Ranciere Interview

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introduction

peter hallward

Jacques Rancire retired from teaching philoso-phy at the University of Paris VIII (Saint-Denis)in 2002. In most of his otherwise varied projectshe seeks to overturn all imposed forms of classi-fication or distinction, to subvert all norms of

representation that might allow for the stabledifferentiation of one class of person or experi-ence from another (workers from intellectuals,masters from followers, the articulate from theinarticulate, the artistic from the non-artistic,etc.). As a general rule, Rancire believes that itis in the moments when the real world waversand seems to reel into mere appearance, morethan in the slow accumulation of day-to-dayexperiences, that it becomes possible to form ajudgement about the world.1

As a student at the cole Normale Suprieurein the 1960s, Rancire was influenced byAlthusser and wrote an important section ofReading Capital in which, like Althusser, hedistinguished between the necessarily deludedexperience of social agents and the quasi-scien-tific authority of theory (exclusively able tograsp, for instance, the mechanics of productionor commodification). It is hardly an exaggera-tion to say that everything else Rancire has

written rejects this distinction and all its impli-cations. Outraged by Althussers distance fromthe political mobilisations during and after1968, and suspicious of the ever-widening gapbetween theory and reality he found in the workof his fellow soixante-huitards, Rancirepublished a spectacular critique of his formerteacher in 1974. Turning instead to Foucault formethodological inspiration, Rancire foundedthe journal Les Rvoltes Logiques in 1975,

dedicated to recasting the relation between workand philosophy, or proletarians and intellectu-als, in such a way as to block any prescriptiveappropriation or representation of the former bythe latter.

Like Foucault, Rancire has applied the workof de-normalisation or de-classification on a

number of successive though overlapping fronts,which for the sake of analysis might be distin-guished as philosophical, pedagogical, historio-graphical, political, sociological, and aesthetic.

Rancires general argument with philosophy,most substantially stated in Le Philosophe et sespauvres (1983), concerns its inaugural attempt todistinguish people capable of genuine thoughtfrom others who, entirely defined by theireconomic occupation, are presumed to lack the

jacques rancire

translated by forbes morlock

POLITICS AND

AESTHETICS

an interview

ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN 1469-2899 online/03/020191-21 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd and the Editors ofAngelakiDOI: 10.1080/0969725032000162657

A N G E LA KIjou rnal of the theoretical human it ies

volume 8 number 2 august 2003


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ability, time and leisure required for thought.The paradigm here is Platos division of societyinto functional orders (artisans, warriors, rulers),such that slaves, or shoemakers, for instance, areforever banished from the domain of philosophy.

To each type of person, one allotted task: labour,war, or thought. Hence the importance of exclud-ing those who, by seeking to imitate a type otherthan their own, threaten to cross these functionallines. Rancire finds echoes of both this divisionand this exclusion in the work of Marx, Sartreand Bourdieu.

In pedagogical terms, Rancires argument (inThe Ignorant Schoolmaster, 1987) targets anyattempt to conceive of education in terms of thegeneralised classification of children, i.e. interms of a process that leads them from initialpostures of submission and docility towards rela-tive security precisely in so far as they come toaccept their suitably sanctioned place. Inspiredby the maverick example of Joseph Jacotot(17701840), Rancires guiding pedagogicalprinciple is that all people are virtually capableof understanding what others have done andunderstood []. Equality is not a goal to beattained but a point of departure, a supposition

to be maintained in all circumstances.2Everyone has the same intelligence; what variesis the will and opportunity to exercise it. On thebasis of this supposition, superior knowledgeceases to be a necessary qualification of theteacher, just as the process of explication (withits attendant metaphors that distinguish childrenas slow or quick, that conceive of educationaltime in terms of progress, training and qualifica-tion) is exposed as the dominant myth of peda-

gogy.When Rancire turns to the writing of history,it is in order to expose the way historians fromMichelet to Braudel have likewise presented apicture of the world in which each individual isset in their appropriate place, in which anyparticular voice becomes audible in so far as itarticulates the logic associated with that place. InMichelets histories, in keeping with a principlethat still dominates the discipline as a whole,everything has a meaning to the degree thatevery speech production is assignable to thelegitimate expression of a place: the earth that

shapes men, the sea on which their exchangestake place, the everyday objects in which theirrelations can be read 3 What is banished fromthis territorialising conception of history is thevery possibility of heresy (heresy understood as

the dis-placing of the speaker and dis-aggregationof the community4), in particular that moderndemocratic heresy incarnated by the arrivalupon the historical stage of a popular voice thatrefuses any clear assignation of place, the voiceof the masses of people who both labour andthink a voice noticeably absent, Rancireobserves, from the Annales-inspired conceptionof history.

It is precisely this heretical conception ofpolitical speech that informs Rancires mostprogrammatic work to date: Disagreement(1995). The supervision of places and functionsis the business of what Rancire calls thepolice; apoliticalsequence begins, then, whenthis supervision is interrupted so as to allow aproperly anarchic disruption of function andplace, a sweeping de-classification of speech. Thedemocratic voice is the voice of those who rejectthe prevailing social distribution of roles, whorefuse the way a society shares out power and

authority, the voice of floating subjects thatderegulate all representations of places andportions.5

Applied in sociological terms, Ranciressubversion of classes and norms applies as muchto Marxist attempts to squeeze the complexity ofworkers experience into the theory-certifiedsimplicity of the proletariat as it does to nostal-gic attempts to preserve a traditional workingclass identity. The Nights of Labor (1981),

Rancires first (and still most) substantial book,a record and analysis of proletarian intellectuallife in the 1830s and 1840s, undercuts any effortto preserve popular, plebeian or proletarianpurity and, in the absence left by the disap-pearance ofthe authentic working class, clears aspace for the emergence of unauthorised combi-nations and inventions transposed utopias,reappropriations of literary forms, worker-runnewspapers and nocturnal poetry societies, trans-occupational associations, etc.6 The workersrecorded by Rancire complain less about mate-rial hardship and more about the predetermined

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quality of lives framed by rigid social hierarchy.Perhaps the truly dangerous classes, heconcludes, were not so much the uncivilisedones thought to undermine society from belowbut rather the migrants who move at the borders

between classes individuals and groups whodevelop capabilities of no direct use for theimprovement of their material lives, and whichmight in fact make them despise materialconcerns.7

It is only a small if not imperceptible shiftfrom here to an interest in the attempt, whichRancire names the aesthetic revolution, tomove from a rule-bound conception of art preoc-cupied with matching any given object with itsappropriate form of representation (the basis fora secure distinction of art from non-art) to aregime of art which, in the absence of represen-tational norms, embraces the endless confusionof art and non-art.8 In this aesthetic regime(whose origins Rancire traces to Schiller, firstand foremost), genuine art is what indistin-guishes, in newly creative ways and with theresources peculiar to a specific artistic practice,art and the other of art examples includeBalzacs application of epic modes of description

to the banalities of everyday life, or Flaubertsextension of an aristocratic conception of style toa democratic equality of subjects, orMallarms blending of the most subtle move-ments of syntax with a general reframing of thehuman abode. Rather than the author of apurely intransitive or hermetic discourse,Mallarm figures here as the writer whoconceives of poetry as both the purest possibleexpression of language and as caught up in the

rituals of private, collective and industrial life (inthe tiny movements of a dancer, the fluttering ofa fan, the fireworks of Bastille Day, and so on,all part of that celebration of the ordinary whichcomes to replace the forlorn ceremonies ofthrone and religion).9 Orthodox modernism, bycontrast, in its determination to restore a strictbarrier between (non-representational) art andnon-art, can only figure here as complicit in theperpetual attempt to restore traditional hierar-chies, to return things to their officially autho-rised place, to squash the insurgent promise ofdemocracy.

notes

1 Jacques Rancire, Nights of Labor19.

2 Rancire, Le Matre ignorant 9, 229.

3 Rancire, Names of History65. Michelet invents

the art of making the poor speak by keeping themsilent, of making them speak as silent people, in

so far as only the historian or analyst is able to

understand their words. Only the historian is able

to let the dead rest peacefully in the tomb to

which their garrulous silence confines them

(6263).

4 In Le Roy Laduries celebrated bookMontaillou(1975), for example, the historians object is not

heresy but the village that gives it a place. The

result effectively repeats the inquisitorial gesture:

the historian suppresses heresy by giving itroots (Rancire, Names of History73).

5 Rancire, Disagreement 99100.

6 Rancire, Nights of Laborx, 10.

7 Rancire, Good Times or Pleasures at the

Barriers (1978) 50.

8 In the aesthetic regime of art, art is art to

the extent that it is something other than art

(Rancire, The Aesthetic Revolution and its

Outcomes 137 this article offers a compressedsummary of aspects of the longer analyses that

Rancire has undertaken in his books Mallarm(1996), La Chair des mots (1998), La Parole muette(1998) and Le Partage du sensible (2000)).

9 Rancire, The Aesthetic Revolution and its

Outcomes 140.

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politics and aesthetics: an

interview 1

jacques rancire

Peter Hallward: One of your constant concerns

has been to analyse and condemn any posture of

mastery, particularly theoretical, pedagogical,

academic mastery. So may I ask why you

started teaching? How did you first get involved

with education?

Jacques Rancire: I became involved almostunwittingly, when I went through the coleNormale Suprieure (ENS), which was set up totrain teachers. I am, in the first instance, astudent. I am one of those people who is aperpetual student and whose professional fate, asa consequence, is to teach others. Teachingobviously implies a certain position of mastery,researcher implies in some way a position ofknowledge, teacher-researcher implies the ideaof the teacher adapting a position of institutionalmastery to one of mastery based on knowledge.

At the outset, I was immersed in anAlthusserian milieu, and consequently markedby its idea of forms of authority linked specifi-cally to knowledge. But I was also caught up inthe whole period of 1968, which threw into ques-tion the connection between positions of masteryand knowledge. I went through it all with thementality of a researcher: I thought of myself,above all, as someone who did research and letothers know about his research. Which meant,

for example, that as a teacher I always resisteddivisions into levels (advanced, intermediate,etc.). At the University of Paris VIII, where Ihave taught for most of my career, there were nolevels in the philosophy department and I havealways tried hard to maintain this lack of divisioninto levels. In my courses I often have people ofall different levels, in the belief that each studentdoes what he or she can do and wants to do withwhat I say.

P.H.: I suppose you must have made your initial

decision to take up teaching and research path

at about the age of fifteen or sixteen: did you

grow up in a milieu where this option was

encouraged?

J.R.: As a child, I wanted to go to the ENS

because I wanted to be an archaeologist. But bythe time I got into the ENS Id lost that sense ofvocation. It has to be said, too, that this was atime when, for people like me, there wasnt reallymuch of a choice: you were good in either arts orsciences. And if you were good in arts, you aimedfor what was considered the best in the field,which is to say, the ENS. That, rather than anyvocation to teach, is how I ended up there.

P.H.: And your initial collaboration with

Althusser, was it a true conversion or the result

of a theoretical interest? What happened at that

point?

J.R.: Several things happened. First, there wasmy interest in Marxism, which was not at all partof the world Id been brought up in. For peoplelike me, our interest in Marxism before Althusserhad to follow some slightly unorthodox paths.The people who had written books on Marx, the

authorities on Marx at the time, were priests likeFather Calvez, who had written a hefty book onMarxs thought, or people like Sartre. So, Iarrived at Marxism with a sort of Marxian corpuswhich was hardly that of someone from thecommunist tradition, but which did provideaccess to Marx at a time when he didnt have auniversity presence and when theory was notvery developed within the French CommunistParty.

In relation to all that, Althusser represented abreak. People told me about him when I firstentered the ENS: they said he was brilliant. Hereally did offer a way of breaking with theMarxist humanist milieu in which we had beenlearning about Marx at the time. So, of course, Iwas enthusiastic, because Althusser was seduc-tive, and I was working against myself in a way,because following Althussers thinking meantbreaking with the sort of Marxism that I hadknown, that I was getting to know, and withthose forms of thought that did not share its sortof theoretical engagement.



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P.H.: Would it be too simple to say that

Althusser was a teacher, whereas Sartre was

something else not a researcher or a teacher,

but a writer or an intellectual, I guess?

J.R.: I dont know if you can say teacher. In theend, Althusser taught relatively little. His wordsseduced us, but they were those of certain writtentexts as much as anything oral. He was like thepriest of a religion of Marxist rigour, or of thereturn to the text. It wasnt really the rigour ofhis teaching that appealed so much as an enthu-siasm for his declaration that there was virginground to be opened up. His project to readCapitalwas a little like that: the completely naiveidea that we were pioneers, that no one had reallyread Marx before and that we were going to startto read him.

So there were two sides to our relation withAlthusser. There was, first of all, a sense of goingoff on an adventure: for the seminar on Capital,I was supposed to talk, to explain to people therationality ofCapital, when I still hadnt read thebook. So I rushed about, rushed to start readingthe various volumes ofCapital, in order to beable to talk to others about them. There was this

adventurous side, but there was something else aswell: our roles as pioneers put us in a position ofauthority, it gave us the authority of those whoknow, and it instituted a sort of authority oftheory, of those who have knowledge, in themidst of a political eclecticism. Thus, there wasan adventurous side and a dogmatic side to it all,and they came together: the adventure in theorywas at the same time dogmatism in theory.

P.H.: Its the role of the pioneer youve held onto. Did your break with Althusser take place

during the events of May 1968? What happened

exactly?

J.R.: For me, the key moment wasnt the eventsof May 1968, which I watched from a certaindistance, but rather the creation of Paris VIII.With the creation of a philosophy department fullof Althusserians, we had to decide what we weregoing to do. It was then I realised that Althusserstood for a certain power of the professor, theprofessor of Marxism who was so distant from

what we had seen taking place in the student andother social movements it was almost laughable.At the time, what really made me react was aprogramme for the department put together byEtienne Balibar, a programme to teach people

theoretical practice as it should be taught. I cameout rather violently against this programme, andfrom that point began a whole retrospectivereflection on the dogmatism of theory and on theposition of scholarly knowledge we had adopted.

Thats more or less how things started for me,not with the shock of 1968 but with the after-shock. Which is to say, with the creation of aninstitution, an institution where we were, in onesense, the masters. It was a matter of knowingwhat we were going to do with it, how we weregoing to manage this institutional mastery, if wewere going to identify it with the transmission ofscience or not.

P.H.: How did that work at Paris VIII? How did

you bring the rather anarchic side of egalitarian

teaching together with the institutional necessity

of granting degrees, verifying qualifications,

etc.?

J.R.: At the time, I had thought very little aboutan alternative pedagogical practice. I had more orless given up on philosophy, the teaching ofphilosophy, and academic practice. What seemedimportant was direct political practice, so for atime I stopped reflecting on and thinking ofmyself as creating a new pedagogical practice ora new type of knowledge. This was linked to thefact that the diploma in philosophy at Paris VIIIwas quickly invalidated. We no longer gave

national diplomas, so we were no longer bound bythe criteria needed to award them. For a goodwhile, then, I was absolutely uninterested inrethinking pedagogy: I was thinking, first, ofmilitant practice and then, when that was throwninto question, of my practice as a researcher. Foryears my main activity was consulting archivesand going to the Bibliothque Nationale. Myinvestment in the practice of teaching was fairlylimited.

P.H.: Did your courses continue more or less as

usual, that is, as lectures?

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J.R.: Not entirely. It varied: there were lectures,but there were also courses which took the formof conversations and interventions.

P.H.: La Leon dAlthusser [1974] insists on the

urgency of the time, a time full of possibilities,when it was still possible to present Marxism as

a way of thinking an imminent victory. When

you started to work on the nineteenth century

and on proletarian thinking in the 1830s and

1840s, was that partly to compensate for philo-

sophical defeat in the present?

J.R.: I dont think so. In the beginning, mine wasa fairly naive approach: to try to understand whatthe words workers movement, classconsciousness, workers thought, and so onreally meant, and what they concealed. Basically,it was clear that the Marxism we had learned atschool and had seen practised by Marxist organ-isations was a long way from the reality of formsof struggle and forms of consciousness. I wantedto construct a genealogy of that difference.

P.H.: A difference that begins in the moment

just before Marx?

J.R.: What I wanted to do, starting out fromthe present, from 1968 (and from what had beenproved inappropriate not only byAlthusserianism and the Communist Party butalso by the movements of the Left more gener-ally), was to rewrite the genealogy of the previ-ous century and a half. In particular, I wanted toreturn to the moment of Marxisms birth to tryto mark the difference between Marxism and

what could have been an alternative workerstradition. This project soon swerved off course.Initially it was a matter of searching for genuineforms of workers thinking, a genuine workersmovement. In relation to Marxism, then, minewas a rather identitarian perspective. But themore I worked the more I realised that what wasat issue was precisely a form of movement thatbroke with the very idea of an identitarian move-ment. Being a worker wasnt in the firstinstance a condition reflected in forms ofconsciousness or action; it was a form of symbol-isation, the arrangement of a certain set of state-

ments or utterances. I became interested inreconstituting the world that made these utter-ances [nonciations] possible.

P.H.: Many of your contemporaries abandoned

Marxism rather quickly, having come to theconclusion that the proletariat as the univer-

sal subject of an eventually singular history, the

class that incarnates the dissolution of class

seemed to lead more or less directly to the

Gulag. You, on the other hand, continued to

reflect on the proletariat in its singularity, but

by resituating it in an historical sequence that

seemed better able to anticipate the risks of

dogmatism and dictatorship. It was still a ques-

tion of a universal singularity, but a singular-

ity in some sense absent from itself, a deferred,

differentiated singularity.

J.R.: In the end, what interested me was a doublemovement, the movement of singularisation andits opposite. On the one hand, there was a move-ment away from the properties that characterisedthe workers being and the forms of statementthat were supposed to go along with that condi-tion. On the other hand, this withdrawal itself

created forms of universalisation, forms ofsymbolisation which also constituted the positiv-ity of a figure. What interested me was alwaysthis play between negativation and positivation. Iwas interested in thinking it through as animpossible identification, since the intellectualrevolution in question here was, in the firstinstance, a work of disidentification. The prole-tarians of the 1830s were people seeking toconstitute themselves as speaking beings, as

thinking beings in their own right. But this effortto break down the barrier between those whothink and those who dont came to constitute asort of shared symbolic system, a system foreverthreatened by new positivation. As a result, youcould no longer say that there had been anauthentic workers movement somewhere, onethat had managed to escape all forms of positi-vation and deterioration.

I wanted to show that these forms of subjecti-vation or disidentification were always at risk offalling into an identitarian positivation, whetherthat was a corporative conception of class or the



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glorious body of a community of producers. Itwasnt a matter of opposing a true proletariat tosome corporatist degeneration or to the Marxistsproletariat; rather, I wanted to show how thefigure of subjectivation itself was constantly

unstable, constantly caught between the work ofsymbolic disincorporation and the constitution ofnew bodies.

P.H.: Sometimes you present political practice

as a sort ofex nihilo innovation, almost like theconstitution of a new world, even if the world in

question is extremely fragile, uncertain,

ephemeral. Dont you need to consider political

innovation alongside the development of its

conditions of possibility? I mean, for instance,

on the political side of things, the role played

by civic institutions and state organisations, the

public space opened up, in Athens, in France, by

the invention of democratic institutions (that is,

the sort of factors you generally relegate to the

sphere of the police, as opposed to the sphere ofpolitics). And on the linguistic side of things,

Im thinking of some sort of preliminary equal-

ity of competences, a basic sharing of the

symbolic domain. Such might be the objection of

someone working in the Habermasian tradition.In short, which comes first: the people or the citi-

zen?

J.R.: I dont know if you can say that one ofthose comes before the other, because so many ofthese things work retroactively. There is aninscription of citizenship because there is amovement which forces this inscription, but thismovement to force inscription almost always

refers back to some sort ofpre-inscription. Menwho are free and equal in their rights are alwayssupposed already to exist in order that their exis-tence can be proclaimed and their legal inscrip-tion enforced. I would say, though, that thisequality or legal freedom produces nothing initself. It exists only in so far as it defines a possi-bility, in so far as there is an effective movementwhich can grasp it and bring it into existenceretroactively.

For me the question of a return to origins ishopeless. If we take modern democracy, it isclear it works by recourse to an earlier inscrip-

tion. There is always an earlier inscription, be it1789, the American or English Revolution,Christianity, or the ancient city-state; as a result,the question of origins doesnt really come up.As to the origin of origins, you can conceive it in

different ways: it could be an originary anthro-pology of the political, but I know I dont havethe means or tools to think of it this way. Itcould be a transcendental condition, but, for me,this transcendental condition can work only as aprocess of retroactive demonstration. I donthave any answers as to real, actual origins, and Idont think you can set out something like a tran-scendental condition for there being people ingeneral.

P.H.: Nonetheless, you insist on an equality

that exists once people speak, once they say to

themselves they are equal as people who speak.

Doesnt this equality, however, establish at thevery same time the conditions of an inequality

between people who speak more or less well? An

abstract equality between players taking part in

the same game and following the same rules

always exists, but obviously that doesnt stop

there being winners and losers. Is it a matter of

a real equality or some sort of inclusion presup-posed by participation in the game (which, in

the end, is less a matter of equality than of

formal similarity)?

J.R.: It isnt a formal similarity. Rather, it isthe necessity of some minimal equality ofcompetence in order for the game to be playable.As I said when I went back to JosephJacotot [discussed in detail in The Ignorant

Schoolmaster (1987)] in Disagreement (1995):for an order to be transmitted and executedthere has to be a minimal level of linguisticequality. This is the problem that troublesAristotle: slaves need to understand what theyare told. Aristotle gets around it by saying thatthe slave participates in language by under-standing it but not possessing it. He discerns akind of hard kernel in the possession oflanguage, which he opposes to its simple use.But what is this possession, this hexis, which heopposes to the simple fact of understanding? Henever explains it.

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I dont have an irenic understanding oflanguage as some sort of common patrimonywhich allows everyone to be equal. Im justsaying that language games, and especiallylanguage games that institute forms of depend-

ence, presume a minimal equality of competencein order that inequality itself can operate. Thatsall Im saying. And I say this not to groundequality but to show, rather, how this equalityonly ever functions polemically. If it is a tran-scendental category, its only substance lies in theacts which make manifest its effectiveness.

P.H.: Isnt there a quasi-transcendental or at

least transhistorical aspect to your idea that the

political actor, the universal actor, is always to

be found on the side of those who arent

accounted for in the organisation of society?

Politics as you conceive it always concerns the

mobilisation of those who arent included in the

social totality, who constitute a part of society

which groups those who belong to no identifi-

able social part (or who have no particular share

[part] of society) and who thus establishthemselves as the incarnation of the universal

interest. The examples you give (Athenian

democracy, 1789, proletarian singularity, etc.),are they thus examples of a more general rule:

that politics only happens when the excluded are

able to affirm themselves in universal terms?

What leads you to believe that this remains the

rule in todays and tomorrows political

conflicts? Its difficult to imagine a genuine

conception of the universal in the USA today,

for example, when people are so caught up in

the conflict between the abstract power of the

market and various communitarian and identi-tarian movements.

J.R.: It isnt a question of belief so much as ofdefining the political. There are clearly all sortsof government and many different modes ofdomination and management. If politics has ameaning, and a meaning that applies to every-thing we seek to elaborate as specifically politi-cal, for me its meaning is just this: there is awhole that constitutes itself other than as acollection of existing parts. For me, this is theonly condition under which we can speak of poli-

tics. Which doesnt stop there being states,communities, and collectivities, all of whichoperate according to their different logics. Butwe must distinguish this very specific form,where the capacity for power is attributed to

those who have noparticularability to exerciseit, where the accounting of the whole is dissoci-ated from any organic conception, from thegenerality of forms of assembly, government,and domination.

I think that the USA is indeed a barely polit-ical community. This doesnt mean that therearent conflicts. But there is a whole structuredsystem of being together which is not onlythought but also massively practised in terms ofbelonging or membership (perhaps founded onsub-memberships), in terms of properties andrights attached to memberships, and so on. Forme, all this defines an ethical rather than a polit-ical conception of community. This conceptiondoesnt necessarily have disastrous conse-quences, even though it seems to in the USAtoday. I see it as a question of definition: acommunity is political when it authorises formsof subjectivation for the uncounted, for thoseunaccounted for. This neednt imply a visible

category which identifies itself as the excludedand which wants to identify the community withitself in that case wed be back in ethics. I amsimply saying that when there is a properlypolitical symbolising of the community, thenthis, in the last instance, is where it lies.Inequality first takes effect as a miscounting ormisaccounting, an inequality of the communityto itself.

Now as to the question: is politics still possi-

ble today? I would say that politics is alwayspossible, there is no reason for it to be impossi-ble. But is politics actually imminent? Here,obviously, I share your sadness, if not yourpessimism, about the current state of publicaffairs.

P.H.: There has often been, for instance, in the

anti-colonial struggles, in the struggle for civil

rights in the USA, a universalist moment, as

you conceive it. This moment rarely lasts,

however, and many Americans might say

that under the circumstances there were good



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reasons to replace Martin Luther King with

Malcolm X in short, that in the reality of the

struggle a choice had to be made: to adopt some

sort of militant particularism or accept the effec-

tive end of the struggle.

J.R.: I wouldnt claim to advise American politi-cal movements, especially those that took placein the past. I think that we are always ambigu-ously placed, at constant risk of being coercivelypinned down. Either you are taken in by auniversal that is someone elses, that is, you trustsome idea of citizenship and equality as it oper-ates in a society that in fact denies you thesethings, or you feel you must radically denouncethe gap between idea and fact, usually byrecourse to some identitarian logic. At this point,though, whatever you manage to achieve comesbecause you show yourself to belong to this iden-tity. Its very difficult, but I think that politicsconsists of refusing this dilemma and putting theuniversal under stress. Politics involves pushingboth others universal and ones own particular-ity to the point where each comes to contradictitself. It turns on the possibility of connectingthe symbolic violence of a separation with a

reclaiming of universality. The double risk ofwhat goes by the name of liberalism still remains:on the one hand, submission to the universal asformulated by those who dominate; on the otherhand, confinement within an identitarianperspective in those instances where the func-tioning of this universal is interrupted. Nomovement has really managed to avoid bothrisks altogether.

P.H.: Does your idea of democracy presupposedemocracy as it is supposed to have existed for

several centuries, that is, where the place of

power is in principle empty, such that it might

be occupied, at least occasionally, by excep-

tional figures of universal interest?

J.R.: I dont think the place of power is empty.Unlike Claude Lefort, I dont tie democracy tothe theme of an empty place of power.Democracy is first and foremost neither a formof power nor a form of the emptiness of power,that is, a form of symbolisingpolitical power.

For me, democracy isnt a form of power but thevery existence of the political (in so far as poli-tics is distinct from knowing who has the right tooccupy power or how power should be occupied),precisely because it defines a paradoxical

power one that doesnt allow anyone legiti-mately to claim a place on the basis of his or hercompetences. Democracy is, first of all, a prac-tice, which means that the very same institutionsof power may or may not be accompanied by ademocratic life. The same forms of parliamen-tary powers, the same institutional frameworkscan either give rise to a democratic life, that is, asubjectivation of the gap between two ways ofcounting or accounting for the community, oroperate simply as instruments for the reproduc-tion of an oligarchic power.

P.H.: It isnt first and foremost a question of

power? This is Slavoj Zizeks objection, when he

reads you (briefly) in his The Ticklish Subject[1999]: that you posit unrealistic, impossibly

ideal conditions for political practice, and as a

result end up just keeping your hands clean.

How might we organise a true popular mobili-

sation without recourse to power, the party,

authority, etc.?

J.R.: Im not saying you need absolutely nopower. Im not preaching spontaneity as againstorganisation. Forms of organisation and relationsof authority are always being set up. The factthat I dont much care for the practices of powerand the forms of thought they engender is asecondary, personal concern. The central prob-lem is theoretical. Politics may well have to do

with powers and their implementation, but thatdoesnt mean that politics and power are one andthe same. The essential point is that politicscannot be defined simply as the organisation of acommunity. Nor can it be defined as the occu-pation of the place of government, which isnt tosay that this place doesnt exist or doesnt haveto be occupied. It is the peculiar tendency ofwhat I call the police to confuse these things.Politics is always an alternative to any policeorder, regardless of both the forms of power theformer must develop and the latters organisa-tion, form or value.

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P.H.: But, leaving aside the business of govern-

ment, how are we to think the organisation of

political authority in this sense? What sorts oforganisation enable the insurrection of the

excluded or the militant mobilisation of univer-

sal interest? Its obvious youre not a partythinker. But how are we to pursue a politics

without party which will, nevertheless, remain a

militantpolitics? Is this something that needs tobe reinvented within each political episode?

J.R.: I dont think there are rules for good mili-tant organisation. If there were, wed alreadyhave applied them and wed certainly be furtheralong than we are at the moment. All I can defineare forms of perception, forms of utterance. Asto how these are then taken up by organisations,I must admit that Ive never been able to endureany one of them for very long, but I know I havenothing better to propose.

P.H.: Towards the end ofDisagreement, I think,you say there was a genuine political movement

in France at the time of the Algerian war, a

subversive movement, that was clearly different

from the movements of generalised sympathy

which developed around the recent conflicts inBosnia, Rwanda, and Timor. Can you see the

beginnings of a new movement of this type,

against the aggressor, in some currents of anti-

American and anti-globalisation thinking?

J.R.: That is difficult to define today. Its easy tosee that people are inspired by the dream of apolitical movement that would define itself inopposition to the domination of international

capitalism. In reality, though, no political move-ment has yet defined itself against internationalcapital. To this point they have been definedwithin national frameworks, or as relationsbetween distinct peoples and their national states,or possibly as three-way relations, as was the casewith Algeria and with the anti-imperialist strug-gles more generally. In such cases the nationalstage split on the international stage and allowedthe uncounted to be accounted for. This three-way game, thispoliticalcause of the other, seemsimpossible today. The anti-globalisation move-ments want to take on capital as world govern-

ment directly. But capital is precisely a govern-ment that isnt one: it isnt a state, and it doesntrecognise any people inside or outside it whomight serve as its point of reference or offerthemselves for subjectivation. The idea of the

multitude proposed by Negri and Hardt is adirect response to this absence of points at whichpolitical subjectivation might take hold. In theend, their idea rests on the transposition of aMarxian economic schema by which the forces ofproduction break through the external frameworkof the relations of production. Capital escapes allpolitical holds. The vast demonstrations of recentyears have, in fact, sought to force it onto thepolitical stage through the institutional or polic-ing instruments by which it operates.

The idea of a direct relation between the multi-tude and empire seems to me to bypass the prob-lem of constituting a global political stage. Imnot sure that we will ever attain a directly politi-cal form of anti-capitalist struggle. I dont thinkthere can be an anti-imperialist politics whichisnt mediated by relations to states, bringing intoplay an inside and an outside. Its easy to sensethe difficulties that the anti-globalisation move-ments and their theorists have when it comes to

current forms of imperialism for example, withAmerican politics after 11 September. Its clearthat the rules of the game are being mixed uptoday. At the time of the big anti-imperialistmovements against the Vietnam War, forinstance, we had a clear sense of who was theaggressor and who was under attack; we couldplay on the obvious contradiction between inter-nal democratic discourse and external imperialistaggression. Again, when the USA supported such

and such a dictatorship in the name of the strug-gle against communism, we could demonstratethe discrepancy between the declared struggle fordemocracy and the reality of supporting dictator-ships. What has characterised the whole periodafter 11 September, however, has been theerasure of these signs of contradiction. The war inAfghanistan was presented directly as a war ofgood against evil. The contradictions betweeninside and outside, like those between words anddeeds, have disappeared in favour of a generalmoralising of political life. The global reign of theeconomy is accompanied by a global reign of



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morality, in which it is harder for political actionto find its stakes.

P.H.: So, for you, national mediation remains

essential and effective for the moment?

J.R.: I think national mediation remains effec-tive, yes, because its there that the relationbetween a structure of inclusion and what itexcludes plays itself out. If lots of things arehappening around those without particularlyaround immigrants without papers [sans-papiers] it is because the example of thosewithout papers exposes the contradictionbetween affirming free circulation in a worldwithout borders and the practices of keepingborders under surveillance and defining groupsof people who cannot cross them. So, I thinkthere are specific scenes of contradiction inconfining some people while allowing others tocirculate freely, but not one great nomadic move-ment of the multitude against empire or oneoverarching relation between the system and itsperipheries.

P.H.: A last question on politics. You say that

the essential work of politics is the configura-tion of its own space. It is to get the world of its

subjects and its operations to be seen.2 You

want to distinguish all political action every

instance of dissensus from what you call the

domain of the police, the domain of social coor-

dination, the government, etc. But dont we have

to think of politics in relation to all the various

ways that social inequality is structured, in rela-

tion, for example, to education, the organisation

of urban life, conditions of employment,economic power, etc.?

J.R.: There I think youre attributing to me anidea that isnt mine but Badious. I think that itis indeed possible to define what is specific topolitics, and in such a way as to separate politi-cal practice and the ideas of political communityfrom all forms of negotiation between the inter-ests of social groups. Thats why I say that thepolitical isnt the social. But Id also say that thesocial as an historical configuration isnt somesort of shameful empirical magma situational,

state-controlled, and so on (rather as Badiouimagines it) which the political act wouldescape from. On the contrary, I think that thesocial is a complex domain, that what we call thesocial is a sort of mixture where the policing

logics which determine how things are to bedistributed or shared out among social groupsencounter the various ways of configuring thecommon space which throw these same distribu-tions into question. What we call social bene-fits are not only forms of redistributing nationalincome; they are always also ways of reconfigur-ing what is shared or common. In the end, every-thing in politics turns on the distribution ofspaces. What are these places? How do they func-tion? Why are they there? Who can occupythem? For me, political action always acts uponthe social as the litigious distribution of placesand roles. It is always a matter of knowing whois qualified to say what a particular place is andwhat is done in it.

So, I think that politics constantly emergesfrom questions traditionally thought of as social,that politics runs through labour movements andstrikes, as well as around educational questions.You could say that the great political movements

in France over the last twenty years have beenconnected with social questions, those of schooland university, the status of employees, the sans-papiers or the unemployed all fundamentallyquestions we might call social. But what doessocial mean? It means that what is at stake ininstitutional problems relating to school ornationality, or in problems arising around thedistribution of work and wealth (employment orsocial benefits), is really the configuring of what

is shared or common. Im thinking, for example,of the movements in France that grew up arounduniversity selection in 1986, or around pensionsand social benefits in the autumn of 1995. Thebattle over selection reminded us that the schooland university system is not simply an instru-ment of training or reproduction; it is alsothe institution by which a society signifies toitself the meaning of the community that insti-tutes it. In the same way, questions relating topensions, health, and social security not onlyconcern what are referred to as employees priv-ileges and rights but also engage with the idea of

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the configuration of the common sphere.Whether healthcare and pensions operate by asystem of redistribution and solidarity, orthrough individual private insurance, doesntjust concern the privileges that employees may

have acquired at any historical moment: ittouches on the configuring of the commonsphere. Within any so-called social negotiationthere is always negotiation over what the commu-nity holds as common.

P.H.: You quote Hannah Arendt from time to

time: do you feel close to her conception of poli-

tics, politics as a place of negotiation, a place

of performances and appearances (rather than

timeless essences), of the vita activa valuedabove the pretensions of theory, philosophy, and

the vita contemplativa?

J.R.: Lets say theres some ground for agree-ment, coupled with a very strong disagreement (adisagreement which is also a reaction against thedominant uses and interpretations of her worktoday). The basis of agreement is that politics isa matter of appearance [apparence], a matter ofconstituting a common stage or acting out

common scenes rather than governing commoninterests. That said, in Hannah Arendt thisfundamental affirmation is linked to the idea thatthe political stage is blurred or cluttered by theclaims of the social Im thinking of what shehas to say about the French Revolution and therole of pity, where compassion for the needyclouds the purity of the political scene. To mymind this just returns us to some of the mosttraditional preconceptions about there being two

distinct sorts of life: one able to play the politi-cal game of appearance and the other supposedlydevoted to the sole reality of reproducing life.Her conception of political appearance simplymirrors the traditional (that is, Platonic) opposi-tion, which reserves the legitimate use of appear-ance for one form of life alone. For me, bycontrast, the appearance of the demos shattersany division between those who are deemed ableand those who are not. Her opposition betweenthe political and the social returns us to the oldoppositions in Greek philosophy between men ofleisure and men of necessity, the latter being

men whose needs exclude them from the domainof appearance and, hence, from politics.

A significant part of what Ive managed towrite about politics is a response to HannahArendts use, in On Revolution, of John

Adamss little phrase, that the misfortune of thepoor lies in their being unseen. She says thatsuch an idea could only have occurred to some-one who was already a participant in the distinc-tion of political life, that it cannot be shared bythe poor in question, because they do not realisethey are not seen so a demand for visibility hasno meaning for them. However, all my work onworkers emancipation showed that the mostprominent of the claims put forward by theworkers and the poor was precisely the claim tovisibility, a will to enter the political realm ofappearance, the affirmation of a capacity forappearance. Hannah Arendt remains a prisonerof the tautology by which those who cannotthink a thing do not think it. As I understand it,though, politics begins exactly when those whocannot do something show that in fact theycan. That is the theoretical differend. As forpractice, Arendts distinction between the politi-cal and the social has been widely used (during

the events of December 1995 to justify govern-mental policies, for example). Liberals andrepublicans keep on reciting their HannahArendt to show that politics which is to say, thestate and the government is above social petti-ness, a realm of common collective interests thattranscends corporate egoisms.

P.H.: Michelet figures prominently in yourTheNames of History [1992]. Did his conception of

history as the history of collective liberty, of apeople becoming conscious of itself, the story of

a hitherto silent peoples entry into speech,

inspire you in one way or another? And what is

Michelets relation, say, to the egalitarian

thought of a Jacotot (as you describe it in TheIgnorant Schoolmaster)?

J.R.: I wanted, above all, to show how Michelethad invented a new form of mastery, one basedon anonymous collective speech. Its theRomantic thesis of a speech that is supposed tocome from below in opposition to the dominant,



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noisy voices of the day. But Michelet never letsthis speech from below actually be spoken, in itsown terms. He converts the speech of revolu-tionary assemblies into a kind of discourse of theearth: a discourse of the fields or the city, of

rural harvests or the mud in the streets, the silentword of truth as opposed to the actual words ofspeakers. What I tried to explain was the consti-tution of this paradigm of the silent masses (asdistinct from the noisy people), the poetico-polit-ical paradigm of a great anonymous, unconsciousthought expressing itself not through peopleswords but through their silence, which thenbecomes a scientific paradigm in history andsociology. This wordless speech is somethingcompletely different from Jacotot and his affir-mation of the capacity to speak of those whodont know how, that is, his presuppositionand verification of the equality of intelligences.

There are two ways of thinking equality. Itcan be thought in terms of intellectual emanci-pation founded on the idea of man as a literaryanimal an idea of equality as a capacity to beverified by anybody. Or it can be thought interms of the indifferentiation of a collectivespeech, a great anonymous voice the idea that

speech is everywhere, that there is speech writtenon things, some voice of reality itself whichspeaks better than any uttered word. This secondidea begins in literature, in Victor Hugos speechof the sewer that says everything, and inMichelets voice of the mud or the harvest. Later,this poetic paradigm becomes a scientific one.

The obvious problem is that these two para-digms, these two ways of thinking the equality ofthe nameless, which are opposed in theory, keep

mixing in practice, so that discourses of emanci-pation continually interweave the ability to speakdemonstrated by anyone at all together with thesilent power of the collective.

P.H.: This is perhaps a good moment to move on

to questions of aesthetics. Your book on

Mallarm came out in 1996, followed by LaParole muette in 1998. Since then you seem tohave been working mainly on topics relating to

art, literature, and aesthetics. Why the shift in

interest? Was it something foreseen, something

you had been anticipating?

J.R.: Ive never had a programme for the future,have never programmed my future projects. So,Ive never imagined my work developing frompolitics to aesthetics, especially since it hasalways sought to blur boundaries. What I wanted

to show when I wrote Nights of Labor[1981] wasthat a so-called political and social movement wasalso an intellectual and aesthetic one, a way ofreconfiguring the frameworks of the visible andthe thinkable. In the same way, in DisagreementI tried to show how politics is an aestheticmatter, a reconfiguration of the way we share outor divide places and times, speech and silence,the visible and the invisible. My personal inter-ests have most often drawn me to literature andcinema, certainly more than to questions of so-called political science, which in themselves havenever interested me very much. And if I was ableto write on workers history it was because Ialways had in mind a whole play of literary refer-ences, because I saw workers texts through anumber of models offered by literature, andbecause I developed a mode of writing andcomposition that allowed me to break, in prac-tice, with the politics implicit in the traditionalway of treating workers speech, as the expres-

sion of a condition. For me, the elaboration of aphilosophical discourse or a theoretical scene isalways also the putting into practice of a certainpoetics.

So, for me, there has never been a move frompolitics to aesthetics. Take the Mallarm book,for example: what was the core of my interest inMallarm? Something like a community of scene[de scne]. The two prose poems in whichMallarm stages the poets relation to the prole-

tarian interested me initially because theyreplayed in a new way scenes that had alreadybeen acted out between proletarians and utopi-ans. Even the relation between day and night inMallarm (which is generally understood throughthe themes of nocturnal anxiety and purity)reminded me strongly of why I had spoken of thenights of labour not on account of workersmisfortune, but in recognition of the fact thatthey annex the night, the time of rest, andthereby break the order of time which keepsthem confined to a certain place. All this hasalways been absolutely connected for me,

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whether I take it as the aesthetics inherent inpolitics or the politics inherent in writing. BeforeMallarm, before La Parole muette, even beforeDisagreement, I led a seminar over several yearson the politics of writing that is, not on how

to write politics but on what is properly polit-ical in writing. The work on Michelet was aboutthe birth of a certain way of writing history. Doeswriting translate properties and transmit knowl-edge, or does it itself constitute an act, a way ofconfiguring and dividing the shared domain ofthe sensible? These questions have continued tointerest me.

This politics of writing is, then, somethingcompletely different from the questions of repre-sentation by which politics and aesthetics aregenerally linked. Knowing how writers representwomen, workers, and foreigners has never reallyinterested me. My interest has always been inwriting as a way of cutting up the universalsingular. Im thinking, for example, of Flaubertsdeclarations, such as I am interested less in theragged than in the lice who feed on them, whichsuppose a whole idea of the relation between thepopulation of a novel and a social population (orthe people in a political sense), and which posit

a literary equality on a level that is no longerthe one used to debate political equality. In itsown way, literature too introduces a dissensusand a miscounting which are not those of politi-cal action. I am interested in the relation betweenthe two, rather than, say, the various forms ofbias in the representation of social categoriesin Flaubert. I began to reflect on these things viathe question of writing history, and this reflec-tion grew into the work on the politics of litera-

ture.Then, on account of my work on history andthe writing of history, I happened to be asked bypeople in the arts to apply my analyses to theirfields and problems both in cinema, in whichIve always had a personal interest (my firstsubstantial text on cinema, for example, dealtwith the relation between the aesthetic and thesocial in Rossellinis Europe 51), and in other,less familiar fields (I was asked to speak, forexample, in my own way about history for theexhibition Face lhistoire organised by theCentre Pompidou in 1997). This last invitation

gave me the opportunity to work on the questionof contemporary art, a topic that had not inter-ested me up to then.

So there is a constant aesthetic core in every-thing I do, even if I only began to speak of liter-

ature explicitly at a particular moment, havingaddressed it until then through questions ofhistory and what one might call the forms ofworkers literary appropriations. Then camerequests for me to speak on topics about which Ihad no real competence. After what I had done,people thought I should have things to say aboutcontemporary art, for example. I didnt know alot about it, but I wanted to respond to the chal-lenge, because it was a chance to learn somethingnew, and to learn how to talk about it.

P.H.: Is there a conceptual parallel between the

status of literature as you describe it in the wake

of the Romantic revolution on the one hand,

the writing of everything, a systematic, ency-

clopaedic, even geological, literature in the

manner of Cuvier and Balzac, and, on the other

hand, a literature of nothing, a writing which

ultimately refers only to itself3 and the status

of politics? As if they were both efforts to

connect everything and nothing, exclusion andthe universal?

J.R.: There is no direct link between the two, butthey both refer back to the same kernel of mean-ing. It is the ancient fictional or dramatic plot,the same organic, Aristotelian idea of the workthat bursts either from a profusion of things andsigns or from the rarefaction of events andsenses. Broadly, literature as a regime of writing

defines itself in the period after the Revolutionnot simply as another way of writing, anotherway of conceiving of the art of writing, but alsoas a whole mode of interpreting society and theplace of speech in it. Literature defines itselfaround an idea of speech that somehow exceedsthe simple figure of the speaker. It defines itselfaround the idea that there is speech [parole]everywhere, and that what speaks in a poem isnot necessarily what any speaking intention hasput into it. This is all the legacy of Vico. Eitherthat or there is language [langage] everywhere,which is Balzacs position. There is something



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like a vast poem everywhere, which is the poemthat society itself writes by both uttering andhiding itself in a multitude of signs.

Or, if you take the Flaubertian perspective,the book about nothing comes to replace the

lost totality. In fact, this is still Schillers idea ofnaive (as opposed to sentimental) poetry asthe poem of a world (an idea with colossal forcewhose effects are still with us), an unconscious orinvoluntary poem for which we must producean equivalent in the inverse form of a work thatrelates only to itself. The lost totality rediscoversitself on the side of nothing, but we must look atwhat this nothing means. Flaubert invents a sortof atomic micrology which is supposed topulverise the democratic population. At the sametime, he contributes to what we could call anaesthetic of equal intensities opposed to thehierarchies of the representative tradition which is the aesthetic he addresses to MadameBovary even as he condemns her. There is aconflictual complicity between the fictionalpopulation and the social world that this litera-ture addresses. Flaubert writes againstMadame Bovary and the democratic confusionof art and life, but, at the same time, he writes

from the democratic point of view whichaffirms the equality of subjects and intensities. Itis this tension that interests me. Literatureinvents itself as another way of talking about thethings politicians talk about.

P.H.: For some time now, most aesthetic

thinkers have emphasised the importance of

modernism and the avant-garde. Among your

contemporaries, you are one of the few to pay

more attention to Romanticism and to the nine-teenth century more generally. For you, the

answers to many of the questions that aesthetics

asks are still to be found in Schiller, Kant, and

Balzac. What is the key to what you call the

aesthetic revolution?4 And how do you under-

stand modernism?

J.R.: What is the kernel of the aesthetic revolu-tion? First of all, negatively, it means the ruin ofany art defined as a set of systematisable prac-tices with clear rules. It means the ruin of any artwhere arts dignity is defined by the dignity of its

subjects in the end, the ruin of the whole hier-archical conception of art which places tragedyabove comedy and history painting above genrepainting, etc. To begin with, then, the aestheticrevolution is the idea that everything is material

for art, so that art is no longer governed by itssubject, by what it speaks of: art can show andspeak of everything in the same manner. In thissense, the aesthetic revolution is an extension toinfinity of the realm of language, of poetry.

It is the affirmation that poems are every-where, that paintings are everywhere. So, it isalso the development of a whole series of formsof perception which allow us to see the beautifuleverywhere. This implies a great anonymisationof the beautiful (Mallarms ordinary splen-dour). I think this is the real kernel: the idea ofequality and anonymity. At this point, the idealof art becomes the conjunction of artistic willand the beauty or poeticity that is in some senseimmanent in everything, or that can be uncov-ered everywhere.

That is what you find all through the fictionof the nineteenth century, but its at work in thepoetry too. For example, its what Benjaminisolated in Baudelaire, but its something much

broader than that too. It implies a sort of explod-ing of genre and, in particular, that great mixingof literature and painting which dominates bothliterature and painting in the nineteenth century.It is this blending of literature and painting, pureand applied art, art for arts sake and art withinlife, which will later be opposed by the wholemodernist doxa that asserts the growing auton-omy of the various arts.

The entire modernist ideology is constructed

on the completely simplistic image of a greatanti-representational rupture: at a certainmoment, supposedly, nobody represents anymore, nobody copies models, art applies its ownefforts to its own materials, and in the processeach form of art becomes autonomous.Obviously all this falls apart in the 1960s and1970s, in what some will see as the betrayal ofmodernism. I think, though, that modernism isan ideology of art elaborated completely retro-spectively. Modernists are always trying tothink Mallarm and the pure poem, abstractpainting, pure painting, or Schoenberg and a

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music that would no longer be expressive, etc.But if you look at how this came about, yourealise that all the so-called movements to definea pure art were in fact completely mixed up withall sorts of other preoccupations architectural,

social, religious, political, and so on. The wholeparadox of an aesthetic regime of art is that artdefines itself by its very identity with non-art.You cannot understand people like Malevich,Mondrian or Schoenberg if you dont rememberthat their pure art is inscribed in the midst ofquestions regarding synaesthesia, the construc-tion of an individual or collective setting for life,utopias of community, new forms of spirituality,etc. The modernist doxa is constructed exactly atthe point when the slightly confused mixture ofpolitical and artistic rationalities begins to comeapart.

Remarkably, modernism that is, the concep-tion of modern art as the art of autonomy waslargely invented by Marxists. Why? Because itwas a case of proving that, even if the social revo-lution had been confiscated, in art the purity ofa rupture had been maintained, and with it thepromise of emancipation. Im racing through allthis, but I do think that this is what lies behind

Adorno or Greenberg: a way of defining artsradicality by the radicality of its separation, thatis, a way of separating art radically from politicsin order to preserve its political potential.Afterwards, this complicated dialectic is effacedin the simplistic dogma of modern art as the artof autonomy. Obviously, this dogma does notsurvive for very long in the face of the reality ofartistic practices, and when it collapses, peoplestart saying Modernity is falling apart. But it

hasnt: what has fallen apart is just a very partialand belated interpretation of what I call theaesthetic mode of art.

P.H.: For you, then, is it a matter of maintain-

ing the contradictory relations of the aesthetic

regime, of continuing in the difficult dialectic

of whole and nothing, of the controlled inscrip-

tion of a generalised speech (an anonymous

beauty, as you put it) and the vacillation of an

ultimately silent discourse which affirms its

own unconsciousness and lack of identity? You

seek to continue in that tradition, rather than

swing in the opposite direction, towards the

postmodern, for example, or the post-whatever?

J.R.: I dont really believe in any great historicalbreak between the modern and the postmodern.

There arent many solid identifying features ofan art that would be postmodern. How exactlyare you going to define postmodernism? By thereturn of figuration? But that is only a part of it.By the mixing of genres? But that is much older.For me, if you want to think about breaks, itsimportant first of all to understand the continu-ities to understand, for example, that modernart was not born, as we still believe, in a simpleand radical break with the realist tradition.The categories which allow us to think modernart were entirely elaborated in the modes offocusing perception that were first imposed bythe realist novel: indifference to subject, close-ups, the primacy of detail and tone. It was oftennovelists like the Goncourts, for example whoas art critics reconfigured the logic of visibility inthe field of painting (which was still very muchfigurative), valorising the pictorial material overits subject. Painting was seen in a new way, onethat abstracted its subject, before painters them-

selves abandoned figuration.To take another example: installation is one of

the central forms of contemporary art. But youwill find an extraordinary passage in Zolas LeVentre de Paris a completely mad book from1874, a great hymn to poetry, and to greatmodern poetry in particular. Now, what is thisgreat modern poetry? And what is the greatmonument of the nineteenth century? Les Halles[the central markets] in Paris. Zola installs his

painter, Claude Lantier the impressionistpainter as he sees him, a painter in search ofmodern beauty in this monument of moder-nity. At one point, Lantier explains that his mostbeautiful work wasnt a painting. Rather, hecreated his masterpiece the day he redid hiscousin the butchers window display. Hedescribes this display, how he arranged the bloodsausages, dried sausages, turkeys, and hams. Stillwith Zola, in Au Bonheur des dames you alsohave the department store as a work of modernart, with the capitalist, Octave Mouret, as thegreat poet of modernity, the poet of commodity



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installation. At that time, then, no one madeinstallations, but an indecision between the art ofthe canvas and the art of display can already bemarked. An art that has only developed in thelast twenty or thirty years had, in some sense,

already found its thought and its visibility. Themodern solitude of art has always also been itsnon-solitude.

P.H.: But what if you take a hard modernist

like Rothko, whose last paintings revolve

around blackness, the absence of all figuration,

all application?

J.R.: Sure, but that was an idea of modernism,and, in any case, we know that it wasnt an ideaof pure painting, since at the time Rothko wasbecoming more and more mystical. Of course,you can cite painters who fit into the exemplaryconfiguration of modernism as it wasconstructed, most notably, by Greenberg. But, inthe end, what is this configuration? A shortsequence of abstract art done at a particularmoment by artists with roots in other traditions,notably surrealism. You absolutely cannotreduce modern art to this short sequence of

abstract painting. Modern art is also construc-tivism, surrealism, Dadaism, or what have you all forms of art with roots in Romantic thinkingabout the relation between art and life. I do notlike modernism as a concept, because it seeks toidentify an entire regime of art with a few partic-ular manifestations that it presents as exemplary,interprets in an extraordinarily restrictive way,and links to an absolutely uncritical idea ofhistorical time.

P.H.: Moving on now to my last questions,

which are mostly about the immediate intellec-

tual context of your work. I was struck by your

reading of Freud, or rather your literary recon-

textualising of Freuds work in LInconscientesthtique [2001]. Can you generalise yourposition a little, to incorporate Lacan, for

example Lacan as a thinker who insists on

the primacy of speech, precisely, on the equality

and essential anonymity of all speech

phenomena, on the importance of listening to

speech qua speech, etc.?

J.R.: I wont say very much about Lacan, becauseI still really dont know what to think of him or,rather, what to do with his thought. For me, theproblem with Lacan is that he seemed to hoverbetween several rationalities. When my genera-

tion got to know him, it was the time of theprimacy of the signifier, the great structuralistmoment, which in my view had no importantconsequences at the level of aesthetics. Whatbecame visible in Lacans subsequent work,though, was a whole other legacy, the surrealistlegacy of Bataille and all those movements in the1930s which wanted in their own way to rethinkrelations between aesthetics and politics awhole way of thinking the obscure rationality ofthought that was not dependent on the Freudianlogic of the symptom (itself still linked to anAristotelian poetics of history as causal agency).Lacan, in this sense, is a lot closer to Romanticpoetics than Freud is. Where Freud deciphers,Lacan turns to the silent words that remainsilent, those ultimate blocks of nonsense whichcan either become emblems of an absolute free-dom ( la Breton) or embody the accursed share,the opaque residue impenetrable to sense ( laBataille). For me, that is ultimately the differ-

ence Lacan brings.This difference shows up clearly in the uses

Freud and Lacan make of Sophocles. Freud obvi-ously constructs everything around the figure ofOedipus, around the link between incestuousdesire as an object and an Enlightenment notionof rationality (the path of interpretation recon-stituting the causal chain). Lacan, on the otherhand, turns more and more to Antigone, whosedesire does not lend itself to interpretation, who

wants only to maintain a stubborn fidelity to thepowers below, who, in short, wants only death.Im thinking here of Lacan taking up Antigoneat the time of the Baader-Meinhof gang, to showthat she has nothing to do with the icon ofhuman rights in the face of power that she isalways made out to be, but is in fact closer toUlrike Meinhof and the radicality of thoseGerman terrorists. The regime of signification inwhich Lacan constructs Antigone is a lot closerto what one might call aesthetic reason than theone Freud uses. The latter reconstitutes classicalcausalities, where Antigone as Lacan reconstructs

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her is closer to those half-obscure figures of theRomantic and realist periods.

P.H.: Is there a risk that your idea of silent

speech might lead eventually to silence pure

and simple? Were you ever tempted by themystical tendency that runs through the work of

Bataille, precisely, and to some extent in the

writings of Blanchot, Foucault and Deleuze,

for example?

J.R.: Ive never been very receptive to eitherBlanchot and Bataille or to what the followinggeneration Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze madeof them. It all struck me as very opaque. Rather,I became sensitive to the question through thewhole problematic of the will in the nineteenthcentury. In nineteenth-century literature, letssay from Balzac to Zola not forgettingStrindberg, Ibsen, and what happens inDostoyevsky and Tolstoy there is a long trainof thought that either challenges the will orcarries it on to some final disaster. Thinkingthrough the death drive begins not just withstories of the will exacerbated (as with Vautrin)or annihilated (as with Oblomov) but also with

the very logic of the regime of writing proper toliterature, its way of untying the representativeknot connecting action, will, and meaning. Atthe heart of the aesthetic regime of art there isan idea that the highest effort of the will is toidentify itself with the highest point of its abdi-cation. So, there is something like a race towardsnothingness, which is always represented eitheras the heros experience or identified as theforce which runs through writing itself. I have

found the theme of the self-destructive will,which is generally thought to belong toSchopenhauer and nihilism in the strict sense,throughout the literature of the nineteenthcentury. And I have been rereading Freudstexts in this light, telling myself that it is reallythis he is measuring himself against. I myselfhave no inclination towards a mysticism ofsilence, but I do feel very deeply the linkbetween a whole regime of writing and thedesertion of a certain idea of meaning, betweenthe privilege of silent speech and the drama-turgy of a self-annihilating will.

P.H.: Your own writing is often heavily ironic,

motivated by a sort of dynamic indignation, as

if the weight of history and silence has forced

you into a constant movement. Is this part of

your resistance to that nihilism?

J.R.: Id say that, broadly speaking, it is less aspecific resistance to the death drive than part ofa strategy of writing which tries to put uncer-tainty back into statements. On the one hand, itsa matter of introducing some give or play intodogmatic statements. On the other, you can onlycontest the assurance of people with knowledgeby undoing the way they construct their other:the one who does not know, the ignorant or naiveone. That is why I wanted to give the discourse ofworkers emancipation its share of play, of doubtabout what it says. I wanted to shatter the imageof the naive believer in a land of milk and honey,to show that workers utopian discourse alwaysalso knows at a certain point that it is an illusoryand ironic discourse, which does not entirelybelieve what it says. The problem is to challengethe distribution of roles. And that concerns thestatus of my own assertions as well. I have triedto offer them asprobable assertions, to avoid a

certain affirmative, categorical style which I knowis elsewhere encouraged in philosophy, but whichI have never been able to assimilate.

P.H.: How do you situate yourself in terms of

your contemporaries? Your interest in writing

and the deferral of certainties seems to align

you, up to a point, with Derrida; on the other

hand, your interest in axiomatic equality and

exceptional configurations of universality

reminds me of Badiou. But its hard to imaginetwo more different conceptions of thought!

J.R.: Those are not quite the markers by whichI would define myself. I have read Derrida withinterest but from a certain distance, from aslightly out-of-kilter perspective. (If I too, in myown way, have tried to reread the Phaedrus, ithas been in order to find at work in that text notthepharmakon or dissemination but a sharingout of the modes of speech homologous to thesharing out of the destinies of souls and bodies in short, a politics of writing.) If, among the



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thinkers of my generation, there was one I wasquite close to at one point, it was Foucault.Something of Foucaults archaeological project the will to think the conditions of possibility ofsuch and such a form of statement or such and

such an objects constitution has stuck withme. As to Badiou, there are doubtless certainsimilarities: a shared fidelity to a commonhistory, a similar way of thinking politics byseparating it from state practice, the question ofpower, and the tradition of political philosophy.But there is also in Badiou this affirmativeposture oriented towards eternity which Iabsolutely cannot identify with. His idea ofabsolute disconnection or unrelation, his idea ofan event that stands out sharply against the situ-ation, his idea of the quasi-miraculous force ofthe evental statement5 these are ideas Iabsolutely cannot share.

P.H.: To close, what are you working on now?

What are your plans for the future?

J.R.: I have no great project. Im still working onquestions around the aesthetic regime of art, therelation between aesthetics and politics, what you

could call the politics of literature. Ive now accu-mulated masses of material on the topic which Idont quite know what to do with. I have enoughmaterial for a five-volume summa on theaesthetic regime of art, but no desire to write it.So I am trying to find forms of writing that allowme to make a few points about what is at stakein thinking the aesthetic regime of art formsthat, through significant objects and angles,allow me to say as much as

possible in as little space aspossible. I suppose my ideaof research is indissociablefrom the invention of a way ofwriting.

notes

1 This interview was conducted in Paris on 29

August 2002.

2 Rancire, Eleven Theses on Politics (Dec.

1996), available online at .

3 See, in particular, Rancire, La Parole muette 14,8889.

4 See, in particular, Rancire, The Aesthetic

Revolution and its Outcomes (2002).

5 What Badiou calls an evental statement is one

that emerges in the wake of an event, where an

event is defined as something that makes it impos-

sible for those who recognise it to carry on as

before for example, in the wake of an encounter

with another person, the statement I love you.

[Editors note.]

works by rancire

Le Concept de critique et la critique de

lconomie politique des Manuscrits de 1844 auCapital. Lire le capital. By Louis Althusser, PierreMacherey, Etienne Balibar and Roger Establet. 2

Vols. Paris: Maspero, 1965. Vol. 1, 93210. The

Concept of Critique and the Critique of Political

Economy (From the Manuscripts of 1844 toCapital). Ideology, Method and Marx: Essays fromEconomy and Society. Ed. Ali Rattansi. London:Routledge, 1989. 74180.

La Leon dAlthusser. Paris: Gallimard, 1974.Chapter 6 has been translated by Martin Jordin as

On the Theory of Ideology (The Politics ofAlthusser). Radical Philosophy 7 (spring 1974):215. Reprinted in Radical Philosophy Reader. Ed.Roy Edgley and Richard Osborne. London: Verso,

1985. 10136.

With Patrick Vauday. En Allant lexpo.

Louvrier, sa femme et les machines. RvoltesLogiques 1 (1975): 522. Going to the Expo: TheWorker, His Wife and Machines. Voices of thePeople. Ed. Adrian Rifkin and Roger Thomas.London: Routledge, 1988. 2344.

With Alain Faure (eds.). La Parole ouvrire18301851: textes rassembls et prsents. Paris:Union gnrale dditions, 1976.

Le Bon Temps ou la barrire des plaisirs.

Rvoltes Logiques 7 (1978): 2566. Good Times orPleasures at the Barriers. Trans. John Moore.

Voices of the People. Ed. Adrian Rifkin and RogerThomas. London: Routledge, 1988. 4594.

Le Social: The Lost Tradition in French LabourHistory. Peoples History and Socialist Theory. Ed.Raphael Samuel. London: Routledge, 1980.

26772.

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La Nuit des proltaires: archives du rve ouvrier. Paris:Fayard, 1981. The Nights of Labor: The WorkersDream in Nineteenth-Century France. Trans. JohnDrury with an introduction by Donald Reid.

Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1989.

The Myth of the Artisan: Critical Reflections ona Social Category. 1983. Trans. David H. Lake

and Cynthia J. Koepp. Working in France:Representations, Meanings, Organization, andPractice. Ed. Steven Laurence Kaplan and Cynthia J.Koepp. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1986. 31734.

Le Philosophe et ses pauvres. Paris: Fayard, 1983.The Philosopher and His Poor. Trans. John Drury,Corinne Oster and Andrew Parker. Ed. with an

introduction by Andrew Parker. Durham, NC:

Duke UP, 2004.

(Ed.). Le Philosophe plbien. By Gabriel Gauny.Paris: La Dcouverte/Maspero, 1983.

With the Collectif Rvoltes logiques. LEmpiredu sociologue. Paris: La Dcouverte, 1984.

Entretien avec Jacques Rancire. Interview

conducted by Edmond El Maleh. Entretiens avecLe Monde I. Philosophies. Ed. ChristianDelacampagne. Paris: La Dcouverte/Le Monde,

1984. 15866.

With the Collectif Rvoltes logiques. Esthtiquesdu peuple. Paris: La Dcouverte, 1985.

La Visite du peuple. Entretien avec Jacques

Rancire. Conducted by Serge Le Pron and

Charles Tesson. Cahiers de Cinma 371372 (May1985): 10611.

Nous qui sommes si critiques La Grve desphilosophes: cole et philosophie. By Jacques Derridaet al. Paris: Osiris, 1986. 11021.

Le Matre ignorant: cinq leons sur lmancipationintellectuelle. Paris: Fayard, 1987. The IgnorantSchoolmaster: Five Lessons in IntellectualEmancipation. Trans. with an introduction byKristin Ross. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991.

After What. 1988. Trans. Christina Davis. WhoComes after the Subject? Ed. Eduardo Cadava et al.London: Routledge, 1991. 24652.

Rponse Alain Badiou: Ltre et lvnement.Cahiers du Collge International de Philosophie 8(Oct. 1989): 21125.

Aux bords du politique. Paris: Osiris, 1990. Enlarged2nd ed. Paris: La Fabrique, 1998. On the Shores ofPolitics. Trans. Liz Heron. London: Verso, 1995.

Courts Voyages au pays du peuple. Paris: Seuil, 1990.Short Voyages to the Land of the People. Trans. JamesB. Swenson. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003.

Les Mots de lhistoire: essai de potique du savoir[subsequent editions: Les Noms de lhistoire]. Paris:

Seuil, 1992. The Names of History: On the Poetics ofKnowledge. Trans. Hassan Melehy with a forewordby Hayden White. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P,

1994.

Overlegitimation. Trans. Kristin Ross. SocialText 3132 (1992): 25257.

Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization.

October61 (summer 1992): 5864.

Prface. La Politique des potes. Pourquoi despotes en temps de dtresse? Ed. Jacques Rancire.

Paris: Albin Michel, 1992. 918.

Prface: la pense du non-retour. La Raisonnomade. By Jean Borreil. Ed. Christine Buci-Glucksmann et al. Paris: Payot, 1993. 918.

Discovering New Worlds: Politics of Travel and

Metaphors of Space. Travellers Tales: Narratives ofHome and Displacement. Ed. George Robertson etal. London: Routledge, 1994. 2937.

Post-Democracy, Politics and Philosophy: An

Interview with Jacques Rancire. Trans. Kate

Nash.Angelaki 1.3 (1994): 17178.

La Msentente: politique et philosophie. Paris:Galile, 1995. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy.Trans. Julie Rose. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P,

1999.

The Archaeomodern Turn. Walter Benjamin andthe Demands of History. Ed. Michael P. Sternberg.Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1996: 2440.

Eleven Theses on Politics. Lecture given

at Ljubljana, 4 December 1996. Synopsis avail-able online at .

Mallarm: la politique de la sirne. Paris: Hachette,1996.

Democracy Means Equality. Trans. David

Macey. Radical Philosophy82 (Mar. 1997): 2936.

Casser lopposition des mots et des choses.

Interview conducted by Robert Maggiori.

Libration 5233 (5 Mar. 1998): 3.

La Chair des mots: politiques de lcriture. Paris:Galile, 1998.



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Existe-t-il une esthtique deleuzienne? GillesDeleuze: une vie philosophique. Ed. Eric Alliez. LePlessis-Robinson: Institut Synthlabo pour le

progrs de la connaissance, 1998. 52536.

La Parole muette: essai sur les contradictions de la

littrature. Paris: Hachette, 1998.Biopolitique ou politique? Entretien avec

Jacques Rancire. Interview conducted by

Eric Alliez. Multitudes 1 (Mar. 2000). Availableonline at .

Dissenting Words: A Conversation with Jacques

Rancire. Interview conducted by Davide

Panagia. Trans. Davide Panagia. Diacritics 30.2(2000): 11326.

Le Partage du sensible: esthtique et politique. Paris:La Fabrique, 2000.

What Aesthetics Can Mean. Trans. Brian

Holmes. From an Aesthetic Point of View: Philosophy,Art and the Senses. Ed. Peter Osborne. London:Serpents Tail, 2000. 1333.

Entretien avec Jacques Rancire. Interview

conducted by Sophie Charlin et al. Balthazar 4(summer 2001). Available online at .

Entretien avec Jacques Rancire. Interviewconducted by Nicolas Poirier. Le Philosophoire 13(winter 2001): 720.

La Fable cinmatographique. Paris: Seuil, 2001.

LInconscient esthtique. Paris: Galile, 2001.

The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes:

Emplotments of Autonomy and Heteronomy.

New Left Review14 (Apr. 2002): 13351.

Jacques Rancire: le cinma, art continu.

Interview conducted by Stphane Bouquet andJean-Marc Lalanne. Cahiers du Cinma 567 (Apr.2002): 5663.

rancire

Jacques Rancirec/o ditions Galile9, rue Linn75005 ParisFrance

Peter HallwardFrench DepartmentKings College LondonThe StrandLondon WC2R 2LSUKE-mail: [email protected]

Forbes MorlockSyracuse University London Centre24 Kensington Park GardensLondon W11 2QUUKE-mail: [email protected]


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Ranciere Interview

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