Wittgenstein & HeideggerUTAS Philosophy Society

Reading GroupSemester 2, 2013

Isaac Foster

Sophie Jarman

Contact details

Reading Group Coordinators

Name | E-Mail | Phone | A little about us

Isaac Foster | iafoster@utas.edu.au | 0498 964 521

I’m a second-year undergraduate from the Northwest Coast. I’m reading Philosophy, Classics, Neuroscience and Zoology at UTAS. My main interests are in Philosophy of Mind, Language, denotation of vocabulary in Critical Theory, and the Social/Philosophical anthropology of human nature, integration, and creative production (toot your horn if you’re into structuralism and post-structuralism). Wittgenstein and Heidegger particularly interest me because of the existential implications of their approaches to epistemology and ontology, and for their relevance to Philosophy of Mind. More on that soon, I hope.

Sophie Jarman | sophie.nicole.jarman@gmail.com | 0457 120 886

Sophie Jarman is a second-year Classics major, with interests in postmodernism, hermeneutics and gender theory. Her primary love is her poetry and short prose. Her focus is on an intersectional reading of history and sexuality through Hegelian dialectics and Heideggerian thought. Of her tendencies as a reader and a writer: “The late Roman Republic is my great passion and influence. The life of Cicero is a constant influence on how I write; his meter, his inflections, his restlessness.”

Reading Course DescriptionThis reading group examines the work and legacy of two philosophers tied for the title of ‘most influential of the 20th century’: one, the German philosopher of ontology, language and metaphysics, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), who presided at the University of Marburg and Freiburg (following his mentor Edmund Husserl; 1859-1938) and as often, in his cabin in Todtnauberg, in the Black Forest of Southwestern Germany; the other, the ascetic Austrian-British philosopher of logic, mind and language, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who worked sometimes in Cambridge alongside Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), and elsewhere alone in Austrian trenches, in Ireland, or in a cabin in Skjolden, up the Lustrafjord branch of the Sognefjord in Eastern Norway. Both underwent two distinct ‘turnings’ in their career, yet it is a work from Heidegger’s first, Being and Time (1927) and Wittgenstein’s second, Philosophical Investigations (1953), which are generally held to be their best.

Other works may come during our reading, and throughout we’ll be directing you to debate and engagement with these philosophers across multiple media, while we help each other to reach an understanding of their works.

Content

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Date Readings Topic Venue (TBC) Date (If TBC)

10th August

6pm Sat.

‘Introduction’ (pp.1-66) B&T

‘Part I’, PI, § 1-20

The method of B&T (Hr) & The Augustinian picture of language (Wt)

16th August

9am, Friday

‘Division One’, Pt. I, II, B&T (pp. 67-90)

‘Part I’, PI, § 21-64

The phenomenology of dasein (Hr) & On Understanding: The Augustinian Picture pt. II, and critique of logical

analysis (44-66) (Wt)

24th August

6pm, Friday

‘Division One’, Pt. III, B&T (91-148)‘Part I’, PI, § 65-91

Worldhood (Hr) & The general form of propositions, language and rules

(Wt)

30th August

9am, Friday

‘Division One’, Pt. IV, B&T (149-168)

‘Part I’, PI, § 92-137

Being in the world with others (Hr) & Critique of ‘essentiality’ and ‘logical

fixicity’ of language (Wt)

7th Sept.

6pm, Sat.

‘Division One’, Pt. V, B&T (169-224)

‘Part I’, PI, § 138-184

More on Being and Thrownness (Hr) & Critique of ‘Understanding’ in

Philosophy of Mind

13th Sept.

9am, Sat.

‘Division One’, Pt. VI, B&T

(225-273)

‘Part I’, PI, § 185-242

Dasein, anxiety, care, and truth (Hr) & From Understanding to Rule-

following: Is there any standard for correctness? (Wt)

21st Sept.

6pm, Friday

‘Division Two’, Pt. I, B&T (274-311)

‘Part I’, PI, § 243-309

Dasein and death (Hr) & On Private Language (Wt)

27th Sept.

9am, Friday

‘Division Two’, Pt. II, B&T (312-348)

‘Part I’, PI, § 310-421

Authenticity (Hr) & Criteria vs. Symptoms: More on Private

Language (Wt)

5th October

6pm, Sat.

‘Division Two’, Pt. III, B&T (349-382)

‘Part I’, PI, § 422-570

Authenticity and Temporality (Hr) & Scattered thoughts on Philosophy of

Mind (Wt)

11th October

9am, Friday

‘Division Two’, Pt. IV, B&T (383-423)

‘Part I’, PI, § 571-693

Temporality & Dasein (Hr) & Scattered thoughts on Philosophy of Mind

(Wt)

19th October

6pm, Sat.

‘Division Two’, Pt. V, B&T (424-455)‘Part II’, PI, § I-IX

Dasein and History (Hr) & PI part 2: Unarranged thoughts on Mind, grammar and ascription (Wt)

25th October

9am, Friday

‘Division Two’, Pt. VI, B&T, (456-488)

‘Part II’, PI, § XI-XIV

Dasein, Time, and Hegel (Hr) & unarranged thoughts on Mind, grammar and ascription (Wt)

EXAM

PERIOD

Flexible

Book Readings

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Monday July 29th – Sunday August 4th

Time and day of meeting: NO MEETING – READING WEEK

‘Introduction’ (pp.1-66) B&T ‘Part I’, PI, § 1-20

On page one, Heidegger states that he will begin with a question of the meaning of the question of the meaning of being. Why?

"Every inquiry is a seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought" (24) In what was does this imply that "The meaning of Being must already be available in some way"? (25) What does he mean when he speaks of a "vague average understanding of Being" and why is it worth clarifying?

He adds that every question must also be guided by what it is that is asked about (25); which is the Being of entitites in this case, so we must investigate one specific entity –– the inquirer. Why?

What does Heidegger mean by "Historicality is a determining characterisation for Dasein in the very basis of its being" (42)?

What does Heidegger mean when he defines phenomenology as a way of letting "that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself" (58)? Why phenomenology? What is it?

Monday August 4th – Sunday August 11th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division One’, Pt. I, II, B&T (pp. 67-90)‘Part I’, PI, § 21-64

In section 43, what does Wittgenstein identify as the meaning of a word?

Which of the following is NOT an objection Wittgenstein raises against logical atomism? (A) It misuses the distinction between "simple" and "composite." (B) It fails to recognise the sharp difference between naming and describing. (C) The process of analysis can be interminable and is thus impractical. (D) Analysed propositions and words are not necessarily more helpful or clearer than their unanalysed counterparts.

What does Heidegger mean when he says that "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence" (42)? "Existence" will take on a special significance for Heidegger. Rocks don't "Exist" in the way he will speak of "Existence". They are only "present-at-hand". Only human beings, Dasein, "exists". Why is it that Dasein is "in each case mine?" (42). What does he mean when he speaks of authentic and inauthentic modes?

Entities "present-at-hand" in the world can be 'in' one another as a beetle can be 'in' a box. But Dasein is not 'in' the world in that way, says Heidegger. Which way, then?

Heidegger says that Dasein is 'in' the world only as a way of being concerned with it (83). What does this mean? How is our concern with things in the world a way of being in the world that is fundamentally different from the way a bug is 'in' a box? Does the phrase ‘to give a damn' ring a bell here?

How is our knowledge of the world a form of being in the world? Why does Heidegger believe our knowledge of the world is founded on a modification of our original concern with the world? Why does he claim "the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grapsed it..." ? (89)

Monday August 12 – Sunday August 18th

Time and day of meeting:

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‘Division One’, Pt. III, B&T (91-148)‘Part I’, PI, § 65-91

Which of the following is true of all games? (A) They are amusing. (B) They have a fixed set of rules. (C) They are played with a ball. (D) None of the above.

What does Wittgenstein mean by "family resemblance"? (A) All words with the same root share a similar meaning. (B) The different uses of a word share certain similarities, but have no defining characteristics. (C) There is a certain "genetic code" that gives words their meaning. (D) Words from the same linguistic families share many traits.

What does Heidegger mean by contrasting the world insofar as it is ready-to-hand from the world present-at-hand? How does he argue that the world is primordially there for us as ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand?

How does the world in which its readiness-to-hand ultimately refer to Dasein itself as "the sole authentic 'for-the-sake-of-which'"? (117) How does the structure of the world in its readiness-to-hand constitute the significance of the world? How without such a structure would the world be empty of meaning? What then is meaning?

How does Heidegger distinguish the spatiality of the world in its readiness-to-hand from a 'three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions which gets filled up with Things present-at-hand"? (136)

Monday August 19th – Sunday August 25th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division One’, Pt. IV, B&T (149-168)‘Part I’, PI, § 92-137

Wittgenstein interrupts his discussion of understanding at 155 to launch an extended discussion of reading. What significance does this latter concept have for the former investigation?

How does our concerned involvement with the world in its readiness-t-hand place me with other persons? How is our being-with-others based "upon what is a matter of common concern"? (159); How does one come to be oneself, to have an identity, in terms of one's involvement in the world in its readiness-to-hand?; How is this sense of who one is that one acquires through one's involvement in the world in its readiness-to-hand possess an anonymous character that permits Heidegger to describe it as "the they"?

Monday August 26th – Sunday September 1st

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division One’, Pt. V, B&T (169-224)‘Part I’, PI, § 138-184

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What is a grammatical investigation? What purpose does it serve for Wittgenstein? (151)

What is Heidegger getting at when he says that Dasein "is itself in every case its 'there'" and "is its disclosedness"?

How do our moods constitute a way "Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition"? (175); How do our moods disclose the world to us insofar as it matters to us? (177); How do moods disclose the way in which I find myself "thrown" into the world and this way disclose what Heidegger characterises as my "facticity"? How does fear illustrate Heidegger's analysis of moods as a way of being-in-the-world?

How do we gain a kind of understanding of our Being-in-the-world through our "potentiality-for-Being"? How does this sense of understanding constitute a disclosure of the world to me? How is our understanding in this sense a form of what Heidegger calls "projection"? How is my state of mind wrapped up with my understanding and vice-versa? In what way are they essentially interconnected?

How does the interpretation of something qua something constitute a "development of the understanding"? How is understanding, as Heidegger understands it, itself an interpretation of the world? How does the assertion of a statement or judgement depend on what he calls "circumspective interpretation"? How does our capacity to speak intelligibly of things, our capacity for language, depend on our understanding interpretation of the world?

What does Heidegger mean in speaking of "idle talk"? How is Dasein "as factical Being-in-the-world ... something from which it has already fallen away"? (220) How does my concerned absorption in the world constitute a falling away from myself as a unique existence?

Monday September 2nd – Sunday September 8th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division One’, Pt. VI, B&T

(225-273)

‘Part I’, PI, § 185-242

Which of the following verbs is used differently from the other three? (A) "Believe" in "I believe that fire will burn me." (B) "Meant" in "I meant you should write '1002' after '1000.'" (C) "Expecting" in "I've been expecting you all day." (D) "Thinking" in "I am thinking of a number between one and ten."

In what way does "anxiety", as Heidegger analyses it, bring us face to face with the "uncanniness" (234) of our existence and "individualises" (233) us?

How is Dasein "ahead-of-itself"?

Why does Heidegger characterise the Being of Dasein as "care" and what does he mean by this?

What does Heidegger mean when he claims "only as long as Dasein is... 'is there' Being? (255) Does this mean that things don't exist apart from our human involvement with things (a seemingly silly idea) or else what?

What does Heidegger mean when he claims that "Before Newton's laws were discovered they were not 'true' ; it does not follow that they were false ... Through Newton the laws became true ..."? (269) What is the relationship between Dasein and the possibility of 'truth'?

Monday September 9th – Sunday September 15th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division Two’, Pt. I, B&T (274-311)‘Part I’, PI, § 243-309

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What is a "private language"? (A) A code according to which only certain people can communicate. (B) The inner monologue in my head. (C) A language I invent that refers to my own inner sensations. (D) A language used by low-ranking soldiers.

What is the "beetle" in the "beetle in the box" analogy of Part I, section 293 supposed to represent? (A) An insect collection (B) Pain behaviour (C) A person's knowledge of other people's sensations (D) A person's own inner sensations

What are the problems that Heidegger sees in grasping Dasein "as a whole"?

Why does Heidegger believe that we do not authentically experience death in our experience of the death of the other person? Why does he claim that "death is in every case mine ..."? (284) Has this changed the way you feel about death? Or how you think about death?

In what way is death my "ownmost" possibility? What does Heidegger mean in discussing death as "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" (294)? How is my being-towards-death disclosed in anxiety?

"One of these days one will die too .. but right now it has nothing to do with us." (297)

How does this phrase capture our everyday being-towards-death as a way of recognising the fact of death while also denying it as one's ownmost possibility?

How does Heidegger distinguish the kind of certainty we have of death as an actual event that will befall us from the kind of certainty we have of death as a possibility that could strike us at any moment? How does our anticipation of death as our ownmost possibility make possible a form of authenticity for us in which "one becomes free FOR one's own death"? (308)

Monday September 16th – Sunday September 22nd

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division Two’, Pt. II, B&T (312-348)‘Part I’, PI, § 310-421

What is the "private language argument"? To what extent is it an argument? To what extent does it deal with language? To what extent does it deal with privacy? What are we to draw from this discussion?

What is the significance of Wittgenstein's use of criteria? What work does it do for him?

What does Wittgenstein say on the question of whether a machine might ever be able to think? (A) It is logically impossible. (B) We don't yet know how to apply the word "think" to a machine. (C) A machine that can calculate already knows how to think on some level. (D) Possibly, but it would take a great advance in our technology.

Which of these questions has no clear application? (A) "Are these books my books?" (B) "Is this foot my foot?" (C) "Is this body my body?" (D) "Is this sensation my sensation?"

How does Heidegger analyse the "voice of conscience" as a call to an authentic appropriation of our possibilities for Being?

What are the formal characteristics of our experience of guilt, for Heidegger?

In what way does Dasein find itself the 'basis of a nullity' and how does this entail that Dasein IS guilty in its very Being in a way which enables us to make sense how our experience of guilt is an experience

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of more than just wrong-doing and regret, but an experience of a constitutive dimension of human existence?

What is Heidegger getting at when he writes: "The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can NEVER get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis"? (330)

What does Heidegger mean by "resoluteness" and how does resoluteness answer the call of conscience to assume authentic responsibility for ourselves?

Monday September 23rd – Sunday September 29th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division Two’, Pt. III, B&T (349-382)‘Part I’, PI, § 422-570

What does Wittgenstein say about the statement, "I believe that fire will burn me"? (A) It is nonsense. (B) It does not state the kind of belief that can be called into question. (C) It is false. (D) It is a state of the mind that is implanted at an early age and remains with us continuously throughout our lives.

What is the "joy" that Heidegger speaks of as parallel with the anxiety of authenticity when he writes: "Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualised potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility." (358)?

Monday September 30th – Sunday October 6th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division Two’, Pt. IV, B&T (383-423)‘Part I’, PI, § 571-693

What determines that I am genuinely guessing the time and not just reciting empty words when I say, "I wonder what time it is"? (A) I have a mental picture of a clock. (B) There is a feeling of assurance or certainty with which I utter the words. (C) There is no difference between the two cases. (D) The surrounding circumstances provide the context for determining the difference.

In what way is "care", understood as the Being of Dasein, simply time itself as it is originally lived by Dasein as a matter of being present to the world in terms of its projection it itself into the future of its concerns on the basis of the situation in which it finds itself thrown (namely its past)? What does Heidegger mean when he claims, "Temporality 'is' not an entity at all... Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself."? (377)

Monday October 7th – Sunday October 13th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division Two’, Pt. V, B&T (424-455)‘Part II’, PI, § I-IX

Which of the following can a dog not feel? (A) Surprise (B) Joy (C) Hope (D) Anger

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Which is an expression of Moore's paradox? (A) "This statement is false." (B) "I believe it's raining, but it isn't." (C) "If, to cover any distance, I must cover half that distance first, I can never begin moving, because no matter how small the distance, there is always a smaller distance that I must cover first." (D) "The concept of a horse is not a concept."

What does Wittgenstein mean when he says, "a rose has teeth in the mouth of the beast"? What is the significance of this statement? (XI, 226)

What sorts of things are we talking about when we talk about "seeing"? (A) Sense data (B) Objects and people (C) Aspects and interpretations (D) A whole range of experiences that cannot be easily classified

Why does Wittgenstein introduce the "duck-rabbit"? (A) To examine the difference between human and animal speech (B) To illustrate what he means by "seeing an aspect" (C) To show us that interpretation is a mental act (D) To examine the relationship between how the eye moves and how we interpret a picture

Monday October 14th – Sunday October 20th

Time and day of meeting:

‘Division Two’, Pt. VI, B&T, (456-488)

‘Part II’, PI, § XI-XIV

Stanley Cavell characterises the Investigations as being written in the form of a confession. What does this claim mean? What is its significance?

Required texts

Martin Heidegger – Being and Time (1927)

Joan Stambaugh or Macquarrie & Robinson (1996) (1962; 2008)

Ludwig Wittgenstein – Philosophical Investigations (1953)

G.E.M. Anscombe standard edition

Other publications and resources

(i) Histories and General reference

Wittgenstein

Bernhard, T (1982) Wittgenstein’s Nephew(a book recommended to me on a bus by Leo Schofield: true story)

Monk, R (1991) Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius(the biography of Wittgenstein)

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Soames, S (2005) Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century(a wonderful two volume history of the analytic movement)

Heidegger

Inwood, M (1999) A Heidegger Dictionary

Inwood, M.J. (2002) Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction

Polt, R.F.H. (1999) Heidegger: An Introduction

(generally considered the best general introduction)

Safranski, R (1999) Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil

(generally considered the best biography on Heidegger)

(ii) Studies Wittgenstein

Braver, Lee Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger

Glock, H (2001) Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader(a very valuable companion of secondary evaluations)

Kenny, A (1973) Wittgenstein(a short introduction by quite a good philosopher)

Kripke, Saul (1983), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language(a fiercely debated but still influential reading of the ‘Philosophical Investigations’)

Heidegger

Braver, L (2009) Heidegger's Later Writings: A Reader's Guide

Dreyfus, Hubert (1991) Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I

Dreyfus, H.L. (2007) A Companion to Heidegger

Guignon, C.B. (2006) The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger

Malpas, Jeff Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World

Philipse, H (1993) Heidegger's Philosophy of Being

Polt, R.F.H. (2001) A Companion to Heidgger's "Introduction to Metaphysics"

Polt, R.F.H (2006) The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's "Contributions to Philosophy"

Schürmann, R (2008) On Heidegger's Being and Time

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Scott, C.E., Schoenbohm, S., Vallega-Neu, D., & Vallega, A. (2000). Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy

Wrathall, M. and Malpas, J. (eds.), 2000, Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Volume 1, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

––– (eds.), 2000, Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Volume 2, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Zimmerman, ME (1986) Eclipse of Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity

(ii) Other works by our Authors Wittgenstein

Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (1921, 1922)

(A great book possibly rendered redundant by Wittgenstein’s own hand in the Philosophical Investigations, which is in part a critique of the Tractatus. Useful to see where Wittgenstein is coming from in the PI)

The Blue and Brown Books (1958)

(Published after his death; the lecture notes written for his students as he was formulating the Philosophical Investigations. Generally considered a very good introduction to the ideas of the PI).

Culture and Value (1977)

(Various remarks on culture, from Art and Music to Kierkegaard, which will be worth comparing to the later-Heidegger’s critique of modernity and the history of dasein in culture. While their philosophies differed radically, the two perhaps had the same existential soul.)

On Certainty (c. 1951)

(A short book in the mode of the Philosophical Investigations, still highly relevant. Perhaps the last philosophy he wrote).

Heidegger

Basic Writings (2008)

A very fine anthology covering a wide range of his works, containing essays and excerpts. May be better than buying the werks above if you’re still testing the water to see if you like Heidegger. Pathmarks and Off the Beaten Track are two further collections of essays which are highly relevant to students of Heidegger.

Basic Concepts

Not a great work in and of itself by all accounts, but along with BasicProblems is a very accessible translation of his thought, by himself.

The Concept of Time: The First Draft of Being and Time (2011).The short first-draft of Being and Time, translated by Ingo Farin.

Introduction to Metaphysics (1935, 1953, 1984, 2000)

Not a textbook or introduction to metaphysics; an approach to the question 'Why are there beings rather than nothing?'; the meaning and concept of Being. Well known and quite important.

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Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982)

(A unit taught at the University of Marburg in 1927, on the history of ontology and the relation between time as temporality and being; intended as the missing division 3 of part 1 of Being and Time, as well as part 2. Covers the key concepts of that work and a little more. Very accessible.)

The Concept of Time

Written as he was working on Being and Time.

History of the Concept of Time

Lectures which are another important companion to Being and Time. It is said that his lectures are frequently clearer than his books.

The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929/30, 1983, 1995)

“Crucial for an understanding of Heidegger's transition from the major work of his early years, Being and Time, to his later preoccupations with language, truth, and history.”

Contributions to Philosophy (1936-8, 1999, 2012)Perhaps Heidegger's second most influential work. The result is a move away from the centrality of the phenomenological analyses of Dasein, toward the grounding of Da-sein as a historical decision of human beings. Earth can be understood as the condition of possibilities for world; neither earth nor world can exist without the other, and are thus engaged in a constant and productive struggle or strife. One of Heidegger's most difficult works.

The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977)

Heidegger on culture. Contains: "The Question Concerning Technology"; "The Turning"; "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead'"; "The Age of the World Picture"; "Science and Reflection". Cf.Wittgenstein’s ‘Culture and Value’.

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