Rails Security

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Rails Security Jonathan Weiss, 30.10.2009 Peritor GmbH

description

Rails Security by Jonathan Weiss - presented at Ruby En Rails Amsterdam 2009.

Transcript of Rails Security

Page 1: Rails Security

Rails Security

Jonathan Weiss, 30.10.2009

Peritor GmbH

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Who am I ?

I work at Peritor in Berlin

I tweet at @jweiss

I code at http://github.com/jweiss

I blog at http://blog.innerewut.de

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Peritor

Working on

http://scalarium.com

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Agenda

Application code

Setup and deployment

Framework code

Rails Application Stack

Follow the application stack and look for

•  Information leaks

•  Possible vulnerabilities

•  Security best practices

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Rails Application Setup

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Rails Setup

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Rails Setup - FastCGI

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Rails Setup - Mongrel

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Rails Setup – mod_rails

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Rails Setup – Unicorn

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Information leaks and

vulnerabilities

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Information leaks

Is the target application a Rails application?

•  Default setup for static files:

/javascripts/application.js

/stylesheets/application.css

/images/foo.png

•  URL schema

/project/show/12

/messages/create

/folder/delete/43

/users/83

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Information leaks

Is the target application a Rails application?

•  Rails provides default templates for 404 and 500 status pages

•  Different Rails versions use different default pages

•  422.html only present in applications generated with Rails >= 2.0

•  Dispatcher files not present in recent Rails versions

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Sample Status Pages

http://www.43people.com/500.html

Rails >= 1.2 status 500 page

http://www.twitter.com/500.html

http://www.engineyard.com/500.html

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Server Header

GET http://www.haystack.com

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 11:23:24 GMT Server: nginx/0.6.32 Cache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store …

GET https://signup.37signals.com/highrise/solo/signup/new

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 11:54:24 GMT Server: Apache X-Powered-By: Phusion Passenger (mod_rails/mod_rack) 2.2.5 Status: 200 OK …

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Server Header

GET http://www.twitter.com

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 11:23:24 GMT Server: hi Status: 200 OK …

GET http://www.golfermail.org

Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2009 11:13:41 GMT Server: Mongrel 1.1.5 Status: 200 OK …

# httpd.conf Header unset Server Header unset X-Powered-By

Disable Server header

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Information leaks

Subversion metadata

•  Typically Rails applications are deployed with Capistrano / Webistrano

•  The default deployment will push .svn directories to the servers

GET http://www.strongspace.com/.svn/entries

… dir 25376 http://svn.joyent.com/joyent/deprecated_repositories/www.strongspace/trunk/public http://svn.joyent.com/joyent

2006-04-14T03:06:39.902218Z 34 [email protected]

<DirectoryMatch "^/.*/\.svn/"> ErrorDocument 403 /404.html Order allow,deny Deny from all Satisfy All </DirectoryMatch>

Prevent .svn download

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Cookie Session Storage

Since Rails 2.0 the session data is stored in the cookie by default

Base64(CGI::escape(SESSION-DATA))--HMAC(secret_key, SESSION-DATA)

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Cookie Session Storage

Security implications

•  The user can view the session data in plain text

•  The HMAC can be brute-forced and arbitrary session data could be created

•  Replay attacks are easier as you cannot flush the client-side session

Countermeasures

•  Don’t store important data in the session!

•  Use a strong password, Rails already forces at least 30 characters

•  Invalidate sessions after certain time on the server side

… or just switch to another session storage

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Cookie Session Storage

Rails default session secret

Set HTTPS only cookies

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Cross-Site Scripting - XSS

“The injection of HTML or client-side Scripts (e.g. JavaScript) by malicious users into web pages viewed by other users.”

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Cross-Site Scripting - XSS

Cases of accepted user input

•  No formatting allowed

search query, user name, post title, …

•  Formatting allowed

post body, wiki page, …

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XSS - No Formatting Allowed (Rails 2.x)

Use the Rails `h()` helper to HTML escape user input

But using `h()` everywhere is easy to forget.

Better, use safeERB, XSS Shield, or rails_xss plugins:

http://agilewebdevelopment.com/plugins/safe_erb

http://code.google.com/p/xss-shield/

http://github.com/NZKoz/rails_xss

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XSS - No Formatting Allowed (Rails 3)

Rails 3 auto escapes strings in RHTML template

Explicitly mark strings as HTML safe

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XSS - No Formatting Allowed (Rails 3)

rails_xss Plugin

•  Build-in in Rails 3

•  Introduces “Safe Buffer” concept

•  Updates all the helpers to mark them as html_safe!

•  Requires Erubis

Install and get familiar with if on Rails 2.x

http://github.com/NZKoz/rails_xss

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XSS - Formatting Allowed

Two approaches

Use custom tags that will translate to HTML (vBulletin tags, RedCloth, Textile, …)

Use HTML and remove unwanted tags and attributes

•  Blacklist - Rails 1.2

•  Whitelist - Rails 2.0

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XSS - Custom Tags

Relying on the external syntax is not really secure

Filter HTML anyhow

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XSS - HTML Filtering

Use the Rails `sanitize()` helper

Only effective with Rails > 2.0 (Whitelisting): •  Filters HTML nodes and attributes

•  Removes protocols like “javascript:”

•  Handles unicode/ascii/hex hacks

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XSS - HTML Filtering

sanitize(html, options = {})

http://api.rubyonrails.com/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html

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XSS - HTML Filtering

Utilize Tidy if you want to be more cautious

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Session Fixation

Provide the user with a session that he shares with the attacker:

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Session Fixation

Rails uses only cookie-based sessions

Still, you should reset the session after a login

The popular authentication plugins like restful_authentication are not doing this!

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Cross-Site Request Forgery - CSRF

You visit a malicious site which has an image like this

Only accepting POST does not really help

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CSRF Protection in Rails

By default Rails > 2.0 will check all POST requests for a session token

All forms generated by Rails will supply this token

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CSRF Protection in Rails

Very useful and on-by-default, but make sure that •  GET requests are safe and idempotent

•  Session cookies are not persistent (expires-at)

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SQL Injection

The user’s input is not correctly escaped before using it in SQL statements

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SQL Injection Protection in Rails

Always use the escaped form

If you have to manually use a user-submitted value, use `quote()`

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SQL Injection Protection in Rails

Take care with Rails < 2.1

Limit and offset are only escaped in Rails >= 2.1

( MySQL special case )

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JavaScript Hijacking

http://my.evil.site/

JSON response

The JSON response will be evaled by the Browser’s JavaScript engine.

With a redefined `Array()` function this data can be sent back to http://my.evil.site

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JavaScript Hijacking Prevention

•  Don’t put important data in JSON responses

•  Use unguessable URLs

•  Use a Browser that does not support the redefinition of Array & co, currently only FireFox 3

•  Don’t return a straight JSON response, prefix it with garbage:

The Rails JavaScript helpers don’t support prefixed JSON responses

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Mass Assignment

User model

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Mass Assignment

Handling in Controller

A malicious user could just submit any value he wants

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Mass Assignment

Use `attr_protected` and `attr_accessible`

Start with `attr_protected` and migrate to `attr_accessible` because of the different default policies for new attributes.

Vs.

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Rails Plugins

Re-using code through plugins is very popular in Rails

Plugins can have their problems too

•  Just because somebody wrote and published a plugin it doesn’t mean the plugin is proven to be mature, stable or secure

•  Popular plugins can also have security problems, e.g. restful_authentication

•  Don’t use svn:externals to track external plugins, if the plugin’s home page is unavailable you cannot deploy your site

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Rails Plugins

How to handle plugins

•  Always do a code review of new plugins and look for obvious problems

•  Track plugin announcements

•  Track external sources with Piston, a wrapper around svn:externals

http://piston.rubyforge.org/

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Conclusion

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Conclusion

Rails has many security features enabled by default

•  SQL quoting

•  HTML sanitization

•  CSRF protection

The setup can be tricky to get right

Rails is by no means a “web app security silver bullet” but adding security is easy and not a pain like in many other frameworks

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Questions?

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Peritor GmbH

Blücherstaße 22 10961 Berlin

Telefon: +49 (0)30 69 20 09 84 0 Telefax: +49 (0)30 69 20 09 84 9

Internet: www.peritor.com E-Mail: [email protected]

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