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A¥ditor's Office SEP 15 20'IL} ~FP j 1 2014\4 Bo~rdof C0m6'8SiOn8.·' ,Pros8~~tln9 .A:rtorn6Y

- OM ClV'lOIVISlOn5 David A Darby, In Propria e na (In Proper Person)6 One People of We the People7 Pursuant to Article 2, Section 38 of 1878 Constitution of the S.tate of Washingt;~~)fl.. l!j}il'lB, .9 P.O. Box 772 Amboy, Washington ~Ff3 1. 5 zu i't'

10 Zip exempt (Not Federal District) .:;in" iI;rtomti!Vprosecu" ~ or..11 Civil ONlsIOn

RECEIVEDCOpy

ORIGINAL FILED

SEP 112014SCQtt G. Weber, Clerk, Clark Co.

RECE~VED

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ECEIVEnSEP ~ 5 ~014 U

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTONIN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK

David A Darby,Sovereign State Citizenpursuant to Article 2 , Section 3of 1878 Constitution of the State of WashingtonPlaintiff

Vs

DefendantClark County, a political subdivision of theState of Washington, Including the followingofficials acting for the county:

Greg Kimsey Clark County AuditorDoug Lasher Clark County TreasurerPeter Van Nortwick Clark County assessorDavid Madore Clark County CommissionerEdward L.Bames Clark County CommissionerAnthony Golick Clark County ProsecutorTaylor R. Hallvik Clark County Deputy Pros.Gary Lucas Sheriff Clark County

Case No.:

DeptNo.:

PlaintiffDavid A Darby, Sovereign StateCitizen pursuant to Article 2 , Section3 of 1878 Constitution of the State ofWashington.

Plaintiff Moves the Court for aComplaint for a Collateral attack tovacate a void Order and Judgment ofForeclosure

17 Plaintiff Collateral attack vacate a void Order and Judgment of Foreclosure18 Plaintiff David A Darby Sovereign State Citizen, pursuant to Article 2 , Section 3 of 187819 Constitution of the State of Washington ("Plaintiff') Moves this court for Collateral attack to20 vacate a void Order and Judgment of Foreclosure Civil Rule 60(b)(5) The Judgment/Order21 is Void.2223

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1 A. INTRODUCTION23 1. Defendant is CLARK COUNTY, a political subdivision of the Corporate State of4 Washington.56 2. Plaintiff David A Darby Sovereign State Citizen pursuant to Article 2 , Section 3 of7 1878 Constitution of the State of Washington.89 3. Defendant sued defendant for tax parcel 2646 I4000 to collect alleged delinquent real property

10 taxes that are owed to date in connection with this parcel 1264614000.1112 4. Defendant is CLARK COUNTY which does not have authority to collect delinquent real13 property taxes under the 1878Constitution of the state of Washington. Pursuant to Article V,14 Section 23. All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures, with15 all their incidents, are prohibited .1617 5. Clark County, a political subdivision of the Corporate State of Washington is18 headquartered at Clark County, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 5000 Vancouver,19 Washington 98666-50002021 6. Anthony Golick Clark County Prosecutor, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 500022 Vancouver, Washington 98666-50002324 7. Taylor R. Hallvik Clark County Deputy Prosecutor, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 500025 Vancouver, Washington 98666-50002627 8. David Madore Clark County Commissioner, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 500028 Vancouver, Washington 98666-50002930 9. Edward Barnes Clark County Commissioner, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 500031 Vancouver, Washington 98666-50003233 10. Greg Kimsey Clark County Auditor Registrar oflands, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box34 5000 Vancouver, Washington 98666-50003536 11.Doug Lasher Clark County Treasurer, 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 5000 Vancouver,37 Washington 98666-50003839 12. Peter Van Nortwick Clark County assessor 1300 Franklin Ave. PO Box 500040 Vancouver, Washington 98666-500041

42 13. Gary Lucas Sheriff Clark County 707 West 13th Street, Vancouver Wa, 9866643

44

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1 B. STAMENT OF FACTS

2 14. Plaintiff through information and fist hand knowledge claims all rights given to him as3 (live man and non-decedent) to his allodial title given to him by a land patent Filed by4 him in the Clark County Auditor's Records office under Document # 4260376 DEC on5 12-14-2006.67 15. Plaintiff, David A Darby Sovereign State Citizen pursuant to Article 2 , Section 3 of8 1878 Constitution of the State of Washington has a contractual right given to him by9 the1878 Constitution of the State of Washington. Hereinafter (Plaintiff, David A.

10 Darby)1112 16. The state cannot interfere with a Sovereign State Citizen's right to contract Bourchard v.13 First People's Trust, 253 Mass 351, 148 NE 895, Schumman-Heink v. Folsom. 159 NE14 250. (1927) Right to Contract.1516 17.United States Supreme Court has long held and recognized that freedom to make17 contracts and have them enforced by the courts is a part of the bundle of rights protected18 by the "due process" clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Patterson v.19 Bank Eudora,190 US 169(1903),47 LEd 1002,23 S Ct 821,Muller v. Oregon. 208 US20 412,52 L Ed 551,38 S Ct 324 (1908), Frisbie v. U.S. 157 US 160,39 LE.d 657,15 S21 CT 586 (1895).2223 18. Plaintiff upon information and belief and firsthand knowledge believes that the 187824 Washington Constitution of the State of Washington. Was redefined by the corporate25 WASHINGTON state.2627 19. Upon information and belief and firsthand knowledge Plaintiff believes that the later28 1889 state constitution did not follow the Constitutional rules of amendment set down29 in Article XVI, Sections 1, 2, 3. Of the 1878 Constitution of the State of Washington.30

31 20. Upon information and belief and firsthand knowledge, Plaintiff believes that the 187832 Constitution of the States of Washington once voted on and accepted by the people in33 1878 became a contract with the people. It has never been terminated by the people34 and therefore, is still an active contract for any sovereign that decides to use that35 contract.3637 21. ON THE LAW OF VOIDS IN WASHINGTON

38 Court held that a quiet title action, not an action to vacate the judgment, was the appropriate

39 means for the grantee of a judgment debtor to clear the title of land sold under a void judgment.

40 Krutz, 25 Wash. at 572-74, 577-78. In Krutz, the judgment and subsequent sheriffs sale were void

41 for improper service. Krutz, 25 Wash. at 566-78. The court stated that the grantee, who purchased

42 from the judgment debtor, was not a party to the prior judgment and could not have brought a

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1 motion to vacate the void judgment. Krutz, 25 Wash. at 566-78. Similarly, Mueller, having an

2 interest in the property as the purchaser from Griffin's estate, made a collateral attack on the

3 validity of the sheriffs sale through this quiet title action

4 If a motion to relieve a party from judgment is based on mistake, inadvertence, excusable

5 neglect, newly discovered evidence or irregularity in obtaining the judgment, it must be made

6 within a year of the judgment's entry. CrR 7.8(b). A motion based on a void judgment or "{a}ny

7 other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" may be brought within a

8 reasonable time. CrR 7.8(b)(5); State v. Clark, 75 Wn. App. 827, 830,880 P.2d 562 (1994)

9 A judgment is void when the court does not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction,

10 or "lacks the inherent power to enter the order involved." Petersen, 16 Wash. App. at 79 (citing

11 Bresolin, 86 Wash. 2d at 245; Anderson, 52 Wash. 2d at 761) (additional citation omitted). A trial

12 court has no discretion when faced with a void judgment, and must vacate the judgment "whenever

13 the lack of jurisdiction comes to light." Mitchell v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177,180-81,

14 797 P.2d 516 (1990) (collateral challenge to jurisdiction of pro tern judge granting summary

15 judgment properly raised on appeal) (citing Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Ruth, 57 Wash. App. 783,

16 790, 790 P.2d 206 (1990)). As discussed above, since the judgment is void, this collateral attack

17 through the quiet title action was proper.

18 A challenge to a void judgment can be brought at any time. Malter of Marriage of Leslie,

19 112 Wash. 2d 612, 618-19, 772 P.2d 1013 (1989) (citing John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v,

20 Gooley, 196 Wash. 357, 370, 83 P.2d 221 (1938) (additional citation omitted); CR 60(b)(5).

21 A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to vacate a default judgment is generally

22 reviewed for an abuse of discretion.; however, a court has a nondiscretionary duty to vacate a void

23 judgment. Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478; In re Marriage of Markowski, 50 Wash. App. 633, 635,

24 749 P.2d 754 (1988); Brickum Inv. Co. v. Vernham Corp., 46 Wash. App. 517, 520, 731 P.2d 533

25 (1987).

26 A motion to vacate under CR 60(b )(5) "may be brought at any time" after entry of

27 judgment. Lindgren v. Lindgren, 58 Wash. App. 588, 596, 794 P.2d 526 (1990), review denied,

28 116 Wash. 2d 1009,805 P.2d 813 (1991); see also Brenner v. Port Bellingham, 53 Wash. App.

29 182, 188, 765 P.2d 1333 (1989) ("motions to vacate under CR 60(b)(5) are not barred by the

30 'reasonable time' or the I-year requirement of CR 60(b )"). Void judgments may be vacated

31 regardless of the lapse of time. In re Marriage of Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d 612, 618-19,772 P.2d 1013Page 4 of9

1 (1989). Consequently, not even the doctrine of aches bars a party from attacking a void judgment.

2 Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d at 619-20. Brenner provides a striking example of how meaningless the

3 passage of time is in the context of a void judgment. There, a default judgment was entered in

4 1969 condemning all interests in certain real property and vesting title in the Port of Bellingham.

5 In 1985, Brenner sued the Port for damages resulting from the condemnation action and alleged in

6 part that the Port had tailed to satisfy the statutory requirements of service by publication. The trial

7 .court denied Brenner's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Port's error was merely an

8 irregularity and, thus, voidable under CR 60(b)(1) rather than void under CR 60(b)(5). The trial

9 court also found that Brenner had failed to move to vacate the judgment within a reasonable time

10 as required by CR 60(b)(1). 53 Wash. App. at 185. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that

11 the Port's failure to strictly comply with the requirements of service by publication meant the court

12 had no jurisdiction over Brenner when it entered the 1969 judgment condemning her interest in

13 the property. Recognizing that a default judgment entered without valid service is void and may

14 be vacated at any time, the court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate

15 the 16-year-oldjudgment. 53 Wash. App. at 188. In the present case, the trial court expressly found

16 Allstate's service of process was defective. "Proper service of the summons and complaint is

17 essential to invoke personal jurisdiction over a party, and a default judgment entered without

18 proper jurisdiction is void." Markowski, 50 Wash. App. at 635-36; see also Mid-City Materials.

19 Inc. v. Heater Beaters Custom Fireplaces, 36 Wash. App. 480,486,674 P.2d 1271 (1984). Because

20 a party may move to vacate a voidjudgmentat any time (Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d at 618-19), the trial

21 court erred by finding that Khani failed to bring his motion within a reasonable time. Further, as

22 discussed in detail below, the trial court's finding that Khani had actual notice of the default

23 judgment through the DOL notice is irrelevant on these facts. More significantly, the trial court

24 erred by denying Khani's motion because it failed to fulfill its nondiscretionary duty to vacate a

25 voidjudgment. See Leen, 62 Wash. App. at 478; Markowski, 50 Wash. App. at 635. Thus, the trial

26 court's order must be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to vacate the default

27 judgment and quash the writ of garnishment. See Leslie, 112 Wash. 2d at 618 (a vacated judgment

28 has no effect, and the parties' rights are left as though the judgment had never been entered).

29 A void judgment is always subject to collateral attack. Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wash. 2d

30 241,245,543 P.2d 325 (1975). A void judgment must be vacated whenever the lack of jurisdiction

31 comes to light. Mitchell v. Kitsap Cy., 59. Wash. App. 177, 180-81,797 P.2d 516 (1990).Page 5 of9

1 "A void judgment may be attacked collaterally as well as directly. It is entitled to no

2 consideration whatever in any court as evidence of right, Kizer v, Caufield, 17 Wash. 417, 49 P.

3 1064.

4 A void judgment is defined in Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 448 P.2d 490 (1968).

5 These historical rules are set against the fact that the law of reopening estates is derived

6 from the law of vacating judgments. In re Jones' Estate, 116 Wash. 424, 426, 199 P. 734 (1921).

7 With the advent of CR 60, additional justifications upon which to reopen an estate may exist.

8 Specifically, CR 60(b)(4) allows the court to vacate a judgment procured through '{f}raud ... ,

9 misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.' CR 60(b)(4). Of course, a 'void

10 judgment is also unenforceable. CR 60(b)(5). CR 60 also contain a catchall provision, which

11 permits the court to vacate ajudgment for '{a}ny other reason justifying relief from the operation

12 of the judgment.' CR 60(b)(11).

13 It is true that, under CR 60(b)(5), a court may vacate a void judgment at any time. A

14 judgment is void if entered by a court without jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Ortiz, 108 Wn.2d

15 643,649, 740 P.2d 843 (1987).

16 Where the judgment was procured fraudulently so that it was void and its invalidity

17 appeared on the face of the record so that either on the Henkles' or on the commissioner's own

18 motion, the court commissioner had the power to vacate the void judgment without notice to

19 McCormick. Morrison v. Berlin,. the court commissioner did not manifestly abuse his discretion

20 here. State v. Scott.

21 Assuming the judgment to be void, the primary question is: Have they such right? There is

22 no question but that a court has inherent power to purge its records of void judgments. It may do

23 so of its own motion. It must be conceded that a party to the record, adversely affected by a void

24 judgment, may have the judgment vacated as a matter of right -- and this without a showing of a

25 meritorious defense. Hole v. Page, 20 Wash. 208, 54 P. 1123; Batchelor v. Palmer, 129 Wash.

26 150,224 P. 685. The parties to the record (the Pumneas) in this case, however, are not adversely

27 affected by the judgment in question. For they have parted with their interest in the property, and

28 the judgment has been satisfied. An order vacating the judgment would affect their rights or

29 liabilities in no manner whatsoever. As to them it is 'functus officio, wherefore the question of the

30 legality or illegality of its obtention is a mere abstraction with which it is no part of the business

31 of appellate courts to deal.' Davis v. Blair, 88 Mo.App. 372.Page 6 of9

1 C. ARGUMENT2

3 22. The only party that the courts ruled on hinges on the testimony of Taylor R. Hallvik and4 no other.56 23. Plaintiff David A Darby Sovereign State Citizen pursuant to Article 2 , Section 37 of 1878 Constitution of the State of Washington. Is a witness and provided testimony to8 the court in the form of Notarized Affidavits.9

10 24. Taylor R. Hallvik Deputy Prosecutor attorney cannot provide testimony to the Court.11 "Attorneys can't testify. Statements of counsel in brief or in oral argument are not facts12 before the court". Trinsey Vs. Pagliaro, D.C. Pa.1964, 229 F. Supp. 647, Taylor R.13 Hallvik is an attorney.1415 25. The Plaintiff David A Darby's testimony that was before the court was the documents16 that were submitted and sworn statements under oath and declare under penalty of17 perjury under the laws of the State of Washington. Under oath which are part of the18 record and therefore can be considered by the trial court as evidence and testimony.1920 26. Taylor R. Hallvik Documents file with the court were un-sworn statements which were21 not part of the record and therefore should not have been considered by the trial court as22 evidence or testimony.2324 27. The THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE25 COUNTY OF CLARK trial court erred when granting summary judgment.262728 D.OBJECTIONS2930 28. Plaintiff objects to the documents that defendant filed into case 12-2-03432-3.that were31 unauthenticated.3233 E. SUMMARY - JUDGMENT EVIDENCE3435 29. No evidence produced in the court record by the Defendant only statement of counsel in36 brief or in oral argument are not fact before the court. As we have said of other un-sworn37 statement which were not part of the record and therefore could not been considered by38 the trial court "Manifestly, [such statements] cannot be properly considered by us in the39 disposition of [a) case." United States v. Lovasco,. 431 U.S. 783, 97 S. Ct. 2044,52 L.40 Ed. 2d 752 (06/09/77) . in support of the motion for Summary Judgment.41

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1 30. No documents that the Taylor R. HaJivik has put in the court have been verified as2 authentic for which the court could rely on as authentic.34 31.No witness came forward for Taylor R. HaJlvik to bring forth his paperwork to5 authenticate it as evidence and bringing it into the court record and providing testimony6 to the court.78 32. When the Court lacks of subject matter jurisdiction can be voided at any time.(A void

9 judgment is always subject to collateral attack. Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wash. 2d 241, 245,

10 543 P.2d 325 (1975). A void judgment must be vacated whenever the lack of jurisdiction

11 comes to light. Mitchell v. Kitsap Cy., 59. Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990).

12131415 F. CONCLUSION161718 Plaintiff moves this court to enter an order to vacate clear of any and all claims that might be19 asserted by any defendants in this case. .2021 Wherefore, Plaintiff moves for judgment against Defendants and each of their as follows:2223 1. Plaintiff moves that the court vacate the void order and judgment for foreclosure in case24 number 12-2-03432-3.2526 2. Restore all rights to the property to the plaintiff and remove the property from the county27 Tax rolls.2829 3. Plaintiff moves this court to seal this case for private and personal reasons and safety.3031

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Dated this If}~Day of the Month of SsrIl~b~,20 I4

Q:~OL,~~ __David A Darby, Sovereign State Citizen Pursuant to Article 2,Section 3 of 1878 Constitution of the State of WashingtonP.O. Box 772 Amboy, Washington Zip exempt (Not Federal District)

VERIFICATION

131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445

I, David A Darby Sovereign State Citizen pursuant to Article 2, Section 3 of 1878Constitution of the State of Washington, am the defendant in the above-entitled action and Ihave read the above Affidavit. I am competent to testify and I have personal knowledge ofthe matters stated herein except as to those matters stated upon belief or information and, asto those matters, I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury and my owncommercial liability, under the laws of the State of Washington, that the foregoing is true,correct, complete, and not misleading, to the best of my knowledge, So Help Me GOD.

// ....-,"Tlayof Cfi{", 12014, in County of Clark State of Washington.~ ~

David A Darby,Sovereign State Citizen Pursuant to Article 2, Section 3of 1878 Constitution of the State of WashingtonP.O. Box 772 Amboy, WashingtonZip exempt (Not Federaql District)

[STATE] tA)CL1)\C(J\ro[COUNTY] C'AC\\ YJ )

On this 10m day ofa.p\tXY\t&R ,20fiThe above ~.gnatory appears before me personally with picture illand execut the forgoing instrument and acknowledges this to be their free act and deed.

) s.s.:

--------:~rf-'<-''_\:::=..-=.------- My Commission Expires: O~ lief / ILlNotary Alhlte

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