Randomizing Districts for Reelection: A Thought Experiment
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RANDOMIZING DISTRICTS FOR REELECTION:
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENTScott Wentland
Assistant Professor of EconomicsLongwood University
Peter StoneLecturer in Political Science
Trinity College (Dublin, Ireland)
Paper available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1767079Or, e-mail me at: [email protected]
Puzzling Numbers Approval Rating of Congress:
Gallup Poll: 13% (Sept. 2012) CBS News/NYT: 12% (Sept. 2012)
Puzzling Numbers Approval Rating of Congress:
Gallup Poll: 13% (Sept. 2012) CBS News/NYT: 12% (Sept. 2012)
Re-election Rates: Senate
2006: 79% 2008: 83% 2010: 84%
House of Representatives: 2006: 94% 2008: 94% 2010: 85%
Hate Congress, Love our Congressman?
Why do we hate the Congress, but love our own representative?
Perhaps the other districts are just not electing the right people… What if we just elected better representatives?
A Nobel prize winning economist has some thoughts…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ac9j15eig_w&feature=share
Economists vs. Everyone Else Why aren’t our Congressmen (or
businessmen, or administrators) doing what we want them to do?
Everyone else: Why can’t we elect the “right” people? What we’ve got is
bad/incompetent/ignorant people Solution: try to get the “right” people in
the job
Economists vs. Everybody Else Why aren’t our Congressmen (or
businessmen, or administrators) doing what we want them to do?
Economists What are their incentives? Given their incentives, should we expect
normal, self-interested human beings to act any different?
Solution: Change the institution. Change their incentives.
Congressional Incentives Members of Congress generally desire to
be reelected To be reelected, Congressmen are solely
accountable to their respective districts These districts are geographically defined,
and Congressmen know who their constituencies are
Congressional Incentives When a Congressman fights for his/her
local interests, such interests may not advance, or may even be at odds with, the wider national interest Some examples:
Wasteful pork-barrel spending e.g. “Bridge to Nowhere”
Various subsidies and tariffs District-specific provisions and
earmarks in omnibus bills
Key Questions Instead of going up for reelection in the
same district over and over, what if legislators did not know who will be voting in their reelection campaign? How might their incentives change?
How might we align representatives’ interests better with a more general, national interest?
A Thought Experiment What if a Congressman had to campaign
for reelection in a different district than the one that last elected him/her?
What if, for each Congressman and for each election, we randomize the districts that would vote on whether to reelect him/her? How might this affect policy outcomes in a
representative democracy?
An Illustration of the Rule An example using the U.S. House of
Representatives Jane Doe, a Congressman from Ohio’s 9th
District is elected in 2010 In 2012, she and her challengers (decided by a
primary) draws California’s 21st district from a random lottery She and her challengers campaign in the new district
and will appear on California’s 21st district’s ballot on Election Day.
Key Objectives Explore the rule’s philosophical
underpinnings Why might this rule be desirable in
principle? Explore the rule’s economic implications
and consequences How does our rule compare with the current
system of static geographically-based representation?
In what ways would our rule improve upon the current system?
Philosophical Underpinnings John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice
How might individuals agree to just rules in a social contract?
A famous thought experiment: The original position and veil of
ignorance In setting up the laws of social contract, if
individuals were completely ignorant of who they are (e.g. place in society, social status, abilities, intelligence, etc.), they would be in a unique, objective position to agree upon just rules for society
Philosophical Underpinnings Introducing a veil of randomness
The veil of ignorance is merely a hypothetical construct and does not exist in the real world
Our rule, however, does resemble it as it places legislators behind a different veil, a veil of randomness
Veil of Randomness Representatives are blinded by a
randomized procedure Representatives do not know to whom they
will be accountable in their next election They will have no knowledge of the specific
political, economic, or cultural make-up of their next constituency Why craft rules/laws/policies specifically
catered to benefit one geographically define area at the expense of others?
Economic and Policy Implications
We believe that, under certain circumstances, our rule will tend to generate:1. Pareto-superior and equitable legislation2. Unanimous agreement on such legislation3. Stability (i.e. prevent “cycles”)4. Incentives to reverse inefficient past
legislation5. A more moderate legislature, ideologically
Creating Legislation & Logrolling
Representatives may logroll, or trade votes, to secure concentrated benefits that their respective constituencies care about most Example
A district in NC may have a strong interest in tobacco, while a LA district has a strong interest in sugar
The NC representative votes for a sugar tariff if The LA representative votes for a tobacco tariff
Deals – Good Ones and Bad Ones Legislative deals and compromises can be
good or “positive sum” for our economy/nation as a whole If deals get made, don’t we all want to be
included in the benefits? If good deals get made, don’t we want these
policy outcomes to be stable? What if legislators made bad or “negative
sum” deals? Isn’t this what the (12% approval rating)
Congress is all about?
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example
With the current system, Policy A & B pass if representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to vote for them as an omnibusFigure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A Policy BDistrict 1 5 -1District 2 -1 5District 3 -1 -1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example
With the current system, Policy A & B pass if representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to vote for them as an omnibusFigure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A Policy BDistrict 1 5 -1District 2 -1 5District 3 -1 -1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example
With the current system, Policy A & B pass if representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to vote for them as an omnibusFigure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
Policy A Policy BDistrict 1 5 -1District 2 -1 5District 3 -1 -1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example
With the current system, Policy A & B pass if representatives from Districts 1 & 2 trade votes to vote for them as an omnibus
…but District 3 loses out
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum GamePolicy A Policy B
District 1 5 -1District 2 -1 5District 3 -1 -1
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example
With our rule, Policy A & B pass but for different reasons One unlucky representative may face District 3
in the next election… They have an incentive to redistribute gains by
adding a Policy C to the omnibus billFigure 2 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum
Game (with an Equitable Transfer)
Policy A Policy B Policy C District
15 -1 -2
District 2
-1 5 -2
District 3
-1 -1 4
Logrolling – A Positive Sum Example
Remember, our representatives are behind a veil of randomness They have little incentive to favor one
district over another Legislation will tend to be positive sum &
Pareto-efficient Generates unanimous agreement
Figure 2 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum Game
(with an Equitable Transfer)Policy A Policy B Policy C
District 1
5 -1 -2
District 2
-1 5 -2
District 3
-1 -1 4
Cycles Under the current system, Policy A & B pass but this
is not a stable equilibrium.
District 3 loses out and has an incentive to make a deal with either District 1 or District 2, leaving one of them out… The districts who are left out always have an incentive to
“reign in on the parade,” creating instability and cycles
Figure 1 – Logrolling as a Positive Sum GamePolicy A Policy B
District 1 5 -1District 2 -1 5District 3 -1 -1
Cycles With our rule, voting cycles need not
exist All representatives stand behind the same
veil of randomness and face the same incentives
They have little incentive to pass legislation that leave any districts out
Randomizing districts for reelection tends to generate stable policy outcomes
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example
With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass, despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X Policy YDistrict 1 5 -3District 2 -3 5District 3 -3 -3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example
With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass, despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X Policy YDistrict 1 5 -3District 2 -3 5District 3 -3 -3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example
With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass, despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X Policy YDistrict 1 5 -3District 2 -3 5District 3 -3 -3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example
With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass, despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X Policy YDistrict 1 5 -3District 2 -3 5District 3 -3 -3
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example
With the current system, Policies X and Y may pass, despite being a net cost to the nation as a whole
District 1 & 2: +4 (or +2 apiece) District 3:- 6
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X Policy YDistrict 1 5 -3District 2 -3 5District 3 -3 -3
Explaining the 12% Approval Among other reasons, we tend to dislike Congress
because they often make bad deals and produce suboptimal policy The deals don’t just extend to economic policy We can think of the “+4” and “-6” as utility, not dollars
“Negative sum” policy can be ideological, too
Legislators tend to get re-elected because they fight for their respective districts District 1 & 2: re-elected for “bringing home the bacon” District 3: re-elected for demonizing Reps. 1 & 2
Logrolling – A Negative Sum Example
With our rule, Policies X & Y will not pass There is some probability (.33) a representative
will draw District 3 Because this is a negative sum game, there is
no way to redistribute gains such that all districts are better off
Figure 3 – Logrolling as a Negative Sum Game
Policy X Policy YDistrict 1 5 -3District 2 -3 5District 3 -3 -3
Back to Friedman “The way you solve things is
making it politically profitable for the wrong people to do the right things.”- Milton Friedman
Further Implications Legislators will have an incentive look for
inefficiencies in past legislation (looking for negative sum legislation) Undoing negative sum legislation is, by
definition, a positive sum game Forward-looking, self-interested legislators
will seek out such inefficiencies and redistribute “free lunch” gains across all districts
Ideology & The Median Voter Under the current system, we tend to
have a wide spectrum of representatives ideologically An extreme representative may simply
represent a more extreme district (i.e. the median voter in that district is more extreme) Figure 5 – An Eleven District Left/Right Preference
SpectrumLess Conservative/More Liberal
More Conservative/Less Liberal
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ideology & The Median Voter With our rule, extreme candidates have
the lowest probability for reelection Because districts for reelection are
randomized, more moderate candidates have the highest probability of winning
Figure 5 – An Eleven District Left/Right Preference Spectrum
Less Conservative/More Liberal
More Conservative/Less Liberal
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Conclusions Problems with our current system of representative
democracy are well-known Our rule certainly does not solve all of them
We think our thought experiment does highlight some key ways randomness can change incentives Legislators that are behind a veil of randomness tend to
create:1. Pareto-superior and equitable legislation2. Unanimous agreement on such legislation3. Stability (i.e. prevent “cycles”)4. Incentives to reverse inefficient past legislation5. A more moderate legislature, ideologically
“The way you solve things is making it politically profitable for the wrong people to do the right things.”
- Milton Friedman