RamanujasCritiqueofShankarasPhilosophyofNonDualityPartIFromRamanujasCommentaryontheBrahmaSutrasM.SudduthI.RamanujarejectsthefollowingmetaphysicalclaimsmadebyShankaraA.Brahmanisnondifferentiatedpureconsciousness.B.Theuniverseisunreal(i.e.,anonenduringexistent).C.Individualsouls(jivas)areunreal(i.e.,anonenduringexistent).D. Individual consciousness is dissolved in moksha. (Follows from C, for theunrealityofsoulsisnotadenialoftheirprovisionalexistence,butadenialoftheirenduringcharacter).II.ScripturalArguments(BS,4955):RamanujarejectsShankarasdoctrineofnondualBrahmanonthegroundsofthetestimonyofthesacredscriptures(sastras),theveryscripturesShankaraallegedlyaccepts.Ramanujacontendsthatthesastras,forexample Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, directly affirm or logically entail thatBrahmanisdifferentiated.A. Manypassages in theUpanishads andBhagavadGita affirm thatBrahmanhasattributes(saguna),butwithoutanysuggestionthatthisisaprovisionalfactaboutBrahman.However,sincenothingcanhaveanattributeandbenondifferentiated,for possessing attributeQ entails that one is distinct fromanything that does nothaveQ,itfollowsthatthesastrasteachaBrahmandifferentiatedfromotherthings.(BS,49,54)B. The satras teach that Brahman is satchitananda (beingconsciousnessbliss)which (i) has nomeaning unless its constituent terms havemeaning, but (ii) theconstituent terms have no meaning unless they are differentiated from theiropposites,thatis,nonbeing,nonconsciousness,andnonbliss.(BS,5053)C.Brahmansays,MayIbemany,mayIgrowforth(ChandogyaUpanishad6.2.23),andthisRamanujatakestoshowthattheworldofdiversityisasrealasBrahman,beingamanifestationofBrahman.(BS,51,54,7980)III.Whereas Shankara appeals to sastrapassages (e.g.,MundakaUpanishad1.1.6)that state that Brahman is nirguna (without attributes), Ramanuja provides analternativeinterpretationofthesepassages.A.WhenthesastrasstatethatBrahmaniswithoutattributes,theymeantosaythatBrahman lacks all evil qualities (or qualities supervening on material nature,

prakrti). For example, Brahman is not perceived by senses, colorless, having nobody, not grasped, etc. Brahman is the opposite of material things. He mustthereforebedifferentiated.(BS,4950,52,79)B.Brahmanisoneonlywithoutasecond(ChandogyaUpanishad6.1.1)meansthatBrahmanaloneistheefficientcauseoftheuniverseandthehighestrealitybecauseBrahmanhasexcellentauspiciousqualities,byvirtueofwhichheisdifferentiatedfromeverythingelse.(BS,49,5051).C.TatTvamAsiThouareThat!(ChandogyaUpanishad6.13.3)doesnotmean(asShankaramaintains)thouAtmanartidenticalwiththatBrahman,butThouJivaartthebodyofBrahman. Inotherwords,Brahmanis theSelfofeverything inthatallindividualthingshaveBrahmanastheiressence.SoBrahmanexistsintwomodes,astheJiva(microoratomicversionofBrahman)andastheSupremecauseoftheworld.SotherelationbetweeneachindividualsoulandBrahmanisoneofparttowholeandthusonlyapartialidentity.(BS,7381)IV.TheScripturalargumentsshowthatRamanujawantsVedantatomostaccuratelyandconsistentlyreflectthetotalityoftheteachingssastras.IsRamanujaawareofthepresuppositionsbroughttothesastrasthatgovernhisinterpretivemoves?Ineithercase,hisengagementwiththesastrasinvolvesarigorousapplicationofrulesofgrammarandlogic.Heisnotdemandingblindfaithintheteachingsofthesastras.V.ThePhilosophicalArgumentfromSourcesofKnowledge:RamanujaarguesthatoursourcesofknowledgedonotpermitaproofthatBrahmanisnondifferentiatedpureconsciousness.(HeseemsatpointstoconflatethisweakerclaimwiththestrongeronethattheconsiderationsprovethatBrahmanisnotnondifferentiated.BS,19,esp.23,whichseemstobethefallacyofappealtoignorance:wecannotprovep,thereforepisfalse.A.Experience:Onlyobjectscanbeexperienced,butobjectsarequalifiedbysomedifference;thereforewecannotexperienceanondifferentiatedobject.(BS,20)B. Consciousness: (i) Conscious is always intentional, i.e., directed towards anobject,whichisnecessarilydistinctfromconsciousnessasthatbywhichtheobjectisapprehendedortowhichtheobjectisgiven.(ii)Consciousnessisalsosaidtohavequalities like eternal and selfluminous, but this makes no sense unlessconsciousnessisdifferentiatedfromthosethingsthatlackthesequalities.(BS,20)C.DirectPerception:Perceptionsareoftwokinds,determinate(savikalpa)andnondeterminate(nirvikalpa).Theformernecessarilyinvolvesdifferentiatedobjects,aswhenoneseesacowweseeanobjectqualifiedbyagenericnatureoressence:thisthingherehasacowessence.Thefirsttimeweseeacowweperceiveittogetherwith its generic character, but we dont differentiate the individual cow and itsgeneric nature because we havent see other cows that have the same genericnature. So the individual and essence is undifferentiated, but the object ofperceptionremainsdifferentiatedinrelationtootherkindsofthings.Soaccording

toRamanuja,nondeterminateperceptionsdonotinvolveapprehensionofanobjectdevoidofallattributes,butonlydevoidofsomeattributes.(BS,2122).D.Inference:Allinferenceinvolvesadistinctionbecauseitinvolvesarelationbetweenthingsthatareobjectsofperception,andasalreadyestablishedperceptiondealsonlywithobjectsqualifiedbydifference.E.Scripture:Argumentsgivenabove.Conclusion: Since all our sources of knowledge involve objects qualified bydifference,wearenotpermittedthroughsuchsourcestoprovethatthereareanynondifferentiated objects. (One might consider this an inductive argument forsupposingthatnonondifferentiatedobjectsexist).VI.ConsciousnessandExistencecannotbeOneRamanujasbriefargumentisthatconsciousnessandexistencecannotbethesamebecauseexistenceisalwaysanobjectofconsciousness.Sincethatbywhichwegraspanobject(consciousness) isdifferentfromtheobjectwegrasp,consciousnessandexistencecannotbeone.(BS26)VII.TheSelfCannotbePureConsciousnessHere Ramanuja argues that the Self cannot be identical with pure consciousness.Hisargumentisasfollows. TheSelfisreallytheknower,whichisthesubstrateofconsciousness,fortheknowerhaspermanenceorcontinuityofexistence(whichistrueoftheSelf),asisshownfromaknoweratanytimebeingabletorecallanobjectseen earlier. There is a persisting I, but this persisting I is not identicalwithconsciousnesssinceconsciousnessisnotpermanent,asisshownfromoursayingIknewthisorIforgotthat.(BS,34)ComparethisargumenttowhatRamanujaargueslater(BS,41),namelythatindeepsleep the I persistsbut consciousnessdoesnot.Therefore theSelf (which is theI)cannotbeidenticalwithconsciousness,pureorotherwise.Islepthappily,notIwaspureconsciousness.