RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
-
Upload
dandansoylaw -
Category
Documents
-
view
226 -
download
0
Transcript of RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
1/40
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7192
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7192 - AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN
AS FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT AND NATION
BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in Development and NationBuilding Act."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The State shall provided women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.
To attain the foregoing policy:
(1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreigngovernments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized
by the agencies concerned to support programs and activities for women;
(2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally andparticipate directly in the development programs and projects of said department,specifically those funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the fullparticipation and involvement of women in the development process; and
(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all theirregulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein.
Sec. 3. Responsible Agency. The National Economic and Development Authority(NEDA) shall primarily be responsible for ensuring the participation of women as
recipients in foreign aid, grants and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amountto be allocated for the development activity involving women.
Sec. 4. Mandate. The NEDA, with the assistance of the National Commission on theRole of Filipino Women, shall ensure that the different government departments,including its agencies and instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect theparticipation of women in national development and their integration therein:
(1) Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside development programs or projects,provide income and employment opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus,prevent their heavy migration from rural to urban or foreign countries;
(2) Include an assessment of the extent to which their programs and/or projectsintegrate women in the development process and of the impact of said programs orprojects on women, including their implications in enhancing the self-reliance of womenin improving their income;
(3) Ensure the active participation of women and women's organizations in thedevelopment programs and/or projects including their involvement in the planning,design, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation thereof;
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
2/40
(4) Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data in its program/project paper,proposal or strategy;
(5) Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so that the percentage ofwomen who receive assistance is approximately proportionate to either their traditionalparticipation in the targeted activities or their proportion of the population, whichever ishigher. Otherwise, the following should be stated in the program/project paper, proposal
or strategy;
(a) The obstacle in achieving the goal;
(b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and
(c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to overcome those obstacles, why theyare not being taken.
(6) Assist women in activities that are of critical significance to their self-reliance anddevelopment.
Sec. 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. Women of legal age, regardless of civil status,shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect beequal to that of men under similar circumstances.
In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married womenshall have equal rights.
To this end:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute securityand credit arrangement under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programsgranting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equaltreatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurancecontracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying forpassport, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consentof their spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have
the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similarcircumstances.
Sec. 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. Women shall enjoy equal access to membershipin all social, civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar otherorganizations devoted to public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights andprivileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization.
Sec. 7. Admission to Military Schools. Any provision of the law to the contrary
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
3/40
notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accordedequal opportunities for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioningin all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the PhilippineNational Police not later than the fourth academic year following the approval of this Actin accordance with the standards required for men except for those minimum essentialadjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.
Sec. 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. Married persons who devote fulltime to managing the household and family affairs shall, upon the working spouse'sconsent, be entitled to voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya atGobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS)coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of the salary and compensation of the workingspouse. The contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the workingspouse.
The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and regulations necessary toeffectively implement the provisions of this section.
Sec. 9. Implementing Rules. The NEDA, in consultation with the different government
agencies concerned, shall issue rules and regulations as may be necessary for theeffective implementation of Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6) months from itseffectivity.
SECTION 10. Compliance Report. Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Actand every six (6) months thereafter, all government departments, including its agenciesand instrumentalities, shall submit a report to Congress on their compliance with thisAct.
SECTION 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason any section or provision of this Actis declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof which arenot affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.
SECTION 12. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Republic Act No. 386, otherwiseknown as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and of Executive Order No. 209,otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executiveorders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith arehereby repealed.
SECTION 13. Effectivity Clause. The rights of women and all the provisions of this Actshall take effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2)newspapers of general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048 March 22, 2001
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSULGENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/ORCHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF AJUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVILCODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1.Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname No
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
4/40
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
Section 2.Definition of Terms As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(1) "City or Municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality, as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the city or municipal mayor in accordancewith the provisions of existing laws.
(2) "Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the petition and who has direct and personal interest in
the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry or change of first name or nickname in the
civil register.
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records:Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex
of the petitioner.
(4) "Civil Register" refers to the various registry books and related certificates and documents kept in thearchives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulates and of the Office of the Civil Registrar
General.
(5) "Civil registrar general" refers to the Administrator of the National Statistics Office which is theagency mandated to carry out and administer the provision of laws on civil registration.
(6) "First name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more
names in addition to the middle and last names.
Section 3.Who May File the Petition and Where. Any person having direct and personal interest in thecorrection of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil
register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such
party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civilregistrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil
registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in
person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in
accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of
only once.
Section 4.Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nicknamemay be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce.
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
5/40
Section 5.Form and Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed andsworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary
to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the
matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be
corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing theentry or entries sought to be corrected or changed.
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the documents
mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a
week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall
submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal
record.
The petition and its supporting papers shall be filed in three (3) copies to be distributed as follows: first copy to
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar, or the consul general; second copy to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General; and third copy to the petitioner.
Section 6.Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General. The city or municipal civilregistrar or the consul general to whom the petition is presented shall examine the petition and its supporting
documents. He shall post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten (10) consecutive
days after he finds the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in form and substance.
The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall act on the petition and shall render a decision not
later than five (5) working days after the completion of the posting and/or publication requirement. He shall
transmit a copy of his decision together with the records of the proceedings to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General within five (5) working days from the date of the decision.Section 7.Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. The civil registrar general shall, within ten (10)working days from receipt of the decision granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn such decision by
way of an objection based on the following grounds:
(1) The error is not clerical or typographical;
(2) The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as it affects the
civil status of a person; or
(3) The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall under Section 4.
The civil registrar general shall immediately notify the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of
the action taken on the decision. Upon receipt of the notice thereof, the city or municipal civil registrar or the
consul general shall notify the petitioner of such action.
The petitioner may seek reconsideration with the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court.
If the civil registrar general fails to exercise his power to impugn the decision of the city or municipal civil
registrar or of the consul general within the period prescribed herein, such decision shall become final and
executory.
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may
either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
6/40
Section 8.Payment of Fees. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be authorized tocollect reasonable fees as a condition for accepting the petition. An indigent petitioner shall be exempt from the
payment of the said fee.
Section 9.Penalty Clause. - A person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, bepenalized by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years but not more than twelve (12) years, or a fine of not less
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or both,
at the discretion of the court.
In addition, if the offender is a government official or employee he shall suffer the penalties provided under civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
Section 10.Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The civil registrar general shall, in consultation with theDepartment of Justice, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the
University of the Philippines Law Center and the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars, issue the necessary
rules and regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not later than three (3) months from the
effectivity of this law.
Section 11.Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impairvested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.
Section 12.Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional, theremaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 13.Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereofinconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 14.Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in atleast two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: March 22, 2001
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. From a
judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not statea cause of action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend, the latter
appealed.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
7/40
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to support
the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter
established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the
plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of herthat she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the
defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiffexasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her
lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce
the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established
by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia
vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the marriage
ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep.,137.) To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a
mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the
parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is
an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and
the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may make .The reciprocal
rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and
none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated
and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as
the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With
these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the question under
consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3
Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended
to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705). Articles 44, 45,
and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the
management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his
domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her
from this duty when the husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent
specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
x x x x x x x x x
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
8/40
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying
the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the
right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The
failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and
obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must livewith and protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his
domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support
his wife may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own
home. May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay thepension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its
decision of December 5, 1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11,
1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to
furnish subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the
party who is entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either
because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of
some justifiable cause morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the rightof selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal was whether there
was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted by article 149 of the Civil Code to the
person obliged to furnish subsistence, to receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to
receive it; and inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental authority of
Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having been set forth that the natural father
simply claims his child for the purpose of thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having
been taken by him toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was obligedto demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact of the marriage of Pedro
Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother to maintain relations with her daughter, all
constitute an impediment of such a nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case,without prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other questions
previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9 Phil. Rep., 576), wherein
the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there
existed a preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to the removal of the oneentitled to support. It is true that in the first the person claiming the option was the natural father of the child and
had married a woman other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had already been
established by a final judgment in a criminal case. Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established
the proposition that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of the supreme court of Spain,
dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order noto prejudice his wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property. When she left him he
gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits, notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to thesafe in which he kept a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being reduced
in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action against his wife, who was then living in
opulence, for support and the revocation of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and
disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her husband) was not legally in a
situation to claim support and that the powers voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could
not be canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant wife appealed to
theAudencia Territorialwherein, after due trial, judgment was rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
9/40
the merits. The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment of
theAudencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the spouses are mutuallyobliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be subordinate to the other provisions of said
Code which regulates the family organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among
which duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as provided in article 56
of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted, the obligation of the spouse who has property to
furnish support to the one who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as
limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been decreed, either temporarily
or finally and this case, with respect to the husband, cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is
rendered, since, until then, if he is culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property
and of the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will, thus
establishing, contrary to the legal provision contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status
entirely incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties inherent therein
and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the law, in conformity with good morals, has
established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela Galindo are not legallyseparated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help and support; and for this reason, it
cannot be held that the former has need of support from his wife so that he may live apart from her
without the conjugal abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to dispose
even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the matrimonial expenses and, consequently,
those of his own support without need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from,
denying the petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil Code and
the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite clearly that the spousesseparated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement previously made. At least there are strong indications to
this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married
persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the truebasis upon which the supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not
be controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the other or
where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this
is true appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In this case the wife brought
an action for support against her husband who had willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode
without any cause whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant upon the
ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left the conjugal
abode, although he claims, without however proving his contention, that the person responsible for this
situation was his wife, as she turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the
wife who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep her in his company
and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the situation, under the ineluctable obligation tosupport his wife in fulfillment of the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with
paragraph 1 of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for the
fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be regulated in the manner it
indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the
duty of affording mutual support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy
spouse does not create any illicit situation of the court above described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of November
3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
10/40
neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a
final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other, still such doctrine or holding
would not necessarily control in this jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular
the same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code in force in the
Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The law governing the duties and obligations of husband and
wife in this country are articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining spouse
has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such as adultery on the part of the wife in
every case and on the part of the husband when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personalviolence actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the wife in order to force
her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife
to corrupt their sons or to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution; and the
condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in this jurisdiction the only ground for a
divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine wasannounced by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire subject. Although the
case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment rendered by this court was there
reversed, the reversal did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being the only
ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this court in that case in December, 1903, no
change or modification of the rule has been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in
this jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting divorce or separation,
as it necessitates a determination of the question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for livingseparate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case,
power to grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the
assumption that the power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a divorce.
That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations of the
spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural
and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in
the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a
duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve thepublic peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and
indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not
an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is
merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair
the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of afeme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for judgment, heretofore filed in
this case, rest.
G.R. No. L-23482 August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner,vs.CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-23767 August 30, 1968
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, plaintiff-appellant,vs.
ALFONSO LACSON, defendant-appellee.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
11/40
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-24259 August 30, 1968
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner-appellee,vs.
CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, petitioner-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent-appellant Carmen San Jose-Lacson.
Norberto Quisumbing for petitioner-appellee Alfonso Lacson.
CASTRO, J.:
These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259) involving the same parties pose a common
fundamental issue the resolution of which will necessarily and inescapably resolve all the other issues. Thus their
joinder in this decision.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson (hereinafter
referred to as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14, 1953. To them were born four children, all
alive.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, andcommenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their
children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable
settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a
joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).
The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying their amicable settlement, read as follows:
3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963 when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left theirconjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to reside in
Manila.
4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to judicial
approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines the particular terms and
conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows:
(a) There will be separation of property petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson hereby waiving
any and all claims for a share in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since
they have acquired no property of any consequence.
(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy such separate
estate as they may acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings from any profession,
business or industry as may be derived by each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner
exclusively.
(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to
petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramonshall be awarded to petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson.
(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance
of P300.00 for the support of the children in her custody.
(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of the
other at their respective residences and, during the summer months, the two children in the
custody of each petitioner shall be given to the other except that, for this year's summer months,
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
12/40
all four children shall be delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until
June 15, 1963 on which date, she shall return the two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa
to petitioner Alfonso Lacson this judgment of course being subject to enforcement by
execution writ and contempt.
5. Petitioners have no creditors.
WHEREFORE, they respectfully pray that notice of this petition be given to creditors and third parties
pursuant to Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and thereafter that the Court enter its judicialapproval of the foregoing agreement for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and for separation
of property, except that the Court shall immediately approve the terms set out in paragraph 4 above and
embody the same in a judgment immediately binding on the parties hereto to the end that any non-
compliance or violation of its terms by one party shall entitle the other to enforcement by execution writand contempt even though the proceedings as to creditors have not been terminated.".
Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law," the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez, presiding)
issued an order on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to as the compromise judgment)
approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. In compliance with paragraph 4 (e) of their
mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of the compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse delivered all the four children to
the respondent spouse and remitted money for their support.
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into andsigned the ... Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of the ... minor
children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she "be considered relieved of the ...
agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children ... and that since all the children are now
in her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmedpendente lite." On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse
opposed the said motion and moved to dismiss the complaint based, among other things, on the grounds ofres
judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC on May 28, 1963, issued an order which sustained the petitioner spouse's
plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After the denial of her motion for
reconsideration, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32608-R)
wherein she raised, among others, the issue of validity or legality of the compromise agreement in connectiononly with the custody of their minor children. On October 14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal
to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-23767), since "no hearing on the facts was ever held in the court below no
evidence, testimonial or documentary, presented only a question of law pends resolution in the appeal." .The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion dated May 15, 1963 for reconsideration of the compromisejudgment dated April 27, 1963 rendered in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, wherein she also alleged, among
others, that she entered into the joint petition as the only means by which she could have immediate custody of
her minor children, and thereafter prayed the CFI to reconsider its judgment pertaining to the custody and
visitation of her minor children and to relieve her from the said agreement. The petitioner spouse opposed thesaid motion and, on June 1, 1963, filed a motion for execution of the compromise judgment and a charge for
contempt. The CFI (Judge Jose R. Querubin, presiding), in its order dated June 22, 1963, denied the respondent
spouse's motion for reconsideration, granted the petitioner spouse's motion for execution, and ordered that upon
"failure on the part of Carmen San Jose-Lacson to deliver the said children [i.e., to return the two older children
Enrique and Maria Teresa in accordance with her agreement with Alfonso Lacson] to the special sheriff on or
before June 29, 1963, she may be held for contempt pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 sections 9 and 10, and
Rule 64 section 7 of the (old) Rules of Court." From the aforesaid compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963and execution order dated June 22, 1963, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 32798-R) wherein she likewise questioned the validity or legality of her agreement with the
petitioner spouse respecting custody of their children. On February 11, 1965 the Court of Appeals also certified
the said appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24259), since "no evidence of any kind was introduced before
the trial court and ... appellant did not specifically ask to be allowed to present evidence on her behalf." .
The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32384R),
now the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court (G.R. No. L-23482). In her petition for certiorari dated
June 27, 1963, she averred that the CFI (thru Judge Querubin) committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
13/40
excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of the compromise judgment in its order of June 22,
1963, thus in effect depriving her of the right to appeal. She prayed for (1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondents therein and any person acting under them from enforcing, by contempt
proceedings and other means, the writ of execution issued pursuant to the order of the respondent Judge
Querubin dated June 22, 1963 in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, (2) the setting aside, after hearing, of the
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 and the order dated June 22, 1963, and (3) the awarding of the
custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to her, their mother. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued ex parte a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of thecompromise judgment rendered in special proceeding 6978. The petitioner spouse filed an urgent motion dated
July 5, 1963 for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte which urgent motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 9, 1963. The petitioner spouse likewise filed his answer. After
hearing, the Court of Appeals on May 11, 1964 promulgated in said certiorari case (CA-G.R. No. 32384-R) its
decision granting the petition forcertiorari and declaring null and void both (a) the compromise judgment datedApril 27, 1963 in so far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the two children, Enrique and
Teresa, and (b) the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of said judgment. The petitioner spouse moved to
reconsider, but his motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 31,
1964. From the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31, 1964, the petitioner spouse
interposed an appeal to this Court, as abovestated, and assigned the following errors:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru certiorari the lower court's order of execution of the
compromise judgment.
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the certiorari case the issue of the legality of the
compromise judgment which is involved in two appeals, instead of the issue of grave abuse of discretion
in ordering its execution.
(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the compromise agreement upon which the judgment is
based violates article 363 of the Civil Code. 1wph1.t
As heretofore adverted, the aforecited three appeals converge on one focal issue: whether the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement, areconformable to law.
We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are valid
with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided
judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property betweenspouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190, emphasis
supplied)
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of theconjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests.
Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. (Art. 191, par. 4, emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said
arrangements.
It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's residence
being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch as a lengthy
separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is
manifest.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
14/40
Besides, this Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together, as
[I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. .. At best such an order can be effective for noother purpose than to compel the spouse to live under the same roof; and the experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54, 60).
However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of theirconjugal partnership, this Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the
spouses, which again in the language ofArroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, supra is a "state which is abnormal and
fraught with grave danger to all concerned." We would like to douse the momentary seething emotions of
couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquility brought about by "mere austerity of temper,petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional
sallies of passion" without more would be minded to separate from each other. In this jurisdiction, the
husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support (art. 109, new Civil Code). There is, therefore, virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married
couples impelled by no better cause than their whims and caprices to abandon each other's company.
'... For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial
cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals, yet it must be carefully remembered that
the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand thatthey must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good
wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in
teaching the duties which it imposes ..." (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
(Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo,Id., pp. 58-59).
We now come to the question of the custody and support of the children.
It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support of
the children. The complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the JDRC was filed by the respondent spouse on
March 12, 1963, whereas the joint petition of the parties docketed as special proceeding 6978 in the CFI was
filed on April 27, 1963. However, when the respondent spouse signed the joint petition on the same matter of
custody and support of the children and filed the same with the CFI of Negros Occidental, she in effectabandoned her action in the JDRC. The petitioner spouse who could have raised the issue oflis pendens inabatement of the case filed in the CFI, but did not do so - had the right, therefore, to cite the decision of the CFI
and to ask for the dismissal of the action filed by the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the grounds ofres
judicata and lis pendens. And the JDRC acted correctly and justifiably in dismissing the case for custody and
support of the children based on those grounds. For it is no defense against the dismissal of the action that thecase before the CFI was filed later than the action before the JDRC, considering:.
... [T]hat the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending
action. They provide only that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action. 1
We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in depriving the mother, the respondent spouse,
of the custody of the two older children (both then below the age of 7).
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure."
The rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby
torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child oftender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the
child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as
in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
15/40
who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).
The use of the wordshall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by the Code
Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in nouncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded
upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two older children who were 6
and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them from their mother. To that extenttherefore, it was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.
Neither does the said award of custody fall within the exception because the record is bereft of any compelling
reason to support the lower court's order depriving the wife of her minor children's company. True, the CFI
stated in its order dated June 22, 1963, denying the respondent spouse's motion for reconsideration of its order
dated April 27, 1963, that .
... If the parties have agreed to file a joint petition, it was because they wanted to avoid the exposure of
the bitter truths which serve as succulent morsel for scandal mongers and idle gossipers and to save their
children from embarrassment and inferiority complex which may inevitably stain their lives. ..
If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the minor children to the Court for incorporation in the
final judgment, they purposely suppressed the "compelling reasons for such measure" from appearing in the
public records. This is for the sake and for the welfare of the minor children.".
But the foregoing statement is at best a mere hint that there were compelling reasons. The lower court's order is
eloquently silent on what these compelling reasons are. Needless to state, courts cannot proceed on mere
insinuations; they must be confronted with facts before they can properly adjudicate.
It might be argued and correctly that since five years have elapsed since the filing of these cases in 1963,
the ages of the four children should now be as follows: Enrique 11, Maria Teresa 10, Gerrard 9, and
Ramon 5. Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the custody of Enrique and Maria Teresa to the
petitioner spouse has become moot and academic. The passage of time has removed the prop which supports the
respondent spouse's position.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple's agreement regarding the custody of the
children. 1wph1.tArticle 356 of the new Civil Code provides:
Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
development.
It is clear that the abovequoted legal provision grants to every child rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not besubject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated
in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the right granted tohim by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful
scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on
the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not a sufficient basis to determine the fitness
of each parent to be the custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is now eleven years of age and should be given the
choice of the parent he wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court
which, states, inter alia:
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
16/40
... When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the question
as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of
First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing testimony as
may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody and control of each such child as will be for its best
interestpermitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age,
unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty... (Emphasis supplied).
One last point regarding the matter of support for the children assuming that the custody of any or more of the
children will be finally awarded to the mother. Although the spouses have agreed upon the monthly support of
P150 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each child, still this Court must speak out its mind on the
insufficiency of this amount. We, take judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady
skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and services, not to mention the fact that all the children are
already of school age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI may increase this amount of P150 according to the
needs of each child.
With the view that we take of this case, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors assigned in the three
appeals.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and June 24,
1963 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject matter of G.R. L-23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for further proceedings, in accordance
with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its
Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente,
Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she
was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-doand socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without
the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in
the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A fewweeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and
accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
17/40
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of
Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol.
III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to
the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate themarriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a
maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college
students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated
the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the
house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned tohis job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was
not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted
her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-
Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that
her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel
Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed withoutprejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that
she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to
return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State
of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On
21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
"D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao,whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a
valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and toacquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00,and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for
damages;.
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
18/40
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on
their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record
before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the
marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competentwitnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because
Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1.Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27.Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of
the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until
the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It
is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the
marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of
Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an
admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence ofPacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and
undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for
annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree
was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine
law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,
expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii;and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides forlegal separation (Title IV,
Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
19/40
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce
betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give riseto an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of
our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer
jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction
Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, and her denial ofconsortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law awrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code,
Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with
Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine
Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws
prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal
history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies
on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Actabove-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision inRamirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is ofparticular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children.
The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941
of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born ofadulterous relations. (Emphasissupplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moranafter the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmurcase is authority for the proposition that
such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not)
would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines,
and the answer to them was given inBarretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
20/40
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they
are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa
Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suitwas begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized
to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and
"sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court
Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had heopenly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that
the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escao did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision,
or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that
Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wishtheir daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur.
130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly
cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not
been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529.Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a parentto interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle
in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from hisown malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse,
but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not
liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and
advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or
where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause
him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the
charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages,
that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
-
8/22/2019 RA 7192 to Dadivas vs Villanueva
21/40
humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that
appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid,
being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact
is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded
sai