Quintilian,InstitutioOratoria

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1Richard L. W. Clarke LITS2306 Notes 09A

QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA (c. 90 CE)

Quintil ian. Institutio Oratoria. Trans. H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP,

1920-1922. (See selections, Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Ed. Vincent

Leitch, et al. New York: Norton, 2001. 157-171.)

Book 1: Elementary Education (Prior to Rhetoric)

1.1 Elementary Education

1.2 Public vs. Private Education

1.3 Capacity and Treatment of Students

1.4 Grammar

1.5 Purity of Language and Vices of Diction

1.6 Origin and Usage of Words

1.7 Spelling

1.8 Reading, Authors to be Read

1.9 Composition

1.10 Studies Adjunct to Rhetoric

1.11 Lessons from the Theatre: Delivery, Gesture, Recitation, Gymnastics

1.12 Studying Multiple Subjects Simultaneously

Book 2: the Nature and Rudiments of Rhetoric

2.1 Rhetoric vis-a-vis Grammar

2.2 Choice of Teacher; The Teacher - Pupil Relationship

2.3 Inferior Teachers

2.4 Progymnasmata (Elementary Rhetorical Exercises)

2.5 Rhetorical Analysis of Literary Authors

2.6 Declamation - Amount of Guidance for; Imitation

2.7 Declamation and Memorization2.8 Customizing Methods to Pupil's Abilities

2.9 Students to Treat Teachers as Parents

2.10 Themes for Declamation to have Verisimilitude

2.11 Necessity of Rhetorical Instruction

2.12 Untrained Speakers - Pro and Con

2.13 Need for Adapting of Rules

2.14 "Rhetoric" and "Oratory" Considered

2.15 Definitions of Oratory

2.16 The Value of Oratory Attacked and Defended

2.17 The Art, Morality, and Truth of Oratory

2.18 Rhetoric as a Practical Art

2.19 Nature and Art

2.20 Is Rhetoric a Virtue?

2.21 The Subject of Rhetoric. Oratory vs. Philosophy; An Orator's Broad Knowledge.

Book 3: Invention: Kinds of Oratory

3.1 Greek and Roman Writers on Rhetoric

3.2 Origin of Oratory

3.3 Divisions and Order of the Art of Rhetoric


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3.4 Views on the Number of Kinds of Oratory

3.5 Things vs. Words; Questions; Definitions of a Cause

3.6 Stasis Theory (the Status of a Case)

3.7 Panegyric

3.8 Deliberative Oratory

3.9 Forensic Oratory; Parts of a Forensic Speech

3.10 The Nature of the Cause

3.11 The Question, Mode of Defence, Point for Decision, Foundation of the Case, etc.

Book 4: Arrangement: the Parts of Speech

4.1 Parts of a Speech: the Introduction (Exordium)

4.2 Parts of a Speech: the Statement of Facts (Narratio)

4.3 Digressions

4.4 Propositions Preparatory to Proof

4.5 Parts of a Speech: Partition (Partitio)

Book 5: Arrangement and Proofs

5.1 Parts of a Speech: Artificial and Unartificial Proofs

5.2 Previous Decisions

5.3 Public Opinion

5.4 Evidence from Torture

5.5 Refutation of Documents

5.6 Taking Oaths: Pro and Con

5.7 Evidence: Documentary, Oral, Witnesses, Supernatural

5.8 Artificial Proofs

5.9 Signs, Circumstantial Evidence, Prognostics

5.10 Arguments

5.11 Examples and Instances

5.12 Arguments, cont'd

5.13 Parts of a Speech: Refutation and Proof

5.14 Enthymeme, Epicheireme, and Syllogism

Book 6: Arrangement, Pathos, Judgement

6.1 Parts of a Speech: Conclusion (Peroration)

6.2 The Judge's Temperament; Pathos, Ethos

6.3 Wit and Humor


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6.4Altercatioor Debate

6.5 Judgment and Sagacity

Book 7: Arrangement, Laws, Reasoning

7.1 Arrangement

7.2 Conjecture

7.3 Definition

7.4 Quality

7.5 Points of Law

7.6 Letter of the Law / Intention

7.7 Contradictory Laws

7.8 Syllogism

7.9 Ambiguity

7.10 Statusof a Case; Limits of Rules

Book 8: Eloquence: Style, Words, Tropes

8.1 Style

8.2 Clarity (perspicuitas)

8.3 Ornament: Merits and Faults

8.4 Amplification and Diminution

8.5 The Value of General Reflections in Oratory

Here, Quintilian states his intention to discuss tropes, or modes (301), as the mostdistinguished Roman rhetoricians call them (301), the rules for the use of which are

discussed by both rhetoricians and teachers of literature (301). Quintilian states his

intention to discuss them now in connexion with the ornaments of oratory (301), rather

than when he dealt earlier with literary education (301).

8.6 Tropes

Here, Quintilian begins by defining a trope as the artistic alteration of a word or phrase

from its proper meaning to another (301). It is a subject that has given rise to

interminable disputes among the teachers of literature, who have quarrelled no less

violently with the philosophers than among themselves over the problem of the generaand

speciesinto which tropes may be divided, their number and their correct classification

(301). Quintilian proposes to ignore such quibbles as in no wise concern the training of

an orator (301) and instead to discuss those tropeswhich are most necessary and meet

with most general acceptance (301). He contents himself with pointing out that some

tropesare employed to help out our meaning and others to adorn our style (301) that

some arise from words usedproperlyand others from words used metaphorically (301),

and that the changes involved concern not merely individual words, but also our thoughts

and the structure of our sentences (301). He believes that those writers are mistaken

who have held that tropes necessarily involved the substitution of word for word(301),

notwithstanding the fact that the tropesemployed to express our meaning involve

ornament as well (303), although the converse is not the case, since there are some


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which are intended solely for the purpose of embellishment (303).

Quintilian begins with the commonest and by far the most beautiful of tropes,

namely, metaphor, the Greek term for our translatio (303). It is a natural turn of speech

that is often employed unconsciously or by uneducated persons (303). It is, however,

also so attractive and elegant that however distinguished the language in which it isembedded it shines forth with a light that is all its own (303). When correctly and

appropriately applied, it is quite impossible for its effect to be commonplace, mean or

unpleasing (303). It adds to the copiousness of language by the interchange of words

and by borrowing (303): a noun or a verb is transferred from the place to which it

belongs to another where there is either no literalterm or the transferred is better than

the literal (303). We use metaphors either because it is necessary or to make our

meaning clearer or . . . to produce a decorative effect (303). When it accomplishes none

of these outcomes, it is merely out of place (303).

Quintilian then proceeds to give examples of A) a necessary metaphor (303):

when they call a vinebud gemma, a gem (what other terms is there which they could

use?), or speak of the crops being thirstyor the fruit suffering (303), or when we speak

of a hardor roughman, there being no literal term for these temperaments (303); B)

metaphors used to make meaning clearer: when we say that a man is kindled to angeror

on fire with greedor that he has fallen into error, we do so to enhance our meaning (303-

305). None of these things can be more literally described in its own words than in those

which we import from elsewhere (305); and C) purely ornamental metaphor[s] (305)

such as brilliance of style, splendour of birth, tempestuous public assemblies,

thunderbolts of eloquence (305), etc.

Quintilian contends that [o]n the whole metaphoris a shorter form of simile

(305). Moreover, in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish to

describe, whereas in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing. It is a

comparison when I say of him, He is a lion, it is a metaphor when I say of him, He is a

lion (305).

Quintilian identifies four classes (305) (each of which would a genus [307]) of

metaphor: A) when we substitute one living thing for another (305) as when Livy saysthat Scipio was continually barked at by Cato (305); B) when inanimate things (305)

are substituted for inanimate (305) (e.g. Virgil writes gave his fleet the rein [305]), or

inanimate may be substituted for animate (307) (e.g Did the Argive bulwark fall by

sword or fate? [307]), or animate for inanimate (307) (e.g. The shepherd sits

unknowing on the height / listening the roar from some far mountain brow [307]). Above

all, Quintilian stresses, effects of extraordinary sublimity are produced when the theme is

exalted by a bold and almost hazardous metaphor and inanimate objects are given life and

action, as in the phrase Araxes flood that scorns a bridge (307). Sometimes the effect

is doubled, as in Virgils And with venom arm the steel. For both to arm the steel and to

arm with venom are metaphors (307). These four kinds of metaphor are further

subdivided into a number of species, such as transference from rational beings to rational

and from irrational to irrational and the reverse, in which the method is the same (307),

and, finally, from the whole to its parts and from the parts to the whole (307).

While the temperate and timely use of metaphor (307) constitutes a real

adornment to style (309), frequent use serves merely to obscure our language and

weary our audience (309). Moreover, if we introduce them in one continuous series, our

language will become allegorical and enigmatic (309). Also, certain metaphors fail from

meanness (309) (e.g. There is a rocky wart upon the mountains brow [309]), or they

may even be coarse (309) (e.g. You have lanced the boils of the state [309]). It is vital

also to avoid grossness in metaphor (309) (e.g. Glaucia, the excrement fo the senate-


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house [309]). Similarly, a metaphor must not be too great for its subject, or, as is more

frequently the case, too little, and that it must not be inappropriate (309). Likewise,

excess in the use of metaphor is also a fault, more especially if they are of the same

species (309). Some metaphors may be harsh (309) or far-fetched (309), such as

the snows of the head (309). However, the worst errors . . . originate in (311) theuse even in prose [of] any metaphors . . . allowed to poets (311) and in spite of the fact

that the latter aim solely at pleasing their readers and compelled in many cases to employ

metaphor by sheer metrical necessity (311). Moreover, citing the authority of previous

usage (e.g. the fact that it was Homer who used phrases like the shepherd of the people

[311] or Virgil who said that winged creatures swim through the air [311] to describe

the flight of bees [311]) is not enough to make them admissible in pleading (311) in

court. This is because metaphor should always either occupy a place already vacant, or if

it fills the room of something else, should be more impressive than that which it displaces

(311).

The foregoing, Quintilian argues, applies with even greater force to synecdoche

(311). Where metaphor is designed to move the feelings, give special distinction to

things and place them vividly before the eye (311), synecdoche has the power to give

variety to our language by making us realise many things from one, the whole from a part,

the genusfrom a species, things which follow from things which have preceded (311).

Some examples of synecdoche are appropriate and others not, for while in prose it is

perfectly correct to use mucro, the point, for the whole sword, and tectum, roof, for a

whole house, we may not employpuppis, stern, to describe a ship, nor abies, fir, to

describe planks (311). Similarly, while ferrum, the steel may be used to indicate a

sword, quadrupescannot be used in the sense of horse (311-313). Synecdoche is most

freely employed in prose (313) where numbers are concerned (313) (e.g. Livys

The Roman won the day [313] when he means that the Romans were victorious [313]).

This trope is not only a rhetorical ornament, but is frequently employed in everyday

speech (313). Also, some use synecdoche when something is assumed which has not

actually been expressed, since one word is then discovered from other words (313), or

when one thing may be suggested by another, as in the line Behold, the steers / Bringback the plough suspended from the yoke, from which we infer the approach of night

(313).

Quintilian then turns his attention to metonymy, which consists in the substitution

of one name for another (313) (also called hypallageby the rhetoricians [313]). These

devices are employed to indicate an invention by substituting the name of the inventor, or

a possession by substituting the name of the possessor (313-315) (e.g. Horaces

Neptune admitted to the land / Protects the fleets from blasts of Aquilo [315]).

Quintilian believes that it is

important to enquire to what extent tropes of this kind should be employed

by the orator. For though we often hear Vulcan used for fire and to say

vario Marte pugnatum est for they fought with varying success is elegant

and idiomatic, while Venusis a more decent expression than coitus, it would

be too bold for the severe style demanded in the courts to speak of Liberand

Cereswhen we mean bread and wine. (315)

It is similarly permissible to substitute that which contains for that which is contained

(315) (e.g. Civilised cities [315]), the converse procedure would rarely be ventured on

by any save a poet (315). It is more permissible to describe what is possessed by

reference to its possessor, as, for example, to say of a man whose estate is being

squandered, the man is being eaten up (315), or when we speak of Virgil when we

mean Virgils poems (315). Metonymy sometimes indicates cause by effect (317) (e.g.


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in poetry, Virgils There pale diseases dwell and sad old age [317] or when the orator

speaks of headlong anger, cheerful youth or slothful ease [317]).

Quintilian suddenly returns to a type of trope (317) which has some kinship with

synecdoche (317): the use of the plural for the singular (317) as when I speak of a

mans looks instead of his look (317) or when I call a gilded roof a golden roof,because gilding forms only part of the roof (317). The aim in so doing is not to enable

one thing to be inferred from many (for the sense is clear enough) (317) but merely to

vary the form of the word (317).

Other tropes defined here include:

Antonomasia, which substitutes something else for a proper name . . . by the

substitution of an epithet as equivalent to the name which it replaces (317), or by

indicating the most striking characteristics of an individual (317), or from acts

clearly indicating the individual (319);

Onomatopoeia, that is to say, the creation of a word . . . adapted . . . to suit the

sensation . . . expressed (319), such as mugitus, lowing, sibilus, a hiss, and

murmur (319).

Catachresis (of which abuseis a correct translation) (321), that is, the practice of

adapting the nearest available term to describe something for which no actual term

exists (321) (e.g. Flasks are called acetabula[i.e. vinegar flasks] no matter what

they contain [321];

Metalepsisor transumption, which provides a transition from one trope to another

(323). It is in the nature of metalepsusto form a kind of intermediate step

between the term transferred and the thing itself to which it is transferred, having

no meaning in itself, but merely providing a transition (323).

The remaining tropesare employed solely to adorn and enhance our style without any

reference to the meaning (323). Hence,

the epithet, of which the correct translation is appositum (323);

allegory, which is translated in Latin by inversio (327) which either presents one

thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to the

meaning of the words (327), the first is generally conveyed by a series ofmetaphors (327), while the latter involves an element of irony, or, as our

rhetoricians call it, illusio (333);

Periphrasis, that is, a circuitous mode of speech (335) by which we use a number

of words to describe something for which one, or at any rate only a few words of

description would suffice (335) and often of special service when it conceals

something which would be indecent (335) (e.g. Sallusts To meet the demands of

nature [335]);

Hyperbaton (335), the rearrangement of normal syntactical order, which is often

demanded by the structure of the sentence and the claims of elegance, and is

consequently counted among the ornaments of style (335). For

our language would often be harsh, rough, limp or disjointed,

if the words were always arranged in their natural order and

attached each to each just as they occur, despite the fact that

there is no real bond of union. Consequently some words

require to be postponed, others to be anticipated, each being

set in its appropriate place. For we are like those who build a

wall of unhewn stone: we cannot hew or polish our words in

order to make them fit more compactly, and so we must take

them as they are and choose suitable positions for them.

Further it is impossible to make our prose rhythmical except


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by artistic alterations in the order of words. (337)

Hyperbole (339) which means an elegant straining of the truth (339) which may

be employed differently for exaggeration or attenuation (339).

Book 9: Eloquence: Figures of Thought and Speech

9.1 Figures of Thought and Speech

Having spoken of tropes in Book 8, Quintilian now turns his attention to figures (349), a

topic closely connected with the preceding (349) to the point where the resemblance

between the two is so close that it is not easy to distinguish between them (349). Many

thinkers have conflated the two because tropes are thought to derive their name from

having a certain form or from the fact they affect alterations in language (a view which has

led to their being styled motions) (349), it must be admitted that both these features are

found in figuresas well (349). The employment (349) of figures is the same (349) in

that they add force and charm to our matter (349). Moreover, although certain kinds

differ (349), they retain a general resemblance (since both involve a departure from the

simple and straightforward method fo expression coupled with a certain rhetoricalexcellence) (349). Tropes and figures are sometimes distinguished by the narrowest

possible dividing line (349) resulting in the fact that for some irony is both a figure of

thought (349) and a trope, while periphrasis, hyperbaton and onomatopoeia have been

ranked by distinguished authors as figures of speechrather than tropes (349).

Quintilian makes clear that where the term tropes is applied to the transference

of expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to

embellishment of style (351). As grammarians put it, a trope represents the

transference of words and phrases from the place which is strictly theirs to another to

which they do not properly belong (351). By contrast, a figure is the term employed

when we give our language a conformation other than the obvious and ordinary (351).

For this reason, the substitution of one word for another is placed among tropes (351)

including metaphor, metonymy, antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdoche, catachresis,allegory, hyperbole, onomatopoeia, and periphrasis a figure does not necessarily involve

any alteration either of the order or the strict sense of words (351). It does not matter

too much by which name either is called . . . since the meaning of things is not altered by

a change of name (353) for just as men remain the same, even though they adopt a new

name, so these artifices will produce exactly the same effect, whether they are styled

tropesor figures, since their value lies not in their names, but in their effect (353). It is

accordingly best to adopt the generally accepted terms and to understand the actual

thing, by whatever name it is called (353). However, we should note that tropeand

figureare often combined in the expression of the same thought (353).

There is a considerable difference of opinion . . . as to the meaning of the name,

the number of generaand the nature and number of the speciesinto which figures may be

divided (353). The term figure is used in two senses (353): first, it is applied to anyform in which thought is expressed (353) in much the same way that bodies . . . must

have some shape (353). Hence, the Latin verbs cursitareand lectitareare said to have

the same figure, that is to say, they are identical in formation (355), i.e. similar forms of

declension. In the second and special sense, in which it is called a schema, it means a

rational change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form (353) in much

the same way that sitting, lying down on something or looking back (353) may be said to

change the shape of the body. A schema is that which is poetically or rhetorically altered

from the simple and obvious method of expression (355).


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For some, all figuresare concerned with words (357) for the reason that a

change of words causes a corresponding change in the sense (357). Others assert that

figures are concerned only with the sense, on the ground that words are adapted to

things (357). However, Quintilian points out that the same things are often put in

different ways and the sense remains unaltered though the words are changed (357).Moreover, a figure of thoughtmay include several figures of speech (357) for the former

lies in the conception, the latter in the expression of our thought (357). However,

Quintilian subscribes to the consensus that there are two classes of figure, namely figures

of thought, that is of the mind, feeling or conceptions (357) and figures of speech, that is

of words, diction, expression, language or style (357). Hence, like language itself,

figures are necessarily concerned with thought and with words (357). Because we

conceive ideas before we express them (359), Quintilian intends to deal firstly with

figures of thought. It may appear that proof is infinitesimally affected by the figures

employed (359), but it remains true that figures of thought lend credibility to our

arguments and steal their way secretly into the minds of the judges (359). The reason

for this is that, just as in swordplay it is easy to see, parry, and ward off direct blows and

simple and straightforward thrusts, while wide-strokes and feints are less easy to observe

(359) and it is the task of the skilful swordsman . . . to give the impression that his

design is quite other than it actually is (359), indirection is similarly conducive to success

in oratory. Moreover, there is no more effective method of exciting the emotions than an

apt use of figures. For if the expression of brow, eyes and hands has a powerful effect in

stirring the passions, how much more effective must be the aspect of our style itself when

composed to produce the result at which we aim (359). Above all, figures serve to

commend what we say to those that hear us, whether we seek to win approval for our

character as pleaders, or to win favour for the cause which we plead, to relieve monotony

by variation of our language, or to indicate our meaning in the safest or most seemly way

(359).

Quintilian seeks to point out that the number (361) of figures is far from being as

great as some authorities make out (361). He rejects the view that there are as many

types of figureas there are kinds of emotion (361) not because emotions are not

qualities of the mind (361) but because a figure is not simply the expression of anything

you choose (361): the expression in words of anger, grief, pity, fear, confidence or

contempt is not a figure (361) per se. Many are able to point out the special figures

employed in expressing anger, in entreating for mercy, or appealing to pity, but it does not

follow that expressions of anger, appeals to pity or entreaties for mercy are in themselves

figures (361). Cicero may equate all ornaments of oratory (361) with figures (361)

but he does not hold that all forms of expression are to be regarded as figures (361), nor

does he restrict the term merely to those expressions whose form varies from ordinary

use (361). Rather, he regards as figurative all those expressions which are especially

striking and most effective in stirring the emotions of the audience (361).

9.2 Figures of Thought (Detail)

At one point in this chapter, Quintilian turns his attention to irony (400) which he refuses

to equate with dissimulation (400) as many do. In terms of its genus (401), irony

which functions as a trope does not differ (401) from irony which functions as a figure

since in both cases we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually

said (401). It is at the level of species (401) that the difference becomes apparent: the

trope is franker in its meaning and, despite the fact that it implies something other than it

says, makes no pretence about it (401) for the context as a rule is perfectly clear (401).

In the figurative form of irony, the speaker disguises his entire meaning, the disguise


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being apparent rather than confessed (401). For in the trope the conflict is purely

verbal, while in the figurethe meaning, and sometimes the whole aspect of our case,

conflict with the language and the tone of the voice adopted (401). Sometimes a mans

whole life may be coloured with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who . . . assumed

the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others (401). Just ascontinued metaphor develops into allegory, so a sustained series of tropesdevelops into

this figure (401). However, certain kinds of this figure. . . have no connexion with

tropes (401) such as irony based on negation (401) Why should I mention his

decrees, his acts of plunder, his acquisition, whether by cession or by acts of force, of

certain inheritances (402) or when we conde to our opponents qualities which we are

unwilling that they should seem to possess (402) or when we pretend to own to faults

which are not ours or which even recoil upon the heads of our opponents (402).

9.3 Figures of Speech (Detail)

9.4 Apt Use of Structure, Rhythm, Metrical Feet

Book 10: Training Eloquence: Reading, Composition, Speaking

10.1 Reading Curriculum

10.2 Imitation

10.3 Writing

10.4 Correction

10.5 Composition Exercises: Translation, Paraphrase, Theses, Commonplaces,

Declamations

10.6 Thought and Premeditation

10.7 Extemporaneous Speaking

Book 11: Kairos, Memory, Delivery

11.1 Respecting kairosWhen Speaking

11.2 Memory

11.3 Delivery, Gesture, Dress

Book 12: the Character of an Orator: Duties, Studies, Etc.

12.1 The Great Orator as Good Man

12.2 Strengthening Character; Philosophical Study

12.3 The Study of Civil Law

12.4 Orator Prepared with Examples and Precedents

12.5 Firmness; Presence of Mind; Cultivating Natural Advantages

12.6 The Orator's Age

12.7 Causes to be Undertaken; Remuneration

12.8 Careful Study of the Case


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12.9 Not Aiming for Applause; Restraining Invective; Preparation Through Writing and

Extemporaneous Speaking

12.10 Styles of Oratory

12.11 Retirement from Speaking; Successful Training of an Orator

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