Decision-making research into farmers’ cattle purchasing behaviour, investigating the current role of TB risk assessment in purchase decisions and appraising future ways to increase the importance of such risk assessment.

Research report for Defra (ZF0532)

Dr Gareth EnticottCardiff University

Dr Ruth LittleSheffield University

With Lindsay Heasman, Holly Shearman and Sarah Tomlinson (Westpoint Farm Vets) and Bertie Steggles (Sellmylivestock.co.uk)

July 2020

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ContentsExecutive Summary..................................................................................................................4

Overview of the research...............................................................................................................4

Main Research Findings..................................................................................................................4

Disrupting Farmyard Cultures..........................................................................................4

Main Implications...........................................................................................................................4

1. Introduction.....................................................................................................................5

2. Methodology....................................................................................................................6

2.1 Farmer Biographical Narrative Interviews..........................................................................6

2.2 Farmer Focus Groups......................................................................................................... 7

2.3 Experts Interviews and Focus Groups.................................................................................7

3. Understanding Farmers’ Cattle Purchasing Decisions......................................................8

3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................8

3.2 Purchasing to Fit the System..............................................................................................8

3.3 Purchasing Practices: ‘the look’ and ‘good value’.............................................................10

3.4 Genuine Sales and Genuine Sellers..................................................................................11

3.5 Using Information to Purchase Cattle...............................................................................13

3.6 Purchasing Cultures..........................................................................................................14

3.6.1 The Chancer....................................................................................................14

3.6.2 The Entrepreneur...........................................................................................14

3.6.3 The Manager..................................................................................................14

3.6.4 The Stockman.................................................................................................15

3.6.5 The Professional.............................................................................................15

3.7 Conclusion........................................................................................................................15

4. Disrupting Farming Systems and Cattle Purchasing Practices........................................16

4.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................16

4.2 Disruption events.............................................................................................................16

4.2.1 Family Affairs..................................................................................................16

4.2.2 The big breakdown.........................................................................................17

4.2.3 The Wake-up Call............................................................................................19

4.2.4 The Tipping Point............................................................................................20

4.2.5 The Lucky Break..............................................................................................21

4.3 Behavioural Responses to Disruptions.............................................................................22

4.3.1 Making it Easy.................................................................................................22

4.3.2 Control............................................................................................................23

4.3.3 Togetherness..................................................................................................23

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4.3.4 Hope...............................................................................................................24

4.3.5 Maintenance..................................................................................................25

4.4 Conclusion........................................................................................................................25

5. Influencing Cattle Purchasing Decision-Making: Translating Research to Behaviour Change Interventions..........................................................................................................................26

5.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................26

5.2 Designing Behaviour Change Interventions......................................................................26

5.3 Identifying Appropriate Behaviour Change Interventions................................................27

5.3.1 Behavioural Response 1: Making it Easy.........................................................30

5.3.2 Behavioural Response 2: Control....................................................................31

5.3.3 Behavioural Response 3: Togetherness..........................................................31

5.3.4 Behavioural Response 4: Hope.......................................................................33

5.3.5 Behavioural Response 5: Maintenance..........................................................34

6. Conclusion......................................................................................................................35

6.1 Summary of Key Findings and Implications......................................................................35

6.1.1 The Importance of ‘lock-ins’...........................................................................35

6.1.2 Continuity is ‘responsible farming’.................................................................35

6.1.3 Cattle purchasing decisions depend on multiple factors................................36

6.1.4 Behaviour changes are dependent on disruptions.........................................36

6.1.5 Information on bTB should be targeted at different purchasing cultures......36

6.1.6 Behavioural interventions that are created by farmers which are fair and locally relevant have more legitimacy.......................................................................................37

6.2 Summary.......................................................................................................................... 37

7. Appendices.....................................................................................................................39

7.1 Tables associated with chapter 2 - Methodology.............................................................39

7.2 Tables associated with chapter 3 - Understanding Farmers’ Cattle Purchasing Decisions41

8. References......................................................................................................................42

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Executive Summary

Overview of the research1.0 This report presents findings from research into farmers’ cattle purchasing decision-making in

the context of bovine tuberculosis (bTB). Cattle movements are an important source of new bTB infections. Recent Defra policy statements suggest the need for greater ‘responsibility’ amongst farmers when it comes to purchasing cattle. The research examined: the factors influencing farmers’ livestock purchasing decisions; the roles different forms of information play in shaping farmers’ purchasing decisions; and the potential for different behavioural policies to influence purchasing practices.

2.0 The research is based on 22 biographical interviews with farmers in the High-Risk and Edge Areas of England, and nine focus groups involving 75 people (farmers, vets, auctioneers and advisors).

Main Research Findings3.0 Farming involves balancing a range of social, economic and environmental influences which

define and lock-in a limited range of possible cattle purchasing decisions. 4.0 Cattle purchasing decisions reflect farmers’ concerns to maintain the long-term viability of

their farming system. ‘Fitting the system’ provides a guide to purchasing, but this strategy is constantly adjusted.

5.0 Purchases were motivated by cattle that ‘looked good value’ and sold at a ‘genuine sale’ by a ‘genuine farmer’. Reputation and trust are important factors in purchase decisions.

6.0 Five broad cultures of cattle purchasing were identified: (i) the chancer, who is motivated by good value and buys on impulse; (ii) the entrepreneur, who is driven by financial margins; (iii) the manager, who carefully weighs up purchasing options using data; (iv) the stockman, whose choices are informed by individual preferences for shape and temperament; and (v) the professional, who buys (and sells) stock to make money by spotting ‘good value’ and compete against entrepreneurs at markets.

Disrupting Farmyard Cultures7.0 Research identified a range of disruption events which fundamentally challenge the farming

system. These included: a large disease outbreak, a bad deal or ‘wake-up call’ (such as a near-miss), economic pressures, luck and family/personal factors (such as partnership break-ups and deaths).

8.0 Farmers’ behavioural responses to disruptions influence how and which cattle they buy in future. Responses included: making things easy, maintaining existing systems, seeking control through data, hoping for the best, and basing decisions in terms of perceived fairness. Farmers were concerned about the perceived unfairness of farm bTB risk scores.

9.0 For farmers seeking information to inform purchasing, ibTB was the most common source but lacked key data such as: years free from bTB, date of last herd test and number of animals, full details of the last bTB breakdown (number of reactors and IRs). Geographical benchmarks of disease incidence would be valuable to some farmers.

Main Implications10.0 To influence cattle purchasing decisions, policies need to recognise the diversity of

approaches and influences to buying cattle amongst farmers. 11.0 Information on disease risks will only be relevant for some farmers, due to their purchasing

style, farming system, and their experience of and approach to resolving challenges to their

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farming system. Locally based information and advisory services may therefore be better placed to identify which farmers require what form of advice.

12.0 The perceived fairness of cattle purchasing policies plays is a significant factor in their acceptability. In general, where bTB policies involve farmers to generate solutions, they are more likely to be acceptable.

13.0 Compensation values are not a significant factor in cattle purchasing decisions. Farmers perceived varying compensation values according to risk to be unfair, of value to some farmers and circumstances, and encourage perverse incentives.

14.0 Accessing information on disease can be made easier by developing ibTB to include additional data on bTB incidents and all farm’s bTB testing histories.

1. Introduction

This report describes the importance of understanding cattle movements from the farmer’s perspective. The report explains that it is vital to understand the social context of farmers’ decisions, and the realities and complexities of farming lives in order to design effective disease interventions for bovine tuberculosis (bTB).

Understanding farmers’ cattle purchasing decisions is important in mitigating the contribution cattle movements make to the spread of bTB. The 2018 review of bTB policy (Godfray et al., 2018) states that cattle movements reflect an important source of new infections. The review recommends that measures to limit cattle movements are explored, such as the development of Risk-Based Trading (RBT) to incentivise less risky cattle purchases. This could be achieved through financial incentives, and/or requirements to provide disease information at the point of sale. Defra’s response to the Godfray report (Defra, 2020) emphasises the need to understand farmers’ decision-making in order to facilitate ‘responsible cattle movements’ in its bTB eradication programme. Both reports note the need for greater economic and social research to provide a better understanding of how herd owners make choices about the animals they buy. This research addresses this need. Specifically, this research aimed to answer the following questions:

1. What factors influence farmers’ livestock purchasing decisions?2. What roles do different forms of information play in shaping purchasing decisions?3. How does farmers’ behaviour vary between farms and areas? 4. How can different behavioural interventions influence farmers’ behaviour?

The first three research questions explore the context in which farmers make cattle purchasing decisions. The fourth question explores the extent to which behavioural interventions can encourage responsible cattle trading by presenting information in specific formats. As a result of the coronavirus pandemic during 2020, the report focuses on research questions 1-3. The intention is to complete research activities relating to research question 4 in 2021. The report therefore provides a contextual assessment for the kinds of behavioural interventions that will be examined when research recommences, and which is relevant in general for Defra’s approach to encouraging ‘responsible cattle purchasing’.

The report begins by describing the methodologies used before reporting results. The analysis is organised around three key themes:

1. Explaining how farmers’ cattle purchasing decisions are shaped by farming systems;2. Identifying disruptions to farm systems and changes to cattle purchasing decisions; and3. Describing farmers’ behavioural responses to these disruptions and their implications for

attempts to encourage ‘responsible cattle purchasing’.5

2. Methodology

A three-stage methodological approach used to answer the research questions.

2.1 Farmer Biographical Narrative Interviews

To understand farmers’ livestock purchasing decisions, face-to-face interviews were used. Interviews allow farmers to set purchasing decisions within the social, economic and environmental contexts of their farm – referred to as ‘farmyard culture’ (see section 3) – rather than framing purchasing decisions purely as economic business decisions. As a result, we used the Biographic Narrative Interpretive Method (BNIM) (Wengraf, 2001) which allows interviewees to reflectively think through their farming practices and decisions revealing their contextual nature. This reflective process emphasises the importance of the discursive consciousness in capturing the multi-faceted nature of decision-making, as opposed to the practical consciousness which emphasises easier, one-dimensional explanations that reflect social expectations (e.g. cost as reflective of business acumen). This method has been used successfully in previous analyses of farmers’ herd-health decisions (Chan and Enticott, 2019; McAloon et al., 2017) and other animal health research (Enticott, 2018). The first stage of this approach involved asking farmers an open-ended question – referred to as the Single Question for Inducing Narrative (SQUIN) – allowing them to talk at length about their approach to managing their herd.

The second stage of the BNIM involves identifying specific moments in the narrative provided by farmers – known as Particular Incident Narratives (PINs) – and posing follow-up questions to generate greater insight into those changes and challenges. Interviews focussed on PINs that related to cattle purchasing: routine purchases, one-off purchases and significant changes to purchasing practices. A third stage of the interview process involved looking at and discussing visual materials. These included: key purchasing reasons from a Defra survey of farmers (Defra, 2019); and graphical representations of bTB risks and reward/penalties that could be associated with cattle purchasing. The logos were used in association with a set of cattle purchasing scenarios to generate discussion about cattle purchasing and the effects of providing information might have on farmers’ cattle purchasing practices (see figure 2.1 and 2.2).

Figure 2.1: Example purchasing scenario as used in the interviews

Figure 2.2: Two example bTB information logos used in interviews

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Scenario 1: You’re flicking through Farmers Weekly when you see an advert for a dispersion sale in Oxfordshire. Although it’s a long way to go, it’s a well-known established herd, and they have some cattle that you’d be interested in. Alongside the advert, there’s a logo showing the TB risk of the herd (show logo). What do you think of the sale?

Farmers were selected for interview in the High-Risk (HRA) and Edge (EA) areas in England using purposive sampling1. As the project’s aims were to understand farmers’ livestock purchasing decisions, farmers that purchased cattle were identified for interview. In addition, to understand how decisions change over time, we identified farmers that had experienced significant challenges and changes to their business. Farmers were therefore selected based on at least one of the following criteria:

- Farmers who move cattle on to their farms (with different frequencies and risk).- Farmers who have experienced a bTB breakdown.- Farmers who have started/taken over their farm business recently.- Farmers who have changed their cattle purchasing policy.- Farmers who have received information on managing bTB.

As these criteria are not stored in any databases from which to sample from, the research team worked with the TB Advisory Service and veterinarians to identify farmers that matched these criteria in at least one way. In total 22 interviews were conducted with 31 participants (for further details on respondent characteristics see table 2.1 – 2.3 in appendices). Interviews lasted an average of 78 minutes (range: 50-112 minutes). All participants were provided with an information sheet and completed a consent form. No financial incentives for participation were offered directly to farmers, but farmers were informed that a charitable donation to an agricultural charity would be made as a result of their participation. Interviews were transcribed fully and analysed in NVivo (version 12) to identify key analytical themes.

2.2 Farmer Focus Groups

To supplement the interview data, focus groups with farmers were organised in the HRA and EA. The focus groups broadly followed the themes covered in the interviews, such as significant changes to farming practices and purchasing, but allocated more time to the use and design of information provided at the point of sale for cattle, and the role of rewards and penalties to influence cattle purchasing. These discussions used the same scenarios as those used in the interviews (see figure 2.1. Some details were changed to reflect the geographical locations of the focus groups). A total of 7 farmer focus groups were held; 3 in the 6 monthly testing EA, 1 in the 12 monthly testing EA, 1 on the border of the HRA and 12 and 6 monthly testing EA, and 2 in the HRA. In order to attract farmers who made regular cattle purchases, four focus groups were held at cattle markets. The research team also attended these markets in person, conducting participant observation to inform questions used in interviews, focus groups and workshops planned for the final stage of data collection. In total, 56 farmers took part in the focus groups (see table 2.4, Appendix). As with the interviews, no financial incentives for participation were offered directly to farmers, but farmers were informed that a charitable donation to an agricultural charity would be made as a result of their participation. In addition, farmers were offered up to £20 to cover travelling expenses. Interviews were transcribed fully and analysed in NVivo (version 12) to identify key analytical themes.

2.3 Experts Interviews and Focus Groups

1 A purposive sample is a sample where the researcher chooses the study participants that they can logically assume are representative of the wider population or who will be the most likely to have undergone the event that we are measuring. This is not done by random chance. 7

Alongside the farmer interviews and focus groups, the research team involved relevant agricultural professions within the research (see table 2.4 in appendices). Three focus groups were mixed with farmers, auctioneers and vets taking part. A focus group exclusively for vets was organised in the EA. A focus group of three auctioneers was also organised at a market in the EA. In total, these amounted to 19 participants who were not farmers.

3. Understanding Farmers’ Cattle Purchasing Decisions

3.1 Introduction

When designing policy and behavioural interventions, it is important to find out what farmers are currently doing in order to identify a focus for policy makers, both in terms of understanding what they are trying to solve and where the policy needs to focus in order to create change. This requires appreciating that farmers’ cattle purchasing will be influenced by their environment, wider societal and cultural norms and their existing approaches to purchasing, which push their purchasing decisions in a particular direction. This section shows how farmers’ purchasing decisions are driven by the motivation to maintain and ‘fit’ animals to their existing farming system or farming culture (Burton et al, 2012). ‘Fitting the system’ includes factors such as productivity, cattle availability and considerations such as disease status, as well as broader social and cultural influences (Hidano et al, 2019). Trust between buyer and seller can overshadow the consideration of other issues (such as disease history) because the reputation of ‘good farmers’ (Burton, 2004) acts as a proxy for conveying information about the animal(s) being sold. Motivations and approaches to cattle purchasing vary across the farming industry. We provide a typology of different styles of cattle purchasing to enable policymakers to appreciate and think through how different interventions may be needed to influence purchasing decisions.

3.2 Purchasing to Fit the System

‘Fitting the system’ was integral to accounts of managing and purchasing cattle. At its most basic level, the ‘system’ represents the kinds of herd management practices that determine all subsequent activities on the farm: what cows are fed, when they are calved and what labour is required. Cattle purchasing decisions therefore need to match new cows with existing systems, such as synchronising purchased cattle to a block calving pattern or other seasonal aspects of farming.

Cattle were also selected based upon wider environmental, economic and social factors based upon a desire to match and therefore maintain the functioning of the existing farm business. In doing so, cattle purchases further entrench the system, reinforcing its path-dependency and the importance placed on disease risks when purchasing cattle. However, the systems that farmers described and sought to maintain should not be seen as perfect systems in which every dimension was finely engineered to work together. Rather, system maintenance should be seen as a process of making-do through practical adaption to an imperfect environment. Indeed, this process of making-do and agile adaption is significant for agricultural identities in general.

Some dimensions of the system could appear harder to change than others, such as old milking parlours or sheds with inadequate ventilation to prevent respiratory problems that needed significant financial investment. However, these challenges could be addressed through careful selection of replacement cows or breeding policy. Similarly, other dimensions, such as soil type and topography, also contributed to an imperfect system but could be managed through careful

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selection of cattle. For others, the system encompassed broader landscape and social factors. Breeding (and buying) rare breeds contributed to a sense of place, family and history. However, these accounts also stress how system maintenance matches cattle breeds to soil and environmental conditions. As an example of this layered reasoning, one respondent explained:

‘There’s poor quality soil on the whole. So they need to do well off nothing.’ And ‘when you see Welsh blacks on Welsh hills, you just know all is right with the world’ (Edge 10).

Economic and regulatory factors also contribute to the nature of the system on each farm. Milk contracts will require farmers to maintain milk quality standards which can be managed by balancing breed characteristics through the herd and/or using calving patterns to meet milk production targets. New entrants may face cash shortages or cashflow problems that make some systems more possible than others, thereby requiring certain kinds of cattle that are better suited to the system. Competition from other farmers may also affect how systems are maintained:

‘You know, it’s all about the money and it’s all about the cash and my system. There’s a lad that goes to market and if he's there I know I'm in trouble, I won’t be able to buy anything because he’s got a slightly better system than me’ (Edge 03)

For all farmers, the financial position of the farm was an integral part of how they saw their system and influenced which animals they might purchase. In this sense, health was a balance between purchasing animals with good health status, and making other improvements – such as erecting new buildings – that could also address cattle health. Thus, whilst cost may affect purchasing decisions, the value of cattle relates to the extent to which it matches or fits the system. Balancing these different priorities is an essential part of maintaining the system, as this farmer describes when discussing buying animals from a high-risk area for bTB:

‘You'd be cautious. If they are the cattle you really wanted, and they were exactly what you wanted for your system, you'd probably buy some. But that again would be at the back of your mind, "I don’t want to overdo the price, I don’t want to go mad, because if we do have a problem I am obviously going to be out of pocket." Yeah, you'd just be very cautious’ (Edge 08)

The timely availability of cattle determines how the system can be maintained. This could vary seasonally, but for some, this meant buying cattle from the same sellers because they were always at the market at the times when they needed to buy cattle. For some dairy farmers, the inability to source reliable and timely sources of cattle led them to purchase them from abroad using an agent. For others, the vulnerability of the agricultural system to future shocks influenced farmers to buy stock when they came up at the market as an insurance policy against limited availability in future. This was accompanied by instances of opportunist purchasing:

‘They had got this bunch of four and we decided to have them, because we had got room in the grass for them. And we thought, "Well, if we've got the grass it seems a shame not to use it… you have to buy cattle from where the cattle are, and unfortunately that's where the grass is, is in the Westcountry, where there is more cattle, more badgers, more problems, but that's the nature of the beast isn't it?’ (Edge 08)

This example highlights the influence of established patterns of cattle movements on decision making and the associated limitation on choice i.e. buying cattle from the west (where bTB prevalence is high) to the east (where it is lower). bTB incidents can also disrupt established purchasing chains and create the need to buy replacement cattle to ensure the farm can continue to supply enough milk to meet its contractual obligations. For example:

‘I need cows now, I need milk in the tank, you have to just bite the bullet and do it because once you're on that rollercoaster of TB in our area it's like, okay, I'm going to go clear but it's not I'm clear I'm going to stay clear, it's like how long am I clear for, six, 12, is something going to down in the abattoir (FG02)

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In summary, whilst farmers’ purchasing decisions reflect the aim of ‘fitting the system’, purchases are unlikely to involve ‘ideal’ cattle. Rather, purchases are compromises that fit the system as best as possible to allow the farm to continue to function in the best way possible.

3.3 Purchasing Practices: ‘the look’ and ‘good value’

Whilst farmers base purchases on the need to fit the system, their purchasing narratives frequently referred to the need for an animal to ‘look good’. The ‘look’ of cattle has two dimensions. Firstly, the ‘look’ refers to the practical skills found in the stockman and is reflective of their standing as a ‘good farmer’ (Burton, 2004) – possessing the ‘stockman’s eye’, a form of intuitive expertise to identify animals that would fit a system and maximise the economic return for the farmer:

‘Some people have just got an instinct. And they’ve got an eye for an animal, and they can say, that one. I’ll keep it for a year and I’ll win the fat stock show next year… It doesn’t come out of a book. Everyone sees things differently, as well. You go in looking for what you want for your set-up’ (Edge FG ES).

Professional buyers and traders were skilled at spotting the best cattle to buy at markets. As one farmer described, it was often better to get to know these people and follow their bidding. It was for this reason that some farmers contracted out purchasing decisions to traders and agents, allowing them to concentrate on their core business and aspects of their system that were of most interest to them. This did not always work smoothly. Some farmers reported buying cattle through agents and ending up with cows the wrong age or already in calf, or problems with disease.

The ‘look’ refers to farmers’ individual preferences. Shape, temperament and specific physical characteristics were important, such as a good ‘back end’, as well as good feet and udders for dairy cows. However, good looks could be offset by poor temperament such that 'average' cows could prove a better labour-saving investment. Cattle that were ‘wild’ or had poor temperament – often Limousins – were regarded as too much of a risk by many farmers. Easy calving was another concern (which was also related to shape) particularly amongst farmers attempting to simplify their systems. Animals were also disregarded if alterations to farmyard infrastructure would prove too costly.

Judging cattle based upon objective information or data rather than just ‘the look’ provided one of the main contrasts between farmers’ purchasing decisions. For information relating to productivity, some farmers distrusted numerical records, pointing to incidents of fraud and inaccuracy. For other farmers numerical indices such as calving indices, estimated breeding values (EBVs) and milk records were critical resources to guide purchasing decisions. Data-driven purchasing was more common amongst dairy farmers and those breeding pedigree cattle, but in the right circumstances became relevant for other farmers (see section 4). This data-driven approach highlighted two conflicting purchasing styles – the intuition of the stockman’s eye, compared to a more managerial or scientific approach to inform what counts as a good-looking animal.

Alongside the look of cattle, purchases also had to represent ‘good value’. The price of cattle was frequently referred to during interviews and focus groups as being an important factor in decision making. For example:

‘some cattle do better than others, you know, and you're… but at the end of the day it comes down to price, it's got to be price, that's… you know, if you see that animal there and it's… and it looks right and it's the right money then you buy it’ (FG09)

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As this quote shows, however, price is relative to ‘looking right’ and the ability to match the system. ‘Looking right’ could also be captured in the phrase ‘good value’ used by farmers when talking about purchasing decisions. ‘Good value’ represents more than simply economic value: rather, it reflects the aesthetic qualities of the animal and its ability to match the farming system. Recognising ‘good value’ tended to be associated more with the intuitive decision-making style of the stockman. Participants spoke about recognising the ‘potential’ of animals and being tempted - sometimes ‘on spec’ – to buy cattle that would pay off at a later date. Others described how the notion of ‘good value’ was beyond description: cattle were good value when you saw them, and reflective of an open mind towards purchasing, rather than approaching the purchase with a specific aim in mind.

The notion of ‘good value’ was commonly expressed amongst beef farmers: dairy farmers were more circumspect about buying ‘on spec’ and challenged the idea that value could be anticipated . Whilst some beef farmers adopting a more numerical approach agreed, others suggested that anticipating value was part of the ‘game’ of farming. Purchasing was always a risk or a gamble which sometimes you won and other times you lost. This didn’t mean that these decisions were price insensitive. Rather, ‘good value’ was shaped by attention to the way economic precarity interacted with other aspects of farming marginality, such as age, duration of business (new entrants), geography and farm infrastructure (land and housing quality). As a result, whilst fitting the system was important, ‘good value’ was more readily identified with the intuitive ability of the stockman to spot a bargain or turn a profit on an animal. Paying attention to financial margins and calculating expecting returns were therefore key decision-making factors for these farming systems. Nevertheless, resisting placing looks over margins can prove difficult.

3.4 Genuine Sales and Genuine Sellers The reputation of the seller informs whether cattle ‘look good’ or are ‘good value’ and was reflected in farmers’ accounts of cattle purchasing by references to ‘genuine sellers’ and ‘genuine sales’. In short, whilst cattle may ‘look good’, if the sale or the seller is not perceived to be genuine, the sale is unlikely to proceed. Reputation and trust therefore act as indictors of quality and disease risk.

In referring to ‘genuine sellers’, farmers referenced the distinguishing characteristics of a ‘good farmer’. A repeated saying amongst farmers and auctioneers was that farmers were buying ‘the man and the beast’. If the beast ‘looked good’, what characteristics of ‘the man’ (sic) would seal the deal? Here farmers were seeking assurance that the farmer possessed the qualities of a good farmer: a ‘fair-dealer’, honest, and trustworthy. Qualities such as professionalism, hard work and being successful were equated with good farming, which could be assessed by visiting a farm to view stock prior to purchasing them to check that farmyards which were tidy and clean, free of ‘junk’ and waste plastic littering the farm:

‘you'd go to the same market for years and years, you know who are the genuine people and who are maybe not quite so genuine, and this, that and the other. You haven’t got to bid for everything, you've got personal preference, haven’t you?’ (HRA05)

‘Well, you could look at a farm, and if it's got heaps of junk and crap around the place it will go with the farmer, and how tidy they are, and it will knock on into other farming behaviours, and not be quite as vigilant as they could be, not quite as kind as they could be. Not quite as health status aware as they could be’ (HRA11)

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Farmers recognised that these rules did not always apply, however. They cited examples of visiting farms that on first impression breached these conventions only to be confronted by excellent stock. The surprise expressed in coming across these circumstances however underlines the importance of cleanliness as integral to the good farmer. Similarly, farmers also made allowances for the farm’s lifecycle: typically, new entrants and younger farmers, or those experiencing financial difficulties were excused compared to established farmers who ‘should know better’.

Good farmers were also associated with genuine sales. ‘Genuine sales’ were those that were legitimate and followed best practice. Dispersal sales counted as a genuine sale, which were also important to attend for cultural reasons, acting as a means of paying respect to a farmer leaving the industry. Indeed, such genuine sales could also lead to unplanned cattle purchases, which may or may not fit the existing farm enterprise. Farmers reported more confidence in buying from a dispersal sale: a detailed history of the animals would be provided, including milk yields and disease status. Assessing the sale of surplus stock, however, would depend on the reputation of the seller. Some farmers called labelled surplus stock sold as “also rans” or “chuck-outs” (FG03) in which markets acted as ‘dumping grounds’ for stock that was rejected from one farm for not fitting their system, or because of fertility and/or disease issues.

The seller’s reputation as a ‘good farmer’ and trust between buyer and seller could be demonstrated and created in a number of ways. One repeated signifier at cattle markets was ‘luck money’2 and ‘standing behind your animals’ in the ring or behind the auctioneer. This offered reassurance that sales were genuine and acted as a guide to the legitimacy of the seller. Purchasing was often a case of buying ‘the man and the beast’. The presence of both at the point of sale signified membership of and commitment to the agricultural community.

It is not just within the market that being able to trust the seller is important. Knowing the seller is also important when buying privately. Firstly, it provided greater control over the quality of the animal farmers were buying. Secondly, detailed questions could be asked about health status. The failure to provide answers in a private sale would indicate the sale could not be trusted. Buying on reputation could be achieved through word of mouth and contacts passed on by other farmers who were ‘honest’ and could be trusted (FG01), friends and neighbours. Farmers who were in positions of authority, such as the Chair of farming unions or breed societies, could also benefit from institutional trust.

These kinds of connections and institutional trust were helpful when buying outside the area a farmer was familiar with. Geography could mediate trust in other ways: buying cattle locally was seen to be better to reduce the stress of the journey on cattle and ensure that they were not exposed to vastly different environmental conditions that would create illness. Buying locally would not necessarily ensure that the seller’s ‘good farming’ status would be known, but at least if something went wrong, such as misleading information about health status, they would not be far away. As one farmer put it, ‘at least you know where they are’ (FG06).

Similarly, knowing the seller was not always the easiest way of purchasing stock. A common purchasing narrative told by farmers was the ‘mistake purchase’ from which they had learned a

2 Luck money is a form of cashback in which the seller provides the buyer with a small sum of money for each purchase, ranging from £2 for calves through to about £10 for older animals. Luck money is visibly held up by the seller standing alongside the auctioneer and is usually passed to the successful bidder by a drover. The amount of luck money paid can be significant in pedigree sales to artificially inflate the sale value, and is used in some areas of the country (the midlands and north) more than others (the south).12

lesson. Mistakes were described as purchases from farmers who had not disclosed information about potential disease presences, such as Johnes disease, in the animals they were selling. More generally, other business models, specifically cattle trading or cattle dealers were viewed with suspicion as not reflecting good farmers. Cattle traders who bought and sold cattle frequently were variously viewed as ‘wide-boys’ or ‘dodgy’. Their actions were perceived to contribute to unnecessary cattle movements which could give the impression that some cattle were from disease free areas when they were actually from an area with high bTB prevalence. Farmers were conflicted by these business models: on the one hand, some believed that ‘playing the system’ should be stopped, that there was a moral code being breached by a minority of farmers that affected everyone else. At the same time, however, others argued so long as it was not illegal, cattle trading was still a legitimate business model, just not one they wanted to have anything to do with.

These forms of trust and moral codes create inertia in farmers’ own farming systems. Once a reliable source of cattle had been found that matched their own system, farmers would continue to use that source for as long as possible. ‘Loyalty’ therefore became a significant characteristic of good farming. Maintaining these supply relationships was harder, however, when either the buyer or seller’s farms experienced a bTB incident. Farmers’ reported losing suppliers whilst they were down with bTB who had to turn to other farmers to sell their stock. However, when long-standing suppliers became bTB free, some farmers reported that they would return to buying from them despite their bTB history.

This did not mean that farmers were oblivious to the dangerous of cattle to cattle transmission or buying in cattle that may have bTB. Rather, it reveals farmers’ own understandings of risk and the complexity of the farming systems they are trying to maintain. Farmers living with the constant threat of bTB, may view bTB as beyond their control. For these farmers, bTB was understood at different scales or intensities. Buying cattle from a dispersal sale that had recently become bTB-free was understood to be a great risk, and asking for trouble. On the other hand, buying from a trusted ‘good farmer’ who had a recent bTB breakdown was not. Thus, breakdowns of low intensity were described as ‘blips’ and ‘hiccups’ to convey their non-serious nature. In effect, they were not seen as ‘real’ breakdowns and provided legitimacy to re-establish long-standing trading relationships with good farmers that were seen to be part of their community.

3.5 Using Information to Purchase Cattle

Using information to judge ‘the look’ or ‘good value’ was not straightforward when it came to information about disease. This information was harder to come by and often reliant on a pre-existing trusting relationship with the seller or made easier when seller and buyer shared the same vet. Failure to disclose information when asked was a sign that the sale was not genuine, and mandatory disclosure of disease information was seen as a positive step. However, farmers recalled instances of disclosures which they suggested were misleading or wrong.

Information about bTB was made complicated by fatalistic attitudes that there was little that could be done to restrict the spread of bTB. Where farmers used agents to purchase cattle, farmers had limited control over the bTB status of the cattle or where they came from. For example:

‘We don’t get into this TB discussion. Because if I say, "I only want them from farms that have got a clear TB history", he will say, "Don't waste my time." He'll say, "Don’t waste my time, don’t call me again." Really because it is bullshit. Until we get the whole industry sorted and get TB sorted, if he wants… if I want him to put in good quality calves. So, I mean good shape and confirmation, and the right price, I can't tie his hands by saying I only want a certain TB history. He will say, "the TB situation is the TB situation”…the TB is the risk

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that we all carry every day, and it's that little cloud that we all just live with. [So] I'd end up with nothing, he couldn’t get them. No, he couldn’t get them. He'd probably say "I'll try", but it wouldn’t happen’ (HRA08).

For those farmers that actively sought information to reduce the risk of bTB, ibTB.co.uk was cited as a source of reliable information. Vets could also act as a conduit of information about health status. Farmers generally referred to the low risk area as a safer source, notwithstanding concerns over testing frequency (see section 4.2.5). However, farmers identified a range of additional information that could be provided as standard on ibTB that was not currently available. Specifically, this included:

- For farms that were bTB free: the date of the last herd test and the number of animals tested; details of any other tests (e.g. tracing tests).

- For farms with a bTB history: details of each bTB test conducted, such as number of animals tested, number of reactors and inconclusive reactors

Farmers expressed support for metrics such as years free of bTB and geographical benchmarks to show the average disease incidence at different spatial scales. Farmers were aware of some of the uncertainties relating to the use of these data in isolation: access to a wide range of disease data was one way of overcoming these problems rather than relying on a single metric. Moreover, there was also concern that simplistic metrics could be used to discriminate against farmers for a problem that was ‘not of their making’.

3.6 Purchasing Cultures

Cattle purchases are made against the backdrop of complex individual farm environments, with multiple economic, social and environmental stresses. Farmers’ work is dedicated to maintaining the viability of the farm holding, with continuity as the broad goal. On-farm vulnerability means that holdings are constantly being repaired and prepared for future changes. The farming industry is a heterogenous assortment of individual enterprises with different approaches and motivations – this is important to note when understanding different approaches to purchasing and in targeting interventions to encourage ‘responsible purchasing’. To assist policymakers in understanding purchasing we identify five over-lapping approaches to farm management that influence decisions over cattle purchasing (see table 3.1 in appendices).

3.6.1 The Chancer

Chance and luck play an important role in cattle purchasing. Availability is not controllable, and neither are some purchasing needs. Whilst these forms of chance and luck pervade all purchasing decisions, the chancer refers to purchases motivated by ‘good value’ and resilience. Chancers in general will use the ‘stockman’s eye’ to identify ‘good value’ animals which will mostly be purchased at markets. They may be persuaded to buy animals from contacts offered through their own social networks and relationships with cattle traders which present an opportunity too good to turn down. Chancers buy animals to fill gaps in the system, prioritizing immediate needs such as the urgent need for a bull or a calf. In doing so they prioritize these immediate system needs, rather than the health of the herd. Chance purchases may be seasonal or based on a whim at market.

3.6.2 The Entrepreneur

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The entrepreneur is driven by financial margins. They are risk takers and have much in common with the chancer. Purchases are seen as gambles with inherent risks. Each purchase is evaluated on a financial basis. Entrepreneurs may be new entrants, forced into adopting a hard-nosed approach to cattle purchasing by their lack of capital. Margins are likely to be tight, and purchasing strategies will reflect the need to prepare and protect the farm from future challenges. As with chancers, entrepreneurs are focused on ‘good value’. This means they may care less about what the animal looks like, but what they can make from it. A focus on margins means that farming systems are more likely to be rigid. Cattle that are bought must therefore have the ability to adapt to or fit the system to maximise financial margins. Thus, whilst lower cost animals may be favoured, perceptions of expected profit are most important. Markets or collection centres are the most likely purchasing destination for these farmers.

3.6.3 The Manager

The Manager carefully weighs up purchasing decisions to maintain their system. Most likely to be dairy farmers, cattle are bought to match existing priorities and contractual requirements. Data are important to these purchasing decisions. The Manager will consider milk yields and health status when purchasing. Beef farmers will pay attention to other statistics such as EBVs and calving ease. Purchases may be from dispersal sales or directly from known good farmers to provide reassurances over the quality and planned in advance. Managers do not tend to buy stock on a whim. In this sense, purchases are also predictable and likely to take place at specific times of the year. The aim is to provide stability to the system rather than volatility. As a result, depending on past experience, Managers may take more notice of the TB status of the cattle they buy, particularly if their business model is vulnerable during a bTB breakdown. Changes to purchasing patterns are only likely to take place after significant disruptions to the farm – which could include a bTB breakdown – that require the development of a new purchasing strategy or replacement of cattle lost.

3.6.4 The Stockman

Purchases by the Stockman are long term investments. Like the Manager, the Stockman is interested in detailed data of the herd, farmer and individual animals that they buy. Their choice of cattle may be down to personal choice: they are likely to have their own breed preferences and be invested in the long-term genetic improvement of breeds. Shape and size of animals they buy is very important, and animals are not expected to fit a system more that the system cares for those animals. In general, all purchases are carefully planned and considered, but will also rely on personal connections and knowledge. In this context, trust between the buyer and seller will be high, and each are likely to be regarded as ‘good farmers’ because of their approach. Sales are usually direct and may follow shows or competitions.

3.6.5 The Professional

Professionals buy and sell cattle for other farmers on a regular basis. Their skill lies in the use of the stockman’s eye to spot ‘good value’ but also to match cattle to specific systems. They have a wide range of contacts and understanding of different farming systems, a skill which will be recognised by some farmers who view cattle purchasing as an expert skill in its own right, allowing them to get on with other aspects of farming. In the market, they are in direct competition with entrepreneurs who may view them with suspicion and question their value to farming.

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Professionals have a sharp eye for detail and an awareness of the market, and they do not say no to luck money if it is offered.

3.7 Conclusion

Individual farm holdings should be thought of as a system which is created by and orders decisions taken on the farm. Farmers’ decisions seek to balance the system to prevent it from spiralling out of control. These systems are, however, complex: a perfect system never seems possible, but it is possible to hold it together with imperfect choices. The aim is to therefore maintain continuity by making things work in a more-or-less way. Decisions on cattle purchasing are made within this wider complexity and through their purchasing decisions, farmers seek to maintain the balance of these relationships.

The accounts of cattle purchasing presented here suggest a range of social, economic, environmental, biological and technological influences to purchasing decisions. Whilst disease is a concern to farmers, it is only one of many aspects of the farming system that farmers need to keep in balance. The balancing process means that disease concerns are relegated, and other factors prioritised – but this will vary over time and according to context. Information can help guide purchases, but the reputation and trustworthiness of the seller appears to act as the most important factors, acting as a proxy for disease status.

The identification of five different purchasing cultures is important to consider when developing bTB policy for responsible cattle trading. The range of different motivations and use of different resources to guide decisions suggests that different approaches will be required to be relevant for each of the purchasing cultures identified. Some may be hard to change, whilst others may be receptive to targeted approaches reliant on specific information needs. These options are explored in the final section (section 5).

4. Disrupting Farming Systems and Cattle Purchasing Practices

4.1 Introduction

Cattle purchasing practices play an important role in maintaining the existing farm system. However, farming systems can become disrupted – either suddenly or from a long-term build-up of issues that become overwhelming (Law, 2006; Higgins et al, 2016; Hilgartner, 2007). These ‘trigger events’ and ‘tipping points’ (Sutherland et al, 2011) can lead to new approaches to managing the farm, including changes to cattle purchasing practices. Identifying these points of change and transition is important for policy makers as they represent a clear opportunity for the targeting of interventions – indeed, the behaviour change literature highlights these moments of disruption as a key factor in instigating change, as individuals are more receptive to making adjustments at this point of transition. This section therefore focuses on how farming systems can break down, emphasising the importance of ‘disruptions’ as catalysts for change. It examines the reasons why farms may reach a ‘tipping point’ and how these disruptions affect existing cattle purchasing practices. Finally, it considers the strategies that farmers employ to re-establish stability to the farm.

4.2 Disruption events

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Disruptions to farm systems affect established cattle purchasing practices and lead to the establishment of new purchasing strategies or adjustments to existing practices. Interviews and focus groups identified five key disruption narratives that trigger change. These are described below.

4.2.1 Family Affairs

Disruptions arising in the narrative of ‘family affairs’ precipitated emergency, immediate and radical change. The narrative of ‘family affairs’ describes how the stability of the farm operation can be suddenly thrown into disarray by the breakdown of the family unit responsible for managing the farm. This narrative presented in a number of different ways. Firstly, sudden death of the head of the household meant that partners and children would need to pick up the business, but handing an opportunity to implement changes to herd management that had been rejected up until that point. In interviews, a generational divide in appropriate cattle purchasing was evident. Younger farmers were more motivated by disease control and responsible purchasing. By contrast, their fathers were more motivated by trust and the routine and social dynamics of the market place. As they also controlled farming budgets, these divergent views could lead to conflict:

‘This is where there’s a slight difference of opinion because it’s dad that goes to market. It’s a generational thing. Before it never really mattered up until this last few years because you were guaranteed to be buying something clean and trustworthy, but more and more so now you have to wonder. But to be fair, when we had the TBAS visit, they said, “You should be using the TB hub,” which is all well and good but dad doesn’t use the internet so that doesn’t work for [him], so not necessarily a great forethought as to where they’ve come from goes into it. It’s more about what he likes. More traditionally you’d walk up and down the rows and [Dad would say], “That’s not bad, that’s not bad,” and wait for it to come through the ring and then you’d bid at it if you so wished to. Nowadays, going forward, you would have to do a lot more research’ (Edge 05).

In these circumstances, navigating these family politics could prove difficult. Younger farmers could resent not being trusted to make the ‘right’ decisions or have the opportunity to prove that they could. Serious illness or death of the head of the household was one way in which these disputes were resolved, leading to dramatic changes to the farming system by opening opportunities to pursue different purchasing practices. However, the impact of sudden death was also related to other ‘family affairs’. For example, in moving responsibility to the next generation, adapting the herd to the demands of a young family was also important (e.g. cutting down calf numbers and keeping suckler cows – Edge 08).

Other examples of family disruption included farms whose partnerships were broken up through divorce, death or other relationship breakdowns. The weight of debt caused by buying out others in the partnership could create inertia in the farm business such that old practices were favoured over new developments. Likewise, the paying off of these debts could act as a trigger from which farmers could expand, buy new stock and reinvigorate their farms.

For farmers with children, a critical moment was when they made the decision as to whether they wanted to farm in future. Once farmers knew their children had no interest in farming, their farm operation could become oriented towards retirement, leading to a process of ‘getting out’ of farming. In one instance, a farmer described how he chose to wind-down and change the farm business, and purchasing practices, once he knew that his children were not interested in following him into the business. The decision was based on a number of steps which started with the desire to spend more time with his family rather than over-working and led to setting up a new

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business venture that differed significantly from the past. This change in with cattle purchasing practices was accompanied by potentially high bTB risks:

‘I've been in dairy farming all my life, as had my dad, my granddad, great granddad so it was sort of the end of the line to… to give it up but we decided to expand the sheep flock and go into purchasing calves for rearing up to sell on when they're weaned, at about five to six months' old. So now the business has changed, that whereas back in the dairy days we might have purchased in 30/40 animals in a given year, maybe, you know, on a… on an exceptional year 100, because we were doing a certain amount of calf rearing additional to our own calves as well, like we bought in calves, now we purchase in about 750/800 calves a year so there's… we've significantly increased our risk of bringing in a problem because nearly all those calves are sourced from[a livestock trading service]’ (FG02)

On the other hand, the sign that children did want to take on the farm once they were old enough could trigger new rounds of investment to set up the farm for when they were ready to fully take over. This could involve setting up new ventures as a trial, requiring the purchase of new livestock.

4.2.2 The big breakdown

Whilst disease outbreaks are undesirable, the presence of disease may not prompt farmers to change their purchasing strategies. Perceptions of disease severity will vary between forms of production (e.g. beef and dairy), and the nature of the outbreak. Thus, farmers for whom a bTB incident lasted a short period (e.g. 6 months) commonly described these disease presences as ‘flare ups’, ‘blips’ or ‘hiccups’.

Although undesirable, many farm enterprises could find ways of living with these challenges without making significant changes to the way they lived and worked. Farmers described this process as ‘getting caught out’ by the disease. Getting ‘caught out’ was recognised to be a particular problem when breakdowns were large or long in duration. Conversely, farmers described ‘getting lucky’: effectively avoiding a bTB breakdown by fortuitously selling cattle in the lead up to a positive test, thereby minimising its effect.

In contrast, the narrative of the ‘big breakdown’ described a more fundamental disruption to the farm that required substantial change. Farmers described this as times when it ‘all went wrong’ (HRA09) and tended to be associated with multiple changes to the farming system. Disease interacted with other system pressures, such as the declining value of cattle because of changing breed standards and tastes, and/or the need to ensure the continuity of economic flows, such as milk volumes and quality to fulfil contracts, or dairy calves to milking platforms. Unravelling of systems was also related to changes in attitudes to buying cattle from infected areas: a feeling amongst farmers selling stock in the high-risk area that they were not getting the same prices due to their status – ‘I can't get the top prices because they know my TB history’ (FG01) - and their economic vulnerability was heightened by lower compensation payments. Similarly, policy change could mean that whereas ‘blips’ could be lived with, this was becoming increasingly difficult as testing frequencies were ramped up and the status of areas moving from low to medium and high risk. In this way, the ‘big breakdown’ is defined not so much by its size, but the way it combines with other pressures on the farm to multiply complexity and intensify the impact of the outbreak.

Farmers coped with this build-up of issues in a number of ways, making significant changes to the way the farm was managed, what it produced and the practices involved. A common shift was away from supplying dairy calves or store cattle (the sales of which would be restricted in the event of a bTB incident) to finishing cattle which could be moved off the holding:

‘We hoped it'd be a blip and we didn’t really think about the future. We thought we'd just get back to doing what we do and carry on…[but], it was becoming obvious that TB was becoming more of a problem, and we

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were going to have to do more TB testing anyway…it was sort of forced upon us really, because we got to sell cattle, we got cattle ready, obviously shut down, we couldn’t take anything to market, so we had to go deadweight, and we've never gone really back to markets’ (Edge 08)

Alongside changing cattle purchasing practices, farmers reported ‘tightening systems’ by implementing smaller changes to their existing practices. This could include using technologies such as ibTB to see the bTB status of the farms they were buying from, and implementing on-farm biosecurity measures to protect themselves. On dairy farms, bTB could lead to an increased reliance on home-bred replacements rather than purchasing them. Alternatively, dairy farms operating a flying herd which had experienced a ‘big breakdown’ shifted their purchasing strategies to buying overseas. Partly, this could be driven by the inability to source appropriate replacement cattle in the UK and in some cases becoming more cautious about a range of different diseases following ‘bad purchases’ (see section 4.2.3), or the threat of bTB increasing due to nearby incidents. For example:

‘And with this TB breakdown, all the advice is the easiest way to bring TB into your herd is to buy anything in. You can test them to the… to your heart’s content and it could still come back. It could still be there. So, we made a decision that we would try to close the herd down completely…That decision was fear…we were so stressed and nervous about what had happened. We were just outside the 3-kilometre testing zone. And the vets were saying your biggest risk is this. I went to these TB meetings. Our biggest risk was that. I thought we just can’t risk it. It wasn’t just TB. It was all the diseases as well. I know you can blood test for them. You can do all that stuff. But it just wasn’t worth it. So, we had to completely reconfigure our farming’ (Edge 11)

The implications of ‘big breakdowns’ were also social. ‘Big breakdowns’ led to the ‘grind’ of repeated bTB testing, the loss of morale and witnessing ‘death at the wrong time’. Breeding genetic lines was emotional labour, and the cost of losing them was enough for some to radically overhaul their farming system, replacing suckler herds with other businesses. 4.2.3 The Wake-up Call

Although cattle purchasing was associated with maintaining farming systems, it was also recognised that purchasing could introduce significant disruptions – in the form of disease – to that system. The narrative of the ‘wake-up call’ was used by farmers to explain how purchasing could go wrong. In this narrative, two related stories were told: ‘making a mistake by pushing it close’ and ‘the bad deal’, both of which contributed to ‘getting caught out’ and re-assessing how the farm operated. Wake-up calls can apply to all sorts of diseases, but were commonly associated with bTB, BVD and Johnes.

Firstly, ‘making a mistake by pushing it close’ was a recognition that purchasing practices used in the past ignored issues such as disease status. These accounts simultaneously recognise that farmers knew that their decisions were not without risk, but were legitimised by inertia and lack of prior adverse consequences. Where mistakes had been made, respondents reflected on their experiences as teachable moments and resolved not to repeat past mistakes:

‘I bought two lovely cows, and all the calves they all died… we had them tested for something, they were full of disease... it wasn’t a contagious problem but they’d got it… I thought I knew where they were from, which I did, but when you got the passports they’d been everywhere, they’d even come from Ireland as well, and when I saw them I just thought oh god, here we go, and they were never any good… we were glad to see the back of them and I think that experience sort of made me more cautious where are you going to get them from. So, we have started rearing our own replacements more, so we don’t have to go to the marketplace’ (FG06)

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Trust could mitigate the resolve not to repeat mistakes. For example, this was the case for those farmers who purchased cattle from Europe through an agent as a response to problems they had encountered when purchasing cattle in the UK. For these farmers, failures and mistakes did not signal the end of a relationships, more a reminder of the importance to strengthen those relationships. Trust was central to continuing these relationships despite mistakes. For example:

‘you always get bad experiences. The last load I had I said what’s going on? Last time I went out we bought all these nice heifers and they were all the right age and some of them are calving down. These are calving down at 30 or 33 months and he sent me these cows across. I said I can’t send them back really because of TB restrictions, etc, and I said I’m left with them now. I got a refund on some of them but I said, “They’re not what I wanted the first time so what made you think I wanted them the second time?” He’s very apologetic and said it won’t happen again and you’ve got to build trust up, build a relationship up and I think you’ve got to go and look at them yourselves. You can’t just designate it to somebody to do it for you’ (Edge 09)

Secondly, the ‘bad deal’ was associated with farmers who had not been honest in their dealings, either by deliberately not disclosing the disease status, or not being aware of it. In this sense, bad deals contravened conduct of a ‘good farmer’ and were not ‘genuine sales’ (see section 3). In this sense, the bad deal often represented a failure of the rules of the good farmer – a warning that using trust to guide purchasing choices was no guarantee of avoiding disease. For example:

‘even if a man's stood behind a cow and you say what your status is, oh yeah, it's fine, he's not going to tell you he's just come out of [bTB]… because we found since we've been down we've bought animals at the market and we've found… I know you can't do it now but previously they've been inconclusive on the farms that we've bought them off and it was never told or stuff like that. So yeah, I wouldn't buy at market now, buy from abroad if I have to buy anymore. (FG02)

Whilst the relationship between the bad deal and diseases like BVD and Johnes was relatively clear-cut, it was more complicated in relation to bTB. As indicated in section 3, cattle that were moved excessively between different bTB regions to disguise their bTB status were not seen as ‘genuine sales’ by ‘genuine farmers’. Whilst these actions may have had a bTB risk, where farmers had bought cattle that had subsequently become bTB reactors, this would not always be seen as a ‘bad deal’. Instead, the perceived uncertainties of bTB transmission and a lack of faith in the accuracy of the test meant that blame would not always be passed on to the seller:

‘I bought sort of big stormers to finish, and had BVD problems with them, mainly BVD is the worst problem we'd had. And then also TB. I mean cattle which were tested with TB, and then we had some go down in the next test… The BVD definitely was the farmer [‘s fault]. He should have tested it, should have let me know. I did go and see them about it and he said, "They are all BVD checked", but obviously they weren't, it cost me a lot of money. And on the TB, no, it's just one of those things, it is no one's particular fault’ (HRA06)

4.2.4 The Tipping Point

Wake-up calls also show how these disruptions are influenced by agents and advisers based off-farm. These ‘outsiders’ play an important role in guiding choices made by farmers but it was rare for shocks to be introduced by them. Rather, outsiders tended to highlight other shocks – particularly economic – that farmers had ignored. Consultants and bank managers, for example, could be instrumental in highlighting economic inefficiencies on a farm that were unsustainable leading to changes in the way herds were managed. On the other hand, farmers could hold consultants responsible for poor decision-making and introducing further pressures to the farm.

‘the plan he did for me was basically to rear 800 calves a year and sell sort of half as stores and half as weanlings and that wasn't a good idea, got us in big trouble. You know I was saying about when we got stopped with TB, also the pneumonia with bringing calves in every week from market was not good’ (HRA07)

Although farming systems are shaped by economic factors, the range of specific economic shocks was limited. Collapses in prices – either beef or milk – and their recoveries were identified, along

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with labour market challenges, as an influence in determining what stock was kept and what was sold off to help keep the farm financially secure. Similarly, changes to the subsidy system were identified as one source of economic influence; one respondent described changing from beef to dairy production in response to the reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy that moved away from payments per head of cattle towards area-based payments. This underlines the structural as well as individual behavioural factors that trigger changes to farm businesses.

These economic influences provided the ‘background noise’ to farming. The volume of this economic noise presented as constant pressure to an extent that its significance was internalised and normalised in a way that helped farmers narrate a longer-term pattern of change and evolution on a farm rather than posing an immediate existential threat. Not all these pressures can be internalised, however, and instead a ‘tipping point’ was reached in which the continuity of the farm would depend on radical investment to fit with modern farming. At these tipping points, new parlours, sheds and livestock were required to stay in business, prompting a radical overhaul of the farm:

‘To survive as a business, I need more cows and for them to be enabled to perform better is what I've written. So, this is a guy that's made a decision that he's staying in farming, this is the kind of classic thing you see, and then I had the opposite of that which is I've sold my herd and got out of milking and now I'm rearing heifers and renting out me land, so that's when you made a [decision]. All my friends on farms around me they get to a point where they have to make that kind of decision because it's such a massive investment to stay in and go forward (FG02).

Where interviews revealed that economic shocks were important, they often related to changes in supply contracts. For dairy farmers, the decision to become organic could be justified in terms of milk price, just as could the decision to get out of organics. More generally, changes in milk contracts were seen to introduce a raft of bureaucratic farm management procedures that stripped the farmer of their own autonomy of how to run their farm. For example, one farmer described how the assurance schemes in milk supply contracts entrenched cost-efficiency in order to maintain the contract.

Whilst farmers followed these contractual obligations, there were few restrictions on cattle purchasing or rewards for following activities that benefitted bTB. Similarly, the cost of meeting new regulations around slurry management could prompt the decision to leave dairy and move production to beef. By contrast, for beef farmers, market evolution could contribute to purchasing new cattle to fit these markets. Farmers reported buying cattle so that they could become part of the Angus scheme which attracted a premium, whilst other supermarkets’ schemes required more stringent disease control practices. Others reported signing up to the Wagyu scheme because this offered better long-term protection against bTB compared to other breeds. An on-going search for financial security in the face of financial uncertainty therefore characterised farmers’ approaches to buying stock.

4.2.5 The Lucky Break

Cutting across all disruption narratives sits the role of luck. Whether change occurs from the bad deal, family transitions or the big breakdown, luck can be found in each. Narratives of good and bad luck highlight how much perceived control farmers have over the trajectory of their farm businesses. Luck can therefore be seen as a moment that, without warning, opens windows of opportunity. When luck appears to be important in shaping how the farm has evolved, it also legitimises the subsequent decisions taken by farmers when purchasing livestock.

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Lucky breaks – both good and bad – were described in various ways in farmers’ narratives of cattle purchasing. For example, luck could be linked to the stability of the family unit, or the role of unexpected changes (such as deaths) that provided a place within the farming partnership (HRA01). In the face of economic pressures, farmers would refer to themselves as being lucky if they were on a ‘good’ milk supply contract that provided some security and confidence (Edge 06) compared to other contracts. In relation to bTB, luck was an ever-present part of farmers’ understandings and their descriptions of their subsequent behaviour. Breakdowns in Edge or high-risk areas were attributed to ‘a lottery’ (FG04). Thus, farmers who avoided bTB were not necessarily good farmers, just seen to be lucky or unlucky:

‘I think everyone considers themselves to be a good farmer… but they’re still scared of getting TB. So, I don’t think there’s any good, bad, indifferent. It’s just lucky or unlucky, I think’ (FG07 Edge)

The impacts of a bTB breakdown could also be attributed to luck. Farmers whose businesses were more resilient to the financial effects of a bTB breakdown put this down to luck rather than their own planning, reflecting a sense of community togetherness rather than difference. Thus, the imposition of new testing regimes and geographical risk categories was seen to unfairly stigmatise farmers. Similarly, luck was associated with the outcomes of the bTB test. The test was described as imperfect, and its results were a ‘relief’ and a matter of chance, highlighting the lack of perceived control farmers had over the outcome (HRA10). At the same time, the lack of testing (i.e. cattle from a TB4 area) was not perceived to be a sign of safety either: buying cattle from these locations was also seen to be prone to chance. In these circumstances, purchasing could be matter of ‘taking a punt’ (HRA11).

The narrative of luck was important when purchasing cattle. Cattle purchasing was the result of good timing and happenstance: from meeting the right people at the right time, chance encounters or coming across adverts at the right moment. Farmers described being lucky to have a good vet when under bTB restrictions who could help them navigate the licensing rules and bring in replacement cattle. For others, lucky purchasing meant avoiding bTB despite the apparent risks of buying cattle from the high-risk area with limited information on their herd history. In this sense, luck was seen to act as a form of protection rather than an intervention, keeping things together rather than introducing new and unwanted challenges. Describing buying from markets, farmers therefore referred to getting the ‘luck of the draw’ (HRA08) or ‘touching wood’ to avoid problems if buying calves from a collection centre (FG02). Not knowing the buyer and their honesty could accentuate these feelings of luck. Buying cattle was therefore ‘always a bit of a gamble’ (FG06).

4.3 Behavioural Responses to Disruptions

Disruptions produce behavioural responses that may be either radical or incremental adjustments. This section outlines five different behavioural responses present within farmers’ accounts of responding to disruptions.

4.3.1 Making it Easy

‘Making things easy’ describes patterns of adjustment designed to ease the burden of farming upon a farmer’s personal life. Farmers were increasingly rejecting the mantra of ‘hard work’ as a ‘badge of honour’ and the idea that ‘my whole family are going to spend their entire waking lives getting up every day [for farming]’ (FG02).

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‘Making it easy’ was an important response in guiding choices made in connection with the narrative of family affairs. For those farmers whose children decided not to take over the farm, ‘making it easy’ came to dictate how the farm was to be managed until retirement. Rather than pushing cows and people, operations would be adapted to allow for an easier way of life, ensuring the continuity of the farm for the time being. Other family affairs that were associated with ‘making things easy’ were sudden deaths and starting a family. These opportunities afforded time to take stock, or prompted moments of reflection as time demands from different elements of the farm became increasingly challenging.

There was no common way of making it easy, however all strategies impacted upon how cattle were bought and sold. At its most extreme, making life easy could involve shifting from dairy to rearing cattle for beef and using a collection centre to purchase new calves. Less extreme measures involved moving to a block calving system, or running a flying herd to minimise the labour required. Purchasing specific breeds of cattle in order to minimise specific challenges such as calving could also make life easier. In one example, the challenges of calving whilst having a young and growing family prompted a reconsideration of the kinds of cattle that could be kept, leading to the purchase of Stabilizers to make life easier because of their easy calving reputation. Buying Stablizers were a common strategy in making life easy, although changing breeds necessitated other work such as sourcing a reliable supply to breed from. Getting rid of young stock offered a more radical solution to making life easy to avoid ‘hassle’. However, rearing calves, instead of dairy farming could still be seen as a way of making life easy. Whatever strategy was chosen, life could only be made easy with a reliable or easy supply chain. Ease could be secured from local markets to minimise travelling around the country looking for cattle. Alternatively, the process could be contracted out to a reliable agent with the relevant expertise to make things easy:

‘one of the reasons in our own mind why it worked so well for so long because it gave us access to those kind of calves without needing to do the research ourselves because we knew that he would go and pick a consistent group because he’d got a reputation and we knew him very well anyway. (Edge 04)

As the search for easy calving cattle shows, making things easy represents a strategy to simplify the system and make the farm more functional in terms of reducing stress on the farmer, their family and the cattle on the holding.

4.3.2 Control

Responses to shocks could involve attempts to control outcomes by using a more scientific or quantified approach to farming. This response seeks to ‘control the controllable’ and is consistent with the managerial approaches to purchasing outlined in section 3.6. Here, performance data becomes relevant to guiding choices. Quantitative data could come from various sources: official metrics, farm records, benchmarking groups and financial figures. For example, this farmer described using various metrics to guide restocking decisions after a bTB breakdown:

‘So really, we were able to get everything you get in your market brochure – so fully milk recorded, previous yields… yields, cell counts, cases of mastitis, whatnot. We knew that they had had a bit of a neospora issue in the past, which was largely under control. But anything that was in calf to beef rather than in black and white was something that had had a neospora positive test so of course we knew to steer clear of those ones. Not a farm that had had any recent TB issues’ (Edge 11)

For farmers concerned about bTB, technologies like ibTB could offer information on the bTB status of farms they were thinking of buying from, or the area the farm was located within. Similarly,

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ease of calving indices, growth rates and estimated breeding values (EBVs) could give some assurances to farmers seeking to develop and respond to challenges in managerial/scientific ways. For these data-hungry farmers, more information promoted a process of continuous improvement, constantly questioning what the farmer was doing. Faced with the shock of the big breakdown, or opportunities arising from family affairs, data on animal health provided a means to re-establish the balance of the farm. Moreover, they demanded more data to make sense of bTB risks in order to secure and protect their farms from further shocks.

4.3.3 Togetherness

Togetherness reflects farmers’ collective belief that bTB represented a situation in which they ‘were in this together’ in experiencing a shared threat. This behavioural response draws together farmers’ beliefs in the importance of trust and fairness in their attempts to manage disruptions. In particular, togetherness is posed in opposition to problems that are seen to be caused by people and organisations from outside the agricultural community, such as Defra and the government. Instead, farmers should collectively find their own fair ways of managing TB - without being dictated to by external decision-makers - whilst the role of government should be to protect them from non-genuine and dishonest sellers and sales.

‘Togetherness’ was demonstrated in a number of ways. Trust became an important means to resolve challenges facing the farm. This was particularly important in relation to purchasing new cattle. Farmers that needed to replace stock following a big breakdown had two choices: to develop new trusting relationships with farmers and/or stock agents in order to get the ‘right’ kinds of cattle to restore their farming system. Alternatively, they placed their trust in their existing relationships with long-term suppliers who were usually known, local and in some cases family members. This highlights the enduring relevance of ‘genuine farmers’ and the extent of path-dependency within farm systems in the face of bTB. For example:

‘This guy, I know him really well. I… I trust what he’s doing, I can see what he’s trying to do with the herd and I actually think he’s going too far in some ways. He’s spending money he doesn’t necessarily need to be… to spend in order to try and make the herd perfect, and from my point of view that’s great that’s providing the type of animal I want. He is closer to farms that have positive TB test results than we are here, which is a worry. [But] we’re not in a situation where if he was to go down with TB tomorrow or I was to go down with TB tomorrow I don’t think I could easily point the finger at him and, therefore, in my view, it wouldn’t affect the relationship. I… I very much take the view that as soon as those animals have landed on my farm, they’re my responsibility, not his’ (Edge 04).

This quote also reveals that buying cattle was considered to be a known risk and that this was an openly acknowledged and accepted part of the process. This provides the link to the second aspect of togetherness: fairness. Whilst fairness is related to community care, it was also directed towards government as a discourse that bound farmers together in opposition towards policies that sought to control the disease. Fairness, or the absence of fairness, helped to explain hope or beliefs in luck. For farmers, the lack of control and the role of chance meant that it would be better for farmers to be treated equally: testing at the same rate throughout the country was a fairer solution for all rather than dividing up farms into different risk zones:

‘Completely the wrong way to come at it, got to be, because you're punishing the poor devils that have got it. And I think, to be fair, I know a lot of folk are doing the best they can in these… in these bad areas and it's still not [working]. They seem to me they're trying, you know they're trying. But they're still going to get penalised from selling their stock, you know, people aren't going to… be less likely to buy the stock so it's maybe reduced value, I don't know, it seems a bit unfair really’ (FG06 Edge)

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This rejection of the risk scores as a means to differentiate the market was therefore based on the perceived unfair impact it would have on the farming community as a whole. What this did not mean, however, that there was a recognition that the community was not without problems. Indeed, in discussions over compensation, farmers argued that varying compensation levels to reward or punish farmers who had avoided bTB or not was unfair because it would penalise people through no fault of their own or, worse, reward people who played the system to gain from perverse incentives. This included, for example, buying cattle specifically to gain additional compensation. These accounts therefore reveal the tensions within the togetherness response: a simultaneous rejection of government attempts to control disease in favour of local community-based approaches, alongside an implicit need for government regulation to prevent marginal members of the community from exploiting the system.

4.3.4 Hope

For many farmers, responses to disruptions were not clear-cut and instead relied on hope. This reflected their perceived lack of control and trust in measures designed to prevent the spread of disease. Hope was performed through two mechanisms: maintaining the status quo (maintenance hope) and adapting purchasing practices in an experimental hopeful way (experimental hope).

Firstly, maintenance hope can be represented as the passive continuation of established trading patterns and farming practices – hoping for the best through sticking with and maintaining the current system. This could include continuing to purchase from high-risk areas or farmers that have had bTB in the past. Here, hope is built on the importance of trust and established social relationships. Alternatively, it can be based on an assessment of balancing the risks from farming in a high-risk area against buying cattle from other high-risk areas. For example:

‘It never bothered me. It was just one of them things; it’s out of your control isn’t it. It’s nothing what I’d done, it wasn’t even like the cows what I’d bought in what had got it, it was my own replacements and two of them were beef animals as well, so… there’s nothing... I’d done nothing wrong, if you know what I mean. If you’d bought them in and you’d given it to your neighbours you could have felt perhaps a bit guilty and that but no, there’s nothing I can do, no’ (Edge 06)

Hope may be connected to risk-taking and having a back-up plan in case these activities do not come off. In general, this kind of hope was negative: expecting the worst but hoping for the best. Expectations may be borne from local experience and lay assessments of the local disease epidemiology and transmission. In particular, hope stems from the farmers’ belief that they had little control over bTB and/or little trust in testing diagnostics. This lack of trust affected the whole of the testing regime: infrequent testing was seen as no guarantee of safety because bTB could be ‘bubbling away’ undetected. In the absence of certainty, hope was the best option to guide purchasing.

Secondly, experimental hope may be performed through specific changes to farming practices. In this way, hope was not necessarily an alternative to maintenance as the two responses could exist together. However, the presence of hope suggested a lack of belief in these measures which may themselves have been implemented because of a perceived lack of alternative actions. Changes that hope could lead to included purchasing from abroad, or establishing health protocols and contingency plans. Whilst these actions theoretically could manage risks, farmers remained cautious, avoiding certainties and continuing to hope for the best.

Both forms of hope highlight the importance of the social environment as a means of overcoming fatalism and providing encouragement to try new solutions. Developing enthusiasm to try new 25

approaches to managing bTB is unlikely to be achieved through top-down forms of disease management. Rather, as with togetherness, hopeful activities are more likely to be encouraged by enabling farmers and their advisors to work together to collectively develop solutions to the challenges that are specific to their farms.

4.3.5 Maintenance

Finally, maintenance refers to attempts to preserve the existing farm system by preparing for or seeking to avoid future disruptions. This approach includes developing contingency plans if cattle could no longer be moved between farms in the case of a bTB incident, or selling cattle to ‘make space’ for disease, or ensuring they are in the right place to cope with disease:

‘I just think when I’m clear I’ll have a good clear out. And then if I go down in January, I’ve got nothing to sell now for six or eight months anyway, so hopefully I’ll go clear, because we only have... we only have the odd one, probably one, and then it will just shut us down for, you know, six months won’t it? By the time we get it clear again’ (Edge 10)

Maintenance could also apply during a bTB incident as a way of ‘filling space’ within the herd that was expected to be lost as a result of further losses from blood testing. Predicting the likely impact of a test and purchasing new animals to replace was therefore a way of coping with a big breakdown by tinkering with the system rather than radical change. In some cases, pre-emptive purchases were informed by experience from a previous bTB incident on the farm. The memory of a bTB breakdown can also live long in the memory of some farmers, ensuring that decisions always have one eye on what could happen based on past experience. In this case, for example, maintenance means always having something on the farm to sell to slaughter to ensure cash continues to flow to/through the farm.

4.4 Conclusion

This section has highlighted different disruptions events that provoke behavioural responses to cattle purchasing practices and farm management. In interviews, the most common narrative associated with changes to purchasing practices was ‘family affairs’ (12/22). These changes also tended to be some of the most significant, such as shifting from one mode of production to another. The ‘wake-up call’ (8/22) and the ‘big breakdown’ (7/22) were the next most common. The most common behavioural responses were ‘togetherness’ (14/22) and ‘making it easy’ (9). Whilst there was no overall pattern between disruptions and responses, the exception was between ‘family affairs’ and ‘making it easy’. These triggers and responses help to explain the rationale behind why and how farmers make decisions to purchase new stock; they also have implications for the acceptability and use of different behavioural interventions to encourage responsible cattle purchasing. The final section explores these implications in more depth.

5. Influencing Cattle Purchasing Decision-Making: Translating Research to Behaviour Change Interventions

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to translate farmers’ behavioural responses to disruptions to their farm management into potential interventions that could guide their cattle purchasing decisions in ways that minimise the risk of spreading bTB. This section combines the understandings of cattle purchasing developed so far with the typology of farmers to assist in developing tailored and targeted interventions. A brief review of different approaches to designing behaviour change 26

interventions is provided before identifying a range of specific interventions and demonstrating how they are related to the behavioural responses employed by farmers when purchasing cattle.

5.2 Designing Behaviour Change Interventions

This section reviews approaches to behaviour change in order to identify a range of different approaches to influencing cattle purchasing practices.

‘Nudge’ – this describes approaches to influencing behaviour that avoid direct intervention (i.e. regulation) in favour of steering people’s choices in directions that will improve their lives (Thaler and Sunstein, 2007). A key element of ‘steering’ choice is recognition of the ‘choice architecture’ – factors that subconsciously influence behaviour. The range of interventions captured by nudges have been simplified into different mnemonic frameworks, such as ‘Mindspace’ (Cabinet Office and the Institute for Government, 2010) and ‘EAST’ (Behavioural Insights, 2014), to reflect the importance of different ways of communicating information. The ‘Mindspace’ framework, for instance, is relevant to promoting responsible cattle purchasing in the following ways:

- Messenger: relying on people who are most trusted to convey information about bTB risks. - Incentives: avoiding financial losses as a consequence of bTB. This may be reflected in different

testing regimes or variations to compensation payments related to the risk of cattle purchasing.

- Norms: telling farmers what other farmers do in relation to cattle purchasing and bTB risk management. Norms will also relate to what is salient, such as notions of ‘good farming’.

- Defaults: building in the lowest risk as the standard choice by, for example, making high-risk purchases harder through additional testing or other procedures.

- Salience: providing information at the most relevant point. This could be at the point of sale at a market, online or other means. Salience may also be relevant in terms of establishing defaults, such as avoiding bureaucratic procedures.

- Priming: such as organising sales according to bTB risk, or using physical warning signs at the entrance to markets to remind buyers about bTB risks.

- Affect: recognising that cattle purchases can be emotionally driven.- Commitment: cattle purchases can be based on long-term reciprocity/trust relationships.- Ego: establishing low-risk cattle purchasing as a central part of farmer identity such that there

is a ‘feel-good’ factor accompanying such purchases.

The Behaviour Change Wheel – Critics state that ‘nudge’ limits behaviour change interventions (BCIs) to those that rely on a logic of choice and discounts other methods of influencing behaviour such as through regulation, legislation and fiscal measures (Michie and West, 2013; Mols et al, 2014). Other approaches to behaviour change, such as the Behaviour Change Wheel (BCW) draw on a systematic literature review of BCIs in order to develop a more comprehensive framework (Michie et al, 2011, 2014). This identifies nine different intervention functions used within BCIs (see table 5.1). These functions are: education; persuasion; incentivisation; coercion; training; restriction; environmental restructuring; modelling; and enablement. These interventions can engage with different components of behaviour: for example, directly with reflective motivations, or physical opportunities. Overlaying these nine interventions, are broad policy categories, including: communication/marketing; guidelines; fiscal; regulation; legislation; environmental/social planning; and service provision. The BCW does not reject methods of intervention developing in nudge approaches which could fit within education, persuasion and incentivisation. However, the BCW seeks to emphasise a broader range of options open to policy 27

makers and stresses that different combinations of behaviour dimension, policy intervention and policy category are possible and required to achieve change.

Shared Social Identity – Another critique of BCIs like ‘nudge’ is that they may offer short-term solutions but fail to establish longer-term commitments to new behaviours. The answer to this problem may lie in moving away from blaming the individual, to seeking a collective solution that relies on a shared approach and common goals (e.g. creating a sense of common purpose that the farming community can improve the overall bTB situation). Collective action may be mobilised simply by experiencing a shared threat. Framing risk messages around a community – the benefits or losses to the collective rather than individuals – can prompt effective community responses (Carter et al., 2013; Drury et al, 2019). In this sense, the aim is to limit the role of external regulators, but to rely on collective self-regulation because it is seen to be the most effective form of regulation (Reicher et al., 2004; Jetten et al, 2020).

The implications of the shared identity approach for cattle purchasing is twofold. Firstly, it highlights the importance of framing the benefits of purchasing low-risk cattle to the agricultural community rather than individual businesses. Secondly, it requires behavioural change interventions to be co-produced by the agricultural community. Co-production refers to the active participation of community members in designing BCIs to manage cattle trading. Elsewhere, co-production has been integral to successful eradication schemes in Australia and New Zealand, where it has been applied to compensation regimes and cattle trading regulations. Co-production is therefore included as an intervention in Table 5.1 alongside those others identified by the BCW.

5.3 Identifying Appropriate Behaviour Change Interventions

The variety of approaches that can be adopted to encourage behaviour change reflect the diversity in motivations and contexts that lay behind farmers’ cattle purchasing decisions. In short, there can be no single intervention that can successfully encourage responsible cattle trading. Rather, interventions will need to address contextual challenges faced by farmers as a community, and also operate at an individual level. Some interventions will be relevant for some farmers; others not. Developing community-led approaches will help overcome contextual barriers, but also instigate longer-term cultural change. In this sense, it is helpful to think of behavioural transitions rather than behavioural interventions, to reflect the long-term process of change.

Drawing on the behavioural responses identified in section 4, this final section translates these into policy implications for the development of responsible cattle trading (see table 5.2). For each behavioural response we outline the specific intervention practices, the circumstances in which they could work, and which farmers they could work with. Some interventions work across all behavioural responses; some will work at an individual level, whilst others will require a collective approach. Full details are given below.

Table 5.1: Applying interventions from the Behaviour Change Wheel, Nudge and Shared Identity approaches to cattle purchasing

Interventions Definitions ExamplesEducation Increasing

knowledge.Providing information on bTB risks to promote low risk trading.

Persuasion Using Using social norms to motivate low risk purchasing

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communication to stimulate action

Incentivisation Creating rewards. Reductions in red-tape in exchange for responsible cattle trading.

Coercion Creating punishments.

Reductions in compensation or increased bureaucracy for high risk cattle trading.

Training Developing skills. Training to use performance metrics to identify appropriate cattle.

Restriction Rules to reduce opportunities.

Prohibiting sales from high to low risk regions.

Environmental restructuring

Changing the physical context.

Providing audio announcements/on-screen prompts at markets to ask about bTB risks .

Modelling Providing examples to imitate.

Using case-studies in agricultural media to promote low risk cattle sales.

Enablement Increasing means or reducing barriers to increase capability or opportunity.

Support to manage transitions between farming systems.

Co-production Promoting shared social identity.

Community design of rewards and penalties (e.g. compensation).

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Table 5.2: Culturally compelling cattle purchasing interventions

BehaviouralResponses

Primary Source of Behaviour

Behavioural Barriers

Intervention Practices

Policy logics (Intervention Functions)

Policy Categories Level of Intervention

BehaviouralTransition

Making it Easy Motivation Capability Defaults

Education

Restrictions

Enablement

AllIndividual Short- &

Long-term .

Control Capability Opportunity Information (for calculative practices)

Enablement Service Provision Communication/marketing

Individual Short-term.

Togetherness Opportunity Capability Fair intervention (testing borders) Targeted regulation (‘dodgy’ farmers)

Restrictions

Incentivisation

Coercion

Regulation Co-production

Community Long-term.

Maintenance Opportunity Motivation Timeliness Defaults (making it easy)

Coercion Enablement

Communication/marketing Regulation

Individual

CommunityLong-term.

Hope Motivation Capability Targeted Advice ModellingEducation

Service ProvisionTrainingGuidelines Individual

Long-term.

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5.3.1 Behavioural Response 1: Making it Easy

Details Following a disruption event, typically family affairs, farmers seek to simplify the complexity of farming systems as far as possible (see section 4). It can be difficult to predict when these decisions to simplify farming practices happen but the changes are often well considered rather than automatic. Examples of this reflective approach include: farmers considering a range of options and experimenting before making a shift to a new form of production and considering practical considerations that support “making things easy” over others. Overall this reflective dimension to this behavioural response means that farmers are more open to information and modes of calculation.

Intervention PracticesMaking it easy can also be applied to intervention practices. Interventions that make decision making simpler through reducing complexity are better for farmers. This suggests the following interventions practices may support responsible cattle purchasing:

i) Regulatory Defaults: setting regulatory defaults makes choices simpler in the face of complexity. Regulatory defaults can be used to prevent activities that could lead to the spread of bTB. Regulatory defaults already exist in terms of moving cattle to the low-risk area. Applying the same standards in all bTB risk areas is one way of reducing regulatory complexity (and enhancing shared social identity, see below). This could be achieved by creating new risk-based trading metrics.

ii) Calculative Defaults: rather than regulation, clear metrics on bTB risks will be useful for farmers seeking to make their lives easier. These could include metrics on the number of years free from bTB which could be connected to variation in compensation. By connecting compensation to years free from bTB, this acts as a benchmark to set an acceptable minimum standard, i.e. a default. These standards may also be set by visual priming and cues.

iii) Information Defaults: similar to calculative defaults, information on bTB should be provided as standard rather than requiring farmers to search out information for themselves. ibTB already provides some information and was used by farmers. However, the amount of information it presents it limited, it does not allow advanced searches, nor is it customisable like other dashboard data visualisation websites. Further changes should be made to ibTB with relevant information to be provided as standard, such as: the number of years bTB free, the date of the last herd test and the number of animals tested, full details of the last bTB breakdown (including number of reactors, IRs and animals tested), the number of prior owners or movements an animal has had in its lifetime, and geographical benchmarks to establish local norms. Farmers that are trying to ‘make things easy’ are actively seeking information. Providing greater information on accessible platforms will help them achieve this.

Policy logic /Categories‘Making it easy’ can be achieved through regulation. Alternatively, ‘making it easy’ is ostensibly achieved through enablement practices, recognising that this behavioural response reflects farmers at particular stages of their farming careers. This recognition

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should also be relevant for agricultural support agencies and advisors who can direct farmers to the most appropriate information to fit and enable their needs.

Rationale/who it will benefit These forms of enablement will benefit farmers who are in a process of reflective change stemming from significant disruptions to farming systems. These farmers may be in High-Risk and Edge Areas and they may be beef or dairy farmers.

5.3.2 Behavioural Response 2: Control

DetailsFarmers who adopt a managerial style of farming are less dependent on traditional socio-cultural expectations, and more focused on optimising the performance of their herd. Their response to disruptions may be to tighten up on lax procedures in relation to bTB. This is suggested in the narrative of the ‘wake-up call’. Adaptions arising from this response are more likely to be reflective and based on economic capability. Farmers who have experienced significant economic upheaval – the tipping point narrative – may be unable to respond by investing in new calculative practices. Control may therefore reflect existing motivations and the continuation or upscaling of managerial practices already employed by farmers.

Intervention PracticesThe intervention practices are the same as for ‘making it easy’ because they are both based on reflective processes. This will include making more information on bTB risks readily available and setting benchmarks to specify default minimum standards. This may be delivered online through ibTB or future initiatives such as the Livestock Information Programme.

Policy logic /CategoriesAs with ‘making it easy’, this response relies on enablement to promote responsible cattle trading. This information will also enable others, such as vets and consultants to deliver relevant services to farmers.

Rationale/who it will benefitThese forms of enablement will benefit those farmers already using these techniques. They are not designed to encourage behaviour change: that will arise in conjunction with contextual changes to the farm. It is important to note, however, that for these farmers, purchasing may be delegated to agents with purchasing expertise. This means that the effectiveness of these practices will also depend on the relationship between the agent and farmer which may take time to develop.

5.3.3 Behavioural Response 3: Togetherness

DetailsWhen farmers respond to disruption events via “togetherness” they look towards farmers’ own knowledges and social relationships to guide decision making and the acceptability of advice and information. Acceptability of behavioural interventions is viewed a lens of

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procedural justice or fairness in which all farmers need to be treated equally. For example, ensuring all farmers are testing at the same frequency provides greater trust in cattle sales and test results, and ensures a level playing field. In this sense, ‘togetherness’ is important for farmers who buy locally, often from markets, but whose normal purchasing area straddles different testing zones. Rewarding good practice is not seen as appropriate as this only adds complexity to decision making and introduces the possibility of anomalies. Rewards (such as enhanced compensation for low risk purchases) may also have perverse consequences. Thus, whilst a shared sense of identity is important, this response recognises the need for interventions to keep everyone working together and penalties (e.g. reductions in compensation) are only appropriate for those who deliberately flout regulations.

Intervention PracticesThe importance of shared identity and distrust of outside intervention means that it is not so much a question of which intervention practices could work, but how they are created which is at stake for this behavioural response. In this sense, all interventions are possible where the agricultural community is involved in producing them.

Policy logic /CategoriesCo-production is required for policy interventions to be successful. Successful co-production in relation to cattle purchasing could be developed for different interventions in a number of ways, including:

i) Using variable compensation: to ensure compensation schemes have legitimacy, farmers should be involved in the design of compensation schemes. Scheme co-production could be achieved by establishing an independent compensation board led by elected farmer representatives responsible for setting compensation levels and the terms on which it is awarded. Farmers could subsequently vote on scheme proposals to reward or punish farmers for low/high risk purchases. Additional regulation may be required to guard against perverse incentives of variable compensation schemes. Similar schemes have been used elsewhere, such as New Zealand, to link compensation to social norms and expectations of the farming community.

ii) Using environmental cues: point of sale cues are already significant at livestock markets. The most significant though are socio-cultural cues in the form of ‘luck money’ and the ‘genuine seller’. The extent to which other bTB relevant cues within livestock markets can overcome the importance of long-term bonds of social trust and create new social norms of ‘responsible purchasing’ is debatable, particularly in areas with historic high bTB prevalence. In livestock markets in low risk areas, cues, priming and information may have more benefit. Legitimate cues and information could be co-produced at individual livestock markets. However, competition between markets means that this is likely to require agreed national standards and regulations to ensure fairness.

Rationale/who it will benefitVariable compensation was not seen as a significant factor in purchasing decisions for many farmers because compensation was low and did not cover production costs (e.g. of rearing a dairy replacement). For dairy farmers, compensation plays a useful role during big

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breakdowns. It was of little relevance for beef finishers. For beef suckler farmers compensation values did not reflect losses. In most cases, variable compensation would appear to have little influence at the point of sale. However, it is possible that varying compensation, if done in a shared way, could have a positive impact by the creation of a general culture of responsible purchasing. This may also provide a means of dealing with high-risk activities. 5.3.4 Behavioural Response 4: Hope

DetailsHope represents the fatalistic belief that nothing can be done to prevent bTB. Hope works in two directions: either behaviour adapts in an experimental hopeful way, or it leads to maintenance of the status quo. Farmers are open to new practices, but their approach is based on hope rather than tried and trusted methods such as calculative metrics. The selection of new practices may therefore appear random or lack faith that they will work. Farmers emerging from the ‘big breakdown’ areas may adopt this response. In high-risk areas, hope may be a result of continued breakdowns, and/or advice that is either inappropriate or does not work. In areas of more recent infection, hope may be articulated by being willing to change practices but being unsure of the best approach.

Intervention PracticesIt is not so much which interventions practices are used, but how they are developed and communicated that is at stake. Fatalism and lack of hope is derived through poor communication combined with poor experiences of disease control. Whichever intervention practices are used must therefore be developed in ways that make them practical and culturally acceptable.

Policy logic/CategoriesOvercoming fatalism requires policy responses that co-produce a shared culture of action and responsibility. Devolving disease control initiatives to local agricultural communities gives farmers control over the situation. This can transform negative fatalism into positive and experimental hope. Facilitating service provision and education about biosecurity in general as well as specific to cattle purchasing will be required to generate positive hope. Importantly, this needs to be targeted at those farmers most in need and those who can make best use of advice. Offering the wrong advice to the wrong people will contribute to negative hope and fatalistic attitudes towards responsible cattle trading. Targeted advice requires mutual support (togetherness) at a local level as this can effectively identify those farmers who are most open to adopting new practices or in need of support to do so. This can be achieved through local farming groups that involve other stakeholders such as vets and consultants who can therefore contribute to a shared community goal and identity.

Rationale/who it will benefitFarmers who will benefit from these interventions are those who lack the capabilities but not the motivation or opportunity. They are not restricted to any sector: beef suckler farms and dairy farms may benefit. They are likely to be farmers who have experienced significant change to their farming system and are open to changing practices. They may also be younger farmers who are looking to take over their farm in future and developing plans to

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do so. The approach is likely to benefit all farmers – indeed, converting the negative response of hope into a positive one will require a collective shared identity. The personal and targeted approach means that it will be relevant to farmers who lack resources to explore new approaches. This may make the approach suitable for farmers who are socially, economically and geographically marginalised.

5.3.5 Behavioural Response 5: Maintenance

Details Farmers seek to maintain the existing farming system by relying on existing purchasing strategies to pre-empt threats. The intention is to avoid those threats or take advantage of opportunities in order to maximise economic returns and provide resilience to the farm. Purchasing is based on prior experience, socio-cultural ideas of the ‘good farmer’ and ‘genuine sale/seller’, and estimations of the ‘good value’. In this sense, purchases reflect the being able to spot ‘the look’ of good cattle using the ‘stockman’s eye’. This response is broadly fitted to farmers seeking to maintain their current farming system. It reflects how purchasing strategies ‘fit the system’ and maintain continuity even in the face of disruption. These purchasing strategies may reflect the continued use of long-standing suppliers even when disrupted by disease because of the significance of trust and reputation. Most likely, this response is demonstrated most at livestock markets where farmers are motivated by attempts to seek value and match livestock to systems.

Intervention PracticesChanging long-standing purchasing practices is challenging where they are held together by socio-cultural expectations. These purchasing practices may be more likely to be changed through wider contextual change in disease prevalence, the regulatory environment, the agricultural economy, and personal factors (e.g. retirement). Point of sale interventions may play a role where purchases are not reflective in nature. Notwithstanding their limitations noted above, coercion through compensation variability and different defaults may influence purchase decisions for some farmers bidding in the market place. For these interventions to act as effective primers or cues, it is likely that they will need to be highly visible and standardised in all livestock markets.

Policy logic /CategoriesThis response will rely on enablement and forms of coercion. Given the consequences of bTB for these farms are low, the likely success of behavioural interventions is also likely to be low without significant disruptions such as the ‘big breakdown’ or ‘family affairs’. Direct regulation may be more appropriate to address the risks of this purchasing strategy.

Rationale/who it will benefitThese forms of enablement will benefit farmers who do not base purchases on calculative reflection but rely on their own sense of judgment. These farmers may be in High-Risk and Edge Areas and they are more likely to be beef finishing farms.

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6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary of Key Findings and Implications

Cattle purchasing is a risk factor in the spread of bTB. This research aimed to establish the factors influencing farmers’ cattle purchasing decision-making; the role of disease (specifically bTB) within these decisions; and the potential for behaviour change methods to reconfigure these decisions towards more ‘responsible’ purchasing practices. In this conclusion, we highlight the key findings, their relevance for managing bTB, and potential behavioural interventions that may affect farmers’ cattle purchasing decisions.

6.1.1 The Importance of ‘lock-ins’

Farmers’ decisions are set in a complex system of socio-economic-environmental relationships. The system establishes behavioural patterns for farmers that lock-in practices and routines. These routines may be based on cultural expectations, environmental possibilities, and economic realities. The nature and importance of the system therefore provides a strong hold over farmers’ activities. Recognising these lock-ins helps to know when farmers may need to be assisted, enabled and/or compelled to make transitions.

Implication 1: the existence of socio-economic-environmental lock-ins are challenging for behaviour change interventions, requiring easy ways to envisage and enact change. This will include tailored assistance/advice and easy access to/incorporation of bTB data into their decision-making. Solutions won’t be the same for all farmers, but thinking through ways to navigate and proactively disrupt these lock-ins is an important first step in designing effective interventions. Implication 2: policy interventions that encourage individual farmers to adopt ‘responsible cattle purchasing’ will not resonate with farmers or be culturally compelling if interventions do not also address the contexts in which farmers work.

6.1.2 Continuity is ‘responsible farming’

Farmers are motivated to maintain their farming system as much as their decisions are configured by this system. Thus, farmers’ cattle purchasing decisions are based on ‘what works’ for their farm. Purchasing decisions that are based on ‘fitting the system’ demonstrate a commitment to continuity and what farmers understand to be ‘good farming’. Thus, ensuring the continuity of the farm is what constitutes ‘responsible farming’ for farmers and extends beyond disease management.

Implication 3: Farmers’ responsibilities are to the continuation of their own farm and the day-to-day functioning of the holding (e.g. ensuring supply of calves). Risks of bTB may be a contributory factor but maintenance of the system is the over-riding goal.Implication 4: Disease management is only one element of responsible farming, and is situated within their wider responsibility to other aspects of the farm. Implication 5: Developing a shared understanding of what ‘responsible cattle purchasing’ is vital if it is to be successfully encouraged.

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6.1.3 Cattle purchasing decisions depend on multiple factors

When purchasing cattle, farmers’ decisions reflect attempts to fit cattle to their farming system. However, purchases that ‘fit the system’ are based on a range of social and economic factors. These include: the ‘look’ of the animal; whether the animal constitutes ‘good value’; the reputation of the seller as a proxy for judging the sale to be ‘genuine’ and ‘reliable’; and availability. Whilst farmers do not want to bring disease onto their farm, these preferences may also relegate bTB as a consideration when purchasing cattle.

Implication 6: farmers’ cattle purchasing decisions reflect different preferences for animals and their owners.Implication 7: in considering which cattle to buy, these preferences can over-ride other factors such as bTB.Implication 8: social ties, trust and reputation are significant factors in purchasing cattle, and reflect the importance of social norms and appropriate conduct to the farming community.

6.1.4 Behaviour changes are dependent on disruptions

Changes to cattle purchasing practices are reactive to disruptive events. These events include: a big breakdown; family relationships; a bad experience; economic tipping points; and bad or good luck. Although these changes are reactive to these disruptions, they can prompt proactive planning and reconsideration of cattle purchasing practices. Whilst these changes may not always prioritise reducing bTB risk, they represent windows of opportunity in which farmers are open to influence. Implication 9: awareness of the kinds of disruptions to farmers can allow more effective targeting of communication about the risks of bTB in cattle purchasing.

6.1.5 Information on bTB should be targeted at different purchasing cultures

Taken together, farmers exhibit a broad range of purchasing styles. Whilst some are conservative and risky, others reflect an openness to reducing the risk of bTB. One purchasing category – the manager – relies on the use of data and calculative technologies to plan and manage the herd. This typology underlines that farmers are different and respond in different ways. The typologies can help us to think through which interventions may be better suited to some farmers than others. Similarly, in responding to farm system disruptions, one favoured behavioural response is ‘control’, i.e. using calculative technologies and metrics to restore order and reduce risk. These farmers may represent an ideal target group for behavioural interventions that rely on behavioural insights and the presentation of data in specific formats. For these farmers, data that is organised around social norms, defaults and benchmarks, may encourage responsible cattle trading. Examples could include the number of years free from bTB benchmarked to the surrounding local area and/or the number of previous owners of an animal for sale.

Implication 10: individual approaches to farmers that currently rely on managerial approaches may be best suited to behavioural interventions for bTB and cattle trading.

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Implication 11: ibTB should be developed to share information on bTB, providing some information by default, and allowing customisable searches and data visualisation.Implication 12: formatting bTB relevant information into social norms, benchmarks and defaults may be useful for managerial farmers.

6.1.6 Behavioural interventions that are created by farmers which are fair and locally relevant have more legitimacy

There are no universally favoured behavioural interventions. Forms of coercion, such as tying rewards and penalties to compensation, or introducing measures of bTB freedom at the point of sale were viewed with caution. Farmers viewed government regulation as simultaneously an unwanted interference, but also required to ensure fairness and a level-playing field for all farmers. For interventions that could be seen to divide farmers into haves and have nots, co-production methods represent the best way to develop appropriate behavioural interventions. This could include allowing farmers to set benchmarks for bTB risk metrics, or allowing farmers to determine how compensation should be allocated. Farmers and relevant local-level organisations may be best suited to help deliver behavioural change. These people and organisations may be more aware of those farmers undergoing significant changes and disruptions, such as the ‘family affairs’ narrative of change. Moreover, what is happening at a ‘local level’ is important to farmers. Devolving the delivery of behavioural change interventions so that they can be targeted and offer hope to farmers is likely to be more effective.

Implication 13: Co-production methods can ensure that behavioural interventions are perceived to be fair. Where behavioural interventions are not perceived to be fair, they will lack legitimacy and fail to generate a culture of responsibility. Involving farmers and farmers’ organisations to decide what is fair can enhance the legitimacy of using compensation as a behavioural intervention.Implication 14: Enhancing local ownership and delivery of behavioural change interventions will help deliver more targeted support and encouragement to those who are also likely to be most receptive to it.

6.2 Summary

Encouraging ‘responsible cattle purchasing’ to reduce the impact of bTB is made challenging by the current socio-economic-environmental context faced by farmers. This entangled relationship locks farmers into set patterns of behaviour which mean that the majority of changes to cattle purchasing decisions are reactive. It is likely that individual methods of encouraging responsible cattle trading will need to be balanced with changes that address these contextual barriers, if they are to be culturally compelling to all farmers. For the moment, this research suggests that there are some existing styles of cattle purchasing that may be influenced by behavioural change interventions where they match their existing calculative and numerical drive approaches to herd management. Where these interventions can be accompanied by targeted, devolved and co-productive approaches, these approaches may be more effective and sustainable.

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Solutions will not be the same for all farmers and will need to resonate to be effective. This research has presented an understanding of the factors influencing farmers’ cattle purchasing decision-making (which may or may not take account of bTB), the barriers and opportunities for change and presented a typology characterising different farmers’ approaches to purchasing and highlighting where some behaviour change interventions may be more effective than others. Understanding this context will help to create a framework for designing interventions that are targeted, specific and cognisant of how current purchasing strategies would need to change to realise the goal of ‘responsible’ trading and the cultural shifts that would need to accompany this transition.

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7. Appendices7.1 Tables associated with chapter 2 - Methodology

Table 2.1: Number of interviews and participants, split by risk area

Edge Area High-Risk Area TotalNo. interviews 11 11 22No. participants 15 16 31

Table 2.2: Farm characteristics of interviewed farms, split by risk area

Edge Area High-Risk Area TotalAverage Herd Size 333 (50-830) 323 (14-650) 328Dairy Herds 6 5 11Beef Suckler Herds 5 3 8Beef Finishing Herds 0 3 3Organic Herds 1 2 3

Table 2.3: Disease status of interviewed farms, split by risk area

Edge Area High-Risk Area TotalNever had bTB 1 0 1Last incident > 6mths ago 5 7 12Last incident < 6mths ago 2 2 4Currently under bTB restrictions 3 2 56 monthly testing frequency 5 0 512 monthly testing frequency 6 11 17

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Table 2.4: Details of focus group participants

Focus group location Edge Area (6mth testing)

Edge Area (12mth testing)

High-Risk Area

Frome 17 (9 farmers, 4 vets, 4

auctioneers)Shropshire 6 (4 farmers, 2

vets)Thame 9 (9 farmers)Bakewell (a) 9 (7 farmers, 2

vets)Bakewell (b) 10 (10 farmers)South Derbyshire 7 (7 farmers)East Sussex (a) 4 (3 vets, 1

auctioneer)East Sussex (b) 10 (10 farmers)Derbyshire 3 (3 auctioneers)Total number of participants (number of farmer participants)

38 (33) 14 (10) 23 (13)

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7.2 Tables associated with chapter 3 - Understanding Farmers’ Cattle Purchasing Decisions

Table 3.1: Description of cattle purchasing typology

Typology Description

The Chancer Opportunity is the main driver for the chancer. Chancers buy animals to fill gaps in the system, prioritizing immediate needs, rather than the health of the herd. Chances may be seasonal, or based on a whim at market.

The Entrepreneur

The entrepreneur is driven by financial margins. They are risk takers, but every decision is weighed up in relation to how much money can be made from an animal. Cost is a driving factor, but so is appearance.

The Manager The manager carefully weighs up purchasing decisions to maintain their system. Cattle are bought to match existing priorities. Herd-health information is important. Decisions are path-dependent, and only change following shocks.

The Stockman

Purchases are long term investments. They are carefully planned and considered. The status of animals and farms are carefully weighed up. Buying the right animal requires personal connections and knowledge.

The Professional

Professional buyers make regular multiple purchases for others. They have a sharp eye for detail and an awareness of the market. Luck money may be useful cash. They compete with entrepreneurs in the market.

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