Radar in Orbit

7/29/2019 Radar in Orbit

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i s ) QUILLf8 j Radar In Orbit

Robert L. Perry


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iiSBR&I'JRl&:IJNeFeRNIlKl


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NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASEDECLASSIFIED BY: C/IARTDECLASSIFIED ON: 9 JULY 2012 (U) Introduction

t9l1f'K)This comprehensive history of the first radar imaging satellite describes the progr&m'sevolution from need to concept to program to launch and evaluation while stressing its experimental .nature: "the feasibility system was to be that and nothing more; no consideration would be given tomaking the demonstration equipment the basis of an operational system." Robert L. Perry's Quillhistory bring interesting contractual, administrative, and financial minutiae as well as technicaldetails. He provides a vivid sense of Bradburn's management style as well as the Cold War settingof the time.

(U)RobertL. Perry (May 10, I 92S-September7, 1990) majored injoumalism at Marshall University, graduating in 1947. He went on to a master's degree in history at The Ohio State University.From 19S1 to 1964. Bob Perry worked for the Air Force-first at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,Ohio, then as chief of the History Office at Air Force Systems Command, E1 Segundo. He was aretired USAF reserve officer who also taught or lecture at Ohio State, Wittenberg University, theUniversity ofDayton 1 the Air Force Academy, the Air University, California Institute ofTechnology. and the Rand Graduate Institute. He also wrote ex.tensively on Air'Force system developmentprograms. chiefly aircraft and missiles. In October 1964 Bob Perry joined the Economics Department of the Rand Corporation, where his list of publications includes more than 2S technologicalcase histories, studies of R&D policy. analyses of system cost trends, examinations of test programstructures. and comparisons ofU.S. and foreign technologies and R&D institutions. He also servedon numerous outside panels and gave testimony to sevenil congressional committees.

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XVI QuaL : RADAR IN ORBIT

In'the f i rs t 20 years of r e C o z m a i 8 ~ I 1 D ~ e satelllte program. actintyin. the United State Quill was th e only program that substantiallyconformed to ini t ial coat . .chedule. alld performance e . t imates . aDd, .th e omy . a t e l l i t ~ p r o g r ~ 01 any Dature to proceed frOID s tar t tofiDlsh with a perlect record in launch.. orbital operations. ,readout,and recovery. .

Quill had ita iDunec:U.ate origin in a propoaal JGlntly QOJ1COc;ted- '- ' .by Lockheed :Mi. riles and SPace Company and the Goodyear AeroapaceCorporation early in 19&. Stitriulatedby riaiDg tn tere . ' i l l post-atrike recozmal ance capabilitie .. those contractora a1ll lestecl thata aynthetic aperture side-looldlli radar be mstalled i.D aD Agena lpace-craft for a umen t 01 weapons eUects in a post-nuclear-strike settiDg.The radar aet was to be a moc1ilied version of One being built to r theRF-.l l0 (which subsequently reverted to ita oriainal R..F-f nomenclature).A Loc:kb.eed briefing team that iDcluded Ooodyear repl'e.entative.exposed the Dotion to a variety of interested audience. in:the middlemonths of 1 9 6 ~ . Air Force Undersecretary Joseph V. Charyk. whoalso headed the ati l l- .ecret National RecoDl18.iss8Jlce Of1lce. was one

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of tho.e who listened. Major General Robert E. Greer a. Directorateof Special Projects (the West Coast element of the NRO) providedanother audience.

The idea of using orbiting radar for bomb damage ..sse nentwu scarcely novel iD 1962.. It hac:lfirst Mel mentioned . s p a r t ofRand S bdti.a1 s ~ e . of satellite teasibility and applications betW8en19


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Greer, With C"haryIt'. support, aaked his PlauChie! , CaptainFrank Gorman (USN) to examine capabUltle. and. needs. Concurrently,Colonel of Greer ' staff established a workiDg relation-ship with the Stratepc Air Conunand'. requirements group in the hopeof clarifyillg SAC'. post-strike reconnaialucerequire121.n.ta. _leuDed little that was new: SAC waDted a .ateWte-born.e.po.t- . tz ' ike.all-weather a meDt capability in near-1'ea1tlnle. 001'121&11.

reached the iDitial conclu8101l that any .ystem " r4tquUbaa :l:efJ.ectecllight can:aot be cODdderod a lood .olutio!) to a problem where reaction.time is paramOUDt as u the situation for 'initial a e ment. . . InGorman' , judgemeDt, the only effective teclmique would be CD8 providiDg"all weatber/Uabt c o n d i t i ~ s " sensitivity. Kia iecommendatioD. toOroer: uA high-re.olution radar d e v e 1 ~ e n t lIhould be iDitlatedwrnedlately i f an. effective POlt.strike recoDDaissa.nc:e capability 18to axlat. tt And he concluded tha t .readout ....... e tial. iBysical recoveryof payload., he argued, had been "a me&llB of circum.veDtiDa th e bandwidth problem. " All of which was true. but in the ab.ence of ad&pt-able technology. was a lBO largely irrelevant.

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Nevertheless. th e several elements nece .aary to the establish .ment of a funded research and development effort that could lead byone route or another to an operational radar-iI ' l-orblt syatezn werein being by the la te BUmI'Iler of 19&. A requirement of I O n . hadbeen acknowledged, though DO formal statement of national need forradar r e c o z m a i . ~ a n c o from orbit had yet emeraod. The approachdefined by Lock:1Jeecl, and Goeclyear. U 1t coulcl be accepted at facevalue.. reprentecl a techaologi.oally achi.vable ca-pabWty that could be.. q ~ r e c l " at ... r"ela.ttnly mod.at coat. Tho i D . , J t ~ t . of a syatePlI .

exiated III the form 4 in-developmeot iteDJ8 if not in operationallyready equipDJen't. "

: In lUll. 1 9 6 ~ . Cha.ryk. directed that Oreerls organtzaUcm evaluatethe possibility of addI.Dg apecial sensors "such a l iuha-l"ecl and radar"to tho payload of the heavy-lift Titan-m vehicle then bein , conaidel'oda . a luCcessor to the Atlas booster us.d for mOlt space launches.The slight prospect that the Titan-m would actually be u l in thesatellite recotma! ance progruu for .everal years prompted Gre.rto suggest consideratioD of a more direct approach. In October Charylt. . ...- , ~ . ( t c . ~ 1 ; ~ 4 - " , O r . f l r . w . . . ~ . " and,fonna.lly u t b . o z i , ~ e d . an e ~ W l t i O J 1 of the

IIICc

Other contractors had similar proposals. but all requiredsome extended period of vehicle or s euo r development.4


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Lockheed-Ooodyear propo.&1. hu .d OD uae of aThol ' ,booster aad3readUyavailable Alen a hardware.What belaD in the summer of 196Z a . an eva1uatlcm becam.e a

source lelection proe.... It ha.cl two upecta . ODe iDvolYlDc a DOnnalCOlDpetitioD 01" the de!,eloplllellt of a radU' let. boater s , readoutequipment suited to e xtu.ded operatiol1l. and the other- an ap . r lmea tusing th e L o c k b e e d ~ o o d y e a r propo' .! as 1&8 bale . Major David D BradburD. a mez:nbel' of the .tz-znan study croup. .... ated tbat th emost direct &lid effective way of.ati.fyiDg Charyk.,zequelt,for anear ly demoD.8tration of raclu-in-orbit fealibility wa. to buy a few let.of on-tb.e-Ib. . f equipment. modify the hardware 11Ifficiently to permitits operation Ullder orbital CCDditiODil. aDd. test the result in a realoperation. Th. group' , head, Colonel Yr1lliam O . Itm,. J r . ,wa lwbolly tn favor of that approach but bavina r e cu t aDd patDfol expel'-

i e ~ e with optlmi.tic coatractor predf.cti.oa, that coW" Dot be tzo.. lated The Ittudy.roup. he.Cled by Colonel O. !tba. J r m e We "Lieutenant Colcm.el. J olm C,opley alMi BracJbUrn,Major Charl.e Red.wiDe, am i Captain all of Greer I,,taB. sn al.o .ipLed Ueu teun tColonel who wu Oreer" lela! .p t .. ~ . . . . Weut.DUlt_III_'ll'''' of th e SP Plan. staff, aDd

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nto operatioual performance. declc1ed t.o verlty th e aUeled perlor-mance capabUf.1iea of the propo.ed systaln by checJdDc w1th AU Forcerac1ar reccmDaiasance ezpertll at Wrllbt Field.

The entire .ix-man study team. viaited file RecOJmai..sUlceLaboratory. an element of the A'eromautical S, . t ema DlmlOD atWright-Patter'OD Air Force Base, early in October. Theprojectofficer for th e AN/APS-73 radar as .ured hisri . i torl that the .e t coulel do What had been 0 I D 1 . e d foJ:' it &Del thatDO other item of avaU.ble equipment could reaUau.caUy be . - . t i tu tod.Th e questiOD. of what resolatiOA could be expected . . . . . DOt as r e ~ yresolvable. ColoaelColODel. XiDg that i f suitable Itz.aquiremeatll l t coaleS be i ued i twould be po.. b le to obtain cOZIipari8011 raclu and photographic bnaaeryof exiatiDg bomb crater . at Frellchman'lI Flata (the Nevada teat site)in foUl' to . ix mODth,. KiD&. who p1aJmed to Wl'ltebU't'baal reportlater that month, said mild!y that he bad a better idea. ODe of bbteam. mem.bers who b .e . th e problem iutlmately wa. Capta1D. _

_ ~ said. CaptaiA _ coulel adequately repre.eDt the kiDl had maDaled the Samoll E-I and E .. 2 prOlramll. hael beeDinvolved with aatellite recoDnab.ance work lince 1955, and ...... thef inal program manager for th e wholly inadequate Su rk mia.Ue.

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study group in superintendinl an immediate effort, say in three orfour days. He would fiy aboard the photo airplane.

after a moment' . reflection, eareeel that the teatexerebe could indeed. be co.mpleted in three or four da)'IJ. It wu,

following week . They demonstrated. that rac1a:r imalery co'Gld readilydistiDpiah the priDc:ipalfeatures of bexnb craters of various 1ci.1uU,although the limitations of the test pbotosrapby excluded any f i r lX l COD-elusions about th e , round resolUtion obtainable from. space by .tele-100ldDg radar. "However, n KiD,'s JToup eventually C:QDCluded, "itfa obvious that cra ters and surface clUferences of the silles ideD'tiAeclin the accompanyhJa photolrapb a can e u n y be aeen With a radar that

aa a p-ound resolution poorer than 50 feet. I I* The craters photoFaphed rallied iD diameter &om a mfnilDUQ).of 80 feet to a maximum of 850 feet. Photographs were lakeD am i aIlx-1rM:h foeallezigtil T- l l aedal camera loaded with PI1D:-X fUm.. th ecombination prmc:U.na a ~ O - 1 i n e . - p e r - m U 1 t m e t e r resolution .a t thef ihn plane. The radar was an AN/APQ-55. with a slx-loot, slottedroU, side-1ooldna antenna, 4S kilowatts of power. aDd. a frecp eney of34.86 kUomegacycle.. An electro-optical photo m.ultiplier tube,an.lndium antimony infrared detector. aDd the radar operated a . pu t.of a development system. being inveatiaated by the Reconnab8auceLaboratory. They were flown ~ , 2 0 0 feet above the cra ters iD a C-131aircraft .

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.Having coDfirmed their preliminary judgement that radar

in orbit could adequately perform bomb damage a es .ment (If i tcould be made to operate wbUe in space), the study , roup had toconfront th e c i u e l t i O ~ of what to recommend to General Greer andultimately to Undersecretary Charyk. Several contractor. hadprovided c.opies 'of earl ier uuoUclted prOPOlalS ancl had briefedgroup meDlber. . In the eDel the study grouplett led on a recommendedapproach which wal characterized as f l not the ODly feaan.leor beet concept; .... b u ~ merely one concept haviDa lO I n .plausibUity--a ba lh from which the Board may proceed. f f The member .were agreed that they would have satisfied the requiremeuts of theircharter i f they provided (a ) a conceptual fomulation. and operativereCODmleDdaticm. io r proc:eedin, with a radar feasibility demon.ltration.and (b ) guidance for the conduct of further studieB and aualy....

The fiual report laid candidly, "w e have asBumed that auinstruction. l imit u . to .ho-trina the feasibility of developing a . . . eUlte-borne radar capable of aenalog iDlonnation of jvlf1cleDt intelliJencevalue to allow lome dama,e aSBeBsment. The more .ubtle problemof BhowiD, the feasibility of an overall post . trlke l'ecozmaisl&Dce.yatem mu.lt be fully analysed concurrently with any raduo demonauation. 1f

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The study pro, ram was intended to analyse the operationalapplicationa of high-resolution radar for bomb darnage a e.srne'llti l l a post a tdke en.viromn.mt. a.s t lminl quick-l'eaction., all- . .eathercapabUlty for acquiring "the relatively coarse detail" obtainablefrom satelUte-carried radar .

The foa8ihility dem.onstratio. was seen aa a process thatshould be ccmducted quickly aDd with the mt"h:num outlay 01. fund.sneeded to . . . .ure . u cce . . . J'ol!owiD, the l in .s of BradburD.s suggestl.ODths Jl"oup ursed teltlDJ olf-tIle-shell radar I t. capable of providiDawormatioD which can be eztrapolated (at mlnhnum r isk) mto dedpinformation required for an operaticma1 radar 1 The object of thedemonstration. would be to establiahthat I I physical phenom.ena.do not eld. t which would preclude development of high resolution. I I

Although the study group report did m t explicitly ao state,group members were convinced that the analysis should be performedoutsi.de the Special Project l directorate. preferably by the Strate , ieAir Command. The participation of Rand Corporation specialistawas explicitly proposed. however. In the event. the lIaNdies and8.1lal.,.ian aspect of the total QuW. pro,ram did not develop . a thestudy group had proposed. Cbaryk never directed ( i reer ' . o1"gaDl.-z,atloD to do the anal,. .l . . Rand did per ionn SODle relevant research,but SAC coDtim.Jed to submit advocacy recommendations which,generally. were coa..idered. by .enior defeAse officials to be insufficiently supported by objectlve analysis. The feaaibUlty demon-

8 t r a t i ~ aspect of Quill became, by a. process of inaction. e l where,the dominant: element of the prograan.

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To those end., the study group recommended that an APS-73 Dlodelradar be integrated with a Thor booster. an Asena-D orbit:lDg vehicle,a Coroma recovery capsule, a readout aystem chosen frO!!). ezta1:t.Dghardwa.re. * au available ground processor. and the orbital controland CommumcatiOb.8 net then hem, uaed by th e National. RecoDllaiasaDceProgram. I t was a 80mewhat 1e ambit10u variant of the Lockheed-Goodyear a p p r o a c h ~ but devoi4 of operational objectives

.coDClucUng tba ~ D 1 y . t J a . e '.8Cl1IipmeDt.com'DiD8tion,p&ef.!.;, . I , ~ > ! l '" .'" .. ~ " ~ ' ..... > 1 I ~ ~ l . ' ~ . : ."" ; r :

an immecllat'e.tart o f ' W o r ~ 118m, a sole-source procure- Relitive1:y l i t t le was said about readout in the final report,which. however, included a senez.a1 discussion of principles aDdtechDlquea and an aBBeSBment of readout tim.e requirem.eJlta. A s ,for feasibility. somethins of 'the groupie vie. . coald be ,Wqed fromthe proridOl1 of a recovery eap.u1e. an acees.ory that pre.umabt.ywould Dot fiDd a place in any operatioDal .ysleDl. A brief ba.t e1oqu.eatcomment on the readout problem appeared toward the m.id.d1e 01. thereport: "Airborne 8DC;l ground equipment. to provide bandwidths 01s ix : J ~ l t a e . ~ _ a J ........ .mlra1aG-.-fbetteeAttbnically feaslble. Theil' xeliabWty leavee IJOmethiDg to be de. ired. rrAnd, after a cUecU8sion which eDded with th e obaervatioD, flOurproblem ie not in senahag iA detail. but . iB retrievAl of theinfortll&tioll, If the report .S l ee t ed th e ' 'broad .. umption' thatn blformatiOD of a modest detaU level. which can be handled maybe uaeful fo r an liDitial a.. S8ment. lit (Underlbtng in the orig iu ltext. ,

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*meilt approach. The evaluation grou.p cODcluded that a three-fliahtdemonstratiOlL effort could be conducted at a costbut that a teD-percent .contingency fee shoulel be pl"arideci to protectaaaiDst U D f o r e s ~ e n development problems. (Should a five-fliahtpZ'ogram be approved, required fUIld8 would total

J"iAally. the , roup recommead.cl that tho exlatmghouae the

feasibility demonstration. aDd that Major Bl"acibuD, ' 'probablythe moat kDowledaleable radar specialist at SAFSP. flbe named

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* That somewhat UDUSUal course--setectiDg contractors.during an evaluation of pro ' ramfe. . bility--. . . . ,iuatified by Charyk' .requirement for the quickest possible demoastratiDD. which me..use of oU-the-shelf equipment. The Agena-D was the omy avall-able orbital vebicle. ~ e Thor the omyappropriate booster previously mated to an AI.... ad. tile APS-73 w U ' 'the near tb.lmato aD off-the-ehelf i tem that could be a .d 1n the fe.sibUlty demOD-' t ratioD. I t 1D the formal op1Di.oD of Caloael_ bee . . . .0D1y Oooclyear mad. that radar ,t. i t would be a , 1 ' 088 wasteof tbne and zncm.ey to . tar t another IDuufacturel ' bailcU.u.c i t nl ieu of havbag Goodyear malte the Dec .uary minimum modificationsin i t . eziatl.ag product. It" .

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progrun 2%u1I1a,er.* In a statement that Bra.dburn waa to mnpha.aizefrequently thereafter, the . ~ o u p ob8erved that the orbital teat programwas n the aUnple8t and quieke.t approach to demollftrat iqthe feasibility of th e radar 8ellaOI', tI that quick completioll 01 tile teatwould malte po.sible a decidoll O Il a la ter operatiOllal .}'1Jtem,butthat t t the launch vehicle aDd radar coDfiluratioll proposed. fororbital test are not considered adaptable for operation al test . .In 80 many word., the feaslbility demollstratlon wa.a to be that and.nothing lUore; no conalderation would be given to maldug the demon-atration equipment the baai. of an operatlonal system. CQui11.-w.ruc&. Pl'wlii.tM1d'i.to.be-. . J a . o r , t ~ t e n a p r ~ s r a z n , o t ' . b i ~tei.+nin. mtereat,q wo.ekllb1t _f8ttIr..iflie "irojec.'to4Jl&D.a;tiY Br&dburntaldKiDc,he:;aitibq;riul with hi.arjt1:atl ' ,. . . . pm.at!-a.-. . . . . . ""fty

d o u J . t , ; y o u ~ . m . , .. r o } e c ~ o f I ' D : e ~ u : ~ t t i : r . t c : r ..,opuI'Ii I'llyou.lSiralrli ' . tb. il>.4uicld, Dqrchaply z u L , ~ ! ~ j z p t e c h f t . ~ alltbeE4'eJDbele wa.nipt,-.ullhfdjoiN1Ut . . . b o U g h l i J l l L ' l h ~ ; id$a.(I f 'the idea .** A poat . t r ike bomb damage aaaeaamentsystem. as cODCelvedthen an d la ter \VaS a wned to mvolve requirementl for multiplelaunches from hardeDed aites. The use of a Minuteman boo.ter wasgeDerally believed to be a p r . e " r e q ~ s 1 t e for opeJ'atloual utility, thatbeing the priDclpalland-based ballilti.c JIll Ue i l l the U.S. inventory.The October 1962. att.uly postW.attsd-ti'nDeU"-aimultaneous launches.with five orbital radar systems maldDg parallel-path pas .es overthe priDcipal Soviet targets. Obviously . a sott. Uquid-fUe1 TboZ' waswholly inappropriate for such an operaticm, Age;ua could not be accomm.odated i l l a MiDuteDlaD eUo. aM the APS-73 raclar promieed tohave definition and I ' e s o l u ~ o n iDappropriate for an opel'aticmal appllcatiOD..


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The report of th e study group, thereafter mo'Wll as th e "KingReport, tI went to General Oreer on 30 October. Its one-word title,

S

01'eer approved the findings and recommended that MajorBradburn. th e board's nombaee for project leader, present them toCharyit for review. Thre . days after Bradburn ' . 7 November 196Zpresentation. Charyk authorized him to begin work. Funding leyels,as first approved. re1l.ected the premiaes of the Lockheed-Goodyearproposal. Bradburn's plan. called for five lliaht-qaaHfted payloads,of which three were actually to be launched. Lockheed was to bea gned liystem engineering aDd teehmcal direction responsibUiti and re.pOlUIibUity for orbital vehicles, system integration. and launch8 e r ~ e s . ~ o o d y e a r Aircraf t was to d e ~ e 1 o p ~ . r adu payloads Qai11 was aunes t ed by Colonel Joseph W. Ruebill... .At West Point ,the t enu.......uUl List" was uaed.to. identify the weekly l ist ing of cadetdemeribl--the diacipliDe liat. To be "on Quill" was, therefore, ahilhly undesirable assignment. That was Dot the way the eventualQuill participant. viewed their aasiJDlllent, 01 COUl'se . . - Loc.kbeed was to perform system integration, caglneeriD, andfabrication of s tructura l modification tor three orbital vehicle anteDD&design and fabrication, provide special batteries and other payloadpeculiar vehicle equipxnent; and do teet plaDDins, i n - ~ a n s aDd launchba.e checkout .ervices . Goodyear was to be responsible for engineering.fabrication. qualification and deUvery ol five fliaht-qualified aatelliteradars. one qualification tes t radar substantially identical to a flightarticle. OD e thermal equivalent t model. one mock-u.p, a i r - t o " l r ~equipment for checkout at Goodyear and lor system checks a t Lockheed.and pad checkout equipnlent a t Vandenberg AFB. including tes t beaconsand apparatus fo r blockhou.e checks of radar operation during countdown.

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had agreed to provicle engineerills consu1tins.ervices for the radar experiment and to develop an optical correlatorlor final proces sing 01 radar data. Cienera! Electric COftlpaDY was tobuild the reentry vehicle and Douglas Aircraft the thru.t-au.meDtedThor 'boosters. The project 10ala included phyaical recovery aDdelectronic data readout _t _ around reaolutioll of 100 leet or better.Real-time electronic readout over olle UDited State... attOD wouldbe acceptable. The projec.t--white name ' 'P-401l--waa to operatewith a m;uimum of JUodiJ1cat1ou to aU off-the-shelf systems. inc1udiDJthe Goodyear radar, and was to be conc:lw:lecl rapidlyaa posaiblTime on orbit aDd data quantities were not con8idered critical i tems.However, Charyk wanted to be wormed immediately 1 there were&Dy queatiOil of rneetina the 100-100t resolution requirement . Healao lnsisted that contractors be clearly informed that the demoD8tl'a-tiOD ~ s of an experimental nature only and was Dot a device for

As Creer had .ugaesteel, ChuyX directed that the demon8tratiooproject be conducted uncleI' a 'fblaclt . cover. He authorized the DOtifi-cation of choaen contractors and the release 01 i l l fi .cal1963 funds to cover initial costs. ~ additional wouldbe provided for fiscal 1964.

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Charyk alao app1'oved the conduct of more refhied experimentalwork iD advanced radar teelmiques. Designated ' 'Phase .Alpha."that aspect of the total project was to be .aparately cla fied t l w h i ~ "but with strict "need to know" security. U ~ e r Special ProjectsOffice auspices, competitive propola1a were to be b lued .-tibalor deaip studle. lookina toward orbital te.ts and deJ!loMtratiOD ofthe feaalbility of radar senaors with electromc readout and stora ,ecapabUit1es (recovery was Dot aD excluded option, however). Accept-able IZ'O\IDd resolutloD was to b ~ specified at 10 to 50 leet. All COD- 6carned expected Phu e Alpha to take longer than the P-40 c1emODltratiOD.

t a u . ~ AI.JI " O l " e . l ' I Q r P P t t . _ f C b ~ ~ 1 1 ' ~ . U l i t e l t ~ ! l , , __a i ' "& e l l ~ o L t $ ~ . . . u ~ t 9 4 l ~ " ~ t b . e ; n . . a c . , . s . - : w . . I l I I I O . f o o t a the

~ Z . M ! o J ' W l j ~ . u l k ~ ~ _ t G ~ 3 1 ~ ~ ~ I G k r-epreaentativea at SUDDyvale...

froD;l o c k h d haclbeen uked.to be ready-to present &aain the proposal he bad Uerma.de to King', group ~ to briD, eosDlzant Goodyear people w i ~

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him. Att8Ddee. included Colonel Robert W. Yundt, who had luceeededVi . G. King as Bradburn' . immediate 8upedor for B!!!!.

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Bradburn informed the contracto:n that the Air Force was. going to proceed: with a minimum satellite radar dem0D8tratlon,generally alODg th e lines of the Lockheed-Ooodyear proposal. but onan ...ociate-contractor basb . Although Lockheed had favored aprimary contractor-subcoDtractor framework, the Air Force haddecided that direct ace to the major contractors involved wouldl imit schedule and coat overruns aDd thereby eDhaaee the probabilityof aD, early firat fli ,ht. Lockh.ed; Ooodyear and_wouldall have direct communication lines to Bradburn. Bzadbura ezplainedthat be WUlted to exploit eziBUn, contracts as much u possible. Dotonly for adm inistrative ease bu.t also far purpose. of maintaintn.security.

The project framework, as laid out by B r a d b ~ iz1.clud.dprocurement of five flipt-qua.Ufied payloads to support three 4lgJ:ataat two-month intervals with the f i rst flilht targeted for ,January 1964.The ,oa l would be toobtain a high-r olution,raclar pictu:re f r om .

a D d : ~ m , ; D t m m i r : m o r l i f i ~ < o f ! _ ~ h D . N H " f t w a r e .(Aeropbyaicl Division of Goodyear) briefed

th e meeting on the radar system. then being developed by Ooodyear

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for the R.F-110 aircraft . Capable of produciDg 50-foot groU11d reaolu-tiOD. the bu lc radar covered two 3G-mUe .watha. QJ1e em either aideof the airplane. The bdliaht recorder and dUpl.ay equipment permitteddbplay of two ten-mile swathl 'Which, could ~ selected as desiredwithiD th e coverage l imit . . The all-up weilht 01 the radar was 450powada (iDcludlD, anteDD&, recorder. tranamiUer ancl receiver) .

_ foreaaw the need for three principal. changes to adaptthe m.t ing APS-73 radar for satellite use. The pulae repetitionfrequeDcy (prf) and. the average power would have to be increased.th e t rusmit terrmodulator (aDd p e r h a ~ other components) whichused refrileration coolbc would have to be repackaaed to prori4efor Ccmdu.ctiOD or rac1iatloD cooling, aDd the recorder would have tob . modified to accommodate a. large film supply and to provide for.aatellite-derived data iAput. .

Existiag development .chedules called for initial beach teatiDgof th e first complete RF-110 racial' in. AprU 1963 anc:l delivery of thef irs t flight teat item to Ec1wa.rd. A ir Force B a a ~ in July. However,there was all"eady some indication of slippage a n d _ c a u t i o n e dthat .f l i .ht te. ta might Dot begin untll September or October.

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described the operating principlea of 1IIe opticalcorre1ator. _cou ld achieve an azimu.th cOIUpreadoD ratioof 1000 to 1 with avallable production-type proceasor. . (The aaimuthresolution in the final. pic tue wculd be 1000 t imes finer thaD thephysical diaum.ions of beaDl width.) With laboratory-type de!D.on-atration equipment. the best obtainable asimuth compre.s ion 2:atiowas about 5000 to 1. In the proposed .atellite experiment, azimuthresolution would be l imited primarUy by ionospheric distortions.U all worked well, the overall system. might produce azimuth resolutionof 15 l or better . At any rate , th e optical proceasor would notb . the Ibnit1ng factor.

During th e enlineering eli .cu., ion. that afternoon. Bradburnspecified that the payload cODfigurationa would be identical from fliahtto fll ,ht--there would be no ,roWth chan,e He emphasiHd the"ttminimwn modlficad.on, as-ahort-a- time- span-as-possible" phUoaophywhich wu to guide Quill. He abo restated h i , determill&tioa to adhereclosely to th e primary ,oa l of showing feaaibUity, not developiDaoperat iou l prototypes. One couequeDCe was that th e radar anteDDawould not be ateerable. Concerned with acquiring a lood pictare a t

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acceptable groUDd resolution and not With vtewina specific tarlote.Bradburu foresaw no Deed to develop aiming capability; the swathwould be wholly dependent on the orbital path of th e vehicle.

Although recovery of the expoled fil.J:n lIIOuld be the pri tnarydata retrieval method. simultaneous readout of th e radar data wouldprovide a COzo.par iSOD in picbh-e qualityaind reveal what data cJeter-loradon was caused by the tran.miaslon lbk . Rea.c!out would aleoprovide a backup systalD in case the recovery I ~ t e m failed.

Lockheed agreed provide w1thiD Z . hours aD initial co. tfigure 10 fUDela could. be ad.ded at once to an on-gom, Air Force c:omrac:t

A work etatwm.eat was to be ready by. Zl Novemberand a fu l l COl t proposal within. the month. Contract aelodations,to bep in ,January 1963, were scheduled to lead to a defiDitivecontract by ZS January 1963. BradbU1'll. scheduled a meetiJ:la withGoodyear for th e week of 18 November, in Phoerd.x. to cWtcuas adraft work statement. propo.ed contract arrangern.ents, aJld pro-curemellt Ichedules. Meetings withwere .e t for early December.* The principal contractor. were in a state of finaDcialne&r-shock when Bradburn told them that Greerls organisation had acceptedtheir premil .s and promises and proposed to proceed with the prolram

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Bradburn. emphasized the need for t ight . ecurity. Eachemployee w o r ~ 1 on the projed would have to be approved by theAir Force p a security agreement, anel bave' a. final . ec re tc:1earance. BradburD requested that he a p p r o v ~ theae name. inadvance, aD arranaement he later chaDged to allow for atter-the-fact notiflcatioD to th e lhxait. of a quota for each c o m ~ D y .

Bradburn &180 s t re ed the need to hold docwaentatiol l toa minimum, both for security reasonal and to le en paperwork.Each company woul4 deal directly with his office, 1 0 a lJ1ultiplicityof reports would be a waste of time as well as a potential. securityr i sk . He empharised that he intended to participate in moat of themonthly engineering aucl.tecJmical review meett.n,. aDd that heexpected all program puticipiults to u .e them. a l a pr imary moauaof ~ u W a i t a 1 I , c c m c e . r . b " , . : p a r t ~ l I a of t e c l m l c a . . l $ e c e . ~ ecbtad.-un.7 1d.ta.iJaJ,.ing .matter8.*(coDUnued) pretty lDuch a8 they had briefed i t --and a t about th e pr icethey bad proposed. As later became plain, aacl a. everYODe concernedprivately ackr&owi.daed at the . tar t , the fiDaucial esdmat .s o r l pa l l ya t tacd to the Lockheed-Goodyear proposal were aalea figurea, UDder-stated by about half. ID the usual way of things, the contractor.would have "recovered" their understated cost . by charging for 1'edesign and refinement needed to s&tidy 'pecificatiOD. aad requirementsthat.varied 8ubstantially from tho.e a .sumed fe r th e proposal.Bradburn's uaeceptancelt of the maiD. e1emeDt8 of the origlDal propoaalmeaDt that there was little occasion for such maneuvermg.and thatin a tlles8' cost" direction, for the most part .

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......


To that point all had ione rather smoothly. But betweenCharyk aDd th e Secretary of Defense there intervened one majorrenew flChelon, and on 15 November Bradburn learned that a poten-t ially troublesome objection to B!!!.!l had surfaced during the flIla1project review aDd approval proees. iD the Penta,on . Dr. Z1lleneFubini J theD .erving as semor technical advisor to Def Secre-tary. Robert McNamara, had held up the rele&se o f program. fundson the Foun!. that "we;(tbe Nat low aecomaai.s&DCe OffIce] intendto pay too r:nuch for the radar. I I LieuteJlaDt Colollel E. J . Istvan,Bradburns chief CODtaCt on the NRO .taff. reported Fubinir protestthat f1APS-73 cost . (only),'a few hundred K.lt Fublrd aaked that theAPS -73 project officer at be solicitedfor a ."'more reallaUc" COl t estimate.

From FublDi,l. viewpoint. COllcerll leemed warrauted. Theprogram C O ~ e.tlzr1ate thit.t reached Fubbd included a provision for

APS-73 radar sets then on procuremellt schedules. But, as Brad-burD pointed out. ~ - 7 3 was not being bought per 8e. a l t h o . modifications were to be beld to the minimum needed to qualify the "quip.ment for space llight. they would nonetheless be comparatively


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expensive. The cost e8timates Fubini. had objected to , Bradburnobserved mildly, had in fact been both prepared and validated by

_ and although th e was charged as "radar payload"costa, it actually inclu.ded engineering, fabricaticm. checkout, andlaunch terv ie . t at.oeiated with the payload. Until f i rm bids becameavailable, probably in January 1963, DO better estbnate could beecompo.ed.

The .respOllse s a ~ . f i e d Fubini's objectiOllsi DO more washeard from that quarter. and funds were released on schedule.

That problelQ dbpo.ed of , Bradburn l I le t 'With Goodyearpeople a t Phoemx on ZO November. Althouih th e company had hadno satellite experience, virtually a ll its contracts were with th eUSAF or the Na.vy'a A ir arm. Org&l'lizationally.head of the Goodyear Arisona Division. reported directly to T. A.KllOwle., prelldent of th e Goodyear Aircraft Company (llame baaedin AkroD, Ohio), a subsic:H.ary of Ooodyear Tire and Rubber Compaay.The Navy was responaible for lDduatrlal security aDd quality a urllllceat PhoeDix (Coll.'lmaDder was the re . ident Navyrepre ntative) and the Air Force Procurement Office a t Sky HarborAirport in Phoenix handled audlting and accounting t-equirer:r;t.ont

2.2.


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UDlike Lockheed. Goodyear had very limited experience withthe special security arrangements that eharaeteriBed work OIl. satellite recoD:D&iss&DCe. Brac:iburA Iloted at th e ODset 01 th e Phoenhdbcu l ion s that three aspecta of the prolr8D). were extremely a u -eitive: that a version of the R.F-


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contract covered by the prOprietary deserlptioD,'tt(p I.It) Sucha cover weald abo ease procurement problema--radar componentscould be purchased "whiten a . commercial iteme--or so i t wasiDitiallyasawned. altboUSh there to o problema were to developsubsequently.

Goodyear'. draf t work statement indicated a need foradditioual 'detailed technical specifications from the Air Force and Lockheedbefore lDaZIpOw.er and coat estimates could be refined. For themom.ent, an e8tialate of expeDditu.re8 for the l i rs t 60-day period9was the beat that could be provided.

SectlrUy rules for Lockheed. were 4eflDed. the toUowin. day,.Lockheed's white contract would not mention !'radar t l or tlGoodyear '-:the black verdon would b . correlated by pazagraph numbers to thewhite and would be a p e ~ i f i . c . Inasmuch as Lockheed had beendoing "black" work of ODe sort or another for a decade, fe w newproblems were l ikely to appear.

* The first .ec1U'ity problem of QuW. &rO._ in the circumstancethat Lockheed's QP,tnal racbj..r e1UtenOtion hadbeen.. . e6d" ~ Y .before i t ' 'went black. t t In mid-November. the Strategic Air Commandasked Lockhe_d to provide additional iDformation re.ard:ina theLockheed-Goodyear radar proposal. Bradburn vetoed th e trip &Delgot word to a witting SAC officer to "layoff. I I 10


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work for th e duefor routine contractual extension in March 1963, appeared eu i lyexploitable to coyer Dew activity. Funcb could be readily u&D8ferredfrom. the program. office to with DO Deed for .eparate fbumcial.accountability. The .contract would be white, though with avalUe work statement, but to in.ure that priority would be , iventh e new paperwork. t h e ~ c b n i c a l project officer am possiblythe responsible procurement oft,'icer would have to be briefed.

Dr40D(,aeld work. coated at aD eatim.ated_ im:luded dealgn of the synthetic-array radar experiment,

cODSiderm, in detail what radar pazameter . 'Were required to obtalna successful demonstration. 8Jld preparing specificationa for criticalradar components. _ w ~ . to be respozdible for do te rmb ju .what azimuth resolution actually was obtained on the radar map.generated by the system and for azualysbg factors aifectiDg resolution.The also to develop and cou.truct a breadboard opticalproce or capable of achieviDa "the larseat attainable compre oarat io." U th e theoreticillly predicted azimuth com.pre on ratioanticipated 10. the experiment were not attainable. the laraeat tecJmi-cally atta.i.Da.ble (probably 2.000 to 1) would be th e key factor in the


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des ign . The proce8sor was al80 to be designed to process ' datawhich miabt be obtained under conditions wbien were departuresfrom the plaDned experiment. a.s miaht occur during actual orbit .Primarily, those diaerepancie8 were to include departure from theintended orbit of the vehicle aDd from the intended orientatiOA o fthe playaical beam.

In add1t1oD to proce88iD& th e radar data. _proposedto liDk tbe around recorcU.ng s,..tom totheoptlcal. display COAYerto:n.Tbe laboratory also sUllested developmg aDd prOCUl"inl J:Ric%owavebeacons to o ~ e r v e and. record .mblitiolnhi'ktori .S . U . t l 1 h ~ t h e

proposed designing a teat to determiDe the limitation OIlcompresslODratio imposed by the camera drives iDthe radar system.

a, reed to send to Bl'acJburnby m-December.two work .tatemeJlt.: draf t . to be approved for content and security.ODe would be comp letet:ae. e c o D . c l r - : w D ~ d ~ ttp.,itisefl"._ am;#'1",any ruere8C e to actoal .atelllte GpeZ'ations 01 ' satellite derived. data. Accordint to_ 11 early objective of th . prolramwas to place empbast. on o'bta1nins fiDe a.tmuth resolution. to ~ egreatel t possible eztent--optim.ally ten feet--whUe ahnhlS for amore Z'eadUy predictable SO feet in range resolution. All factorsdetermining ranle resolution were generally well understood, i twas desirable to th e experiment and potential future project . todetermine whether adequate compre.sfon of l i i m u t h ~ s e historiesof target . could be reaUzec:l. l l .


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any refereDCe to . Goodyear. Lockheed. Special Projects Office. orthe deliYeryof report . on "DelilD. of Experiment". The problem ofcoDductiDg covert work s e t t i D a was not as easy aswith Goodyear and Lockheed, but the basic procedures were muchthe same. As ~ 1 : b _in Phosecurity officer, was not to be bri . ted we . s i t became unavoidableat 80m.e later time. * Uncleared personnel were not to be awareof the exi8tence of aD orbital rada r experiment. that satellite-derived data ba4 been or would be processed or that

createcl.a worldng relationsbip with Lockheed,Oooclyeu, Space SY8tem.s D i v 1 a l o ~ or SAFSP.U

In mid-Decem.ber, Bradburn learned would be ableto revise i ta ontraet to iDclude Quil l work before the contract-expired in Warch. I t did. lDdi,naDt that hetd been left out of the l o op , _~ t r o D J I h im. to drop inq,uirie. into security cleara.n


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A few days later, Goodyear's draft work .. atemea,t.specificatioDs summary, and deliveryscl?edule.appeared.. Not sur-priaiDgly, April 1964 rather thaD January 196. had become the tarsetfor f i rst fligbt. A formal Oo04year price proposal still was lacld.ng,but B r ~ privately expected that i t too would depart from. theeatimates earUerfOJ"Wal'ded. WhenQuW. had f i rst been approved,-foUl' IDOI'lths earl ier , Major BradbuzoD had very lntormally observed.to Major J'ohn Pietz, with whom he then sbared an office. that heexpected the forma! COst propasals to exceed prelimiDary estimateaby a factor of two or more, and that his past experience with theaeveral aspecta of Samoa led him to conclude that schedule revisionwould immediately lollow the opeDing of negotiations for firm contracta.

named project manaler, Bradburn had eUcited an ironic .mUe aacl

in reque.tina program approval from Charyk. rather thaD aomemoc:leat variation on the propoaal estimates f i rst received from4X:kheed ancl Goodyear. Lockheed's proposal of m i d - 1 9 6 ~ b a dpostulated a cost a five-mi.. on program; Bradburncalcub.ted probable .costs 01 lor three launches. but only

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if he could keep program objectives substantially unchanged from. those approved by Charyk in Hovember:-.,;There was D O o t h . e ~ way ofpreventing the cost growth that had characterized 8 0 many venture-some Air Force prop-am. of the past decade. Concern for COIUlargely explained Bradburn's continued reiteration of pr imary procramgoals in discwasiolls with contractors. He wanted all concerned. tounderstand that in no circum.8taD.ce8 would he couide r incorporaUn,either work additional to or technology newer tban that origiDallycontemplated. * In eUly 1963; Gellera! Greer ' . organization was battJ.iDg aseries of COl t gl.'owtb problema. virtually aU of them. haying originatedin faul ty init ial elt imates by cOlltractorl and UIlcritical acceptanceof optimistic project ions by various pro,raJD managers. Bradburn.who had by thell speDt nearly two years in Oreer ' s plans and policygroup. was fully aware of ezbting cost control problems and. theirorigins. Colonel King. under whose ,uidance th e QQUl program.had progressed from proposal to initial approval. wu-aDOther whoseskepticism about the validity of contractor propo_alB w... prOD01lJlCedaDd who .bared with Bradburnthe convictioll that h i l h - t 8 c h n i c a 1 ~ r i s kprolrams entrusted to large management groups with complex reportingchannels were sure to overrun. Qu.111 aDd th . P-35 (project 4:17)weather satellite progrlLll).s were the f i r atSAFSP undertakin.s whlcbconformed to tho Gre.r-Km, ' philosopby, al tboqh a _ b i t s re-coDfipred to that moclel in 1963 after Kiac became GarAblt p2'ogl'&D1ma.D;8ler: The azchetype of amall-stii.1f. ~ e c t - m a . D a I . m e n t , r i sk-minhnization was CorOAa. as originally c r g ~ ~ e d . The mOl!lt suc-ce ul c O m D 1 . r ~ i a l practi t ioner wa. C. L . John80n, Lockh.ed ' ,leading aircraft deal_n manager, _ 0 p:roduct4 included the originalof-80, the U-2. and th e A-ll .


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In accepting the .chedule revision, Bradburn pressed Goodyearto _,ree to build the t r a n . m i t t e r ~ m . o d u 1 a t o r UD.it in Phoeulz ra thvthaD Akron as originally plarmed. A.lele from dahtenina secUrity.that move would ."bance engineerma control over the s.ificlUltlycrit ical unit. whi.cb was going to r e q ~ e estenaive r.ed.esipl forradiation coolhig. Although proteetina that by persODl1e1 would have

14to be moved from A l t r o ~ Goodyear asreed.

By early January 1963, th e status 01 th e ~ bwltet wasbecoming clearer . COlt propo.als from contractors at this pointin time were ali .hlly underrw:miDg the tentative budget approved'by

NaO comptroller, the previous Novelnher. Ooodyearwaa estimating coab of for fiacal 1963,for 196 . &Dd for 1965.black tUDela. White moade. toLockheed'a-800 contract were estimated to be for 1963,

fo r 196'" aDd.. for 1965. White funds transferredto were expected to to ta l_ n fiscal 1963,the same in 1964, aDd _ in filcal 1965. PropOsed total CORSfor the 9!!:!! contracts fo r fiscal 1963 wereapproved bldget of fiecal19M, _approved), and_ n fiscal 1965. Total costs for all three

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contract. were e.t1mated tobudget

November' . -approved

BradbvZl had estimated total program coat. of at 1ea ._plus boo.ter . , launchea, IIld orbital operations.

The three TAT/Agena D's with. modificatlona. launch lerv iee . ,aDd three reentry capsule. were additl.o1ial COl t . to be funded UDder

AgellA D plus la\IDCh probably would total; TAT -pluslaunch- telemetry. trac:ld.Jll and commaud (vehicle)--

and -operation8- TOlethar. theee ack1edaDO the price of th e ,prog-ran leI; .. grand. tc)ta1

enpneer in charia of the contract atin January. Bradburn approved the ~ -

and black Vel ' aloll8 ofbut deleted 80me of the task. a d earl ier pr9POleci. Hebadd&\cidecl that the raw radar film. . h ~ d be developed by the SatellitePhotop-aphic Proces8ing Labol'atory. at W e . t o v e ~ Au ForceBaae. Massachusetts, rather than

:n


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-'-", ........ prcwide engineering Uabon serrice. . The czo1U1cl-based photo recorders (for use with the readout mode of data retrieval)would be ~ p l i e d by Goodyear rather t h an_ . Lut lYt ~ o c k h e e drather than_would btdlcI the microwave beacODs.

Under th e circumstances. Bradburn decided that no fonnalblack contract need b.e written for the troup. smc.e mostof the very sensitive work: had been as . iped ebewhere . The .hi tecontzac:t wi th .wou14 therefore become th e ODly biDding a l ~ e e m 8 D t .Bradburn felt the motivation was so hi,h a t _ and hie contact.with them 10 freqllent that any black . tatement assilDlna eleac11.iDesfor the report . that comprised mOlt 01 the remaimnl black eItortthere would be extraneous.

It appeared that eHlort : would codThe total included _ for system del ign and analyaia of para-meter.: _ for the data analylis anel fiDal report ;_to design and build th e optical correlator and another_tooperate it;_to ollect and analyze radar and beacon alguall;and_to design and operate th o camera drive evaluator. Ofth e total, _ would be . pent in fiscal 1963 and_iza h ca l161964.

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Baeic arranlemcntl having been made, Major Bradburnbriefed Dr. Brockway McMillan in March and agaiD ia May 1963(Mc).fUlan had replaced Charyk aa Director, National ReccmDai88aDCeOffice. early in March). de.cribhal the re1haed parameter . for theQuW. ex.perbneat . . . then deaiped and brimgiag him up to date on thestatua of QuW contracts, budget,and techDology. It was Bradburn ' .f irs t opportunity lo r describing fully the content of th e program h.had just created.

A. defined in May 1963, the radar payload cOlllponenta ofQuil l consi8ted of (I) a transmitter-modulator whieh was basicallya high-power radar frequency (ltF) pulle amplifier; (2) aD RF-lFunit. which generated a low-power 1lF pulse for the transmitter iUldreceived aDd compressed the reflected radarpul. .e; (3 ) a reference ,computer which generated t iming and coDtzool . ignab (aDd trlUUJnU orapulses) and synchronously demodulated the received interm.ediatefrequency to provide video data; (4 ) a power control unit which cODtrol-led 8.!ld .Witched power and generated re,wa.ted volta,e. necesaaryfor the radar; and (5 ) a recorder which recorded the received videofrom the reference computer on f ihn by expo .ve from the face of acathode ray tube.

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Goodyear bad estimated 1hat in its operating mode the radarsystem would CODS\1me Z700 watts of power. (Radiated effective peakpower was 450 kilowatts, actual peak tranall'litter power 30 kUowatta.average traJlllmiUer power Z50 watts.) Th. length 01 th e uU8mi t tepulse wae 0.9 lIliCrOHCOll.cIa. By the use of pulae compr oll.tedl-Dique., th U waa reduced to aD e f f . ~ t i v e . p u 1 width of .06 micro-.ecollda. Pul repetition frequ.eney (PR!') had a l i -s tep variablerllDle from 8116 to 8736 tne,acycl.. . The radar operated OI l a I r e .qUeD.cy of 9S00 megacycles per aecOIlei.' Citva such parametera,Bradburn .st imated that slant-range resolution would b . SO f .e t andazimuth resolutlon 50 feet or better.

The AleDa . . . . . to be iDjected iDto a near-circular orbi t of130 nautical mJl . plus or mmus 13 m1l.s) at aD mcli:Aation of 70de, r s . Precis . attita.de stabilisation o f the . eh ic le would orientth e radar antemla sO that the maiD lobe of the radar beam would beat a fixed depre ou of 55 degreee from the horizontal. In thatattitude, the radar would map a .1ant. , ranaeillter 'ft l of 5.9S nauticalmile., or about,ten miJ.eaa1oq the' ground.

.Active radar operation was to b8 conlmecl within the limitsof the ccmtinental United Stat .a--and within the l imit . of control ofthe VaD


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..c:

,


stations.* The data obtained frolll the payloa.d would be in the formof target echoes which would be synchronously demodUlated to pre-aerVe both phaae and amplitude upecta of the Signals. The rNmt1Daraw radar map data (a doppler history of the Wuminated terralD).would be recorded photographically OD fUm in the recovt!rabl . capsuleaboard th e satellite. Simultaneoully, the data signals would be t rana-mUted over the wide-band data l ink to tracking atations, where theywould be recorded both on photographic film and on wide-band Tnapidictape recorders. After mli l ioa completion. the film record in thesatellite would be recovered near Hawaii by air catch of the reentrycapsule.

The radar a.nteana, beiDa buUt by Lockheed. W&8 a tw o .

1iDi.formly illuminated in both directions.. The hip .power output* One of the principal doctriDal proble-me of conducting a radar-in-orbit ezperime.nt was ~ ~ e n a i D t 1 ' about the reaction of the SovietUmon. AlthoUJh there were varioua juatlflcatioDI for using radArseD80rs fo r oTer1light recozmaillance--all-weather, all-leaBon,al l-BUD polition capabUity encomp.s8m, moet of them--aDd 11.0 whollyratloDal r ... ia for concluding that active radar iD orbit would bemore objectionable to a target . tate thaD photolZ'aphy. th e selUlitivitiescaused by the U . affair of May 1960 still were evident in 1963.The arauments againat active radar surveillance of tbe SovietUnion fel l into two categories. One had to do wlth the prembe thatnobody could object to surveillance if he:re were DO demonetrableevidence of i t . Becauae photography was wholly passive. there was

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(continued) (in theory) no way of provicU.ng incontrovertibleevSdeDCe'that aurv.WaDce wa. iD. prol r -unl.a. , of cour th eowner of the recODDai anc:e vehicle acJmowledaed wbat he was doiDa.or aomehow phyaical evtde1u:e of the. activity feU imo t&Dfrtec11yhaacla. Putting the entire l'8CoaDaia.ance aatellite Pl'ol1'&Ul beldIuldeue security barriers late in 1960 effec:tively precluded the fil 'stof thos. circumstancea; the United State. neither deDied nor coDftz'medthat i t waa flylDc recolmai.aazace .atellite. over Ru.ala, althou.pthat iDtelltlcm bad be. . oudl.,.. proclaiDaecl OD several oc.culCliDa betweea19S8 aDd 1960. The posaibility tbat the J ' t u . a 8 ~ milht 801Dohowrecover a camera-equipped U.S. satellite, or eaough of ODe toprove tbat i t was a racODDais.aac::e veJdcle, had worried pZ'O.ramIDaDaiers dace 1.be lUet CoroDa lauacl:da J'UDe 1959. Pl-ecaQtloD8alaiDat iDad't'erteDt de.eem of either capaul or camera .eetl.ol.utwitbiD. reach of Soviet recovery force . were exteaaive, and for.e .eral ,au. they were believed to be eflective. At leaat once lDCorona experieDce, however. a largely iDtact capaule left a decayorbit aDd .arvivecl r8Ddom reentry, aDd late m the 1960. sizeablesharda ot a Gambit mb-ror l ~ . . . . . . rioua bit. aDd p t e ~ .. . 01 ita electromcsub.yatems .urvived atmoepheric reentry auad were recovered iDEDgIIlDd.. Eraougb capsulea and orbital vehicle. 'Weat .. ray iD the1960. to .upport realoDable ,pecvlatioD. that lome could have fa l lqiDw lluslliaD haDds--but nothiDi was ever .aiel by the Soviete to . . . . .that had bapp . . .d. .. By i ta very Dature, however, a radar latellite radiated recordableesridence of it. purpo.e. That e'\ficleDce might be aufficlent to IUPPOJ:ta demand for a ce ation of latellite over1'.U.ght operaUoD. shou1c1 ,theSonet UDlon--or aay other nat1on--make an la.ue of the matten t hu .th e reluctazace to cODIider use of radar recOI2D&1aaance m aatelliteoverfU.pt of c:leDied U ' .as .But there waa aaother r . . . .on for luch c a u t i o . D ~ Photographic.atellit of the early 1960. were incapable of provldml Dear-realt ime information. They were superb in.truments for doiDg tu-aetUag.for tec1mi.cal iatelligellce, for force . tructuz . . . . 1uation. aad forvari0U8 other ta .k . with m1litary IigDiflcaDce. But ODly a radar.atellite could cODc.ivably do wide-swath bomb damage a m.a twithout concern for leason. cloud cover. or tim.e of day. AI no radarsatellite could provide the detaU of photography, i t followed. then,that one subltantial justification for operatiDg a radar aatellite of1963 vintage (limited in definition aud re.olution) could be to baYe

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pulse of the radar was tranamitted tbl'OlIP the llat, phased-al'l'a.,.atdellDa mounted on the . ide of the Agena, with th e beam orieDtedperpe.nclicular to the vehicle's lODgitudinal axi. but depres.ed S5de,rees be1Bw horizoutal. :rho beam was .36 clegre.s wiele in the.Bhnllth directioD and Z.9 de,rees wicH in th e vertical direction

17a t the half-power points.

Some 01 the early premiaes had to be altered early in thedevelopment proll 'am.. researchers le&l:lI.ed,for inetauee, that bias errors leDerated by tJ . AIena's attitude chaugesdurina Bigbt wel'e too large to be accommodated by th e radar beun-width. To onsure that tlzerO doppler" direction in asim.uth would.re.1I1t, a clutterloek or electronic beam ateerer had to be de.igDed

.within the reference computer. Althoqh th e clutterlock oscillator.output could conceivably de.rade date return., (continued' eometh.iDa in position fo r immediate bomb damaaeasse8sment- - whicb (accordin, to the reaeoDing then current) couldbe interpreted to mean that a surprise nucleu strike wae Imminent.It was highly UDlikely that aDy America pre8ident would ol'de1" apreemptive nuclear attack solely on the atrellith of iDformatlon thatthe Soviet. were operatiDg a racial' eate1l1te. but there was no 8uchconfideDce in Soviet reaction. wez-e the United State. to do a . mllCh.There were other reaeoDS for reatrictiDg OIl-orbit r a ~operationa to the l 1 m ~ t . of the continental Uaited States, the de. ireto keep the capability secret being ODe. but in th e councUs of Washingtonuncertainty a.bout Soviet reaction was the principal callS. of caution.

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predicted that no serious delradation would occur except a t initiallock-on.

McMiuan was concerned about the ...vanee of obblt'Dt"1qualitative c1ata to support evaluation of radar performance. Hetherefore directed that around resolution t u . e t e be provided so thata direct measure of radar resolution could be obtained from analystsof a finish.ed radar map_ He also sug,ested incorporation. of an alt1f;uderate chaDge recorder in the vehicle. (CballIea in altitwle rates woulddelrade the aslm.utb resolution; i f accurate rate data . .ere availableduring evaluation, delradation from that s01U"ce could be more

18reacU1y l.d.eDti.fied. ) B r ~ n made _r.sponsible forresolution measurements and aabel Loc:kheed. to evaluate the feaai-bUlty of iDcoZ'poratlng a ra t . recorder.

Bradburn also allked Lockheed to reverify reference computerspecificatiOJls. Electronically, the mOlt. complicated component of.9!!!!1. the computer: . .u ezpedenc1ns severe vibr&tioD problenls

QuUl proaram. apeci.8.caticms required testing at 7.5 Os; the originalcoftlputer. designed for aircraft use. had f.neel at 3 G

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Leas threateDina but equally trouble.ome problems appeareelin the procurem.ent area in April. G o o d y e a ~ belan experieDcinldUficulty in buyiug ,oyermnent-ifttpected parts UI1der commerclalauspic A tentative 801utiou bad been iDiti.ally worked out byhaviDa the . local Air Force' procurement 8p'cialiat .verbally approve . . . IICODtractin, Office:r" Goodyear's request . forthe delivery of hiah-reliability com.ponena. The ratlODal. . .e rnl,htsell it o th e ,ovenunent" was u ed to ju.t1fy the Implled u.e 01govermnent-approved i tems in what was represented. to be an Itin._hOWie, fI companysponsored pr'ogram. That tODUou.8 aetworK collapsedin early May when a govermnent iDapector. who had ,been "ofAcially"asked to release parts hom a boDded warehoue for whichh. wasresponaible. ..u. .v. Goodyear 'ssecurity officer. to coDfirm that the commercial purch.. orelerhe had received actually supported a ,overmnent contract. :aoutblelyattempting to confirm that the listed parts wculd be uaed in workfo r the government.. _ fel l into the local cover atory--that theywere aeeded to support a p r o ~ : r i e t a r y contract. Convinced that he had.tUlnbled mto something unsavory, _ imrnec l i . a t e ly blocked thepurchase. An alarmed Ooodyear executive hurriedly notified_

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who called_to verify that the work waa indeed Air Force .pOD-sored. _st i l l sensing someth iq h1Jhly irregular, said stifflythat he was obliged to notify his superiors in the Navy procureznentch.a.1D. Seeing visions of a total collapse of securlty, u r r i e c n yalerted Bradburn, who inittructed him to 1188 some excuae--any excuae--to stall until program office persODDe1 couletgetto Phoenix. _ grudgingly accededto_ lea to postpcmea,D.Y action unti l th e followlDg M o ~ c 1 . a y . (It was then Friday alterDOOA.and Bradbu:rn appreciated that a delay until Pentalon closing tbnewould represent two days of grace.)

Colonel Ruebel and Major B r a d ~ D flew to Phoellbt CD SUIlclayand em oiled who agreed to support the project.They agreed that a ll future requests for verification of goverzmumtinterest in commercial purchase orders would be referred to.directly aDd that_ would cc:mfirrn their validity. _alSQagreed to assume the function of acting as co,mal.Dt security officerover the clo.ed areas of the plant. No other Naval persozmel were

19to be briefed or mad. cogDizant 01 any special requirement . ./ . The potentially mor e troublesome problem of arraza,q. tlu'ouah.1the CIA., fo r General. Electric to buUet azad deliver three CorOlla- \

configured recovery cap.wes for use m the Quill experimentwas reaolyed in th e early Spring also. As with LUlyard aDd \Gambit, CtA peraoD.1lel were apprehensive about a. security leak. \"/

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pi.CUlaiOIl8 between SAFSP and CIA security spec:ialbta in a le r iesof meeUna_ led to agreement on 9 April 1963 that th e procurementcould proceed. The three capsules would be handled wuler C01':ODasecurity procedures until their delivery to Swmyvale &Dei would there-after be handled UDder.9!!!:!! procedures. III ODee that hurdle hacl beenpal.ed, the c ~ D t r ..cdn l azad funding arrangements were quickly re .o lv .d . O

The f i rst .er ious threat to Icheclllling expectatioDil and Qui l l811cce.. occurred 1D early JUDe 1963. Dr. McMillan had ear lJer

~ r e .. d concerD to Braclb1U"D. that arems in hiah-YOltage powersupplie. might become a problem. The original Goodyear specifi--cation. approyed by Lockheed had ablished a level of .001 1bilH-meter. of mercury .s the highelt preure in which the payload wouldoperate. Hilh-voltaa. areing would Dot occur i f that a meDt werecorrect. Bradburn, nudged by McMillu, dec1ded toius1st on veri- .ticatioD of Goodyear" estimate and asbd ProjectMUlLger for Lockheed, to cover that item during the next moD.thlyprosram review in late June. Although be cUd not fully ahare MCMillan.'sconcern, Bradburn asked lor a complete review of design .coulderatioDe,par t . qua11f1catiOD,8 b b t o 1 ' Y ~ and qualification to.tiDa for Lockheed- andGoodyear-furllbhed hi,h-voltage supplies aDd any circuit polnta wherehigh voltage ezlated. The clifferences were entirely academic.

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Not until July was the Lockheed t eun able to present i tsinitial report , .but the part ial study was enough to indicate that aserious problem existed. Aetual measurement revealed that pres -sures in and around the payload boxes could pos.ibiy be 10 to 100t ime. htaher tbaA anticipated. T ~ e g r o a . t e r molecular density thuasuggested made i t highly probable that high-voltaae arciDa would oc-cur.

.During tI a DaD several weeks, andDr.__ of Lockheed .valuated r ed . s i p a 1 t e ~ ~ t i v e s . conaideredt ing difficultie., and weight penalti,es, aDd e . ~ t e d the effeetof the unforeseen rework on laUJ;lCh schedules. There were, funda-mentally. tJuee feasibi. zoe'paDeeS to the a r c i q problem: pre uri-zation, to driVll molecular deD8itie. above th e crlticallevel.; ventma.to he lppr ur sufficiently low; and illsu1a.ttcm by th e use of a pot-tiDs coznpound. Goodyeal' . t l 'on,ly reco1'nQ1ended that the tranamitterbe pree .urued (as bad beem done in the l lF-4C ver.iou) aD d maiDtahedthat & pre u r . ve el could be desi,ned and te . ted on .the same timeseal a potting program, favored by Lockheed. Concerned by theeonflict of opiDioD8. Bradburn pressed the Lockheed mvestiaators formore details and learn.ed that Lockheed to o would have recommendedpres ~ i z a t i o D i f the problem had been recognized at the outset of the


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program. He immediately ordered that preparatioJls be made to pres-surise the t ransmit ter and any other modules th8.t looked critical. .

By th o end of August i t had been decided to pot and pre urizethe transmitter, to use only Pottin& compoUDd iD the recorder, and toprovide for a bac:lt-up pres8u.risation system. that coulcl be re-evaluatedfor need by mid-September. All concerned c o ~ e d e d that the t r ~ . -mitter-m.odulator and the recorder would pre.eDt the moat complexinaulating problem.a. but that the hish-voltage pOwer supply beingdeveloped by Lear Sieper for Lockheed aDd tbe ,RF-lF unit mightal lo be troublesome. Arcm , problema i l l the contrOl unit and thereference computer seemed to be controllable. t.bzougbtbe application

Zlof a void-ireeiD8ula&g conformal coat in , . But i t appeared thatredes ip and rework would caua. a progrun sl ippa.e .

~ a,8Bociated difficulty appeared clu.rina the late Bummer oi1963. Colonel John Martin,- head of th e NItO Wasbi.ngtOD staff.adviaed General Greer that fiscal 1964 fund, might be insufficientto cover currODtly projected 9!!!!! coatll. He directed that the thirdB!:!!! fllsht be deleted from the launch schedule and con.laDed asa payload spare. Requestina p rogram re-costin& by 10 August.Martin advised that although was authorized to spend a t pre-viously approved rates through the first quarter of the Dew fiscalyear, the program office should be prepared for a possible ten percent

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cutback thereafter. Martin assured Creer that he waa proceeding"through OSD cbBllDehu to overcome the deficiency aad that should22th o :measure. fa i l he would be notlfied immediately.

At.tbe end of Auguet i t wa. clear that Goodyear was eightweek. behind i ts original scbedule and that offieiallaunch datesshould be slipped by two month. . Bradburn attributed ODe monthof the slip to Goodyearls engineerm, and parts delivery problemaaDd olle month to the high-voltage red esign requirem.enta. He estimated

. *hat th e delay would ca , . e coate a t Goodyear to So up 8 0 f t l . , . a t ~On the whole.Braciburn informed Creer on 30 Auguet. Goodyearappeared to be doms a good job and Lockheed, although somewhat

23sloppy in systems enginee rina, ,wa. improvm, .

By late Septenber , the launch sUppage had been officiallyconfirmed and a DeW a ~ : 1 o r first flight--5 Aueuat 1964--had beentargeted. Negotiation. lor th e deletion of the third Qu.Ul flight were-completed t:ha.t month: the third Agcma D vehicle aDd. the Thor werecancelled, aa w e ~ e all Lockheed efforts on the third payload beyoM* I t will be recalled that Braclburnls ac:hedule and co.1: esdm.ate.were 1 a optUnistic than thoa. proposed by the contractors andformally incorporated in contractor program pu . . .

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the installatiOD of the radar compoDents in the p a y l o a d ~ u p p o l ' t i D gstructure. The third wa. DOW treated aa a spare payload thatcould be readied for launch within five to six. month. after the f i r . t.9!!!!111ight. Bradburn recommended that any further action 011number three be deferred until th e results of the f i rst Qu1ll flight

~ 4 -- -could be evalWltec1.

Early October 1963 .aw a De" cle.ign. problem. Goodyear.attemptiDa to lDeet the . t r iDaent vibration requ i remeDbof the prolram..concluded that the rigid payload rack m01lDting. oripnal ly calledfor could cause payload performance degradatiOD and called on Lock-heed to provide vibration-re8istant ahock mounts. The iDitial approach.a simple substitution of moun'tiJ18., proved inadequate. Payloadracks in manufacture were stopped for redesign, a proce . thatpromised to take a month or more . A new interior dist:ributionplan for the component equipment was c a 1 1 ~ d for. plus modificationof th e ecouclary barre l structure to provide th e required structU:ralst i f fne. . . Lockheed's program manager anticipated the r ack . couldbe delivered by early December. AlthouSh that schedule 'WO'Uld betight, overal l program scheduling should not be affected.

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Goodyear and the . p ~ c i a 1 Lockheed high-voltage .team w ~ r enot eDjoying slmUa.r s u c ~ e s s . Telts of the potting design. ~ Septemberand October. had been dbappoi.nting. Poor surface preparatioll andimproper c::leanb:la and prhner appUeation techniques were blamed.But .ven after potting compound adhesion problems were dilposedot, altitude testina disclosed tho appearance ot corona arotID.d pottedcompoueDb and cables. Lockheed recommended th e u l . of llght-weight closed-cell polyurethane loam. a . a countermeasure to eoro:nageneration in. the Rl'-IF box. ExteJl8ively us.d to inlulate aDd 8llpport. .hip .frequency cOQlponents, several such foam s, . . tems had beenused by Lockheed on ~ a c t o r multtpl iers aimUar to that Goodyearwas building. The expedieut worked, 81imjnating corona. u d break .doWD in the unit.

Elsewhere, however, foam as a corona ,uppre.s8.Ilt was notluccessful owing to the lack of a prbner that would act . a an adhesivebetween the foam and the ,Uieone-insulated lead wire , aDd bigb-voltage components. External corona problema could alao be ellmi-Dated by potti.ng high-voltage component. mmeta l cans, and eveD-tually Goodyear decided to combine that expedient with the use ofbraid-shielded i & b ~ v o l t a l e cables and a conductive epo xy to lDter-COUllcct components.

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For a time i t appeared that the solution was working. Then ODeof th e cylindrical can. containing the thyraton cOInponent burstat the .eam beeauee of pottinl' expansioD caused by the heat 01component operation . Goodyear adopted a lIquare can configurationtaallow for bwgmg durf.ns th.n:na1 expansion and began to ezp82"imentwith expandable..top ~ a n e . Such lUeuure ' l . when supplemented bythe addition 01 an aluminum. sling lD. the 8DOde area (to reduc:e th ebulk of the pottiDi.). proved .ucce ul. No fur tberproblema wereexperienced with thyratron pottiDg. althoUCh repeated f a U ~ e . wereto occur in latel' teatins :ir0lU othel' causes

.As a further precaution . , a i n s t high-volta breakdown aDdcorona. Lockheed resorted to venting of the payload bozes. one-inch

Z5diameter screened vent holes bemg cut on thl'ee aides on each boz.

that the high-voltage problem was under controL Arcing and coronaphenomena in 1he transmitter-modulator had been eUminated. Thebadcup pre88urisadiOn-:Yes,el could be cancelled. The RF-IF UDit,reference COlUPUteJ'. control unit and recorder had a ll been succe88-fully potted. Teata on th e anteD.D.a model had indicated i t would DOtneed pres8udsing.

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Payload qualification te.tm. waa 8che4u1edto cOIDlUezace iDSurmyvale in .JanlLU'y and Goodyear w u to deliver the hs t fliIhtpayload for acceptance testing i l l February. Pa.yload final assemblyand checkout would continue through April; full-scale system te . tswould bepn i l l April azul contlnue th roqh .JUDe. A 5 Aqus t laUDch

Z6date sun .eemed to be achievable.

The uncertainties of funcliAl that had appeared several mODtb.earlier continued to be irritating but cIid Dot yet represent aeriolUlproblems. Lockheed' . Qu1ll work. t i l l was beiDa fuDded under sup--plemental asreoment to aDotb.er contract and Bradburn a n t i c i ~ DOchaDse in that dtuat ion for the Dear term. .A8 expected. Goodyear ' .need for acldi.tional money had to be acbowledsed in February. aDdfund. for sufficient only to .upport 1IiIork there throughSeptem ber--if expenditures were continued at the rate oriJina1ly

thatin a ll likelihood no more than _ additional could.:be madea. .uab1ethrough the end 01 th e year. which 1Oe&l)t that the_would have. to . t retch. i :z month. of contract doUar. to cover DiDemonths ofIwork. No major ~ e e l m i c a 1 problems were irDmecliatelyapparent, although corona effects had again occurred in the high-

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vOltage power supply and there were minor but troublesome cti.ffi-cultlea with transmitter power aDd transmitter-modulator UDits iDFeb1'WU"y and March. For the moat part th e r .sponse of p rop ..manalera was to i n c r eu . the tempo of teatlD&. All of th e radar UDitawere scheduled to emerse from the m a : a . a f a c t u r ~ procea. in March.and other priDcipal dem.eDu ot th e paylolUl were O Il .c:hed.w... Astill-millor conflict of launch-pad ac:hedulina cau.ed BradburD80me concern in March, but h . did not anticipate that it would becomeserious. (He planned to us. a NASA lantry to mate payload. and.booster elements of Quill. and. NASA had iDformallyiDc11cateCl apo .a ib l .need for theequipmeot at about the tUne 9!!!! was due to 10 mto

Z7orbit.)From. th e time Of propam approval through lUrch 1964.

only five months short of the acheduied fil-at rusht date, Quill had-been mana,ed almost entirely by BradbUl'J1, for the.Ail' Force, andthe three principal contractor project leader.: _ (Lockheed).

_ (Goodyear), an d Altb.oulhhe had reported frequently to Oreer, and periodically to M.cUUlan,Draelburn had. for practical purposes exercised com.plete and Dear-exclusive control of the proaram. In March, Oree r decided, a8 he

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told Bradburn. to call in 80me non-participating experts for a detaUedoverview of the work and of the operational readiness of Quill.-In advising bb contractor associates of th e prospect , Major B r ~ d b u n aemphasised that the review was "not an iDquieition li :and did not indicatedissatisfaction with any aspect of the effort thus far . But he observedthat they could ~ c t a "thorough aCl'ubbiDg. II

The review had some undercurrents of interest that escapodthe notice .of. thole who =ere ly read the eventual review report. Ithad begUD. as Bradburn recalled. with Greer a usual report toMcMillan, "Brad ' . doing fine, I I followed bY9''wait a minute. Howdo ! know he 's doing fine. Hela the one who's tallln, me." The"Tiger Team lt to review Quil l was Greerls rejoinder to Ids se l f ,remi.nder.

That the review would be thorough was paran teed by thecomposition of the review t e ~ . ' ! I - e ~ 9 I y O ~ _ I M 1 : : B 1 L i i 1 f H , D J I O l l t ocmeof Oeneral Greerls most. capable aezdor maDaler8. i t was composedlargely of Aerospace C orporat ion specialists in reconnaia sanceradar . UnhlrppUy for their state of temper, they had become "Ipecial-ista tt mostly through involvement in th e "P-ZZIt proJect-- the rtnitetrprogram. conducted in par t to provide a screen ofcover lor Qbill.-

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P-22 participants had 8enerally believed, until beiDg sudc1eDly briefedOn QuW. that 'What they were doms was an extremelytmportaDt-prelude to what might eventually become a radar-on-orbi t system.At the t ime of the briefing they learned that the radar-OIl-orbit . , . .temwas not an abstraction but was in being--actually only about fivemonths ahort of scheduled launch. They were, iD Bradburn's re-collection, "somewhat upset to learn there was a ~ radar expe:ri-meat g o q OA. tl Tbey deve10pecl wbat Braclbunl described .s nan

29inteDae interelt t ' in the quality of Quill.-

The sp ecially appointed Aerospace team headed by__ (which included several Air Foree people) bad i.D:structi0D.8

to look at payload and vehicle system desi&ns: at qualiftcation testhlBtory Ol1lLew components. at power gl'OUlld equipment dest ,n ,availability and placement; at prefli&ht checkout philosophy and theadequacy of test planning; at operational effect. of recovery systemchaD,e.; atcompeteAce.of trac1dn, statioa.. aIld STC personnel tosupport the musiom; aDd at traeld.n& station equipm.ent reac!lll s .Briefed first by Bradburn, th e team studied project doeumentatiOllgenerated by the contractors before begtmdng meeting. with Lockheed,Goodyear and pe l .BODll l :U in early Apr.i1 1964.

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The briefiDss concluded on 7 May and the report was forwardedto Greer .hort ly after .

Overall. the Aerospace group waa optimistic thatwould accomplbh i ta main objeetive: obtain a. high-resolution radarterrain map from aD orbldDg satellite within the designated sh9rtspan of time. Neverthe1.... they were ure the eXperimentwould contribute .lg'llificantly to secondary objectives encouragingan operational future for an orbiting radar satellite. Secondary 'objectives had been stated as (1) evaluate the resolution potentlal.an d limitations of satellite. .oorne, ground-mapping radar; (Z) evaluatethe capability to re t r ieve the mapping information in rea l t ime byreadout over a wide-band data link; (3 ) evaluate the feu1bUltyofusinc sateUiteooborne radar for terrain recODlla1 ancei ( . ) obtainsufficient engineedng information to determiDe the cau .e of a failureto achieve th e pr imary mission, or portiona thereof; and(S) itnprovefuture system design. AcbowledciILJ that useful' informatioD wouldprobably be obtained to .upport evaluation of the "resolution poteutialand limitations'l of orbital radars , the teaDl anticipated that the fli,htswould not produce finding. of greater .isz:aifieanee. The tellor' of thereport was to recolrunend for the second and third flight ' a restructuring


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of miuion objectives and emphasi. . Inherent i l l h ~ . e cd t ic i swas dista.te for the de . i p philo.ophy that had ga1cled 0aUl hom i t .-ouet : uae many oU-tbe-aheU compoDel1t. aIId. u little modUleatioDa . ab.olutely required. Perhaps no le could be expected of a ,roupthat until a few weelt. earl ier had. considered i tself to be leadtD& theway to the f i r . ~ orbitinc radar ,ys tem.

The.grou.p azauecl that ' 'the uae o fa wUle .band 1iDk torth e retr ieval of syndl.etic array radar data cannot be fully evalQ8.tedfrom. the .9!!!Y experimen.t . Nelative re .ults will not be cGDCluiaivesiDee the link was not enpneered for this application. Positiveresults wil l not be conclusive siDce the qu.a11ty of the Quil l data ia-n.ot repr . sa ta t tv . of a high-quaUty radazo." And elaewhere: "Siftcemuch bettel ' lDapping pel ' formanc. than the radar wUl provlcJeia technically poll ibl . . thit program will not fully evaluate thepotential of orbital radar 101' higb-quality terrain mappiDg." The

. group cOllCluded ra ther tepidly, that at ita leaat th e experiment30would determine the cause of Ucatastrophic faUures. t t

Italics added.

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The f i r . t tw o recommendation. of the repor t CODeerned work by.66 . o;J . . . . . . . I;I"" to define th e lources of flna1 ima,e degradation. The

reviewers urgec1 'that data be col1't1Dua11y updated throughout the program.with equal cODSideraticm. for data retrieval from the capsule and via thewide-band data 11_. aDd to poat .1llght anal.,..ia of the ftDal map prochid.Bradburn &ll'e84 that the I'esearchers .hould devi bothanalysis and evaluation plaD. to satisfy the l 'ecommendation.. But hedid not accept UIlcriticaUy a recommenclation focuss.d on the .ecOlDdaryobjecti.Tes of the mia.ion. The Aerospace team felt that considerationshould be given to flying Quill in a lower orbit (which would nomiDallyimprove the s tpa l - to-noise ratio) and in a .JDChrODOUs orbit (wbJ.cbwould permi t QWll to overfly. the .a.m.e target on succe Ve daya). WhUe-the pl&llDed orbit aeomed to .atisfy the primary objective of the uper i -meat, the team felt i t ' 'marginal for th e purpoae. of the aecoDClaryobjectives. "

Poilltins out that a lower orbit would decrea.e ~ e swath widthand the payload operatlDg t imes and thereby decreale the probabilityof .eeing th e resolution t a r l ab . Bradburn ' . people argued 1bat"marginal enhancement" wa. I10t a sufficient Justification for .

. chaDpg vehicle altitude. U th e fl'l' .t &pt were lucceaaM, lowerflight altituc:le would be considered for follow-on fllsht SynchrODOU.orbits had beencon8idered early in the program.. but the necessaryorbit adjust capability had bee;q, discarded becau.e it ran cOUDter to

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Quill 's 'tmiDimum modifications" policy. Bradburn felt that gaiDafrom overflying selected targets on succeseive days were not worththe extra effort.-and cost . -of incorporating orbit adjust capabiUtyin. the A,ena.

The cOIDlIlitt.. report took Dote of veral problem ar_already well boWil to BradburD ancl th e cODtractor8 u . result ofqualificatioD aDd acceptance testiDl. They 1Dclude4. slnOna othernth,umplnatt in th e tranamitter-moctalator, contiDuecl cracldDg 01 th epotUag compoUDd after repeated temperature cycling. aDd cath9Cleray tube spot sensitivity It o vibration effecta. The reviewer. abo .. ",express .d concern tha.t aDteDDa testlD, had Dot beeIL sufficientlyirltensive,urging c0111prehen81ve teat . to verify the characterUtic8of an anteDDa they characterised aa . aD advance in the atate-ol-the-art..(beC:-auaa,of i ta aise and iU required precialC!Jl). On the whole,however. the accepta nce aDd qualUlcatlOD teetmg Fosram rece1yedapprobatloD. The review team noted that eyatem teaters .rappeareelto be capable of giring the subsyatemsa thoroUlh checkout; tb-achedule of retesting after lnajor enviromnental teata waa very 10od .,But program. reviewers also r e c ommeDded t b a t - . , r e p a r e asystem error bqet o inlu1'e that tolerance margina did DOt become

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excessive, with a resulting degradation in payload performance.In the end, the review tearn cClD(:luded that Uno individual

factor wa.. lIDcovered which can be expected to prevent accomplisll-m.ent of the primary objective of the Quill prol ram. It There Were the

. -usual injW2Ctiona urain& continued dili ,ent system ClngiDeering. analyBle,and testing. The only significant remark in that eategory proposed"cloler control of overall performance criteriaeliminate the possibUity of either over-epecifying or under-specifyiDcsubay.tem requirements. I I The committee also felt that the threeprincipal contractors insufficiently appreciated the problems of inter-fact"" such .ubsya.tems as attitude control, data lhalt. aDd the anteDD&.But on the whole th e review bad to be considered approbatory of program

31cODduct.l e . thy commentl , . he report w .. nbmitted to General Greer , afterwhich th e program office aDd the maiD contractors spent much ofMay and June in responlliing by both comment and action.

lD the meantime. BradburD wal more cODcerned with trouble-some faUures of th e transmitter-modulator boze. in temperature-altitude simulation tests . During late March and early April, thef irs t such com.plete tes t had been interrupted by p o w e ~ supply fatlure--

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blamed on a faulty capacitor--and tranemit ter modwator breakdownin altitude test . (charged to poor circuit design). After circui tredesign, a a e ~ o n d .altutude . temperature teat of the complete p a y l o a ~began on 6 May. Resulb were rever.ed. The transnUtter passedaltitude testing but duriDs the aea-leYel run the klystron fa l l .d .After l'eviewiDa test status, Bradburn concluded late in Way that29 August 1964 was the earlleat possible launch date and that the nextseries of onvironm..ental teaU was likely to uncover more difficulties.He reconunended that 29 Augu.t become th e new launch d a . ~ target,32but that the program office be prepared to accept further deWys.

In .June the potting problem. drew new attention. Lockheedhad reported to Bradburn in late May that Goodyear had no writtenprocedures or quality control Q % t ' ; . t i n . procedurelhT" Bradbura 's '1'espouewal to notify Goodyear that he wanted ataD.darde written, and alsoto ins t ruct th e radar contractor to buUd eigbt of eacb potted i tem,to test all eicht ,dissect three, and i f all three were good to pa.s theremaining :flye. AlthoUJh the rem.a.iDiDg difficultt:el .eem.ed relati'f'elysmall . the .eh.dule of ma.nutacturiDg and acceptance testing hadbeen i rreparably affected; in July i t was nece. aa1'Y to specify anaclditional two-week delay in the Icheduled f i rst launch. Goodyear' .hardware delivery problems were th e principal cause of th e alippage.

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One of the important residual uncertalDtiol of c:om.ponent:iDtorface cmnpatibility wal resolved by late July. In a ser ies oftests at i ts Santa Cruz facUity. Lockheed ran eomparboa te . te ofa parabolic antenna and th e flight antemaa.. both aimed at a cornerreflector four q a half miles distant. Teat criter ia was to comparepube tranlhDitt.d aDd received tlu:ough-the horn or parabola. with thepulse through ar ray in order to mOallure distortion of radar pulsecaused by the :flight anteaDa. Third objective wal to meaaure .,..tem-range resolution. Resulta demonstrated that the ~ g h t antem:aa W1UIcOlXapatible with th e basic radar generator, tha t the antenna did notc a ue pube diltortiOD,azad that ranee resolu.d.cm (with. a cornerreflector aa a target) was better than 2,5 feet.

For all that reassurmg DeWS. th e program incurred anotherschedule slip. Pulse-iorming network recieligD problem8 and klystronand plate c h ~ k e potting failurel in th e transmitter-modulator forced

34a re.checlulblg of lUs t launch to a4 October. Then 011 8 September.one of the klystrons in the transtnltter-modulator Ailed during analtitude-temperafure 1bn.u1ation checkout experiment. After replace-:ment of the damaged element. , testing wae resumed. Further com .pODOnt failures in the transmitter-modulator element. early i l l

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October forced Bradburn(now a LieuteDlDt Colonel) to postponethe scheduled f i rat launch once again, tbla time to mid-November.In order to verify confidence in th e reliabUity of d:ae f irs t flight .qualified payload. he In_bted

Radar in Orbit

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