaign for Education

4 C O N T E N T S

C o n t e n t s PAGE

Foreword Previous page

Acronyms and abbreviations used in this report 6Executive summary 8Introduction 10Purpose, scope and methodological limitations 12A note on reading this report 13

P a rt 1 Real World Strategies – towards EFA 2015: an assessment 15

Section 1 The background to RWS II 16The theoretical underpinning of RWS advocacy 16The origins and aims of RWS II 16Box 1: The RWS II project objectives 17RWS in operation 18The range and scope of RWS II 18The context of the project 19

Section 2 Localised action, global change 21Changing landscapes in national EFA advocacy 21Box 2: RWS II works for and with children and

adults denied their right to education 21Size and outputs 22Box 3: A snapshot of non-case study RWS coalition activity 2006-2010 23Policy change 24Process 24Structures and systems 25Sustaining activism through reflection 26Regional Networks: builder, initiator or enabler? 27CLADE and RWS 28Box 4: A snapshot of CLADE activities 2006-2010 29Box 5: Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación:

an RWS II success story 30ANCEFA and RWS 33Box 6: Highlights of ANCEFA capacity building support 2006-2010 33Box 7: A snapshot of ANCEFA activities 2006-2010 34ASPBAE and RWS 35Box 8: A snapshot of ASPBAE activities 2006-2010 36RWS and the regions 37Box 9: Building high level influencing through regional action 38RWS global coordination and action 40Box 10: RWS II and CONFINTEA VI: a story of coordinated global advocacy 4 2

Section 3 Did it work? 46

Section 4 Global lessons 48Key Lessons 49

Local action, global change is a valid concept but requires a strategy 49Build institutions 50Limit advocacy focus 50Constructive dialogue but no compromise on rights 50Flexible and reliable financing for sustainability 51Research and knowledge creation 51Learning for future practice 51

CONTENTS 5

P a rt 2 E FA Advocacy in the Real World: PAGE

the country case studies 5 3

Introduction 54

Latin Context 55America Case Study: The policy advocacy experience of Colectivo de Educación

para Todos y Todas of Guatemala in the search for free basic education 56Case Study: Brazilian campaign for the Right to Education –

leading the drive for quality education resourcing and strengthening civil society advocacy for education 61

Case Study: Colombia – advocacy for recognition of free basic education 66Case Study: CLADE advocacy experience regarding several forms of

discrimination in education 70R e g i o n a l Summary: Latin America & the Caribbean 7 3

Africa Context 76Case Study: Malawi – civil society influence in election and

budget cycle processes 77Case Study: Tanzania – effective participation of CSOs in policy reforms 81Case Study: Kenya – when education financing matters 84Case Study: Uganda – the quest for transparency in policy implementation 8 8R e g i o n a l Summary: Africa 9 1Commonalities in approaching EFA campaigns, lessons learned,

lobbying and advocacy and operational challenges 91A sample of the specific contributions of Real World Strategies in Africa –

coalition building, resuscitation and strengthening within country-specific circumstances:

1. Zimbabwe: CSOs in the eye of the storm 922. ANCEFA’s coalition building methodology 933. Kenya: The successes and challenges of coalition building 934. Senegal 945. The Gambia 95

General challenges 95General recommendations 96

Asia Context 97Case Study: National Coalition for Education (NCE) India –

campaigning for the Right to Education Law 100Case Study: Coalition for Educational Development (CED), Sri Lanka –

campaigning for mothers’ education 106Case Study: NGO Education Partnership (NEP), Cambodia –

campaigning against informal school fees 112Case Study: E-Net Philippines – mobilising out-of-school youth to

advocate for education financing 118R e g i o n a l Summary: Asia-Pacific Successes and remaining challenges 124

P a rt 3 129Conclusion 130Going forward 130Recommendations 131

For national coalitions 131For the regional networks 132For the GCE global centre 132

R e f e rence Materials 1 3 3Bibliography 134Appendices 1. Methodology 135

2. Biographical information on researchers 1373. List of national education coalitions participating in RWS II 1 3 8

6 ACRONYMS

A c ronyms and abbre v i a t i o n sused in this re p o rt

A&E – Accreditation and Equivalency ABI – Alternative Budget InitiativeACHR – American Convention on Human RightsALE – Adult Learning and EducationALS – Alternative Learning SystemsANCEFA – Africa Network Campaign on Education for AllASEAN – The Association of Southeast Asian NationsASPBAE – Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (formerly Asia SouthPacific Bureau of Adult Education)AU – African UnionBALS – Bureau of Alternative Learning SystemsBBA – Bachpan Bachao Andolan (save the children movement), IndiaBCRE – Brazilian Campaign for the Right to EducationBTVET – Business Technical and Vocational TrainingCAQi – Initial Cost of Quality Education, BrazilCBOs – Community-Based OrganisationsCEAAL – Council of Adult Education in Latin AmericaCED – Coalition for Educational Development, Sri LankaCEF – Commonwealth Education Fund CEJIL – The Centre for Justice and International Rights CLADE – Latin American Campaign for the Right to EducationCNTE – National Federation of Education Workers of BrazilCONEB – National Conference on Basic EducationCONAE – National Conference on EducationCONFINTEA – International Conference on Adult EducationCOSYDEP – Coalition des Organisations en Synergie pour la Défense de l’Education PubliqueCSCQBE – Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education, MalawiCSEF – Civil Society Education FundCSO – Civil Society OrganisationsDP – Development PartnersEd Watch – Education WatchECCD – Early Childhood Care and Development ECCE – Early Childhood Care and EducationECD – Early Childhood DevelopmentECDG – Education Donor Coordination GroupECOWAS – The Economic Community Of West African StatesECOZI – Education Coalition of Zimbabwe EFA – Education for AllEFA Net – Education for All Campaign NetworkEI – Education InternationalE-Net – Civil Society Network for Education Reforms, PhilippinesESCR – Economic, Social, and Cultural RightsESWG – Education Sub-sector Working Group EYC – Elimu Yetu Coalition, KenyaFAWE – Forum for African Women EducationalistsFBOs – Faith-Based OrganisationsFECODE – Federación Colombiana de EducadoresFENU – Forum for Education NGOs of UgandaFGD – Focus Group Discussion

ACRONYMS 7

FISC – International Civil Society Forum (at CONFINTEA VI)FTI – Fast Track InitiativeFUNDEB – Basic Education Maintenance and Development Fund, BrazilGAW – GCE Global Action Week GCE – Global Campaign for EducationGMR – Global Monitoring ReportICAE – International Council for Adult EducationICESCR – International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights IDS – Institute of Development Studies, University of SussexINGOs – International Non Governmental OrganisationsJTWG – Joint Technical Working Group KESSP – Kenya Education Sector Support Programme MDA – Mid-Decade Assessment (EFA)MDGs – Millennium Development GoalsMDGS – Malawi Growth and Development StrategyMoEYS – Ministry of Education, Youth, and SportsNCE –National Coalition for Education, IndiaNASCECZ – National Civil Society Education Coalition of ZimbabweNEP – NGO Education Partnership, CambodiaNEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s DevelopmentNGOs – Non Governmental OrganisationsODA – Official Development AssistanceOSISA – Open Society Initiative for Southern AfricaOSY – out-of-school youth PASEC – Programme of Support to Education systems in French-speaking countriesPCE – Pakistan Coalition for EducationPEAN – Papua New Guinea Education Advocacy NetworkPETs – Public Expenditure Tracking SurveysPINASAMA – Pinagsamang Samahan ng Magulang Youth Organisation, The Philippines PROPAG – Pro-Poor Advocacy GroupPRSP – Poverty Reduction StrategyPTA – Parent Teacher Association QEI – Quality Enhancement InitiativeREPEM – Red de Educacion Popular de MujeresRTE – Right to EducationRWS – Real World StrategiesSAARC – South Asian Association for Regional CooperationSADC – Southern African Development Community SEAMEO – South East Asian Ministers of Education OrganizationSMC – School Management CommitteesSWAP – Sector-Wide ApproachTEN/MET – Tanzania Education Network/Mtandao wa ElimuTLM – Teaching and Learning MaterialsTSG – Technical Support GroupsUNDIME – National Union of Municipal Education Leaders, BrazilUNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganizationUPA – United Progressive AllianceUPE – Universal Primary EducationVCEFA –Vietnam Coalition for Education for All VSO – Voluntary Services Overseas

8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The participation of civil society is a key partof democratic societies; ordinary people needopportunities and spaces to hold theirgovernments to account. The DakarFramework for Action: Education for AllMeeting our Collective Commitments (2000)recognised this and included the participationof civil society as a key strategy to trackprogress to EFA and to demand change. TheReal World Strategies – Towards EFA 2015project set out to honour this principle,aiming to support national educationcoalitions in the global south to developstrategic advocacy agendas and increase theircapacity to hold governments to account onprogress to EFA. Funded by the Governmentof the Netherlands and coordinated by theGlobal Campaign for Education the project,which ran from 2006-2010, provided supportto a total of 52 coalitions.

This report provides an insight into theimplementation and achievements of theproject at national, regional and the globallevel, highlighting some of the shared lessons,with recommendations for future advocacyon EFA.

At the outset of the second phase of RealWorld Strategies Project (RWS II) the abilityof civil society to hold governments toaccount in many countries in the global southwas still limited with many coalitions at acritical, still fragile, stage of theirdevelopment. At the same time the challengestowards achieving the six EFA goals weregreat, with many countries still off way offtrack from the 2015 deadline.

Managed and implemented throughGCE’s regional partners – the AfricaNetwork Campaign on Education for All(ANCEFA), Asia South Pacific Associationfor Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE) andCampaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho ala Educación (CLADE) – the project hasincreased advocacy directed at nationalgovernments and regional bodies in relationto EFA. Underpinned by a belief that changeon EFA needs to be located at the nationallevel, close to where the denial of the right toeducation is occurring, the project sought to

develop and strengthen the voice and capacityof southern activists.

In a context of limited internal capacityand significant external challenges RWS IIhas led to important changes in the ability ofcivil society education coalitions in the globalsouth to influence change in their nationalcontexts. It has also resulted in some valuablechanges in policy and opened spaces forincreased dialogue between civil society andgovernment on EFA.

RWS II supported the establishment of new coalitions and contributed to thedevelopment of advocacy capacity of the new and existing coalitions. The increasedability of coalitions to plan and act forchange on EFA is evidenced in both outputand outcomes supported through the project. Sustained pressure on all arms ofgovernment – the executive, legislative andjudiciary – has been key to influ e n c i n gpositive outcomes such as increased budgetallocations to education and new policiesand legal changes to support the right toeducation. The building of constructiverelationships with politicians and civilservants, another widely embraced strategy,has resulted in the establishment of policydialogue on EFA and suggests more positivechanges on EFA policy are likely to follow.The pioneering use of the human rightsframeworks and the legal system, show that taking new and innovative approachescan provide a useful strategy for achievingthe EFA goals and upholding the right toeducation.

The report provides an insight into theproject through 12 campaign case studiesmade possible by RWS II. These examine the work of 11 national coalitions in Kenya,Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda; Cambodia,India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka; Brazil,Colombia and Guatemala. A twelfth casestudy details the case on discriminationtaken to the Inter-American Human RightsCommission by CLADE.

The growing strength of the regionalnetworks, an unanticipated yet importantcontribution of RWS II, is also examined in

Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9

the report. Through RWS II the regionalnetworks have grown in institutional strengthand capacity, with increasing advocacyinterventions. CLADE has shown the mostsignificant changes over the course of RWS II,developing from a small organisation to aregional hub of advocacy activity on EFA.Each region has chosen slightly differingmodels in implementing RWS II andproviding capacity development for thenational coalitions.

The shift of power away from the globalcentre in relation to day-to-dayimplementation of the project is evident withthe role of the GCE Secretariat and boardlargely administrative. Limited centralengagement left gaps in knowledgemanagement and in fostering relationshipsbetween countries in different regions.

In its totality, the evidence collected forthis report points clearly to RWS II being aworthwhile experience for those who tookpart. It highlights a multitude ofachievements, some big, some small, that leadto the conclusion that RWS II has been asuccess, however, there is scope for moreeffective policy and practice at all levels. RWSII has increased advocacy on a global scale(i.e. in multiple countries across the globe),however, the pace of change is different ineach country and across regions – people andcontext factor in to create different scenarioswith different outcomes. Advocacy is,however, a process and the impact of RWS IIis ongoing.

A number of lessons have emergedthrough this examination of the RWS II,which require reflection for future practice.These suggest that: (i) local action, globalchange is valid concept but requires a strategyand will not be achieved without a deliberatepath from national to international advocacy;(ii) that technical capacity building is ofcourse important but unsustainable unless itgoes hand in hand with institution building;(iii) in a desire to be inclusive and reflect allthe interests of their members coalitions arespreading their resources too thinly andshould in fact limit advocacy focus; (iv) the

strategy of constructive dialogue withgovernment is important but there should beno compromise on rights and that using thelaw and human rights can pay huge dividendsin the struggle for EFA; (v) coalitions needflexible and reliable financing if they are tobe sustainable; and (vi) research to provideevidence for key advocacy demands is animportant tool and, through the developmentof new knowledge, coalitions can take theiradvocacy in new directions, creating newways of working and demanding change onEFA in their national context.

With less than five years remaining for theachievement of the EFA Goals agreed inDakar it is clear that the reality of EFA willfall far short of the promises made. Nationalcivil society coalitions along with theirregional partners need to act with renewedvigour in the remaining years and projectssuch as RWS II are key to doing so. GCE, theregional networks, the national coalitions andtheir funders need to address the weaknessesidentified by this research and build onstrengths to ensure more effective andsustainable advocacy on EFA. Projects suchas RWS II provide the foundations forbuilding a strong, democratic globalmovement of activists, who together will beable to demand the change that is needed toachieve EFA.

10 I N T R O D U C T I O N

1 So much so that it is oftenmanipulated and/or subject toviolent attack for political ends,see O’Malley 2010

2 Seehttp://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml for full details on theMDGs and their history

3 See a recent joint publication byUNESCO, UNICEF, The State ofQatar and Save the Children fora discussion on the role ofeducation in achieving the MDGgoals – ‘The Central Role ofEducation in the MillenniumDevelopment Goals’

4 S e eh t t p : / / w w w . u n e s c o . o r g / e d u c a t i o n/ e f a / e d _ f o r _ a l l / d a k f r a m _ e n g . s h t m l

5 UNESCO Global MonitoringReport 2010, p. 41

6 See Amnesty International 2005,p.20

7 See UNESCO GMR 20078 Collier 20039 See GTZ 20091 0 Action Aid estimates that at least

55% of out of school childrenare girls, excluded throughdiscrimination and violence. Seehttp://www.actionaid.org/main.aspx?PageID=168 (October 2010)

1 1 16 per cent of the world’s adultpopulation according toUNESCO, figures obtained inOctober 2010 from –http://www.unesco.org/en/efa/efa-goals/adult-literacy/

1 2 Bivens at al 20091 3 Violence and conflict have a

huge impact on access toeducation. An estimated onethird of all out-of-school childrenlive in countries affected byconflict (see research by Savethe Children and the 2011GMR). Millions more children,especially girls are subject toviolence in or on the way toschool impacting on theirattendance and learning (see research by AmnestyInternational)

Each day millions of children, women andmen face practical, social and economicchallenges due to their lack of education.Reading a simple set of instructions or gettingthe job they want are all, to a large degree,determined by their level of education and thesocio-economic status this affords them.While it might sound like just another cliché,the reality is that education is critical,fundamentally affecting life trajectories.

Education is a powerful weapon in thestruggle for justice and the reduction ofglobal poverty1 and its importance isrecognised in the internationally agreedMillennium Development Goals2 (MGD 2and 3). Without improvements in access toquality education an eradication of globalpoverty, avoidable child deaths, inequityand discrimination will not be possible.3

Being excluded from the benefits ofeducation because of class, ethnicity, caste,gender, physical or intellectual impairment,religious belief or geographical location isunnecessary, unacceptable and a violation ofthe universal right to education.

Governments have the power to changethis. In the year 2000 more than 164governments committed to makingeducation for all a reality by 2015, drawingup the six Education for All (EFA) goals.4

Unfortunately political expediency hasmeant promises have been broken and evenrights – which are universal and indivisible,and to which all signatories have obligations– are frequently ignored.

An underlying problem is thef a i l u re of many governments toput higher priority on policiesthat extend opportunities to themost marginalized sections ofs o c i e t y. Failure to change thisp i c t u re will result in thei n t e rnational community fallingfar short of the promise madeat Dakar in 2000.5

Beyond failing to meet their ownpromises made in Dakar, governments in

many countries are also in breach of theirobligations under international law toprotect, respect and fulfil their citizens’right to education.6 The exclusion of themost marginalised groups from qualityeducation perpetuates existing inequality,with a significant impact on hundreds ofmillions of people each day. The humanface of government failure to tackle thisproblem can be seen in the 69 millionchildren who never enter the school gate;the millions more in over-crowdedclassrooms, with under-qualified teachersand inadequate learning resources who willnever enjoy the pleasure of learning norb e n e fit from the opportunity it affordst h e m ;7 it is millions of out of school youthput at increased risk of violence andexploitative labour,8 consigned to a life ofpoverty because of barriers to education; itis the tiny child who by the age of five hashis or her life chances seriously limited bythe denial of early childhood care ande d u c a t i o n ;9 it is the girls forced to grow upbefore their time, married or caring forsiblings rather than enjoying the benefits ofan education equal to that received by theboys in their communities;1 0 it is the 776m i l l i o n1 1 women and men who facerepeated humiliation trapped in lives ofpoverty and exclusion through illiteracy.These well worn figures and phrases fail toconvey the human tragedy that beingdenied an education creates: perpetuatingintergenerational cycles of poverty ande x c l u s i o n ,1 2 creating social and economicinequity and social tensions that can, anddo, spill into violence.1 3 The political will toprioritise education, matched by adequateresources, are central for the achievement ofEFA. National governments and donorshave responsibility to make this happen;however, competing demands, weaksystems and corruption take their toll,slowing progress and in some cases evenreversing it.

Yet with scrutiny and pressuregovernments can be reminded of theirpromises; they can be encouraged to review

I n t ro d u c t i o n

I N T R O D U C T I O N 11

their practice and implement new policies.The majority of politicians – even corruptones – find it hard to ignore coordinated,vocal and persistent public opinion. It wasfor this reason and because children andadults have a right to express their opinionsand a right to participate in their ownd e v e l o p m e n t ,1 4 that the Dakar Frameworkfor Action included within the corestrategies for achieving the six goals: “theengagement and participation of civil societyin the formulation, implementation andmonitoring of strategies for educationald e v e l o p m e n t . ”1 5

The participation of ordinary people todemand their rights is the cornerstone ofdemocratic societies, and essential inaccelerating progress on EFA. This reportdocuments one such experience, the GlobalCampaign for Education’s Real WorldStrategies – Towards EFA 2015 p r o j e c t .Sharing stories of success, innovation andchallenges in the struggle for EFA, the reporttells how ordinary people from Africa, Asiaand Latin America, motivated by a vision ofequality and justice have, and continue, tomake their opinion known and to find thepressure points to leverage change in local,national, regional and international politicalspaces on EFA. The stories shared here willboth inspire and frustrate; so much energy,commitment and drive have led to manysuccesses but also at times to

disappointment and misplaced energy. Eduardo Galeano, the Uruguayan writer

suggests that holding onto a vision of bettersociety helps activism continue even whenprogress appears slow: “Utopia is on thehorizon. I walk two steps and it moves twosteps further away and the horizon moves10 steps further. What purpose does Utopiaserve then? For this – it helps us to walkf o r w a r d .”1 6

The struggle for EFA did not begin orend with the stories shared here but it is fairto claim that it has been shaped by them andthat their legacy is a step in ensuring moreand better education around the world.

14 See UN Convention on theRights of the Child and the UNCovenant on Economic Socialand Cultural Rights

15 UNESCO 2000, p.816 Author’s translation of “La utopía

está en el horizonte. Camino dospasos, ella se aleja dos pasos yel horizonte se corre diez pasosmás allá. ¿Entonces para quesirve la utopía? Para eso, sirvepara caminar.” Seehttp://www.sabidurias.com

12 PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS

17 RWS II should have started inJanuary 2006, however, a delayin the release of funds meantthat the project did not becomeoperational until the middle ofthat year. This had a knock-oneffect that year and furtherdelays in release of funds insubsequent years also impactedon the implementation of theproject including the loss ofvaluable staff

18 Phase II of Real World Strategieswas still operational during theresearch and writing of thisreport

19 The research was carried out bya team of four researchers, seeAppendix 1 for more information

20 Please see Appendix 2:‘Methodology’ for moreinformation

21 This includes teachers, students,parents and school workers andalso the teachers’ unions

22 Overall response to the surveywas less 50% in total, with thehighest percentage (relative tonumber of coalitions in theregion) from Asia, followed byAfrica and none from LatinAmerica. Questionnaires weretranslated into French andSpanish so language was not afactor limiting participation in thesurvey

The purpose of this report and the researchthat informed it is to document and assessthe second phase of the Real WorldStrategies project (RWS II), which ran fromm i d - 2 0 0 61 7 to December 2010.1 8 It isintended to provide readers with an insightinto the functioning, outputs and outcomesof this large-scale, cross-regional and multi-country project, designed to increase thevoice of civil society advocacy andcampaigning on EFA. It set out to identifyachievements and best practices onstrengthening the capacity of civil society todevelop processes for influencing publicpolicies to achieve the EFA goals, and morewidely, moving towards the full realisationof the right to education.

The research set out to examine thespecific approach that RWS proposed tosupport the advocacy of civil society ineducation and to highlight specific examplesof how this approach was applied, using casestudies to draw out good practice developedby diverse actors. As a result this report offersa number of generalised insights into howcivil society can play an important role ininfluencing progress towards EFA, pullingtogether an interesting collection of in-depthexperiences from Africa, Asia and LatinAmerica. It hopes to show how ordinarypeople from all walks of life can cometogether to make their demands heard bylocal and national government authorities, byregional bodies, by the UN and otherinternational actors to increase opportunitiesand the quality of education for all. It ishoped that the innovation and flexibility,which characterised the project, along withattention to some of its strengths andweaknesses, will encourage reflection andlead to new and more effective action.

The research for this report was conductedby four independent researchers,1 9 b e t w e e nJuly and September 2010, following thedevelopment of a methodological framework2 0

for data collection for the agreed case studiesformat. Data collection combined a review ofrelevant literature, one to one interviews, focusgroups and surveys. Research informants were

selected from a sample of staff, boardmembers, activists as well as external contactsfrom civil society, UN, foundations,government officials and ‘school community’b e n e ficiary groups.2 1 The research design wasgiven careful consideration and data collectionwas carried out systematically across the threeregions, however, the research team recognisethat there are limitations in both the scope ofthe research conducted and the fin d i n g spresented in this report. The report did notlook at all the RWS experiences, choosinginstead to focus in-depth on 12 of the possible52 countries. These 12 case studies were pre-selected by members of staff of the GCESecretariat, ANCEFA, ASPBAE and CLADEwho were also responsible for the managementof the project implementation, leaving theresearch open to the accusation that casestudies were ‘cherry-picked’ to highlight thepositive outcomes. It also runs the risk ofimportant information being missed from theother countries that have been part of theRWS II. To counter this a questionnaire wassent to all RWS II countries, the response ratewas however relatively low leaving signific a n tgaps in information.2 2 Furthermore not all thestakeholders selected for interview wereavailable and the number and sample ofresearch participants may be a limiting factor.Despite these limitations the research team feelthat the evidence presented is both credibleand informative. The team have endeavouredto reflect concisely the views shared and havesought to highlight issues not only ofaccomplishment but also those that may havelimited the overall success of the RWS work.

It is not the intention of this report toprovide a detailed evaluation of all aspects ofthe project. Instead the report aims tocapture a selection of unique stories throughcase studies that can form the basis ofcollective learning for those who participatedin RWS II. For all involved in the researchand drafting of the report, and moreimportantly for those whose decisions andactions inform these pages it is hoped thatthis report acts as encouragement forincreased and stronger activism on EFA.

Purpose, scope andmethodological limitations

A NOTE ON READING THIS REPORT 13

This report is structured intothree separate parts:

P a rt 1

Is intended to tell the story of RWS; topresent an overview of the project since 2006,providing some basic background on how theproject functions, its scope, the context inwhich it took place. It provides a generalisedview of each project level – national, regionaland global – aiming to highlight achievementsand draw attention to issues that requirereflection.

P a rt 2

The second part of the report presents 12 case studies, along with a contextualoverview from each region where the projectwas operational: Africa, Asia and the Pacific,and Latin America and the Caribbean. It is inthe detailed case studies that a full picture ofthe work supported by RWS II emerges andthat an understanding of the common threadsacross the work can be located. Part 2 isdivided into three sections each written in adistinct voice of the regional researcher.

P a rt 3

The third part of the report presentsconclusions, reviewing some global lessonsand recommendations for the future, directed at the national, regional and global level.

R e f e rence material

Reference materials for Part 1 and Part 2 ofthe report, such as the bibliography, a noteon methodology and appendices can be found at the end of the report.

A note on reading this re p o rt

Part1

WorldStrategiest o w a rd s E FA 2015:

Real

16 THE BACKGROUND TO RWS II

are frequently not replicable, sustainable ordesirable in the South.”28

The theory of change underpinning RWSa f firms the fundamental importance ofsouthern activists being able to define theirown messages and to learn through doingeven if progress is not always linear.2 9 T h eidea was to build a movement, a cadre ofcampaigners analysing and articulating theinjustices they saw in their daily lives.Encouraging people who knew children were out of school in a local village tobelieve that they had the capacity to change this situation.3 0 To use well-wornterminology: to try and build the foundationof change from the bottom up, from wherethe violations of the right to education weremost strongly felt, connecting with actions in different arenas in the north and on theinternational EFA circuit. The change thatRWS II has sought to make is based on atheoretical understanding that the strugglefor EFA, although global and linked toregional and international advocacy, isrooted in local and national action.

The origins and aims of RWS II

When GCE and two of its regional partners –ANCEFA and ASPBAE – submitted the RWSII funding proposal to the NetherlandsMinistry of Foreign Affairs, the project wasdescribed as aiming: “to provide structuredfacilitation and capacity-building support toSouthern civil society groups wishing toimprove the focus, coherence and creativityof their advocacy efforts to increase impact atthe national level and get countries on trackin achieving all the EFA goals and targets.”31

The project’s overarching goal was tostrengthen the advocacy and campaigningpotential of civil society organisations in theglobal south with the hope that this wouldspeed progress towards the six EFA goals setin Dakar, which by that time were alreadyoff track.3 2 According to one source withinGCE involved in drafting the project therewas a recognition of a ‘higher order’

The background to RWS II

23 Green, 200824 Although not directly linked to

the book it is worth noting thatOxfam is a member of GCE andholds a seat on the GCE board.

25 This view was reflected ininterviews with Maria Khan andGorgui Sow, leaders of the Asianand African regional networksinvolved in RWS.

26 This paper uses the termcoalition in its commonlyunderstood use as an alliance ofdifferent groups to achieve acommon goal, such as civilsociety groups or political parties(such as current UKgovernment). For ease andclarity the paper uses coalitionfor national grouping andnetworks to describe theregional bodies involved in thiswork. For an interesting andinformed discussion oncoalitions see Tomlinson andMacpherson 2009

27 Janice Dolan, Senior ConsultantCfBT Education Trust.

28 See IDS Annual Report 2010 p.8for more information

29 Various interviews 30 Geoffrey Odaga former Global

Coordinator of the RWS projectand now Global Coordinator ofthe Civil Society Education Fund(CESF) at the GCE Secretariatspoke of a vision of RWS as a‘movement’ and not a discreteproject

31 GCE Final SALIN 2006-2010Application Form, p.14

32 See page 1 of the 2006UNESCO Global MonitoringSummary Report for a fullpicture of progress on EFA atthe outset of RWS II

The theoretical underpinningof RWS advocacy

In 2008 Oxfam became the first of the biginternational non-governmental organisations(INGOs) to try to explain, in-depth, itstheory of how social change happens, in itsbook From Poverty to Power.23 The sub-heading of the book identified what it saw as the two key components to bring about a more just and equitable world – activecitizens and effective states.24 Both of theseideas can be found in numerous publicationsrelating to education for all, including theDakar Framework for Action. It is the firstcomponent, active citizenship in its organisedform, which lies at the heart of the RealWorld Strategies approach to acceleratingprogress to EFA.

The theory of change that drove RWS (Iand) II stems from a belief that advocacy forpolicy and practice change on EFA needs tobe located at the national level, close towhere the denial of the right to education isoccurring. ANCEFA and ASPBAE realisedsoon after the World Education Forum inDakar in 2000 that there was an imperativeto ground action for change on EFA in thereal world and to advocate for change at thenational level, rather than rely solely on atrickle-down effect from internationaladvocacy.25

Rather than the centralised advocacyagendas developed in head offices of the biginternational NGOs – or even the secretariatof GCE – it is key that national coalitions26

are the drivers of change in their context. Asone research informant noted, while theintentions of the large INGOs were good andin fact “acted as an important catalyst in theearly days of the coalitions, coalitions neededto own their own agenda.”27 This idea isreinforced by the findings of work by theUniversity of Sussex’s Institute ofDevelopment Studies (IDS) on ‘ReimagingDevelopment’, which concluded that: “oneidea that has resonated throughout theresearch sites from around the world is thatdevelopment models generated in the north

THE BACKGROUND TO RWS II 17

objective to mobilise political will on EFAand that a key piece of the puzzle, thecapacity of civil society to hold governmentsto account, was still ‘patchy’.3 3

The project application referred to civilsociety in the global south as vital partnersand advocates who through mass publicsupport for their actions and providingevidence could hold government to accounton progress to EFA. The project had anumber of specific (although not necessarilyS M A R T3 4) objectives focused on developingthe capacity of civil society groups tocontribute to global advocacy on EFA (seeBox 1).

The RWS II project applicationr e a f firmed the concept of delivering changethrough the real world approach w i t hscaled-up and expanded campaigns,increased coordination at different levelsand strengthening alliances.3 5 The projectproposal stressed the centrality of theproject to GCE’s overall advocacy work,making the case that: “GCE coalitions arethe voice of excluded children, illiteratewomen and poor families, and supported byRWS they can be a truly effective fig h t i n gforce to demand change for good.”36

RWS II was designed to build on andexpand the progress made during RWS I,which had increased the number andcapacity of southern civil society coalitionsand enabled them to take more lobbyingand campaigning actions. RWS I was alsosaid to have strengthened links in advocacyfrom local through to international level.3 7

At the end of RWS I, however, it was GCE’sopinion that: “Leadership and institutionalcapacities (human and financial) of theeducation coalitions to sustain educationcampaign and policy work at the nationaland regional level remain slim and fragile.”3 8

Because of this and the belief in the criticalrole of national level advocacy GCE feltcontinuing this line of work into a secondstage was needed.

Despite the fact that RWS II was acontinuation of an existing project, theplanning for the implementation of phasetwo was weak. Plans for the initial year andhalf of the project were clearly formulated,however, for the remainder of the projectthey were described as ‘rather nebulous’.

Rather than being a weakness the lack offully articulated plans, along with theextraordinary flexibility shown by theNetherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as funders), was in fact positive and meantthat RWS II was able develop moreo r g a n i c a l l y .3 9 Although the work remainedtrue to its central component of capacitybuilding, this flexibility allowed the regions to develop the project in differentdirections. In Africa the focus of the workremained strongly rooted in technicalcapacity training; in Asia supportingresearch and EFA monitoring at the nationallevel grew and in Latin America (which onlyjoined RWS in this second phase) a focus onthe justiciability of the right to educationtook precedent (see the section below onregional work and country case studies formore a more detailed picture).

The flexibility shown by the NetherlandsGovernment also allowed for an increasedamount of the funds to remain at theregional level in later years.4 0 This strongregional dimension within RWS IIdistinguishes it from other projects such asthe Commonwealth Education Fund4 1 or themore recent Civil Society Education Fund.4 2

The Government of the Netherlandsacknowledge the flexibility of the grant,

33 Interview with Lucia Fry currentlythe Global Policy Coordinator atthe GCE Secretariat.

34 A commonly used acronymSMART objectives refer toobjectives which are Specific,Measurable, Achievable,Relevant and Time-bound

35 It is worth noting from the outsetthat RWS II (as was the casewith RWS I) was submitted tothe Dutch Government undertheir Strategic Alliances withInternational NGO (SALIN) grantsprogramme, as one side of ajoint project proposal withEducation International and assuch teachers’ unions incountries were seen as strategicpartners from the outset of theproject (although this relationshipmanifested itself differently indifferent contexts).


37 For more information on the finaloutcomes of RWS I see: RWSfinal narrative 2003-2005


39 Lucia Fry, Global PolicyCoordinator, GCE Secretariat

40 Interview with Owain James,Global Coordinator of GCE

41 The Commonwealth EducationFund (CEF) gave advice andfunding to education groups in16 Commonwealth countries forthe promotion of free primaryeducation. See http://www.com-monwealtheducationfund.org

42 In 2008, EFA FTI agreed tosupport GCE to scale upsupport to national civil societyeducation coalitions inFTI–eligible countries throughthe Civil Society Education Fund(CSEF), which is coordinated bythe GCE at the global level. Seehttp://www.educationfasttrack.org/financing/epdf/csef

Box 1: The RWS II project objectives

● To strengthen and deepen the work of existing education civilsociety coalitions such that they are able to mobilise publicdemand and concern for free quality Education For All

● To build further education coalitions in countries and regionswhere none exist

● To align the work of education coalitions with other networks,coalitions and movements

● To deliver timebound, coherent national and regional advocacystrategies

● To contribute to the delivery of effective global advocacy work byGCE, ensuring consistency, coherence and cross-fertilisationbetween national advocacy plans and regional/global strategies

● To build broad-based movements with other interest groups,linking education interests with others working on public sectorservice delivery, aid, debt and children’s issues

● To bring about specific policy changes at global, regional andnational level, consistent with overall objectives of GCE GlobalStrategy


43 Interview with Yvonne van Hees,Senior Policy Advisor, Educationand Research Division (SocialDevelopment Department)Netherlands Ministry of ForeignAffairs

44 Ibid45 For example, compared to CSEF

which is US$17.6 million overtwo years (2009-2011) whereasRWS II is approximately US$6,793,267 over five years

46 Geoffrey Odaga, former GlobalCoordinator of RWS II andcurrently Global Coordinator forthe Civil Society Education Fund(CSEF) at GCE global secretariat

47 Initially the grant was intended togo directly to GCE with‘throughput’ to EI, however, dueto the legal identity of GCE atthat time this was not possibleand so it went the other wayround – interview with Lucia Fry

48 Education International has apermanent seat on the GCEBoard and as such all GCEaffiliated coalitions areencouraged to include nationalteachers’ unions

49 CLADE only joined RWS in thesecond phase and was notinvolved the project design

50 It was felt this set up workedbetter in Asia than in Africa dueto greater diversity ofopinion/approaches betweenregional staff and EIrepresentatives

51 A full list of current boardmembers is available on theGCE website – http://www.cam-paignforeducation.org/en/about/board/

52 It should be noted that twonational coalition seats are partof the GCE Board composition,electable via the GeneralAssembly process, and are notlinked to membership of theRWS project

likening it to core funding.4 3 It is, accordingto a Ministry of Foreign Affairsrepresentative, in the Dutch tradition toinvest in advocacy and strengthen supportfor development activity and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were keen to fund acontinuation of RWS. The project was inline with their policy priorities; increasingpublic support for EFA and strengtheningcivil society advocacy. It also built on anexisting relationship with GCE, which post-Dakar was recognised as an importantlobbying organisation. The Dutchgovernment believed that GCE could helpdevelop policy and strengthen civil societyadvocacy in a number of countries.4 4

The project’s ambitions, despite acomparatively small budget of 5 million,4 5

were big in scale. The project aimed toincrease the number and reach of nationalcoalitions, encouraging the formation ofstrategic alliances with other anti-povertycampaigning networks and human rightsgroups. It aimed to change policy andpractice to propel progress towards EFA.The aim was to build a ‘global movement’of EFA activists.4 6

The RWS grants (I & II) were part of alarger grant given to Education International(EI) and on through to GCE.4 7 The two sidesof the project had limited overlap, however,like much of GCE core’s work it encouragedthe inclusion of teachers’ unions as keymembers of the national coalitions.4 8

RWS in operation

Central coordination was limited, with day-to-day management and implementation ofRWS II led by staff in the regional networksANCEFA and ASPBAE and CLADE.49 In Asiaand Africa regional steering groups were setup, constituting among others regionalnetwork members and EI members.50 TheRWS Global Coordinator was the sole postfor the project within the GCE Secretariat; inhindsight this is regarded (by more than oneinterviewee) as too little. The regionalnetworks were responsible for themanagement of the project in their region;this included the development of regionaladvocacy strategies and support to national

coalitions. Funds were allocated through the regional

networks to national coalitions to supporttheir capacity development and advocacyactivity. Allocation of these funds was largelydemand-driven with coalitions identifying aparticular campaigning activity or capacityneed and submitting a proposal to theregional networks. Based on the regionalsecretariat or steering committees’ appraisalof the absorptive capacity of the coalition ineach year, a grant was made. At other timesthe need was identified by the regionalnetwork, which then either facilitated theestablishment of a coalition or helped todevelop and support actions by existingcoalitions. In later years increasing amountsof funding remained at the regional level, andwas used to develop the organisationalcapacity of the regional networks and/or tofund regional advocacy initiatives.

A mechanism for operational decision-making does not appear to be formallyarticulated but annual reporting andplanning, including financial reports, were inplace to monitor the project’s progress. TheRWS Global Coordinator was responsible forfacilitating and overseeing these processes.

Ultimate accountability for the project sitswith the GCE Board51 who have oversight ofall work and projects funded through theGCE Secretariat. All three regional networksplus two of the RWS project countries arerepresented on the board.52 Only limitedcopies of the reports given to the board onRWS II were available and no documentationwas seen in regard to decision-making atboard level on the strategic direction of RWSor budget allocations of RWS II. Accordingto interviews, GCE board operates on thebasis of consensus and decisions on RWS IIwere reached amicably despite the threeregions each bidding for a percentage of theoverall funds.

The range and scope of RWS II

RWS II is not limited to advocacy on onespecific EFA goal but allows nationalcoalitions and regional networks to identifyand address the most pressing issue(s) in theircontext from across the full spectrum of EFA

THE BACKGROUND TO RWS II 19

goals. The majority of RWS II is focused onbasic education, in particular issuessurrounding barriers to access such as costand discrimination. Literacy and non-formaleducation are also areas of focus. ECCE hashad and in Latin America is gaining increasedattention, emerging as the priority issue inPeru and of greater priority in CLADE work.

In addition to supporting work across theEFA spectrum RWS II has supported multipleforms of action that reflect differenttraditions and a diversity of approaches inbringing about change. They range from classicevidence-based lobbying (the Education Watchreports), to mass public rallies (India), out-of-school youth advocates (the Philippines), radiophone-ins (Uganda) to pursuing legal recourseto the violation of the right to education(Colombia). The range of activities and actionstaken with the support of RWS II – some ofwhich are detailed in the case studies in Part 2– demonstrate examples of tried and testedmethods along with innovative actions,which, while context specific, may provide abasis of cross-contextual learning. They alsodemonstrate the breadth of RWS II and reaffir mthe concept of actions taking place in the ‘realworld’ where a need for specific in-depthunderstanding of context must inform practice.

The context of the project

To fully understand why and how the RWS IIdeveloped and operated it is necessary tolocate it within the broader context of EFA

discourse and progress during the last fiveyears; marked by periods of both optimismand frustration. RWS II began the year afterthe global Make Poverty History campaign,when the translation of donor andgovernment promises into real change seemedimminent. The power of ordinary people tocome together and achieve change created asense of optimism and renewed energy amongcivil society groups in many countries. Justover two years into the project the bankingcrisis and austerity measures that followeddramatically changed the global context, asnoted by the EFA working group meeting inParis in late 2009.

“The global financial crisis has provided astark reminder of the realities of globalinterdependence. There is now a danger that,after a decade of encouraging progress,continued advancement towards the 2015education goals will stall in the face of risingpoverty, slower economic growth andmounting pressure on government budgets.”53

The crisis, which coincided with an increasedfocus on learning outcomes, also changed thediscourse, with a shift away from the right toeducation to education as an investment foreconomic recovery.

Despite these increased challenges it isclear that progress has been made in thelifetime of RWS II, however, importanttargets have been missed.54 In 2006 theUNESCO GMR estimated that approximately100 million children were not enrolled inprimary school.55 The most recent U N E S C OEFA global monitoring report put the total

53 Tenth meeting of the WorkingGroup on Education for All(EFA)‘Concept paper on theImpact of the Economic andFinancial Crisis on Education’.Paris, 9-11 December 2009

54 The 2005 gender parity goal wasmissed by 100 countriesaccording to the figuresanalysed in the 2006 UNESCOGMR and many will still miss thegoal in 2015. 72 million childrenwere still out of school accordingto data presented in the 2010UNESCO GMR, despite the factthat 2009 the last year by whichall children needed to beenrolled in school for universalcompletion of primary educationby 2015

55 UNESCO 2006, GMR


56 GMR 201157 GMR 2010 main report, p.1 58 See the Dakar Framework for

Action, p.3http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf

59 EFA GMR 2010 Summary, p.5http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001865/186525E.pdf

60 A groundbreaking report byKatarina Tomas̆evski in 2006found that more than half ofcountries still charge foreducation in breach of article 28of the UN Convention on theRights of the Child. Althoughsome countries have stoppedthis practice, as the case studiesin Part 2 of this report highlight,is still commonplace

out-of-school figure at 69 million56 and isclear that at current rates of progress morethan 56 million children will still be out ofschool in 2015.5 7

The reality for the poorest and mostmarginalised groups of children is that theyare still denied their right to education. Whyis this the case? Surely global resources –even in the face of the current economiccrisis – are sufficiently plentiful to ensureenough classrooms, with enough trainedteachers for all children of school age. Surelythere is money to care for and stimulate thedevelopment of young children and toprovide opportunities as they reach theirteens. If economic development is so closelylinked to education levels as researchsuggests then surely funds should be madeavailable to tackle illiteracy. The greatestbarrier to achieving EFA is not a lack ofresources or know-how; it is political will –education is too often simply not a priorityeither for governments or donors. That isnot to underestimate the real challenges thatexist; cultural beliefs about girls or disabledchildren, or contexts of war, naturaldisasters or remote rural location andnomadic lifestyles, however, these barrierscan be tackled when the political will ispresent. If and where national governmentsare facing serious financial constraints,

overseas development aid can help meetshortfalls, and the pledge made at the Dakarmeeting should not be forgotten: “Nocountry seriously committed to educationfor all will be thwarted in their achievementof this goal by the lack of resources.”5 8

Despite this pledge, where nationalbudgets fall short international donors arefailing to meet the shortfall. According to themost recent EFA Global Monitoring Report:

“Overall aid has been increasing, butcommitments are falling short of the US$50billion increase pledged in 2005. Africa facesthe greatest projected shortfall, estimated atUS$18 billion”.5 9

In addition to the failure of governmentsand donors to meet the promises they madeat Dakar, legal obligations under humanrights law (that governments have freelysigned up to) are often being ignored. Manycountries still charge fees6 0 a n ddiscrimination against groups of childrenincluding girls, disabled children, childrenfrom linguistic and ethnic minorities (toname a few) is commonplace.

The political and economic contexts inwhich RWS II has been and is operating areclearly challenging and highlight vividly theneed for continued pressure to be exerted ongovernments and donors alike if progress isto be made on realising education for all.

LOCALISED ACTION, GLOBAL CHANGE 21

RWS II sought to root change at the local leveland by doing so create change on a globalscale. At its heart RWS II has been concernedwith empowering ordinary people to bringabout change for EFA in their local andnational contexts. Not new in and of itself;local action by local people has a long traditionin movements for social change. The actions,for example, of Rosa Parks, an ordinarywoman whose refusal to give up her seat to awhite person fundamentally impacted theBlack Civil Rights struggle; or Chico Mendes,the Brazilian rubber tapper whose activismand tragic murder helped draw the world’sattention to the struggle to preserve ourenvironment. These are just two examples fromamong the millions of women and men whoover the course of history have taken actionto make the world a fairer, more just place.

Ultimately judgement of RWS II must bemeasured by what new or strengthenedcapacity to demand – and achieve –government action on EFA now exists amongnational southern civil society coalitions.However, the role of the regional networksand the global centre of GCE cannot beignored and an important part of thisresearch will be to highlight the strengths andweaknesses of the project at all levels.

This section of the report provides asynopsis of achievements of RWS and highlightsareas that require additional attention at each ofthe project levels –national, regional and global.

Changing landscapes innational EFA advocacy

The research undertaken for this report wasqualitative. It set out not only to documentand assess the concrete outcomes in regard tosize and number of coalitions and policychanges but to draw out less tangible results,such as increased levels of confidence of civilsociety groups to demand their rights; levelsof awareness and value placed on educationby beneficiary groups; and the sensitivity ofgovernments in the light of increased publicscrutiny.

Localised action, global change

Box 2: RWS II works for and with children and adultsdenied their right to education6 1

Jamaica Malapit was 15 years old whenshe quit school. “I had just finishedsecond-year high school,” she recounted.With several children in school at the sametime, her parents were forced to take aloan to cover their expenses, but it simplywasn’t enough. Giving way to two oldersiblings, Jamaica and a younger sisterdropped out of school, “just for a while ,”they hoped. Her mother, a day careteacher in their urban poor community,had taught them to value education, so thiswas a painful decision for everyone.

After a year spent selling vegetables inthe market, Jamaica saved enough to helpher younger sister resume schooling.Jamaica herself was still unable to go backto high school, and so signed up to freetraining courses in her village. There was atwo-month computer literacy course, andanother on English proficiency. She evensigned up for a two-week call centretraining, although her chances of landing ajob at a call centre without a high schooldiploma were nil.

In 2009, she joined the PinagsamangSamahan ng Magulang (PINASAMA)Youth Organisation, the youth arm of acommunity-based organisation workingfor urban poor and women’s rights. Along-time member of E-Net Philippines,PINASAMA initiated its own AlternativeLearning System (ALS) programme. Theresponse was overwhelming, dozens ofout-of-school youth signed up, one of themJamaica.

After a few months, PINASAMA raninto problems. They didn’t have anyfunding for ALS and had to charge a feefor photocopying the modules, whichmany learners could not afford. Somelearners had children or part-time jobs thatleft them too exhausted and distracted

61 Information presented hereformed part of data collected in Asia by Barbara Fortunato.More information on E-NetPhilippines can be found in Part 2 of the report

22 LOCALISED ACTION, GLOBAL CHANGE

62 This means new groupconstituted with formalisedstructure, legally registered, withvision and mission agreed

63 GCE report: RWS final narrative 2003-2005

64 This figure is based on themembership of all the CSOs andteachers’ unions that are part ofthe national coalitionsparticipating in RWS II

documentation, the answer is that a greatdeal of change has occurred. There are morecoalitions; stronger coalitions and someimportant policy changes, which have beenmade possible because of RWS II. To fullyunderstand the dynamics and achievements(as well as weaknesses) it is necessary toengage with the case studies in Part 2 of thisreport, yet even at a glance there are someimpressive developments to celebrate as thissummary below highlights.

Size and outputs

There has been a marked growth in numbersof new coalitions62 developed through thesupport of RWS, the majority in Africa. RWSII is now supporting 51 coalitions comparedto the 25 African and Asian countriessupported by RWS I.63 Taken together theRWS II membership base runs to millions ofactivists across the world,64 an increasingpressure that governments cannot simplyignore. This only provides a partial picturebecause while size is important, what mattersis what these organisations do with theirnewly formed status or newly built capacity.

To complement the picture created by theincrease in numbers we also need to look atthe outputs generated by the coalitions. Giventhe number of coalitions involved in RWS II itis not feasible to list the outputs, it isimportant however to offer a flavour of thesediverse, creative and innovative activities.These range from a public march in Indiainvolving thousands, to presenting a case tothe constitutional court in Colombia, toproducing an election agenda in Malawi. Inaddition there are numerous policy briefin g s ,media slots and in-depth reports such as thoseof the Education Watch initiative. There havealso been policy workshops for members inTanzania, consultations with activists inBrazil and a mother’s convention in SriLanka. In Guatemala joint documentation ofthe violation of the right to education with theSpecial Rapporteur on the Right to Education,and partnerships in Tanzania with thegovernment. These are among the activities ofjust some of national coalitions that you canread about in more detail in the case studies inPart 2 of this report.

Box 2 (c o n t i n u e d): RWS II works for and withc h i l d ren and adults d e n i e dtheir right to education

during the all-day Saturday classes. Theteachers, too, were tired, after handlingfull-time day care responsibilities theprevious five days. After 3-4 months,PINASAMA decided to suspend the ALSprogramme. “Our biggest lesson is thatALS won’t work without a budget,without money for instructional materials.We really need to prepare ourselvesmore,” said PINASAMA president Estrella Soriano.

For Jamaica, the door to educationwas again temporarily closed.

Jamaica later joined the E-Net‘Claiming Our Future Today!’ campaignas a youth volunteer. “I joined because ofmy own experience of being forced todrop out.” The Advocacy and CampaignSkills and Leadership Training was fun,she said. “The atmosphere was light-hearted, with lots of kidding around.The trainers didn’t come across like ourstrict teachers in school. At the end of thetraining, we were given a chance to saywhat we thought. I also learned otherthings like the rights of women andchildren.”

Jamaica was among the five youthvolunteers invited for the dialogue withrepresentatives of the Department ofEducation Bureau of Alternative LearningSystem. “[…] I talked about droppingout of school, about having to spend tophotocopy modules for the PINASAMAAlternative Learning Systems. I alsoasked them to support E-Net. Thegovernment staff were gentle with us,they were willing to listen. ”

So what change has occurred? Has RWSII strengthened the collective voice ofsouthern education coalitions and have theybeen able to bring about concrete changes ineducation policy and practice?

Looking at the testimonies collectedduring this research and reviewing existing


Only 12 coalitions are featured in the casestudies although 51 countries are part ofRWS II. The box below provides a snapshotof what has taken place in some other RWS-supported coalitions:

lobbying of the Durban Review Conferencein Geneva in 2009; input into the UNESCOEFA mid-term review coordinated byASPBAE in 2007; and ANCEFA’scoordinated lobbying to promote adult andyouth learning in 2008 in the run up to theAfrican Regional Conference in support ofGlobal Literacy.65

Numbers and even activity don’tnecessarily result in changes in governmentpolicy, however, it is reasonable to argue thatmost governments begin to take notice whentheir citizens group together and take action

65 The meeting itself was convenedby the UNESCO Institute forLifelong Learning and hosted bythe government of Mali, for moredetails on ANCEFA’s lobbyingsee Box 10 on CONFINTEA VIpage 42

Box 3: A snapshot of non-case study RWS coalition activity 2006-2010

2006 Lesotho: ZANEC, the well-established Zambia coalition, assisted in convening a workshop in Lesotho andBotswana in early November 2006, co-funded with CEF. This has helped the nascent Lesotho coalition (Campaign forEducation Forum) begins to move towards having a country campaign strategy in place.

2007 Papua New Guinea: Following the completion of the PNG Education Watch report, the Secretary for theDepartment of Planning and Monitoring agreed to launch the Report and publicly announced that he would like hisdepartment to enter into a formal collaboration with Papua New Guinea Education Advocacy Network (PEAN) and ASPBAEto extend the survey to all provinces of PNG. It also prompted an invitation to PEAN to the Education Sector WideApproach (SWAP) Steering Committee as CSO representative, thus extending lobbying to the donor community in PNG.

2008 Burundi: The national coalition on education called BAFASHEBIGE published a report on The Quality ofEducation in Burundi , the outcome of the Education Watch survey conducted in 2007. The report indicted the ‘double-shift and multi-grade class system’ adopted by the government to enhance access. The evidence adduced indicated thatlearning outcomes are barely being met and that the overcrowded classrooms and acute teacher shortage compromiseeducation quality. BAFASHEBIGE, by mobilising the support of teachers’ unions and NGOs to engage in policy dialoguewith the government, has embarked on an aggressive campaign to address education quality concerns.

2009 Chile: RWS enabled the following activities: a participatory process for the elaboration of the Forum’s PositionPaper on Financing of Education in the country; the publication and distribution of the Forum’s publication Cuadernoon the issue of public education; the training of the members of 10 School Councils; the elaboration and disseminationof the Statement “Towards the Reform of Higher Education”; the submission of the Forum’s proposals on education torepresentatives of the presidential candidates and the ensuing debate; and the support to the Regional Forums ofValparíso and Maule.

2010 Pakistan: The Pakistan Coalition for Education (PCE) printed and launched an ODA for education study onJanuary 22, 2010. There was successful turnout of participants and the participation was of good quality, eliciting muchdebate around the issues on aid effectiveness and equitable allocation to neglected areas. Around 175 participantsincluding managers and executives of different INGOs, donors, etc attended. There was much media coverage of thelaunch, published in all leading newspapers across Pakistan in Urdu, English and Sindhi languages.

These outputs are shaping the nationaldebate on education and moving the issueof education for all up the politicalagenda, shifting the discourse from if, tohow to bring about change. Furthermoreas these coalitions grow in organisationaland advocacy capacity, and increase theircoordinated engagement with regionaland international actors their influence atthe national level will grow. Nationalcoalitions have also played a central partin many activities led by regionalnetworks, such as: the CLADE-led


66 See Asia regional overview inPart 2 of this report

67 This financing tool, known inEnglish as the Cost of InitialQuality Education per Studentsets out the minimum cost ofquality education per student.For more information on this toolin English see: http://arquivo.campanhaeducacao.org.br/publicacoes/CAQi_ingles.pdf

68 Approximately US$ 911,16169 An anonymous quote, which

according to more than onewebsite, hung on Einstein’soffice wall

to demand change. They listen more if theircitizens do so in large numbers andconsistently over time. As a former MP fromAsia said: “If the demand for qualityeducation can be generated, then the systemwill comply.”66

It is clear that the support of RWS II hasallowed national coalitions to increase theirsize, capacity and level of activity, however,the success of RWS II becomes apparentwhen we review some of the impressiveoutcomes of the work highlighted below anddescribed in detail in Part 2 of this report.

Policy change

In Guatemala RWS II permitted thecontinuation of a long-term effort to preventthe charging of school fees, which culminatedin 2008 when school fees were declaredillegal. Pressure from the coalition also led tothe establishment of conditional cashtransfers for education for the mostmarginalised families. In August 2009 thelower house of the Indian Parliament passedinto law the ‘Right of Children to Free andCompulsory Education Act’ following broadCSO pressure, including significantinvolvement by the national educationcoalition with support from RWS II. Morerecently, RWS II funding enabled theColombian coalition to take a case to theColombian Constitutional Court. Asuccessful outcome saw the right to free andcompulsory basic education upheld. InCambodia support from RWS II provided thenational coalition with resources to campaignfor the end of informal school fees. Thecoalition linked the charging of informalschool fees to the issue of low teacher salaryand contributed to change on two fronts: theissuing of a sub-decree on teachers’professional conduct making it an offense tocharge fees, and a declaration by PrimeMinister Hun Sen that teachers’ salarieswould be increased by 20% every year,starting 2010. In Tanzania RWS II allowedthe national coalition to continue to build apositive working relationship with theMinistry of Education and play an importantpart in the development of the new EducationBill, which should shortly be passed into law.

RWS II also contributed to many otherimportant policy changes in the last fiveyears. In Brazil the national coalition usedextra resources made available through RWSII to lobby for the adoption of its Custo-Aluno Qualidade Inicial (CAQi)67 by theNational Conference of Basic Education;CAQi is now accepted by the NationalCouncil on Education in Brazil as abenchmark for the public financing ofeducation. The national coalition of thePhilippines has increased the attention andactivism around the issue of alternativelearning systems (ALS) for young people whohave dropped out of school; they mobilisedmany out-of-school youth and convincedlegislators that this issue required increasedinvestment. Their efforts led to an increase inthe 2010 budget of PhP 40-million68 morethan the previous year, and although it wasless than hoped for, even getting support forALS from legislators can be counted as majorstep forward. In Malawi the nationalcoalition’s advocacy focused on the country’sbudget cycle. They worked in partnershipwith the Ministry of Education to lobby theMinistry of Finance, leading to an increasedallocation of resources for the educationsector. Details of these RWS II stories andmore are provided in Part 2.

The role of RWS II in developing theresearch and policy analysis capacity has beencritical in achieving these gains. Regionalcoalitions invested a significant amount ofresources in training in this area. Thesecapacity development events and trainings,along with nominal sums to develop researchand other actions, led to significant change onthe ground.

P rocess

Concrete outcomes are only part of theequation and it is useful to remember theoften quoted saying that “not everything thatcan be counted counts, and not everythingthat counts can be counted.”69 Process is animportant part of the RWS II story. Why?Because it is the strengthening of process that will ultimately ensure sustainability.

It is the process of building the coalition’sknowledge, skills, experience, and self-


confidence rather than just a focus on short-term results that will ensure the longer-termpressure to achieve the EFA goals beyond thelifetime of the project. And even though insome countries RWS II has not deliveredconcrete policy changes, it has opened up andcreated change at the level of politicaldiscourse, itself an important part of thepolicy change process.

At the same time as arguing, with reason,that more change may yet come from RWS IIwe should also acknowledge that changetakes time and is built in the course of thelong process of social struggle in eachcountry. The nature of policy change oftengoes beyond one intervention or project. It isabout long-term processes, stronglydependent on the country’s political context.It is about political literacy, alliances andopportune moments to increase pressure toincrease influence. One actor or oneintervention rarely influences change. Thesuccess and failures of RWS II are then notthose of the coalitions alone, however, thestructure and working practice of thecoalitions and their ability to read thepolitical context are critical factors inestablishing a strong platform for mobilisingactivists and bringing pressure to bear on thegovernment.

Forthcoming research by the University ofAmsterdam, also funded by the Governmentof the Netherlands and linked to the RWS IIproject, looks at GCE member coalitions andtransnational advocacy for EFA, and drawssimilar conclusions. Their researchhighlighted three types of external changes byGCE coalitions: political, procedimental andsymbolic impact.70 They relate closely topolicy (political) and process (procedimental)as discussed above. Their third category,symbolic impact – the changing of publicattitudes and awareness – can be seen in casestudies, for example Mothers’ Empowermentin Sri Lanka or out-of-school youth in thePhilippines. The evidence, however, waslargely implicit rather than explicit. In otherwords although it is likely attitudinal changetook place during the different mobilisationactivities, it has not been measured by thecoalitions in a systematic way. For example,in Sri Lanka, the national coalition addressedthe issue of mothers’ education, documenting

the extent of the problem, raising awarenessand organising a huge national convention of600 people, pole-vaulting a previouslyinvisible issue into the public domain. It ishighly probable that many people beyond the478 mothers they worked with and otherswho attended the convention now have anincreased understanding of the issues facingpoor women in marginalised communities asa result of press coverage and communitywork, however, there is no measure of theextent to which this has occurred.

S t r u c t u res and systems

Recent development discourse and practicehas emphasised the need to invest in listeningto and enabling activists in the south to speakand to lead, particularly where advocacy andcampaigning are concerned. This does not,however, mean coalitions should be treatedwith unquestioned reverence. Where failingshave occurred they should be identified andaddressed. This research has thrown up someexamples of where personalities, along withpolitical loyalties can – and have – createdtensions that reduced the effectiveness of thework and led to divisions in coalitions. Thecase of the national coalition in Kenya is oneexample.

The national coalition in Kenya wasformally constituted in 2006 when itregistered as a Trust in November that year.It had been functioning for seven years priorto that as network of CSOs, which since2002 had been supported by CEF. Thecoalition was housed in the ActionAid Kenyaoffice and was subject to the same “robustfinancial and accounting policies, systems andprocedures for the effective management ofits activities, resources and information.”71

However, when the coalition left themanagement control of ActionAid Kenya,tensions between the board and coordinatoremerged leading to a crisis that almostdestroyed it. The research conducted for thisreport concludes that weak managementsystems were to blame. Thankfully the crisiswas resolved and the coalition is nowengaged in forward-looking work.

The experience is not unique to Kenya,and teaches us that it is imperative to

70 Research was conducted byMaster’s students, under theguidance of Professors MarioNovelli and Antoni Verger, whodid fieldwork based at theeducation coalitions in Brazil,Ecuador, India, The Philippines,Ghana and Zambia. RWS II alsoprovided support to thecoalitions to engage with thisresearch process, for exampleholding national/regionalworkshops to discuss findings

71 Extract from the Kenya casestudy below in Part 2


72 This description is based oninformation in Colombian casestudy in Part 2

73 This fits with the idea articulatedby Coe and Mayne, in their 2008publication (p.11) that “Aparticipatory approach tomonitoring and evaluation canpromote vital learning andempowerment of staff and thecommunities for and with whomyou are campaigning. Byassessing achievements andproblems, participants involvedin monitoring and evaluationenhance their analytical capacityand critical awareness. It canalso increase their motivation toparticipate in planning andimplementing future activitiesand take responsibility for theirown lives”

74 Quote fromhttp://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/41108.Paulo_Freire

75 See for example work by JackMezirow; also see Oswald andMoriarty 2009 for discussion ontransformative and qualityeducation

establish strong management systems andstructures. Privileging visibility and actionover institutional effectiveness cancompromise effective advocacy (in both theshort and long term) and is an importantlesson for national coalitions and the regionaland global structures which support them.Management capacity should be a key areafor investment in developing andstrengthening coalitions. The temptation tomove too quickly to action can createproblems of sustainability and effectiveworking practices. Overcoming breakdown incoalitions when differences surface requiresstrong democratic decision making systemsand capacity development in the area ofmanagement.

This issue of adequate managementsystems is intricately linked to the operatingmodel of coalitions, which unlike NGOs orCBOs, need to represent the diversity ofvoices advocating on EFA in their country. Assuch, their structures need to ensure internaldemocratic accountability. The case of theColombian coalition offers a positive model:With regard to organisational decision-making an organisational structure wasestablished. It is made up of five main[decision making] bodies: (i) the GeneralAssembly; (ii) the Support Committee orBoard; (iii) the Secretariat; (iv) the thematicCommittees; and (v) the Regional FocalPoints which all link to create a structure thatis circular instead of pyramidal. This meansthat the decisions and actions developed bythe Coalition are the result of the discussionand the participation of all theorganisations.72

Certain criteria are critical to thecoalition’s institutional legitimacy and overalleffectiveness. In the framework of RWS II thedefinition of coalitions seem to have beentaken for granted, leading to diverse practicewhere some coalitions were simply smallsecretariats operating as NGOs and notnecessarily representative of the diversity ofthe organisations working on education inthe country, or the beneficiaries of its work.

There is a tendency among coalitions andNGOs in general to focus outwards andensure external engagement, sometimes at thecost of internal systems and structures thatwould ensure long-term sustainability of the

networks. Spending more attention andresources on internal functionality isnecessary to the longer-term success of thecoalition.

Sustaining activism thro u g hre fle c t i o n

Notwithstanding some limitations, it isevident that RWS II has helped createincreased political space and activism on EFAat the national level. It has contributed tobuilding a movement of EFA activists,although more needs to be done to ensurejoint actions across regional boundaries. Thecoalitions have made mistakes but they have(in the main) acted in good faith, with thecommitment to bring about a positive changethat will enable all children and adults toenjoy their right to education. Coalitions aremade up of extremely motivated women andmen, but even the most committed are onlyhuman and opportunities have been missedand weaknesses remain which need to beaddressed. This has to be done with supportfrom the regions and/or global centre andalso through learning from their own practiceand from each other.

As previously stated an objective of thisresearch was capturing some of the stories ofRWS II at the national level and in doing sofacilitate a process of collective learning . It isimportant that all those involved in RWS IIare willing to reflect on the issues raised hereas a means to learn and grow their activismin the future. As the Brazilian educator, PauloFreire, notes in Pedagogy of the Oppressed:“Looking at the past must only be a means ofunderstanding more clearly what and whothey are so that they can more wisely buildthe future.”74

Ideas on critical thinking and reflection(developed from Freire’s work) haveinformed progressive adult education andtransformative education75 processes formany years. Coalitions can benefitenormously by reflecting on ways of workingand their achievements; activism withoutreflection is less likely to be sustainable. Thispoint is also made in the previouslymentioned research by the University ofAmsterdam:


Critical reflexivity allows thecoalition to evaluate and learnfrom past experiences, revisestrategies and formulate newstrategies according tocontextual changes. This strategiclearning can contribute to betteropportunities and more impactfor E-Net. Critical reflexivity isintertwined with all aspects ofthe research as members shouldreflect on the political andeducational context, on thenetwork and on themselves.7 6

As coalitions move ahead with their work,it is important that they learn from theirexperiences while building their knowledgeand capacity on key issues, underpinned bystrong institutional structures and systems.This report is intended as one block in thislearning. Going forward, the regionalnetworks and global centre (discussed below),also have an important role in supporting thisprocess beyond RWS II.

Regional Networks: b u i l d e r, initiator or enabler?

The regional networks – ANCEFA, ASPBAEand CLADE – are sometimes mistaken assimply the regional extension of the GCEsecretariat. They are in fact autonomousorganisations with their own unique historiesthat sometimes predate the GCE by decades.All three affiliated regional networks are coremembers of GCE are represented on theboard and, as such, ultimately accountablefor GCE work in its totality, andmanagement of the global secretariat staff.ANCEFA and ASPBAE were part of RWS I,and instrumental in the development of theRWS II funding proposal. Given their uniqueidentities it is unsurprising that each regionhas translated the implementation of RWSproject in different ways based on capacityand context, with resources supporting arange of activities at both regional andnational level. All three regions use projectfunds toward some of their regional staff andoffice costs.

In each region the RWS II has counted for

a significant proportion of total regionalfunds, for example in 2010 it accounted for50% in the case of Africa, 45% in the case ofLatin America and 25% in Asia,77 enablingimportant work to take place. Funds aredivided up between the three regions, withAfrica taking the largest share, followed byAsia. Latin America has received asignificantly smaller share. The global centrereceived only marginally less than LatinAmerica over the course of the project:

76 Joosje Hoop, University ofAmsterdam, Master Thesis on E-Net Philippines, p.113

77 In Asia it had previouslyaccounted for 45% until this year

78 GMR 2010. Regional OverviewLatin America and The Caribbean

79 BRIC is a term coined by theGoldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to describe the fourlargest developing economies of Brazil, Russia, India and Chinawhich are projected toincreasingly dominate worldfinancial markets

80 GMR 2010: Regional OverviewEast Asia and the Pacific

81 These 2007 figures are quotedin the 2010 GMR; RegionalOverview sub-Saharan Africa,p.4

Before looking a little closer at the work ofthe regional networks we must bear in mindthe different socio-economic and politicalcontext of each region. To take universalprimary education (UPE) as one indicator ofprogress towards EFA, stark differences areapparent: Latin America, home to manymiddle income countries, has the best regionalindicators at primary level, highest among thethree regions. It is, however, a continent ofextreme inequality, which faces remainingchallenges in retention, completion andeducation quality across the region.78 Asia,home to two of the so-called BRICs7 9 has mademixed progress on UPE with a decline inregional net enrolment ratios during the lastfew years.80 Africa has the worst indicators onuniversal primary education, accounting fornearly 45% of the global out-of-schoolpopulation.81 It is also a continent with manylow-income countries and a large number offragile states, many affected by conflict.

Each context brings its own uniquechallenges. These contextual differences playtheir part in the type and speed of changepossible by civil society groups – including

RWS grant income2006-2010 (EURO)


82 These categories are taken anddeveloped from a paper on civilsociety networks by Smith, 2007

83 No value judgement is beingassigned to the models andmore research is required to fullyvalidate the typology and tounderstand the implications ofeach for future practice

84 GCE provided CLADE with aEuro 9,409.33 (approxUS$12,779) from non-RWSsources to kick-start the RWSprogramme in 2006 (informationfrom 2006 Annual report)

85 Not just in Latin America butarguably they have beenpioneers in this work globally

86 E.g. Finance seminar (BuenosAires 2007 and Sao Paulo2010), Discrimination Seminar(Sao Paulo 2010), EarlyChildhood (Sao Paulo 2010) etc

the regional networks – although strategychoices and effectiveness also come into play.

What is apparent from this research isthat different operational models appear tohave emerged in each region. These can bedivided into three categories: (i) builder, (ii) enabler and (iii) initiator8 2 although thesedistinctions are not black and white and each network reflects characteristics of theother two:83

● ANCEFA appear to base their activity ona model of builder focusing the mostsignificant part of their efforts on buildingthe number of coalitions and theircapacity to establish a base from whichnational level advocacy can grow.

● For ASPBAE the model is that of back-seate n a b l e r, taking a less visible role themselvesbut instead building the capacity of a smallnumber of national coalitions to advocateon EFA in their own national context andin regional platforms.

● In Latin America, in contrast, a model hasdeveloped where CLADE is an initiatorinitiating and leading advocacy at theregional level and in pursuing this agendaworking with and increasing the capacityof national coalitions.

These models may be a reflection of thecultural dynamics of activism in each region,or of the roots of the network itself, that havedeveloped either intentionally or organically.The short descriptions and analysis belowprovides more detail on how each hasinterpreted their part in implementing RWS II.

CLADE and RW S

During the lifetime of RWS II, CLADE hasdeveloped from a small organisation withlimited reach into a powerhouse of advocacywithin the regional EFA sphere. Creatingstrong links and joint work streams among itsmembers and taking innovative action on theright to education in regional spaces. RWS IIaccounts for at around 45% of CLADE’sbudget and the support and the opportunitythis brings has been the major factor in itsrapid development in just a few years.8 4

Developing advocacy capacity at theregional level is an explicit objective of RWSII and CLADE has risen to this challenge,making good progress and supporting policychange through its regional advocacy work. Ithas been at the forefront of the ‘justiciability’of the right to education,85 taking a case tothe Inter-American Commission for HumanRights. Working in partnership with a varietyof stakeholders including the SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Education.CLADE has led this work, along with jointactions with national coalitions.

CLADE members include 18 nationalcoalitions (10 of whom are supportedthrough RWS II) and nine regional networksto whom they provide guidance on goodgovernance and support in both institutionaland technical capacity development. CLADEruns many collective learning opportunities,86

which strengthen both regional and nationaladvocacy. Despite this CLADE does not seeits primary function as that of capacitybuilder. CLADE do, of course, realise it is notpossible to do advocacy and policy makingwithout strong national coalitions, however,they see themselves more as a partnerworking with the national coalitions. In thissense CLADE is perhaps different from theother two regional networks.

Two areas emerge as points for refle c t i o ngoing forward: these relate to sustainabilityand balance in CLADE’s work. The first is aquestion of institutional sustainability. Timeand again in interviews for this researchnamed staff in the CLADE secretariat wereheld up as a critical force in its success withsome concern as to whether the momentumcould be sustained if they moved to new jobs.Furthermore, by the staff’s own admission


they have been less good at documenting (in asystematic way) process, actions and outcomesmeaning that much of the institutionalmemory rests in just two individuals. CLADEhas taken steps to address this through itsnewsletters and annual reports and a recentlearning event was held in Buenos Aires inSeptember 2010,8 8 showing increasedmomentum in this area.

The second area of potential weakness isthe need for CLADE to have a check andbalance between regional and nationalinitiatives. It is important to ensure thatregional advocacy does not take precedenceto the detriment of strengthening coalitions atthe national level. CLADE recognise the needto increase their presence and foster morenational coalitions, in particular in theCaribbean. Of the 41 Nation-states within

87 Information for snapshot ofactivities was taken from the RWS annual reports for therespective years mentioned. These reports offer an in-depthreview of RWS each year, alongwith lists of activities for eachregion

88 More information on this meetingcan be found (in Spanish) at h t t p : / /www.campanaderechoeducacion.org/action.php?i=507&L=es

89 For full listing of RWS supportedcoalitions in Latin America andother regions see Appendix 3 ofthis report

Box 4: A snapshot of CLADE activities 2006-2010

2006 – CLADE began the task of setting up political alliances and partnerships, the programmatic framework andidentification of activities to be carried out, the putting in place of adequate institutional structures capable of seeingthrough all the processes involved as well as drawing clear criteria for the selection of national coalitions to be part ofthe RWS.

2007 – CLADE held its 4th regional assembly in Panama. This was very important in bringing together all thenational coalitions. It allowed the development of a Letter of Principles and a two year political agenda, based on aconsensus. The Assembly also produced the Panama Declaration, a political statement that presents the collectivevision that regional networks and national fora agreed to work with regarding Latin American education.

2008 – The establishment of a regional advocacy sub-group on free quality public education: Following the adoptionof the conceptual and operational framework, a regional advocacy sub-group on free quality public education wasestablished, constituted by five national coalitions that had earlier prioritised the issue in their national policy agendas.This group enabled CLADE to promote a collective action in the region, which had both a national and regionaldimension. The five countries that focused on this campaign were Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala and Haiti.

2009 – CLADE played a leading role in bringing together national coalitions and other regional networks and theirmembers to lobby the CONFINTEA IV meeting held in Belem, Brazil in December that year. CLADE used theopportunity of CONFINTEA VI to strengthen its relations with the ministries of education of the region. Through itsdelegation, composed of four national forums, CLADE worked directly with the official delegations that representedtheir governments to advocate for the reaffirmation of the assumed commitments. CLADE also had notableengagement around the creation of the International Civil Society Forum (FISC) and work done jointly with theInternational Council for Adult Education (ICAE), its members and the Council of Adult Education in Latin America(CEAAL).87

2010 – CLADE, jointly with a group of regional networks of Latin-America and the Caribbean and Spanish NGOs,produced a joint document with the aim of influencing the debate and the final outcome of the IberoamericanoCongress on Education held in Buenos Aires in September attended by all education ministers from Latin Americanand the Caribbean who were discussing their newly formed ‘2021 Goals’.

the region, CLADE works with only 18national coalitions, nine of whom are part ofRWS II with one additional sub-regionalgrouping of countries in Central America.89

These two areas of potential vulnerabilityshould be issues for reflection amongCLADE’s Board (made up of six NationalCoalitions; two regional networks and twoINGOs) and staff.

Importantly this research finds that CLADE’sgrowth and the development of an effectiveadvocacy strategy over the course of just afew years is cause for celebration and shouldbe noted as a major achievement of RWS II.

(As the new network joining RWS in itssecond phase CLADE was chosen for a morein-depth review as part of this documentationand assessment process please see Box 5 onpage 30).


90 RWS 2006 annual report p.1191 The African Commission on

Human and Peoples’ Rights hasoversight and interpretation ofthe African Charter on Humanand Peoples’ Rights. A protocolto the Charter was subsequentlyadopted in 1998 whereby anAfrican Court on Human andPeoples’ Rights was to becreated. The protocol came intoeffect on 25 January 2005.Unlike all other regions, Asia andPacific does not have a regionalinter-governmental system inplace – such as regional courts,commissions and relatedinstitutions – to monitor andprotect human rights

Box 5: Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación: an RWS II success story

Of the three regions involved in the RWS project it is strikingly obvious that the EFAcommunity, especially powerful donor governments, see Latin America as less of a prioritythan Asia or Africa. This view was also to an extent ‘naturalised’ within the GCE board,and a glance at indicators – such as those on universal primary education – lead easily tothat conclusion. Scratching just below the surface, however, it is soon apparent that LatinAmerica still faces many challenges in achieving the EFA goals. Serious obstacles remain inregard to quality, discrimination and adult literacy, undermining the right to education forall in the region. There is also a massive equity gap.

When the second phase of RWS II began, the Brazilian Campaign for the Right toEducation held a seat on the GCE Board (a seat they will hold until February 2011) andwere able to open up discussion to persuade the board that Latin America could benefitfrom inclusion within RWS II. As a result Latin America joined RWS in 2006, a processdescribed in the RWS annual report that year in the following terms: “[…] theimplantation process of such a complex and challenging initiative and expanding the GCEmembership in the continent was in itself a major endeavour.”90

Notwithstanding the challenge, the inclusion of Latin America into RWS II began, andas a result it enabled CLADE to become the strong regional network it is today. In factCLADE’s development is an achievement, which owes much to RWS and without doubtshould be noted as one of the big success stories of RWS II.

CLADE came into existence in 2002, formed of a loose grouping of organisations fromthe platform of the Inter-American Human Rights network, who decided a specific focus oneducation was necessary post-Dakar. Today CLADE has 18 national coalitions as members –ten of whom have received direct RWS funding – and nine regional networks as members.

It was not until 2006 that a coordinator was hired, and a strategic planning meetingwas held in Lima, Peru in November 2006, attended by key partners, among themCEAAL, ActionAid Brazil and the Brazilian Campaign for Education.

2007 marked a significant milestone in the organisation’s development when all themembers came together in the 4th regional assembly held in Panama. CLADE used thismeeting – made possible with support from RWS II – to launch its mission and vision, andto make operational decisions for future work. Among the issues the meeting discussedwas how RWS resources should be used, agreeing to share the funds between regionalactions and small grants for national coalitions’ advocacy of up to US$10,000. CLADEcontinues – as do the other regional networks – to hold annual assemblies that, in thewords of one interviewee, provide a democratic space for decision making and planning.CLADE has also changed the composition of its board; of its ten members, six are nationalcoalitions, two regional networks and two international NGOs, ensuring that variedperspectives are brought to bear in the decision-making processes.

From its inception – and prior to its incorporation in the RWS project – CLADE clearlysaw itself as political actor in its own right; a regional network that has established aconsensus with national coalitions but maintained its own political agenda. CLADEcontinues to view itself in these terms and this vision has shaped its work and the strategicuse of RWS funds. Of the three regional networks in RWS, CLADE has pursued regionallevel advocacy to a much greater extent, with positive results that could offer a model(taking into account different regional structures and human rights charters91) for ASPBAEand ANCEFA’s future actions.

Central to CLADE’s mission and approach is the international human rightsframework. Quality education is a fundamental right, which governments have an


obligation to respect, protect and fulfil92 and a quick glance at CLADE’s mission, principlesand objectives all place human rights at the centre of their work.93 Their understanding ofthis framework, and importantly how to move beyond simply re-articulating that the rightexists to demanding it legally, have led to one of their most innovative advocacy initiativesfunded by RWS II – challenging discrimination in education through the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights (a detailed account of this work is included in the LatinAmerican case study reports in Part 2). CLADE’s work on the justiciability of education isground breaking; this only the second case on education to be taken to the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights. It provides an example of innovation and paves the wayfor future action in Latin America and a model for action elsewhere.

CLADE provides some interesting learning that shows how legal paths can forcegovernments to fulfil their obligations in areas previously considered firmly as developmentissues and matters of political choice rather than law. Their work bridges the world of EFAand the world of human rights, and as such could offer an interesting example for the biginternational development NGOs adopting a rights based approach, and the big humanrights organisations taking on the economic, social and cultural rights. The case of Colombiaand the change in the constitutional law to provide free education is another example (seethe Latin American case study section in Part 2 for a detailed analysis of this work).

This research has shown that CLADE have made a positive impression on manyexternal bodies in the region including UNESCO, the former Special Rapporteur on theRight to Education, and human rights organisations. These organisations have praisedCLADE for giving high visibility to issues such as discrimination and defending the right toquality education. One external respondent said they had “never encountered a networkwith such a level of sophistication and organisation ” pointing to their “well preparedmaterials” and “nice website”. What was also evident from these testimonies is that thesealliances not only enabled CLADE to progress its advocacy agendas but were also of greatvalue to the other parties. For example, the relationship with Vernor Muñoz, the formerSpecial Rapporteur on the Right to Education94 meant he was a resource for CLADE butthey were also a resource for him.95

This externally facing, regional advocacy has led to a highly positive reputation forCLADE among external actors in the region. It is not though the only remit of CLADE,especially within the framework of RWS II, which is deeply concerned with increasing thestrength of national coalitions. CLADE’s approach here is also distinct to other RWSregional networks principally because of how they view themselves and their relationshipwith the national coalitions. CLADE describe themselves as having a very horizontalrelationship with national coalitions and although they do support capacity building it isnot seen as their primary role, and instead priority is given to joint actions where issuesidentified by both CLADE and the national coalition are taken up by CLADE to regionaland even international platforms. It has been difficult to form a full picture of how CLADEis viewed by the national coalitions as none of the coalitions responded to thequestionnaire (even though it was translated into Spanish), although available evidencefrom interview sources suggest this relationship is in general a good one.

It is important for CLADE to maintain a balance in its work and in the words of onenational coalition member: “CLADE could… should, have a closer relationship to thenational coalitions, not only to create spaces where they can come together but also toreally know the coalitions in order to broaden CLADE. ”96

Other respondents also stressed the need for more capacity building. Stronger nationalcoalitions will be not only lead to increased effectiveness for national level advocacy theywill be able to support and lead (if necessary) regional advocacy from a point ofknowledge and strength.

92 For more information oninternational law, human rights andeducation see the website of the‘Right to Education Project’http://www.right-to-education.org/node/234

93 see the CLADE website http://www.campanaderechoeducacion.org for more information

94 Vernor Muñoz, a Costa Ricanacademic held the post of SpecialRapporteur on the Right toEducation from July 2004 –August 2010

95 Interview with Vernor Muñoz96 Author’s translation from original

Spanish


97 Author’s translation 98 Interview with Camilla Croso,

General Coordinator of CLADE99 Interview with Nelida Cespedes,

President of CEAAL and amember of the CLADE board

100 This would mean, in theframework used by University ofAmsterdam, that CLADE wouldbuild on their symbolic impact(media, public opinion) as well asthe political and procedimentalimpact areas

Box 5: (c o n t i n u e d)Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación: an RWS II success story

This research did not set out on a mission to find fault with any part of the RWS butneither has it shied away or ignored failings or areas of weakness where they have beenfound. In the case of CLADE the message is overwhelmingly positive and this research hasrevealed few areas for criticism, however, this issue of sustainability and institutionalmemory is a serious concern. The concern arises from the fact that much of CLADEsuccess is seen as being due to exceptional staff:

“A good part of the success [of CLADE] is because of the team; the human factor isvery evident but this raises questions of sustainability when there is a change of staff.”97

Of course, it would be wrong to criticise excellence in staff – something flaggedrepeatedly as a critical factor in CLADE’s success – what is needed however, is thedevelopment of systems and structures which would allow for smooth transition if or whensecretariat staff move on. The construction of institutional memory on processes andsuccessful strategies, along with knowledge management are areas that CLADE needs toaddress to ensure it can sustain its progress. CLADE, while very keen on the idea of beinga learning organisation, has through this documentation and assessment process alreadyrealised that most of this learning is oral, that “documentation of learning so far has beena weakness but we are using this [process] to systematise learning.”98

This is not to be over alarmist, structures and mechanism already exist in CLADE –such as the board, thematic working groups, and assemblies – which ensure a spread ofknowledge and process management. In the words of one board member the democraticfunctioning of CLADE “is a very important aspect ” and the board and staff are in“permanent communication .”99 Furthermore already initial learning from this research isto take other measures to preserve the ‘learning’ that occurs and ensure a stronginstitutional memory.

Other suggestions from outside of CLADE would be to increase influence with themedia in Latin America not only to reach policy makers but to raise more awarenessamong population at large to help combat false beliefs and negative attitudes.100

With more than half of their funding coming from RWS – including salaries, officecosts, regional activities and money for national coalitions – it is clear that RWS II hasbeen ‘absolutely decisive’, ‘very important’, ‘key’ in CLADE’s development, and in spite ofsome areas of potential weakness, the growth of CLADE as an organisation and itssuccessful advocacy can be flagged as a major achievement for RWS II.


A N C E FA and RW S

ANCEFA’s mission is: “To promote, enableand build capacity of African Civil Society toadvocate and campaign for access to freequality education for all.”101

True to this statement and to the corepurpose of RWS II, ANCEFA has used theresources of RWS II to engage in a massiveexpansion of the number of nationalcoalitions in the region. ANCEFA’s efforts tosupport national coalitions is impressive,increasing the number of coalitions it hassupported in the region from 19 to 35 duringthe lifetime of RWS II, of which 16 were partof RWS I and 31 are part of RWS II.

ANCEFA came into formal existence in

2000 as a response to the Dakar EFA meetingand has made a useful contribution insupporting progress towards EFA in light ofthe extremely challenging context where itworks. It describes its work under RWS II asbeing ‘demand driven’: building nationalplatforms and strategic alliances when acountry asks for such support. During RWSII it identified its achievements in buildingnew coalitions and it is proud of the technicalcapacity development it has supported suchas research skills and budget tracking (seebox below). These are seen as important toolsfor national advocacy, enabling coalitions totrack government expenditure on educationand demand increases from a more informedposition.

101 As described on their website inOctober 2010 –http://www.ancefa.org/english/index.php?rub=about_mission

102 The Economic Community OfWest African States

103 Annual Status of EducationReport. Aser also means‘impact’ in Hindi

Box 6: Highlights of ANCEFA capacity building support2 0 0 6 - 2 0 1 0

● Provision of start-up financial support to coalitions from 2006 to 2010 e.g. coalitionsin Botswana and Mozambique in Southern Africa, Kenya/Somaliland in East Africa,and Senegal, Cameroon and Togo in West and Central Africa. In many cases thefinancial support has led to setting up of a secretariat, recruitment of staff andcoordination of coalition activities.

● ANCEFA has also provided funds and technical support to national coalitions toundertake targeted advocacy campaigns. For instance in 2008 and 2009 ANCEFAprovided support to coalitions in Malawi and Kenya to undertake election and budgetcycle projects; in 2009 ANCEFA provided funds to coalitions in Zambia, Senegal, andMali for EFA Gender Assessment and advocacy, and in 2008 and 2009 providedsupport to coalitions in Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana to undertake policy advocacyinitiatives. This support has enhanced skills among coalitions for policy influencingaround education financing, gender and inclusive education.

● ANCEFA has supported capacity building workshops for coalitions across all Africanregions. For instance the 2006 Southern Africa Workshop on policy advocacy andresource mobilisation held in Zambia; the 2008 Lusophone Workshop on Educationfor All held in Mozambique, the workshop with ECOWAS102 Parliamentarians andJournalists held in Senegal in 2009; and Sub-Regional Education Financing workshopsin Kenya, Malawi and the Gambia in 2010. These workshops have equippedcoalitions with skills in various areas that have boosted their coordination andadvocacy work.

● ANCEFA has embarked on developing training manuals, toolkits and leaflets in anumber of areas such as coalition building, budget tracking, and policy analysis andadvocacy. These will provide coalitions with resources for them to undertake capacitybuilding activities with their membership at country level.

● In 2010 ANCEFA facilitated a learning visit for two ANCEFA staff members and 15representatives of the Senegal and Mali national coalitions on the ASER103 tool forassessing child learning skills practiced by PRATHAM in India. This was done tooffer the staff and coalitions exposure and skills for monitoring learning outcomes atcountry level in the bid to promote quality teaching and learning.


104 A view expressed by externalcommentators

105 Programme d’appui dessystemes educatifes des paysde la CONFEMEN (Programmeof support to education systemsin French-speaking countries)

106 Pro-Poor Advocacy Group107 Information for snapshot of

activities was taken from the RWSannual reports for the respectiveyears mentioned. These reportsoffer an in-depth review of RWSeach year, along with lists ofactivities for each region

RWS II has been significant in supportingthe work and development of ANCEFA –accounting as previously mentioned for 50%of its budget – supporting institutionalgrowth through funding of staff salaries andoffice space and enabling ANCEFA to rollout a programme of technical capacitybuilding. For some, this effort is seen ashaving been too much, too fast; creatingincreased numbers of coalitions who are notfully prepared for the challenges of theircontext.104

This raises the question whetherANCEFA has been strategic in its approachor whether it has responded in a more adhoc manner to the demands from thecountries. In its desire to increase the

number of coalitions in the region, ANCEFAmay have spread its efforts too thinly. In itspursuit of scaling up the number of nationalcoalitions (demand-driven or not) there havebeen weaknesses in the strategy in terms ofconsolidating the effective formation andrepresentativeness of some coalitions;resulting in the establishment of a secretariatbut not an effectively functioning coalitionwith solid management systems. That is notto say ANCEFA have ignored managementcapacity; they have provided guidance inwritten and training form on coalitiongovernance, with success, however, lookingat the big picture it would seem that thestrategy was too fast but not necessarilydeep enough. Even the Education Watch

Box 7: A snapshot of ANCEFA activities 2006-2010

2006 – ANCEFA supported the establishment of an expert team that went round to fine-tune the methodology andto put the regional frameworks for the Education Watch (EdWatch) project in place. The expert team ofrepresentatives from PASEC105 and PROPAG106 – working on quality tools and budget tracking tools respectively –met in Dakar in November 2006 to finalise the monitoring tools. These tools were submitted to coalitions anddisseminated at country level to allow the actual monitoring in the 12 countries to begin.

2007 – A consensus-building workshop facilitated by ANCEFA was arranged in Angola at which CSOs working indifferent sub-sectors were brought together to identify priority education issues around which a campaign could be focused.A co-coordinating team was established to work towards setting up a Coalition and to open a national Secretariat.

2008 – The Africa regional approach to capacity building involved several regional and sub-regional events, whererepresentatives from country level were invited to take part in joint and coordinated regional training workshops.During these workshops countries were supported to develop their country campaign plans and to spearheadcampaigns at national and local level. A process to revive the coalition in Zimbabwe, which had been badly affectedby the country’s socio-economic and political turmoil was initiated, following a stakeholder meeting with OpenSociety Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) in Johannesburg. ANCEFA also supported the revitalisation andconsolidation of Lusophone coalitions in Africa through the Lusophone Conference held in Maputo. A strongcoordination framework through the Lusophone Moderator in the ANCEFA Board emerged and this constantlymobilises otherwise excluded actors in Africa.

2009 – ANCEFA visited the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) offices and engaged education officials from these bodies. In addition, ANCEFA developed aconcept for engaging the African Union (AU), which will be implemented from 2010.107

2010 – ANCEFA initiated, facilitated, and supported EFA awareness campaigns during two major soccer events, the Africa Cup of Nations in Angola (January), and the FIFA World Cup in South Africa through the 1Goal Project.In Angola ANCEFA worked with the Angola EFA Network in presenting trophies and holding press conferences onEFA, while during the 1Goal Project ANCEFA collaborated with GCE helping coalitions in Africa mobilise soccerstars and politicians to raise awareness on EFA during the Global Action Week (April), and during the World CupTournament (June-July). Jointly with GCE, EI and ActionAid, ANCEFA facilitated three sub regional educationfinancing workshops (in Kenya, Malawi and the Gambia) and one national workshop in Zimbabwe.


reports – a flagship initiative of RWS II(mentioned above) are considered by someto be weak and an area where ANCEFAshould have provided much greaterguidance.

Another key issue after establishing thecoalitions has been financial sustainabilityespecially in a period before major fundingcould be realised. ANCEFA thus learnt thatone of the things to do is to provide fundsfor institutional support as members andmanagement board strove to get adequatefunding for their work. These are areas forcritical reflection as ANCEFA takes thisimportant work forward.

To be fair to ANCEFA, there are obviousreasons to celebrate the changes that theyhave supported under RWS II. ANCEFAitself has been able to maintain and grow itsown capacity through the support of RWS,supporting coalitions and ensuring anAfrican voice at the table of important EFAdiscussions. Over the lifetime of RWS II,ANCEFA has positioned itself at the table ofmany important international debates andensured the regional voice was representedin these forums. This is an area of work thatANCEFA is increasing, very recently comingtogether to develop an advocacy strategy forengagement with the African Union (AU).Using the space of regional platforms can bevaluable (as we have seen with CLADE) butANCEFA should be cautious that itsengagement in these international forums isbalanced and does not distract from itsstated core function of building the capacityof national coalitions.

ANCEFA received warm endorsementfrom many of its affiliated nationalcoalitions in response to a questionnairecommissioned for this report. The nationalcoalitions are happy with the type andamount of support they have been receiving;many now have a voice in governmentpolicy discussions that has led to concretepolicy changes. The coalitions said theywould also welcome more peer-to peerlearning opportunities and coming togetherin sub-groups; as well as longer termfunding. In order to save time and money itwould be worth ANCEFA investing more inits website to create easy access to resourcematerials such as manuals etc.1 0 8

ASPBAE and RW S

The Asia South Pacific Association for Basicand Adult Education (ASPBAE) is the oldestof the three regional networks affiliated toGCE. Formed in 1964 by a group of adulteducationists it was only in relatively recenttimes that its focus expanded to include thefull spectrum of EFA goals. ASPBAE beganits collaboration with GCE in developing andimplementing RWS I, in response to the needto build stronger CSO capacities for policyengagement at national levels. The approachto RWS (I and) II in Asia has, like its Africancounterpart, concentrated largely at thenational level, supporting national levelresearch and advocacy. It has a growing focuson regional advocacy and has influencedregional UN bodies such as the UNESCOAsia Pacific Regional Bureau for Educationand sub-regional bodies such as the SouthEast Asian Ministers of EducationOrganisation (SEAMEO).

A feature worthy of note is that in Asiathe national coalitions who have beensupported through RWS were not – unlike inAfrica or Latin America – necessarilyaffiliated to ASPBAE. They were insteadselected on the basis of the project criteria ofexisting or emerging coalitions with thepotential to engage in policy change for EFA.Of course the coalitions are encouraged toaffiliate to ASPBAE and GCE if they wish.

In Asia there were only two nationalcoalitions in existence in 2000 when RWS Ibegun, Bangladesh and the Philippines. By theend of that first phase new coalitions weredeveloping and the idea going into RWS IIwas focused on strengthening competencies.At the outset of this second phase of RWS,ASPBAE was working with seven nationalcoalitions. Now RWS II has 11 full timecoalition partners and has links to three othernational coalitions within this project. It hasbeen a deliberate strategy on the part ofASPBAE to work with a limited number ofcoalitions.

RWS II has allowed ASPBAE to developits own organisational capacity, putting inplace teams in Asia and South Pacific whomaintain frequent contact with the nationalcoalitions. During the course of RWS II it hasaccounted for 45% (previous) to 25%

108 This is equally the case for theglobal centre – see below


(current) of ASPBAE total funding. Even nowthat it accounts for only 25% of their totalfunding and is according to one interview a“very significant 25%” because of the highdegree of flexibility of the fund which allowsthem to prioritise their most relevant needs.

ASPBAE’s approach of building thecapacity of national coalitions to do theirown research for advocacy, such as in thecase of the mid-decade EFA review (see Box 9on page 38) and the Education Watchinitiative had very beneficial results and ledto increased influence of national coalitionswith their governments. These twoinitiatives helped start a dialogue at nationallevel between the coalitions and their

governments. RWS II has also established the value of

regional advocacy, which was previously lesswell articulated, and increased regionalsolidarity, capacity and participation in jointregional actions. Through the course of theproject sub-regional groupings have emerged,with coalitions coming together anddeveloping unique themes of action. Theseregional sub-groups included: South Asiawhose primary focus has been budgettracking; South East Asia who have pursued amapping of disadvantaged in relation toeducation; and the Asia-Pacific sub-regionalgroup who have focused their attention onissues around literacy.

Box 8: A Snapshot of ASPBAE activities 2006-2010

2006 – In March 2006, a regional Asia Pacific Education Watch Planning Workshop was convened in Jakarta,Indonesia. Two sub-regional consultations and trainings were organised, one in Asia – the South Asia EducationWatch Researchers Meeting in Colombo, Sri Lanka in July and another – the South Pacific Education Watch Trainingalso held in July, and conducted in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. As a direct consequence of these, nationaltrainings on Education Watch were organised in seven of the eight participating countries in Asia, primarily with thetechnical support of ASPBAE staff.

2007 – The project expanded its work to Sri Lanka and Cambodia in the year, working with the national educationcoalitions in these two countries. Both coalitions participated in the Education Watch initiative and other coordinatedlobbying and campaign opportunities in the period.

2008 – A meeting held in Mumbai, India in July devised a methodology for alternative budgeting which was to beused in the pilot countries. Participants from Sri Lanka and Pakistan took part in the workshop with ASPBAE staff.During this workshop, the experience of alternative budgeting from the Philippines was shared to help shape anddefine the methodology to be used in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

2009 – RWS facilitated the participation of coalitions in a CSO Forum on the eve of the South Asia EducationMinisters’ Forum in Dhaka on December 14, 2009, and it was immensely useful for reaching a common set ofdemands to put to the ministerial. It was hailed as a historic event, as this was the first time the South Asian CSOshad a prep meeting on education before an official event. Output from the meeting included two documents: theDeclaration, and the ‘Strategies for Reaching the Unreached and Regional Collaboration’, a one-page CollectiveStatement set down bullet point commitments including: justiciability of the right to education for all; 6% of GDP toeducation; 6% of education budgets to adult education; role of civil society (came out very strongly in thedeclaration); need for comprehensive assessment of resource requirements.

2010 – At the 6th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) People’s Forum on September 23-26, 2010 inHanoi, a month before the actual ASEAN Summit, ASPBAE worked with E-Net for Justice Indonesia, E-Net Philippines,NGO Education Partnership (NEP Cambodia), Vietnam Coalition for Education for All (VCEFA) and youthorganisations, and successfully influenced civil society engagement with the ASEAN Summit to ensure inclusion of the education agenda among other social development concerns, in the context of the financial turmoil, price crises,global warming, and trade and general economic downturn, in informing the policy discussions of the ASEAN leaders.


According to responses to a surveyconducted for this research national coalitionsare happy with the support they have receivedfrom ASPBAE. A more holistic, sector wideapproach was identified as an area forincreased attention and longer term supportto make advocacy more effective was alsoraised. ASPBAE has played an important rolein enabling the coalitions to engage inregional advocacy. Coalitions have, withsupport of RWS II, been able to participate inregional platforms and meetings. Being at thetable of such meetings has had the doubleimpact of giving them a voice in the regionalforum and to having more credibility in theeyes of their own governments.

ASPBAE appears to take a middle routebetween ANCEFA’s big push to buildnational coalitions and CLADE’s vocalpresence in regional platforms. ASPBAE hasalso (according to one non-ASPBAE source)gone further and better along the cross-fertilisation of advocacy between countriesthan the other two regions.

There is scope, however, for ASPBAE tor e flect on its practice going forward. By theirown admission ASPBAE haven’t yet fullyexploited the potential of action at theregional level and this needs to be an area forincreased action in the future. Another pointfor reflection is required in regard to ensuring

that long-term capacity development is notcompromised in the desire for short-termoutputs. One external commentator pointedto an example where it appeared that acoalition was encouraged to undertake anational level research but capacity was notstrong enough, resulting in delays and amissed opportunity. ASPBAE needs to bearthese concerns in mind and ensure thatnational coalitions have the necessary capacityfor sustained work and not just to deliver ofdiscrete pieces of work or one-off activities.

In late 2009, ASPBAE began to develop an‘RWS Creative Narratives and KnowledgeSharing Project’ for joint reflection anddocumentation of RWS II. This process hasfed into this report and highlights thecommitment to learning going forward.

RWS and the regions

The regional networks are a pivotal point ofpower in RWS II and are most definitely acritical piece of puzzle for progressingadvocacy on EFA. They are key in supportingnational coalitions, who overwhelming valuetheir support.109 What is more it is clear thatANCEFA, ASPBAE and CLADE are dynamicactors in current EFA circles and wellrespected in their regions.

109 In fact 100% of responsesreceived expressed satisfaction,however, it is worth noting thatoverall response to the surveywere less 50% in total, with thehighest % (relative to number ofcoalitions in the region) fromAsia, followed by Africa andnone from Latin AmericaQuestionnaires were translatedinto French and Spanish solanguage was not a factorlimiting participation in thesurvey


Box 9:Building high level influencing through regional action

RWS II has permitted all three regional networks to support the capacity and advocacy ofnational coalitions in their respective regions. It has also played a key role in thedevelopment of the networks themselves, both institutionally and as regional advocates.Latin America has pursued this strategy furthest110 but both ASPBAE and ANCEFA arealso engaged in high level influencing in their regions and in international forums.

A key feature across all three regions (as well as in national contexts) has been the useof regional platforms and spaces to bring about policy change. In Latin America this isevident in its collaboration with human rights groups such as the Robert KennedyFoundation and former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernor Muñoz, totake a case to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. In Africa, ANCEFA hasproactively engaged with forums of UNESCO, the AU, ADEA, and sub regional blocks(like SADC and ECOWAS) and is currently stepping up its work in this area. ASPBAErecognised that most policies (which have a significant impact) are decided at the nationallevel by governments and/or globally by donor governments and multilateral aid agenciesand not regionally. ASPBAE considered it critical therefore to identify and engage in thestrategic regional policy spaces that had significant impact on the ability of countries todeliver on the EFA promise.

In the region, the UNESCO Regional office (Bangkok) was identified as a strategicpartner and ASPBAE sought to maximise the spaces opened by UNESCO Bangkok,especially around the Mid-Decade Assessment (MDA) of EFA. The process of inputting toand influencing the content of the mid-decade review spanned more than two years andbenefited from the increased resources available through RWS II. In February 2007ASPBAE facilitated the participation of CAMPE Bangladesh, E-Net Philippines and NEPCambodia in the 8th UNESCO EFA Coordinators’ meeting held in Bangkok. Thecoalitions, with other CSOs, made a joint presentation on the indicators they felt should belooked at in the EFA review. In the forum, relevant government reports from countrieswere shared, providing the coalitions and the RWS team an opportunity to review andinfluence the official reports with data and evidence emerging from the Education Watchprocesses. In the same meeting, ASPBAE was elected as a member of the Sub-regionalAdvisory Group for South East Asia. This was a significant outcome of the worksupported by RWS II because it allowed them to monitor how the EFA assessment reportswere shaping up, to point out the gaps in these reports, and to suggest how to addressvarious issues.

During the year, ASPBAE was also invited to be a member of the Technical SupportGroups (TSGs) of UNESCO’s Mid-Decade Assessment Steering Committee and tonominate coalitions to be part of this. To review the draft national EFA MDA reports andassist in the preparation of the EFA MDA Sub-Regional Report, TSGs were constituted toreview the draft national and sub-regional reports with a focus on the specific EFA goals:early childhood care and education, universal primary/basic education, life skills andlifelong learning, literacy, gender equality, and quality education. ASPBAE joined the TSGson Literacy and Education Quality and nominated CAMPE Bangladesh, E-Net Philippines,E-Net Justice Indonesia, and NEP Cambodia for the other areas. Membership in theseTSGs provided another opportunity for lobbying national governments’ policy positionsbacked by Education Watch evidence.

ASPBAE, NEP Cambodia and E-Net Philippines also participated in the UNESCOBangkok organised Writers’ Workshop for the EFA Mid-Decade Assessment for EastAsian, South Asian, and South-East Asian Member States in Bangkok, Thailand in

110 See Box 5 and the LatinAmerican case studies in Part 2 of this report


September 2007. The Writers’ Workshop provided a venue for countries and partners toparticipate in a peer review of draft National MDA Reports. In addition, countries andpartners collaborated to generate common themes and issues to be included in the MDASub-Regional Synthesis Report.

This continued in 2008 with ASPBAE and the coalitions engaging in another strategicopportunity during the South East Asia EFA Mid-Term Policy Review Conference, whichbrought together UNESCO representatives from South-East Asian countries, UN agenciesand partners involved in EFA. The Review Conference aimed to translate the findings ofthe EFA Mid-Decade Assessment into concrete action, identify policy gaps, and proposepolicies and strategies towards reaching the unreached.

With the participation of education CSOs, the key recommendations from theconference were presented at the SEAMEO Education Ministers Council Meeting in KualaLumpur in March 2008. Again, the conference was an important opportunity for the RWSSouth-East Asian countries and EFA partners to verify and validate the Insular South-EastAsia and Mekong EFA MDA sub-regional synthesis reports. Both conferences providedunique moments for the Asian RWS countries and EFA partners, including UNESCO andgovernments, to work together and agree on the general direction for EFA in the region.

In addition to developing the capacity of coalitions111 for this regional advocacy,APSBAE also took on a regional representation and lobbying role. For example,representing the RWS II coalitions at a meeting of 70 high level representatives fromSEAMEO, ASEAN and UNESCO. The theme of the meeting was Reaching the Un-reached: Meeting of South-East Asian Countries to Achieve the EFA Goals together by2015 and the education officials from the region and EFA partners came up with concreteproposals for joint collaborative targeted activities in education.

Through RWS II ASPBAE has been able to increase their own and the nationalcoalitions’ influence in regional spheres, as the example above demonstrates. Furthermore,gaining an international perspective through RWS II is consistently mentioned by thenational education coalitions. The opportunities to participate in ASEAN and UNESCOevents enriched their understanding of the dynamics between international organisationsand national policies.

“Before E-Net joined RWS, we were already engaging with the Philippine governmenton EFA. But we didn’t always understand why the government was involved in certaininterventions. When we joined RWS in 2004, we were able to engage at the regional level.It was here that we saw where government was often taking its cue. ”112

Furthermore the participation of national coalitions in these regional forums openeddialogue between the coalitions and their governments, when they met in this regionalspace. The coalitions gained credibility by being at the table of these important discussions.Coalitions and governments sometimes found they were in fact ‘singing a similar tune’ andagreement and consensus were possible.113

With the support of RWS II ASPBAE, ANCEFA and CLADE have been able to increasethe voice of civil society at the regional level. They have utilised existing EFA forums inalliance with UN agencies such as UNESCO Bangkok; exploited political openings such asthe AU second decade for education or sought out new spaces to push the fulfilment of thepromises made in Dakar in 2000, seen in the justiciability work led by CLADE. As they goforward they must continue to assess and evaluate the strategic importance of regionalplatforms in leveraging change on EFA and the fulfilment of governments’ human rightsobligations.

111 i.e. through sub-regional PolicyStrategizing Workshops forSouth Asia coalitions (May,2008) and South East Asiacoalitions (August, 2008)

112 Interview with Cecilia Soriano, E-Net Philippines for the RWS Creative Narratives video case study

113 Interview with Maria Khan


114 Other well known civil societyeducation funds such as CEF orCSEF do not have such supportat the regional level, althoughCEF did provide some funding toANCEFA and ASPBAE forregional work, separate to itssupport to national coalitions

115 A question was asked why amore significant evaluation of theregional networks was not takingplace; such an in-depthevaluation is not the withinpossibility of this project as theregional networks are biggerthan RWS alone

116 There was some suggestion thatthe new Civil Society EducationFund could run into similarproblems, especially aroundabsorptive capacity

117 INTRAC NGO Policy BriefingPaper No.4, April 2001

118 Since the start of RWS II thispost has been held by threedifferent people Lucia Fry (whomanaged the project althoughthis was not her main functionpost within GCE), GeoffreyOdaga, and Jill Hart

The regional networks’ own institutionalgrowth and advocacy represent a significantsuccess for RWS II. Furthermore it is evidentthrough a review of annual reports andtestimony given for this research that they areplaying an important function in supportingincreased advocacy in national contexts onEFA. The support that RWS II has been ableto provide to the regional networks isunusual114 and highly valued by the regionalnetworks.

The research points to the regionalnetworks possessing much strength; it alsohighlights areas where their capacity andaction need to be strengthened and theirpurpose and identity considered.115 Oneresearch informant said that trickle-downcould not be certain and if you focus toomuch at the regional level there is a risk thatchange will not occur at the national level;another view was that actions at the regionallevels helped create spaces for nationalcoalitions to engage their governments andcreated greater pressure. There are clearlydifferent perspectives on which strategieswork, however, a number of issues stand outfor reflection: ● Regional networks are social actors in

their own right and to see them purely asa vehicle to express the views of nationalforums is naïve, and their active politicalvoice should be welcome. The key is toensure a mixed and balanced approach soregional networks pursue regionaladvocacy as well as supporting nationalcoalitions.

● Support to building national coalitionsneeds to happen at a suitable pace andcapacity development needs to ensuresustainability. While regional coalitionsneed to support growth in numbers andsize of national coalitions, a greater focuson capacity in management andgovernance116 is required to ensurecoalitions can manage their resources andprocedures adequately.

● The regional networks create a space forknowledge and skill development, whichis valued by the national coalitions.Despite the flexibility offered by the RWSII grant there has been a generalisedtendency to see capacity development astraining with less attention to follow up

and longer-term qualitative engagementthat is critical for the success ofsustainable national advocacy.

● Regional networks need to keep a balancein their work and guard against becomingover ‘institutionalised’, focused too muchon their own growth and voice. Theyshould ensure continued consultation withtheir members to determine strategicpriorities in order to ensure the legitimacyof the direction of their work goingforward.

The different histories and context of eachnetwork have of course shaped them. Goingforward, however, these reflections shouldallow for a more strategic approach.

RWS global coordination anda c t i o n

Theory can sometimes be easier than practiceand shifting power is not always as simple asit sounds. Many INGOs have (and continueto struggle) with being ‘partners’ withsouthern affiliates, especially when a fundingrelationship is a core part of therelationship.117 RWS II was a genuinecommitment to shifting this power dynamicof the work and the allocation of resourcesand management reflect this.

Day-to-day management over RWS II wasfirmly located at the regional level andstaffing and resources at the global centre (theGCE secretariat) were limited. The projecthad only one centralised global post, that ofthe RWS Global Coordinator118 who has beendescribed as more of ‘an onlooker, a pursekeeper, a keeper of relationships’. Thesecretariat staff member did not play a majorrole in capacity strengthening although thereare examples of some involvement, the rolewas more of a facilitating one to bring theregions together, to share lessons relevant toall three regions to support reporting andplanning processes. Secretariat staff andothers now question if this was the rightbalance and this research points to a need fora stronger role from the secretariat inknowledge and resource management;providing joint forums for learning andactions, and creating stronger links between


nation-regional and global level advocacy. The idea that advocacy at the national

level would link with advocacy at the global(or perhaps more accurately to sayinternational level) was articulated in two ofthe seven specific project objectives (and isreflected in the presentation of progress in theannual reports) which state:● To contribute to the delivery of effective

global advocacy work by GCE, ensuringconsistency, coherence and cross-fertilisation between national advocacyplans and regional/global strategies

● To bring about specific policy changes atglobal, regional and national level,consistent with overall objectives of GCE Global Strategy (authors highlights)

Looking at RWS as a whole the availableinformation suggests that the link fromnational to specific international level policychange has been the weakest area ofadvocacy within the project. This is not tosay there are not examples, however, policychanges at the international level that havecome about as a result of RWS II are less easyto identify. One research informant said acertain naivety existed in believing that itwould be easy ‘to join the dotted line betweenthe two levels of advocacy when in fact theseneeded to be created, and that global policylines didn’t have automatic resonance fornational coalitions’. In hindsight the sameperson felt that the project shouldn’t have‘pegged itself to high level policyobjectives’.119

The learning from this may be that thislink is simply not easy to create or that thisarea of work was overlooked in theimplementation of the project, with the latterof the two appearing the most plausibleexplanation. Limited levels of staffing at theglobal centre and limited allocation ofresources for global work from the RWS IIbudget meant the global coordination wastoo limited and overstretched to followthrough on this important aspect of theproject. Specific and intentional connectionsneed to be made in order to foster this cross-fertilisation from national to internationalpolicy change.

To ensure that the dynamic of change islocated at the national level – a key vision of

the project – any future work under the RWSbanner must ensure that national messagesfeed up to the global advocacy in a moreintentional manner.

Another area where the globalsecretariat’s facilitating role could have beenused to greater effect was creating moreconcrete actions between the regions andbetween countries from different regions. In2006 a good start was made around theEducation Watch with the 2006 annualreport noting that:

In March 2006, ANCEFA took part in theAsia Pacific Education Watch PlanningWorkshop held in Jakarta, Indonesia. InAugust 2006, ASPBAE attended the AfricaEducation Watch Planning Meeting held inDakar, Senegal. The experiences developedthrough this inter-regional collaboration willfacilitate development of a model that will seethe operation of the EdWatch projecttranslated from research to a popularpolitical agenda in all the regions.120

This early collaboration does not appearto have been pursued as fully as it could.There are very few examples between acountry in one region linking up with acountry in another region – a potentiallyvaluable process for learning and advocacywas therefore missed.

One success story in terms of joint action– even though it resulted in frustration inregard to the policy changes sought – was thecombined actions in the run up to and duringthe CONFINTEA VI. This provides ablueprint for joint action at all levels –national, regional and international – that isuseful for future action.

119 Interview with Lucia Fry120 RWS 2006 annual report, p 22


121 UNESCO 2006 GMR, summarydocument, p1http://www.unesco.org/en/efareport/reports/2006-literacy/

122 UNESCO 2010 GMR Fulldocument, Chapter 1, p.7http://www.unesco.org/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/GMR/pdf/gmr2010/gmr2010-overview.pdf

123 Interview with Camilla Croso 124 Nelida Cespedes is the

President of CEAAL and amember of the CLADE board

125 Paulo Freire is the Brazilianeducator and educationalphilosophy whose work in 1960sBrazil (up until his death in 1997)challenged conventional literacyteaching, suggesting that literacywas more than just reading andwriting per se but also throughliteracy the ability to criticallyread the world

126 The meeting itself was convenedby the UNESCO Institute forLifelong Learning and hosted bythe government of Mali

127 CONFINTEA VI RegionalConference (Nairobi, KenyaNovember 2008)

128 GAW is, as the name suggests,a week of action on a specificpolicy issue that GCE identify(through a process ofconsultation) as key forincreasing progress on the EFAgoals

129 See the GCE websitehttp://www.campaignforeduca-tion.org/en/big-read-campaign-materials/

130 Global Action Week takes placeevery April and the massmobilisation would havedovetailed with CONFINTEA VIthat was originally to take placein May 2009 but was postponeduntil later that year due to fearsover the Swine Flu pandemic

131 Seehttp://fisc2009english.wordpress.com/2009/12/02/civil-society-caucus-proposals-to-strengthen-the-belem-declaration/

132 Interview with Maria Khan133 Interview with Camilla Croso134 It should be made clear that

although this short case studypicks out different types of workfrom each region, national andregional activity in the run up toCONFINTEA were seen acrossall three regions and only limitedexamples are shared here

Box 10: RWS II and sixth international meeting ofCONFINTEA: a story of coordinated global advocacy

The sixth international conference on adult education (CONFINTEA VI) entitled‘Harnessing the power and potential of adult learning and education for a viable future’was held in Belem, Brazil in December 2009. The meeting provided a focal point for jointadvocacy among RWS II members. All three regions, many national coalitions and theglobal centre worked independently and together in order to influence governments andinternational donors.

The UNESCO-convened CONFINTEA meetings only take place every 12 years and theopportunity to influence the outcomes could not be missed. GCE globally, including RWSII participant countries, decided on a coordinated approach, with actions across themovement. The previous meeting of CONFINTEA V in 1997 produced an agenda for thefuture, which set out a number of comprehensive paths to promoting equitable adulteducation to reduce literacy and empower marginalised groups such as women. By 2006,however, the UNESCO Global Monitoring Report (which has a special focus on literacy)was clear that literacy was getting ‘short shrift’ with governments and aid agencies givinginsufficient priority and finance to youth and adult literacy programmes.121 The GMRcalled for a three-pronged approach to tackling illiteracy that included achieving UPE andscaling up youth and adult learning programs, as well as the promotion of literateenvironments. The 2010 GMR published just prior to the Belem meeting (in the autumn of2009) highlighted some progress in reducing the total number of illiterate people whilemaking it clear that: “adult literacy remains one of the most neglected of the Education forAll goals. There are currently some 759 million illiterate youths and adults in the world.Reflecting the legacy of gender disparities in education, two-thirds of this number arewomen.”122

With this backdrop the need to advocate for increased attention to literacy was crucialand GCE and its affiliated members began their strategic engagement well in advance ofthe actual conference. CLADE and others, lobbied for the meeting to be held in Brazilbecause (as one informant explained) they were anticipating that President Lula wouldattend and throw weight behind the progressive changes demanded by GCE members.123

Others considered it of symbolic significance that the meeting should be held in “the homeland of Paulo Freire”124 whose work has so greatly influenced the form and purpose ofadult literacy.125 National, regional and global activities were planned well in advance andcoordinated across the GCE movement.

In Africa ANCEFA began preparatory lobbying at least two years before CONFINTEAVI, targeting actions at the African Regional Conference in support of Global Literacy126

held in Bamako, Mali in September 2007. At that meeting ANCEFA coordinated a numberof activities including a public march to lobby the Ministers in charge of literacy, as well asrepresentatives of multilateral and bilateral agencies. Together with PAMOJA andActionAid, ANCEFA engaged the press, making clear the message that literacy is theresponsibility of the government as much as other education sectors and should not beignored. They called for a greater budget allocation to education in general and especiallyto literacy; highlighting the link between literacy levels and improvement in health and inthe most marginalised communities. ANCEFA with its partners EI Africa, GCE and otherCSOs were able to influence the final Conference Communiqué that included the policydemand to increase the allocation for literacy to at least 3% of the education budget.

ANCEFA and a number of national coalitions continued to focus on the issue ofliteracy in the subsequent years and in 2008 published a report entitled ‘Forgingpartnership towards a renewed vision of adult education in Africa’, which was a key civilsociety contribution to both the Regional Preparatory Conference in Kenya in November


2008127 as well as to CONFINTEA VI in 2009 in Brazil. The literature review was based on work done by nationalcoalitions, but also at regional and international levels.

In 2008 GCE adopted literacy as the theme for the 2009 Global Action Week128 and planning and developmentbegun under the banner of ‘The Big Read’.129 The GAW was intended as the culmination of the lobbying work, whichhad begun years before at national and regional level.130 In total GCE mobilised an estimated 13 million peopleworldwide and sent a powerful message to governments and donors that this issue was important.

Among this global effort for GAW were many of the national coalitions supported by the RWS II project. In Asia theseincluded, among others, three of the case study countries (see Part 2) who engaged in a range of creative activities: ● Cambodia (NGO Education Partnership) – More than 700 people joined the Big Read Launching Event on

25 April at the National Institute of Education in Phnom Penh organised by GCE Cambodia, with support fromNEP. Local Big Reads also took place in eight selected provinces in Cambodia. The key message for the event wason lobbying for more resources to education.

● Philippines (E-Net) – Simultaneous Big Reads were held in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao where more than1000 people were mobilised on 22 April to call for youths’ right to quality and free education. In Quezon City,members of the coalition shared an eight-point agenda for policy advocacy on education, before an audience ofchildren, out of school youth and students. Local celebrities and members of local government officials and theDepartment of Education joined in the Big Read.

● Nepal (GCE Nepal) – The Big Read on 25 April brought together different politically affiliated youth groups, theYouth Minister, the Department of Education to tackle issues on youth and adult literacy. India (National Coalitionfor Education) – Local Big Read Books were produced and distributed to 14 states in India. A reading event led bymore than 300 children, youth and adults and a big concert was held on 28 April in New Delhi. Local artists andcelebrities took part in the Big Read through their music and messages of solidarity.

Action also took place in other countries coordinated by ASPBAE, who, like ANCEFA and CLADE, began preparationwell in advance. ASPBAE also actively lobbied regional bodies as part of the coordinated approach.

For CLADE and its members, tackling illiteracy is a key focus of work and with the agreement by the governmentof Brazil to host the meeting, their work took on global significance within GCE. Lobbying ahead of and atCONFINTEA VI saw a ‘pooling of resources led by a professional team’ with important preparatory work led byCLADE. They played an instrumental role in the organisation of the International Civil Society Forum (known by itsPortuguese acronym FISC). This meeting was held in the days running up to CONFINTEA to prepare the participationof civil society groups and also to create working links with other movements, networks and organisations that havebeen working on the right to Youth and Adult Education. CLADE, with others in GCE, were influential in setting outrecommendations to strengthen the Belém Framework for Action in the form of the document From rhetoric tocoherent action131 that was presented December 1st, 2009. Civil society was represented on the main panels at themeeting and on the drafting committee of the final declaration although this was ultimately described as ‘frustrating’because ‘the language in the final communiqué could have been stronger’.132

Despite the pre-lobbying that took place, there was too much expectation about what could be achieved at theactual conference, which was in the main attended by lower ranking government officials, articulating decisions thathad already been taken elsewhere. This according to one informant highlights an important lesson about knowing howmuch time and energy to invest in one meeting when in fact much of outcome has been decided in advance.

The space opened by the national coalitions, the regional networks and the global centre in the run up and duringthe conference drew attention to literacy as fundamental right and was an important step in getting governments anddonors to give more attention to this EFA Goal.133

The real success story lies not in the outcome this time but in the blueprint that coordinated action across the GCEmovement, in part made possible by RWS II. It supported the work of national coalitions such as those in Asia, it contributedto regional actions such as those of ANCEFA and facilitated action taken at the meeting, led in great part by CLADE.1 3 4 T h ecoordinated action in the run up and during CONFINTEA VI is, despite some disappointment in the final outcome, asuccess story and outlines how the different RWS II countries and regional networks can work together for greater effect.


135 Gaventa and Mayo (2009) IDSWorking Paper 327, p 23

136 Interviews with Yvonne vanHees, Geoffrey Odaga and LuciaFry

137 Interview with Madeleine Zuniga,National Coordinator, CampañaPeruana por el Derecho a laEducación

138 Interview with Geoffrey Odaga139 Various interviews – Owain

James

Overall, however, the findings of thisreport suggest that the link between nationaland international advocacy, as well asbetween regions and between countries fromdifferent regions could be have been muchstronger. It is also an area in which somenational coalitions would have appreciatedmore activity. Despite this, it is worth notingthat GCE as a global coalition has beenpraised for its ability to bring togethermultiple sites of action: “The nature of theGCE is that it is simultaneously linking acrossall levels of action. This challengesassumptions about a simplistic vertical orlayered model of change.”135

An obstacle to assessing the contributionof RWS II to the international policy debateshas been the lack of specific brand identity ofthe project. This was borne out in interviewswith external research informants who, whileknowledgeable of GCE, the regionalnetworks and some of national coalitions,knew very little about RWS II and as suchwere unable to validate the impact of itssuccess in the field of global advocacy. It isfair to stress here, that this lack of externalbranding was not considered an issue by the Government of the Netherlands andaccording to the former RWS GlobalCoordinator it was a deliberate choice not to brand the project but rather allow it tomake a contribution to building a movementon EFA.136

Despite the weakness of the project inaggregating advocacy and campaign issuesfrom the national level to global advocacy itis clear that for national coalitions there isconsiderable benefit from these wideraffiliations. The Peruvian Campaign forEducation for All, among others felt stronglythat their association not only with CLADEbut to GCE globally afforded increasedcredibility and enhanced their image in theeyes of the Peruvian government.137 Or as InSamrithy of the Cambodia national coalitionput it: “I think Real World Strategies is aboutglobal links. We feel that ok we are notalone, we have friends in other coalitions inother countries who care about us and wecare for them”.

Furthermore being part of a globalcoalition provides access to a direct source ofinformation for coalitions to understand the

dynamics of the EFA global political context,which can provide useful ‘intelligence’ forinfluencing their own governments. Onefurther benefit from international andregional links is possible protection in theface of government hostility; although not amajor concern in the countries where RWS IIhas been operating, there are examples. Thecoalition coordinator in Haiti was harassedby the military and his passport marked toidentify him as a dangerous person, CLADEissued a statement about this harassment andit is hoped the increased public attention willprovide protection for him to continue hisactivities.

One area where local RWS action did linkto a globalised action can be found in thecontribution made to the annual GCE GlobalAction Week (GAW). Although not a statedobjective of RWS II, according to one sourceRWS II countries accounted for 70%138 of theGAW numbers. This claim, however, isdifficult to assess for accuracy as money atthe national level was at times ‘foldedtogether’ with other funds.139 It is also worthnoting that despite the importance of highvisibility mobilisation on a global scale, someresearch participants said that GAW detractsfrom defining national advocacy agendas.There was a view that GAW focuses a lot oftime, energy and resources on an advocacytheme that may not be the most relevant ortimely in the national context.

A notable gap at the global level is thelack of centralised database of resources thatcould serve as means of documenting theproject’s output in one centralised locationand facilitate the sharing of good practice,advocacy tools, and training materials(subject to language and/or culturaldifferences); it could help save time andmoney and act as a catalyst of ideas forothers. It would also help reduce pressure on the regional networks to undertake thistask. While a balance is important and themajority of funds should support the needs of national coalitions, a marginal increase in resources at the central level could beextremely beneficial for projects such as RWS II.

The issue of ‘operational space’ washighlighted during this research process and itis worth touching on to order to avoid similar


confusions arising in the future. GCE is aglobal coalition working on EFA withaffiliated members in over 100 countries; itdoes not however work with all existingeducation networks or coalitions. ANCEFA,ASPBAE and CLADE are the affiliatedregional networks with whom GCE partnersfor the core of its activities in those respectiveregions. An understanding exists, articulatedin GCE’s strategic plan, that all regionalactivities will be done in cooperation withthese regional networks, however, there aresome examples where this has not been thecase. For example in South Africa a parallelprocess of coalition building occurred thatdid not include ANCEFA, and in Boliviasome confusion arose regarding the allocationof the new CSEF grant and which coalitionwas affiliated to CLADE/GCE. The danger isthat parallel processes or separaterelationships can lead to a perception (toboth insiders and outsiders) of a lack ofinternal communication and/or a lack of trustwithin the GCE ‘family’, and warrant somereflection by GCE secretariat and board.

One final issue that emerged in relation tothe global centre during this research is theperception that the GCE Board tends to seeRWS as a side issue and not as a core aspectof GCE work. Research informants felt that

the project was dealt with as anadministrative issue and that the Board didnot focus sufficient attention on the richnessor importance of the work. This reinforcesthe findings of the GCE Mid-Term review in2007 that noted: “RWS currently appears tomany as a ‘bolt-on’ rather than a core part ofGCE’s programme. Despite their key role inmanaging RWS, many feel that GCE has notrealised the potential of regional networks, orreflected their contribution in itsgovernance.”140

Others also asked to what extent the1Goal Campaign141 has absorbed adisproportionate amount of secretariat andboard attention during the last couple ofyears, draining energy from work such asRWS. There was also a concern that 1Goalmessaging was too centrally driven and notenough space given to national coalitions,undermining the aims of projects such asRWS II that aim to increase the voice ofsouthern activists.

These comments and questions wouldsuggest that at the very least a perceptionexists that questions whether the GCEBoard has been sufficiently focused on RWSII, an issue which may require refle c t i o nfrom the board about its future engagementin such work.

140 Mid Term Review of GCE 2007,p.9

141 Seehttp://www.join1goal.org/home.php for more information

46 D I D I T W O R K ?

142 Lucia Fry 143 For practical suggestions see:

http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/672/Tracking-Progress-in-Advocacy-Why-and-How-to-Monitor-and-Evaluate-Advocacy-Projects-and-Programmes.pdf

144 Interviews with Geoffrey Odagaand Lucia Fry

145 Approx. US$ 6,793,267146 According to an article by

Geoffrey Sachs in the UKnewspaper the Guardian(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/04/g8-aid-pledges-broken) “hosting thisyear’s G8 summit reportedlycost Canada a fortune, despitethe absence of any significantresults. The estimated cost ofhosting the G8 leaders for a dayand a half, followed by the G20leaders for a day and a half,reportedly came to more than$1bn [ 717,865,737,913.84].This is essentially the sameamount that the G8 leaderspledged to give each year to the world’s poorest countries to support maternal and childhealth.”

One purpose of this report is to capturesome of the unique stories of RWS II,another to examine the individual elementsand the project in its entirety and to respondto the question of has RWS worked? Theoverview above has attempted to generatean understanding of RWS II and todocument some key aspects of the project,as well as offer an assessment of some of thehighlights and challenges. There have beenlimitations in the way the project wasmonitored and evaluated, includinglimitations in the research for this reportand as a result, not all that is either good, orless good, about RWS has been unearthed.

How far then has the project realised itcore aim? How many objectives have beenmet and what is the project’s contributionoverall to helping shape progress to reachingthe EFA goals? Has the money invested bythe Government of the Netherlands and theeffort of so many helped to change thelandscape of national EFA advocacy?

As with any multi-faceted issue theanswer is often more complex than a simpleyes or no response: RWS has led to someamazing policy and legal changes that willwithout doubt have a fundamental impacton access to quality education for all.Naturally it has also had it failings; issues ofpersonal and/or political tensions thathindered the work and resulted in missedopportunities.

From the testimonies collected it is clearthat RWS II has been a valuable experiencefor those organisations that took part. RWSII has enabled the building of national EFAcoalitions where there were none; increasingthe capacity of others already in existenceand significantly strengthened the work of theregional networks. Building civil societyadvocacy capacity cannot, however, solely bemeasured by increased numbers or professedself-esteem of coalitions (regardless of howimportant this is in itself). It must also bemeasured against its own objective ofwhether or not, having been strengthened,civil society can deliver on policy changes tofurther progress towards EFA.

The research team faced a double hurdlein documenting and making an assessmentof how far this was achieved: firstly, the wellrecognised difficulty regarding attributionfor changes as a result of advocacy andsecond in the case of RWS II the signific a n tlack of external (or at times even internal)branding of the project. Althoughattribution of a policy change to a singleevent or organisation is sometimes possibleit is more feasible to assess the contributionto a desired result. One internal researchinformant was very clear that “you have tothink of RWS [II] – what was itscontribution, rather than attribute changesto it. ”1 4 2 This view is more credible becausechange rarely occurs as the result of a singleprocess but (as already touched on in thediscussion on ‘policy change’ above) changeis achieved over time and influenced by avariety of factors. Building in goodmonitoring and evaluation systems foradvocacy, however, reduces the diffic u l t i e sof attribution to some extent.1 4 3

This generic challenge of attribution ofadvocacy was exacerbated by a lack ofbranding of RWS II. It was (according tomore than one internal informant) adeliberate policy not to create an RWSb r a n d ;1 4 4 no matter how valid the rationalefor this decision it made the process ofassessing RWS II’s unique contribution morecomplicated. Despite these challenges it isevident that RWS II has contributed to somes i g n i ficant policy changes in a number ofnational contexts, and that it has helpedincrease size and effectiveness of manycoalitions, suggesting that further policychanges will follow.

It is the conclusion of this research thatRWS II has been a success, making aworthwhile contribution in the struggle forEFA. What’s more, taking a top line look,the project provides value for money. Theoverall budget for this project was 5m i l l i o n1 4 5 over five years – only a fraction ofthe cost for example of G8 and G20Summits held in Canada in 2010146 – noti n s i g n i ficant of course but considering some

Did it work?

D I D I T WORK? 47

of the changes in law, policy, budgets, andincreased levels of activism of EFA itappears to be money well spent.

That is not to say that the project waswithout its weaknesses. Reports of poorgovernance, questions over sustainabilityand even lack of transparency have all beenraised and must be addressed by thenational coalitions, the regional networksand GCE secretariat and board.

RWS II success is then evident in thestrength of coalitions and the policychanges their actions have influenced. It isalso evident in the impact it has had on thereal lives of the women, men and childrenwho have been part of it, from activists toschool community beneficiaries. It is worthpausing to reflect on the words of Jamaica,the 15 year old girl who after being forcedto drop out of school became an activist inan RWS II-supported campaign run by E-Net in the Philippines:

“I learned from E-Net that all of us canhelp in education. I’d like to teach childrenmyself. Before the campaign, I didn’t talkmuch except to say yes when someone askedme a question. I talk more now. ”1 4 7

These simple words illustrate a powerfulpoint that goes to the heart of RWS, which isthat creating spaces and opportunities allowsordinary children (and adults) to find theirvoice and – when they believe it is correct –raise it for their right to education.148

147 Interview conducted by BarbaraFortunato as part of the RWSDocumentation and Assessmentprocess in Asia

148 See the Asia regional casestudies below in Part 2 to learnmore about the work of E-NetPhilippines

48 G L O B A L L E S S O N S

149 See quote on page 17 of this report

Context and different political environmentscan have a huge bearing on the type andimpact of advocacy on EFA. Each story mustbe read with an understanding of the culturaland political situation in which it has takenplace. Action that generates a positive responsein one country may lead to a negative reactionin another. Despite cultural and contextualdifferences, a reading of the case studieshighlights some common issues facing nearlyall the countries, and also highlights somecommon strategies.

Across the countries and the regions it isclear that many barriers to the right toeducation are universal and coalitions facesimilar issues. It is clear that all coalitions areoperating in environments with multiplechallenges to achieving EFA including barriersto access and quality, weak governmentsystems and policy frameworks. Lack ofresources and widespread charging of fees(formal and informal) is commonplace.Cultural barriers that designate some children– girls, children with disabilities, children fromparticular ethnic or social groups – less worthyof an education are resulting in unequal accessto formal education and higher rates ofilliteracy for these discriminated groups –another shared reality.

Despite poor education indicators, thecoalitions face governments whose publicdiscourse on education is supportive. The notionthat these governments lack resources ratherthan political will was widespread andcoalitions face the challenge of highlightinginaccuracies in government data and/ordispelling the myth that governments would domore if only they could. Of course, somecountries do face real resource constraints butpolitical prioritisation of education is oftenlacking. The starting point for much of theadvocacy is one where policies and practiceneeded updating, changing or proper resourcing.

In addition to sharing many similarexternal obstacles in moving the debate andaction on EFA forward, coalitions also sharedsome common characteristics. At the start ofRWS II, as GCE acknowledged, manycoalitions lacked leadership and institutional

capacity and their ability to advocateeffectively was described as ‘slim and fragile’.1 4 9

Coalitions were at once trying to tackle thehuge barriers to EFA in their countries whilealso needing to develop their own systems,structures and capacity.

The commonality of experiences is not onlyr e flected in the context and starting point ofthe coalitions’ work but also in the strategiesand tactics they pursued, guided andsupported by the regional networks. Theirtactics included lobbying different parts of theState, although most commonly the Ministryof Education. Of course the political culture ofdifferent countries led to different relationshipswith government, in some cases the coalitionsformed very close working relationships withgovernment, acting as advisers and allies. Forcoalitions in both Africa and Asia, adopting aninsider approach to government was seen asextremely important, whereas in LatinAmerican coalitions focused on legal changes,using the division of State powers to hold theexecutive to account.

Another pattern evident across most of thework is the importance of lobbying consistentlyacross a defined period of time and using thepolitical and/or policy calendars to maximiseimpact. For example lobbying prospective MPsand getting their sign up to key demands priorto elections, or finding out key dates in thenational budget cycle and lobbying in the runup to key decisions. Coalitions have becomeincreasingly aware that they need to targetlobbying further and wider, not just focusingon the executive and the legislative arms of theState but also with the judiciary, somethingthat has paid enormous dividends in LatinAmerica. Mobilisation of the public andb e n e ficiaries is another tool that has been usedto good effect during RWS II, as has reachingout to the wider public (and decision makers)via the media.

Another common tool in advocacy was thegeneration of new research to support use ofevidence-based advocacy. Generating reliableevidence serves as an alternative to offic i a lgovernment data that is often limited (andpossibly misleading) and it demonstrates to

Global lessons

G L O B A L LESSONS 49

government that coalitions are serious andcredible actors with a good understanding ofthe education sector. RWS II gave a greatimpetus to evidence-based advocacy throughEducation Watch, a flagship initiative in theearly years of the project.1 5 0 Participation inEducation Watch increased confidence of thesector to engage with government from aninformed position. The research highlighted theissues at hand and the weak institutional datacollection capacity at the State level. Theinability of the State to generate the samequality data, therefore its inability to effectivelyrespond to the education needs on the ground,was highlighted indirectly through the processof engagement with decision makers.

RWS II started not long after the massmobilisation of organisations and individualsin the Make Poverty History movement thatculminated around the 2005 G8 Summit. Withthis backdrop and because it makes sense, theproject objectives stressed the importance ofbuilding broad-based alliances. This didhappen, the work with the teachers’ unions inparticular (at times strained) has resulted in animportant collaboration, which has beengreatly facilitated by EI. For example inTanzania, the national coalition and theteachers’ union worked together to press foran Teachers’ Professional Board, however,they have met resistance from the governmentas to whether this board should beindependent or government controlled. InBrazil the national coalition and the teachers’union cooperated to get the ‘Teachers’ WageFloor Law’ approved by the Congress. Thisrepresented a very important victory, however,there are still problems with itsimplementation in some states where it has yetto be rigorously enforced. In India the powerof the teachers’ unions has been used by thecoalition in their public mobilisations.1 5 1

Despite some successes linking with othersocial movements and forming wider alliances,this has perhaps not come to fruition in the waythe project envisaged. Some coalitions noted thed i f ficulty in getting education high on the agendaof wider social movements. There are examples,however, where forming strategic alliances haspaid great dividends, such as the importantalliance built with the Special Rapporteur onthe Right to Education in Latin America, orASPBAE’s strategic relationship with the

UNESCO regional office (Bangkok) aroundthe Mid-Decade Assessment of the EFA goals.Building alliances, while time consuming, can beuseful but they need to be decided strategicallyrather than being a blanket objective.

RWS II has taught us that collective actionbased on a clear targeted strategy can influ e n c egovernment and lead to progressive changetoward achieving EFA. The rich case studiespresented in this report (see Part 2 below) offerus an opportunity and a challenge. They offerus an opportunity to connect with the ‘realworld’ of women, men and children who arecommitted to take action, to speak out, todemand the right to education for all. Theyoffer us the opportunity to assess approachesin light of outcomes and importantly to learnfor future practice. They also pose a challengebecause there is not a one-size fits all model.Even where we can draw out examples ofcommonalities and highlight good practice it is not always possible to replicate models ascontext and capacity must be factored in.

Key Lessons

Local action, global change is valid conceptbut requires a strategy.The theory of change that underpinned thiswork, as the name ‘real world strategies’suggested, saw the need to locate change atthe grassroots. Power was most definitelydevolved from the global centre in RWS II. In fact it seems reasonable to conclude that so little focus was given at the global levelthat it had a detrimental effect on theproject’s potential outcomes. The globalcentre could have served an importantfunction in terms of centralised mechanismfor sharing materials, facilitating cross-project learning and actions, and makingmore explicit links between national andinternational advocacy. While power shiftedfrom the centre, it did not shift as far as wasintended, and a significant yet previouslyunarticulated growth in the size, field ofoperation and voice of the regional networksoccurred. Many positive outcomes have beenachieved as a result and clearly they point tothe need for increased advocacy towardsregional bodies. If this model is to beextended then it should be accompanied by

150 The 2006 RWS annual reportdescribes Education Watch asthe ‘centrepiece of the RWSproject in 2006’. It goes on toexplain that EdWatch as it wasknown “is an independent,alternative, citizen-basedassessment of the status ofbasic education in 20 projectcountries. It is designed tostrengthen local and community-based capacities for claim-making on education, andintended to bolster nationaleducation coalitions’ capacitiesto sharply define, pursue andachieve their policy changeobjectives, armed by crediblealternatives, and based ongrassroots-locally generatedevidence.”

151 The earlier mentioned researchon transnational advocacyconducted by the University ofAmsterdam, which was alsofunded by the Government ofthe Netherlands, looks morespecifically at the relationshipbetween teachers’ unions andtheir membership of nationalcoalitions (publicationforthcoming in 2011)

50 G L O B A L L E S S O N S

152 Quote included in a power pointpresentation on the 15th June2010 at World Council ofComparative EducationSocieties, Istanbul

more accountability mechanisms so thatnational coalitions remain at the heart ofregional decision-making processes.

GCE did not fully implement its vision ofchange through RWS II. It was not able toadequately connect the local level concerns tothe international policy objectives of GCE.And it failed to create meaningful linksbetween coalitions from different parts of theworld. GCE should, in future projects, be moredeliberate in creating horizontal and verticallinkages across geographical contexts. Moreexplicit action is required to foster these links,as they do not necessarily emerge organically.This not only facilitates learning andmentoring but also supports the creation of aweb of influence that will strengthen the entireGCE ‘movement’.

Build institutions One of the main aims of the RWS II projectwas to strengthen the advocacy andcampaigning potential of CSOs in the South; tobuild new coalitions where there were noneand to deepen their work where they alreadyexisted to mobilise public demand and concernfor EFA. The evidence in this report shows thishappened. There are more coalitions and therehas been an increase in advocacy activity andachievements as a result of RWS II. A question,however, remains over the sustainability ofsuch a rapid growth in action and actors.

Sustainability requires well-developedsystems and structures that are able to captureand systematically store and retrieveinstitutional memory. Documentation of theproject processes and achievements, soimportant for future use and reference, need tobe strengthened. Access to reference materialsand examples of good practice would saveresources. User-friendly databases and intranetsites could provide a repository for resources atglobal, regional and the national level.Sustainability also calls for knowledge, skillsand experience to be spread across themembers to ensure continuous learning fromthe project for all staff in the coalition, regionalnetwork or even the global centre.

The tendency to concentrate capacitydevelopment on technical knowhow has insome cases been to the detriment of developingenabling strong internal systems and structures.Strengthening governance and management

should be prioritised over a rush for outputs.Increasing numbers of coalitions in someregions did not go far enough and in others itwent too fast. The regional networks need tobe strategic in their choices so as not toreactively respond to every demand forsupport. In some cases the money disbursedthrough to the national coalition was verysmall and a look at the future use of budgetsand how they can be used most effectively isrequired. The well-intentioned desire to takeon more issues and responsibilities rather thanto deepen and consolidate existing work is alsoa lesson that some coalitions need to reflect on.

Limit advocacy focus An RWS II objective was the development oftime-bound advocacy strategies at both thenational and regional level. While this hasobviously occurred, there needs to be far moreconsistency and coherence in the waystrategies are developed. Strategic developmentprocesses need to factor in both processobjectives that will achieve a capacitydevelopment outcome and impact objectives.

Ambition is good, however, limitedresources mean that advocacy should be morefocused. Coalitions should plan their advocacycycle and choose one, or two, main issues. Thiswas summed up nicely by researchers at theUniversity of Amsterdam who said “Busieragendas may facilitate cohesion, but limiti m p a c t. ”1 5 2 This does not mean that other EFAgoals will be ignored but it is clear from theexperiences of RWS II that resources shouldbe used effectively and not spread too thinly.

Constructive dialogue but no compromise on rights I n fluencing change is a process that requiresjudgement. Coalitions need to understand theissues, problems and the context in which theyoperate. They also need to be politically literateand understand the power dynamics at play;change after all often rests in the hands of just afew people. An important point noted in thisresearch is that coalitions are not simply tryingto change the education system, they are tryingto change the political system as it relates toeducation, and political literacy is therefore key.

A clear message emerging from the casestudies is that building constructive relationshipsrather than opting for confrontational

G L O B A L LESSONS 51

approaches pays greater dividends. Using thelanguage of the target and highlighting theb e n e fits of education that are of most interest tothem is an effective tactic. Building constructive,positive relationships helps build trust andopens up policy dialogue, although coalitionsmust be aware of the danger of co-option.

Compromise and constructive engagementopens up dialogue, and using advocacy toolsthat identify a problem but also propose a pathtowards a solution is necessary. However,compromise must only go so far and thebottom line is that the right to education is notnegotiable. A number of widely ratifie dinternational human rights conventions existthat carry with them legal obligations andcoalitions should use these obligations todemand change. The UN Convention on theRights of the Child is the most widely ratifie dhuman rights convention and sets out the rightto free quality education in primary educationthat governments have to respect, protect andf u l fil. It is important for coalitions to know andunderstand these rights and if necessary takelegal action for them to be upheld.

Flexible and reliable financing for sustainability When the Government of the Netherlandsdecided to fund the second stage of the RWS IIproject their trust in GCE resulted in anextraordinary amount of flexibility in theadministration of the grant. This flexibility waswidely acknowledged as strength of RWS II.The flexibility of the grant meant it functionedmore like core support than project money. Itthrows up an interesting comparison with themodality of sector or general budget supportwhich donors increasingly favour. Of courseaccountability mechanisms need to be in place,however, this type of support for nationalcoalitions could prove very favourable,strengthening the institutional and capacitydevelopment of the coalitions and networks.The new Civil Society Education Fund (CSEF)is structured to offer this type of support,however, it does not provide support to theregional networks.1 5 3 For coalitions there isneed to have more stable sources of fundingthat not only allows them to plan ahead butalso to take more innovative action.

One issue not covered in detail in the reportbut that affected RWS II was the delay in therelease of funds each year up until 2009. This

was quoted as a considerable problem leadingto delays in implementation, missedopportunities and in at least one case the lossof a valuable staff member, when salaries werenot available. Ensuring swift and appropriatedisbursement of funds is important to thesuccessful running of any project but when sucha large degree of reliance is invested in one potof money delays can have knock-on effects. Thisis something for grant recipients to factor in andfind strategies to manage the risk effectively.It is incumbent on the donors or those centralbodies to guard against such delays.

Research and knowledge creationThe vision of RWS II to drive change at thenational level, to empower ordinary people totake action, extended to coalitions engaging inresearch, generating evidence to holdgovernments to account. The benefits areconsiderable, having both an external andinternal effect.

The ability to identify key issues inachieving EFA and conduct research into thescale of the problem and to propose solutionswas a key feature of the Education Watchwork. It provided key data and evidence bywhich coalitions could hold their governmentsto account. It exposed the failure of bothgovernment policy and weakness in offic i a ldata. It recommended feasible steps forgovernments to address the problem. Researchproved a useful lobbying tool and increasedthe credibility of the national coalition. It alsoincreased the coalitions’ sense of confidence initself, shifting power dynamics between thecoalition and their governments.

Furthermore, through external engagementand alliances with regional and global partners,coalitions develop new knowledge that allowsthem to move their advocacy in new directions,creating new ways of working and new knowledgeregarding EFA in their national context.

Learning for future practiceThe global lessons above reflect some of thelearning that has emerged from this researchof RWS II (with more highlighted in theregional summary following the case studiesin Part 2 below). It is hoped that these lessonsoffer a starting point for reflection, whichalong with the recommendations in Part 3 willresult in more effective advocacy on EFA.

153 The CSEF is focused onsupporting CSOs at the nationallevel and although it is managedthrough structures within theregional networks they cannotbenefit from the fundingthemselves

Part2

World:

Advocacy Real

in the

EFA

54 The country case studies

154 As previously mentioned thisgroup is made up ofrepresentatives from the regionalnetworks and global centre whomanaged the research andediting of this report

For all of the national coalitions that havebeen part of RWS II the experiences andoutcomes – both in organisationaldevelopment and policy change – will bedifferent. RWS II was a flexible fundingstream designed to allow each coalition tobuild their capacity for advocacy in a waythat was most appropriate for them. Theresult is a rich and diverse set of stories thatreveal common challenges and sharedstrategies yet unique paths and distinctresults. Across and even within regions,different coalitions had their own particularset of circumstances and priorities. Somewere able to progress further and faster intheir advocacy demands but all were able tobenefit from being part of this project.

One report cannot capture all thesestories, however, 12 unique case studies,four from each region, are shared below asan illustration of how RWS II has enabledthe development of more and stronger civilsociety advocacy on EFA during the last fewyears.

In keeping with the belief of giving a voiceto southern activists, the RWS Reference

Group154 chose researchers native to eachregion to collect the data and write up theircase studies. The result is a rich collection ofstories, which although distinct in style andform, have many common threads runningthroughout (many of which were highlightedin Part 1) and it is clear that RWS II hasmade a significant contribution to advocacyon EFA. The outcomes differ; in somecountries change is witnessed by thecoalition’s ability to engage in dialogue withthe government and in other countries therehave been concrete changes in policy and law.Each one represents progress and suggestssustained advocacy on EFA during thecoming years.Part 2 of this report is divided in threeregional sections. They include a briefintroduction to the regional context, the casestudies and a regional summary pullingtogether some of the learning emerging fromthe research process. Although each has itsown distinct style, research was standardisedacross the regions in accordance with theagreed case study and data collectionmethodology (see Appendix 1).

I n t ro d u c t i o n

Section 1: Latin America & the Caribbean by Ilich Leon Ortiz Wilches page 55

Section 2: Africaby Omar Ousman Jobe page 76

Section 3: Asia-Pacific by Barbara Fortunato page 97

The regional case studies are followed in Part 3 of the report by final conclusions andrecommendations for future action.

RWS II IN LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN 55

Context

It is long known that the Latin

American and Caribbean region is

characterised by increasing social and

educational inequality, due to

processes that give rise to poverty and

social, political and economic

exclusion. Marginalised groups such

as ethnic minorities like indigenous

and afro-descendents as well as

migrants and refugees are the most

affected – over 40% of the population

lives below the poverty line and more

than 21 million people in the region

migrated to United States or

Europe,155 for the most part, in the

pursuit of better living conditions.

Some States in the region are oriented

to a social platform while others are

reviving conservative and

antidemocratic practices – States, it is

worth mentioning, where democracies

are recent and fragile.

Education, a right of all people, key to therealisation of all of the other rights and to socialtransformation, is still a low-priority issue forLatin American and the Caribbean States,although the opposite is affirmed in most oftheir discourses. Ensuring free, universal andquality education for all – the framework wherethe Latin American Campaign for the Rightto Education/ Campaña Latinoamericana porel Derecho a la Educación (CLADE) works –requires overcoming obstacles of a structural,political and cultural nature.

In the region, there are still 35 millionilliterate people and another 88 million peoplewho have not completed primary education.The financing allocated to the realisation ofthe right to education, which was alreadyinsufficient, has suffered the effects of theeconomic and financial crisis. Additionally,there are several forms of discrimination ineducation, which prevent thousands of peoplefrom exercising their right to education.Noteworthy improvements in terms of accesscan be observed; however, children, youngpeople and adults in the region still face hugechallenges in order to remain in school andcomplete their education. In this scenario, theaction of civil society’s forces is relevant andnecessary in exerting pressure on States sothat they fulfil their role of guarantors ofrights. CLADE is one of the organisationsthat have been working dynamically in thefield of policy advocacy to help achieve this. 155 CEPAL 2006

RWS II in Latin America & the Caribbean by Ilich Leon Ortiz Wi l c h e s

56 RWS II IN LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

156 About this see: Guatemala asCold War History, Richard H.Immerman. Political ScienceQuarterly Vol. 95, No. 4 (Winter,1980-1981), pp. 629-653.Published by: The Academy ofPolitical Science, Pásara, Luis,Torres-Rivas, Edelberto (2003) el proceso de paz, sus actores,logros y límites, and FondoXavier Clavijero (2003),Guatemala, Guatemala. S.J. –ITESO (Mexico): UniversidadRafael Landívar, Instituto deInvestigaciones Jurídicas

157 It was only the currentdemocratic government ofPresident Colom, underpressure from civil society, thatput a definitive end to thecharging of school fees anddeveloped programs to increaseaccess to education. Even so,parliamentary opposition meansthat the increase in theeducation budget is still blocked

C o n t e x t :

Between the 1960s and 1990s, Guatemalawent through a brutal armed conflict thatlasted for over 35 years. This war betweenleftist insurgent forces and the anti-communist reaction of the successivegovernments jointly with the army left a trailof destruction and violation of human rightsacross the country, with more than 300,000victims and millions of displaced people. Thisarmed conflict was solved only by negotiationin the 1990s, thanks to an intenseinternational mediation effort as well as asuccession of governments electeddemocratically since the late 1980s which,despite some failed attempted coups,managed to establish peace agreements andreintegrate the combatant forces back intocivil life in 1996.156

Agreements were signed in peaceroundtables to tackle the need for deepchanges in Guatemalan society. Theseagreements addressed the futureimplementation of public policies that wouldguarantee access to public services and therealisation of economic and social rights bythe entire population. However, theimplementation of these agreements and thedesign of these policies remained as pendingtasks for future governments. Althoughconstitutional order and the rule of law weremaintained and strengthened after theagreements were signed, much remains to bedone to set in motion reforms and policies toimprove the population’s socio-economicconditions.

Within the context of the peaceagreements, two important reforms related tothe right to education were proposed,intended to broaden citizens’ participation inthe design and social watch of public policy,

and improve teachers’ working conditionsand salaries. First, to establish and regulatemunicipal and departmental educationcouncils in order to foster popularorganisation and enable citizens’participation in the decision-making processaround education’s direction in each locality.Second, a proposal of massprofessionalization of teachers was presented;this would allow teachers to have broadaccess to higher education, thus achieving animprovement in their salaries and workingconditions.

During Portillo’s democratic government(2000-2004) attempts were made to set bothreforms in motion but did not succeed due toopposition in parliament, where right-wingforces opposed to any real reforms held themajority. Therefore, attempts to improveparticipation in and availability of theeducation service in Guatemala have beenquite restricted until today due to theimpossibility of putting into practice deepreforms that guarantee the realisation of theright to education for the majority of thepopulation.157

Guatemala has the lowest rate ofeducation investment in the region, at lessthan 2% of GDP. In addition, the lack ofsufficient education centres to provideprimary education and high drop-out ratesresult in the country having the lowestprimary education completion rates in theregion (72.5% in 2006); likewise, theenrolment rates in secondary education(34.7% in lower secondary and 20% inupper secondary) are also the lowest in LatinAmerica. There is a contrast between havingonly one national public university(University of San Carlos) and nine private

Case Study: The policy advocacy experience ofColectivo de Educación para Todos yTodas of Guatemala in the search forf ree basic education


universities. In 2006, a study on the “Statusof the Education System” (Ministry ofEducation/USAID) showed that 49% ofschools did not have drinking water, 36% didnot have electricity, 8% had their roof in badcondition, 5% had the walls in bad conditionand 8% had the floor in bad condition. Thus,only 15% of public education centres meetthe quality criteria to develop their activities.

Within this context, full of obstacles topublic policy democratisation and beset by anurgent need for substantive improvement ofthe education system, the Colectivo deEducación para Todos y Todas (Educationfor All Group) emerged as a diverse coalitionof organisations that seek to develop actionsof citizen mobilisation and advocacy beforethe State to make clear advances towardsimprovement of education. Since its inceptionthe Colectivo has dedicated its efforts on theachievement of the EFA Goals in Guatemala.As it began to network with CLADE,158 itdeepened and incorporated a clear humanrights perspective in its work in order tounderstand public education policy.

Advocacy processes of The Colectivo De EducaciónPara Todos Y To d a s

The Colectivo was born in 2003, and set outto make the Dakar EFA goals signed byGuatemala more widely known at a timewhen the State made no reference to theseinternational commitments. The main challengewas to raise awareness of the internationalpromises and commitments of the State ofGuatemala in order to promote their fulfilment.

Facing a political context adverse toreforms in education, the Colectivo carriesout concrete policy advocacy actions to pressgovernment to fulfil their obligations to theEFA goals and make significant advancesconcerning the realisation of the right toeducation in Guatemala. As a consequence,since 2005 the organisation developed alobbying process to use the visit of UNSpecial Rapporteur on the Right to Educationas a mechanism to open up a broad andparticipatory debate around the difficultconditions of education in the country. This

158 Colectivo has been a member ofCLADE since its Assembly inPanama in March 2007, wherethe Charter of Principles of thisnetwork was signed

58 RWS II IN LATIN AMERICA & THE C A R I B B E A N

159 In 2008, President Alvaro ColomCaballeros of the center-leftpolitical party Unidad Nacionalde la Esperanza (UNE) tookoffice

160 CLADE itself has been able toscale up its presence andadvocacy in the region in largepart to the support of RWS II inthe last five years – as outlined inPart 1 of this report

took place when the Guatemalan groupjoined CLADE, gaining a link to theinternational debate on education in the LatinAmerican and Caribbean region.

During the World Social Forum in PortoAlegre, Brazil in 2005, and thanks toCLADE’s invitation, Colectivo was put incontact with Vernor Muñoz, UN SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Education for theperiod 2006-2010. During the forum, theGuatemalan group told him of their interest inhaving his presence in Guatemala to which hewas very receptive. Colectivo immediatelybegan once more to contact the governmentand call for an official mission of theRapporteur. The Colectivo used sustainedpressure and lobbying. It maximised informalcontacts with the Human Rights Office of thePresident’s Office, the favourable participationof the Office of UN High Commissioner onHuman Rights in the country, and theestablishment of formal communicationsbetween these bodies, however, it was notpossible to obtain the authorisation for thevisit until the new government of PresidentColom took office in 2008.1 5 9

The campaign for Fre eE d u c a t i o n

Colectivo also developed a campaign on theneed to universalise free education in thecountry and, through it, pressed for theelimination of enrolment and school fees,which by then were legal due to the existenceof a Governmental Agreement thatauthorised them.

Colectivo understood that it wasnecessary to contrast the right to freeeducation with the programme AutogestiónEducativa (Education Self-Management), ledat the time by the Ministry. The AutogestiónEducativa, based on a neo-liberal model,burdened schools and communities with theresponsibility of partially financing theeducation process.

The activities carried out by Colectivoboth in the interlocution with the governmentand through a gradually increasingcommunication with the citizens did notobtain the desired government responsivenessduring the Perdomo government (2004-2008).

Perdomo neither authorised the visit of theRapporteur nor created an atmosphere forthe abolition of school fees. However, theseactions by Colectivo gathered momentumand a window for opportunity was openedwith the election of Colom.

Colectivo had already developedmobilisation and communication actionsregarding free education such as radiopublicity against school fees, publications onfree education as part of human rights, andan agenda of sensitisation about freeeducation as a condition for the achievementof the EFA goals. It used these tools toincorporate the concerns about the status ofthe education system in the agenda of thepresidential candidate Colom.

RWS support to advocacyactions and results inGuatemala

Thus, after the presidential election tookplace, Colectivo established a direct dialoguewith the government, finally obtainingPresidential authorisation for the officialmission of the Rapporteur in the country.Ultimately, this created important politicalconditions and generated public opinion andas a result, in September 2008 thegovernment took action to prohibit fees.

Both actions – the pressure and lobby toachieve the Rapporteur’s visit as well as thecampaign for free education – had thesupport of RWS II since 2007. Colectivo alsobenefited from increased support at regionallevel for CLADE, which coordinates theexecution of the RWS II funds in CentralAmerica.160

Vernor Muñoz’ visit to Guatemala, whichfinally took place 20-28 July 2008, opened aspace for the debate on the education policyin the country, unprecedented since the PeaceAgreements. As a consequence, Colectivo,jointly with a wide group of organisations,prepared a comprehensive report on thedifferent aspects involved in guaranteeing theright to education in the country, showinginfrastructure’s precarious conditions, thelow provision levels, the very low investmentrates and the absence of a clear proposal forthe inclusion of traditionally discriminated


groups of people. This report was developedin a participatory manner and included thevoice of numerous grassroots organisations.These organisations played a key role inshowing the Rapporteur that the report’sfindings matched the reality in the field,repeated in most municipalities of thecountry.

In his final press conference VernorMuñoz depicted thoroughly the panorama ofthe precarious status of the education systemand stated very emphatically that freeeducation is an integral part of the right toeducation and that school fees had to beeliminated in order to make advancestowards the realisation of this right. Thismessage, specifically intended for the newgovernment, was vital for the actions of theCampaign for Free Education, led byColectivo since 2006, to have concreteresults. In September 2008, the Executiveabrogated the Governmental Agreement thatauthorised the charging of school fees andestablished a new one that prohibits themdefinitely (A.G. 223/Septiembre de 2008).Colectivo advocacy had led to a memorableachievement and crucial progress towards therealisation of the right to education.

This measure had immediateconsequences: access, education provisionand enrolment rates increased around 20% inthe 2009 school year. A great number of boysand girls moved from private to publiceducation; this, in turn, affected citizens, whopressed the government to allocate largerresources to the public education system. As aresult, in 2009, the government presented anambitious budget project, which in additionto larger resource investment aimed atschools and teachers, included theestablishment of a broad programme ofconditional cash transfers to families tosupport the payment of costs associated withtheir children’s education, covering 180municipalities. Nonetheless, the Parliamentwas still averse to it and decided to notapprove the budget project, so the Executivehad to resort to public indebtedness to fundthe conditioned transfer programme.

As a result of the pressure by the Congress(where the opposition party were strong) onthe Colom Government, the Minister ofEducation Bienvenido Argueta, who was

leading the negotiation of the educationbudget, became the target of politicalpersecution. He was removed from office dueto an administrative ruling of a high tribunalthat he had refused to share information onthe beneficiaries of the conditioned transferprogramme, when in fact this information hadalready been submitted to the ComptrollerGeneral’s Office. This was part of a strongcampaign to discredit the government, usingcorruption scandals, accusations of murder1 6 1

and Parliamentary obstruction of bills seekingto affect the inequitable structure of taxes,incomes and wealth.

In 2010, as a result of this politicalintimidation and undue pressure, theGovernment had to implement its programmeswith the same budget as 2009 and theMinistry of Education had to change andappoint two Ministers in this last year. Duringthis time, the Colectivo, reflecting the concernsof civil society in regard to education in thecountry, advocated very closely on theproposals for increased resources and rise ofenrolment rates implemented by the Ministryof Education, while playing a participatoryrole in policy design and social watch of theimplementation.

RWS II impact on the capacitybuilding of Colectivo

Despite the adverse political conditions,Colectivo is currently undergoing a process ofcapacity building and institutionalconsolidation. This allows the coalition tomaintain a direct interlocution with theMinistry of Education and othergovernmental bodies as well as with differentcitizens’ strata and education agents. Thisstrengthening is mainly due to the result ofthe advocacy process conducted around thevisit of UN Special Rapporteur on the Rightto Education as well as to the Campaign forFree Education that resulted in the abolitionof school fees.

RWS II did not only contribute with thenecessary resources for the operations of bothprocesses, helping to meet the coalition’sfinancial needs, but also tightened the bondbetween the advocacy at regional level led byCLADE and the Guatemalan forum.

161 In May 2009 extremely unusualevents surrounded the death oflawyer Rodrigo Rosenberg,assassinated while riding hisbike through Guatemala City.After his funeral a video wasreleased which featuredRosenberg accusing thecountry’s President of beinginvolved in his death. After athorough investigation of theInternational CommissionAgainst Impunity in Guatemala(sponsored by the UN), Colomwas cleared and it was foundthat Rosenberg himself hadorganised his own assassinationin attempt to destabilise thegovernment


162 Colectivo have been on theCLADE board since 2008

Colectivo de Educación para Todos y Todasis now member of the CLADE SteeringCommittee162 and a key member of thenetwork’s construction and capacity buildingprocesses at regional level.

The tightening of the bond between thenational and regional levels was clearly andexplicitly seen in the 5th CLADE Assembly inGuatemala City. In that event, a workshopon the justiciability of free education at alllevels of the education process was held; thiswould be also vital for establishing contactsthat later led to rulings favourable to freeeducation in other countries, e.g. Colombia.International organisations participated inthis event: the Robert Kennedy Foundation,The Centre for Justice and internationalRights (CEJIL) and the Institute of LatinAmerican Studies of the University of CostaRica. The workshop initiated an activity ofthe regional group to legally demand the rightto free education, established in 2007 by fourcountries of the region, coordinated byCLADE and supported by the RWS II policyadvocacy project.

By being part of a regional network andreceiving financing from the cooperation witha distinct focus on advocacy, such as RWS II,the Guatemalan group gained, among others,the following capacities: ● Knowledge of and communication with

international bodies and organisationsliable to be mobilised to give visibility toand demand the right to education in thenational context (e.g. the Office of UNSpecial Rapporteur); More capacity forinterlocution with governments by havinginternational support around thecommitments to the frameworks of twoglobal agreements concerning education:Education for All (Jomtien 1990 andDakar 2000) and the InternationalCovenants on Human Rights (ICESCRand General Comments 11 and 13 ofESCR Committee);

● Deep knowledge of the content of theright to education expressed fully andintegrally not only in internationalcovenants but also in the conceptualframework developed by the previous UNSpecial Rapporteur of the Right toEducation, Katarina Tomas̆evski. Thisframework incorporates, besides the

access and availability of the educationservice, education adaptability andacceptability; these issues are currentlybeing developed by the Colectivo for itsnew policy advocacy period.

The organisation and the membership werestrengthened particularly by the Campaignfor Free Education, and at the time of thepreparation of the report for Vernor Muñoz’visit to Guatemala, when numerousorganisations joined the coalition and anextended bureau on education wasestablished for discussion of the report andthe organisation of the Rapporteur’s visit.

All the above mentioned are advancesthat, even if they cannot be ascribed solely tothe use of the RWS II resources, took placewithin a framework of cooperation betweenorganisations at different levels involved inthe implementation of this project, and arelinked to the possibilities that were opened asa result of mutual cooperation.

C u r rent challenges faced byColectivo de Educación paraTodos y To d a s :

At present, the main challenges Colectivoseeks to address are: immediate advocacywith other organisations and trade-unionsaround the upcoming electoral process topress the future government to acknowledgethe concept of the Right to Education asguiding principle of public policy; anddemonstrating that the demands for newplaces at schools and more access toclassrooms – a result of the establishment offree education – require larger resourceinvestment in infrastructure, improvement ofteachers’ working conditions and broaderadaptability and acceptability conditions forall traditionally discriminated populations.

Finally, for the coalition’s future advocacyprocess, the old aspiration of civil society isstill pending: to regulate, open up, foster andparticipate in municipal and departmentaleducation councils proposed since the time ofthe peace negotiation roundtables. This debtof the Guatemalan State to civil society hasbeen pending for almost fifteen years andneeds to be repaid.


C o n t e x t :

During the 1990s, Brazil, like most LatinAmerican countries, applied public policiesformulated on the basis of a neoliberal modelthat opted for a minimal role of the State andvery restrictive macroeconomic conditions interms of public expenditure, as part ofstructural adjustment program. Pricehyperinflation resulting from the debt crisishad been a serious problem in the country. Itled to the implosion of the monetary systemand its substitution during the early 1990sthrough the promotion of the ‘Plan Real’.

Opting for a prevailing neoliberal policyalso resulted in assuming and legitimising thetrend of the State withdrawing from itsresponsibility for ensuring the realisation ofthe Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights(ESCR); restricting the active growth of socialpolicies and hindering important structuralreforms to reduce the grave economicinequality, that is characteristic of Brazil.

Several of the agents interviewed in thiscase study recognise that this posture of theExecutive was visibly rectified after theprogressive leftwing government of PresidentLula was elected. It opened once again thedialogue on the State’s responsibilityconcerning human rights; it undertookambitious policies to overcome poverty andfostered a leading role of the State in thecountry’s social and economic development.As pointed out by Roberto Franklin Leão,president of CNTE (National Federation ofEducation Workers of Brazil) and member ofthe Steering Committee of the BrazilianCampaign for the Right to Education(BCRE): “It is clear that the election of thePresident who is currently in office163 openednew dialogues and facilitated the relationswith the civil society, which finds morefavourable conditions to make itself heard.Today we scheduled a hearing with the

Ministry of Education over the phone and ina month we will be received by the Minister.This did not happen before. Everythingbecomes more accessible for socialmovements, leaving us in a differentiatedsituation in relation to other countries.”

However, in spite of the change in theattitude of the national government regardingthe dialogue with civil society and theprevalence of social policies, it is still veryd i f ficult to make structural changes aimed atthe realisation of the human right toeducation. This is partly due to the fact that amore progressive public policy promoted bythe Executive does not suffice. In addition,legal and regulatory frameworks must bemodified; to this end, important majorities inthe parliament must be reached. Moreover,once the laws are passed, it is necessary todevelop an exigibility process that takes yearsto be applied in each and every federated state.As observed by Leão: “Even if we manage toget important laws passed by the NationalCongress, these are not enforced because the

163 At the time of the interviewPresident Lula was still in office

Case Study: Brazilian campaign for the Right to EducationLeading the drive for quality education re s o u rcing and s t rengthening civil society advocacy for education


164 See brief explanation of CAQi onp24 in Part 1 or full explanationin the following paragraphs

165 According to the law in Brazilstates have to spend apercentage of their budget oneducation. However, sometimes,as the case of the poorestStates, this amount is notenough to guarantee teachers’salaries etc. Due to thismechanism, the Federal Unionmust send more money to thesestates allowing them to achievea minimum

most powerful groups and people use artfuldevices to prevent those laws from beingenforced. The fact that Brazil is a FederativeRepublic, with states and municipalities withhigh autonomy levels, is a factor that adds tothat situation. This way, if one of themconsiders that their right to legislate wasaffected, they take the case to the SupremeCourt and the ruling takes years. ”

That is precisely what happened with theTeachers’ Wage Floor Law approved by theCongress. It represented a very importantvictory of the civil society, with theparticipation of the BCRE and the teachers’unions with the aim to dignify the professionof teaching; however, to this day it is notbeing rigorously enforced by most statesacross the country.

B a c k g round of the Braziliancampaign for the Right toEducation and pre v i o u sadvocacy pro c e s s e s

The history of the BCRE goes back to 1998when a group of CSOs that were going toparticipate in the World Education Forum inDakar, Senegal (2000), discussed the need toestablish a national coalition that would allowcivil society to influence the education publicpolicy agenda. This process of the Campaign’sorganic constitution went on until 2003, whenthe Campaign’s Steering Committee wasconsolidated and tasks were set in motion tocreate regional committees and establish linkswith youth movements across the BrazilianFederation States. By 2006, 27 statecommittees had been created already and werepresent in all the most populated regions of thecountry; boards were duly consolidated andthe first policy advocacy actions aimed atachieving national impact were developed.

Between 2005 and 2007 the BCREdeveloped a policy advocacy process veryimportant for the consolidation of a nationalfund of resource redistribution among thestates to be invested in education (FUNDEB,its acronym in Portuguese). To this end, an in-depth strategy of knowledge production andleadership training on the education fin a n c i n gscheme in the country was developed. Foryears the BCRE has been characterised by

having great expertise in two specific issuesrelated to the right to education: a) thedemocratic management of education systemand policies; b) financing of education.

Both thematic strengths, developed withinthe framework of the advocacy process meantthat, for the first time in Brazil, a civil societyinitiative was able to modify in-depth a federallaw and affect a Constitutional amendment.By combining technical strength with effectiveparliamentary policy advocacy, the BCREmanaged to modify totally the Fund regulationproject proposed by the government andprocessed by the Parliament in 2007. Fives p e c i fic points were included due to theadvocacy work led by the BCRE: (1) widercoverage of the Fund to include initialeducation kindergartens (public institutions ofearly childhood education and care); (2) theregulation that the Fund adopt C u s t o - A l u n oQualidade Inicial ( C A Q i ) ,1 6 4 Cost of InitialQuality Education per Student, as the criterionfor the minimum investment per student. Thiscosting was based on an extensive consultationand collective construction with a range ofcivil society stakeholder on the inputs andresources needed to put into practice aneducation process with quality standards; (3)inclusion of the creation of a major socialwatch system over the Fund’s resource flo w sand transfers so to make possible themonitoring of FUNDEB resource allocationand execution; (4) inclusion of teachers’ wagefloor which would be later regulated inanother law; and (5) supplemental budget forthe Fund transferring a federal budget item tocompensate the poorest States with the aim ofresourcing spending per student and teachers’salaries, regulated by this very law.1 6 5

Brazilian campaign pro c e s s e sand advocacy achievementssupported by RWS II:

When the RWS policy advocacy project wasinitiated in Brazil at the end of 2007, theBCRE had already developed the above-mentioned process of lobbying and modifyingof the Constitutional Amendment andFUNDEB Law. The BCRE was already verystrong and with technical, political and socialmobilisation capacity to develop new


advocacy processes at national level. RWS II enabled the Brazil coalition to

support, and partially fund, two new wide-ranging policy advocacy initiatives and, inparticular, BCRE participation at the NationalConference on Education (CONAE). Thecoalition aimed to first, advocate on theconsensuses established in that space from therights perspective and; second, position CAQias the central reference for public educationfinancing in Brazil, working towards its fullendorsement not only by FUNDEB but also byall public policy across the country. Bothadvocacy processes would later become fullyinterlinked since within the framework of theNational Conferences on Education, CAQiwas approved by consensus as the parameterof the education budget.

Furthermore, with the support of RWS II,BCRE managed to take part in theorganisation and deliberation of the NationalConference on Basic Education (CONEB),achieving the coordination of two themes: i)financing of education and ii) democraticmanagement of the education system,consistently with the expertise alreadydeveloped in-depth by the BCRE. Likewise,the BCRE also managed to participate inCONAE, coordinating the theme of financingand achieving in both instances the approvalof CAQi as a minimum parameter in thedebate on the education budget.

The above represented the main challengefor BCRE: to ensure CAQi became the basicreference in the debate on the publiceducation budget and that this was affirmedwithin the context of the consensuses reachedby CONAE. This participation also sought toachieve greater recognition of BCRE as thevoice of civil society education groups, aswell as the strengthening of CONAE aslegitimate space for the discussion of publiceducation policy by civil society, withdecision-making and binding character.

The political positioning of thestudent/quality cost:

CAQi is the result of a social consensusprocess around the minimum inputs andresources necessary for quality education. Assuch, it is a technical and political advance. In

its technical aspect, the CAQi implies theproduction of knowledge about the materialand non-material requirements of education.As for its political facet, CAQi implies amajor consultation and agreement processinvolving the education agents in order todefine the minimum parameters of quality,such as, the minimum for teachers’ salary, theminimum for student ratio per school and perclassroom, the need for and frequency ofteacher training, the coverage and scope ofthe associated costs, etc.

From 2006 onwards, after wideconsultation and agreement on these basicinputs, a political strategy was developed toposition this initial, technical and politicalagreement as a benchmark for the decisionson education public policy across thecountry. The first positioning process was itsinclusion in FUNDEB regulation. Thisopened up a big space for CAQiincorporation in the political decisions thatfollowed. This Law stipulated a wholemechanism of resource allocation, transferand execution at local levels so that theapplication of CAQi financing parameter isguaranteed through FUNDEB, provided thatthe Federal Government assumes theresponsibility of supplementing the resourcesaccording to the estimated amounts in thiscosting parameter.

That was precisely the aspect to reinforceat the National Conferences on Education:pressing for public policy to adopt the CAQiparameter as the minimum budget allocationper student so that the Federal Government iscommitted to transfer the necessary resourcesto guarantee that minimum in all regions ofthe country, particularly in the poorest Stateswith no capacity to fund an investment ofsuch magnitude.

With the support of RWS II, the BrazilianCampaign adopted the strategy of positioningCAQi as a central theme in CONEB andCONAE. Consensus was sought around theissue, encompassing the participation ofseveral CSOs and other organisations that didnot yet know of this tool, and even making itknown in political sectors that were notnecessarily in agreement with its enforcementbut which would agree to discuss it anyway –an important advocacy achievement in itself.

According to Daniel Cara, National


166 The coalition, along with othercivil society groups had agreedtheir position prior to the actualmeeting, which meant theypresented a unified view, makingit easier to gain acceptance ofBCRE proposals in these forumsof social civil participation

Coordinator of the BCRE, “CAQi’s centraldiscourse as policy advocacy tool is that inorder to have a better education the centralgovernment has to participate in the financingof education. This is an effort the FederalState can do because it raises a net 53% oftaxes and fees. The sum total collected by themunicipalities and states of the federation islower than the sum collected by the federalgovernment. This does not happen in otherfederated countries. In real terms, the FederalGovernment is the one that has theconditions to make a larger investment. And the Brazilian Campaign was the first tonotice that disparity”.

Advocacy at the CONEB and CONAE:

CONAE, held in 2009, was the first majornational conference on education organisedby the Brazilian State. It was an interestingprocess that started out in the municipalitiesand the regions and went through the States,finally arriving in the national sphere.Guidelines for the National Education Planwere approved by it; its objective was tobuild the foundation of a national educationsystem that was absent due to Brazil’sfederative and unequal character. TheConference represented the possibility for anew and fully participatory NationalEducation Plan, based on feasible goals to beconstantly monitored. It was about a mass,participatory and direct advocacy on theformulation of a public policy that would bepassed as Law and as such would ensuremore resources for education, increasing thefederal government’s investment.

Thanks to the advanced positioning ofBCRE, which managed to achieve thecoordination of the roundtables onfinancing, it was possible to put forward theissue of education’s financial structure forample discussion and propose theincorporation of CAQi as the minimumeducation investment. As Carlos EduardoSánchez, President of UNDIME (NationalUnion of Municipal Education Leaders)declared: “s p e c i fically in relation to CAQi,taking that discussion to the NationalCouncil on Education represented a

breakthrough. We are now waiting for theMinister to homologate that decision thisyear thereby transforming CAQi into anindispensable tool for improving the qualityof education in the country. The creation ofthis tool enabled us to comprehend the realdimension of what should be done in orderto bring quality into basic educations c h o o l s.”

The consensus around CAQi collectivelyvalidated the acknowledgement that new andfurther investment in education had to bemade by the Federal Government. Moreover,it was publicly acknowledged that since theConstitution of 88, the States and especiallythe municipalities had been undertakingextraordinary efforts to increase the resourcesallocated to education. This acknowledgmentpermitted sustained demand and consensusaround the need to substantially increase thefinancing of public education, up to 10% ofGDP.

Moreover, at CONAE the BCRE alsomanaged to position the issue of democraticschool management, around which consensuswas also reached.166

Currently, CONAE is on the verge ofnegotiating a national education plan thatwill be sent to Congress and the challengenow is to achieve the approval of thoseproposals. The situation is very similar tothat of FUNDEB and there are even morefavourable probabilities. The Campaign hasgained much social legitimacy and theConference agreements are backed up by somany groups of civil organisations that itcould be very expensive for the executive toput forward a proposal on public educationpolicy different to the one agreed byconsensus at the CONAE. “We will make ourbiggest effort at the Congress in order thatour National Education Plan gets approved”,Daniel Cara says. “Civil society is organisedfor this and civil society is much strongerthan the one that struggled at the time ofFUNDEB, when the Campaign was theleading network. Now we are part of theleading group and it is much better to havecollective leadership because chances forsuccess are much bigger. Half of theorganisations that lead the CONAE processhave joined the Campaign”.


Lessons learned along theadvocacy pro c e s s :

The campaign was a very collective process.It had a very active steering committee andits coordination focused on promotingconsensus and assisting in settlingdisagreements. In the BCRE SteeringCommittee there are national-scopeorganisations with great capacity formobilisation but, at the same time, withmarked interest in the education policy. As aresult, reaching consensus may not be easy,but once achieved there is a great capacity totake it to the public policy debate andmobilise actors around this discussion.

The coordination role has been key inensuring that consensus is built around thepublic agenda and considered and endorsedby other social actors in decision-makingspaces. To this end, the advocacymethodology combining technical expertise,grassroots training and exact precision innegotiating and convincing decision-makershas permitted groundbreaking advancestowards the adoption of really progressivemeasures in Brazilian education policy.

The RWS II project supported thisadvocacy capacity building process in asatisfactory manner, highlighting theflexibility granted in the use of resources.Although these resources represented afraction of the BCRE’s total budget, from2006 onwards they allowed the Campaigncoordination more discretion when takingaction in crucial times, thus ensuring thatthe advocacy measures were effective andthat the proposed changes were accepted.

RWS II, by supporting the participationin CONEB and CONAE, offered a valuablecontribution to the broad recognitionachieved by the Campaign, which went frombeing an organisation with great technicaland advocacy capacity at the Parliament tobecoming one of the benchmarks of socialmobilisation for education in Brazil. Thisfact is widely acknowledged not only by theeducation sector NGOs or by BCREmember organisations, but also by all civilsociety actors and the State itself thatparticipated in the broad consultation,debate and decision-making processes of theNational Conferences on Education.

The networking capacity within civilsociety has been strengthened with theinclusion of CAQi in the CONAE. TheBCRE showed its deep expertise, politicalclarity and aptitude for building validleadership from the grassroots andcapacities for real change, the backdrop ofwhat the RWS project sought to develop inthe first place.

The Brazilian Campaign is a clearexample that the policy advocacy approachthat supports knowledge production and thearticulation of well-informed grassrootscitizens is able to mobilise importantchanges; changes that the traditionalpolitical bodies of representative democracyare not able to bring about.

As noted by Carlos Eduardo Sanchez,from UNDIME: “The element that setsapart the Campaign from otherorganisations is its mobilisation power, itsnetworking capacity. We like not only thepractical results it has achieved but theprocess developed to achieve them. Theprocess is as important as the results.Gathering different organisations andinstitutions with different approaches andp r o files around a table and reachingconsensus is something the Campaignd e l i v e r s.”

All those capacities built during theadvocacy process are clearly part, asproposed by RWS II, of a strategy buildingprocess to bring about a real change in thepolitical processes, along the path towardsachieving the realisation of the right toeducation for all people. In this sense,international cooperation such as RWS II, isimportant not only because of itscontribution of financial resources butbecause it shows the solidarity betweenagents that respond to diverse realities,allowing for the circulation of approaches,shared knowledge and purposes. It showsthat advocacy in each country is not asolitary process; it responds to a worldwidewave that seeks to empower citizens inorder to achieve deep transformations thatenable them to enjoy their rights.


167 After the civil war in Colombia inthe 50’s, known as La Violencia,the elites of the two majorpolitical parties (the Liberal Partyand the Conservative Party)made a pact to alternate inpower and allocate quotas andbureaucratic patronage betweenthem, leaving out anyparticipation of other politicalforces. This agreement becameknown as the ‘National Front’,which lasted over threedecades, between 1960 and1990; many experts called thisregimen ‘restricted democracy’.About this see: Leal Buitrago, F.(1989). Estado y política enColombia. Siglo XXI

168 About this see: Sánchez, G.(1991) Guerra y política en lasociedad colombiana. El AncoraEditores, and Pécaut, D.Presente, pasado y futuro de laviolencia. En publicacion: AnálisisPolítico, Nro.30. IEPRI, Institutode Estudios Políticos y RelacionesInternacionales. UN, UniversidadNacional de Colombia, Santafede Bogotá, Antioquia, Colombia:Colombia. 1997

C o n t e x t :

Colombia has been characterised by beingone of the most unequal countries in LatinAmerica – the most unequal region on theplanet. Despite the fact that Colombiaunderwent a rapid urbanisation processduring the second half of the 20th Centuryand that it grew an industrial foundationprotected by the State, the fruits of thatwealth have not been distributed throughpublic policies to ensure all citizens’ rightsuniversally. In fact, quite the opposite: largesections of the population have beenmarginalised from the benefits of economicgrowth. High poverty levels still exist, inrural areas in particular, as well as a structureof wealth and land ownership concentrated inthe hands of a small elite. The combination ofinequality, exclusion and a democracymodel167 closed to the participation of themajority of the population constituted abackground that led to the emergence ofinsurgent forces, which have sustained anarmed struggle against the State, demandingmore social justice, political equality andinclusion, thus giving rise to a social conflictthat has lasted for over six decades.168

In the field of the right to education,Colombia has faced transformationprocesses, advances and regression.According to the mandate undersigned in theConstitution of 1991, the country has adecentralised structure that establishes thetransfer of resources aimed at health care andeducation in relation to the growth of thenation’s current revenue. However, facing theeconomic crisis of the late 1990s, theNational Government issued Law 715 of2001 as a temporary measure. In that law,the introduction of per capita criteriaconcerning the allocation of resources tohealth care and education was established,freezing the growth of available resources,and incorporating new modalities for themanagement of education services by means

of contracting private service provision aswell as administration of these publicinstitutions. This law, as a temporarymeasure, will be in force until 2016.

These measures resulted in a gradualreduction of the financing of education with asignificant reduction of resources transferredto territorial bodies, which was by thenbarely enough to cover the costs of teacher’swages in poor and marginalised communitiesand only a minimal budget was available tocover other aspects linked to the right toeducation. Thus, this right faces a situation ofde-institutionalisation since it has become aservice for which citizens must pay, or in thecase of those who are entitled to targetedsupport, a gift that can only be accessed bythe most disfavoured people.

Actions and results of theRWS II project in Colombia

Facing the complex context of educationpolicy in Colombia, in 2007, the ColombianCoalition for the Right to Educationpositioned itself as an emerging organisationthat seeks to engage different social actors inthe debate and endorsement of basic politicalconsensuses for the achievement of changes inthe public policy required to guarantee theright to education. RWS II supportstrategically strengthened those initiatives atboth national and regional levels.

Mobilisation of civil society took andpublic debate processes took place in severalparts of the country (Cartagena, SantaMartha, Quindío, Risaralda, Caldas,Antioquia and Bogotá), which later openedup a space for debate on the right toeducation. In that space, essential issuesrelevant to the advocacy process werecovered e.g. the education financing, theabsence of free education, comparing theeducation budget with debt payments, andthe cost of quality education.

Case Study: Colombia – advocacy for re c o g n i t i o nof free basic education


Ruling of the ConstitutionalCourt of Colombia in favour off ree basic primary education:

The debates and the consensus promoted bythe Colombian Coalition for the Right toEducation within Colombia and at theregional level169 resulted in the Coalition’smember organisations recognising freeeducation as an essential element aroundwhich policy advocacy efforts should bearticulated, with the support of the RWS IIproject, to advance the right to education.Thus, the Coalition began a strategyformulation and implementation processaround free education, starting byestablishing contact with other organisationsthat had already advanced debates or actionsin favour of free education in different spaces.That gave way to the establishment of aspecial thematic committee on free educationthat comprised national and internationalorganisations, linking several kinds ofknowledge related to jurisprudence on theright to education and on the financing ofpublic education policy. This Committeeworked on the elaboration of an analysis ofthe state of free education in the country andthe conceptualisation of free education onjuridical, financial and administrative levels.This allowed mobilisation towards theactionability – to demand through legalaction – of free education and made itpossible for the Coalition to file a complainton grounds of unconstitutionality againstArticle 183 of Law 115 of 1994, whichgrants the National Government theauthority to regulate the collection ofpayment of academic fees in State educationcentres. This infringes Articles 93, 44 and 67of the Political Constitution, Article 13 of theInternational Covenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 26 ofthe American Convention on Human Rights(ACHR), Articles 13 and 16 of the Protocolof San Salvador and Article 28 of theConvention on the Rights of the Child, whichstates education is a universal and free right.In the process preceding the filing of thecomplaint, a campaign was undertakenwithin the Coalition to collect and systemiselife stories of boys and girls who had been leftout of the education system due to the fact

that their families could not afford to payschool fees. This documentation strengthenedthe arguments of the complaint as, drawingon concrete cases, it showed that accessingthe education system was impossible for alarge number of Colombian boys and girls.After a process of studies and debates, theConstitutional Court of Colombia throughthe Ruling C -376 of the 19th of May of2010 declared by unanimous decision theenforceability on condition of Article 183 ofLaw 115 of 1994, which does not applyconcerning the basic primary education level.The latter, according to the Court’s ruling, iscompulsory and free.

Budget monitoring drawing oneconomic literacy and thedebate on the public fin a n c i n gof the right to education:

When considering the possibility of citizenoversight and follow up of the publicresources earmarked for education, one of themain difficulties faced by any initiative is theaverage citizen’s lack of knowledge on thebasic concepts of economy and the fiscalstructures where the nation’s budgets are set.Facing this problem and taking into accountthe policy advocacy proposal presented bythe RWS project, the Coalition began itspolicy advocacy work in the area ofeducation budget monitoring with aneconomic literacy initiative in several regionsof the country. These efforts resulted in thecreation of a literacy team on the issue“Economy and the Right to Education” aswell as in the design of a basic thematicprogramme featuring contents andmethodologies pertinent to the subject.

The connecting thread of these discussionsrevolves around the analysis of the high levelsof public debt payment that amount to 30%of the annual public budget and generateincreasing pressure for social expenditureadjustment; and, on the other hand, theresearch on cost per child for qualityeducation that resulted in the creation of asimulator of the costs involved in therealization of the right to quality education.170

This made evident the urgency of increasingthe investment in education gradually to

169 In August 2008, with the supportof CLADE and the presence ofUN Special Rapporteur Mr.Vernor Muñoz, a workshop washeld in Bogota with theparticipation of all the Coalition’smember organizations aroundthe issue of free education andits meaning for the country

170 This research was carried out bythe research centre, School forDevelopment, based on theexperience of the BrazilianCampaign for the Right toEducation around CAQi, seekingto create a useful simulation toolfor advocacy on the issues offinancing the right to educationin Colombia. This research drewon various capacity buildingactivities undertaken by CLADE,such as economic literacyworkshops in 2005 and 2006,and workshops on financing ofeducation carried out later


171 The Colombia Coalition hasbeen an official member ofCLADE since the March 2007Assembly in Panama, and amember of GCE since theJanuary 2008 General Assemblyin Sao Paulo

achieve minimum quality standards.In addition, within the framework of the

policy advocacy processes fostered by theRWS project, the Colombian Coalitionsupported students’ mobilisation and engagedin several forums and debates that promotedthe opposition to budget cuts, even atmunicipal level.

Positioning of the ColombianCoalition for the Right toEducation as civil society actor:

Since the very moment of its inception, theColombian Coalition for the Right toEducation started to do networking withdifferent CSOs with the aim of advancingthe realisation of the right to education.With the experience and expertise of itsmember organisations and a clear policyadvocacy project, the Coalition positioneditself as an important interlocutor in thedebate on the right to education and in thefield of education public policy.

Starting with a process of building andsocialising knowledge on the socio-economicconditions of education in the regions andon the trends of budget allocation interritorial entities, the organisations linkedto the coalition at regional level positionedthemselves as significant interlocutors beforethe public education authorities and evenfostered processes of participatory educationplanning in some municipalities.

Moreover, during the process of politicalelection of candidates for mayors andgovernors, especially in Quindio andCartagena and in Soacha (Cundinamarca)education proposals were discussed with thecandidates. These approaches gave theCoalition visibility in those regions andopened windows of opportunity toarticulate the Coalition’s proposals with arights-based perspective within thedevelopment plans of the new localauthorities for the period 2008-2011.

At national level, the Coalition alsoparticipated in the consultation roundtableson the Decennial Plan on Education. Thisprocess was led by the Ministry of NationalEducation, and the Coalition was also presentin the discussion on the counter-proposal

presented to the national government byBogotá’s local government.

During the period 2007-2010, theCoalition, with the support of RWS II,achieved a significant linkage withinternational networks on advocacy for theright to education. The link with CLADEand GCE was formalised and the Coalitionstarted to participate organically in both oft h e m .1 7 1

The sustained work in those spaces and,especially, in the workshops on legalaccountability of the right to education heldby CLADE in Sao Paulo (2008), Bogotá(2008) and Guatemala City (2009), was keyto raising visibility of the need to articulatethe efforts made by Colombian organisationsaround the issue of free education andestablish a follow-up plan. Those workshopsallowed the Coalition to connect withinternational actors familiar with strategiclitigation on ESCR, particularly with theOffice of UN Special Rapporteur of the Rightto Education, the Robert Kennedy Center forJustice & Human Rights and theInternational Human Rights Clinic of CornellLaw School, which linked to the complaintfiling process developed by the Coalition inrelation to the Colombian case.

Furthermore, this mobilisation strategyaround free education allowed the Coalitionto approach other national organisationsthat, until that moment, were notparticipating organically in the Coalition,such as teachers’ trade unions, the Office ofUN High Commissioner on Human Rights inColombia, the Office of the Ombudsperson,the Attorney’s Office and the Secretary’sOffice for Education of the Capital District.

Finally, the Coalition contributed to thedebate on the status of adult learning andeducation via joint work with severalorganisations such as Red de EducacionPopular de Mujeres (REPEM) and FederaciónColombiana de Educadores (FECODE),among others, in the elaboration of thedocument from the civil society “Analysis ofthe National Report on Development and theStatus of Adult Learning and Education(ALE) presented by the Ministry of NationalEducation of Colombia on the 30th of Aprilof 2008”; this document was presented atCONFINTEA VI.


Consolidation of theo rganisational structure :

At an organisational level, during theperiod 2007-2009 the Coalition, with thesupport of RWS II, created a morecohesive dynamic of collective work and amore participatory decision-makingstructure. For example, the manydiscussions regarding the work of theCoalition allowed it to reach consensuswith the member organisations on thenetwork’s work horizon, while outlining avision, a mission and one of the long-termstrategic objectives. All this took placewhile deepening the knowledge on thecontent of the right to education amongthe coalition’s organisations, drawing onthe study and socialisation of the nationaland international legal frameworks, withspecial emphasis on the issue of freeeducation as an integral and basic part ofthis right.

With regard to decision-making, anorganisational structure was established,comprised of: the General Assembly; theSupport Committee or Board; theSecretariat; the thematic Committees; andthe Regional Focal Points. The steeringand representation functions have astructure that is circular instead ofpyramidal, and it should be highlightedthat this structure implies that thedecisions and actions developed by theCoalition are the result of discussion andparticipation of all the organisations.

Lessons learn e d :

Although the Colombian Coalition for theRight to Education is a network oforganisations that is still undergoing abuilding process, the processes developedwithin the framework of RWS II allowedfor learning some lessons.

The first one relates to the generationof consensuses, which are necessary in anypolicy advocacy process that demands aclear objective of change and a platform ofallies willing to promote it. In theColombian case, even if the differentorganisations linked to the coalition

converge in their interest in the right toeducation, they work in different areas of this right according to their ownspecialisations. Nonetheless, the researchundertaken on the issue of financing andthe dialogues with CLADE regarding thelegal obligations under this right enabledthe organisations to acknowledge freeeducation as a policy advocacy objectivefundamental for the development of otherdimensions of the right to education.

A second lesson was the experience ofarticulating the knowledge of the experts in financing and jurisprudence with theobjectives of the social movement. Thecase of the demand for free educationshowed that when academics and socialmovements get together it is possible toachieve a political process of demandingand fighting for the right, advanced andsustained by social forces.

A third lesson was product of thecoalition’s organisational restructure,which showed the need to establish acollective steering body that included thepresence of the regions more actively. The aim was to have knowledge about the local processes and foster them bycollective work in order to achieve aninterlocution between the different workfields of organisations, thus allowing jointefforts around the advancement of the EFA goals.

Finally, the challenges faced by thecoalition are, among others, the following:The advancement of the campaign for freeeducation so that the Court’s rulingbecomes a reality in every corner of thecountry, starting from a strengthening ofthe regional focal points in order that theycan join in the citizens’ oversight of thef u l filment of that right; The strengtheningof relations with the actors involved in the education process (students, teachers,parents), as the Coalition is mainlycomposed of NGOs and it needs theseactors’ participation to achieve realchanges in education policies; Thedevelopment of a strong media strategypositioning the Coalition as a signific a n tactor at national level in the discussion and decision-making process around theissue of the right to education.


172 “For education to be ameaningful right it must beavailable, accessible,acceptable and adaptable. The concept of these 4 As wasdeveloped by the former UNSpecial Rapporteur on the Right to Education, KatarinaTomas̆evski, and it is one of the best ways to assess and act upon the situation.” – for more information seehttp://www.right-to-education.org/node/226

C o n t e x t :

The Latin American Campaign for the Rightfor Education (CLADE) is a diverse networkof CSOs acting in the defence and promotionof the right to free public education for allpeople. The responsibility of the State inregard to the right to education includes thedimensions of availability, accessibility,acceptability, adaptability and accountability.1 7 2

Since 2001, in the scenario following the WorldConference on Education for All (Dakar, 2000),CLADE has been promoting networking so thattoday it includes 18 National EducationForums in Latin America and the Caribbean,plus eight regional networks.

Building on the framework of theaffirmation and protection of the human rightto education, CLADE has been working onseveral development and advocacy processesdrawing on networking among several actors inLatin America and the Caribbean, as well asat international level, while fostering mutualcooperation. Over the past years, the issuesconcerning different forms of discrimination ineducation gathered momentum and gained amore central place in the network’s politicalagenda. This was stated clearly in its Charterof Principles. Moreover, through a series ofactivities, meetings and communicationstrategies, CLADE started a process to establisha knowledge framework that would allow thenetwork to understand the different forms ofdiscrimination and address them at local,national, regional and international levels.

The network identified that the socialinequality of the region as well as the m u l t i p l eforms of discrimination constitute the firstcause of social and educational exclusion andthe main obstacle to the achievement of theright to education and all the other rights.Furthermore, the multiple forms ofdiscrimination cross-cut and add to each other:the most discriminated groups on account of

race, ethnicity, gender, geographic location,sexual orientation, disabilities, migration anddeprivation of freedom are usually the poorestand their condition of poverty becomes, in turn,a factor for increased discrimination.

In parallel, CLADE, its forums andnetworks went through a process of in-depthunderstanding of the legal frameworks –national, regional and international – in thefield of the human right to education.Workshops were held; activities, informationdissemination and actions that relied on thevaluable alliance of the Office of the UN SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Education werecarried out. In that sense, the multiple formsof discrimination are regarded as explicitviolations of the right to education and therebycan be denounced in the systems of justice.

RWS support for visibility –seeking and advocacy actionsa d d ressing diff e rent forms ofdiscrimination in education( 2 0 0 7 – 2 0 1 0 )

Supported by the RWS II project, CLADE’sexecutive initiated a set of regional advocacyactivities to carry out visibility-seeking andlobby actions and exert political pressure atseveral regional and international opportunities.In 2008, a sustained regional strategy to fight allforms of discrimination was set in motion. Thiscase study highlights four key moments: 1. the advocacy process at the Durban

Review Conference (April, 2009); 2. the elaboration of a collective strategy to

work on the issue (August 2009);3. the Hearing before the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights(November 2009);

4. the initiatives aimed at sensitising thepopulation and giving visibility to theissue (since 2009).

Case Study: CLADE advocacy experiencere g a rding several forms ofdiscrimination in education


1 . Participation in the preparatory processtowards the UN Durban ReviewConference (November 2008 – April 2009)

The aim of this participation process was tojoin the global movement againstdiscrimination and racism, with two specificmessages. First, to show the need toincorporate education policies and schools asspaces to fight against all forms ofdiscrimination while showing that someeducation policies are discriminatory and thatsome education contents reinforcediscrimination. And second, to point out thatan education respectful of human rights is afundamental tool to fight against all forms ofdiscrimination since it has the noteworthypotential to modify culture and prejudices thatare at the basis of all discriminatory practices.

In order to carry this two-prongedmessage to the Durban Review Conference inGeneva, CLADE began preparation in late2008 using knowledge production andcollection of specific cases of violation of theright to education on account of differentforms of discrimination. It also produced apublic position paper with 13 specificrecommendations on the issue. In particular,case studies on two population groups thatare particularly discriminated against in LatinAmerica (indigenous and African-descendantpeople) were commissioned. Furthermore,four international cases of violation of thehuman right to education on account ofdiscriminatory practices were documented.

The Durban Review Conference in Geneva(also called Durban II) was one of the toughestnegotiation moments within the UN. As such,the conference was marked by very deeptensions between some countries (Iran,Palestine, Israel). The United States did notattend the conference, and in the middle of theevent a group of ten central countries withdrewfrom the negotiation as a result of the tensions.Despite all that, civil society’s pressure and theleadership of some governments prevented theconference from being a complete failure; allthe agreements proposed in Durban I (the fir s tconference, in 2001) were reaffirmed andtherefore no regressions ensued – a risk alwayslatent during the preparation period prior tothe development of the Conference.

CLADE attended the Conference with adelegation, participated in the civil society

meeting and its drafting committee – held inparallel to the governments’ meeting – andsubmitted a statement to the UN plenaryreinforcing its standpoints before theparticipating nations. Furthermore, itdisseminated information and positioned theissue of education amidst the official delegationsand CSOs present at the conference. In thatsense, it is worth noting that links and allianceswere established. After the conference, thesebonds (e.g. with the African-CaribbeanWomen’s Network) were strengthened andmade the most of during the following stepsof the visibility-seeking advocacy campaignon the different forms of discrimination.

CLADE achieved a profound awareness onthe meaning of discrimination in educationthrough its participation in the Durban ReviewConference and the preparation it made for theconference, taking concrete steps in knowledgeproduction and generating consensuses for thepublic position paper jointly with other regionaland global networks. Such vision permeated thenational forums too, which received informationthrough CLADE’s communication networkand were directly involved in the informationgathering for the cases on discrimination,thus sharing the issue across all branches andthreads of the whole regional network. Thisway, the fight against xenophobia, racism,homophobia and, overall, against all forms ofdiscrimination, achieved a central position inthe network’s political agenda.

2 . Designing a regional advocacy campaignagainst all forms of discrimination ineducation (March 2009 – August 2009)

Thanks to the impact of the mobilisationaround Durban II, in August 2009 CLADE’sexecutive coordination convened a RegionalWorkshop to design a precise advocacy plan tofight against discrimination in education. Thisworkshop was held with much success in SaoPaulo and, in addition to the participation of sixNational Forums and several organisationsworking on ESCR justiciability such as CEJIL,DEJUSTICIA and the Center of Latin AmericanStudies of the National University of CostaRica, it also benefitted from the activeparticipation of UN Special Rapporteur onthe Right to Education. This plan envisaged ashort-term strategic action with the presentationof a report before the Inter-American Court on


Human Rights on some form ofdiscrimination in particular. Moreover, itcontemplated a set of sustained visibility-seeking actions as well as the will to establishalliances and joint work with severalorganisations that work in Latin Americaproducing knowledge and fighting against thedifferent forms of discrimination.

3. Report and hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

Immediately after the Sao Paulo August 2009workshop , CLADE, jointly with CEJIL and theOffice of United Nations Special Rapporteuron the Right to Education, filed a petition tothe Inter-American Commission on HumanRights for a regional thematic hearing. Theissue chosen to be brought forward before thecommissioners was the Status of the Right toEducation of Persons with Disabilities. Thepetition was granted and scheduled to takeplace in November 2009 in Washington, USA.

The hearing before the Commissionrepresented a big step for CLADE because itwas the first time it had reached aninternational system of justice and, moreover,in alliance with the Office of UN SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Education. Bothcircumstances determined that the hearingwas a success: the commissioners were deeplysensitised and did not only recognise thepeculiarities of the violation of the right toeducation of this population in particular butthey also encouraged CLADE to bring the

Commission further cases and reportsconcerning the human right to education.

Many commissioners expressed theirinterest in receiving more demands arisingfrom civil society related to Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights: one commissioner, PauloSergio Pinheiro, Rapporteur on the Rights ofthe Child in the Inter-American Human RightsSystem, expressed his interest in establishing adirect link with CLADE with the aim ofdeveloping alliances and joint work.

4. Actions aimed at giving visibility to the different forms of discrimination in education

Consensus was also reached at the August2009 workshop, on advocacy actions to givevisibility to issues related to discrimination ineducation. In Latin America and theCaribbean, the myth prevails that racial andethnic discrimination has been substantiallyovercome. The argument given to sustain thisnotion is that the majority of the continent’spopulation is composed of people of mixed-race or multiracial and therefore it is inclinedtowards the integration of communities.However, reality shows us that the traditionalforms of discrimination have fused with newones of a socio-economic nature therebyperpetuating a matrix of exclusion that affectsindigenous and African-descendant ethnic andracial groups more distinctly and gravely.

Considering the above-mentioned issue,CLADE devoted itself to seek methods tomake these populations visible since veryoften they are not even recorded in thenational censuses, thus proving that they arediscriminated even in public policies and atschools, and to make known to citizens howthose facts explicitly contravene internationalhuman rights frameworks.

Among the awareness raising activities, aphotographic exhibition on the subject waspresented in May 2010 on the occasion of theCLADE VI Assembly in Sao Paulo. The exhibitlasted for over a month in a public space that isvisited by more than 700 thousand peopleannually – by teachers, students and personsinterested in the matter. Afterwards, it wastaken to Buenos Aires within the framework ofthe Ibero-American Congress on Education.Three thousand delegates attended the event:representatives of ministries of education,


universities and CSOs. A virtual disseminationof the exhibition was also created and it wasvisited by over 3,200 people.

Furthermore, a document addressing theissue was published. This publicationaddresses in detail the international humanrights frameworks that condemn the differentforms of discrimination and how these are still alatent part of Latin America and the Caribbean’sreality. Finally, the team has been making effortsto approach the mass, public and communitymedia so that they include the issue in theircoverage. As a result, approximately 100communication media covered the issue, whetherin relation to the exhibition, events or interviews.

Lessons learn e d

● A requirement for successful advocacyprocesses is the production of knowledge andevidence on the issue the advocacy is aimedat, which results in more effectiveness andcapacity for dialogue with lobby targets.

● Advocacy is a collective process that needs toinclude as many actors as possible aroundprogramme agreements and consensuses thatcould be shared widely by means of publicstatements. All of this is transformed intomore capacity to exert pressure and developlobby efforts at the events and conferences

targeted. It is very important to have veryclear messages to take into spaces such asUN Conferences.

● Evaluation of a policy advocacy process,should take into account what aspects ofpublic policies or regulatory frameworks areaffected favourably and, moreover, how thatadvocacy capacity building process enhancesCSO vision and deepens the agendatowards the future of organisations andnetworks that promote advocacy.

● In order to achieve a higher capacity to exertpressure and develop dialogue at regionaland global levels, previous and thoroughwork is needed, mapping the actorsinvolved, creating alliances, producingknowledge and formulating advocacystrategies. In turn, this work should besupported by sufficient resources to carryout the tasks at regional level as that levelis able to link the efforts made by severalcountries and increase their power in supra-national decision-making spaces.

● Among the most valuable alliances, apartfrom those with the civil society networksand organisations at regional and globallevels, there are those that can be establishedwith the members and actors of thesystems of justice and protection ofhuman rights, in both the Americas axisand the Inter-American System.

R e g i o n a l S u m m a ry: Latin America & the CaribbeanCommonalities between how coalitions in the region approached campaigns

● Qualities in common included: organisationalflexibility; internal democracy and collectiveconstructions; grassroots mobilisation; andwillingness to talk with different stakeholders

● Structure included a small team (staff) and aSteering Committee that represents theeducation community and the diversity of t h ecountry with its social movements, all of themin a given human rights political field;

● Successful coalitions have a clear definition ofprinciples, revised, updated and consolidated

throughout time. They do ongoingpolitical reading and strategicdefinition, enabling them to giveresponses to the context by providingproposals and monitoring compliance.They are clear about the legislativeand juridical sphere, and thejurisprudence concerning theadvocacy issue;

● Reflection, knowledge production,constant thinking should be present;


thinking must occur constantly whilebuilding bridges with academia. Advocacyproposals as well as key messages shouldbe formulated on the basis of knowledgeproduction, reflection and collectivedebate;

● Positions and actions should occursimultaneously at national and locallevels, at macro and micro levels;

● Very concrete and precise proposalsshould be made, on the basis of thecontext;

● It is beneficial to have a broad-scopealliance with the university, movementsand trade unions;

● Sensitisation and awareness raising of thegeneral public and mass media is anational priority;

● Coalitions should have autonomy beforethe State; ensure a relationship of non-subordination;

● A strategy and a clear communicationpolicy should be promoted. This includeshaving a policy regarding languages andthe language used;

● Relations with the legislative, judicial andexecutive powers should be establishedand maintained.

How RWS specifically made acontribution in the re g i o n :

RWS has promoted the consolidation ofCLADE as a regional/ international actor,thus strengthening the call for implementingthe EFA Agenda and the right to education,taking into account national, regional andinternational levels.

There have been key politicalimprovements around the agenda putforward by CLADE, particularly in terms of education rights, free education, non-discrimination, adequate education financingand Youth and Adult Education.

Through RWS, CLADE has been able toput in practice the principle of liaising withdifferent stakeholders around commonaction, including NGOs, social movements,teachers’ unions, women’s groups, andindigenous groups, among others.

Additionally, RWS has fostered dialoguebetween Civil Society and the State, including

legislative, executive and judicial powers atthe regional level.

Through RWS, CLADE has been able toconsolidate a regional platform of debate andaction, involving 18 National EducationForums and nine Regional Networks, thusarticulating a collective analysis and strategyfor social and political action in the field ofeducation.

There has been an improvement of alladvocacy strategies inside the region:conducting research, strategic communication,social mobilisation, inter-institutionalnetworking, thus increasing legitimacy andpower to influence decision making processesand policy making.

National level work within the region hasmade important steps towards EFA goals,despite facing huge challenges. Nationalhighlights include the Brazilian coalition,that, in the framework of RWS led the firstNational Conference on Education andinfluenced approval of the Student/QualityCost Parameter as benchmark for policies.Also of note is Colombia, where the nationalcoalition demanded at the ConstitutionalCourt the abolition of fees in the publiceducation system, therefore, generating anunprecedented victory of an education socialmovement.

The lessons (positive andnegative) of key learning for the region.

Overall ● Education has great power to bring people

together. However, networking with neworganisations and movements, requiresclarity about the coalition’s ideologicalfield (e.g. does it include the businessinterest group movement). We must havethe same vision on the world. It isimportant to not ‘negotiate’ positions thatlessen the principles. Agreements that goagainst basic principles should not bemade. Autonomy is to maintain theprinciples, to uphold those principles andstandpoints in the political arena.

● There is a need to articulate the fight forthe right to education with other strugglesand social fields. Social movements are


dispersed and this fact prevents building adeeper and more structural agenda forchange. Meanwhile, coalitions must beaware that there is a struggle for agendas inthis deeper and structural change. The fig h trevolves around a new education systembut above all, of a new political system.

● Pretexts for political action, debatestrengthening and articulation should bealways identified as, for instance, the UNConferences and other international andregional Congresses. Coalitions must knowhow to make the most of theseopportunities and view major events aspart of processes that allow for majorarticulations and collective debates.

● Caucuses should be used more intensely asan advocacy method when preparing toface the major Conferences.;

● Coalitions need to continue to buildcapacity for dialogue and negotiation withstakeholders, both national and frominternational bodies, drawing on knowledgeabout their standpoints, proposals anddecision-making mechanisms.

● The achievements reached during anadvocacy process should be acknowledgedas achievements, the strengthening of civilsociety in collective advocacy processes isan achievement per se, not just when itachieves the final advocacy objective. Thisstrengthening and recognition generatespotential, helps future advocacy actions.

Main obstacles faced in the region:● Tendency towards a reduction in

governments’ willingness to engage withcivil society, that hinders the possibility ofdebate and denies dissent as legitimate.

● Governments that act against human rightsand, notwithstanding, are very popular.

● Criminalisation of social movements andactivists e.g. human rights activistspersecuted and arrested in Haiti, systematicmurder of teachers’ union leaders inColombia, students’ persecution inArgentina and Chile after their involvementin protests and riots, among others.

● Closed mass media that are positioned inanother paradigm.

● The influence of churches and theirdogmas (e.g. affecting gender issues).

● The denial, on the part of the State, to

acknowledge society as a legitimateinterlocutor and acknowledge dissent aslegitimate. Lack of institutionalised spacesfor civil society participation, spaces for civilsociety to be heard. This gives way to a veryvulnerable State-Civil Society relationship.When there are no such spaces, the possibilityof dissent, critical vision and denouncementby civil society is extremely low.

● The vulnerability of civil movements andorganisations regarding their funding andsustainability.

● Struggle for legitimacy and spaces withbusiness interest groups and movements.Business sector corporate socialresponsibility groups have different interestsand priorities; the latter tend to match thestatus quo and do not ‘inconvenience’ theState so much and, for that reason, canserve States as priority interlocutors underthe concept of ‘social participation’.

● Difficulty in achieving the mobilisation of grassroots.

● Risk of being co-opted by the State: it mightbe more difficult to do advocacy in a contextwhere the government’s ideological field iscloser to that of the Forums and Networks.It might reach a point where the State seesitself and conducts itself as civil society.173

● D i f ficulty in incorporating more progressiveissues in the agenda within a context ofdiverse and antagonistic standpoints;

● At international level, language is a bigobstacle to the possibility of puttingforward our agenda in the global scenarioand presenting our proposals. It is crucialto think of ways that prepare us all,collectively, to overcome this barrier.

● In major conferences, such as CONFINTEAand the Ibero-American Congress,workshops and roundtables end up being ahuge distraction that takes place while thepolitical decisions are being made elsewhere.It is important to do advocacy to even changethe format of these major conferences.

● In advocacy situations that take place ininternational spaces and conferences, aprior advocacy process should be planned,jointly with the ministries, having allinformation possible on how theconference is going to work and who theleading stakeholders are. Advocacy workshould begin far in advance.

173 The concept of civil society,based on political scienceauthors, refers to a diversegroup with different cittizenswho, out of the governmentbodies, act in a collective way indecision making process at thepublic sphere

76 RWS II IN AFRICA

174 32 national coalitionsparticipated in the last ANCEFAGeneral Assembly in Dakar inApril 2009. Since then, themembership was brought to 33 with the building andacceptance of Somaliland EFAcoalition. The coalition buildingprocess is ongoing in somecountries, which are not yetrecognised/registered asANCEFA members.

Context

The pace of progress towards

achieving the Education for All Goals

(EFA) is all but slow and uneven

across sub-Saharan Africa and

remains a formidable challenge: to

governments to deliver on their Dakar

2000 promises; to CSOs to hold such

duty-bearers and service providers

accountable through policy

influencing and monitoring and to

development partners to pledge the

right quantum of resources to finance

the six EFA goals. The EFA Global

Monitoring Report published

annually by UNESCO to track

progress paints a grim picture of the

state education in Africa: According

to that report, Sub-Saharan Africa

still continues to account for 47% of

the out-of-school children worldwide

(2006 figures), despite the remarkable

achievements registered in terms of

access to basic education between

1999 and 2006. And adult literacy

(EFA goal 4) is still neglected by

African governments.

While many countries have made someprogress towards achieving the EFA goals,many more are lagging behind and theabsence of a clear ‘political will’ is one ofthe key sticking points that deter progresstowards the set targets and hence limits theprospect for poverty reduction. Thisassessment highlights both the challengesand achievements of a number of nationalcoalitions in their drive to achieve the EFAgoals.

To engage with governments,development partners and otherstakeholders at the national, regional andinternational levels, ANCEFA and GCEworked together through Phase I and II ofthe RWS project. RWS I and II were aimedat building strong constituencies for thepurpose of lobbying and advocating for theachievement of the EFA goals by 2015.RWS II is the instrument through whichANCEFA in partnership with GCE givessupport to the 32 national coalitions thatare members of ANCEFA. Using the RWS Iend of project report as the baseline togauge the performance of RWS II againstthe objectives set, it could be argued thatconsiderable ground has been covered in theareas of coalition building and/orstrengthening. RWS II funding has enabledANCEFA to support national coalitions toengage in research (in particular theEducation Watch initiative); advocacy;communication and publications. ANCEFAhas been responsible for the coordinationand management of the project in theregion. When ANCEFA started rolling outRWS II only 16 coalitions were up andrunning. As of today, 33174 nationalcoalitions are already firmly established andhave proven to be respected advocacyplatforms in their own right and in theircountry specific contexts.

RWS II in Africa by Omar Ousman Jobe

RWS II IN AFRICA 77

I n t roduction:

The Civil Society Coalition for Quality andBasic Education (CSCQBE) was set up in2000 in the immediate aftermath of theDakar Education Forum to serve as aproactive hub and an umbrella network foreducation advocacy. It is mandated to:“promote transparency, accountability,equality and access for all to qualityeducation in Malawi”. Since its inception, themembership has steadily grown to reach itscurrent level of about 70 organisationalmembers spread across the country. Thecoalition has decentralised structures (theDistrict Education Networks) in 27 districtsthrough which it implements its activities.The Coalition is committed to the EFA goalsand has been supported by ANCEFA andother development partners to advocate andcampaign at national and regional levels.

The RWS was able to bring MalawianCSOs together so that they could build aconsensus on education advocacy issues. Thecoalition was able to engage with nationaleducation processes through the organisationof campaigns. Although CSCQBE alreadyexisted in Malawi (supported by CEF175 andother donors) before RWS II, the projectsucceeded in galvanising the coalition furtherby refocusing its agenda on the urgency ofachieving the EFA goals.

The key informants interviewed are of theopinion that the coalition is strong and is avalued partner of the Ministry of Education,exemplified by its participation in most of thetechnical working groups set up by theMinistry. The coalition uses that forum as avaluable source of knowledge andinformation about the evolution ofgovernment policy and presents possibleoptions and issues for consideration.CSCQBE also use this forum to deliver policyadvice services to the government aimed atenhancing educational outcomes. Through itsbudget and election cycle advocacy it has

succeeded in placing education as the thirdmost important priority in the government’stop 11 priorities for the country in theMalawi Growth and Development Strategy176

(MGDS). Before that policy shift, the MGDShad only five (5) themes (Social andEconomical Growth, Social Protection, SocialDevelopment, Infrastructure and Governance,prioritised in that order). Education was amere sub-theme under the third theme ofsocial development, clustered with health andcommunity development. In the RevisedMGDS of 2009, Education is the thirdpriority and is not under any theme, butstands alone as a sector, after agriculture andwater development.

Perception of the Status of EFA in Malawi:The local concerns in Malawi revolvearound the following issues: inadequatefunding of Early Childhood Development(ECD) programmes, although coverageincreased by 1.2% (in 1996) to 26.7% (in2006); low participation of men in literacyprogrammes taking the adult literacypopulation to 4.6 million, translating intoan adult literacy rate of 60.9% (urban90.5% and rural 58.7%); high pupil/teacherratio of 81:1 and a pupil/trained teacherratio of 92:1; shortage of teaching andlearning materials; low teachermotivation/high dropout rate andinadequate educational infrastructure ase x e m p l i fied by a pupil/classroom ratio in allprimary schools at 116:1. Despite theseserious challenges, progress is being madetowards the achievement of the EFA goals –particularly in the areas of access (goal 2)with a Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for the6-13 age cohort at 115% and a NetEnrolment Ratio (NER) of 99% (2009)1 7 7

and gender parity (goal 5). The allocationsto education are increasing but Malawi isstill a far cry from the 2015 goals. It is notsurprising therefore that the majority ofrespondents consider that the impact of the

175 The Commonwealth EducationFund promoted free primaryeducation for all children. CEFgave advice and funding toeducation groups in 16Commonwealth countries.These groups workindependently or together in anational coalition to identify andact on the problems that stopchildren from attending school

176 The country’s currentdevelopment framework

177 2009 Education StatisticsReport, Ministry of Education(Malawi) EMIS Report

Case Study: M a l a w iCivil society influence in election andbudget cycle pro c e s s e s

78 RWS II IN AFRICA

coalition’s EFA campaigns has been positive,albeit moderately. CSCQBE has beenresponding to the issue of budgetinadequacy to finance educationalrequirements in Malawi and all theattendant issues linked to it: lack ofhardship allowances for teachers etc. Thelevel of education financing is at 12.2%,which is far short of the internationalbenchmark of 20% of the national budgetor 6% of GDP.

Documenting best practicef rom Malawi: the Election andBudget Cycle Advocacyi n i t i a t i v e s :CSCQBE has made laudable efforts ineducation advocacy worthy of beingshowcased for international learning andsharing. The coalition’s budget cycleadvocacy project supported by ANCEFAwith RWS funds is a year-long process ofsustained engagement with the Ministry ofEducation, the Ministry of Finance,parliamentarians, CSOs and the media.During this process, the coalition consultscommunity stakeholders on their prioritiesfor the education sector with a view tocritically informing the national budget andthe advocacy agenda of the coalition (thepre-budget phase). Policy briefs andstatements are then issued to serve as thebasis for engaging with the media (for themto amplify the position of the coalition); forengaging with Parliamentary Committees(the legislators) to foster Parliamentarians’buy-in; the Ministries of Education andFinance (the duty bearers, policy makers anddecision makers) for them to adequatelyresource the sector. Advocacy packs areproduced at this stage for use by regionalconstituents to influence the budgetaryprocesses and outcomes. The approach toi n fluencing education policies is multi-pronged in that the coalition engages withthe Education Select Committee of theParliament; influences the party manifestosat another level and through its decentralisedstructures brings enormous pressure to bearon the political machinery for educationissues to be considered as a high priority innational politics.

I. The Budget Cycle Project:

Preparation stage : As a key partner of theMinistry of Education, serving in some of thetechnical working groups, CSCQBE uses thatprivileged position to leverage the outputs ofthe pre-budget consultations forconsideration as inputs into the sectoralestimates submitted by Ministry of Educationto the Ministry of Finance. The coalitionlobbies the Ministry of Finance; consults withsister networks to have a united front and toavail themselves of the 10 minutepresentation time allotted during the interfaceforum to build a convincing case for theeducation sector. To bring further pressure tobear on the decision makers, the coalitionelicits the support of the donor communityand CSO partners; organises radio phone inprogrammes and does not hesitate to petitionthe relevant ministries whenever necessary.

Legislative stage : During the legislative stagethe budget is presented, deliberated upon,amended and passed in parliament. Thecoalition monitors the budgetary processes;distributes leaflets and flyers underscoring theemerging issues in the budget; engages in one-to-one lobbying with targeted members ofparliament perceived as highly influential inthe legislative process; convenes press briefin g sto advance issues that it feels MPs are notpaying greater attention to. The coalitionmobilises sister networks like the MalawiEconomic Justice Network, the Civil SocietyAgriculture Network, the Malawi HealthEquity Network etc. to organise marches ordemonstrations to make its case heard.

Budget execution stage: The coalitionconstantly monitors the performance of thebudget in terms of: implementation rate;e f ficiency and effectiveness of the budgetaryprocesses; development initiatives andMinistry of Education recruitment provision.CSCQBE uses the district education networksto provide oversight of the procurement anddistribution of teaching and learning materialsin schools. The coalition also monitors thedisbursement cycle to determine resource flo wfrom central government to local assemblies,in line with the decentralisation policy.CSCQBE monitors receipt and usage of direct

RWS II IN AFRICA 79

support to schools. It organises communityhearings with Members of Parliament andlocal assembly officials in selectedconstituencies to profile gaps in the budgetimplementation and collectively offersolutions to emerging problems. Such a socialaudit process enhances civic engagement ofthe communities with local leaders and policymakers.

Monitoring and evaluation/ Reporting stage :The coalition conducts a mid-term budgetreview to monitor progress and gaps in thebudget implementation process; undertakespost-budget analysis looking at the overallbudget performance against set indicators;assesses internal efficiency of the Ministry ofEducation and the local assembly; examinesthe extent to which the School ManagementCommittees (SMCs), Parent TeacherAssociations (PTAs) and the community atlarge are involved in education budgetimplementation.

Results: CSCQBE’s proactive engagement atdifferent levels using practical evidence helpsto push for increments in the budgetprovisions for teaching and learning materials(TLM) and development. The TLM budgetline for instance, increased from MK1.8billion (US$ 11.7 Million) to MK2.1billion(US$ 13.7 Million). The coalitionpushed for: greater support towards specialneeds education, recruitment of moreteachers and the construction of moreclassrooms. During the 2009 financial year,government made clear allocations in theoverall education budget to provide for:recruitment of 400 teachers; construction of1,000 extra classrooms; construction of aspecial needs education institute; and theestablishment of a special needs educationdepartment with a special monitoring andsupervision section.

II. The Election Cycle Processes:

Introduction : Another important projectimplemented by the CSCQBE and supportedby ANCEFA with RWS II funds is theelection cycle project aimed at identifyingpriority education issues for politicalparty/politician buy-in during the electoral

process. The project was designed at a timewhen Malawi was about to holdparliamentary and presidential elections andthe coalition used the opportunity to demandstrategic political commitments towardseducation from aspirant members ofparliament and their party apparatuses.

Engagement process : The coalition consulteddifferent stakeholders across the country togenerate issues that citizens felt wereimportant for the promotion of qualityeducation in Malawi. The data collected wasvalidated to ensure that it represented theviews of the stakeholders consulted and wasconsolidated in a document dubbed theEducation Agenda. A literature review wasalso conducted to systematically documentthe priorities and gaps in education. Politicalparties’ manifestos were critiqued in terms oftheir responsiveness to the education agenda;Community stakeholders were sensitised onemerging issues from the consultation andhow they could use the Education Agenda tomonitor education service delivery in Malawi.

The coalition succeeded in summoning allthe political parties (the Secretary General orthe President), and all the relevant nationalstakeholders for the launching of theEducation Agenda – the climax of the electioncycle advocacy. All political parties madecommitments towards supporting educationand signed an addendum that once voted intooffice they will implement the agenda. Toolsused to engage with the general publicincluded a massive radio campaign topopularise the Education Agenda; translation

80 RWS II IN AFRICA

178 The work of the coalition (alongwith other civil societyorganisations) was praisedduring the launch of the Demandfor Good Governance Network;a world bank led initiative in June2008 at World BankHeadquarters in Washington DC

and distribution of advocacy booklets tocommunity stakeholders through the DistrictEducation Networks; t-shirts with themessage ‘have a vote by supportingeducation’; news features in the dailynewspapers. The development of theEducation Agenda unified the nationregardless of political affiliation or groupingto exert pressure on the prospectivegovernment.

Results: National education coalitions in sub-Saharan Africa should endeavour tobenchmark the processes employed byCSCQBE to put together an EducationAgenda which serves as the yardstick toassess government’s performance againstpolicy commitments. The Malawi coalitioncontinues to monitor education policies andbudgets against the commitments madeduring the launching of the EducationAgenda, the implementation rate, and theeffects it is having on the EFA agenda. Comethe 2014 elections, CSCQBE will have anopportunity to comprehensively measure thedegree of achievement by the currentgovernment in education service delivery andthe extent to which opposition parties havebeen holding the government accountable.The coalition also critiqued political parties’manifestos to determine to what extent theywere promoting or prioritising education andheld a series of live-phone-in programs tocreate space for citizens to put across theirviews. Some Development Partners (DPs)used the Education Agenda information as abasis for their engagement with the politicalparties and the elected government. CSCQBEwas the first network to come up with a clearagenda for its sector and this served as goodlearning point for other sectors.

Other coalitions could learn from thismodel of partnership between governmentand CSOs. Constructive engagement withpolicy makers pays. Devolving power to thedistrict level also helps to build a very strongpower base to support headquarters. Thecoalition’s election and budget cycle processeshave been hailed as international successstories by the World Bank, UNESCO andOSISA.178 The budget cycle advocacyinitiative has aroused keen interest incountries like Mozambique, The Gambia,

and Ethiopia who have embarked on a studytour to Malawi to learn best practice and seehow they could possibly import the model,taking due cognisance of their country-specific circumstances.

Challenges: ● Staff turnover is a challenge for the

Malawian coalition, just as it is for someother coalitions, including those in Kenyaand Tanzania (see case studies thatfollow). The coordinators have all been inpost for less than two years. The approachto capacity building must therefore changeto target not just the nationalcoordinators but the wider membershiplike the coordinating committees of thenational coalitions.

● Activities are expanding but funds arelimited. And by trying to satisfy all theregional structures, the impact of activitiesconducted can only be limited.

● Some key informants take the view thatcoalitions are endowed with the requisiteexpertise. The problem at issue isduplication of efforts and inadequateknowledge management within thecoalitions and therefore the perceivedinability to leverage such competences tobenefit the network.

● There has also been limited learning andexperience sharing platforms. Membersfelt that problems in the African countrieswere similar and thus learning fromsuccessful coalitions is very important.

● Evidence-based research should bepromoted at all levels. Respondents areadvocating for the increase of resources tocater for district-based research activitiesto inform policy at both the decentralisedand national levels.

RWS II IN AFRICA 81

I n t roduction:

The Tanzania Education Network/Mtandaowa Elimu (TEN/MET) emerged as a coalitionin 1999 when a group of CSOs came up withthe idea of building an education advocacyplatform and were supported by Save theChildren to set it up. TEN/MET can boast ofhaving a very strong Secretariat based in DarEs Salaam and a significant membershipcomprising of a spectrum of NGOs,Community-Based Organisations (CBOs),Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) and otherinterest groups (about 200 of them). Thechallenge, however, remains the commitmentand active participation of its members in itscampaign platforms. The coalition isrepresented in 12 task force committees ofthe Ministry of Education, a positioning thatenables it to raise pertinent issues and haveinputs in the policy development andimplementation processes. The institutionparticipates in meetings with the Ministry ofEducation at least every week.

TEN/MET work revolves around thefollowing focus areas: Policy Analysis andAdvocacy; Information Sharing andNetworking; Capacity Building; andAdministration and Finance. Its strength liesin the fact that it is not just a Secretariat,but a network with a nationwide coverageand outreach. Consequently, whenTEN/MET takes a decision, it is a strongrepresentation of Tanzanian civil society inall its administrative layers that decide: from the national, zonal (8), regional (26)and district (128) levels. The organisationcan therefore boast of a strong mobilisationcapacity when there is an advocacy issue to be tackled. For the purpose of dealingwith issues, the Tanzanian coalitioncommunicates with its membership throughthe decentralised structure given above forthe message to filter down to the grassrootslevel. But for the purpose of disseminatingadvocacy material and publications, the

coalition sends information directly to theinstitutions and partners.

TEN/MET gained strength from theCommonwealth Education Fund (CEF) as aresult of the capacity building interventionsinitiated by the project from 2002-2008.TEN/MET promotes Citizen Watch179 forpolicy change and its activities are veryvisible in Tanzania. The current Educationand Training Policy is largely influenced bythe coalition. A dialogue structure is in placewith TEN/MET serving as the educationprivileged partner of government. Thecoalition was therefore instrumental inspearheading the current national BasicEducation Strategy.180

Stakeholder Perception of the Status of EFAin Tanzania: According to the key informants interviewed,access is improving in Tanzania but there isstill a lot of room for enhancing enrolment.There are a few excluded and marginalisedgroups that need to be targeted properly.These are mainly girls living in the ruralareas, and other vulnerable groups such asthe children of pastoralist communities andphysically challenged individuals. Quality isconsidered to be a serious challenge. EarlyChildhood Care and Education remainssomewhat patchy; pre-school NER stands at27.7%. The government is trying to extendprimary school downwards in a separateentity rather than having ECD facilitiesembedded in existing primary schoolstructures. The problem has to do with thedifference in methodology and the transitionfactor. Adult literacy is sliding backwardsafter the gains of the 1980s, when Tanzaniaalmost achieved universal adult literacy.

Quality, a cross-cutting issue, is the chiefconcern. Some key informants werecategorical that they do not anticipate totalachievement of the EFA goals by 2015. Thestrategy consisting of emphasisingquantitative aspects related to access and

179 The scrutiny by citizen groups ofpublic service delivery by dutybearers (policy and decisionmakers) based on anaccountability relationship aimedat maximizing developmentresults.

180 Tanzania Education Strategy forImproving the Quality ofEducation (2009-2013)

Case Study: Ta n z a n i aE ffective participation of CSOs in policy re f o rm s

82 RWS II IN AFRICA

focusing more on enrolment is having someunintended consequences. Quality, in all itsdifferent facets: quality teacher; qualityteaching and learning materials;professional development; pupil/teacherratio and pupil/classroom ratio etc are stillnot being addressed properly.Consequently, learning achievements (interms of exam pass rates, acquisition ofliteracy and numeracy skills) are low, ataround 50%. As a result, monitoring andevaluation of the impact of education oncommunities needs to be conducted. Theproblems highlighted by the respondents asbeing areas of concern in the countryinclude: girl child education; educationfinancing; quality, teacher motivation andpupil/teacher ratio – which is at 52:1, whilethe pupil/classroom ratio stands at 73:1.Gross enrolment ratio has jumped from77.6% (2000) to 109.9% (2005) whileNER progressed from 58.8% to 94.8%(Education Watch report). Educationspending as a percentage of GDP was at3.9% (2006), 2.1% below therecommended 6% benchmark.

Example of best practice: Working toreform the 1995 Education Policy: Policy engagement with the Ministry ofEducation is one of the key strengths ofTEN/MET. The institution has alreadyestablished a track record of workingsuccessfully with the Tanzanian governmentto develop a policy document (the EducationBill), that is on the verge of beingpromulgated into law.

The policy reform agenda : The 1995Education Policy was outdated andconsequently was not meeting the challengesof the day. People with disabilities, childrenfrom pastoralist families, girls’ educationalrequirements, re-entry policy etc wereglaringly absent in the policy framework.Participatory methodologies promotinginclusiveness were not given due prominence.The issue of school fees and other mandatorycontribution by parents were seen as barriersto access to basic education in Tanzania. Theestablishment of TEN/MET created theplatform for education focused NGOs andCBOs to urge the government to removeschool fees and put in place a capitationgrant. Prior to that, a study had beenundertaken to document the facts and to usethem for evidenced-based advocacy to informpolicy. A heavy campaign was mounted byTEN/MET in 2001/2002 to ensure that theTanzanian government abolished thepayment of school fees as a means ofboosting access to basic education. Thatresulted in a significant increase in thenumber of children attending schools. Thatnotwithstanding, many still remained out ofthe system: the marginalised and excludedcommunities, orphans, the physicallychallenged etc. Some key informantsunderscored the fact that Mwalimu JuliusNyerere, Tanzania’s first President, had aclear vision of what he wanted for theeducation sector of the country: education forself-reliance through competence-basededucation. After his retirement from politics,the country went astray. Entry qualificationsfor teachers were lowered, so was theduration of teacher training. The EducationPolicy of 1988 dismantled the legacy of theNyerere era. It was much later that peoplestarted to reconnect with Nyerere’s policies.

The first point of entry was thus to reviewthe 1995 Education Policy and to lobby forenhanced allocation of resources to theeducation sector (after it had been loweredduring the preceding decade) and for thepromotion of competence-based approachesto education.

In 2006 therefore, it was agreed thatstakeholders should sit together to review thepolicy of 1995. A dialogue and consultationprocess was triggered at all levels (regional,

RWS II IN AFRICA 83

district, council and zonal) to seek the viewsof stakeholders and TEN/MET being aneducation-focused NGO played a prominentrole in the process, collecting the views fromaround the country. Those inputs were usedto serve as the basis for drafting the newEducation Policy Bill, entitled: The Educationand Training Policy. Following due processand an approach to participation, theMinistry again circulated the draft to elicitcivil society inputs in an attempt to entrenchall the issues that were relevant to Tanzania’sdevelopment needs. Thereafter, the final draftof the policy was posted on the Ministry’swebsite for ease of access, but was laterwithdrawn to accommodate furtheradjustments. The policy reform engagementmodel (as described above) was effective inhelping to influence the development of thenew Education Bill and is certainly a worthyexample for emulation by other nationalcoalitions.

The Draft Education Bill that shouldreplace the 1995 Education Policy is widelycited as an example of CSOs successfullyinfluencing education policy outcomes inTanzania. The model used by TENMET tosupport advocacy initiatives goes through thefollowing stages: a small team is formeddrawn from the membership and is tasked toanalyze an issue; then determine how toengage with the government; a core team isselected that would represent the coalition forthe purpose of engaging with the Ministry ofEducation. The lobbying and advocacy forthe review of the Education Policy of 1999went through that process and involved highlevel meetings with the decision makers at theMinistry of Education.

Unfortunately, the Bill has stalled at theMinistry of Education since 2006 and is yetto be enacted into law. The Bill was the resultof a strong advocacy campaign to ensure thatevery child in Tanzania has access to aquality teacher and quality education.

The Teachers’ Union was involved in theprocess through the TEN/MET platform butalso had its views captured separately froman exclusively teachers’ perspective. Usingresearch as a tool to inform policy, the Unionalso conducted research entitled: Why everychild needs a quality teacher. The Teachers’Union later managed to convince the Minister

to attend the validation workshop where thefindings of the research were disseminated. Asan active member of TEN/MET, theTeachers’ Union of Tanzania has helped toenhance the negotiating capacity of thecoalition.

Other examples of best practice:● TEN/MET and the Teachers’ Union

initiated the formation of a Teachers’Professional Board, so that teaching isgiven the respect that it deserves. The Billwas initiated by the pair and after dueconsultations with the Parliamentarians’drafting committee it was introduced forconsideration and enactment. This Bill isalso in the pipeline. The problem howeveris that, TEN/MET and the Teachers’Union want an independent Teachers’Professional Body whereas others are infavour of a government controlledTeachers’ Professional Body

● To maximise the effectiveness of civilsociety participation in the technicalcommittees of the Ministry, the formerwere first trained by the government andthen given the space to engagemeaningfully with ministerial committeesand processes. TEN/MET is a member ofthe Basic Education DevelopmentCommittee and the Quality ImprovementTask Force. A stronger group emergedfrom the process.

C h a l l e n g e s :● The challenges of TEN/MET include: the

issue of sustainability. With the UKDepartment for InternationalDevelopment moving more towardsbudget support, CSO resourcemobilisation possibilities may dwindle; thestrategy of the association could beconsidered too ambitious.

Recommendation: It will be important torefocus the activities of the coalition to whatit does best, for instance, influencing policychange at the macro level. The issue ofmembership and what is expected of eachmember within the coalition continues to be achallenge. Relationship with donors hasimproved a notch and needs to be sustainedover time.

84 RWS II IN AFRICA

I n t ro d u c t i o n :

The Elimu Yetu Coalition (EYC) wasestablished in 1999 in the aftermath of theJomtien World Education Conference of1990, and was registered as a Trust inNovember 2006. Prior to that, it wasfunctioning as a network of CSOs with aneducation focus, supported by theCommonwealth Education Fund (CEF).ActionAid Kenya provided an institutionalhome to EYC. That arrangement availedEYC of the agency’s robust financial andaccounting policies, systems and proceduresfor the efficient management of its activities,resources and information.

At the outset, it was a one-personSecretariat, supported by a board of ninepeople. The organisation emerged whenstakeholders deemed it necessary to have alleducation-focused CSOs under one umbrellaso that they could speak with one voice toinfluence education policy and outcomes. Thecoalition currently has around 120 membersspread across the country. It has a nationalSecretariat and regional level affiliatedmembers. The campaign structure of thecoalition has many layers: the ExecutiveCommittee, Secretariat, thematic groups andregional chapters. And according to thedispensation and provisions of its newConstitution, the structure should alsoembrace the newly established counties. Forcampaign efforts, the level of commitment ofthe membership is quite impressive, at around80%. But participating in the campaignefforts aside, the issue of registration andpayment of subscriptions to the parent bodyis a sticking point. In that regard, only about20% of the members could be consideredactive. EYC has thematic groups (sub-networks) structured around the EFA goals asfollows: Early childhood development andeducation; Disability and special needseducation; Gender and girls’ education;Teachers and Quality; Basic Education inUrban Slums and Arid Lands; and AdultLiteracy.

EYC has a Constitution, a functionalstructure and all the legal instruments tofunction effectively. The coalition’s imageamong its membership and partners,particularly the donor community haschanged drastically in the last couple of yearsafter some major internal challenges (seebelow). Confidence and credibility haveincreased a notch resulting in more fundingopportunities to conduct EFA-relatedadvocacy activities.

Perception of the Status of EFA in Kenya:Under the Kenya Education Sector SupportProgramme (KESSP), the country has madesignificant progress towards EFA. The localchallenges in Kenya however revolve aroundthe following issues: improving EarlyChildhood Care and Development (ECCD)opportunities, particularly for vulnerablechildren; ensuring that all children haveopportunities to access and complete theireducation; ensuring that teaching andlearning are available and accessible;attaining a 50% improvement in adultliteracy levels for women; eliminating genderdisparities in primary and secondaryeducation and improving all aspects ofquality education. Respondents lamented thelack of adequate support (both financial andhuman) to early childhood development andeducation; the low quality of education; thehigh teacher/pupil ratios; overcrowdedclassrooms (a ratio of 1 teacher to 80 pupils)and high numbers of unreached childrenespecially in slum areas. Access has increasedtremendously since the government’sintroduction of the Free Primary EducationProgramme in 2003/2004 but the absence ofa capitation grant has compromised access toquality basic education among poor,vulnerable and marginalised groups.However, primary school gross enrolmentrate increased from 107.6% in 2005 to109.8% in 2008. Transition rate fromprimary to secondary increased to 60% in2007, up from 45% in 2003. The educationsector budget as a percentage of the total

Case Study: K e n y aWhen education financing matters

RWS II IN AFRICA 85

national budget has been constantlyincreasing and currently stands at 17% – but still 3% less than the FTI World Bankbenchmark of 20%. Differently stated, theGovernment of Kenya spends over 6% ofGDP on education.

The respondents unanimously agreed thatgovernment, through the Ministry ofEducation, also developed policy frameworkson Early Childhood Education, Adult andContinuing Education, Non-FormalEducation, Nomadic Education and GenderPolicy in Education. Under the EconomicStimulus Package, the government hasembarked on improving the infrastructure inschools and has also increased the number ofteachers by hiring teachers on short-termcontract basis. A teacher/pupil ratio of 1:100 iscommon, especially in rural areas and thattends to have a negative impact on learningoutcomes.

Challenges of Coalition BuildingAs described in the regional lessons learnedbelow, EYC experienced the kind ofgovernance challenges that pose a risk to bothestablished and new coalitions. Around 2005,EYC, despite strong performance overprevious years, had arrived at a low point andwas experiencing difficulties in campaign andorganisational management issues, leading to aloss of focus, trust and confidence, which ledto the emergence of different factions withinthe coalition. In 2008, a special AGM wassuccessfully organised to revive and revitaliseEYC, and an interim office was set up tooversee the affairs of the coalition for a periodof one year. ANCEFA, via RWS II initiatives,assisted EYC to get back on track, providing a project support officer and administrativesupport to strengthen the network and bolsterthe Secretariat. Thereafter, a full-blown AGMsupported by ANCEFA was organised in 2009to set up proper structures, leading to therejuvenation of EYC. This is an example of the important support role that regionalorganisations can play in sensitive and oftensecretive matters such as internal cohesion andgovernance. The flexibility of the RWS II grantallowed ANCEFA to respond when this riskemerged, and to prevent the loss of a coalitionthat had until that time been seen as a strongadvocacy leader.

86 RWS II IN AFRICA

Documenting best practicef rom Kenya: the Election Cycle Advocacy with linkagesto Education financing via the NationalB u d g e t :

The manner in which EYC is trying toengender value-based politics in Kenya isexemplary and worthy of emulation by othernational coalitions. In anticipation of the2012 elections, the coalition evolved anelection blueprint (manifesto) encapsulatingthe problems, issues, policies and possiblesolutions for the education sector and ispresenting it to the political parties forstakeholder buy-in and also putting thecitizenry on notice when casting their votesand also for the purpose of tracking electoralpromises. That strategy is premised on theview that politicians are more responsive topolitical and social stimulus when they arecanvassing for votes during election times.Then it becomes possible to hold them toransom, thereby influencing their partymanifestos in favour of the Education for Allgoals. Elimu Yetu Coalition’s Election andBudget Advocacy project financed byANCEFA is intended to create that space forCSOs to engage constructively with theelection cycle processes having stronglinkages to education financing through thenational budget.

This is an example of good practice thathas been tested. Already in 2007 (prior to theelection and the post-election crisis thatensued) political parties published their partymanifestos to seek the mandate of theelectorate and were competing for theattention of education-focused CSOs in termsof the robustness of their education sectorplan. CSOs engaged with the processes toinform and influence the party manifestos.EYC is taking stock of the achievementsmade in the education sector thus far bykeeping track of the electoral promises andthe extent to which they have beenimplemented by the coalition government.The lessons learned served to inform the EYCManifesto to political parties for the 2012elections. The coalition has elaborated a‘minimum package’ for party manifestos in10 agenda points, taking on board all theEFA goals, followed by a call to action from

all the citizens of Kenya. Major politicalparties in Kenya cannot afford to beindifferent to such a clarion call.

The key stages in the election and budgetcycle project observed in Kenya to holdpoliticians to account are as follows:● Review and analysis of the education

sector plans and budgets (pre and postelections)

● Review and analysis of manifestos ofmajor political parties to underscore thespecific pledges and commitments theymade while canvassing for the votes of thecitizens

● Review of the evolution andimplementation of the education sectorplans in line with EFA, the Vision 2030framework and the KESSP

● Tracking of electoral pledges andpromises made in 2007 to determine towhat extent these have been adhered toand finally, the development of a shadoweducation manifesto to serve as a sellingpoint for the 2012 election. Thatdocument serves as the benchmark todetermine who is serious abouteducational development in Kenya todeserve endorsement by the coalition.

These budget and election cycle processes inKenya are reminiscent of those in Malawi,except that in Kenya the processes areintertwined (election cycle processes withbudgetary implication), while in Malawi, theelection cycle and the budget cycle advocacyoutreaches seem to be parallel processes thatare mutually supportive (see the Malawi casestudy). The commonality that they both haveis the manner in which national coalitions areable to lobby for enhanced resourceallocation to the education sector by applyingpressure on political formations to makecommitments against which they will bejudged in future elections. This model couldbe exported to other ANCEFA countries. Butthe effectiveness of such a strategy willdepend largely on the structure of partypolitics in country-specific contexts. In anenvironment where one party clearlydominates the political landscape, acoalition’s leverage to influence politicaloutcomes may not be that significant.

RWS II IN AFRICA 87

Points of learning: ● Part of the internal crisis that EYC faced

was linked to a lack of managementinstruments. EYC left the ActionAid fold(where it had been housed in its earlyyears) before management instrumentswere developed. The lack of oversight,control mechanisms and reference pointsthat the situation created gave rise tovarious conflicts of interest in the awardof contracts without due process. TheExecutive Committee and theCoordinator had not been on the samewave length, leading to a crisis situationthat almost provoked the demise of thecoalition.

● The brand of advocacy and mode ofengagement: EYC adopts a constructiveengagement approach in its dealings withthe government. The coalition positionsitself strategically in sector committeesand tries to influence policies from withinrather than overly involving itself inconfrontational mode of advocacy andcampaigning. That strategy has enabledEYC to develop joint documents with theMinistry; partake in joint task forcecommittees to prepare for certainconferences and to draft position papersto influence educational policies andoutcomes.

● The EFA goals are so broad. EYC hastried to do so much at the same time. Inother to be more effective, campaignsneed to be more focused. It would benecessary to focus the educationcampaigns mounted by nationalcoalitions to three things at most and notto try to do everything at the same time,with little resources.

● Using the education donor coordinationgroup to influence policy: one of the keypoints being driven home is the tacitalliance between the donor communityand CSOs as to who should take the leadin pushing certain policy agendas in eachforum. Such a strategy is premised on theunderstanding that sometimesgovernment would be more receptive tohome-grown advocacy positions. Othertimes, CSOs could lean on the donorcommunity to promote a certain policyposition on their behalf.

Best practice: ● In Kenya, there is a sector wide approach

geared towards inclusiveness that bringstogether all those who have a stake ineducation. EYC is considered by theMinistry as a key development partnerand as such is present during theplanning, implementation andmonitoring processes of the Ministry.Joint missions/ interventions are carriedout in an effort to promote best practice.The impact of the education sector innational development is palpable,resulting in strides being made inreforms. EYC exerts positive pressure onthe Ministry for them to be moreresponsive to the challenges of the day.The Ministry offers consultancycontracts to the coalition aimed atreviewing progress towards the EFAgoals. Quality remains a big concern fordevelopment partners.

● EYC is part of the Education DonorCoordination Group (EDCG) and helpsthe Ministry to show donors how theycould help in education. They are alsoactive in the non-formal educationcampaign to achieve the EFA goals.Elimu Yetu helps in the area of policyadvice as part of the planning team andengages constructively with the Ministry.The coalition can easily have access tothe Ministry and have played aprominent role in the review of KESSP.

● Media Advocacy: EYC has a robustmedia strategy through which strong tieswere established with media houses.

● The work of the coalition is welldocumented for learning and sharingwith partners. The publications are madeavailable to members and developmentpartners to keep them abreast of theactivities of the coalition.

● EYC is good at unpacking issues usingthe network. A national conference isheld every year to bring CSOs together inan effort to take stock of what ish a p p e n i n g .

88 RWS II IN AFRICA

I n t ro d u c t i o n :

The Forum for Education NGOs in Uganda(FENU), like TEN/MET, EYC and CSCQBE,is a founding member of ANCEFA. FENUhas 83 members and around 65% of themare actively engaged in the coalition’sadvocacy efforts. The network has a nationalSecretariat but is not so successful inmounting district chapters due to amongother things, resource constraints. FENU isstructured as follows: The Annual GeneralAssembly (organised every year) is thesupreme body, followed by the Board ofdirectors, the Secretariat and three districtchapters that are independent of FENU. Four out of the seven Board members comefrom upcountry, thereby conferring a goodrural/urban balance. The organisation hasboth an administrative manual and afinancial manual to guide procedures andprocesses. It operates on five thematic groups:Access and Quality; Gender Parity; EarlyChildhood Education; Adult Education;HIV/Emergencies and Multi-lingualEducation. The model observed for themanagement of the network is as follows:FENU chairs the first meeting. Thesubsequent meetings are supposed to behosted by other members every other monthon a rotational basis.

FENU was established in 2001 to serve asa forum for networking, capacity buildingand advocacy on education policy andpractice. The cohesiveness of the coalition,like that of EYC in Kenya, did not stand thetest of time. The coalition was very strongbefore 2008 but deteriorated thereafter dueto governance challenges around leadershipand management of the affairs of thecoalition. Members at one point starteddistancing themselves from the network,resulting in a reduction of vibrancy of theinstitution. FENU has fortunately regained itsprominence, but needs to bring back the lostmembers into the coalition fold. One key

informant alleged that the Secretariat tends tobe the coalition and the staffing levels seem tobe grossly inadequate to deal with thechallenges at hand. The coalition, accordingto another interviewee, is overly dominatedby INGOs. Two others underscored thechallenges to coalition building, but hailedthe fruitful relationship they have with themedia as a good example of a successfulpartnership. Unlike RWS II, RWS I was veryvisible in Uganda. There was a supportmechanism (including a package for therecruitment of a programme staff memberand institutional and outreach support) andFENU had a moderating role within theANCEFA board from 2005 to 2009 until itsupported Kenya to take over the moderatingrole for the East African region, when it wasfelt that Kenya was ready for the job. Thatsupport mechanism changed under RWS IIand the provision for a support staff memberwas not renewed. There is evidence thatFENU participated in a trip to Djibouti (withone ANCEFA Programme Officer), to set upthe coalition there and also attended theNairobi Board meeting to discuss RWSissues.

Perception of the Status of EFA:FENU played a key role in influencing theadoption of the free Basic Education Act,guaranteeing access to education for all thechildren of Uganda. Uganda has largelyachieved access to basic education with aGross Enrolment Ratio (GER) of 122%, butis not very much on track with respect to theissue of quality. FENU has been doing well inthe area of advocacy and has spearheadedthe: ‘go back to school’; ‘back to school’;‘stay in school’ campaigns across Uganda.The coalition also celebrates the GlobalAction Week (GAW) and the Day of theAfrican Child. But the challenges are hugeand parents are expected to bear some of theburden, e.g. hidden costs, to keep theirchildren in school. When school-related costs

Case Study: U g a n d aThe quest for transparency in policy implementation

RWS II IN AFRICA 89

are attached, there is reluctance on the part ofcertain parents to get their children into theschool system. For cultural reasons, the girlchild is more vulnerable and is less likely tobe kept in school; girls are often married offearly, resulting in a pyramid-like structure,showing a wide base of female pupils at theschool entry point that gradually tapers offtowards the upper levels.

The government has not committed itselfto providing Early Childhood Developmentservices. It only coordinates the privateproviders but is not delivering that service.Today, enrolment in ECD stands at 2.6% ofnew entrants in primary one. There are gapsin basic education provision, although therehas been increased allocation. The provisionof midday meals is proving to be aformidable challenge contributing to thehigh dropout rate. Repetition rates forgrades 1-5 is at 7%. Enrolment is increasingbut the retention rate is a matter forconcern. Recognising that some childrencannot fit into the traditional mould,ActionAid Uganda is involved in providingnon-formal education school services. Theorganisation influences government toconsider the issue of non-formal educationfor children of primary school going agethat cannot access the conventional schools.The government is gradually coming in toprovide the funds to build permanentstructures for non-formal schools. Teachers

are being included in the governmentpayroll; a curriculum for teachers has beendeveloped and a two year trainingprogramme has been evolved. In May 2010,the government trained 800 non-formalteachers and that in itself, could be seen as agreat achievement.

Examples of best practice:● One strategic objective being vigorously

pursued by FENU is to position andentrench itself in the places where policyand practice happen, to be able toi n fluence the decision making process.The strategy is to influence from withinrather than be engaged in protestprocessions that are more often than not,counterproductive. It is a strategy ofconstructive engagement aimed atbringing FENU’s voice to the table. Thatobjective has been met to a large extent.FENU has now reached a certain level inthe government machinery that hasenabled it to be regularly consulted oneducation issues. The coalition is invarious working groups of the Ministrynamely: Monitoring and Evaluation;Teacher Education, Business Technicaland Vocational Training (BTVET), BasicEducation and the Education SectorConsultative Committee – the top policyorgan in the Ministry of Education. As aresult of that constructive engagement,

90 RWS II IN AFRICA

FENU enjoys legitimacy, recognition andrespect. The coalition can no longer beignored and is never closed out when itcomes to discussing education issues inUganda. The relationship has beencemented to such an extent that FENUdoes not need an appointment to see theMinister of Education or the PrimeM i n i s t e r .

● The outcome of FENU’s policy ofentrenchment within government bodieswas that it was able to influence policy,over a period of years, culminating in thegovernment’s enactment of the 2008Education Act. This Act was many yearsin the making. It began as the 2000Education Bill, which was stalled, havingbeen subjected to a protracted debatefrom 2001 to 2008 and amended aboutfive times. The issues in the bill include:the need for basic education to be freeand compulsory; non-formal educationto be recognised in law; the gender parityissues that need to be adequatelymainstreamed. In 2008 after the SocialServices Committee has reported to theplenary, there was a clause FENU calledinto question: parents could be punishedfor not taking children to school. FENUcontested that and the committee wasforced to take it back, thereby bendingits own rules. But FENU lost the battledue to inadequate preparation to argueout their case. The problem at issue was:what do we do with parents who decidednot to take their children to school? It isevident that the coalition did notadequately research the issues to teaseout the information that could informtheir lobbying and advocacy strategies.For future GCE interventions, it wouldbe critical to enhance capacity inlobbying and negotiating with dutybearers and decision makers oneducation advocacy issues.

● FENU enjoys good relations with theMinistry of Gender, taking care ofgender mainstreaming and adulteducation issues, and seeks to influ e n c etheir policies to promote the related EFAgoals. The coalition is now working hardto entrench itself with the Ministry ofLocal Government, taking advantage of

the new dispensation devolving authorityto the decentralised level.

● There had been serious issues with thepayment of teachers’ salaries. Thedistrict education officers took time toregister the names of teachers on theirpayroll. The coalition took up the matterthrough lobbying and advocacy toreduce the layers through which thefunds transited. The funds transferprocess changed. Today, teachers arenow being paid by the Ministry ofFinance directly into their accounts. Thecapitation grant also goes directly intothe school bank accounts, whichenhances accountability at thedecentralised level, but that has its ownchallenges also in terms of readiness ofthe local community structures to engagewith the processes. Efforts are currentlybeing made to rejuvenate the SchoolManagement Committees and to makethem functional and capable of playingan oversight role. The guidelines arecurrently being published to empowerlocal structures for the task at hand.

● FENU is represented in the highest policyorgan where policy related issues arediscussed and affronted. The meetingsare chaired by the Permanent Secretaryand the big donors take part in suchmeetings, creating a good opportunity toengage with the education sectorprocesses. The Education Sector ReviewMeeting takes place in November andoffers CSOs the opportunity to influ e n c epolicy and the decision making process.

● The Government of Uganda is spendingabout 30% of the national budget oneducation, 65% of which is goingtowards basic education – according tothe FENU national coordinator. That is10 points higher than the FTI WorldBank benchmark of 20% of the nationalbudget to be allocated to the educations e c t o r .

● A Quality Enhancement Initiative (QEI)and Community Participation outreachesare to be promoted in Uganda. This willgo a long way in putting the issue ofquality as a cross-cutting issue high in thegovernment’s agenda. Other ANCEFAmember countries need to do the same.

RWS II IN AFRICA 91

● One of the key lessons learned during thisexercise is that the best way for nationalcoalitions to achieve development results isto lobby government or the relevant sectors(education in this instance) to be representedin their working groups and to be seen tobe key planks in those structures. Then itbecomes possible for civil society to be privyto what is happening and to be able toinfluence the processes from within. Thatis one key commonality between EYC,TEN/MET, FENU and CSCQBE. They haveall succeeded in entrenching themselves inthe technical working groups of theirrespective Ministries of Education and haveproven to be worthy development partnerscapable of offering policy advice service andalternatives to government for the commongood. The point of learning here is that:the principle of constructive engagementfrom within offers a higher pay-off thanconfrontational modes of advocacy!

● TEN/MET’s Strategic Planning period isaligned to the national election cycle. Thepremise of that strategic positioning is toavail its network of members of theopportunity to engage meaningfully withpoliticians by getting them to commit tothe coalition’s agenda, and thatcommitment serves as the yardstick tomeasure their performance in anaccountability relationship. This hasproven to be an effective way to push theEFA agenda. Without aligning its strategicplanning period to the election cycle, theCSCQBE uses the same approach to getpolitical parties and politicians to takeeducation issues into their party manifestosto get their support. Such an approachneeds to be replicated in all ANCEFAmember countries as politicians are moreresponsive to civil society demands whenthey are busy canvassing for citizens’ votes.

● The election and budget cycle advocacyproject undertaken in Malawi as twodistinct projects supported by ANCEFA

through RWS II are reminiscent of theElection and Budget Advocacy projectconducted by EYC in Kenya. Both aredesigned to track political promises,government programmes and budgetallocations for basic education. EYC haselaborated a ‘minimum package’ that allparties vying for government should buy inblock whereas the CSCBQE has evolvedthe Education Agenda to foster stakeholderbuy-in. Both coalitions have the ability tosummon political parties to one forum andto get them to commit to these agendas.

● Building and managing a coalition is achallenging endeavour. While ANCEFA,through projects like RWS, supportsongoing internal processes ofstrengthening, there is still a lot of roomfor improvement. There are staffing gapsto be filled as a matter of urgency. Themonitoring and evaluation systems of theinstitutions are often weak and need to bedeveloped. Lack of institutional memoryis an issue and a challenge.

● The national coalition of Malawi hassucceeded in demystifying the educationbudget and has raised awareness amongduty bearers, policy makers and decisionmakers to give consistent support to theeducation sector. This is done through aconsistent, unrelenting year-roundadvocacy strategy. The coalition’s successstories have been recognised by the WorldBank, UNESCO and OSISA. The budgetcycle has been a learning point for otherAfrican countries, and CSCBQE hasalready welcomed study tour visits byMozambique, The Gambia, and Ethiopia.

● Before engaging a serious development actorlike the Ministry of Education, coalitionsneed to be adequately prepared and tothink through all the possible argumentsthat could be advanced by the other partyat the negotiation table. FENU (Uganda),according to a key stakeholder, engagedthe Ministry unprepared.

Regional Summary : A f r i c aCommonalities in approaching EFAcampaigns, lessons learned, lobbying andadvocacy and operational challenges

92 RWS II IN AFRICA

ANCEFA has been working to deliverchange at the national and regional levels.Coalition building is one of the key planksof ANCEFA’s strategic plan aimed atbuilding and sustaining capacity to engagewith national education processes.ANCEFA’s role as a change agent and theorganisation’s ability to build, nurture,resuscitate and revitalise national coalitionsis well established. A number of countrieshave, during RWS I and II, learnt/benefit t e dfrom ANCEFA’s coalitionbuilding/strengthening blueprint. Theyinclude but are not limited to Zimbabwe,Senegal and Kenya.

1. Z i m b a b w e: CSOs in the eye of thes t o r m: Zimbabwe is the country that ismost unlikely to reach any of the EFAgoals by 2015 and gives credence to theview that local political and economiccircumstances matter! The politicalclimate in Zimbabwe did not bode wellfor the national education coalition.From being one of the best educationsystems in Africa, with a literacy rate of98% by the late 1990s, the performancerating of the country dropped to between40–50% in 2006. Teachers weredeliberately targeted for their role in thepolitical education of communitiesleading to the defeat of the ruling party,and repression, violence and intimidationbecame the order of the day. Thepolitical deadlock over power-sharingthat ensued between ZANU-PF andMDC, the high cost of education, closureof public schools, poor wages of teachersand low morale all contributed to thecrumbling of the education system. Massteacher exodus into neighbouringcountries followed in order to escapepersecution and economic hardships. Itwas difficult under those circumstancesto have a legal platform on which tostand to advocate for the EFA goals. The

atmosphere of suspicion that prevailedmade it difficult for the National CivilSociety Education Coalition ofZimbabwe (NASCECZ), set up in 2003and nurtured to play its role until 2007,to have an input, output or influence onthe education sector processes. Thecoalition was therefore reduced to tryingto make the best out of a bad situationand was forced to scale down itsoperations and eventually had to gou n d e r g r o u n d .

A political compromise has since thenbeen reached between ZANU-PF andMDC, and Zimbabwe is graduallymoving from the jaundiced years ofpolitical suspicion and crackdown into anew era that is more conducive tolearning and development. In September2008 ANCEFA and OSISA held ameeting in Johannesburg to strategise forrevival of a coalition in Zimbabwe,culminating in the birth of the EducationCoalition of Zimbabwe (ECOZI). A newSteering Committee emerged with theForum for African WomenEducationalists Zimbabwe Chapterserving as the Focal Point forCoordination. The organisation is now ina learning curve and is encouragingdialogue and consensus building with aview to also gaining a foothold at theMinistry of Education, as had been thecase in 2007 when NASCECZ had acordial relationship with the government.The current situation therefore calls for‘guarded optimism’. A fact finding visitwas commissioned in October/November2008, followed by stakeholder mappingin June 2009, and a consensus buildingworkshop in June 2009. As at end June2009, the Steering Committee wasleading discussions on an MOU thatwould facilitate full revival of thecoalition. It is interesting to note that acoordinator has now been appointed.

A sample of the specific contributions of Real World Strategies in Africa – coalitionbuilding, resuscitation and stre n g t h e n i n gwithin country - s p e c i fic circ u m s t a n c e s :

RWS II IN AFRICA 93

2 ANCEFA’s coalition buildingmethodology: ANCEFA has developed itscoalition building methodology based onthe following elements and processes:ANCEFA provides start up funds;facilitates the stakeholder mappingexercise, and organises a stakeholderbriefing session with the SteeringCommittee. After the conclusion of thatprocess, the Committee is expected toundertake the following: developMOU/Constitution for the coalition;mobilise NGOs to take part in thecoalition; get involved in preparations andholding of an NGO Education Forum;facilitate a coalition membershipworkshop; reach a consensus for thecoalition vision and mission; establish asecretariat and enhance its visibility in thecountry. The start-up funds that the newlyset up coalition is endowed with are used,among other things, to: recruit a skeletonstaff; acquire office space; acquire officeequipment – computers, printers,photocopiers, furniture, telephone, faxmachine etc; introduce activities tostakeholders; communicate with membersand partners. But the challenges tocoalition building include: inadequatefinances to run good campaigns; limitedcoordination, political interference andthe capacity to undertake evidence-basedcampaigns.181

3. Kenya: The successes and challengesof coalition buildingEYC provides a vivid example of thesuccesses and challenges that can beset acoalition and the potential pitfalls thatestablished or emerging coalitions shouldavoid. The 2005 AGM that culminated inthe election of a new Board wasdominated by organisations outsideNairobi. Few people were therefore left torun the affairs of the coalition and thecampaign. All the others felt left out duelargely to the lack of consultations oncampaign and organisationalmanagement issues. The difficulty ofcommunication between the Secretariat,the Board and the regional membershipresulted in the loss of focus. Opposingcamps developed, culminating in the

absence of trust and confidence in theorganisation by members and partners,thus threatening the organisation’s veryexistence. But committed individualsseized the moment, took ownership of theproblems and invested an enormousamount of time and energy to assuage thecoalition stakeholders. The values thatsustain an enabling coalition were onceagain espoused, culminating in theevolution of an all-encompassingconsensus to ground the coalition on a

181 Coalition Building Support forSouthern Africa Project

94 RWS II IN AFRICA

sound footing. This is a clear example ofANCEFA using its diplomatic goodo f fices to resolve the problems of anational coalition and to iron out theterms of the new arrangement with themembers.

The rejuvenation of EYC: The approach was in two stages: ● one-to-one consultation with stakeholder

institutions to prepare the ground, ● followed by a consultative and

consensus building meetings.

The Forum for African WomenEducationalists (FAWE) Kenya wasapproached to host the institutiontemporarily and a caretaker committeewas put in place. Members wereconvinced to have a meeting in 2008 toform a caretaker committee for one year,entrusted with the mandate to: revive thecoalition and get a Secretariat andskeleton staff. Two staff members werethen recruited and housed in a smallroom to operate. After that process, thebiggest challenge lay in trying to rebuildthe confidence of the coalition’sconstituencies and to reconnect with theMinistry of Education and the media.EYC now have a strategic p a r t n e r s h i pwith the Ministry of Education and havea robust media strategy for engagingwith journalists to amplify theircampaign messages.

4. S e n e g a l: The Republic of Senegaloffers a good example of CSOssuccessfully influencing policy change in the area of teacher recruitment inaddition to constantly playing amediation role between the Teachers’Unions and the Senegalese Government.This role aimed at appeasing thetensions between the various unions andhas galvanised them to be a formidableadvocacy platform to support thecampaign for EFA in Senegal. Today,some 32 Teachers’ Unions are membersof the coalition.

In 2006, the Senegalese coalition wasmired in a crisis with the ANCEFASecretariat when it failed to provide a

narrative and a financial report on theimplementation of activities as per itscontractual obligation to ANCEFA. Itlater emerged that some fin a n c i a lmalpractices occurred and thestakeholders involved could no longer beperceived as credible partners, and thecoalition was therefore suspended by theGCE and excluded from RWS activities.The coalition’s collapse created a vacuumbetween 2006 and 2008. In 2008 theCoalition des Organisations et Syndicatspour la Défense de l’Education PubliqueCOSYDEP emerged first as aconsultation forum of NGOs andTeachers’ Unions (with the support ofANCEFA) and later evolved into a fullyfledged coalition, following a consensusbuilding workshop in Mbour, in April2 0 0 8 .

Today, COSYDEP has positioneditself as a credible, well-respected andproactive CSO that offers mediationservices between the Senegalesegovernment and the Teachers’ Unionswhen necessary to pre-empt industrialactions that can only harm learners in theschool system. On invitation by theMinistry of Education, the organisationoffers its diplomatic good offices andexplores viable win-win solutions thatsatisfy the different parties to a confli c t .That is a good testimony that theMinistry of Education has trust in thecoalition and its ability to galvanise theTeachers’ Unions around a reasonablearrangement. COSYDEP has also beenchosen by the Ministry to play anoversight role, ensuring that thecommitments made during negotiationsare respected by the parties involved. Inthat respect, the coalition participated ina September 2010 meeting aimed atappraising the implementation of thecommitments made by the differentparties and the impact it was having onthe social climate in the education sector.

5. The Gambia: ANCEFA has strengthenedthe EFA Network in The Gambia toenhance education service deliverythrough the institutionalisation of budgettracking. The coalition has been engagingwith the National Assembly to sensitise

RWS II IN AFRICA 95

them on the need to support greaterresource allocation to the educationsector. That process has beencomplemented by a sustained engagementwith the Ministry of Education for thelatter to provide feedback on inputs andresources in the education sector throughtracking strategies. EFA Net has beenparticipating in policy planning,formulation and monitoring of theeducation process. That has enhanced theawareness of the National AssemblyMembers of the urgency to support policychange and greater resource allocation tothe sector. ANCEFA supported theorganisation of a regional trainingworkshop on budget tracking in TheGambia in August 2007. ANCEFA, viaRWS II, also financed the EducationWatch research as part of the first groupof countries to be supported. ANCEFAalso enabled the coalition secretariat toparticipate in the GCE Africa pre-meetingin Dakar in the same year. In an effort tocreate transnational synergies, ANCEFAsupported the cross-border Global ActionWeek celebrations at Kerr Ayib betweenthe Gambia and Senegal and thepublication of the Education Watchreport. In 2009, ANCEFA commissioneda gender assessment182 and the deepeningof the Education Watch research of 2007.

General Challenges

The dilemma of national coalitions is whetheror not they should address some or all of theEFA goals, given their financial, technical and human resource shortcomings. Manycoalitions have not been able to make thattrade-off and to invest their energies and limitedresources in the few things that they do best.

More national coalitions should developthe capacity to: engage more proactively withnational budgetary processes all year round,contribute articles in the print and electronicmedia and play host to radio/TV talk-showsto boost coalition visibility. Obtaining qualitydata for evidence-based advocacy continuesto be a challenge in many countries. TheEducation Watch research project attemptedto bridge the gap. Unfortunately, only half ofthe ANCEFA member countries have beencovered by the project.

The issue of coalition governance andaccountability has been raised by certainstakeholders. As shown in the previous pages,governance challenges around accountability,leadership and commitment threatened thevery existence of Elimu Yetu, and corruptmanagement led to the demise of the firstSenegalese coalition. In terms of feedback onresults and outcomes, coalitions also need toensure that there are formal processes to keepmembers in the loop.

182 This study was aimed atproviding a detailed assessmentof the state of gendermainstreaming in the educationsector, the progress registeredand the hurdles in terms ofsector preparedness, capacitygaps etc with a view toadvocating for policy reform.

96 RWS II IN AFRICA

General Recommendations

● Visibility of Real World Strategies (RWS)as an instrument : Knowledge of RWS asan instrument for giving support tonational coalitions is somewhat patchyamong coalition members. Since otherinstruments like the Civil SocietyEducation Fund (CSEF) are alsoproviding support to coalitions via GCE and the regional networks, it isuseful to note which activities aresupported by RWS. That will help toenhance the visibility of the projectamong coalition members.

● Fundraising : Expectations are very highfor ANCEFA to provide enhancedsupport services to the national coalitionsand their decentralised structures.However, the funds available are notcommensurate with the national demandsto scale up capacity building andadvocacy interventions. Without step-down mechanisms that target thedecentralised structures, the impact ofRWS may be limited and only confined tothe urban areas. As a context-based anddemand driven approach, the trickle-down effect to meet the needs andaspirations of grassroots structures islargely unsatisfied due to funding gaps.

● Enhancing vertical and horizontalnetworking and support mechanisms : The importance of results orientation tothe success of the EFA agenda cannot beoveremphasised. Coalitions are allproactively interacting with ANCEFAand not sufficiently with each other.They are not harnessing the powers ofinformation technology enough (ascampaign tools) by having a vibrant e-network to share information on bestpractices for ‘quick wins’ and peer-to-peer learning and support mechanisms.ANCEFA needs to create that space forthe development of a learning cultureand the management of knowledge forenhanced results orientation. That couldadd value to their campaigns goingforward.

● Building the capacity of the coordinatingcommittee for institutional memory : Theresearch has revealed that the attrition

rate at coalition Secretariats is high, andeach time a coalition coordinator leavesthere is a risk that the coalition will losethe learning acquired through trainingoffered by ANCEFA and other agencies.Targeting the coordinating committee asa whole would be a better approach tocoalition building or strengthening.

● Coordination only for coalitions : Theideal situation should be for coalitions tohave a coordination role and to delegateactivities to the organisation (within thecoalition) that has a comparativeadvantage to deliver on a particularproject to take the lead.

● Policy consultation and operationalc o l l a b o r a t i o n : Policy and budgetmonitoring needs to be intensified. TheCSCQBE has amply demonstrated that itis possible to improve the quality of thepolicy consultation approach at all stagesof the budget and election cycles to exactaccountability, focusing constantly on theaction items that are critical for achievingdevelopment results. That case study is atestimony that it is possible to scale upoperational collaboration at nationallevel. That way, they can collectivelywork towards improving theresponsiveness of their respectivegovernments to the EFA agenda.

● Inclusive approach : Education focusedNGOs are no longer conducting advocacyin solo but are working together as acoalition to plan and implement educationadvocacy activities. The teachers’ unionsand the coalitions in East Africa enjoy avery fruitful partnership based on mutualtrust and confidence. That confidence isreplicated between the coalitions and theMinistries of Education of the respectivecountries.

RWS II IN ASIA-PACIFIC 97

The following case studies present various advocacy campaigns inresponse to challenges to achievingEducation for All (EFA) in theirp a rticular countries:

● In the Philippines, the Civil

Society Network for Education

Reforms (E-Net Philippines)

campaigned for a bigger budget for

Alternative Learning Systems, to

provide educational opportunities

for drop-outs and others not

reached by the formal school system.

● In C a m b o d i a, the NGO

Education Partnership (NEP)

lobbied with government to halt

the collection of informal school

fees which restrict childre n ’s access

to education, and to incre a s e

teachers’ salaries.

● In I n d i a, the National Coalition for

Education (NCE) campaigned for

legislation to guarantee free and

c o m p u l s o ry education for children

from 0-18. Making education

compulsory, they argued, would

deter child labour.

● In Sri Lanka, the Coalition for

Educational Development (CED)

campaigned for adult l i t e r a c y,

p a rticularly for women who were

forced to drop out of school early –

both for their empowerment and in

order to support their children’s

education.

RWS II in Asia-Pacificby Barbara Fortunato

98 RWS II IN ASIA-PACIFIC

183 Interview with Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, 2 August 2010

184 Interview with Ravi PrakashVerma, 12 August 2010

Although the national coalitions addressedother challenges to education, the casestudies focused on these particular advocacycampaigns which were supported by theReal World Strategies programme (RWS)coordinated in the Asia-Pacific region by theAsia South Pacific Association for Basic andAdult Education (ASPBAE). The campaignswere distinct and separate, but the educationissues they addressed shared many commont h r e a d s :● Although public education is supposedly

‘free’, in reality students and theirfamilies spend a significant amount foreducation-related expenses such asschool supplies, transportation, foodconsumed in school, fees forexaminations and other school events,and school uniforms. The high cost ofeducation is consistently cited as theprimary reason why students drop out ofschool. A related issue is poverty, whichforces children to forego school andwork instead to supplement their family’si n c o m e .

● Girl children are particularlydisadvantaged: they are often seen as lessvaluable than boys and therefore notworth the investment in education, or areexpected to stay home and do thehousework. Girls who marry early spendfewer years in school. As a result, girlsoften have lower enrolment and literacyrates. Among the four case studies, thePhilippines is the exception, with moreboys dropping out than girls, yet this toomay still be a gender issue, with malesexpected to earn money to support thefamily.

● Governments unanimously hail theimportance of education, but do notprovide adequate resources for qualityeducation. Thus, advocacy campaignsinevitably touch on the issue of educationfinancing.

● Most national coalitions prioritise theeducation needs of children and youngadults, but Sri Lanka’s campaign is areminder of the value of lifelong learning.The great bulk of the budget goes intothe formal education system, with just aminuscule share going to non-formaleducation programmes that cover adult

literacy. Thus, governments failed toadhere to their official pronouncementsof a Lifelong Learning framework foreducation as they neglected adultliteracy, one of the EFA goals.

● The national coalitions’ advocacyexperiences also exemplify the oftencontentious relationship betweengovernments and NGOs. Althoughgovernments are graduallyacknowledging the participation ofNGOs and CSOs in development, theyare more comfortable with NGOs inservice delivery roles and less receptive toNGOs or CSOs in advocacy roles.Education campaigners face manychallenges in pushing for theirparticipation in policy development.

Likewise, the national coalitions employedsimilar strategies and activities:● Providing evidence for advocacy . As a

former representative to the PhilippineCongress noted, good research isessential in lobbying with legislators.1 8 3

The education coalitions’ experiencesreinforced the need to continually updateor expand the scope of their evidence.The need for evidence was the impetusfor the RWS Education Watch project(EdWatch). Through EdWatch,education coalitions in Bangladesh,Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal,Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, thePhilippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,and Thailand were able to generate newdata and analysis to support theirrespective advocacy campaigns. Nationalcoalitions also provided evidence byquoting government data, which offic i a l scould not refute, and by presenting out-of-school youth, formerly bondedchildren, and illiterate mothers asphysical evidence of deep-seatedproblems in education.

● Mass mobilisations . Another formerMember of Parliament in India declared,“If the demand for quality education canbe generated, then the system willc o m p l y. ”1 8 4 Education coalitions utilisedmass mobilisations as a common meansof expressing their demands and puttingpressure on government to take action.


These mobilisations generated mediacoverage, which amplified their messageand further added to the pressure.

● Lobbying with Parliament/Congressand other significant players ing o v e r n m e n t, both at national and locallevels. National coalitions were awarethat decisions and policies are oftenmade by key officials, and they sought toprovide information and convincingarguments to influence these leaders’positions.

● Deploying education stakeholders inboth mass mobilisations and lobbying .National coalitions’ activities includedchildren, out-of-school youth, illiteratewomen, and other learners who had themost stake in the government policiesthey sought to influence. These were alsoconstituents who wanted to holdaccountable their representatives togovernment. Lobbying requiredpreparations such as consultations,b r i e fings, and workshops which had theadded benefit of building the capacity oflearners and campaigners.

● Developing and using allies ingovernment bodies such asCongress/Parliament, Joint TechnicalWorking Groups, and other policy-making fora. Allies helped nationalcoalitions to understand the policydevelopment process and maximise theopenings better. Allies also spoke onbehalf of the national coalitions insidegovernment circles and helped recruitmore advocates among their peers.

● Meeting policy makers and highgovernment officials in regional andglobal platforms , and then continuingthe lobbying with them at country level.


185 http://indiacurrentaffairs.org/186 Rama Kant Rai, “The

Justiciability of Right to Free andCompulsory Education Act 009in India,” National Coalition forEducation, undated

187 Laura Grant, “The SecondFreedom Struggle” TransnationalAdvocacy for EFA Case Study:National Coalition for EducationIndia. Thesis paper submitted inpartial fulfilment of MScInternational DevelopmentStudies, Universiteit vanAmsterdam, 16 February 2010,page 16

188 10th Joint Review Mission of theSarva Shiksha Abhiyan,Government of India, 20-31 July2009, Aide Memoire, page 12

189 http://www.economywatch.com/indianeconomy/poverty-in-india.html

190 Laura Grant, page 38

Education in India has come a long way. In1951, soon after the country’sindependence, only 18.33% of the peoplewere literate. By 2001, when the lastnational census was undertaken, literacy hadrisen to 64.84%.

But, India has still a long way to go.Many inequalities persist. The literacy rate,for example, is 75.26% for males in contrastto 53.76% for females,1 8 5 and 79.9% inurban areas in contrast to 58.7% in ruralareas. For education campaigners, one of thebiggest issues is that millions of children arenot in school because they are being made towork. The 2001 Census registered 12.66million child workers, an increase over thefigure ten years before. There is also theissue of the so-called ‘nowhere children’ –not in school but not at work either, whonumber 72 million.1 8 6

There is no precise figure for childrenwho drop out without completing primaryschool, as different surveys cite differentstatistics. The 2001 Census reported thedropout rate in primary classes at 31.5%.1 8 7

Another government study puts the figure at2.7 million every year.1 8 8 Many issuesconspire to keep children away from school.With 37% of the population living belowthe poverty line as of 2010,1 8 8 children areoften put to work to contribute to familyincome as bonded labour outside the home,unpaid labour in farms and familylivelihoods, or especially in the case of girls,to assume responsibilities at home while theparents work. Human trafficking, includingthat of children, is a chronic problem.Muslims, scheduled castes, and scheduledtribes have traditionally had less access toeducation, a pattern that persists today. Thestanding of women in society also affectsgirls’ access to education. Figuresconsistently show girls lagging behind inliteracy, school attendance, and completion.

The Indian government has sought toredress the problems in various ways, e.g.,providing incentives to scheduled castes andtribes, minorities, and girls, and providingmidday meals, uniforms, and school suppliesto reduce the financial burden on families.Nevertheless, millions of children are stilldeprived of education.

The National Coalition forEducation (NCE) and theSecond Freedom Struggle toB reak the Chains of Illiteracy

NCE’s mission is “to restore the fundamentalright of every child without exception toreceive free and quality education up to theage of 18 on the basis on equal opportunity,without discrimination on the basis on gender,class, ethnicity or religion, in an environmentof love and care and with appropriate facilitiesconducive to joyful learning”. Its membershipis a virtual powerhouse of Indian socialmovements, including:1 9 0

● Bachpan Bachao Andolan (BBA or Savethe Children Movement), a network ofmore than 760 organisations and 80,000social activists working on child rights;

● All India Primary Teachers Federation, a union of 1.3 million primary teachers;

● All India Federation of TeachersOrganisation, a union of 1.2 millionteachers;

● All India Secondary Teachers Federation, a union of 0.85 million secondary teachers;

● All India Association for Christian HigherEducation, a network of principals andteachers from 300 colleges and 20,000schools, and

● World Vision India, an NGO foundationworking for child rights, education, anddevelopment in 6,000 communitiesacross India.

Case Study: National Coalition for Education (NCE)I n d i a – campaigning for the Right toEducation Law


NCE is an offshoot of joint activities byactivists. Since the 1990s, they had workedtogether to push government to pass aConstitutional amendment on free andcompulsory education as a fundamental rightof children until the age of 18. They believedthis would be a decisive weapon not just topromote education but also to protect childrenagainst exploitation, including bonded labour.Within Parliament, allies established aParliamentary Forum on Education in 1999 tolobby for education reforms. Outside, in thestreets, NCE member organisations and theirsupporters launched demonstrations to claimtheir right to education, which culminated ina Shiksha Yatra (Education March) in 2001covering 15,000 kilometres over 20 states.

Finally, in 2002, Article 21A, the 86thAmendment of the Constitution wasapproved: “The State shall provide free andcompulsory education to all children of theage of 6 to 14 years in such manner as theState may, by law, determine.” This was asignificant victory, but only the first of manysteps in India’s elaborate bureaucracy andlegislative processes. Parliament still had topass a law to enforce children’s right toeducation. NCE threw all its energies behindwhat they dubbed “The Second FreedomStruggle to Break the Chains of Illiteracy”.

In 2004, the United Progressive Alliance(UPA) was elected into power and promised topass a law on the right to free and compulsoryeducation, as required by the Constitution.Draft bills were consequently introduced inParliament in 2005, 2007, and 2008, but failedto muster the necessary votes. Nor did the billshave the full support of NCE and its memberorganisations who opposed several provisions.For one, NCE wanted the scope of the billexpanded to guarantee education for childrenfrom 0-18 years old, rather than just 6-14.More demonstrations, lobbying, and dialogueswith government officials took place. But by thetime the UPA government reached the end ofits term in 2009, a right to education (RTE)bill had still not been passed in Parliament.

When general elections were called inApril-May 2009, NCE pulled out all thestops to ensure the elected MPs would consist of those who supported their cause. It launched a campaign with the followingcomponents:

Pledge letter signed by individual candidates .NCE and its member organisations in 12 statespersuaded candidates for parliament to sign apledge letter stating they would supportlegislation assuring free, compulsory, andquality education for children aged 0-18.Campaigners were often accompanied bychildren from child-friendly villages or childrenwho had been rescued from bonded labour,and therefore spoke with particular passionabout the need for education to be madecompulsory so that children go to school andnot to work. “We will declare a list of child-friendly (bal mitra) candidates who sign thepledge letters in favour of child rights." Thecatch: "The candidates who will oppose it andnot sign the pledge letter will be blacklisted andopposed by the mass campaign. ”1 9 1

Appeal for inclusion of children’s educationright in party manifesto . Likewise, all majorpolitical parties were enjoined to adoptNCE’s policy positions in their partyplatform. In addition, NCE examined theplatforms of all political parties andmonitored their policy pronouncements oneducation. It also gave ammunition toopposition parties by reminding them offailed UPA promises, such as 6% of GDPexpenditure on education.

In the end 80% of those who had signedthe pledge were elected into office,192 and theParliamentary Forum on Education gained 61 new members.193 In addition, four partiesresponded positively by either insertingNCE’s demands into their manifesto oragreeing to work for the right to education.

Media campaign . NCE organised pressconferences, sent out press releases, andpersonally spoke to contacts in media topersuade them to report on NCE’s campaign.It also told media which candidates hadsigned the pledge and which refused to do so– stories that media eagerly grabbed.

Lobbying Parliament . NCE did not let up thepressure. It sent congratulatory letters to allnewly elected Members of Parliament (MPs),reminding them yet again about the pendingbill on the right to education, and enclosed adetailed critique of the bill, urging them torectify these weaknesses. When the 15th

191 NCE Press Release, no title nordate, page 3

192 Laura Grant, page 42193 Interview with Ravi Prakash

Verma, 12 August 2010


194 NCE websitehttp://nceindia.org/220210.php

195 Email correspondence withAnjela Taneja, 26 and 30 August2010

196 http://southasia.oneworld.net/todaysheadlines/indian-court-opens-education-for-874-children


Parliament convened, NCE campaignersknocked on the doors of parliamentarians inDelhi and legislative assembly members at thestate level. NCE also continued its effectivestrategy of feeding questions toparliamentarian allies so they could be raisedduring official sessions. As a result, 95 MPsand more than 100 state legislative assemblymembers raised education-related questionsin their respective houses, spurring morediscussion and awareness. NCE alsoorganised roundtable discussions to briefparliamentarians and legislative assemblymembers who were less familiar with theeducation issues.

In August 2009, the Lok Sabha ( L o w e rHouse of Parliament) passed the Act, andshortly afterwards it received the assent of IndiaPresident Pratibha Singh Patil. The celebrationswere sweet but short: to be enforced, the acthad to be notified, i.e. government needed to seta date by which the Act takes effect and thepeople are held accountable. Intense lobbyingresumed once more.

Mass mobilisations . In February 2010, NCEmobilised 5,000 activists including teachersand children to demonstrate in frontParliament and demand action from thePresident and Prime Minister. NCE alsomobilised children in a week-long campaignwhere they knocked on the doors of MPs’houses. At least16 MPs signed the pledgeletter and promised to raise the issue inParliament.194 Similar activities wereorganised outside Delhi.

It took eight months from the time the Actpassed before the wheels finally moved. OnApril 1st, 2010, The Right of Children toFree and Compulsory Education Act of 2009was notified for implementation in all statesand union territories of India.

Outcomes of the campaign

NCE does not claim sole credit for passage ofthe right to education law. But havingcampaigned relentlessly since 2002 at boththe national and state level, some of the creditis certainly due to NCE. Anjela Taneja,Education Programme Officer for ActionAid,said NCE’s presence in the capital was criticalin influencing Delhi-based policy makers anddonor agencies. “While there were a numberof voices demanding a Right to EducationAct in the beginning of the process, there hasbeen something of an advocacy fatigue on thepart of many coalitions. Consequently, therehas been little actual coalition-based work atthe end of the process. My personalimpression is that NCE played a significantrole at this point filling a vacuum created by alot of larger networks that had effectivelyimploded or took a more radical (and in myopinion unrealistic – in the sense of beyondtheir capacity to realistically deliver based ontheir strength) stand. NCE took a morebalanced middle ground position.”195

NCE identifies three major outcomes oftheir campaign:

F i r s t, a guarantee that children will be providededucation, and a tool – even a ‘weapon’ – tocompel children to be sent to school instead ofto work. Already, children are starting to benefitby gaining access to schools. A landmarkruling by the Delhi High Court declared that874 children who were previously deniedaccess to education be admitted to schools.Most children came from disadvantagedsectors, and 350 of them were disabled.196

S e c o n d, greater awareness of education rightsand issues. This is evident, for example, in thegreater attention to education and childrens’stories in media and in the increased numberquestions on education and longer timediscussing these issues in parliament. TheParliamentary Forum for Education whoseestablishment NCE had helped facilitate, hasbeen cited as both an outcome of the campaignas well as critical factor for the campaign’ss u c c e s s .1 9 7 The Forum’s existence ensures thateducation issues will always be highlighted inParliament.


Third, greater budgetary allocation foreducation. NCE has pushed government toconvert its rhetoric into reality by actuallyproviding the resources needed to makequality education accessible. It contributed topressurising the government to agree (at leastin principle) to expenditure on educationamounting to 6% of GDP. Actualexpenditure has increased, though not at thescale promised: the actual figures are 3.2% ofGDP in 2009 and 4.32% in 2010. Theeducation budget for 2010 has also increasedby 14.5% from the 2009 level.198

Having spent so much time campaigning forthe right to education law, NCE itself hasbeen transformed by the experience: ● Within the coalition , more members

and partners, improved capabilities inplanning and implementation, betteradvocacy skills, a clearer role about theirrole as a coalition

● Among coalition members like the AllIndia Primary Teachers Federation,increased attention to child-focusedadvocacy, rather than just working topromote teachers’ interests.

The campaign highs and lows

Factors that supported success● Evidence-based advocacy . Research,

NCE agreed, is the basic ingredient forsuccessful advocacy. NCE’s evidence camein the form of the Education Watchresearch and briefing papers for MPs.NCE did its own research, but it alsoquoted from official reports, e.g. on earlymarriage, child trafficking, childrenaffected by disasters, etc, which thegovernment could not refute. Onoccasion, NCE would also show physicalevidence, for example by presentingchildren who had been rescued frombondage during media conferences, or byscreening a video on other rescuedchildren. Research continues to be apriority. Data gathered from participatoryresearch covering 10 states in early 2010will be used for future advocacy.

● Mass mobilisations . “If the demand forquality education can be generated, then

the system will comply.”199 Thisobservation comes from someone who hasan intimate knowledge of howgovernment works: Ravi Prakash Verma,a former three-term MP and President ofNCE. Mass mobilisations serve severalpurposes: ● A show of force to remind

government, particularly MPs, of thescale of organisations behind thedemands – and the size of NCE’sconstituency is particularly impressive

● A magnet for media attention, whichboth adds to pressure on governmentand amplifies NCE’s message to thegeneral public

● An opportunity to directly bring theissues to people in the streets

● Direct lobbying with MPs and statelegislators . NCE organised countless face-to-face meetings to lobby for educationlegislation and financing. Delegationscame to meetings prepared not just withevidence but also with practical details ofwhat legislators could do. NCE maderepeat calls and follow up visits, almostalways accompanied by children who,with prior briefing, became effective,assertive campaigners.

● Parliamentary Forum and critical allies .The Parliamentary Forum is also cited asan NCE achievement. “Without the NCEthere would have been no space to createa dialogue amongst legislatures andparliamentarians about the educationalissues India is facing and how to go aboutchange.”200

● Astute messaging. “Our messages togovernment and legislators were: a) this isgood for your political agenda, and b)education is a good investment for thefuture.” NCE had monitored politicalparties’ platforms and public statementsof parliamentarians, which it quoted backto them. “We would say ‘we’re not askingfor anything new, this is what you said inyour platform.’ It’s more effective toconvince them it was their idea all along,instead of making them feel we wereselling something new.”201

● Organisational cohesion . “Campaigningis a matter of energising everyone.” Thatstarts with NCE’s board members who,

198 Interviews with Rama Kant Rai,16 August 2010 and SandeepMishra, 17 August 2010

199 Interview with Ravi PrakashVerma, 12 August 2010

200 Laura Grant, page 74201 Interview with Rama Kant Rai,

16 August 2010


202 Interview with Sandeep Mishraand Umesh Kumar Gupta, 13 August 2010


although busy with their ownorganisations’ tasks, were unanimouslyactive in the campaign. Likewise, memberfederations and network partners atdistrict level contributed much to thecampaign. NCE also said workingtogether on long campaigns contributed toits internal cohesion.

P roblems encountered andlessons learn e d

● Volume of MPs/legislators vs. limitedt i m e. There are more than 740 MPs in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) and LokSobha. For lobbying to create results,NCE tried to meet MPs not just once, but 3-4 times a year.2 0 2 The workloadrequired by lobbying was heavy, even for a coalition with a deep bench ofmembers. One of the most frequentlycited lessons is the need for morelobbying with MPs not just in Delhi butalso when they are in their respectivestates – they spend more time there, andit would be easier to arrange meetingswith local constituents. The challenge,however, is to build the capacity ofdistrict-level NCE members, partners, and supporters to undertake these.

● Expanding NCE’s reach . Laura Grantwrote, “Right now the NCE’s presence inthe south is by association only throughmember organisations, so the NCE isvirtually unknown in the south. This alsolimits their strategies to the level ofadvocacy, with little or no localmobilisation.”203 She summarised thefollowing lessons learned that haveinfluenced NCE strategy:● The importance of advocacy at all

levels of government; ● The importance of getting Members of

Parliament informed and involved (as apoint of entry into the government);

● Taking advantage of the judiciary andSupreme Courts (to make thegovernment accountable);

● The impact of moral leverage and massmobilisation (following Gandhi’sexample) to make the governmentliable for its promises and obligations;

● The importance of grassroots activityto garner a strong base for evidence-based advocacy.

Continuing challenges

There is consensus that the Act represents asignificant gain for Education for All. In thesame breath, there is agreement that the Actis imperfect and retains many provisionswhich NCE had previously opposed as wellas loopholes that undermine education accessand quality.

In particular, NCE is frustrated that theAct’s scope continues to cover only childrenaged 6-14 years, such that pre-school andsecondary education are not included. NCE isalso worried that under the 65%-35% cost-sharing agreement between central and stategovernments, states which are poor and havelimited resources, or whose localadministrations lack commitment toeducation, will not match the fundingrequired. Other misgivings concern theestablishment of School ManagementCommittees which provide a bigger role forcivil society participation but could also bevulnerable to manipulation or politicisation.Public-Private Partnership, promoted by theAct, is viewed as a move towards furtherprivatisation of education.

Meantime, model rules (state law)defining how the Act will be implemented atthe state level are required to be framed andapproved before July 2011. By August 2010,only four of the 28 states had drafted theirmodel rules. And that, for NCE, is both achallenge as well as an opportunity. “The Actstates the minimum, but not the maximum,therefore some states can do more", saidNCE convenor Rama Kant Rai. Naturally,NCE will be campaigning for the ‘maximum.’

What happens next?

NCE will continue its campaign on the Rightto Education law – for greater publicawareness so that children can claim theirrights, for the law’s implementation so thataccess to education can be broadened, formodel rules to be drafted immediately at state


level, and for some sections to be amended toaddress loopholes. NCE leaders have beenholding meetings with member organisationsand partners in the different states to step upactions there. NCE will also sustain itsadvocacy for government to increasefinancing to levels adequate for qualityeducation.

Almost 10 years ago, NCE mobilised itsforces for a Shiksha Yatra (Education March)which helped push government to introducethe vital Constitutional amendmentguaranteeing education as a fundamentalright. NCE plans to retrace its steps. InNovember 2010, another Shiksha Yatramarch/motorcade will cover 70,000kilometres, with the following objectives: a) To collect evidence of the situation ofchildren’s education, e.g., violations of theRight to Education law and examples of goodpractices in education, and b) To campaignfor changes in the RTE law by lobbying withstate/district officials and communities in 10states to draft model rules and guidelines thatare in line with NCE’s advocacy.

R e flections on the Real Wo r l dStrategies (RWS) pro g r a m m e

NCE is one of the first partners of the RWSprogramme in the Asia-Pacific region. Itscampaign to pass the Right to Education lawreceived financial support from RWS. NCEcounts ASPBAE, which facilitated RWSimplementation in the region, as one its mostmajor partners – not just in this particularcampaign, but also in building capacity.

NCE convenor Rama Kant Rai said, “Weare thankful to ASPBAE for training, events,materials, and exchanges with othercountries. Because of the opportunity to meetcounterparts from other countries, we starteddoing introspection on our work. That gaveus more confidence, especially in extendingour work to more than 13 states.”204

Rama credits ASPBAE and RWS for itsengagement in education financing. "Ineducation financing, ASPBAE gave us a very,very powerful tool for advocacy and planninghow to move ahead. After attending atraining on official development assistance(ODA) and budget tracking, NCE did three

training-workshops at national and statelevels on the same topic. These generated newunderstanding among members on ODA andeducation financing. It made us look at a newangle in advocacy. Now we have becomemore detailed in how much governmentshould allocate, how much governmentshould spend, and pressure on government toensure timely release of funds." Publicationof the ODA and budget tracking bookletswas also supported by RWS.

Rama also expressed appreciation forNCE’s exposure to advocacy on a regionallevel, for example in the December 2009South Asia Education Ministers Meeting.ASPBAE convened the national coalitions oneducation in the region who drafted a set ofrecommendations to submit to the ministers.As a result of intense lobbying by RWSrepresentatives, the ministers’ DhakaDeclaration on Education for All encouragesmember countries to spend 6% of GDP oneducation and supports the role of CSOs.“We saw how this forum can make bindingcommitments on member countries.”

RWS has contributed to NCE’s plans forlong-lasting advocacy by building its capacity toundertake this; in turn, NCE has built that of itsmembers and partners. NCE wants to dobetter. Umesh Kumar Gupta, NCE’s NationalAdvocacy Coordinator, asked, “How can weinnovate in the campaign, especially incommunity-based strategies or in usinginformation technology? Our currentapproaches may be effective, but we want tocontinue to grow and develop. Maybe this issomething that could be considered by RWS.”2 0 5

204 Interviews with Rama Kant Rai,16 and 17 August 2010

205 Interview with Umesh KumarGupta, 13 August 2010


206 Interview with HPN Lakshman,23 August 2010

207 EFA Global Monitoring Report,Reaching the Marginalized,UNESCO and Oxford UniversityPress, 2010

208 MDGs Country Report 2005 –Sri Lanka, quoted inhttp://www.mdg.lk/inpages/thegoals/goal2_primary_education.shtml

209 Student Drop-Out Rate in EstateSchools Alarming, Daily Mirror,23 August 2010, page A4

210 Education for All Mid-DecadeAssessment Report Sri Lanka,pages 10-11 and interview with HPN Lakshman, 23 August 2010

211 Interview with K.V. Karunaratne,19 August 2010

212 Interview with ChandanaBandara, 16 September 2010

At first glance, Sri Lanka appears to have madeenviable progress in education. Education hasbeen considered a basic right since 1943.Government provides free education at theprimary, secondary, and tertiary levels,which, since the 1980s includes free textbooks,uniform material, midday meals, and subsidisedbus tickets. In 1997, education for children age 5-14 was made mandatory and enforcedthrough the School Attendance and SchoolSupervision Committees down to the lowestgovernment level.206 As a result, figures foryouth and adult literacy and enrolment inprimary school in Sri Lanka are consistentlyamong the highest in the South Asia region.2 0 7

But many challenges remain, thegovernment admits. These include lack ofschool infrastructure and qualified teachers,disparities in educational standards betweenrural and urban children (with only 37% ofrural children mastering local language skillsand a mere 38% having numeracy skills), anda recent drop in the completion rate forprimary school.208 A study by TransparencyInternational on dropout rates also shows asignificant gap: 1.4% overall in contrast to8.4% in plantation schools. Poverty and lackof parental support were cited as the primaryreasons for dropping out.209

One bright spot is the increase in femaleparticipation in education. Today, girls are evenmore likely than boys to finish primary school.But that has not always been true. Many yearsago, when primary education was not yetmandatory, large numbers of girls – who todayare mothers – were unable to go to school orwere forced to drop out early, thus resultingin de-learning or reverting to illiteracy.

The result is social exclusion. The womenhave less access to information because theycannot read newspapers or notices incommunity bulletin boards, such as those aboutdengue prevention. They have difficulty movingabout as they cannot read bus signs. As

mothers, they cannot read letters their childrenbring home from their teachers, much less helpthem with homework. They also have lessaccess to services such as loans. Improving adultliteracy is one of the six Education for All (EFA)goals, and it urgently needs more attention.

Responsibility for adult education (bothfunctional literacy and vocational training) fallsunder the Non-Formal and Special EducationBranch of the Ministry of Education. Thedirector, Mr H.P.N. Lakshman, admitted hisagency’s reach, scope, and effectiveness areconstrained by their limited budget. “Sri Lankais not alone in this”, he said. At a South Asiaconference he attended, all countriescomplained of meagre funds for non-formaleducation. It is an “attitude problem. Mostpeople don’t get attention on this project.”2 1 0

The impact of funding constraints may be glimpsed in vocational training.Many learners have expressed interest incomputers and information technology, butvocational centres have limited facilities andinstead offer training on making traditionalcrafts. But the market for crafts is small, andlearners have difficulty selling products theylearned to produce in vocational training. Azonal education officer admitted thatlivelihood skills do not necessarily translateinto higher income.211

Thus, critics complain there is no coherentadult education policy, no programme thatmakes a substantial impact on the affectedpopulation.212

Case Study: Coalition for EducationalDevelopment (CED), Sri Lanka –campaigning for mothers’ education


The Coalition for EducationalDevelopment and the Campaignfor Mothers’ Education

The Coalition for Educational Development(CED) was established in 2004 and formallyregistered as a legal organisation in 2006. Itsmission is “To promote and advocate theinvolvement of civil society organisations(CSO) from community level to national levelin the formulation and implementation ofnational policy of quality education for alland to support achieving innovativeeducational programmes at all levels toensure quality and equal opportunities.”

CED has 61 member organisations fromall nine provinces of the country. As arelatively young coalition, CED has onlyrecently started flexing its muscles to donational level advocacy. Most of its keymember organisations were focused onimproving education at provincial and lowerlevels, whether through direct serviceprovision or local level advocacy. CED hassought to address issues such as schoolenrolment and dropouts. Education financingis another major concern, and the subject ofCED research. An executive summary of theresearch findings were published, entitledBudget Process and Budget Tracking inFormal School Education in Sri Lanka.213

This has also been the subject of severalworkshops and fora among members.

Many CED member organisations,particularly those based in communities, hadbeen working with women/mothers for manyyears and in varying degrees. As early as2007, CED had already thought aboutnational-level advocacy on mothers’education for empowerment. There wereother reasons that spurred CED’s interest inthe issue. Mothers played a critical role indecisions on their children’s education. Ifmothers were educated, CED reasoned out,then they would be more supportive of theirown children’s schooling and help arrest thedropout rate.

In 2008, the CED Executive Committeerecommended holding a national conventionwhere mothers themselves would articulatethe need for a coherent and effective adulteducation policy in the country. CEDsubmitted a project proposal to ASPBAE,

which had earlier funded, through RWS, thepublication of the executive summary ofCED’s research on budget tracking ineducation. ASPBAE agreed.214

CED’s plan was to hold a one-dayconvention in December 2008 of motherswho were either functionally illiterate or whohad very few years of education – their way ofdemonstrating that adult illiteracy exists on as i g n i ficant scale in the country. But CED alsowanted the process to be empowering andgive a voice to the mothers who had been keptin the shadows for so long.

General objectiveTo advocate to policy makers to effectnecessary changes in the existing nationaladult education policy so that it gives moreprominence to women and especiallymothers’ education.

S p e c i fic objectives● To mobilise women, especially mothers

from disadvantaged communities, to cometogether and build a broad nationalalliance to advocate for change in theadult education policy and a gendersensitive adult education policy.

● To build a common consensus that thereis a vacuum in the present adult educationpolicy by not recognising the importanceof improving educational standards ofwomen, especially mothers.

● To create a platform for women in theprovincial and national levels and raisetheir voices to draw policy makers’attention to the need for a gender sensitiveadult education policy.

Pre-campaign activities included:● September: Displaying banners that

proclaimed “Literacy is the key to healthand well being” in time for InternationalLiteracy Day

● October: Convening 34 CED memberorganisations from eight provinces to planthe convention (Armed conflict preventedCED members from the NorthernProvince from travelling to Colombo.)

● October-November: ● Holding village consultations and

drawing out the mothers who wereeither non-literate or had low

213 Research was funded by Savethe Children, and the executivesummary published with fundsby the RWS Education Watchproject.

214 Listening to the Voice of theMothers, CED report to ASPBAEon the Mothers’ educationCampaign, 2008, page 10


215 Ibid216 Mothers’ education in Selected

Four Districts (Project proposal),CED, no date

217 Interview with M.A.P.Munasinghe, who drafted theresearch report, 23 August 2010

218 Capacity Building for Advocacyon Neglected Goals of EFA byDeveloping a District level Frontfor Mothers’ Basic Education(research report, June 2010)

educational attainment to understandthe links between illiteracy and otherproblems in their lives

● Facilitating dialogues between thecommunity women and the educationextension staff / higher-level zonaleducation officers

● Seeking the mothers’ feedback on theplanned national convention

The response was overwhelming. Motherswere very enthusiastic about a projectinvolving them. Some were understandablynervous about publicly admitting theirilliteracy, but majority acknowledged theimportance of such a convention and werevery keen to participate.

Finally 13 December 2008 came and themothers gathered in the capital, Colombo.From the start, CED was determined theconvention should be as wide and inclusive aspossible, thus participants came from eight ofnine provinces and 18 of the 24 districts inthe country. The women represented allmajor ethnic groups: Sinhalese, Tamil, andMuslims. In all, 478 mothers were present,along with 75 men from the samecommunities. Their participation wasfacilitated by 39 CED member organisationswho brought them to Colombo. Guests frominternational NGOs, multilateraldevelopment agencies like UNICEF, and CEDmember organisations brought the totalnumber of participants to approximately 600.Government was represented by officials ofthe Ministry of Education, including thedeputy director for Non-Formal Educationand the director of the National Institute ofEducation, and provincial education officials,including the Secretary of Education at theCentral Province. The convention was alsoreported in mass media such as Tamilnewspapers and the National TelevisionNews Telecast.

That day marked a watershed in themothers’ lives. Not only did government andNGO leaders speak to them and about them,they too were accorded opportunities to talkabout their lives before a distinguishedgathering. Mothers also participated incultural presentations through songs anddances.215

CED member organisations continued to

raise awareness of the need for mothers’education and to lobby for this duringmeetings with government staff assigned tothe field and even with grassroots politicians.In their own livelihood training courses, theyintegrated literacy, numeracy, and leadershipskills.

In 2009 CED submitted another proposalto RWS-ASPBAE with the objective ofempowering women/mothers to achieve theirfull potential by educating them to becomeco-equal members of society and productivemembers of every available field of work.

Using their own very limited funds, someCED members also started to compile adatabase of mothers with little or noeducation in four provinces: WesternProvince, Southern Province, North-westernProvince, and North-central Province.216 Inthese provinces, CED mobilised 19 partnerorganisations whose staff underwent a one-day research orientation before proceeding tointerview mothers in the villages as well ascollect data from divisional secretaries.

The research report was completed inJune 2010.217 In these provinces, researchersidentified 831 women: 696 of whom wereilliterate, and 135 with education up toGrade 6. In general, these mothers came fromlow-income, marginalised communities. Somehad children who were disabled or who werenot in school or had dropped out of school,and were thus illiterate. Other mothers werecurrently in jail or had recently been releasedfrom jail.218

Research findings were shared with theadult education authorities in the respectiveprovinces and officials of the NationalEducation Commission. In closing, theresearch listed several recommendations suchas income-generating activities coupled withliteracy training, establishment of AdultEducation Centres, multi-level advocacy forprovision of government programmes onmothers’ education, establishment of amothers’ education fund, etc.

According to a CED board member whopresented the research findings to provincialauthorities, some government officials werestunned at the report and asked: do we reallyhave illiterates in the 21st century? Incommunity meetings to discuss the research,some mothers cried after doing a roleplay/short


skit depicting their problems. “They said, ‘Allour lives we had to face challenges. In thisactivity we gain strength.’ The mothers arebrave, but they don’t always realise it.”219


Three major outcomes emerged from CED’s campaign:

● Greater awareness of illiteracy and loweducational attainment of many mothers,and the consequences on theirempowerment and on their children’seducation. Before CED embarked on thiscampaign, much had been made of SriLanka’s impressive statistics in educationand literacy, and perhaps there was evensmugness about these records. By shiftingthe spotlight to illiterate mothers, CEDhas in effect reminded government and thepublic of persisting challenges before SriLanka can achieve Education for All. Thisawareness has been amplified at the locallevels through community meetings anddialogues with local officials, and at thenational level through discussions withgovernment officials and developmentorganisations. Much needed publicity wasalso generated through media coverage ofthe December 2008 mothers’ convention.Greater discussion within CED and theresulting awareness among its memberorganisations has produced morecommitment to address the issue. This isevident, for example, in the interest ofmembers to deepen the research in theNorth-Western Province, even withoutexternal funding. The study, still inprogress, aims to identify gaps in currentimplementation procedures of non-formaleducation divisions in the province forempowering women and to formulaterecommendations for raising theeducational level of mothers.

● Greater self-esteem for the mothers . Somemothers admitted to feeling ashamed oftheir illiteracy. Gradually, the attentiongiven them has reduced some of thestigma. By coming together for the firsttime, the mothers felt less isolated. By

being acknowledged by government,mothers move one step away fromexclusion. By having their aspirations foreducation recognised, the mothers becomemore determined to pursue their dreams.

● Improved capacity for CED and memberorganisations to engage in advocacy . “Anational level campaign is not enough, wehave to do local at the same time.”220 ForCED and its member organisations,advocacy is still a very new endeavour.NGOs and CBOs at ground level are morefamiliar with service delivery, and someare starting to organise mothers at thevillage level. They continued training andother forms of support for mothers, withadditional advocacy activities. Initialsuccess has been reported by memberorganisations in Kurunegala and Puttulamdistricts in obtaining funds (150,000 and50,000 rupees, respectively) from localgovernment offices for mothers’education.221

CED itself is a new organisation with limitedcapabilities. “Before, we thought advocacymeans demonstrating, like anti-governmentforces do”, a CED board member admitted.222

With this issue, CED found that was not so,and was forced to learn the ropes in lobbyingwith government officials and makingpersuasive presentations. Its ability to conveneup to 600 participants in the mothers’convention added to CED’s confidence andc r e d i b i l i t y .

The recently completed research alsoprovides CED with evidence to strengthen itsadvocacy.


Factors that supported success

CED credits the gains made through thecampaign to the mothers’ interest andcommitment to make themselves available formeetings and consultations. It also commendsCED member organisations for theircommitment to mothers’ education and fortheir willingness to step outside their comfortzone and engage in advocacy activities.

219 Interview with Daya Ariyawethi,21 August 2010

220 Interview with CharlesElamaldeniya, 20 August 2010

221 Ibid. 222 Interview with Chandana

Bandara, 16 September 2010


223 Interview with M.A.P.Munasinghe, 23 August 2010

224 Email correspondence withChandana Bandara, 16 September 2010

225 Email correspondence fromCharles Elamaldeniya, 7 September 2010

Challenges Encountered andLessons Learn e d

Some challenges encountered in the fieldrelated to practical issues like:● Difficulty in finding available time for

meeting with mothers who have bothwork and family obligations. One lessonlearned was to try to make meetings‘attractive’ by showing films or dramawhich communities appreciated.

● Difficulty in navigating the governmentbureaucracy, for example in arrangingmeetings with government officials. Someofficials are reluctant to meet NGOsunless prior clearance has given by higherlevel officials, but that can be even moredifficult to obtain. Despite this difficulty,CED has found it easier to reach localofficials rather than those at the nationallevel, which reinforces their interest inlocal level advocacy.

● Limited funds, for example fortransportation and meals, whichconstrained the number of mothers andcommunity representatives that CEDcould mobilise for the national conventionin 2008 or for more in-depth research in2009.

Other challenges concern CED’s capacity,such as skills in basic research, writing, andanalysis. In hindsight, the one-day researchorientation should have been expanded tomore in-depth training.223 Capacity buildingin advocacy and other aspects of programmeand organisational management should alsobe sustained.

The biggest challenge involves policymakers: how to get them to change theirpriorities and allocate more resources fornon-formal education, and mothers’ literacyin particular.

Given the chance to start the campaign allover again, CED would recommend twoactions: first, building district-level mothers’organisations that can serve as pressuregroups during advocacy campaigns, andsecond, participatory planning andimplementation with other educationstakeholders at the district, provincial, andnational levels to expand the constituency formothers’ education.

What happens next?

The campaign for mothers’ education will besustained by CED members working atgrassroots level.

At the national level, one venue foradvocacy pertains to the new Education Actwhich is currently under consideration in theParliament and will be voted on in early 2011.CED and other education stakeholders wantto see the law expand the reach of non-formaleducation. To this end, CED and otherstakeholders met in August 2010 and agreedto gather one million signatures to createpressure for a progressive education law.


Capacity building is what CED associates withRWS and ASPBAE. Like Cambodia’s NGOEducation Partnership (NEP), CED’s firstexposure to RWS capability-building was atthe Asia Regional Training on PopularCommunications for Education Advocates andCampaigners in Kuala Lumpur in September2006. Since then, CED members haveparticipated in other RWS capacity-buildingand advocacy training courses. As a result, CEDdrafted a national framework and identifiedpriority areas for advocacy, including thedevelopment of CSOs’ capacity for advocacyand education reform and development, whichis currently supported by RWS and the CSEF.

CED Director for Adult and InclusiveEducation Chandana Bandara added, “Due toRWS, CED developed its capacity in advocacy.We learned what is meant by advocacy, whereit can be applied, what it can change, and howto plan effective steps in a campaign.”224

CED Board Chairman CharlesElamaldeniya wrote, “The CED learnedabout advocacy from RWS. In so doing, RWShelps to bring the idea of Education for All areality. It would not have been successfulwithout funds and proper guidance fromRWS.”225 Charles also credited RWS as “theturning point in relation to making contactand links with regional and global networks”and for gaining “knowledgeable exposure viamaking participation at various regional andinternational forums and seminars”. This


includes CED’s participation in the UNESCOCollective Consultation of NGOs Conferenceheld in Dhaka in March 2010.226

In particular, RWS and ASPBAE haveprovided funding and mentoring support inCED’s first ever national advocacy campaignon mothers’ education in 2008. Getting theneeded State intervention/attention was oneof our achievements. We reached manygovernment bureaucrats who were leadingpersonalities in the local education fraternity,supported by raising awareness of the issue inresponsible policy circles. By calling attentionto this issue, CED also became known as apioneering organisation in discussions on anational education policy.

The lessons learned by CED memberorganisations in this project resulted in followup activities at the regional and local levels.They maintain an abiding interest in workingwith the regional non-formal educationauthorities to mitigate the issue in theirlocations. What we did in the past was justan initiation and what have to do in futurewould be of much more worth in making trueremedies for the issue. In particular, theadvocacy programme should be brought towar-affected regions and areas with ethnicminorities. The dropout rate in the Northprovince (affected by war) is reportedly morethan 60%. Civil society organisations mustadvocate with relevant parties to bring thosechildren back to schools, and so our futuremothers’ education programmes shouldexplore strategies for dealing with theresponsible government authorities.

CED members should be trained forpolicy advocacy. Therefore it’s better if wecan organise a policy advocacy programmefor CED members and other educationalorganisations and officers.227

226 Charles Elamaldeniya, in RWSQuestionnaire, no date

227 Charles Elamaldeniya, in RWSLetter to Raquel Castillo, 10 October 2010


228 Education Law, Kingdom ofCambodia, 2007

229 The Impact of Informal SchoolFees, ASPBAE and NEP, 2007,pages 12-17

230 Some informants for this casestudy say teachers fees areseldom solicited in rural areaswhere families simply cannotafford these.

231 Education Strategic Plan 2006-2010, page 10

Article 31 of the Cambodia’s Education Lawstates: “Every citizen has the right to accessqualitative education of at least nine years inpublic schools free of charge.”228 These nineyears cover six years primary school andthree years lower secondary school whichconstitute basic education in the country.

In reality, basic education comes at aprice. A 2007 study by the NGO EducationPartnership (NEP) exposed what it called‘informal school fees.’229 Examples include:● Daily costs, e.g. food consumed in school

and fee for parking bicycle:● Some teachers sell food items to

supplement their salaries. Children feelobliged to buy from teachers, fearingthat failure to do so would negativelyaffect their marks.

● The parking fee reportedly goes tosomeone who ensures the bikes’ safety,but some accounts say a share of thefee goes to the school administrator.

● School fees, e.g. teachers’ fee paid eitheron a daily or monthly basis,230 privatetutoring, and lesson handouts and exampapers:● Teachers charge fees to supplement

their salaries. Children are often tooembarrassed to go to class if they don’thave money.

● ‘Private tutoring’ is done by the sameteachers. Lessons are often part of thecurriculum rather than supplementary.These are often held in preparation for exams. Children who don’t attendprivate classes invariably do poorly on the exams and may have to repeatthe grade.

● Start up costs, e.g. school uniform (dailyuniform, sportswear, shoes), studymaterials (bag, notebooks, pens), andschool registration fees (registrationforms, photographs, study recordbooklets, fees for sports):● These are one time purchases at the

start of the school year, the largeamount of which might preventparents from sending children toschool.

● Miscellaneous fees, e.g. study and classsupplies, bike maintenance, gifts forteachers and ceremonies, water,electricity, and garbage disposal:● Gifts for teachers were not commonly

practiced in grades 1-6 in someprovinces. There were cases, however,where supplies intended for somelessons actually went to teachers, e.g.‘manual production’ classes becameopportunities for teachers to receiveitems purchased by students.

● Schools have a budget for maintenanceand repair, but funds are ofteninsufficient, thus students are asked tocontribute.

NEP was very concerned because 63% ofrespondents cited as their reason for quittingschool “Parent is poor and no ability to pay”.As such, informal school fees prevent Cambodiafrom achieving the Millennium DevelopmentGoal of universal primary education.

The government is fully aware that informalschool fees are being collected and has issuedseveral statements calling for their abolition.As early as 2002, for example, the Ministry ofEducation, Youth, and Sports (MoEYS) issueda Directive on Taking Measures to PreventAbnormalities in Primary Schools, which listedteachers’ fees and sale of food items amongthe ‘abnormalities.’ In 2005, MoEYS issuedDirection Statement Implemented Prakas No. 513 About the Abolishment of MoneyCollection from Students at Public Primaryand Secondary Schools. More recently, theEducation Strategic Plan 2006-2010 set a targetof abolishing informal payments in grades 1-9 nationwide by the end of 2008.231

Nevertheless, the practice remains aswidespread as ever.

Case Study: NGO Education Partnership (NEP),Cambodia – campaigning againsti n f o rmal school fees


NEP and the campaign to stopinformal school fees

NEP was organised in 2001 as a channel forNGOs to engage with government oneducation policy.232 Today, NEP has 85member NGOs, both local as well asinternational.

One of NEP’s biggest advocacies isstopping the collection of informal school fees.The issue is repeatedly raised by NEP memberNGOs, particularly those working at thegrassroots level, who witness the implicationswhen families withdraw children, especiallygirls, from school. Initially, NEP did researchin one province but needed broader and morein-depth studies to demonstrate the problemwas widespread. In 2007, funding supportcame from the RWS programme of GCE, inpartnership with ASPBAE. RWS was thenimplementing Education Watch, a regionalinitiative to equip education campaigners forevidence-based advocacy.

In December 2007, NEP launched theresearch findings in a big gathering. Althoughinvited, the MoEYS minister did not make anappearance; instead he sent a representative.NEP was disappointed but undeterred. Nowthey had the evidence to back up a sustainedcampaign.

The concept of ‘campaign’ has differentmeanings in different countries, prompted bytheir political realities. In Cambodia, forexample, mass mobilisations in the streets oroutside government offices would endangerpeople’s safety and freedom, without assuringthe results sought. Instead, NEP conductedlobbying activities in high level inter-agencybodies where it was a member. Theseincluded the Joint Technical Working Group(JTWG) composed of government ministriesand donors/development partners and theEducation Sub-sector Working Group(ESWG) composed of multilateral andbilateral agencies and NGOs engaged ineducation programmes. “In all meetings, inall these fora, we say the same thing: wedon’t blame you, but we need to address thisin order to expand access to education. Pleasestop the collection of informal school fees”,said In Samrithy, executive director of NEP.233

NEP’s Education Watch study wasdistributed during these meetings.

The research was also quoted by NEPrepresentatives and member organisations innumerous presentations, such as thegovernment’s Education Congress in 2009where Samrithy talked about informal schoolfees as a barrier to accessing qualityeducation. The Minister of Education

232 http://www.nepcambodia.org/pages.php?mainid=6&key3=history

233 Interview with In Samrithy, 30 July 2010.


234 Ibid.235 Teaching Matters: A Policy

Report on the Motivation andMorale of Teachers inCambodia, 2008, page 8

236 Interview with Kan Kall, 28 July 2010

237 Teaching Matters, page 25238 Interview with Chim Manavy,

29 July 2010239 Interview with Sorn Seng Hok,

29 July 2010

acknowledged Samrithy’s remarks andinstructed government delegates to takeaction on violators. Media, both local andoverseas, picked up the issue.

Another form of campaign was lobbyingwith groups with more clout, such asUNICEF and UNESCO, to use theiri n fluence with government. “We ask them to speak against the informal school feesbecause when they talk, we know thatgovernment will listen. ”2 3 4 Meanwhile, someNEP members campaigned against the fees atgrassroots level.

NEP knew it couldn’t merely oppose thefees, it also had to propose a sustainablesolution. Thus, NEP engaged in a parallelcampaign to raise teachers’ salaries andimprove their working conditions. Onceagain, NEP engaged in research to gatherevidence, by teaming up with VoluntaryService Overseas (VSO) in producingTeaching Matters: A Policy Report on theMotivation and Morale of Teachers inCambodia, published in 2008. The reportpainted a detailed, vivid, and poignantpicture of the daily lives of teachers who cited‘inadequate salary’ as their top cause fordissatisfaction. “Public school teachersperceive themselves to be underpaid,undersupported and working in under-resourced schools.”235 At the time of thestudy, they earned on average between U.S.$30-60 per month, depending onqualifications, years of experience, andnumber of shifts worked. In contrast, an NEPboard member estimated a city-based familywith two children needs US$200-250/monthjust to survive.236 The problem is compoundedby delayed releases. Following up salarieswould require teachers to go all the way tothe provincial education office, taking themaway from teaching assignments. “Teacherssee themselves as having no option but toseek other income generating activities; 93%of individual interviewees had second jobsand 99% of them said that a teacher’s salaryalone is not enough for them to live on.”237

As a consequence of low salaries, teachersresort to collecting informal school fees. NEPboard chairperson Chim Manavy asked, “If teachers are hungry, can they be justifiedin finding ways to make money? Does thesystem force teachers to become corrupt?”238

In closing, the research called ongovernment to increase the salaries ofteachers, school directors, and staff of theprovincial and district offices of education toa level appropriate to the cost of living andlinked to inflation.

To step up pressure on the government,VSO facilitated the visits in 2008 and 2009 oftwo British Members of Parliament whoraised the issue of teachers’ salaries duringtheir meetings with MoEYS.


NEP did not run a conventional campaignwith planned activities and a structuredtimeframe. Instead, it utilised all availableopportunities in meetings with government,development partners, and fellow NGOs toremind them that the practice continued inviolation of the law and could only be solvedby raising teachers’ salaries. For their part,development partners also lobbied withgovernment on the issue. Thus, credit for anysuccess belongs to all who participated in thecampaign. ● Greater awareness on teachers’ salaries

and challenging working conditions andon the impact of informal school fees . Ofall the outcomes, NEP agrees this is whatcan be most directly attributed to theirresearch and campaign efforts. Publicawareness has been raised, too, as a resultof media coverage. Even MoEYS gaveNEP credit for “helping the MoEYS ininformation dissemination.”239

● Issuance of Sub-decree No. 126 on Codeof Professional Conduct for Teachers ,which states, “Teachers shall not raise orcollect money informally or makebusinesses in the classroom. Teachersshall avoid doing business in thecompound of the educationalestablishments.” Unlike earlier directivesissued at the ministry level, the sub-decreeis signed by Prime Minister Hun Sen,signifying greater commitment fromg o v e r n m e n t .

● Government measures to ensure equalaccess to education services and studentretention. “To reduce parental costbarriers and retain students in schools,


efforts have been made such as increasingschool operational budget, eliminatingunofficial payments in schools, andproviding scholarships to poor students,in particular 17,667 girls per year ingrades 7 to 9.”240

● Increase in teachers’ salaries . In 2009,Prime Minister Hun Sen announced thatteachers’ salaries would be increased by20% every year, starting 2010. In January2010, Secretary of State for EducationNath Bunrouen announced that, effectiveimmediately, teachers’ salaries would nowstand at: Primary school teachers = US $50;Lower secondary school teachers = US $75;and Upper secondary school teachers = US $100. Teachers posted to remote areaswould receive an additional allowance asincentive.


Factors that supported success● NEP carried out two distinct but

overlapping campaigns: opposinginformal school fees and demonstratingtheir negative consequences on children’saccess to education, and proposing theincrease of teachers’ salaries as onemeans of stopping the practice. Bytaking two complementary tracks, NEPincreased the chances that its advocacywould yield results.

● As mentioned earlier, NEP was not alonein campaigning against informal schoolfees. The campaign was taken up bymany other organisations, acting singlyor in collaboration with NEP. And NEPdid not just have many allies, it hadpowerful allies such as UNICEF,UNESCO, the Asian Development Bank,and other bilateral donors. BecauseCambodia is heavily reliant on offic i a ldevelopment assistance, these agencieswield considerable influence overgovernment. “When they push, changecomes more quickly,” NEP said.2 4 1 AMoEYS official agrees, “D e v e l o p m e n tpartners help to speed up changep r o c e s s e s. ”2 4 2 Even UNICEF supportsNEP’s strategy of working through high-level bodies like the Joint Technical

Working Group. “Development partnersand NEP/NGOs having the same voicewill be more powerful and effective.”2 4 3

● NEP has actively worked at cultivatinggood relations with government. “We try to get ideas and feedback from MoEYS about our plans beforeimplementing these. We engage, ratherthan confront. Our message is always‘We’re not here to harm you.’” As a result, MoEYS is more willing to listen to NEP, for example, to itsresearch fin d i n g s .2 4 4

● NEP has also worked hard to build itscredibility as a coalition. “Duringspeeches we don’t say ‘On behalf ofN E P.’ We say ‘On behalf of the 85member organisations of NEP.’ Thatmakes a difference.”2 4 5 With more than100 NGOs working in education inCambodia, majority of whom are fie l d -based, coordination can be a problem.And that, UNESCO wrote, is where NEP serves a crucial role. “UNESCOand NEP have excellent cooperation inthe last couple of years, in advocacy and some pilot projects on the ground. It will be very meaningful to keep andstrengthen this cooperation.”2 4 6

● For NEP, perhaps the most effective wayof building credibility was by generatingevidence for advocacy through itsresearch papers. “Talk is not enough,but we have evidence.”2 4 7 This wasv e r i fied by development partners whoexpressed appreciation for NEP’sthorough research and documentation.Using quotes and personal stories alsoadded a more emotional and humandimension to the issues. Because thereport contained direct quotes from theteachers themselves, or school directorsand local education officials, theCambodian government was not in aposition to reject the report fin d i n g s .Research has been NEP’s distinctcontribution to a campaign supported bymany players.

● NEP acknowledges the vital role playedby RWS and VSO in providing muchneeded financial and technical supportthroughout the research and advocacya c t i v i t i e s .

240 National Strategy DevelopmentPlan Update 2009-2013, page 63

241 Interview with Ang Sopha andLeng Theavy, 30 July 2010

242 Interview with Sorn Seng Hok,29 July 2010

243 Email correspondence with ChieTakahashi, 12 August 2010

244 Interview with In Samrithy, 30 July 2010

245 Ibid.246 Email correspondence with Sun

Lei, 6 August 2010247 Interview with Ang Sopha and

Leng Theavy, 30 July 2010


248 Interview with Seng Hong, 30July 2010 This is equivalent toan approximate figure of 8 UScents to 17 US cents

249 Ibid250 Interview with Kan Kall,

28 July 2010251 Interview with Seng Hong,

30 July 2010252 Ibid

Challenges and lessons learn e d

● The most obvious challenge is that thepractice of collecting informal school feesis as widespread as ever. Government hasmissed its target of abolishing thepractice by 2008. The sub-decree, whiles i g n i ficant, has not eliminated theproblem, and there are doubts if it isseriously being enforced. Publicawareness of the sub-decree appears tobe low, and families have not directlyb e n e fitted from it. Teachers’ fees haveeven increased since the study was madein 2007. Then, the daily fee was 200-300riels; today it is between 500-700 riels.2 4 8

● Public awareness is not enough; NEPwants to see this translated intobehavioural change. “Parents may beaware that it’s wrong to pay informalschool fees, but they continue payinginstead of coming together and opposingthe practice.”249 This challenge mayindicate a role for field-based NEPmember organisations with localconstituencies.

● Despite the increase, teachers’ salariesremain inadequate. Cambodia’s resourceconstraints simply prevent governmentfrom giving more. One of the NEP boardmembers was present during a meetingwhen an Asian Development Banko f ficial offered to cover teachers’ salariesto the required level for two years. Notsurprisingly, the Cambodian governmentrefused, knowing they could not sustainthe salaries after the grant expired.2 5 0

● Although some in the NEP board suggesttackling the issue of governmentcorruption head on, because this is whatprevents government resources frombeing used for services like education,this view is not widely shared within thecoalition. NEP has always had to treadcarefully in relating with government,knowing that government’s ambivalentattitude toward NGOs could easily swingagainst them and negate any gains madein more quiet diplomacy. Anticipatinggovernment’s reactions and ensuring theydo not lose face is always paramount inthe campaign. “We have to phrase ouradvocacy (criticism) in a positive way so

that government will not be angry withu s . ”2 5 0

● Advocacy campaigns are central to NEP’swork, but they do not have full-time stafffor advocacy. In the past VSO volunteersadvised them on advocacy work. A three-year advocacy plan is currently beingdrawn up, and an experienced local staffmember dedicated to advocacy must berecruited to see this through.

● “NEP alone is not powerful enough, weneed the voices of local NGOs to say thesame thing”.2 5 2 NEP member organisationshave campaigned against informal schoolfees in varying degrees. These efforts haveto be stepped up and coordinated.

What happens next?

NEP is committed to continue campaigningfor teachers’ salaries to be increased andinformal school fees to be abolished. It willcontinue speaking on the issues during inter-agency meetings and coordinate withdevelopment partners to similarly lobby withgovernment. Other tentative plans include:● More aggressive media and public

information campaign about informalschool fees, the laws banning these, andthe consequences for violators

● Training and capacity building for NEPpartners so they can run their owncampaigns in their communities

● Gathering NEP partners and otherstakeholders to exchange experiences ontheir varying approaches to the problem



NEP formally joined RWS in 2007. For SengHong, NEP’s executive director at the time,the support of ASPBAE, which coordinatedRWS implementation in the region, came at acritical point when institutional funding froma donor agency would be ending soon. Hongcredits ASPBAE’s endorsement for eventuallyobtaining multi-year funding from Misereor,a German donor agency. ASPBAE alsointroduced NEP to Deutschen VolkshochschulVerbandes International, which todaysupports NEP’s programme on adult literacy.These funds enabled NEP to make long-termplans and expand its programmes.

RWS support went beyond finance. “They were actually interested in buildingour capacity,” Hong said – something NEPhad not experienced in their institutionaldonor. During periodic meetings, ASPBAEgave advice on their advocacy plan, updateson international campaigns like GlobalAction Week, and experiences of othernational coalitions in expanding membershipand working with media.

Through RWS, ASPBAE contributed tocapacity building of NEP members. Thisincluded a three-day training on monitoringand evaluation and seminars on theEducation Law. RWS funds enabled two NEPmember NGOs to conduct campaigns toincrease school enrolment.

ASPBAE also introduced NEP to othergroups engaged in education, such as Save the Children Sweden and EducationInternational.

NEP staff met other RWS partners ininternational conferences where they exchangedexperiences on effective campaigns. “Some oftheir ideas could not be applied to Cambodia” ,NEP research coordinator Ang Sopha admitted,“but they made me think hard about whatapproaches will work here. ”253 “Before RWS, allI knew was the Cambodian context. Afterjoining meetings organised by RWS, I learnedthat Education for All is a commitment ofgovernments all over the world, not only inCambodia. I also realised a lot of information isavailable here. During meetings we had to makepresentations which forced me to research and,in so doing, understand the issues better. ”2 5 4

253 Interview with Ang Sopha, 30 July 2010

254 Interview with Ang Sopha, 2 March 2010

255 Interview with In Samrithy, 2 March 2010

RWS also facilitated NEP’s participation inregional-level advocacy, for example in UNESCOA s i a - P a c i fic Regional Office conferences andworkshops. This included the Mid-DecadeAssessment processes where NEP met with itsMOEYS counterparts, including State Secretaryfor Education, Mr. Nath Bunrouen. Theseengagements were considered both as advocacyevents and capacity building opportunities inpolicy advocacy through the RWS.

For Samrithy, “I think Real WorldStrategies is about global links. We feel thatokay we are not alone, we have friends inother coalitions and countries who care aboutus and we care for them.”255


256 Mapping Out DisadvantagedGroups in Education: PhilippinesSummary Report. Philippines:ASPBAE and E-Net, 2007.

257 Ibid., page 3.258 http://pcij.org/stories/when-

classes-open-today-many-boys-wont-be-in-school/

259 http://www.e-netphil.org/amisvis.html

260 Figures provided by CarolinaGuerrero, BALS director, during2 August 2010 interview

261 E-Net, Education LegislativeAgenda for 15th Congress, no date

Poverty has forced many millions of Filipinochildren to drop out of primary and secondaryschool – either because they cannot afford themany school-related expenses or because theyhave to work to supplement their families’income. Many children quit school even beforethey reach functional literacy. Ironically, theirlow level of education reduces the children’schances of employment, or limits them to low-paying jobs.

In 2006, the Department of EducationBureau of Alternative Learning System (DepEdBALS) estimated that 1.84 million Filipinochildren of the 6-11 age group and 3.94million of the 12-15 age group were not ins c h o o l .2 5 6 Another study covering fourcommunities found that only 81.1% ofchildren aged 6-11 were attending elementaryschool, and only 55.8% of those aged 12-15were in high school. Sixty percent were behindtheir school levels by one or two years.2 5 7

Males comprise the majority of thedropouts. In high school, for example, thereare two boys who drop out for every girl whodoes. For every 100 boys who enter first year,only 57 earn a high school diploma,compared to 71 girls.258

For more than a decade, the Civil SocietyNetwork for Education Reforms, or E-NetPhilippines for short, has been campaigningfor alternative learning systems to reach theseout-of-school youth (OSY). Organised in2000, E-Net Philippines is on a mission “to expand and strengthen civil societyparticipation in reforming the Philippineeducation system and in developingalternative learning systems with specialconcern for marginalised, excluded, andvulnerable sectors.”259 Today, E-NetPhilippines counts 150 members andpartners. These include NGOs, community-based and people’s organisations, day carecentres, and teachers’ associations.

Because of the magnitude of dropouts andOSY in areas where they operate, many E-Net

member organisations are engaged in populareducation, adult education, and distancelearning, with a growing number involved inthe government’s Accreditation andEquivalency (A&E) programme for drop-outs.

At the local level, E-Net Philippinesmembers have lobbied with local governmentunits to invest in ALS, for example, byutilising special education funds for OSY. Asa result, some members have received localfunds for education of indigenous childrenand child labourers in sugar plantations.Other members have been accredited asservice providers to implement ALS in theircommunities.

At the national level, ALS advocacy isaddressed to both DepEd and Congress whooften blame drop-outs or their parents forleaving the formal education system andinsist they return to school. This argumentignores the poverty, armed conflict, naturaldisasters, overcrowded classrooms, orinaccessible schools in the countryside thatcaused students to drop out in the first place.The focus on formal education has meantthat BALS receives a pittance: an average ofjust 0.15% of the total DepEd budget in thelast ten years, and just 0.26% in 2009.260

BALS’s limited funds are not proportional tothe vast numbers of OSY it seeks to reach,nor are they adequate for quality services.

E-Net and the campaign toi n c rease the budget fora l t e rnative learning systems

Since 2005, E-Net and other civil societyorganisations have been part of a SocialWatch-Alternative Budget Initiative (ABI) thatlobbies with Congress to increase budgets fortheir particular advocacies. As head of ABI’seducation cluster, E-Net called on governmentto invest at least 20% of the national budgetand 6% of GNP in education.2 6 1

Case Study: E-Net Philippines – mobilising out-of-school youth to advocate for education fin a n c i n g


In 2009, E-Net Philippines decided toscale up its advocacy by mobilising OSYs toget Congress to allocate one billion pesos toALS. Around 25 youth volunteers wereidentified, the majority of them in their teens.In preparation for lobbying, the youthvolunteers attended training courses onadvocacy, campaign, and leadership skillsand on education financing. They werementored by the E-Net secretariat andmember organisations, did role plays onnegotiation, took the lead in that year’sGlobal Action Week activities on the themeof Youth and Adult Education and LifelongLearning, and learned painting and art skillsfor making campaign materials.

Highlights of the campaigni n c l u d e d :

● Mobilisation outside the DepEd office onthe first day of school in June 2009. In response to the mobilisation, BALSofficials invited the group’s representativesto come inside for a dialogue. E-NetPhilippines had hoped for such a dialogueand prepared the following messages:● DepEd must work for more

investments to enable ALS to reach outto more out-of-school children andyouth and to enable BALS to innovate

in adult education programmes ● Provide modules for use of ALS

learners ● Make available free trainings for ALS

facilitators from NGOs and people’sorganisations

● Create more venues for civil societygroups to inform ALS and othereducation policies

E-Net Philippines also informed BALS itwould bring the campaign for a bigger ALSbudget to Congress.

In turn, BALS agreed to: ● Involve E-Net Philippines in the ALS

Omnibus Guidelines formulation ● Look for more funds for printing the

modules ● Provide training to E-Net Philippines

members on ALS, free of charge. (Thisdid not actually materialise, althoughBALS Deputy Director Joble andSenior Staff Edna Golusino wereresource persons in E-Net-organisedtraining courses on ALS.)

● Extend other technical assistance to E-Net Philippines membersimplementing ALS

● Lobbying with Congress, which consistsof the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives.


262 Approximately US$11,389,521263 Approximately US$ 911,161

● Mobilisation of OSY and studentsduring the President’s State of theNation Address in July 2009, to stressthe need for a bigger ALS budget.

● Mobilisation of youth volunteersduring the DepEd budget hearing inSeptember 2009. Although onlylegislators are allowed to participate inCongressional discussions, the youthvolunteers were able to observelegislative procedures. An E-Net ally,Rep. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel readthe E-Net position paper, particularlyits call for a PhP 1-billion budget forALS. The paper was also used forinterpolations on the legislative floor.

● Lobbying for an ALS budget linked to livelihoods for OSY in armedconflict areas with Rep. RisaHontiveros-Baraquel and Rep. Teofisto Guingona III.

● Distribution of E-Net Philippinespolicy briefs to some offices in theHouse of Representatives and theSenate, from July to November 2009.

● Youth volunteers’ attendance duringSocial Watch presentation of theconsolidated alternative budgets ofcivil society organisations to theminority parties in Congress andduring Social Watch briefings forindividual members of theAppropriations Committee.

● Youth volunteers’ serenade outside abuilding where the BicameralCommittee of Congress was meeting tomake the final decisions on thenational budget, December 2009.

● School roving campaign. Youth volunteersvisited four universities and a high schoolwhere they set up booths, distributedinformation materials, and spoke beforestudents in their classrooms.

● Awareness-raising through the media.This includes:● Press conferences during Global Action

Week, launch of the Big Readcampaign which focused on youth andadults, and the DepEd forum onfinancing programs for OSY.

● Interviews by radio stations and

newspapers, and features in a popularTV programme

● Issuance of press releases, for example,on the June 1st mobilisation,September 24th hearing in Congress,and Senator Edgardo Angara’s promiseto raise the ALS budget by PhP 500-million

● Use of Facebook and e-mails topromote the campaign of youthvolunteers

● Although not a deliberate part of thecampaign, E-Net Philippines also ran aone-day orientation workshop formedia on Education for All and theneed to support ALS. The workshopwas supported by RWS.

Midway through the campaign, E-NetPhilippines and its members were set backwhen Typhoon Ketsana battered MetroManila and adjacent provinces. The E-Netoffice was flooded by almost two metres,destroying files and equipment, including twocomputers. Urban poor communities sufferedeven more damage, as floods and mudwashed out flimsy shanties. After that, itbecame difficult to mobilise community andyouth participation in the campaign, as theywere understandably more engrossed withsurviving the aftermath of the typhoon.

Later, the campaign tried to get back ontrack. E-Net Philippines was overjoyed whenEdgardo Angara, head of the SenateAppropriations Committee, assured them ofhis support for a PhP 500-million262 increasein the ALS budget. This was less than the PhP 1-billion they sought, but E-Net wasecstatic nevertheless.

At the end of the budgetary process,deliberations hinged on the BicameralCommittee which met behind closed doors.In the final version of the 2010 budget, BALSgot PhP 40-million263 more than the previousyear. It was less than what E-Net Philippineshad hoped for. Even so, E-Net believes thatgetting support for ALS from legislators whoinitially had no idea about the programmewas in itself a victory. The BicameralCommittee’s decision not to grant a moresubstantial budget increase poses a challengeto intensify awareness-raising on ALS inCongress.



● Increased capacity and commitment ofOSYs to campaign on education issuesaffecting them, and increased selfconfidence, in general, as attested by theE-Net Philippines secretariat and theurban poor organisations who have morefrequent contact with them.

● Increased capacity of E-Net Philippinesmember-organisations to understandprocesses in the DepEd and Congress,engage in advocacy, and appreciate the linkbetween policy change and their ownprogrammes. This is evidenced in initiativesof urban poor organisations whoparticipated in the campaign to later lobbywith their local government units forsupport in establishing an ALS programme,or to represent E-Net in subsequent DepEdworkshops and conferences.

● Greater recognition of E-Net Philippinesand its work from the Department ofEducation and other concerned agencies:● Public citation by BALS officials for E-

Net’s help in campaigning for thebudget increase

● Consistent invitations from the DepEdfor E-Net to represent civil societyorganisations in discussions concerningALS and even in judging nationaleducation contests

● Invitation to represent civil societyorganisations in a UNICEF-ledworking group that would mapchildren at risk of dropping out andinvestigate the inordinate dropout rateamong boys

● Greater awareness of individual membersof Congress of issues contributing to themassive dropout rate from school, theproblems affecting access to publiceducation, and the role of ALS inproviding education for OSY.

● Greater awareness of local governmentunits of the situations of the OSY in theirareas, what is ALS, and how can it beimplemented.

● Succinct policy briefs produced by E-NetPhilippines on the problems ofimpoverished out-of-school youth fromtheir perspective and the impact of ALSon their development.

The campaign also prompted changes withinE-Net Philippines:● Increased exchanges between and support

among E-Net members because of thecamaraderie they developed.

● Realisation that the youth sector shouldbe represented in the Board of Directorsto influence the policy agenda and actionsof the coalition.


Factors that supported success● Evidence . Allies in Congress emphasise

good research is essential in lobbying. E-Net Philippines’s research through the RWS-supported Education Watchprovided the compelling evidence theyused in the campaign. “Research onEducation for All deficits prepared theyouth spokespersons and other E-Netmembers to confidently talk aboutstatistical realities on the OSY.”264

● Organisational buy-in . The E-NetPhilippines board and members,particularly the urban poor organisations,gave full support to the campaign. Forexample, the urban poor organisationstook responsibility for identifying youthvolunteers, monitoring them in thecommunities, and mobilising them forcampaign activities. E-Net partners suchas Action for Economic Reforms,Education for Life Foundation, and SocialWatch were also critical in crafting thecampaign plan and strategies.

● Allies in Congress . E-Net Philippinesgained a foothold in Congress throughallies such as party-list groups whorepresent disadvantaged sectors, and eventhose from more traditional politicalparties who nevertheless adoptedprogressive positions on education. Theseallies helped facilitate the entry of youthvolunteers into Congress and presented E-Net’s policy briefs in their behalf.

● Youth volunteers’ commitment. E-NetPhilippines gives the biggest credit to theyouth volunteers who made themselvesavailable and spoke from the heart. Asone of the volunteers attested, thatcommitment stems from personal

264 Email correspondence, CeciliaSoriano, 4 August 2010


265 Interview with Jamaica Malapit,26 July 2010

experience and disappointment of leavingschool, and their desire for education.265

The youth leaders were excited abouttheir role as campaigners and constantlyasked what more could they do. Hearingdirectly from the youth volunteers made a difference to politicians who askedquestions afterwards. Even E-NetPhilippines itself learned more nuances of school dropout issues.

● Support from ASPBAE and RWS. E-NetPhilippines’s Education Watch reportdone with ASPBAE in 2007, andsupported by RWS, was a key resource forwriting policy briefs on the situations ofOSY in the country. On a wider scale,ASPBAE’s support via RWS expanded thecapability of E-Net Philippines in areassuch as research, analysis of EFA deficitsand building partnerships for EFA, andcampaigns that promote the interests ofthe marginalised groups.

Challenges and lessons learn e d

● For E-Net, Philippines the most strategicchallenge is changing the mindset in bothDepEd and Congress that the solution tothe problem of OSY lies in formaleducation. One approach could be toupdate research on the number of OSYsand show the long-term benefits ofinvesting in education programmes thataddress their difficult circumstances,empower them economically, and buildtheir confidence to participate in society.

● ALS is not unique in being underfunded.The social sector has suffered the brunt ofthe budget squeeze in the last five years,including declining per capita spending oneducation by government. The actualDepEd budget may have increased, but itsshare of the national budget went down.

● E-Net Philippines’ collaboration with therest of the CSOs for an alternative budgetrequires long-term and sustainedengagement. E-Net’s former Advocacyand Campaigns Associate, estimates that,to be effective, the campaign to increasethe ALS budget should have beenundertaken for at least 18 months.

● E-Net Philippines was hobbled by

resource constraints, particularly aftertheir long-time source of institutionalfunds changed their priorities in theregion and stopped core funding. By theend of 2009, E-Net secretariat staffingwas reduced to two, from the originalfour who already juggled multipleassignments. Although the board andmember-organisations were verysupportive, they were busy with theirown programmes and could not committo more of the hands-on, time-consumingwork that advocacy requires. Thisaffected the campaign, to some extent,e.g. the limited activities of the schoolroving campaign not producing theresults sought, and the inability to sustainsome aspects of the media campaign. E-Net activities to build the capability ofyouth volunteers were likewiseconstrained by funds.

● Personal circumstances prevented someOSYs from participating until the end ofthe campaign: some relocated to adifferent community, two got married inthe midst of the campaign, but the biggestdeterrent was their need to work or tofind work. Over time, the number ofOSYs mobilised dwindled. As a result, E-Net Philippines had to deal with newrepresentatives from member-organisations and further boost theconfidence and morale of the originalteam.

The lesson for E-Net Philippines is the needfor comprehensive and continuing capacity-building of a larger and new pool of youthvolunteers – in the knowledge that severalwill be unable to sustain their participation,but also in order to build a reliableconstituency of youth campaigners whocould be mobilised. Such capacity-buildingrequires a range of training courses,workshops, and mentoring, which in turnrequire resources. In light of the OSYs’challenging circumstances, E-Net deems itnecessary to convene an annual gathering ofyouth advocates, for example, among ALSlearners who stay in a programme for 6-10months until their A&E test. They can betapped as advocates for a year and possiblybeyond that, if they stay in the same


community or remain in contact with theircommunity organisation.

Indeed, if E-Net Philippines was to gothrough the campaign again, it suggestsorganising more one-on-one dialoguesbetween the youth volunteers and membersof Congress, and not just lobbying at thecommittee level. Another proposal is toencourage OSYs to develop a nationalorganisation to promote their issues.

What happens next?

For E-Net, the campaign to increase theALS budget did not end in 2009. Thecampaign started years before that, and itwill continue. “Budget advocacy is aninstitutional advocacy of E-Net andcontinues to be part of yearly and long-termeducation financing advocacy.”2 6 6 I nFebruary 2010, for example, the youthpursued the campaign by participating inthe People’s Voices for Education, whichpresented to electoral candidates aneducation platform which included anagenda for the OSY.

There is slightly more room for cautiousoptimism in the newly elected 15thCongress for 2010-2013. Some key alliesare now in the majority party, whichincreases E-Net’s chances of being heard,and new allies have been identified amongthe newly elected. Within DepEd, E-Netexpects to maximise opportunities foradvancing their advocacies in the teamcrafting the ALS Omnibus Guidelines.

At the local level, E-Net members whohave been trained in education fin a n c i n gexpect to continue lobbying with localgovernment units and local developmentcouncils for support to ALS.


E-Net Philippines’s campaign thatmobilised out-of-school youth to campaignfor education financing was supported bythe GCE in partnership with ASPBAEthrough the RWS initiative. ASPBAE andRWS have left a strong imprint on E-Net

Philippines’ capacity: from undertakingprimary research which in turn became apowerful tool for advocacy, to linking withother national coalitions for a regionaladvocacy platform on ODA and educationfinancing. Its national-level campaigns aswell as those of member organisations onthe ground have increased theireffectiveness and credibility with bothgovernment agencies and localc o m m u n i t i e s .

For E-Net National Coordinator CeciliaSoriano, “RWS for E-Net Philippinesmeans three things: information,transnational connections, and innovation.RWS provided us access to information,connections to powerful institutions andpeople in the education sector, and skills todo work better…”2 6 7

E-Net Philippines President Edicio de laTorre admitted, “It is very difficult to fin dvenues or even to have the capability tocome together and engage regional sub-regional formations.” RWS helped in thisregard. With RWS support, the nationalcoalitions of the Philippines, Indonesia, andCambodia initiated the Southeast AsiaEducation Network as a platform forengaging with ASEAN. “Like all nationalcoalitions, our primary focus tends to bework within our borders. Sub-regional,regional, and global work are secondaryand perhaps would not even be addressed,were it not for the additional resources,stimulus, and assistance from a programmelike Real World Strategies.”2 6 8

266 Interview with Cecilia Soriano267 Interview with Cecilia Soriano,

8 March 2010; Reflections onthe RWS from E-Net Philippines,Powerpoint presentation, 2 March 2010; and emailcorrespondence with CeciliaSoriano, 25 July 2010

268 Interview with Edicio de la Torre,2 March 2010


269 Email correspondence withAnjela Taneja, 30 August 2010

270 2007 Asia RWS Annual Report271 Interview with Aloysius

Matthews, 1 March 2010

Attribution will always be a ticklishquestion in advocacy campaigns wheremany forces are involved. All nationalcoalitions admit they cannot claim soleresponsibility for any successes; credit must be shared by all who collaborated toachieve the outcomes, including teachers’unions and even supporters withingovernment. “The plurality of voices…adds to the overall pressure on theg o v e r n m e n t . ”2 6 9 The advocacy campaignsachieved the following:● Enactment of legislation or issuance of

government pronouncements thatadvance education rights . In India, thegovernment passed an Act to guaranteethe right to free and compulsoryeducation for children between the ages of six and 14. In Cambodia, the PrimeMinister issued a sub-decree on Code ofProfessional Conduct for Teachers thatreiterates the ban of the practice ofcollecting informal school fees. Althoughthe Act fell short of the NCE’s fulldemands and NEP reports the sub-decreeis lacking in enforcement, neverthelessthese are significant tools coalitions canuse to further promote their advocacies.

● Greater awareness of education rightsand issues . This is evidenced in greaterdiscussion within Congress/Parliament, in government meetings at national andlocal levels, and in media reports.

● Bigger budget for education . In thePhilippines and Sri Lanka, coalitionmembers started to gain access to fundsfrom local government units and agencies.In India, the government made a policycommitment to increase spending ineducation. In Cambodia, the governmentincreased teachers’ salaries.

● Improved capacities of children, out-of-school youth, mothers, the nationalcoalitions, and their members.Participation in the campaigns alsobenefitted those mobilised, for example bygaining skills in research, lobbying andadvocacy, organising, making effectivepresentations, and even analytical skills.

They also gained a deeper understandingof legislative and decision-makingprocesses

● Evidence for sustained advocacy .EdWatch had several results: it producedevidence that the national coalitions coulduse for continuing campaigns; it helpedthose involved, particularly the coalitionmembers, gain research and analyticalskills; and the publication of researchadded to the national coalitions’credibility. The value of EdWatch can beseen in how even governments used thesestudies to inform their EFA mid-termassessment report. In Indonesia, forexample, findings of the coalition’sEdWatch paper were included in thegovernment’s Millennium DevelopmentGoals report. In Papua New Guinea, thenational government announced itsinterest in expanding the survey to allprovinces, in collaboration with thenational coalition and ASPBAE.270

Education International, one of thefounding members of the GCE and amember of the RWS Steering Committee,also said it “benefited and utilised quite alot of these research materials for ouradvocacy and campaign work.”271

Nevertheless, many challenges remain. ● Legislation and government

pronouncements signify importantmilestones in the campaign rather than the destination itself. National coalitionsneed to continue campaigning for theimplementation, enforcement, and evenamendment of laws, or for actualallocation of budgets and release ofpromised funds.

● A lot more needs to be done to translateawareness of education issues intobehavioural change or action. InCambodia, impoverished communitiesand families resent paying informal school fees, but continue to do so. In the Philippines and Sri Lanka, localgovernment funding for non-formaleducation programmes benefitting school

Regional Summary : A s i a - P a c i fic Successes and remaining challenges


drop-outs is still relatively new and,therefore, more the exception rather than the rule.

● Most countries involved areunderdeveloped, their governmentshobbled by resource constraints. All havehuge internal disparities and significantnumbers of their population live inchronic poverty. Consequently, advocacyfor bigger spending on education (andother social services) will always be anuphill battle. The challenge is todemonstrate that government investmentin education pays high dividends in thelong term, and that failure to do so willhave harsh consequences.

● Education campaigns require long years ofsustained advocacy. Governments can beselective about the policy pronouncementsthey will actually implement. The RWSAsia 2008 report, for example, noted thatalthough policy recommendations byeducation coalitions were accepted inUNESCO regional workshops in Southand Southeast Asia, these still awaitconcrete policy action at country level.Armed conflict and natural disasters canalso wreak havoc on even carefullyplanned campaigns.

● The search for effective strategies issomething that has continually occupiededucation campaigners. An RWS reportnoted, “Given the slow progress onmeeting the EFA promise – with damagingconsequences especially for the poor andmarginalised – coalitions need to morecarefully strategise on a campaignapproach that is likely to bring about themore decisive ‘wins’ for EFA. A targeted,more focused approach – combininglobbying, engagement with sustainedpublic and political pressure may beconsidered. Greater coordination betweenlocal and national level advocacy effortsneed consideration. The use of the media,Global Action Week high profile events in a manner that more effectively servepolicy change strategies should becontemplated.”272 Identifying the rightstrategies is particularly crucial wheneducation campaigners confrontgovernments with sensitive issues or‘uncomfortable truths.’

● Other education coalitions tended to gofor advocacy activities they are alreadyfamiliar with, instead of trying approachesoutside their comfort zone. Or, if theywere to try something new, as E-NetPhilippines did with education financing,they did so under the umbrella of largercollaborations, rather than venturing offby themselves. This is especially true whenorganisations had limited funds: they wereless able to make long-term plans and lessopen to experimentation which mightentail risks.273 There are exceptions, ofcourse. RWS II marked new forms ofengagement for the national coalitionssuch as advocacy on education financingand advocacy addressed to sub-regionaland regional platforms.

● Education coalitions were hampered byother organisational constraints: few full-time staff who were inevitablyoverstretched, lack of a full-time staffdedicated to advocacy and campaigns,leadership changes (in 2008 alone, sevenof the ten national coalitions changedleaders), and member organisations wholikewise face resource constraints and arepreoccupied with delivering their ownprogrammes.

● Advocacy requires organisations to beinnovative, agile, and to think on theirfeet. In general, much needs to be done to increase organisational capacity ofnational coalitions. On the more positiveside, progress made by educationcoalitions is a testament to theirdetermination as well as the mentoringsupport provided by ASPBAE.

Along the way, important lessons werelearned.

Lessons learn e d

● As mentioned in the Cambodia case study,the political realities in each countrydictate which forms of campaign andadvocacy are possible. Educationcoalitions have to assess what thegovernment allows or is responsive to,what captures the public imagination, aswell as what the coalitions are capable of

272 2007 Asia RWS Annual Report,page 9

273 Interview with Raquel Castillo, 11 September 2010


274 Interview with Maria LourdesAlmazan Khan, 14 September 2010

275 2008 Asia RWS Annual Report,page 25

delivering within their limited resources.Thus, while there are benefits ofexchanging experiences amongsteducation coalitions, at the end of the dayeach one has to reflect on what works fortheir specific context, how can others’approaches be adapted rather thanadopted wholesale, or whether they cansimply be inspired by someone’s successbut carve out their own path.

● Whilst the campaigns were national inscope, the coalitions also realised the needfor local-level advocacy activities. Thisposes many challenges for coalitionmembers who may also be more adept inorganising or services delivery butunfamiliar with the advocacy processesand their requirements. Multi-leveladvocacy, while imperative, places greaterdemand on capacity- and constituency-building at the local level.

● Education financing – including budgettracking and official developmentassistance – is one area that educationcoalitions ventured into only recently, inlarge part due to RWS support, includingthe EdWatch studies. Coalition memberorganisations in India, the Philippines,and Sri Lanka have already benefittedfrom local advocacy by accessing localfunds for their education programmes.Education financing is attractive becausecampaigns can be applied at variouslevels, covering any education issue, andthe gains are tangible. For ASPBAESecretary General Maria Khan, the budgettracking process was a crucial startingpoint in demystifying the whole issue ofeducation financing. “Budget trackingsends the message that not only does theissue affect me but that I can dosomething about it.”274

● Education coalitions can explore moreadvocacy approaches, such as strategicengagements with media to rally publicopinion and generate awareness outsidethe direct stakeholders. However, steppingup media engagements will requireresources and organisational capacity.Advocacy consultants also attest to theeffectiveness of local government officials(legislators, policy makers, programmedirectors) learning from their peers over

hearing the same ideas from civil societyorganisations. Education coalitions andtheir members may want to considerpromoting best practices and organisingdialogues or cross visits with other localofficials who adopted thepolicy/programme they advocate and whocan attest to its value or demonstrate itssuccess. Again, this will require resourcesand organisational capacity.

● Yet another important learning for theRWS team is timing. Advocacy plans, itsaid, should be designed around nationalevents such as summits, national elections,and major EFA reviews. However, itcautioned, expectations on deliverablesneed to be scaled down during periods ofpolitical turmoil.275

● The experiences also underscored thelesson that advocacy is not a one-shot dealbut rather, a sustained and focusedprocess. India, Cambodia, and thePhilippines were able to score policy gainsbecause they built their campaigns onprevious years of effort. CED in Sri Lankawas just starting to inform and engagegovernment around mothers’ educationand literacy, non-formal education, andlifelong learning; consequently, it did notyet register policy gains in two years.

The impact of RWS in each country andnational coalition went beyond the educationcampaigns featured in the case studies.

● The primary objective of the RWSprogramme was to build the capacity ofcivil society organisations, and morespecifically the national educationcoalitions, to engage effectively withgovernment to achieve the goals ofEducation for All. The work of RWSshould be viewed in this frame, and notjust in terms of the outcomes of thecampaigns in the case studies. In Asia-Pacific, RWS was implemented throughASPBAE, which undertook capacitybuilding through in-country workshopsand training, mentoring the coalitionboard and secretariat, acting as asounding board for their ideas, providinginformation on sub-regional/regional/global education campaigns and


initiatives, organising sub-regional andregional workshops/training, facilitatingthe exchange of experiences with othercoalition networks, facilitating links todonor organisations and other educationplayers, and facilitating the coalitions’participation in regional and sub-regionalplatforms such as ASEAN, South AsiaMinisters of Education Forum, SEAMEO,and UNESCO.

● Gaining an international perspectivethrough RWS is consistently mentioned by the education coalitions. Theopportunities to participate in ASEANand UNESCO events enriched theirunderstanding of the dynamics betweeninternational organisations and nationalpolicies, e.g. national educationprogrammes in consonance with theirgovernments’ commitments tointernational or regional agreements.

Even during the first phase of RWS, it hadalways been emphasised that educationcoalitions would not simply have a one-on-one relationship with ASPBAE, but engagewith coalitions from other countries. As aresult, coalitions identified together commonissues that needed concerted action. Forexample, the coalitions in the Philippines,Indonesia, and Cambodia worked together to address privatisation issues in education.Listening to experiences of other coalitionsalso prodded them to reflect on strategies and approaches they could adapt to theirparticular context. Coalitions were buoyed by the spirit of solidarity among their peersand gained confidence in their work.

● Through RWS, national coalitions gainedaccess to regional platforms for educationadvocacy. In turn, coalitions have alsobeen acknowledged by sub-regional orregional bodies on EFA and invited toparticipate in regional conferences andfora, unlike in the past when they had togatecrash UNESCO EFA Coordinators’Meeting, for example.276

Spaces for regional policy advocacyneed to be created. “It’s often taken forgranted it will take place, but it actuallyrequires deliberate effort. We need toenlarge regional policy spaces, e.g.,

with UNESCO, Asian Development Bank,ASEAN, SAARC, and World Bank Asia,because in some instances processes anddecisions here can be highly decisive interms of policy directions at nationallevel.”277

● RWS also provided funding support foradvocacy campaigns such as thosedescribed in the case studies. As a fundingmechanism, RWS is unusual in that itallowed coalitions much leeway indetermining the subject of the campaigns,the forms these would take, and the kindof support requested from RWS.Coalitions appreciated this flexibility.

However, RWS fund releases were repeatedlydelayed. It was only in 2009, more thanhalfway through RWS II, that the full projectfunds were released within the calendar yearto which they were allocated. This causedcomplications for both region-wide andcountry-level plans. National coalitions wereforced to postpone some activities and thenspend the funds (implement activities) in amuch shorter timeframe. On the regionallevel, ASPBAE sometimes had to advancefunds to cover staff salaries and the firsttranche of RWS country allocation.278

A review of RWS in the Asia-South Pacific region would not be complete without discussing the role of the RWSSteering Committee, which is responsible for programmatic oversight and strategicplanning for RWS in the region. TheCommittee consists of representatives fromfour organisations: ASPBAE (Maria Khan),Education International (Aloysius Mathews),Global March Against Child Labour(Priyanka Ribhu), and the representative ofthe national coalitions for Asia in the GlobalCampaign for Education Board (Edicio de laTorre). As RWS project holder for Asia,ASPBAE acts as convenor of the Committee.

One of the Committee’s roles was tofacilitate better understanding and forgegreater cooperation among the keyconstituent groups of GCE in the region –NGOs, teachers’ unions, child rights activists– who, at the onset of RWS, had limitedexperience of working together. Committeemembers acknowledge there have beentensions in working together. Differences in

276 Interview with Raquel Castillo, 30March 2010

277 Interview with Maria LourdesAlmazan Khan, 14 September2010. SAARC is the South AsianAssociation for RegionalCooperation.

278 Interview with Raquel Castillo, 25 July 2010


279 Interview with Raquel Castillo, 30 March 2010

size, focus of work, and organisationalcharacter of unions and NGOs made formany differences in ways and styles ofworking which needed to be understood byeach group as they started interacting moreclosely. Over time, relations did improve and parties came to see the benefit of working together.

During the first phase of RWS, theprogramme covered Bangladesh, India,Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua NewGuinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, andVanuatu. In 2006, at the start of RWS II, the programme covered the same countries,except for Vanuatu. By 2010, RWS includedtwo more countries, Cambodia and SriLanka, and linked up with educationadvocacy networks in Thailand, Vietnam,Japan, and Australia through variousactivities.

Both ASPBAE and the national coalitionsare unanimous in hoping the RWSprogramme can be sustained. Without RWS,national coalitions might suddenly lose thespace where they “collectively strengthenedthemselves, collectively learned things, andcollectively advocated around specific prioritypolicy issues. The movement in Asia Pacificmight not be as vibrant.”279 Continuedadvocacy in regional platforms, which is still at a relatively new stage, is particularlyvulnerable without RWS support. The timing is also crucial, with only five years leftto go before the target dates for achievingEducation for All and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals in 2015. “The cohesiveforce that transforms national coalitions intoa movement should be kept.”

Part3

WorldStrategiest o w a rds Education for All

Real

130 PART 3

280 Maria Khan, Secretary Generalof ASPBAE.

The evidence collected for this report points clearly to RWS IIbeing a worthwhile experiencefor those who took part. Ithighlights a multitude ofachievements, some big, somesmall that overall lead to theconclusion that RWS II has beena success.

It is not possible, however, tosay without reservation thatevery aspect of the project hasbeen successful and there isscope for improvement at alllevels. RWS II has increasedadvocacy on a global scale (i.e.in multiple countries across theglobe), however, the pace ofchange is different in eachcountry and across regions –people and context factor in tocreate different scenarios withdifferent outcomes. Advocacy is, however, a process and theimpact of RWS II is ongoing.

Going forward

With less than five years remaining for theachievement of the EFA Goals agreed inDakar it is clear that the reality of EFA willfall far short of the promises made. Thatshould not create apathy among activists butinstead fuel a sense of urgency for more andbetter advocacy over the next few years.Projects such as RWS provide an opportunityfor national coalitions and their regionalpartners to demand the change that is needed.

“The Real World Strategyworks – you have got to tru s tand invest in people, let themrun with their commitments,their passions and help themmake informed judgements.”2 8 0

If the six EFA goals are to be met and theright to education fulfilled, ordinary women,men and even children need the politicalspaces created by projects such as RWS II to hold their governments to account.

GCE, the regional networks, the nationalcoalitions and their funders need to addressthe weaknesses identified by this research inorder that future projects of this kind aresustainable. Easily understandable decisionmaking processes and clear lines ofaccountability to the school communitybeneficiary groups they work with and for are essential. They need to consolidate theirsuccesses by focusing their work, building on strengths and embracing innovation.Projects such as RWS II are the foundationsfor building a strong, democratic globalmovement of activists, who together will beable to demand the change that is needed toachieve EFA.

C o n c l u s i o n

P A R T 3 131

1. Use the political spaces and calendar togood effect:● Use the run up to elections as a prime

time to get prospective parliamentarianson board and signed up to your agenda.

● Find out the key moment in governmentplanning process such as the budgetcycle and ensure lobbying is timeda c c o r d i n g l y .

● Understand that the change you aretrying to effect is not just change in theeducation system, it is also change inthe political system, and powermapping and political literacy are key toi n fluence the real decision makers.

● Engage with the donor community andget them onside.

● Engage ‘school community’b e n e ficiaries meaningfully in theadvocacy process.

2. Spend time planning and building capacity ● Develop robust advocacy strategies

with SMART objectives.● Build in participatory monitoring

and evaluation from the outset.● Focus on fewer issues for greater

impact. ● Conduct research to back advocacy

demands so you start from aninformed position.

● Use a mix and match of tools toinfluence key targets consistently over a defined period of time.

3 . Relationships with government● Working in partnership with Ministry

of Education and other governmentdepartments offers more opportunityto influence policy dialogue than aconfrontational stance.

● Coalitions should take the position of ‘critical friends’ of the governmentand avoided being co-opted. A balanceis needed between engaging toi n fluence policy and acting as anextended branch of the MoE.

● Engage with all arms of the State, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary.

● Solution-orientated engagement isimportant but there should be nonegotiation over the States’ obligationin regard to human rightsconventions.

4. Democratic structures and modus operandi● Secretariats must guard against acting

as ‘the coalition’, they must ensureproper consultation and representationmaximising specific expertise andcompetencies through the use of sub-groups and other working structures.

● De-centralised structures ensurerepresentation from different parts ofthe country and avoid concentrating all activity and/or decision making inone place.

● Membership must take responsibilityfor joining actions and not expect thesecretariat to do it all, especially inmany cases when there is no paidcoordinator.

● Systematise work to create aninstitutional memory, making reportsand accounts open for scrutiny toensure accountability andsustainability.

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

Recommendations for national coalitions

132 PART 3

1. Regional advocacy● Engagement in focused regional

advocacy must be maintained orincreased; regional networks are andmust be seen to be using regionalplatforms effectively.

● Where possible, joint actions withnational coalitions and/or the globalcentre should be sought.

● Build in institutional learning as partof monitoring and evaluation systems.

2. Capacity development● Developing capacity of the network

membership should remain a key areaof activity. This should focus on agradual increase of coalitions (i.e. acrossdifferent countries) with an emphasis oneffectiveness (i.e. the institution andadvocacy capacity of coalitions).

● Capacity development should prioritiseinstitutional strengthening with a strongfocus on management skills anddemocratic decision-making structures.

● Capacity development should gobeyond training of nationalcoordinators to ensure the spread ofknowledge and skills among a range ofcoalition members.

● Technical training is important butshould be timely and focused, and notover reliant on regional workshopswhich may not lead to trickle-down atthe country level.

3. ‘High level’ advocacy● Lobbying regional and/or

international conferences takesconsiderable pre-planning and it isimportant to consider that mostdecisions are made before the actualmeeting and plan lobbyinga c c o r d i n g l y .

● Regional and/or internationalconferences can be a valuable space tobuild relationship with governmentand donors and raise the visibility ofcoalitions, network or GCE as aglobal movement. Having one ormore clear messages across themovement is important.

4. Bridge the gap between development,human rights and humanitarian fields● Understand and make effective use of

human rights law and mechanisms.● Build relationships with key external

actors such as the Special Rapporteuron the Right to Education or thenational human rights ombudsperson.

● If feasible, consider the use of legalframeworks and the justiciability of theright to education.

● In situations of national disasterengage with the education cluster toensure a quick return to school.

Recommendations for the regional networks

Recommendations for the GCE global centre

1. Increase human and financial resourcesfor ‘movement building’ within clearparameters of operational space andagreed roles and responsibility.

2. Create explicit strand of work to linknational advocacy and internationaladvocacy.

3. Build a central database of materials forcollective learning (i.e. examples of goodpractice and innovative training materialssuch as workshop agendas withaccompanying materials, manuals etc).

4. Review strands of work/projects in terms ofstrategic fit with organisational objectivesand interrelationship of projects.

5. The GCE Board needs to developmechanisms for closer board involvementin all projects including small grants suchas RWS II and increase their visibleengagement with the work.

WorldStrategiest o w a rds Education for All

RealReference

material

134 REFERENCE MATERIAL

Amnesty International. 2005. Human rights for human dignity: A primer on economic, social andcultural rights. London: Amnesty International.

Bivens, F, Moriarty, K and Taylor P. 2009. ‘Transformative Education and its Potential for Changingthe Lives of Children in Disempowering Contexts’. IDS Bulletin January 2009. Brighton: IDS.

Brehm, V. 2001. NGOs and Partnership. INTRAC NGO Policy Briefing Paper No.4, April2001. Oxford: INTRAC.

Carreira, D and Rezende Pinto, JMR. 2007. Custo Aluno-Qualidade Inicial: rumo à educaçãopública de qualidade no Brasil. São Paulo: Campanha Nacional pelo Direito à Educação.

Claasen, M. 2009. Making the Budget Work for Education: Experiences, achievements andlessons from civil society budget work. London: Commonwealth Education Fund.

Coe J, and Mayne, R. 2008. Is Your Campaign Making a Difference? London: NCVO.

Collier, P et al. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Oxfordand Washington DC: Oxford University Press and World Bank.

Culey C, Martin A, and Lewer D. 2007.Global Campaign for Education: 2007 Mid-termReview. London: Firetail.

Freire, P. 1970. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Continuum Publishing Company.

Gaventa, J and Mayo, M. 2009. Spanning Citizenship Spaces Through Transnational Coalitions:The Case of the Global Campaign for Education. IDS Working Paper 327, Brighton: IDS.

Green, D. 2008. From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States CanChange the World. Oxford: Oxfam International.

GTZ. 2009. Getting the basics right: Contribution of Early Childhood Development toquality, equity and efficiency in education. Eschborn, Germany: Deutsche Gesellschaft fürTechnische Zusammenarbeit.

Institute of Development Studies 2010 ‘Annual Report’, University of Sussex, UK.

Hoop J, Grant L, Novelli M & Verger A. 2010. Social Movements and Education for All:Comparative Analysis of the Global Campaign for Education. Power point presentation given atWCCES, Istanbul, 15 June 2010. University of Amsterdam.

Hoop, J. 2009. Transnational Advocacy for Education for All: The Philippines’ Case.(Master’s Thesis). University of Amsterdam. Netherlands (available online at http://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/publications/).

IDS. 2010. Global Knowledge for Global Change: Annual Report 2010. Brighton: IDS.

O’Flynn, M. 2009.Tracking Progress in Advocacy: Why and How to Monitor and EvaluateAdvocacy Projects and Programmes. M&E Paper 4, Oxford: INTRAC.

O’Malley, B. 2010. Education Under Attack: A global study on targeted political and militaryviolence against education staff, students, teachers, union and government officials, aidworkers and institutions. Paris: UNESCO.

Oswald, K and Moriarty, K. 2009. Transforming Children’s Lives Through Innovation inQuality Education: Implications for Policy and Practice. Brighton: IDS.

RWS Final narrative report 2003-2005. (GCE Internal).

RWS II annual reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009. (GCE Internal).

SALIN Grant Application 2005 (GCE).

Smith, F et al. 2007. Networks for Change: Civil Society Networks Campaigning for Changein Southern Africa. Johannesburg: Umhlaba Development Services.

Tomas̆evski, K. 2006. The State of the Right to Education Worldwide Free or Fee: 2006 Global Report. Copenhagen.

Tomlinson, K and Macpherson, I. 2009. Driving the bus: The journey of national educationcoalitions. London: Commonwealth Education Fund.

UNESCO, UNICEF, The State of Qatar and Save the Children. 2010. The Central Role ofEducation in the Millennium Development Goals.

UNESCO. 2000. Dakar Framework for Action. Education for All: Meeting our CollectiveCommitments. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO. 2006. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2006: Literacy for Life. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO. 2007. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2007: Strong foundations: Early childhoodcare and education. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO. 2010. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2010. Reaching the marginalized. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO. 2009. Concept paper on the Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis onEducation. Paris: UNESCO.

REFERENCE MATERIAL 135

Case studies were the principal method usedin the documentation and assessment process,to allow an in-depth examination ofstrategies, achievements and lessons learnedin the implementation of RWS II. Given thetheory of change underpinning RWS II it wasconsidered appropriate that this type ofqualitative investigation of the project wasmost valuable. Twelve case studies (four fromeach region) were selected from a pool of 51possible coalitions. The case studies wereselected by GCE Secretariat and RegionalNetwork staff according to the followingcriteria: geographical representation, type ofintervention and issues addressed. Theprocess of this sampling for the specific casestudies including the identification of keyinformants (drawn from multiplestakeholders) and the size of the sample wasmade individually by each regional researcherwith guidance and input from the RWSreference group.

The research drew on primary andsecondary data, with fieldwork carried outbetween July and September 2010.Approximately 4-5 days were spent onprimary data collection in each country usinga mix of face-to-face interview, focus groupdiscussion. Telephone interviews and aquestionnaire survey were also conductedduring the same period. The research wasconducted by four independent researchers(see Appendix 2): two men and two womenfrom Africa, Latin America, Asia and Europerespectively. An additional fifth researcherwas hired for the Colombia case study inorder to prevent any perceived conflict ofinterest as the main regional researcher forLatin America had been directly involvedwith the Colombian Coalition during theimplementation of the RWS project.

Prior to the start of data collection amethodological framework for the projectwas developed by the lead researcher withinput from the regional researchers. Itoutlined standardised data collectionprocesses across the different locations to

allow for the global lessons to be drawn. Itincluded: (a) understanding of the coreobjectives of RWS II and the relevant casestudy. To this end, access was granted to theglobal and regional documentation on RWSincluding planning documents, annualreports, and copies of other relevantpublications on Dakar goals and the status ofthe Right to Education etc was consulted; (b)Agreement on basic field procedures, such assourcing of information, ethicalconsiderations etc; (c) Agreed researchquestions that could be adapted as requiredin situ dependant on the context and theinformant being interviewed; (d) guidance onthe presentation of data (outline, format forthe narrative).

Reference groups members managed theresearchers in their respective regions,providing copies of documentation andbackground information where and whenneeded. In addition to the main researchquestions outlined in the frameworkdocument, researchers developed specificresearch tools to fit the context.

Data Collection

Data collection for each case study and theoverall analysis of RWS II involved a range ofdata collection methods.1. Literature review: The literature review

included a review of relevant global,regional and local literature by eachresearcher with guidance from the RWSmanagement team and included: Internalpolicies/statements/reports/publications;relevant external literature on EFA;external literature on civil society activismetc

2. Field data collection (outcomes andperceived impact): Semi-structuredinterviews, focus group discussion,workshops and surveys with: (i)staff/activists; (ii) beneficiaries (iii) keygovernment local and national, donor

Appendix 1: Note on Methodology

136 REFERENCE MATERIAL

officials (iv) other civil societyorganisations (v) foundations (humanrights; education) and (vi) UN officials.Data collection tools (interview questions,focus group guide, email questionnaire,workshop agenda) were developed byindividual researchers based on the mainresearch questions agreed in themethodological framework.

3. Analysis of internal and external policies:Analysis of internal coalition policy andapproaches and how they change as resultof RWS II influence. Analysis of relevantgovernment policy and/or law, and how itchanged as result of RWS II supportedactivity. An examination of coalition’sinstitutional structures, plans and activity.Review of relevant education indicatorsi.e. % of budget to education, accessfigures, retention, drop out, numbersaccessing adult literacy programs etc.

L i m i t a t i o n s

The case studies used in this research fall intothe category of ‘Program Effect Case Studies’and as the name implies they are used todetermine the impact of particular programof work, in this case RWS in specificcontexts. The use of such case studies doespresent methodological concerns in regard togeneralising findings, especially whendrawing generalised conclusions andprinciples of good practice. In order toaddress some of these limitations the researchteam endeavoured to make data collectionsystematic across the case studies and totriangulate through the collection ofadditional data to help verify these findingsfrom the case studies. This included theexamination of external data, reports andrelevant literature, as well as consultation ofother external stakeholders.

The purposeful sampling used to selectjust 12 of a possible 51 case studies (in whichthe researches themselves were not involved)leaves the research vulnerable to anaccusation of ‘cherry-picking’ the best cases.It also limits the reliability of findings in thereport as more than 75% of RWS II has notbeen scrutinised.

Note on Methodology (continued)

REFERENCE MATERIAL 137

Kate Moriarty: Lead Researcher and report authorKate is an independent consultant working inthe area of international development andhuman rights. She is a specialist in the field ofeducation with policy and advocacy experienceon a range of education themes including:education quality, early childhood care andeducation, education in fragile states andemergencies and the financing of education.Kate has extensive experience in advocacy andhuman rights education gained over 15 yearsthrough work with international human rightsand development agencies such as AmnestyInternational and Save the Children. Kate has aBA in Sociology from the London School ofEconomics, and an MA in Latin AmericanDevelopment Studies. She is a qualified teacherwith specialism in special needs education andsociology.

Omar Ousman Jobe: Africa Regional Researcher and co-authorOmar is a Development Studies andManagement specialist. He is currently theHead of Programmes and the Policy and BudgetAnalyst of the Pro-Poor Advocacy Group (Pro-PAG) – a Gambian NGO, specialising in budgetwork (budget analysis, participatory budgeting,child-friendly budgeting, gender budgeting etc),social accountability and PRSP monitoring.He is also a part-time lecturer in Managementand Development studies at the University ofThe Gambia and works as an InternationalConsultant. Omar Jobe studied at the Universityof Pantheon-Sorbonne and the ConservatoireNational des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) and holdsa Post Master’s degree in Local Developmentand Territorial Dynamics in Third WorldCountries; an MPhil in DevelopmentEconomics; an MPhil in Geography andDevelopment Practice in Third World Countriesand a Master’s degree in Management Science.

Barbara R Fortunato: Asia Regional Researcher and co-authorBarbara is a freelance development worker

based in the Philippines. She is involved inresearch, writing, editing, training, andevaluation.

Ilich Leon Ortiz Wilches: Latin America Regional Researcher & co-authorIlich is an economist with Master’s studiesin Philosophy from the Colombian NationalUniversity and a Master’s in DevelopmentEconomics at Bordeaux University inFrance. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. inEconomics at GRETHA -CNRS laboratoryof Bordeaux. For more than a decade, Ilichhas worked with social organisations,NGOs, international cooperationorganisations and government agencies, onthe relationship between public policy,macroeconomics and social rights in LatinAmerica. He is a founding member of theSchool for Development, based in Colombia,an academic centre which seeks tostrengthen social movements and civilsociety advocacy through the academicresearch. His work has been closely involvedin the production of knowledge for policyand finance debate of education from ahuman rights perspective.

Yenny Carolina Ramirez: Colombia Researcher Yenny has a Master’s in Sociology from theNational University of Colombia(Universidad Nacional de Colombia). She is aMember of the School for Development and aresearcher with expertise on issues related torights and early childhood. Yenny hasworked as a coordinator in the constructionof a simulator of costs associated with theimplementation of the Rights of EarlyChildhood in Colombia. At the academiclevel, she has worked as a teacher at theNational University of Colombia in the areaof sociological theory and has publishedarticles on topics related to the concept ofindividualism in classical sociology. Her latestresearch work was regarding the developmentof subjectivity in neoliberal times.

Appendix 2: Biographical information on the re s e a rch team

138 REFERENCE MATERIALS

A s i a

1. Bangladesh: Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE)

2. Cambodia: NGO Education Partnership(NEP)

3. India: National Coalition for Education(NCE)

4. Indonesia: Education Network for Justicein Indonesia

5. Nepal: Campaign Coalition for Educationin Nepal (CCEN)

6. Pakistan: Pakistan Coalition forEducation (PCE)

7. Papua New Guinea: Papua New GuineaEducation Advocacy Network (PEAN)

8. Philippines: Civil Society Network forEducation Reforms (E-Net Philippines)

9. Solomon Islands: Coalition for Educationin Solomon Islands (COESI)

10. Sri Lanka: Coalition for EducationalDevelopment (CED)

11.Vietnam: National Education Coalition inVietnam (NECV)

Africa

1 2 . Angola: Rede de Educacao Para Todos1 3 . Benin: Coalition Béninoise des

Organisations pour l’EPT1 4 . Botswana: Botswana Coalition on Global

Campaign on Education1 5 .Burkina Faso: Cadre de Concertation

pour l’Education de Base CCEB1 6 . Burundi: Bafashebige1 7 . C a m e r o o n: Cameroon E F An e t w o r kC E F A N1 8 .Cape Verde: Rede Nacional da Campanha

de Educaçao Para Todos 1 9 . Central Africa Republic: Focal point

(Teachers Union)2 0 . Côte d’Ivoire: Focal Point SNEPPCI

(Teachers Union)2 1 . Djibouti: Forum des Associations pour le

Développement de l’Education2 2 . E t h i o p i a: Basic Education Association BEA2 3 . Ghana: Ghana National Education

Campaign Coalition GNECC2 4 . Guinea Bissau: Rede de Educacao Para

Todos –GB2 5 . Kenya: Elimu Yetu Coalition2 6 . Lesotho : Campaign for Education Forum2 7 . Liberia: Liberian Technical Committee on

EFA LETCOM2 8 . Malawi: Civil Society Coalition for

Quality Basic Education CSCQBE

Africa (continued)

2 9 . Mali: Coalition des Organisations de laSociété Civile pour l’Education Pour Tous(COSC- EPT)

3 0 . Mozambique: Movimento Para EducationPara Todos MEPT

3 1 . Niger: Coalition EPT du Niger3 2 . Nigeria: The Civil society action coalition

for EFA CSACEFA3 3 . Republique Democratique du Congo:

Coalition Nationale pour l’EPT3 4 . Senegal: Coalition des Organisations en

Synergie pour la Defense de l’EducationPublique COSYDEP

3 5 . Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone EFA network3 6 . Sudan: Sudanese Network for EFA3 7 . Swaziland : Swaziland Network

Campaign for Education For All3 8 . Tanzania: Tanzania Education Network

Mtandao wa Elimu TEN/MET3 9 . The Gambia: The Gambia EFA Net4 0 .Togo: Coalition Nationale Togolaise pour

l’Education Pour Tous CNT/EPT 4 1 . Uganda: Forum on Educational NGO’s in

Uganda FENU4 2 .Zambia: Zambia National Education

Coalition ZANEC

Latin America

4 3 . Argentina: Campaña Argentina por elDerecho a la Educación (CADE)

4 4 . Bolivia: Foro Educativo Boliviano (FEB)4 5 . Brazil: Campanha Brasileira pelo Direito à

Educação 4 6 . Central America: activities were developed

by CLADE, including work withColectivo de Educación para Todos yTodas of Guatemala as described in Part 2of this report

4 7 .Chile: Colectivo de Educación de Calidadpara Todos y Todas

4 8 . Colombia: Coalición Colombiana por elDerecho a la Educación

4 9 . Ecuador: Contrato Social por laEducación en el Ecuador

5 0 . Haiti: Reagrupación por la Educaciónpara Todos y Todas (REPT)

5 1 . Mexico: Incidencia Civil en la Educación(ICE)

5 2 . Peru: Campaña Peruana por el Derecho ala Educación (CPDE)

Appendix 3: Coalitions involved in the RWS project

ASPBAE Secretariat Office

Address: C/o MAAPL 9/F Eucharistic Congress Bldg 3 5 Convent St, Colaba, Mumbai – 400 039India

Telephone: +91 22 2202 1391/ 2281 6853 Website: www.aspbae.org

Global Campaign for Education

Postal address: PO Box 521733, Saxonwold, Johannesburg 2132, South Africa

Physical address: 26 Baker Street, Rosebank, Saxonwold,Johannesburg, South Africa

Telephone: +27 (0)11 447 4111Fax: +27 (0)11 447 4138Email: [email protected]: www.campaignforeducation.org

ANCEFA Regional Coordinator

Address: Amitié III, Villa 4566B BP 3007 Yoff Dakar, SENEGAL

Telephone: +221 33 824 2244 Fax: +221 33 824 1363 Email: [email protected] Website: www.ancefa.org

Campaña Latinoamericana por el Derecho a la Educación (CLADE)

Address: Rua Costa Carvalho 79 05429-130 São Paulo – Brasil

Telephone: (55-11) 3853-7900Email: [email protected] Website: www.campanaderechoeducacion.org

Real World Strategies - Global Campaign for...

Documents

Transcript of Real World Strategies - Global Campaign for...