Question 6- Predestination

8/10/2019 Question 6- Predestination

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/question-6-predestination 1/53

Question Six: Predestination

1. Primo utrum praedestinatio pertineatad scientiam vel voluntatem.

2. Secundo utrum praescientia meritorum sit causa vel ratio praedestinationis.

3. Tertio utrum praedestinatiocertitudinem habeat.

4. Quarto utrum numeruspraedestinatorum sit certus.

5. Quinto utrum praedestinatis sit certasua praedestinatio.

6. Sexto utrum praedestinatio possitiuvari precibus sanctorum.

1. Does predestination belong toknowledge of will?

2. Is foreknowledge of merits thecause of or reason forpredestination?

3. Is predestination certain? 4. Is the number of predestined

certain? 5. Are the predestined certain of their

predestination? 6. Can predestination be helped by

the prayers of the saints?

ARTICLE I

This question treats predestination.

In the first article we ask:

Does predestination belong to knowledge or will?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, aa. 1, 3-4; I Sent., 40,1, 2; C.G., III, 163; In Rom., c. 1, lect. 3 (P. 13:7a,

82).]

Quaestio est de praedestinatione. Et primoquaeritur utrum pertineat ad scientiam, vel

ad voluntatem

Difficulties

Et videtur quod ad voluntatem sicut ad

genus.

It seems that it has will as its genus, for

Quia, ut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de

praedestinatione sanctorum,

praedestinatio est propositum miserendi.Sed propositum est voluntatis. Ergo et

praedestinatio.

1. As Augustine says,‟ predestination is the

intention of being merciful. But intention belongs

to the will. Consequently, predestination also belongs to the will.

Praeterea, praedestinatio videtur idem

esse cum electione aeterna, de qua diciturEphes., I, 4: elegit nos in ipso ante mundi

constitutionem, quia idem dicuntur electi

2. Predestination seems to be the same as the

eternal election referred to in the Epistle to theEphesians (1:4): “He chose us in him before the

foundation of the world”— because the chosen are

http://www.dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer6.htm#2






































et praedestinati. Sed electio, secundum

philosophum in VI et X Ethicorum, magisest appetitus quam intellectus. Ergo et

praedestinatio magis ad voluntatem, quam

ad scientiam pertinet.

the same as the predestinated. Now, according to

the Philosopher, choice belongs rather to appetitethan to intellect. Hence, predestination belongs

more to the will than to knowledge.

Sed dicebat, quod electio praedestinationem praecedit, nec est idem

ei.- Sed contra, voluntas sequitur

scientiam, et non praecedit. Sed electio advoluntatem pertinet. Si igitur electio

praedestinationem praecedit,

praedestinatio non potest ad scientiam

pertinere.

3. But it was said that election comes before predestination and is not the same as it. — On the

contrary, will comes after knowledge, not before

it. But choice pertains to the will. If, therefore,choice comes before predestination, then

predestination cannot belong to knowledge.

Praeterea, si praedestinatio ad scientiam pertineret, idem videretur esse

praedestinatio quod praescientia; et sic

quicumque praesciret salutem alicuius, praedestinaret illum. Sed hoc est falsum.

Prophetae enim praesciverunt salutem

gentium, quam non praedestinaverunt.

Ergo et cetera.

4. If predestination belonged to knowledge, then itwould seem to be the same as foreknowledge; and

thus whoever foreknew the salvation of a person

would predestine him. Now, this is false; for the prophets foreknew the salvation of the Gentiles;

yet they did not predestine it. Therefore.

Praeterea, praedestinatio causalitatemimportat. Sed causalitas non est de ratione

scientiae, sed magis de ratione voluntatis.

Ergo praedestinatio magis pertinet advoluntatem quam ad scientiam.

5. Predestination implies causality. Now, causalitydoes not have the nature of knowledge, but rather

the nature of will. Consequently, predestination

belongs more to the will than to knowledge.

Praeterea, voluntas in hoc a potentia

differt quod potentia effectus respicit

tantum in futuro (non enim est potentiarespectu eorum quae sunt vel fuerunt),

voluntas vero respicit aequaliter effectum

praesentem et futurum. Sed praedestinatio

habet effectum in praesenti et in futuro;unde et ab Augustino dicitur, quod

praedestinatio est praeparatio gratiae in

praesenti, et gloriae in futuro. Ergo praedestinatio ad voluntatem pertinet.

6. The will differs from a passive potency in this

respect, that the latter refers only to effects taking

place in the future, for we, cannot speak of passive potency in relation to things that are or have been,

whereas the will extends equally to both present

and future effects. Now, predestination has both

present and future effects; for, as Augustine says:“Predestination is the preparation of grace in the

present and of glory in the future.” Therefore, it

belongs to the will.

Praeterea, scientia non respicit res ut 7. Knowledge is not related to things in so far as



factas vel faciendas, sed magis ut scitas

vel sciendas; praedestinatio vero respicitid quod faciendum est. Ergo

praedestinatio ad scientiam non pertinet.

they are made or to be made but in so far as they

are known or to be known. Now, predestination isrelated to a thing as something that must be

effected. Consequently, it does not belong to

knowledge.

Praeterea, effectus magis denominatur acausa proxima quam a causa remota, sicut

homo generatus ab homine generante

magis quam a sole. Sed praeparatio est ascientia et voluntate; scientia autem est

causa prior et remotior quam voluntas.

Ergo praeparatio magis pertinet ad

voluntatem quam ad scientiam. Sed praedestinatio est praeparatio alicuius ad

gloriam, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo et praedestinatio magis erit voluntatis quam

scientiae.

8. An effect receives its name from its proximatecause rather than from its remote cause. For

example, we say that a man is begotten by a man,

instead of saying by the sun, which also begetshim. Now, preparation is the effect of both

knowledge and will, but knowledge is prior to the

will and more remote than it. Consequently,

preparation belongs more to the will than toknowledge. But, as Augustine says:

“Predestination is the preparation of someone forglory.” Therefore, predestination pertains rather to

the will than to knowledge.

Praeterea, quando multi motus ordinantur

ad unum terminum, tota motuum

coordinatio recipit nomen ultimi motus;

sicut ad educendum formamsubstantialem de potentia materiae

ordinatur primo alteratio et secundo

generatio, et totum nominatur generatio.

Sed ad aliquid praeparandum ordinatur primo motus scientiae et deinceps motus

voluntatis. Ergo totum debet voluntati

attribui; et ita praedestinatio praecipue involuntate esse videtur.

9. When many motions are ordered to only one

term, then the entire co-ordinated complex of

motions takes the name of the last motion. For

example, in the drawing out of a substantial formfrom the potency of matter, the following order is

had: first, alteration, then generation. But the

whole is called generation. Now, when something

is prepared, this order is had: first, movements ofknowledge, then movements of the will.

Consequently, the whole should be attributed to

the will; therefore, predestination seems to beespecially in the will.

Praeterea, si unum contrariorum

appropriatur alicui, reliquum maxime

removetur ab eodem. Sed mala maxime

appropriantur divinae praescientiae;malos enim praescitos dicimus; ergo

praescientia non respicit bona. Sed

praedestinatio est de bonis salutaribustantum. Ergo praedestinatio non pertinet

ad praescientiam.

10. If he of two contraries is appropriated to

something, then the other contrary is removed

from it in the highest possible degree. Now, evil is

appropriated especially to God‟s foreknowledge,for we say that the damned are known beforehand.

Consequently, His foreknowledge does not have

good things as its object. Predestination, however,is concerned only with those good things that lead

to salvation. Therefore, predestination is not

related to foreknowledge.



Praeterea, illud quod proprie dicitur,

glosatione non indiget. Sed in sacraScriptura quando cognitio respectu boni

dicitur, glossatur pro approbatione, ut

patet in I Cor., cap. VIII, 3: si quis diligitDeum, hic cognitus est ab eo id est

approbatus: et II Tim. II, 19: novit

dominus qui sunt eius, id est approbat.

Ergo notitia non est proprie de bonis. Sed praedestinatio est bonorum. Ergo, et

cetera.

11. When a word is used in its proper sense, it

does not need a gloss. But; whenever the sacredScripture speaks of knowledge of good, a gloss is

added saying that this means approval. This is

evident from the Gloss on the first Epistle to theCorinthians (8:3): “„If any man love God, the

same is known by him‟— that is, he is approved by

God”; and from the Gloss on the second Epistle to

Timothy (2:19): “„The Lord knows who are his‟— that is, God approves him.” In its proper sense,

therefore, knowledge is not related to good things.

But predestination is related to good things.

Therefore.

Praeterea, praeparare est motivae virtutis,

quia ad opus pertinet. Sed praedestinatioest praeparatio, ut dictum est. Ergo

praedestinatio ad virtutem motivam pertinet: ergo ad voluntatem, et non ad

scientiam.

12. To prepare belongs to a power that moves, for

preparation is related to some work. But, as has been said, predestination is a preparation.

Therefore, it belongs to a moving power and so tothe will, not to knowledge.

Praeterea, ratio exemplata sequitur

rationem exemplarem. Sed in rationehumana, quae est exemplata a divina,

videmus quod praeparatio est voluntatis,

et non scientiae. Ergo et in praeparatione

divina erit similiter; et sic idem quod prius.

13. A reasoning power modeled upon another

reasoning power imitates it. Now, in the case ofthe human reason, which is modeled upon the

divine, we see that preparation belongs to the will,

not to knowledge. Consequently, divine

preparation is similar; and the conclusion is thesame as before.

Praeterea, omnia attributa divina sunt

idem secundum rem, sed differentia

eorum ostenditur ex diversitate effectuum.Ad illud ergo attributum reduci debet

aliquid de Deo dictum, cui eius effectus

appropriatur. Sed gratia et gloria sunt

effectus praedestinationis, etappropriantur voluntati, sive bonitati.

Ergo et praedestinatio ad voluntatem

pertinet, non ad scientiam.

14. Although the divine attributes are one reality,

the difference between them is manifested in the

difference in their effects. Consequently,something said of God should be reduced to that

attribute to which this effect is appropriated. Now,

grace and glory are the effects of predestination,

and they are appropriated either to His will or Hisgoodness. Therefore, predestination also belongs

to His will, not to His knowledge.

Sed contra. To the Contrary

Est quod dicit Glossa Rom. VIII, 29 super 1. The Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans (8:29),



illud quos praescivit, hos et

praedestinavit: praedestinatio, inquit, est praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum

Dei, et cetera.

“For whom he foreknew, he also predestinates,”

says: “Predestination is God‟s foreknowledge and preparation of benefits...”

Praeterea, omne praedestinatum est

scitum, sed non convertitur. Ergo praedestinatum est in genere sciti. Ergo et

praedestinatio est in genere scientiae.

2. Whatever is predestined is known, but the

opposite is not true. Consequently, what is predestined belongs to the class of things that are

known; hence, it is included in the genus of

knowledge.

Praeterea, magis est ponendum

unumquodque in genere eius quodconvenit ei semper, quam in genere eius

quod non convenit ei semper. Sed

praedestinationi semper convenit id quodest ex parte scientiae: semper enim

praedestinationem praescientia

concomitatur, non autem semperconcomitatur eam appositio gratiae, quae

est per voluntatem: quia praedestinatio est

aeterna, appositio autem gratiae est

temporalis. Ergo praedestinatio magisdebet poni in genere scientiae quam

voluntatis.

3. A thing should be placed in the genus to which

it always belongs, rather than in a genus which isnot always proper to it. Now, the element of

knowledge always belongs to predestination,

because foreknowledge always accompanies it.The granting of grace, however, which takes place

through the will, does not always accompany

predestination, since predestination is eternalwhile the bestowal of grace takes place in time.

Predestination, therefore, should be placed in the

genus of knowledge rather than in that of will acts.

Praeterea, habitus cognitivi et operativi

inter intellectuales virtutes a philosophocomputantur, qui ad rationem pertinentmagis quam ad appetitum, ut patet de

prudentia et arte in VI Ethic. Sed

praedestinatio importat principiumcognitivum et operativum quia est et

praescientia et praeparatio, ut ex

definitione inducta patet. Ergo

praedestinatio magis pertinet adcognitionem quam ad voluntatem.

4. The Philosopher places habits of knowing and

doing among the intellectual virtues, for they belong more to reason than to appetite. This isclearly what he does in the case of art and

prudence, as can be seen in his Ethics.” Now,

predestination implies a principle of doing and ofknowing, since, as is evident from the definition

given, predestination is both foreknowledge and

preparation. Predestination, therefore, belongs

more to knowledge than it does to the will.

Praeterea, contraria sunt in eodem genere.

Sed praedestinationi est contrariareprobatio. Cum ergo reprobatio sit in

genere scientiae, quia Deus praescit

malitiam reproborum et non facit eam,

5. Contraries belong to the same genus. But

predestination is the contrary of reprobation. Now,since reprobation belongs to the genus of

knowledge, because God foreknows the malice of

the damned but does not cause it, it seems that



videtur quod etiam praedestinatio sit in

genere scientiae.

predestination also belongs to the genus of

knowledge.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod destinatio, unde nomen

praedestinationis accipitur, importat

directionem alicuius in finem: unde

aliquis dicitur nuntium destinare qui eumdirigit ad aliquid faciendum. Et quia id

quod proponimus, ad executionem

dirigimus, sicut ad finem; ideo id quod

proponimus, dicimur destinare, secundumillud II Machab., cap. VI, 20, de Eleazaro,

quod destinavit in corde suo non

admittere illicita propter vitae amorem.

Destination (from which predestination is

derived) implies the direction of something to an

end. For this reason, one is said to destine a

messenger if he directs him to do something. And because we direct our decisions to execution as to

an end, we are said to destine what we decide. For

example, Eleazar (2 Maccabees 6:19) is said to

have “destined” in his heart not to do “anyunlawful things for the love of life.”

Sed haec praepositio prae, quaeadiungitur, adiungit ordinem ad futurum;

unde cum destinare non sit nisi eius quod

est, praedestinare potest esse etiam eiusquod non est: et quantum ad haec duo

praedestinatio sub providentia collocatur

ut pars eius. Dictum est enim in

praecedenti quaestione quod ad providentiam pertinet directio in finem:

providentia etiam a Tullio ponitur

respectu futuri; et a quibusdam definitur,quod providentia est praesens notiofuturum pertractans eventum.

Now, the particle pre-, when joined to a word,adds a relation to the future. Consequently,to

destine refers to what is present, while to

predestine can also refer to what is future. For tworeasons, therefore, predestination is placed under

providence as one of its parts, namely, because

direction to an end, as pointed out in the preceding

question,” pertains to providence, and because providence — even according to Cicero — includes

a relation to the future. In fact, some define

providence by saying that it is present knowledge bearing upon future event.

Sed tamen praedestinatio quantum ad duo

a providentia differt: providentia enimdicit universaliter ordinationem in finem,

et ideo se extendit ad omnia quae a Deo in

finem aliquem ordinantur, sive rationalia

sive irrationalia, sive bona sive mala; sed praedestinatio respicit tantum illum finem

qui est possibilis rationali creaturae,

utpote gloriam; et ideo praedestinatio nonest nisi hominum, et respectu horum quae

pertinent ad salutem. Differt etiam alio

modo. In qualibet enim ordinatione ad

On the other hand, predestination differs from

providence in two respects. Providence means ageneral ordering to an end. Consequently, it

extends to all things, rational or irrational, good or

bad, that have been ordained by God to an end.

Predestination, however, is concerned only withthat end which is possible for a rational creature,

namely, his eternal glory. Consequently, it

concerns only men, and only with reference tothose things that are related to salvation.

Moreover, predestination differs from providence

in a second respect. In any ordering to an end, two



finem est duo considerare: scilicet ipsum

ordinem, et exitum vel eventum ordinis:non enim omnia quae ad finem

ordinantur, finem consequuntur.

Providentia ergo, ordinem in finemrespicit tantum, unde per Dei

providentiam homines omnes ad

beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed

praedestinatio respicit etiam exitum veleventum ordinis, unde non est nisi eorum

qui gloriam consequentur. Sicut igitur se

habet providentia ad impositionem

ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio adordinis exitum vel eventum: quod enim

aliqui finem gloriae consequantur, non est

principaliter ex propriis viribus, sed ex

auxilio gratiae divinitus dato.

things must be considered: the ordering itself, and

the outcome or result of the ordering, for noteverything that is ordered to an end reaches that

end. Providence, therefore, is concerned only with

the ordering to the end. Consequently, by God‟s providence, all men are ordained to beatitude. But

predestination is also concerned with the outcome

or result of this ordering, and, therefore, it is

related only to those who will attain heavenlyglory. Hence, providence, is related to the initial

establishment of an order, and predestination is

related to its outcome or result; for the fact that

some attain the end that is eternal glory is not due primarily to their own power but to the help of

grace given by God.

Unde, sicut de providentia, supra dictum

est, quod consistit in actu rationis, sicut et

prudentia cuius est pars, eo quod soliusrationis est dirigere vel ordinare; ita etiam

et praedestinatio in actu rationis consistit

dirigentis vel ordinantis in finem. Sed ad

directionem in finem praeexigiturvoluntas finis: nullus enim aliquid in

finem ordinat quem non vult: unde etiamet perfecta prudentiae electio non potestesse nisi in eo qui habet virtutem

moralem, secundum philosophum in VI

Ethicorum: per virtutem enim moralem

affectus alicuius in fine stabilitur, adquem prudentia ordinat. Finis autem in

quem praedestinatio dirigit, non est

universaliter consideratus, sed secundumcomparationem eius ad illum qui finem

ipsum consequitur, quem oportet esse

distinctum apud dirigentem ab his quifinem illum non consequentur: et ideo praedestinatio praesupponit dilectionem,

per quam Deus vult salutem alicuius. Ut

sicut prudens non ordinat in finem nisiinquantum est temperatus vel iustus, ita

Deus non praedestinat nisi inquantum est

diligens.

Therefore, just as we said above that providence

consists in an act of reason, like prudence, of

which it is a part, because it belongs to reasonalone to direct and to ordain, so now we say that

predestination also consists in an act of reason,

directing or ordering to an end. However, the

willing of an end is required before there can bedirection to an end, because no one directs

anything to an end which he does not will. This iswhy the Philosopher says that a perfect prudentialchoice can be made only by a man of good moral

character, because moral habits strengthen one‟s

affections for the end which prudence dictates.

Now, the one who predestines does not considerin a general way the end to which his

predestination directs him; he considers it, rather,

according to the relation it has to one who attainsit, and such a person must be distinct in the mind

of the one predestining from those persons who

will not achieve this end. Consequently, predestination presupposes a love by which Godwills the salvation of a person. Hence, just as a

prudent man directs to an end only in so far as he

is temperate or just, so God predestines only in sofar as He loves.



Praeexigitur etiam et electio, per quam

ille qui in finem infallibiliter dirigitur abaliis separatur qui non hoc modo in finem

ordinantur. Haec autem separatio non est

propter aliquam diversitatem inventam inhis qui separantur quae posset ad amorem

incitare: quia cum nondum nati essent aut

aliquid boni egissent aut mali, dictum est:

Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui; utdicitur Roman., cap. IX, 11-13. Et ideo

praedestinatio praesupponit electionem et

dilectionem; electio vero dilectionem. Ad

praedestinationem vero duo sequuntur:scilicet consecutio finis, quod est

glorificatio, et collatio auxilii ad

consequendum finem, quod est appositio

gratiae, quae ad vocationem pertinet; undeet praedestinationi duo effectus

assignantur, scilicet gratia et gloria.

Another prerequisite of predestination is the

choice by which he who is directed to the endinfallibly is separated from others who are not

ordained to it in the same manner. This separation,

however, is not on account of any difference,found in the predestined, which could arouse

God‟s love; for, as we read in the Epistle to the

Romans (9:11-13): “When the children were not

yet born nor had done any good or evil... it wassaid... „Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have

hated.‟” Consequently, predestination presupposes

election and love, and election presupposes love.

Again, two things follow upon predestination: theattainment of the end, which is glory, and the

granting of help to attain this end, namely, the

bestowal of the grace that pertains to the call to be

among the predestined. Predestination, therefore,has two effects: grace and glory.

Answers to Difficulties

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod inactibus animae ita est quod praecedens

actus includitur quodammodo virtute in

sequenti: et quia praedestinatio

praesupponit dilectionem, quae est actusvoluntatis, ideo in ratione

praedestinationis aliquid includitur ad

voluntatem pertinens, et propter hoc, propositum, et alia ad voluntatem

pertinentia, in definitione

praedestinationis quandoque ponuntur.

1. The acts of the soul are such that a precedingact in some way is virtually contained in the act

that follows. Since predestination presupposes

love, an act of the will, the notion of

predestination includes something that belongs tothe will. For this reason, intention and other

elements belonging to the will are sometimes put

into its definition.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod

praedestinatio non est idem electioni, sed praesupponit eam, ut dictum est; et ideo

est quod idem sunt praedestinati et electi.

2.Predestination is not the same as election, but, as

we said above, it presupposes election. This iswhy the predestined are the same as the elect.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum electiosit voluntatis et directio rationis, semper

directio electionem praecedit, si referantur

ad idem; sed si ad diversa, tunc non est

3. Since choice belongs to the will, and directionto the intellect, direction always precedes election

if both have the same object. But if they have

different objects, then there is no inconsistency in



inconveniens quod electio praecedat

praedestinationem, quae directionisrationem importat: electio enim, prout hic

accipitur, pertinet ad ipsum qui in finem

dirigitur: prius autem est accipere illumqui dirigitur in finem, quam ipsum in

finem dirigere; et ideo electio in proposito

praedestinationem praecedit.

election‟s coming before predestination, which

implies the existence of direction. As election istaken here, however, it pertains to one who is

directed to an end; and the acceptance of one who

is to be directed toward an end comes before thedirection itself. In the case stated, therefore,

election precedes predestination.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod praedestinatio, quamvis ponatur in genere

scientiae, tamen aliquid supra scientiam et

supra praescientiam addit: scilicet

directionem vel ordinationem in finem,sicut etiam prudentia supra cognitionem;

unde, sicut non omnis cognoscens quidagendum sit, est prudens, ita nec omnis

praesciens est praedestinans.

4. Even though predestination is placed under thegenus of knowledge, it adds something to

knowledge and foreknowledge, namely, direction

or an order to an end. In this respect, it resembles

prudence, which also adds something to the notionof knowledge. Consequently, just as every person

who knows what to do is not thereby prudent, soalso not every one who has foreknowledge

thereby predestines.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis

causalitas non sit de ratione scientiae

inquantum huiusmodi, est tamen de

ratione scientiae inquantum est dirigens etordinans in finem; quod non est

voluntatis, sed rationis tantum; sicut etiam

intelligere est de ratione animalis

rationalis, non inquantum est animal, sedinquantum est rationale.

5. Even though causality does not belong to the

notion of knowledge as such, it belongs to that

knowledge which directs and orders to an end; and

direction of this kind is not proper to the will butto the intellect alone. Similarly, understanding

does not belong to the nature of a rational animal

in so far as it is animal but only in so far as it is

rational.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut voluntas

respicit effectum praesentem et futurum,

ita scientia; unde quantum ad hoc nonmagis potest probari quod praedestinatio

ad unum eorum pertineat quam ad

alterum. Sed tamen praedestinatio, proprie

loquendo, non respicit nisi futurum, quodex praepositione designatur, quae

importat ordinem ad futurum; nec est

idem dicere habere effectum in praesenti,et habere effectum praesentem, quia in

praesenti esse dicitur quidquid pertinet ad

statum huius vitae, sive sit praesens, sive praeteritum, sive futurum.

6. Knowledge is related to both present and future

effects, just as the will is. On this basis, therefore,

it cannot be proved that predestination belongsmore to one than to the other. Yet predestination,

properly speaking, is related only to the future-as

the prefix pre-indicates, because it implies an

ordering to the future. Nor is it the same to speakof having an effect in the present and of having a

present effect, because whatever pertains to the

state of this life — whether it be present, past, orfuture — is said to be in the present.



Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis

scientia inquantum est scientia, nonrespiciat facienda, tamen scientia practica

facienda respicit; et ad talem scientiam

praedestinatio reducitur.

7. Even though knowledge as knowledge is not

related to things in so far as they are to be made, practical knowledge is related to things under this

aspect, and predestination is reduced to this type

of knowledge.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod praeparatio proprie importat dispositionem potentiae

ad actum. Est autem duplex potentia:

scilicet activa et passiva: et ideo duplexest praeparatio: una patientis, secundum

quem modum materia dicitur praeparari

ad formam; alia agentis, secundum quam

aliquis dicitur se praeparare ad aliquidagendum; et talem praeparationem

praedestinatio importat, quae nihil aliud inDeo ponere potest quam ipsam

ordinationem alicuius in finem.Ordinationis autem principium proximum

est ratio, sed remotum voluntas, ut ex

dictis patet; et ideo secundum rationeminductam, praedestinatio principalius

rationi quam voluntati attribuitur.

8. In its proper sense, preparation implies adisposing of a potency for act. There are, however,

two kinds of potencies: active and passive;

consequently, there are two kinds of preparations,There is a preparation of the recipient, which we

speak of when we say that matter is prepared for a

form. Then there is a preparation of the agent,

which we speak of when we say that someone is preparing himself in order to do something. It is

this latter kind of preparation that predestinationimplies; for it asserts simply this, that in God there

exists the ordering of some person to an end. Now, the proximate principle of ordering is

reason, and, as is clear from above, its remote

principle is will. Consequently, for the reasongiven in the difficulty, predestination is attributed

more to reason than to will.

Similiter autem dicendum est ad nonum. 9. A similar answer should be given to the ninth

difficulty.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod malaappropriantur praescientiae, non quia praescientia sit magis proprie de malis

quam de bonis, sed quia bona habent

aliquid aliud respondens in Deo quam praescientiam, mala vero non; sicut etiam

convertibile non indicans substantiam

appropriat sibi nomen proprii, quod etiam

aeque proprie definitioni convenit, propterhoc quod definitio aliquid dignitatis addit.

10. Evil things are ascribed as proper toforeknowledge, not because they are more properobjects of foreknowledge than good things, but

because good things in God imply something

more than mere foreknowledge, while evil thingshave no such added implication. Similarly, a

convertible term which does not signify an

essence appropriates to itself the name of

property, which belongs just as properly to thedefinition, because the definition adds a certain

priority.

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod glossationon semper significat improprietatem, sed

est quandoque necessaria ad

specificandum quod generaliter dicitur; et

11. A gloss does not always mean that a word hasnot been used in its proper sense. Sometimes a

gloss is necessary merely to make specific what

has been stated in a general way. This is why the



hoc modo glossatur notitia per

approbationem.

gloss explains knowledge as meaning knowledge

of approval.

Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod

praeparare vel ordinare est motivaetantum; sed motiva non solum est

voluntas, sed etiam ratio practica, ut patetin III de anima.

12. To prepare or direct belongs only to powers

that move. But to move is not peculiar to the will.As is clear from The Soul , this is also a property of

the practical intellect.

Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod

etiam in ratione humana ita est, quod

praeparatio, secundum quod importat

ordinationem vel directionem in finem,est actus proprius rationis, et non

voluntatis.

13. In so far as preparation made even in a human

reason implies an ordering or directing to an end,

it is an act proper to the intellect, not to the will.

Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod in

attributo divino non solum estconsiderandus effectus, sed respectus eius

ad effectum: quia idem est effectus

scientiae et potentiae et voluntatis, sednon idem respectus ad illum effectum per

illa tria nomina importatur. Respectus

autem quem praedestinatio importat ad

effectum suum, cum respectu scientiae,inquantum est dirigens, magis convenit

quam cum respectu potentiae et

voluntatis; et ideo praedestinatio adscientiam reducitur.

14. When treating a divine attribute, we should not

consider only its effect but also its relation to theeffect; for, while the effects of knowledge, power,

and will are the same, still, as the names of these

attributes imply, their relations to them are not. Now, in so far as predestination is directive, the

relation implied by predestination to its effect is

more logically said to be a relation of knowledge

than a relation of power or will. Consequently, predestination is reduced to a type of knowledge.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Alia concedimus: quamvis ad secundum

posset dici, quod non omne quod est in

plus, sit genus, quia potest accidentaliter

praedicari.

1.-2.-4. We concede the other arguments presented

here. One might reply to the second, however, by

pointing out that not everything that is found in

more things is thereby a genus, for it might be

predicated of them as an accident.

Ad tertium etiam posset dici, quod

quamvis dare gratiam non semperconcomitetur praedestinationem, tamen

velle dare semper concomitatur.

3. Even though the granting of grace does not

always accompany predestination, the will togrant grace always does.



Ad quintum etiam posset dici, quod

reprobatio directe non opponitur praedestinationi, sed electioni, quia qui

eligit, alterum accipit et alterum reiicit,

quod dicitur reprobare; unde etiamreprobatio ex ratione sui nominis magis

pertinet ad voluntatem: est enim reprobare

quasi refutare; nisi forte dicatur reprobare

idem quod iudicare indignum quodadmittatur. Sed pro tanto reprobatio ad

praescientiam dicitur in Deo pertinere,

quia nihil positive ex parte voluntatis est

in Deo respectu mali culpae; non enimvult culpam, sicut vult gratiam. Et tamen

etiam reprobatio dicitur praeparatio

quantum ad poenam, quam etiam Deus

vult voluntate consequenti, sed nonantecedenti.

5. Reprobation is directly opposed, not to

predestination, but to election, for He whochooses accepts one and rejects another and this is

called reprobation. Consequently, as the word

itself shows, reprobation pertains more to the will.For to reprobate is, as it were, to reject — except

that it might be said that to reprobate means the

same as to judge unworthy of admittance.

However, reprobation is said to belong to God‟sforeknowledge for this reason, that there is

nothing positive on the part of His will that has

any relation to sin. He does not will sin as He

wills grace. Yet reprobation is said to be a preparation of the punishment which God wills

consequent to sin — not antecedent to it.

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

Is foreknowledge of merits the cause of or reason for predestination?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 19, 5; 2 3, aa. 2, 4-5; I Sent., 40, 1, 1; 41, 3; C.G., III,163; In Ephes., c. 1,

lects. 1, 4 (P. 13:445b, 45 1 b); In Evang. Johannis, c. 15, lect. 3 (P. 10:568b) ; In Rom., c. 1, lect.3; c. 8, lect. 6; c. 9, lect. 3 (P. 13:8a, 86b, 96a, 972).]

Secundo quaeritur utrum praescientia

meritorum sit causa vel ratio

praedestinationis

Difficulties

Et videtur quod sic. It seems that it is, for

Quia Rom., IX 15, super illud, miserebor

cui misereor etc., dicit Glossa Ambrosii:misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio

post errorem toto corde reversurum ad

me. Hoc est dare illi cui dandum est etnon dare illi cui dandum non est; ut eum

vocet quem sciat obedire, illum vero non

quem sciat non obedire. Sed obedire et

1. In his gloss on the verse in Romans (9:15), “I

will have mercy on whom I will have mercy,”Ambrose writes as follows: “I will give mercy to

him who I know will return with his whole heart to

Me after his error. This is to give mercy to him towhom it should be given, and not to give it to one

to whom it should not. Consequently, He calls him

who He knows will obey, not him who He knows



toto corde ad dominum reverti ad

meritum pertinet; contraria vero addemeritum. Ergo praescientia meriti vel

demeriti est causa quare Deus proponat

alicui misericordiam facere vel aliquema misericordia excludere; quod est

praedestinare vel reprobare.

will disobey.”‟ Now, to obey and to return to God

with all one‟s heart are meritorious; the oppositeactions are demeritorious. Foreknowledge of merit

or of demerit is therefore the cause of God‟s

intention of being merciful to some and ofexcluding others from His mercy. This is equivalent

to predestination and reprobation.

Praeterea, praedestinatio includit in se

voluntatem divinam salutis humanae;nec potest dici quod includat solam

voluntatem antecedentem, quia hac

voluntate Deus vult omnes salvos fieri,

ut dicitur I Timoth., II, 4, et sicsequeretur quod omnes homines essent

praedestinati, relinquitur igitur quodincludat voluntatem consequentem. Sed

voluntas consequens, ut dicitDamascenus, est ex nostra causa, scilicet

inquantum nos diversimode nos

habemus ad merendam salutem veldamnationem. Ergo merita nostra

praescita a Deo, sunt causa

praedestinationis.

2. Predestination includes God‟s will to save men.

It cannot be said that it includes only Hisantecedent will, because, according to this will — as

is said in the first Epistle to Timothy (2:4): “God

wills all men to be saved”; hence, it would follow

that all are predestined. It remains, therefore, that predestination includes only His consequent will.

Now, “We are the cause,” as Damascene says, “ofGod‟s consequent will,” according as we merit

salvation or deserve damnation. Our meritsforeknown by God are therefore the cause of

predestination.

Praeterea, praedestinatio principaliter

dicitur propositum divinum de salutehumana. Sed salutis humanae causa est

humanum meritum; scientia etiam causa

et ratio est voluntatis, quia appetibilescitum voluntatem movet. Ergo

praescientia meritorum causa est

praedestinationis, cum duo eorum quae praescientia continet, sint causa illorum

duorum quae in praedestinatione

continentur.

3. Predestination means primarily God‟s will with

respect to man‟s salvation. But men‟s merits are thecause of their salvation. Moreover, knowledge

causes and specifies the act of the will, since that

which moves the will is a desirable thing which isknown. Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is a

cause of predestination, since two of the things

which foreknowledge contains cause the two thingscontained in predestination.

Praeterea, reprobatio et praedestinatio

significant divinam essentiam, etconnotant effectum; in essentia autem

divina non est aliqua diversitas. Ergo

tota diversitas praedestinationis etreprobationis ex effectibus procedit.

Effectus autem sunt considerati, ex parte

4. Reprobation and predestination signify the divine

essence while connoting an effect. There is nodiversity, however, in the divine essence.

Consequently, the difference between

predestination and reprobation comes entirely fromtheir effects. Now, effects are considered as caused

by us. It is due to us, as cause, therefore, that the



nostra. Ergo ex parte nostra causa est

quod praedestinati a reprobissegregantur, quod per praedestinationem

fit. Ergo idem quod prius.

predestined are segregated from the reprobate, as

takes place through predestination. Hence, the samemust be said as before.

Praeterea, sicut sol uniformiter se habet

quantum est de se, ad omnia corporailluminabilia, quamvis non omnia

possint eius lumen aequaliter participare;

ita Deus se habet aequaliter ad omniaquamvis non omnia aequaliter se habeant

ad participandum bonitatem ipsius, ut a

sanctis et philosophis communiter

dicitur. Sed propter similem habitudinemsolis ad omnia corpora, sol non est causa

huius diversitatis, quare aliquid sittenebrosum et aliquid luminosum, sed

diversa dispositio corporum adrecipiendum lumen ipsius. Ergo et

similiter causa huius diversitatis, quod

quidam perveniunt ad salutem, quidamautem damnantur, aut quod quidam

praedestinantur et quidam reprobantur,

non est ex parte Dei, sed nostra; et sic

idem quod prius.

5. Taken in itself, the sun is in the same relation to

all bodies that can be illuminated, even though all bodies cannot share its light equally. Similarly, God

is equally related to all, even though all do not

participate in His divine goodness in an equalmeasure, as the saints and philosophers say so

often. Now, since the sun is in the same relation to

all bodies, it is not the cause of the differences that

we find in these bodies, namely, that some of themare dark and others bright. This is due, rather, to

differences in the physical constitution of the bodies which affect their reception of sunlight.

Similarly, the reason for this difference, namely,that some reach salvation and others are damned, or

that some are predestined while others are rejected,

is to be found not in God but in us. Consequently,our original thesis stands.

Praeterea, bonum est communicativumsui ipsius. Ergo summi boni est summe

communicare se ipsum, secundum quod

unumquodque est capax. Si ergo alicuinon se communicat, hoc est quia illud

non est capax eius. Sed aliquis est capax

vel non capax salutis, ad quam praedestinatio ordinat, propter

qualitatem meritorum. Ergo merita

praescita sunt causa quare aliqui

praedestinantur, et aliqui non.

6. Good communicates itself. It belongs to thehighest good, therefore, to communicate itself in

the highest possible degree, that is, as much as each

and every thing is capable of receiving it.Consequently, if it does not communicate itself to

something, this is because that thing is not capable

of receiving it. Now, according to the quality of hismerits, a person is capable or not capable of

receiving that salvation which predestination

ordains. Foreknowledge of merits, therefore, is the

reason wily some are predestined and others are

not.

Praeterea, Numer., III, 12: ego tuli

Levitas, etc. dicit Glossa Origenis:

Iacob, natu posterior, primogenitusiudicatus est; ex proposito enim cordis,

quod Deo patuit priusquam in hoc

7. Concerning the passage in Numbers (3:12), “1

took Levites...,” Origen writes: “Jacob, younger by

birth, was judged to be the firstborn. Because whatthey intended to do was in their hearts, and this was

clear to God before they were born or did any good



mundo nascerentur, aut aliquid agerent

boni vel mali, dictum est: Iacob dilexi,Esau autem odio habui. Sed hoc pertinet

ad praedestinationem Iacob, ut sancti

communiter exponunt. Ergo praecognitio propositi quod habiturus erat Iacob in

corde, fuit ratio praedestinationis eius; et

sic idem quod prius.

or evil, It was said of them:„Jacob have I loved,

Esau have I hated.‟” Now, this love, the saintscommonly explain, pertains to Jacob‟s

predestination. Consequently, God‟s

foreknowledge of the intention Jacob was going tohave in his heart was the reason for his

predestination. Thus, the same must be said as was

said previously.

Praeterea, praedestinatio non potest esseiniusta, cum universae viae domini sint

misericordia et veritas; nec potest ibi alia

iustitia attendi inter Deum et homines

quam distributiva; non enim cadit ibicommutativa iustitia, cum Deus, qui

bonorum nostrorum non eget, nihil anobis recipiat. Iustitia autem distributiva,

inaequalia nonnisi inaequalibus dat;inaequalitas autem non potest attendi

inter homines nisi secundum

diversitatem meritorum. Ergo, quodDeus aliquem praedestinat et alium non,

ex praescientia meritorum diversorum

procedit.

8. Predestination cannot be unjust, since the waysof the Lord are always the ways of mercy and truth.

Nor can there be any form of justice between God

and men other than distributive justice. There is no

place for commutative justice, since God, whoneeds none of our good things, receives nothing

from us. Now, distributive justice rewardsunequally only those that are unequal. But the only

cause of inequality among men is difference inmerit. Therefore, the reason why God predestines

one man and not another is that He foreknows their

different merits.

Praeterea, praedestinatio praesupponit

electionem, ut supra dictum est. Sedelectio non potest esse rationabilis, nisi

sit aliqua ratio propter quam unus ab

altero discernatur: nec in electione dequa loquimur, potest alia ratio

discretionis assignari nisi ex meritis.

Ergo, cum electio Dei irrationabilis essenon possit, ex praevisione meritorum

procedit, et per consequens etiam

praedestinatio.

9. As mentioned previously, predestination

presupposes election. But a choice cannot bereasonable unless there is some reason why one

person is to be preferred to another. Now, in the

election we are speaking about, there can be noreason for the preference other than merits.

Therefore, since God‟s choice cannot be irrational,

His election and, consequently, His predestinationalso must be caused by His foreknowledge of

merits.

Praeterea, Augustinus exponens illud

Malach., I, 2: Iacob dilexi, Esau autemodio habui, dicit, quod voluntas ista Dei

qua unum elegit, et alium reprobavit,

non potest esse iniusta; venit enim exoccultissimis meritis. Sed haec

occultissima merita non possunt accipi in

10. Commenting on that verse in the Prophecy of

Malachi (1:2-3), “I have loved Jacob, but havehated Esau,” Augustine says that “the will of God,”

by which He chose one and rejected the other

“cannot be‟ unjust, for it came from their hiddenmerits.” But the hidden merits can enter into an

intention only in so far as they are foreknown.



proposito, nisi secundum quod sunt in

praescientia. Ergo praedestinatio de praescientia meritorum venit.

Consequently, predestination comes from

foreknowledge of merits.

Praeterea, sicut se habet abusus gratiaead effectum reprobationis, ita bonus usus

gratiae ad ultimum praedestinationiseffectum. Sed abusus gratiae in Iuda fuit

ratio reprobationis eius; secundum hoc

enim reprobus effectus est quod sinegratia decessit. Quod autem tunc gratiam

non habuit, non fuit causa quia Deus ei

dare noluerit, sed quia ipse accipere

noluit, ut Anselmus dicit, et Dionysius.Ergo et bonus gratiae usus in Petro vel

alio quolibet, est causa quare ipse estelectus vel praedestinatus.

11. As the use of grace is related to the final effectof predestination so the abuse of it is related to the

effect of reprobation. Now, in the case of Judas, theabuse of grace was the reason for his reprobation,

since he was made reprobate because he died

without grace. Moreover, the fact that he did nothave grace when he died was not due to God‟s

unwillingness to give it but to his unwillingness to

accept it — as both Anselm and Dionysius point out.

Consequently, the good use of grace by Peter oranyone else is the reason why he is elected or

predestined.

Praeterea, unus potest alteri mereri primam gratiam; et eadem ratione

videtur quod possit ei mereri gratiae

continuationem usque in finem. Sed ad

gratiam finalem sequitur esse praedestinatum. Ergo praedestinatio

potest ex meritis provenire.

12. One person can merit the first grace for another.For the same reason, it seems that he could merit

for that other person a continuation of grace up to

the end. Now, if one gets final grace, he is

predestined. Consequently, predestination can becaused by merits.

Praeterea, prius est a quo non convertitur

consequentia, secundum philosophum;sed hoc modo se habet praescientia ad praedestinationem, quia omnia Deus

praescit quae praedestinat; mala autem

praescit, quae non praedestinat. Ergo praescientia est prius quam

praedestinatio. Sed prius in quolibet

ordine est causa posterioris. Ergo

praescientia est causa praedestinationis.

13. According to the Philosopher: “One thing is

said to be prior to another when the sequence oftheir being cannot be reversed.” But God‟sforeknowledge is related to predestination in this

way, because God knows beforehand what He

predestines, while He foreknows the evil which Hedoes not predestine. Foreknowledge, therefore, is

antecedent to predestination. But what is prior in

any order is the cause of what is posterior.

Consequently, foreknowledge is the cause of predestination.

Praeterea, nomen praedestinationis a

destinatione vel missione imponitur. Sedmissionem vel destinationem cognitio

praecedit: nullus enim mittit nisi quem

cognoscit. Ergo et cognitio est prior

14. The word predestination is derived

from sending or destining. But knowledge precedessending or destining, because no one can send a

person without knowing him first. Knowledge,

therefore, is prior also to predestination; hence, it



praedestinatione; et ita videtur esse causa

ipsius; et sic idem quod prius.

seems that it is the cause of predestination.

Consequently, our thesis stands.


Est quod dicitur Rom. IX, 12, in Glossa

super illud: non ex operibus, sed ex

vocante dictum est, quae sic dicit: sicut

non pro meritis praecedentibus illudfuisse dictum ostendit, scilicet Iacob

dilexi, etc., ita nec pro meritis futuris. Et

infra, super illud: numquid iniquitas est

apud Deum? Nemo dicat Deum, quiafutura opera praevidebat, alterum

elegisse, alterum reprobasse. Et sic ut

prius.

1. The Gloss on the following verse in the Epistle

to the Romans (9:12), “Not of works, but of him

who calls was it said,” reads: “He shows that the

words „I have loved Jacob, etc.,‟ were due neitherto any previous nor to any future merits.” And the

Gloss on the verse, “Is there injustice with God?”

(9:4), says: “Let no one say that God chooses one

man and rejects another because He foresaw futureworks.” Consequently, it does not seem that

foreknowledge of merits is the cause of

predestination.

Praeterea, gratia est effectus praedestinationis, est autem principium

meriti. Ergo non potest esse quod

praescientia meritorum sit praedestinationis causa.

2. Grace is the effect of predestination but the principle of merit. Hence, foreknowledge of merits

cannot possibly be the cause of predestination.

Praeterea, ad Tit., III, 5, dicit apostolus:

non ex operibus iustitiae quae fecimus

nos. Sed secundum suam misericordiamet cetera. Ergo praedestinatio salutis

humanae non provenit ex praescientia

meritorum.

3. In the Epistle to Titus (3:5), the Apostle says:

“Not by the works of justice which we have done

but according to his mercy...” Predestination ofone‟s salvation, therefore, does not arise from

foreknowledge of merits.

Praeterea, si praescientia meritorumesset praedestinationis causa, nullusesset praedestinatus qui non esset merita

habiturus. Sed aliqui sunt huiusmodi,

sicut patet de pueris. Ergo praescientia

meritorum non est praedestinationis

causa.

4. If foreknowledge of merits were the cause of predestination, then no one would be predestinedwho did not merit. But some predestined never

merit, as is evidently the case of children.

Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is not the

cause of predestination.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod hoc distat inter causam

et effectum, quod quidquid est causa

There is this difference between a cause and an

effect — that whatever is the cause of the cause must



causae, oportet esse causam effectus;

non autem quod est causa effectus,oportet quod sit causa causae; sicut patet

quod causa prima per causam secundam

producit effectum suum, et sic causasecunda causat aliquo modo effectum

causae primae; cuius tamen causae causa

non est.

be the cause of the effect, but the cause of the effect

is not necessarily the cause of the cause. It isevident, for example, that the first cause produces

its effect through a second cause, and so the second

cause, in some way, causes the effect of the firstcause, although it is not the cause of the first cause.

In praedestinatione autem est duoaccipere; scilicet ipsam

praedestinationem aeternam, et effectum

eius temporalem duplicem, scilicet

gratiam et gloriam: quorum alter habetcausam meritoriam actum humanum,

scilicet gloria; sed gratiae causa non potest esse humanus actus per modum

meriti, sed sicut dispositio materialisquaedam, inquantum per actus

praeparamur ad gratiae susceptionem.

Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod actusnostri, sive gratiam praecedant, sive

sequantur, sint ipsius praedestinationis

causa.

Now, we must distinguish two aspects of predestination, the eternal predestination itself and

its twofold temporal effect, grace and glory. Glory

has human acts as its meritorious cause, but grace

cannot have human acts as its meritorious cause;human acts can act only as a certain material

disposition to grace, inasmuch as through these actsmen are prepared for the acceptance of it. It does

not follow from this, however, that our acts,whether they precede or follow grace, are the cause

of predestination.

Ad inveniendum autem causam

praedestinationis oportet accipere quod prius dictum est, scilicet quod

praedestinatio est quaedam directio in

finem, quam facit ratio a voluntate mota;unde secundum hoc potest aliquid esse

praedestinationis causa, prout potest esse

voluntatis motivum. Circa quodsciendum est, quod aliquid movet

voluntatem dupliciter: uno modo per

modum debiti, alio modo sine debiti

ratione. Per modum autem debiti movet

aliquid dupliciter voluntatem: uno modoabsolute, et alio modo ex suppositione

alterius. Absolute quidem ipse finisultimus, qui est voluntatis obiectum: et

hoc modo voluntatem movet, ut ab ipso

divertere non possit; unde nullus homo

potest non velle esse beatus, ut

Now, to discover the cause of predestination we

must recall what we have said previously, namely,that predestination is a certain direction to an end,

and this direction is brought about by reason,

moved by the will. Consequently, a thing can be thecause of predestination if it can move the will.

However, a thing can move the will in two ways,

first, as something due, secondly, as something notdue. Now, as something due, a thing can move the

will in two ways, namely, either absolutely or on

the supposition of something else. The ultimate

end, which is the object of the will, moves

absolutely; and it moves the will in such a fashionthat the will cannot turn away from it. For example,

as Augustine says, no man is capable of not willingto be happy. But that without which an end cannot

be had is said to move as something due “on the

supposition of something else.” If an end can be

had, however, without a certain thing which



Augustinus dicit in Lib. de libero Arbit.

Sed ex suppositione alterius movetsecundum debitum illud sine quo finis

haberi non potest. Illud autem sine quo

finis haberi potest, sed facit ad bene essefinis ipsius, non movet voluntatem

secundum debitum, sed est libera

inclinatio voluntatis in ipsum. Sed tamen

ex quo voluntas libere inclinata est iamin ipsum, inclinatur in omnia sine quibus

hoc haberi non potest, per modum debiti,

ex praesuppositione tamen illius quod

primo volitum ponebatur: sicut rex exsua liberalitate facit aliquem militem;

sed quia non potest esse miles nisi

habeat equum, efficitur debitum et

necessarium ex suppositione liberalitatis praedictae quod ei det equum.

contributes merely to the well-being of the end,

then that thing does not move the will as somethingdue. In this case, the will inclines to it freely; but

when the will is already inclined to it freely, the

will is thereby inclined to all the things withoutwhich it cannot be had, as to things that are due on

the supposition of that which was first willed. For

example, out of liberality a king makes a person a

soldier; but, because one cannot be a soldierwithout a horse, on the supposition of the afore-

mentioned liberality, giving the soldier a horse

becomes due and necessary.

Finis autem divinae voluntatis est ipsa

eius bonitas, quae non dependet abaliquo alio; unde ad hoc quod habeatur a

Deo, nullo alio indiget; et ideo voluntas

eius non inclinatur ad aliquid primo

faciendum per modum alicuius debiti,sed liberaliter tantum, in quantum sua

bonitas in eius opere manifestatur. Sedex quo supponitur quod Deus aliquidfacere velit; per modum cuiusdam debiti

ex suppositione liberalitatis ipsius

sequitur quod faciat ea sine quibus res

illa volita esse non potest; sicut si facerevult hominem, quod det ei rationem.

Ubicumque autem occurrerit aliquid sine

quo aliud a Deo volitum esse possit, hocnon procedit ab eo secundum rationem

alicuius debiti, sed secundum meram

liberalitatem. Perfectio autem gratiae etgloriae sunt huiusmodi bona quod sineeis natura esse potest, excedunt enim

naturalis virtutis limites; unde quod

Deus velit alicui dare gratiam et gloriam,hoc ex mera liberalitate procedit. In his

autem quae ex liberalitate tantum

procedunt causa volendi est ipsa

Now, the end-object of the divine will is God‟s own

goodness, which does not depend on anything else.God needs nothing to help Him possess it.

Consequently, His will is inclined first to make

something freely, not something due, inasmuch as

it is His goodness that is manifested in His works.But, supposing that God wishes to make something,

it follows as something due from the supposition ofHis liberality that He make those things alsowithout which those that He has first willed cannot

be had. For example, if He wills to make a man, He

must give him an intellect. But if there is anything

which is not necessary for that which God wills,then that thing comes from God, not as something

due, but simply as a result of His generosity. Now,

the perfection of grace and glory are goods of thiskind, because nature can exist without them

inasmuch as they surpass the limits of natural

powers. Consequently, the fact that God wishes togive grace and glory is due simply to Hisgenerosity. The reason for His willing these things

that arise simply from His generosity is the

overflowing love of His will for His end-object, inwhich the perfection of His goodness is found. The

cause of predestination, therefore, is nothing other

than God‟s goodness.



superabundans affectio volentis ad

finem, in quo attenditur perfectio bonitatis ipsius. Unde causa

praedestinationis nihil est aliud quam

bonitas Dei.

Et modo etiam praedicto potest solviquaedam controversia quae inter

quosdam versabatur: quibusdam

dicentibus omnia a Deo secundumsimplicem voluntatem procedere,

quibusdam vero asserentibus omnia

procedere a Deo secundum debitum.

Quarum opinionum utraque falsa est: prima enim tollit necessarium ordinem

qui est inter effectus divinos ad invicem;secunda autem ponit omnia a Deo

procedere secundum necessitatemnaturae. Media autem via est eligenda; ut

ponatur ea quae sunt a Deo primo volita,

procedere ab ipso secundum simplicemvoluntatem; ea vero quae ad hoc

requiruntur, procedere secundum

debitum, ex suppositione tamen: quod

debitum non ostendit Deum esse rebusdebitorem, sed suae voluntati, ad cuius

expletionem debetur id quod dicitur aDeo secundum debitum procedere.

According to these principles, a solution can befound to the controversy that has been taking place

between certain groups. Some have asserted that

everything comes from God‟s simple pleasure,while others say that everything which comes from

God is due. Both opinions are false. The former

ignores the necessary order that exists between the

things God causes, and the latter asserts thateverything arises from God because of a natural

necessity. A middle course must therefore bechosen so that it may be laid down that those things

which are first willed by God come from Hissimple pleasure, but those that are required for this

first class of things come as something due,

although on the basis of a supposition. This “debt”does not, however, make God obliged to things but

only to His own will; for what is said to come from

God as something due is due simply in order that

His will be fulfilled.


Ad primum igitur dicendum, quoddebitus gratiae usus est quiddam ad quod

divina providentia gratiam collatam

ordinat: unde non potest esse quod ipse

rectus gratiae usus praescitus sit causamovens ad gratiam dandum. Quod ergo

Ambrosius dicit: dabo illi gratiam quem

scio, ad me toto corde reversurum, nonest intelligendum quasi perfecta cordis

reversio sit inclinans voluntatem ad

dandum gratiam, sed quia gratiam datamad hoc ordinat ut aliquis ex accepta

gratia, perfecte convertatur in Deum.

1. Divine providence ordains that grace bestowed be used as it should. Consequently, it is impossible

for foreknowledge of this right use of grace to be

the cause that moves God to give grace. The words

of Ambrose, “I will give grace to him who I knowwill return to me with his whole heart,” cannot be

understood as meaning that a perfect change of

heart inclines God‟s will to give grace but that Hiswill ordains that the grace given be accepted by the

person and that he be turned completely toward

God.



Ad secundum dicendum, quod

praedestinatio includit voluntatemconsequentem, quae respicit aliquo

modo id quod est ex parte nostra, non

quidem sicut inclinans divinamvoluntatem ad volendum, sed sicut id ad

cuius productionem divina voluntas

gratiam ordinat; vel etiam sicut id quod

ad gratiam quodammodo disponit, etgloriam meretur.

2. Predestination includes God‟s consequent will,

which is related in some way to that which wecause on our part, not by inclining the divine will to

act, but by bringing about that effect for which His

will has ordained grace or by bringing about thatwhich, in a certain sense, disposes us for grace and

merits glory.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod scientia est

movens voluntatem; non autem quaelibet

scientia, sed scientia finis, quod estobiectum movens voluntatem; et ideo ex

cognitione suae bonitatis procedit quodDeus suam bonitatem amet; et ex hoc

procedit quod eam in alios diffunderevelit; non autem propter hoc sequitur

quod meritorum scientia sit causa

voluntatis, secundum quod in praedestinatione includitur.

3. While it is true that knowledge moves the will,

not every kind of knowledge does this but only

knowledge of an end; and an end is an objectmoving the will. Consequently, it is because of His

knowledge of His own goodness that God loves it;and, from this love, He wishes to pour out His

goodness upon others. But it does not thereforefollow that knowledge of merits is the cause of His

will in so far as it is included in predestination.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis

secundum diversitatem effectuum

sumatur diversa ratio attributorum

divinorum, non tamen propter hocsequitur quod effectus sint attributorum

divinorum causae: non enim hoc modo

accipiuntur rationes attributorumsecundum ea quae in nobis sunt, sicut

secundum causas, sed magis sicut

secundum signa quaedam causarum; etideo non sequitur quod ea quae ex parte

nostra sunt, sint causa quare unus

reprobetur et alius praedestinetur.

4. Although the different formal characters of

God‟s attributes are drawn from the differences in

their effects, it does not follow from this that these

effects are the cause of His attributes. For thedifferent formal characteristics of His attributes are

not derived from our qualities as though our

qualities caused them; rather, our qualities are signsthat the attributes themselves are causes.

Consequently, it does not follow that that which

comes from us is the reason why one man isreprobated and another predestined.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod

habitudinem Dei ad res possumusdupliciter considerare. Uno modo

quantum ad primam rerum

dispositionem, quae est secundumdivinam sapientiam diversos gradus in

rebus constituentem; et sic non eodem

5. We can consider God‟s relation to things in two

ways. We can consider it only with respect to thefirst disposition of things that took place according

to His divine wisdom, which established different

grades of things. If only this is considered, thenGod is not related to all things in the same way. We

can, however, consider His relation to things also



modo se habet Deus ad omnia. Alio

modo secundum quod iam rebusdispositis providet; et sic similiter se

habet ad omnia, in quantum omnibus

aequaliter dat secundum suam proportionem. Ad primam autem rerum

dispositionem pertinet totum hoc quod

dictum est a Deo procedere secundum

simplicem voluntatem, inter quae etiam praeparatio gratiae computatur.

according to the way in which He provides for

them as already disposed. If His relation to them isconsidered in this manner, then He is related to all

things in the same way, because He gives equally to

all, according to the proportion He has made. Now,all that has been said to proceed from God,

according to His will taken simply, belongs to the

first disposition of things, of which preparation for

grace is a part.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod ad bonitatem

divinam pertinet, in quantum est infinita,

ut de perfectionibus quas unaquaeque ressecundum suam naturam requirit,

unicuique largiatur, secundum quod eiusest capax; non autem requiritur hoc de

perfectionibus superadditis, inter quasest gloria et gratia; et ideo ratio non

sequitur.

6. It belongs to the divine goodness as infinite to

give from its perfections whatever the nature of

each thing requires and is capable of receiving. Butthis is not required for superabundant perfections

such as grace and glory. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod

propositum cordis Iacob praescitum aDeo, non fuit causa quare ei dare gratiam

voluit, sed fuit quoddam bonum ad quod

Deus gratiam ei dandam ordinavit. Et

ideo dicitur, quod ex proposito cordis,quod ei patuit, eum dilexit, quia scilicet

ad hoc eum dilexit ut tale propositum

cordis haberet, vel quia praevidit quod propositum cordis eius fuit ad gratiae

susceptionem dispositio.

7. God‟s foreknowledge of what lay in the heart of

Jacob was not the reason for His willing to givegrace to him. Instead, the intention in Jacob‟s heart

was a good for which God ordained the grace to be

given to him. It is for this reason that God is said to

have loved him “because his heart‟s intention wasknown by Him.” For God loved him in order that

he might have such an intention in his heart or

because He foresaw that his heart‟s intention was adisposition for the acceptance of grace.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod in illis quae

sunt secundum rationem debiti inter

aliquos distribuenda, esset contrarationem iustitiae distributivae, si

aequalibus inaequalia darentur; sed in his

quae ex liberalitate donantur, in nulloiustitiae contradicit; possum enim uni

dare, et alteri non dare, pro meae libitu

voluntatis. Huiusmodi autem est gratia;et ideo non est contra rationem iustitiae

distributivae, si Deus proponat se

8. It would be contrary to the nature of distributive

justice if things that were due to persons and were

to be distributed to them were given out unequallyto those that had equal rights. But things given out

of liberality do not come under any form of justice.

I may freely choose to give them to one person andnot to another. Now, grace belongs to this class of

things. Consequently, it is not contrary to the nature

of distributive justice if God intends to give graceto one person and not to another, and does not

consider their unequal merits.



daturum gratiam alicui, et non alteri,

nulla inaequalitate meritorumconsiderata.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod electio Deiqua unum reprobat et alterum eligit,

rationabilis est; non tamen oportet quodratio electionis sit meritum; sed ratio

electionis est divina bonitas. Ratio autem

reprobationis est in hominibus peccatumoriginale, ut Augustinus dicit, vel infuit

hoc ipsum quod est non habere debitum

ad hoc quod eis gratia conferretur.

Rationabiliter enim possum velledenegare aliquid alicui quod sibi non

debetur.

9. The election by which God chooses one man andreprobates another is reasonable. There is no reason

why merit must be the reason for His choice,however, since the reason for this is the divine

goodness. As Augustine says,” moreover, a

justifying reason for reprobation [in the present] isthe fact of original sin in man — for reprobation in

the future, the fact that mere existence gives man

no claim to grace. For I can reasonably deny

something to a person if it is not due to him.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod Magister

distinct. 41, l. I dicit illam auctoritatemesse retractatam ab August. in suo simili.

Vel si debeat sustineri, referendum est ad

effectum reprobationis et

praedestinationis, qui habet aliquamcausam vel meritoriam vel dispositivam.

10. Peter Lombard says that Augustine retracted

that statement in a similar passage. But, if it must be sustained, then it should be taken as referring to

the effect of reprobation and of predestination,

which has a meritorious or disposing cause.

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod

praescientia abusus gratiae, non fuit

causa reprobationis in Iuda, nisi forte ex parte effectus, quamvis Deus nullivolenti accipere gratiam eam deneget;

sed hoc ipsum quod est velle accipere

gratiam, est nobis ex praedestinationedivina; unde non potest esse

praedestinationis causa.

11. God‟s foreknowledge of this abuse of grace was

not the reason why Judas was reprobated, unless we

are considering only the consequences of thisabuse — though it is true that God denies grace to noone who is willing to accept it. Now, the very fact

that we are willing to accept grace comes to us

through God‟s predestination. Hence, ourwillingness cannot be a cause of predestination.

Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod

quamvis meritum possit esse causaeffectus praedestinationis, non tamen

potest esse praedestinationis causa.

12. Although merit can be the cause of the effect of

predestination, it cannot be the cause of predestination itself.

Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod

licet illud a quo non convertiturconsequentia, sit aliquo modo prius, non

13. Although that with which the consequent

cannot be interchanged is prior in some way, it doesnot always follow that it is prior as a cause is said



tamen sequitur quod semper sit eo modo

prius quo causa prius dicitur, sic enimcoloratum esset causa hominis; et

propter hoc non sequitur quod

praescientia sit causa praedestinationis.

to be prior; for, if this were true, then to be colored

would be the cause of being a man. Consequently,it does not follow that foreknowledge is the cause

of predestination.

Et per hoc patet solutio ad ultimum. 14. The answer to this difficulty is clear from ourlast response.

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Is predestination certain?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, aa. 6-7; I Sent., 40, 3; Quodl., XI, 3, 3; XII, 3, 3; De rationibus fidei, c.10(P. 16:96a); C.G., III, cc. 94, 162-63. See also readings given for q. 5, a. 5.]

Tertio quaeritur de certitudine

praedestinationisDifficulties

Et videtur quod certitudinem non

habeat.

It seems that it has no certitude, for

Nulla enim causa cuius effectus variari potest habet certitudinem respectu

effectus sui. Sed effectus

praedestinationis potest variari, quia illequi est praedestinatus, potest non

consequi praedestinationis effectum;

quod patet ex hoc quod Augustinusdicit, exponens illud quod habetur

Apocal., III, 11: tene quod habes ne

alius accipiat etc.: si, inquit, alius non

est accepturus nisi iste perdiderit, certusest electorum numerus. Ex quo videtur

quod unus possit amittere, et alius

accipere coronam, quae est

praedestinationis effectus.

1. No cause whose effects can vary can be certain ofits effects. But the effects of predestination can

vary, for one who is predestined may not attain the

effect of his predestination. This is clear from thecommentary of Augustine on the words of the

Apocalypse (3:1 1), “Hold fast that which thou hast,

that no man take...” in which he says: “If one personwill not receive glory unless another loses it, then

the number of the elect is certain.”‟ Now, from this

it seems that one could lose and another receive the

crown of glory, which is the effect of predestination.

Praeterea, sicut res naturales subduntur

divinae providentiae, ita et res humanae.

2. Human affairs fall under God‟s providence as

things in nature do. But, according to the ordering



Sed illi soli effectus naturales

certitudinaliter ex suis causis proceduntsecundum ordinem divinae providentiae,

quos necessario causae suae producunt.

Cum igitur effectus praedestinationis,qui est salus humana, non necessario,

sed contingenter ex causis proximis

eveniat, videtur quod ordo

praedestinationis non sit certus.

of God‟s providence, only those natural effects that

are produced necessarily by their causes proceedfrom them with certainty. Now, since the effect of

predestination, man‟s salvation, arises not

necessarily but contingently from its proximatecauses, it seems that the ordering of predestination

is not certain.

Praeterea, si aliqua causa habet certum

ordinem ad aliquem effectum, effectus

ille ex necessitate proveniet, nisi aliquid

possit resistere virtuti causae agentis;sicut dispositiones in corporibus

inferioribus inventae resistunt interdumactioni caelestium corporum, ut non

producant proprios effectus, quosnecessario producerent, nisi esset

aliquid resistens. Sed praedestinationi

divinae nihil potest resistere: voluntatienim eius quis resistit? Ut dicitur Rom.

IX, 19. Ergo si habet certum ordinem ad

effectum suum, effectus eius necessario

producetur.

3. If a cause has certitude with respect to some

effect, that effect will necessarily follow unless

there is something that can resist the power of the

agent. For example, dispositions in bodies here below are sometimes found to resist the action of

celestial bodies; and, as a consequence, thesecelestial bodies do not produce their characteristic

effects, which they would produce were there notsomething resisting them. But nothing can resist

divine predestination, because, as we read in the

Epistle to the Romans (9:19): “Who resists hiswill?” Therefore, if divine predestination is ordered

with certitude to its effect, its effect will necessarily

be produced.

Sed dicebat, quod certitudo praedestinationis ad effectum, est cum

praesuppositione causae secundae. —

Sed contra, omnis certitudo quae estcum suppositione alicuius, non est

certitudo absoluta, sed conditionalis;

sicut non est certum quod sol causetfructum in planta, nisi cum hac

conditione, si virtus generativa in planta

fuerit bene disposita, propter hoc quod

certitudo solis ad effectum praedictum

praesupponit plantae virtutem quasicausam secundam. Si igitur certitudo

divinae praedestinationis sit cum praesuppositione secundae causae, non

erit certitudo absoluta, sed conditionalis

tantum; sicut in me est certitudo quod

Socrates movetur si currit, et quod iste

4. The answer was given that the certitude which predestination has of its effect presupposes the

second cause. — On the contrary, any certitude based

on the supposition of something is not absolute butconditional certitude. For example, it is not certain

that the sun will cause a plant to bear fruit unless the

generative power of the plant is in a favorablecondition; and, because of this, the certitude of the

sun‟s producing this effect presupposes the power

of the plant as though the latter were a second

cause. Consequently, if the certitude of divine

predestination includes the presupposition of asecond cause, that certitude will not be absolute but

merely conditional — like the certitude I have thatSocrates is moving if he runs, and that he will be

saved if he prepares himself. Therefore, God will

have no more certitude about those who are to be

saved than I have. But this is absurd.



salvabitur, si praeparabit se; et ita non

erit in divina praedestinatione aliacertitudo de salvandis quam apud me;

quod est absurdum.

Praeterea, Iob XXXIII, 24, dicitur:

conteret multos et innumerabiles, etstare faciet alios pro eis: quod exponens

Gregorius dicit: locum vitae, aliis

cadentibus, alii sortiuntur. Sed locusvitae est ad quem praedestinatio ordinat.

Ergo a praedestinationis effectu

praedestinatus deficere potest; et sic non

est certa praedestinatio.

5. We read in Job (34:24): “He shall break in pieces

many and innumerable, and shall make others tostand in their stead.” In explanation of this passage,

Gregory writes: “Some fall from the place of life,

while others are given it.” Now, the place of life isthat place to which men are ordained by

predestination. Hence, one who is predestined can

fall short of the effect of predestination; therefore,

predestination is not certain.

Praeterea, secundum Anselmum, eademest veritas praedestinationis et

propositionis de futuro. Sed propositio

de futuro non habet veritatem certam etdeterminatam, sed variari potest, ut patet

per philosophum in Lib. Periher., et in II

Perigeneseos, ubi dicit, quod futurus

quis incedere, non incedet. Ergo necveritas praedestinationis certitudinem

habet.

6. According to Anselm, predestination has thesame kind of truth that a proposition about the

future has. But a proposition about the future does

not have certain and determinate truth. Such a proposition is open to correction — as is clear from

that passage in Aristotle where he says: “One about

to walk may not walk.” Similarly, therefore, the

truth that predestination has does not possesscertitude.

Praeterea, aliquis praedestinatus

quandoque est in peccato mortali, sicut patet de Paulo, quando Ecclesiam persequebatur. Potest autem in peccato

mortali perseverare usque ad mortem,

vel tunc statim tunc interfici; quorumutrolibet posito, praedestinatio effectum

suum non consequetur. Ergo possibile

est praedestinationem non consequi

effectum suum.

7. Sometimes one who is predestined is in mortal

sin. This was clearly true of Paul when he was persecuting the Church. Now, he can stay in mortalsin until death or be killed immediately. If either

happens, predestination will not obtain its effect.

Therefore, it is possible for predestination not toobtain its effect.

Sed dicebat, quod cum dicitur

praedestinatus potest in peccato mortali

mori, si accipiatur subiectum prout statsub forma praedestinationis, sic est

composita, et falsa; si autem accipiatur

prout consideratur sine tali forma, sic est

8. But it was said that, when it is stated that one

predestined may possibly die in the state of sin, the

proposition is taken compositely and so is false; forits subject is taken as simultaneously having the

determination predestined. But if its subject is taken

without this determination, then the proposition is



divisa, et vera.- Sed contra, in formis

illis quae non possunt removeri asubiecto, non differt utrum aliquid

attribuatur subiecto sub forma

considerato, vel sine forma; utroqueenim modo haec est falsa: corvus niger

potest esse albus. Sed praedestinatio est

talis forma quae non potest a

praedestinato removeri. Ergo praedictadistinctio in proposito locum non habet.

taken in a divided sense and is true. — On the

contrary, with those forms which cannot beremoved from the subject, it does not matter

whether a thing is attributed to the subject with

those qualifying determinations or without them.For example, taken either way, the following

proposition is false: “A black crow can be white.”

Now, predestination is the kind of form that cannot

be removed from the one predestined. In the matterat hand, therefore, there is no room for the afore-

mentioned distinction.

Praeterea, si aeternum coniungatur

temporali et contingenti, totum erittemporale et contingens: sicut patet de

creatione, quae est temporalis, quamvisclaudat in sua ratione essentiam Dei

aeternam et effectum temporalem; etsimiliter missio, quae importat

processionem aeternam et effectum

temporalem. Sed praedestinatio,quamvis importet aliquid aeternum,

tamen importat etiam cum hoc effectum

temporalem. Ergo totum hoc quod est

praedestinatio, est temporale etcontingens; et ita non videtur

certitudinem habere.

9. If what is eternal be joined to what is temporal

and contingent, then the whole is temporal andcontingent. Thus, it is clear that creation is

temporal, even though its notion includes God‟seternal essence as well as a temporal effect. The

same is true of a divine mission, which implies aneternal procession and a temporal effect. Now, even

though predestination implies something eternal, it

also implies a temporal effect. Therefore, predestination as a whole is temporal and contingent

and, consequently, does not seem to have certitude.

Praeterea, quod potest esse et non esse,

non habet aliquam certitudinem. Sed praedestinatio Dei de salute alicuius

potest esse et non esse; sicut enim potuit

ab aeterno praedestinare et non praedestinare, ita et nunc potest

praedestinasse et non praedestinasse;

cum in aeternitate non differant

praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Ergo

praedestinatio non habet certitudinem.

10. What can be or not be cannot have any

certitude. But the fact that God predestines tosalvation can be or not be. For just as He can, from

all eternity, predestine and not predestine, so even

now He can predestine and not predestine, since present, past, and future do not differ in eternity.

Consequently, predestination cannot have any

certitude.


Est quod dicitur Roman. VIII, 29: quos

praescivit et praedestinavit, et cetera.

1. In explanation of that verse in the Epistle to the

Romans (8:29), “Whom he foreknew, he also



Glossa: praedestinatio est praescientia et

praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quacertissime liberantur quicumque

liberantur.

predestined,” the Gloss says: “Predestination is the

foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits ofGod by which whoever are freed are most certainly

freed.”

Praeterea, illud cuius est immobilis

veritas, oportet esse certum. Sed veritas praedestinationis est immobilis, ut

Augustinus dicit in Lib. de

praedestinatione sanctorum. Ergo praedestinatio habet certitudinem.

2. If the truth of a thing is unshakable, it must be

certain. But, as Augustine says: “The truth of predestination is unshakable.” Therefore,

predestination is certain.

Praeterea, cuicumque convenit praedestinatio, ab aeterno ei convenit.

Sed quod est ab aeterno, invariabile est.

Ergo praedestinatio est invariabilis, etita certa.

3. Whoever is predestined has this predestinationfrom all eternity. But what exists from all eternity

cannot be changed. Predestination, therefore, is

unchangeable and, consequently, certain.

Praeterea, praedestinatio includit

praescientiam, ut patet ex Glossa

inducta; sed praescientia habetcertitudinem, ut probat Boetius in V de

Consolat. Ergo et praedestinatio.

4. As is clear from the Gloss mentioned above,

predestination includes foreknowledge. But, as

Boethius has proved, foreknowledge is certain.Therefore, predestination is also certain.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod duplex est certitudo:

scilicet cognitionis, et ordinis.Cognitionis quidem certitudo est,

quando cognitio non declinat in aliquo

ab eo quod in re invenitur, sed hocmodo existimat de ea sicut est; et quiacerta existimatio de re praecipue habetur

per causam rei, ideo tractum est nomen

certitudinis ad ordinem causae ad

effectum, ut dicatur ordo causae ad

effectum esse certus, quando causainfallibiliter effectum producit.

Praescientia ergo Dei, quia non importatuniversaliter habitudinem causae

respectu omnium quorum est, non

consideratur in ea nisi certitudocognitionis tantum; sed praedestinatio,

There are two kinds of certitude: certitude of

knowledge and certitude of ordination. Now,certitude of knowledge is had when one‟s

knowledge does not deviate in any way from reality,

and, consequently, when it judges about a thing as itis. But because a judgment which will be certainabout a thing is had especially from its causes, the

word certitudehas been transferred to the relation

that a cause has to its effect; therefore, the relation

of a cause to an effect is said to be certain when the

cause infallibly produces its effect. Consequently,since God‟s foreknowledge does not imply, in all

cases, a relation of a cause to all the things whichare its objects, it is considered to have only the

certitude of knowledge. But His predestination adds

another element, because it includes not only Hisforeknowledge but also the relation of a cause to its



quia praescientiam includit, et

habitudinem causae ad ea, quorum est,addit, inquantum est directio sive

praeparatio quaedam; sic potest in ea

considerari supra certitudinemcognitionis, certitudo ordinis; de qua

solum certitudine praedestinationis nunc

quaerimus: de certitudine enim

cognitionis, in ipsa inventa, patere potest ex his quae dicta sunt, cum de

scientia Dei quaereretur.

objects, since predestination is a kind of direction or

preparation. Thus, not only the certitude ofknowledge, but also the certitude of ordination is

contained in predestination. Now we are concerned

only with the certitude of predestination; thecertitude of knowledge, found also in

predestination, has been explained in our

investigation of God‟s knowledge.

Sciendum est autem, quod, cum

praedestinatio sit quaedam providentiae pars, sicut secundum suam rationem

supra providentiam addit, sic etiam etcertitudo eius supra certitudinem

providentiae. Ordo enim providentiaedupliciter certus invenitur. Uno modo in

particulari; quando scilicet res quae a

divina providentia in finem aliquemordinantur, absque defectu ad finem

illum particularem deveniunt; sicut patet

in motibus caelestibus, et in omnibus

quae necessario aguntur in natura. Aliomodo in universali sed non in

particulari; sicut videmus ingenerabilibus et corruptibilibus, quorumvirtutes quandoque deficiunt a propriis

effectibus, ad quos sunt ordinatae sicut

ad proprios fines, sicut virtus formativa

quandoque deficit a perfectaconsummatione membrorum; sed tamen

ipse defectus divinitus ordinatur ad

aliquem finem, ut patet ex dictis, dumde providentia ageretur; et sic nihil

potest deficere a generali fine

providentiae, quamvis quandoquedeficiat ab aliquo particulari fine.

It should be known that, since predestination is a

particular type of providence, not only its notionadds something to providence, but also its certitude

adds something to the certitude of providence. Now,the ordering of providence is found to be certain in

two respects. First, it is certain with relation to a particular thing, when God‟s providence ordains

things to some particular end, and they attain that

end without failure. This is evident in the motionsof celestial spheres and in all things in nature that

act necessarily. Second, providence is certain in

relation to things in general, but not in particular.

For example, we see that the power of beingscapable of generation and corruption sometimes

falls short of the proper effects to which it has beenordered as its proper ends. Thus, the power thatshapes bodies sometimes falls short of forming

members completely. Yet, as we saw above when

treating providence, these very defects arc directed

by God to some end. Consequently, nothing can failto attain the general end of providence, even though

it may at times fall short of a particular end.

Sed ordo praedestinationis est certus

non solum respectu universalis finis, sed

etiam respectu particularis et

determinati, quia ille qui est ordinatus

The ordering of predestination, however, is certain,

not only with respect to its general end, but also

with respect to a particular and determinate end. For

one who is ordained to salvation by predestination



per praedestinationem ad salutem,

nunquam deficit a consecutione salutis. Nec tamen hoc modo est certus ordo

praedestinationis respectu particularis

finis, sicut erat ordo providentiae: quiain providentia ordo non erat certus

respectu particularis finis, nisi quando

causa proxima necessario producebat

effectum suum; in praedestinationeautem invenitur certitudo respectu

singularis finis; et tamen causa proxima,

scilicet liberum arbitrium, non producit

effectum illum nisi contingenter.

never fails to obtain it. Moreover, the ordering of

predestination is not certain with reference to a particular end in the way in which the ordering of

providence is; for, in providence, the ordering is not

certain with respect to a particular end unless the proximate cause necessarily produces its effect. In

predestination, however, there is certitude with

respect to an individual end even though the

proximate cause, free choice, does not produce thateffect except in a contingent manner.

Unde difficile videtur concordare

infallibilitatem praedestinationis cumarbitrii libertate. Non enim potest dici

quod praedestinatio supra certitudinem providentiae nihil aliud addat nisi

certitudinem praescientiae; ut scilicet

dicatur, quod Deus ordinat praedestinatum ad salutem, sicut et

quemlibet alium; sed cum hoc de

praedestinato scit, quod non deficiet a

salute. Sic enim non diceretur praedestinatus differre a non

praedestinato ex parte ordinis, sedtantum ex parte praescientiae eventus; etsic praescientia esset causa

praedestinationis, nec praedestinatio

esset per electionem praedestinantis;

quod est contra auctoritatem Scripturaeet dicta sanctorum. Unde etiam praeter

certitudinem praescientiae ipse ordo

praedestinationis habet infallibilemcertitudinem; nec tamen causa proxima

salutis ordinatur ad eam necessario, sed

contingenter, scilicet liberum arbitrium.

Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the infallibility

of predestination with freedom of choice; for wecannot say that predestination adds nothing to the

certitude of providence except the certitude offoreknowledge, because this would be to say that

God orders one who is predestined to his salvation

as He orders any other person, with this difference,that, in the case of the predestined, God knows he

will not fail to be saved. According to this position,

one predestined would not differ in ordination from

one not predestined; he would differ only withrespect to [God‟s] forek nowledge of the outcome.

Consequently, foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take place by the choice of Him who predestines. This,

however, is contrary to the authority of the

Scriptures” and the sayings of the saints. Thus, the

ordering of predestination has an infallible certitudeof its own — over and above the certitude of

foreknowledge. Nevertheless, the proximate cause

of salvation, free choice, is related to predestinationcontingently, not necessarily.

Quod hoc modo potest considerari.Invenimus enim ordinem infallibilem

esse respectu alicuius dupliciter. Uno

modo inquantum una causa singularis

necessario inducit effectum suum ex

This can be considered in the following manner. Wefind that an ordering is infallible in regard to

something in two ways. First, an individual cause

necessarily brings about its own effect because of

the ordering of divine providence. Secondly, a



ordine divinae providentiae; alio modo

quando ex concursu multarum causarumcontingentium, et deficere possibilium,

pervenitur ad unum effectum; quarum

unamquamque Deus ordinat adconsecutionem effectus loco eius quae

defecit, vel ne altera deficiat; sicut

videmus quod omnia singularia unius

speciei sunt corruptibilia, et tamen persuccessionem unius ad alterum potest

secundum naturam in eis salvari

perpetuitas speciei, divina providentia

taliter gubernante, quod non omniadeficiant uno deficiente:

single effect may be attained only as the result of

the convergence of many contingent causesindividually capable of failure; but each one of

these causes has been ordained by God either to

bring about that effect itself if another cause shouldfail or to prevent that other cause from failing. We

see, for example, that all the individual members of

a species are corruptible. Yet, from the fact that one

succeeds another, the nature of the species can bekept in existence; and this is how God keeps the

species from extinction, despite the fact that the

individual perishes.

et hoc modo est in praedestinatione.Liberum enim arbitrium deficere potest

a salute; tamen in eo quem Deus praedestinat, tot alia adminicula

praeparat, quod vel non cadat, vel si

cadit, quod resurgat, sicut exhortationes,suffragia orationum, gratiae donum, et

omnia huiusmodi, quibus Deus

adminiculatur homini ad salutem. Si

ergo consideremus salutem respectucausae proximae, scilicet liberi arbitrii,

non habet certitudinem, sedcontingentiam; respectu autem causae primae, quae est praedestinatio,

certitudinem habet.

A similar case is had in predestination; for, eventhough free choice can fail with respect to salvation,

God prepares so many other helps for one who is predestined that he either does not fall at all or, if he

does fall, he rises again. The helps that God gives a

man to enable him to gain salvation areexhortations, the support of prayer, the gift of grace,

and all similar things. Consequently, if we were to

consider salvation only in relation to its proximate

cause, free choice, salvation would not be certain but contingent; however, in relation to the first

cause, namely, predestination, salvation is certain.


Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod

verbum illud Apocalypsis potest intelligi

vel de corona praesentis iustitiae, vel decorona gloriae. Utrolibet autem modo

intelligatur, secundum hoc unus dicitur

accipere coronam alterius, alio cadente,inquantum bona unius alteri prosunt vel

in auxilium meriti, vel etiam in

augmentum gloriae propterconnexionem caritatis, quae facit omnia

bona membrorum Ecclesiae communia

1. The word crown as used in the Apocalypse (3:11)

may mean either the crown of present justice or the

crown of future glory. No matter which meaning istaken, however, one person is said to receive the

crown of another when that other person falls in the

sense that the goods of one person help another,either by aiding him to merit or even by increasing

his glory. The reason for this is that all the members

of the Church are connected by charity in such away that their goods are common. Consequently,

one receives the crown of another when that other



esse; et ita contingit quod unus coronam

alterius accipit, dum, aliquo per peccatum cadente et ita suorum

meritorum praemium non consequente,

alius fructum percipit de meritis quaeille habuit, sicut etiam percepisset alio

persistente. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod

praedestinatio umquam cassetur.

falls through sin and does not achieve the reward of

his merits; and another person receives the fruits ofthe sinner‟s merits, just as he would have benefited

from the sinner‟s merits had the latter persevered.

From this, however, it does not follow that predestination is ever in vain.

Vel potest dici, quod unus coronamalterius accipere dicitur, non quod

aliquis amittat coronam quae est ei

praedestinata, sed quia quandoque

aliquis amittit coronam sibi debitamsecundum praesentem iustitiam, et in

locum eius alius substituitur adcomplendum numerum electorum, sicut

in locum Angelorum cadentium sunthomines substituti.

Or it can be answered that one is said to receive thecrown of another, not because the other lost a crown

that was predestined for him, but because whenever

a person loses the crown that was due to him

because of the justice he possessed, another personis substituted in his place to make up the number of

the elect — just as men have been substituted to takethe place of the fallen angels.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod effectus

naturalis qui ex divina providentia

infallibiliter evenit, consequitur ex unacausa proxima in effectum necessario

ordinata; ordo autem praedestinationis

non est certus per hunc modum, sed per

alium, ut dictum est.

2. A natural effect issuing infallibly from God‟s

providence takes place because of one proximate

cause necessarily ordered to the effect. The orderingof predestination, however, is not made certain in

this manner but in the manner described above.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpuscaeleste agit in haec inferiora

necessitatem quasi inducens, quantum

est de se; et ideo effectus eius necessario provenit, nisi sit aliquid resistens. Sed

Deus agit in voluntate non per modum

necessitatis, quia voluntatem non cogit,

sed movet eam non auferendo ei modumsuum, qui in libertate ad utrumlibet

consistit: et ideo, quamvis nihil divinae

voluntati resistat, tamen voluntas, etquaelibet alia res, exequitur divinam

voluntatem secundum modum suum,

quia et ipsum modum divina voluntasrebus dedit, ut sic eius voluntas

impleretur; et ideo quaedam explent

3. A celestial body, taken in itself, imposes a kind ofdeterminism in its action on bodies here below.

Consequently, its effect necessarily takes place,

unless something resists it. But God does not act onthe will in the manner of one necessitating; for He

does not force the will but merely moves it, without

taking away its own proper mode, which consists in

being free with respect to opposites. Consequently,even though nothing can resist the divine will, our

will, like everything else, carries out the divine will

according to its own proper mode. Indeed, thedivine will has given things their mode of being in

order that His will be fulfilled. Therefore, some

things fulfill the divine will necessarily, otherthings, contingently; but that which God wills

always takes place.



divinam voluntatem necessario,

quaedam vero contingenter, quamvisillud quod Deus vult, semper fiat.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod causasecunda, quam oportet supponere ad

inducendum praedestinationis effectum,etiam ordini praedestinationis subiacet;

non autem est ita in virtutibus

inferioribus respectu alicuius virtutissuperioris agentis. Et ideo ordo divinae

praedestinationis, quamvis sit cum

suppositione voluntatis humanae,

nihilominus tamen absolutamcertitudinem habet, etsi contrarium in

exemplo inducto appareat.

4. The second cause, which we must suppose as prerequisite for obtaining the effect of

predestination, lies also under the ordering of predestination. The relationship between lower

powers and the power of a superior agent is not one

of predestination. Consequently, even though theordering of God‟s predestination includes the

supposition of a human will, it nevertheless has

absolute certitude, despite the fact that the example

given points to the contrary.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod verba illa

Iob et Gregorii sunt referenda ad statum praesentis iustitiae, a quo aliqui

quandoque decidunt, aliis subrogatis;

unde per hoc non potest concludi aliquid

incertitudinis circa praedestinationemquia illi qui finaliter a gratia deficiunt,

nunquam praedestinati fuerunt.

5. Those words of Job and Gregory should be

referred to the state of present justice. If some fallfrom it, others are chosen in their place. From this,

therefore, we cannot conclude to any uncertainty

with reference to predestination; for those who fall

from grace at the end were never predestined at all.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudo

Anselmi quantum ad hoc tenet, quod,sicut veritas propositionis de futuro nonaufert futuro contingentiam, ita nec

veritas praedestinationis; sed differt

quantum ad hoc, quod propositio defuturo respicit futurum ut futurum est, et

hoc modo non potest habere

certitudinem; sed veritas praescientiae et

praedestinationis respicit futurum ut est praesens, ut in quaest. de scientia Dei

dictum est; et ideo certitudinem habet.

6. The comparison Anselm makes holds good in this

respect, that just as the truth of a proposition aboutthe future does not remove contingency from afuture event, so also the truth of predestination

[does not take away the contingency of

predestination]. But, in another respect, thecomparison is weak. For a proposition about the

future is related to the future in so far as it is future,

and, under this aspect, it cannot be certain. As we

pointed out previously, however, the truth of predestination and foreknowledge is related to the

future as present, and, consequently, is certain.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod aliquid potest dici posse dupliciter. Uno modo

considerando potentiam quae in ipso est,

sicut dicitur quod lapis potest moveri

7. A thing can be said to be possible in two ways.First, we may consider the potency that exists in the

thing itself, as when we say that a stone can be

moved downwards. Or we may consider the



deorsum. Alio modo considerando id

quod ex parte alterius est, sicut sidicerem, quod lapis potest moveri

sursum, non per potentiam quae in ipso

sit, sed per potentiam proiicientis.

potency that exists in another thing, as when we say

that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a potency existing in the stone, but by a potency

existing in the one who hurls it.

Cum ergo dicitur: praedestinatus iste potest in peccato mori; si consideretur

potentia ipsius, verum est; si autem

loquamur de praedestinato secundumordinem quem habet ad aliud, scilicet ad

Deum praedestinantem, sic ordo ille non

compatitur secum istum eventum,

quamvis compatiatur secum istam potentiam. Et ideo potest distingui

secundum distinctionem prius inductam,scilicet cum forma, vel sine forma

consideratio subiecti.

Consequently, when we say: “That predestined person can possibly die in sin,” the statement is true

if we consider only the potency that exists in him.

But, if we are speaking of this predestined personaccording to the ordering which he has to another,

namely, to God, who is predestining him, that event

is incompatible with this ordering, even though it is

compatible with the person‟s own power. Hence, wecan use the distinction given above; that is, we can

consider the subject with this form or without it.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod nigredo et

albedo sunt quaedam formae existentes

in subiecto, quod dicitur album vel

nigrum; et ideo non potest aliquidattribui subiecto nec secundum

potentiam nec secundum actum, quod

repugnet formae praedictae, quamdiu in

subiecto manet. Sed praedestinatio nonest forma existens in praedestinato, sed

in praedestinante, sicut et scitum

denominatur a scientia quae est insciente; et ideo quantumcumque

immobiliter stet sub ordine scientiae,

tamen potest ei aliquid attribuiconsiderando suam naturam, etsi etiam

repugnet ordini praedestinationis. Hoc

enim modo praedestinatio est aliquid

praeter ipsum hominem qui dicitur

praedestinatus, sicut nigredo est aliquid praeter essentiam corvi, quamvis non sit

aliquid extra corvum; considerandoautem tantummodo essentiam corvi,

potest aliquid ei attribui quod repugnat

nigredini eius; secundum quem modum

dicit Porphyrius, quod potest intelligi

8. Blackness and whiteness are, in a sense,

examples of forms that exist in a subject said to be

white or black. Consequently, nothing can be

attributed to the subject, either according to potencyor according to act, as long as blackness remains, if

it is repugnant to this form of blackness.

Predestination, however, is a form that exists, not in

the person predestined, but in the one predestining, just as the known gets its, name from knowledge in

the knower. Consequently, no matter how fixed

predestination may remain in the order ofknowledge, yet, if we consider only the nature [of

the predestined], we can attribute something to it

which is repugnant to the ordering of predestination.For, considered this way, predestination is

something other than the man who is said to be

predestined, just as blackness is something other

than the essence of a crow, even though it is not

something outside the crow, but, by consideringonly the essence of a crow, one can attribute to it

something that is repugnant to its blackness. For thisreason, as Porphyry says, one can think of a white

crow. Similarly, in the problem being discussed,

one can attribute something to a predestined person

taken in himself which cannot be attributed to him



corvus albus. Et ita etiam in proposito

potest ipsi homini praedestinato attribuialiquid secundum se considerato, quod

non attribuitur ei secundum quod

intelligitur stare sub praedestinatione.

in so far as he is predestined.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod creatio etmissio, et huiusmodi, important

productionem alicuius temporalis

effectus, et ideo ponunt temporalemeffectum esse; et propter hoc oportet ea

esse temporalia, quamvis in se aliquid

aeternum claudant. Sed praedestinatio

non importat productionem alicuiuseffectus temporalis secundum suum

nomen, sed tantummodo ordinem adaliquid temporale, sicut voluntas,

potentia, et huiusmodi omnia: et ideo,quia non ponitur effectus temporalis

esse in actu, qui etiam est contingens,

non oportet quod praedestinatio sittemporalis et contingens: quia ad

aliquod temporale et contingens potest

aliquid ordinari ab aeterno et

immutabiliter.

9. Creation and mission imply the production of atemporal effect. Consequently, they affirm the

existence of a temporal effect, and so must be

temporal themselves, even though they includesomething eternal. Predestination, however, does

not imply the production of a temporal effect — as

the word itself shows — but only an ordering to

something temporal, such as will, power, and allsuch attributes also imply. Since it does not affirm

the actual existence of a temporal effect, which isalso contingent, predestination is not necessarily

temporal and contingent itself, because frometernity something can be unchangeably ordained to

a temporal and contingent effect.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod, absoluteloquendo, Deus potest unumquemque

praedestinare vel non praedestinare, aut

praedestinasse vel non praedestinasse:quia actus praedestinationis, cum

mensuretur aeternitate, nunquam cedit

in praeteritum, sicut nunquam estfuturus; unde semper consideratur ut

egrediens a voluntate per modum

libertatis. Tamen ex suppositione hoc

efficitur impossibile: non enim potest

non praedestinare cum suppositionequod praedestinaverit, vel e converso,

quia mutabilis esse non potest; et ita nonsequitur quod praedestinatio possit

variari.

10. Absolutely speaking, it is possible for God to predestine or not to predestine each and every

person, and it is possible for Him to have

predestined or not to have predestined. For, sincethe act of predestination is measured by eternity, it

never is past and never is future. Consequently, it is

always considered as issuing from His will assomething free. Because of the supposition,

however, certain things are impossible: He cannot

predestine if He has predestined, and He cannot

predestine if He has already not predestined — for

God does not change. Hence, it does not follow that predestination can change.



ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:

Is the number of predestined certain?

[ARTICLE See readings given for preceding article.]

Quarto quaeritur utrum numerus praedestinatorum sit certus

Difficulties

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for

Quia nullus numerus cui potest fieri additio, est

certus. Sed numero praedestinatorum additio

fieri potest: hoc enim petit Moyses Deuter. cap.I, 11,: dominus Deus patrum nostrorum addat

ad hunc numerum multa millia. Glossa:

definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui sunt eius.

Frustra autem peteret, nisi fieri posset. Ergonumerus praedestinatorum non est certus.

1. No number is certain if something can be

added to it. But something can be added to

the number of the predestined, becauseMoses‟ petition for such an increase is

described in Deuteronomy (1:11) where he

says: “The Lord God of your fathers add to

this number many thousands.” And the Glosscomments: “This number is fixed by God,

who knows who belong to Him.” Now,

unless such an addition were possible, Moseswould have asked in vain. Consequently, the

number of the predestined is not certain.

Praeterea, sicut dispositio naturalium bonorumest praeparatio ad gratiam, ita per gratiam praeparamur ad gloriam. Sed in quocumque est

praeparatio sufficiens ex naturalibus bonis, est

invenire gratiam. Ergo etiam in quocumque est

invenire gratiam, erit invenire gloriam. Sedaliquis non praedestinatus quandoque habet

gratiam. Ergo habebit gloriam; ergo erit

praedestinatus. Ergo aliquis non praedestinatus potest fieri praedestinatus, et sic augeri

numerus praedestinatorum; et ita non erit

certus.

2. As we are prepared for grace through thedisposition of natural perfections, so are we prepared through grace for the attainment of

glory. Now, grace is found in whomsoever

there is sufficient preparation of natural gifts.

Similarly, then, glory will be found wherevergrace is found. But one not predestined may,

at one time, possess grace. Therefore, he will

possess glory and so be predestined.Consequently, one not predestined may

become predestined. In this way, the number

of the predestined can be increased; hence, itis not certain.

Praeterea, si aliquis habens gratiam non sithabiturus gloriam: aut hoc erit propter

defectum gratiae, aut propter defectum dantis

gloriam. Non autem est ex defectu gratiae,

3. If one who has grace is not to have glory,his loss of glory will be due to a failure either

on the part of grace or on the part of the one

giving glory. However, this loss cannot be



quae, quantum est in se, sufficienter ad gloriam

disponit; nec ex defectu dantis gloriam, quiaquantum est in se, paratus est omnibus dare.

Ergo quicumque habet gratiam, de necessitate

habebit gloriam; et sic aliquis praescitushabebit gloriam; et erit praedestinatus; et sic

idem quod prius.

due to a failure on the part of grace, for, in

itself, it sufficiently disposes for glory; norcan it be due to a failure on the part of the

one giving glory, for, on His part, He is ready

to give it to all. Consequently, whoever hasgrace will necessarily have glory. Thus, one

who is foreknown [as lost] will have glory

and be predestined. Accordingly, our original

argument stands.

Praeterea, quicumque praeparat se ad gratiam

sufficienter, habet gratiam. Sed aliquis

praescitus potest se ad gratiam praeparare.

Ergo potest habere gratiam. Sed quicumquehabet gratiam, potest perseverare in illa. Ergo

praescitus potest usque ad mortem in gratia perseverare, et sic fieri praedestinatus, ut

videtur; et sic idem quod prius.

4. Whoever prepares himself sufficiently for

grace, gets grace. But one foreknown [as

lost] can prepare himself for grace.

Therefore, it is possible for him to havegrace. Whoever has grace, however, can

persevere in it. So it seems that one who isforeknown [as lost] can persevere in grace up

to the time of his death and thus become predestined. Consequently, the same must be

said as before.

Sed dicebat, quod praescitum mori sine gratia,

est necessarium necessitate conditionata,quamvis non absoluta.- Contra, omnis

necessitas carens principio et fine, et

continuata in medio, est simplex et absoluta, et

non conditionata. Sed talis est necessitas praescientiae, cum sit aeterna. Ergo est

simplex, et non conditionata.

5. It was said, however, that God‟s

foreknowledge that a man will die withoutgrace is necessary by conditional necessity,

not by absolute necessity. — On the contrary,

any necessity, which lacks a beginning and

an end, and which is without succession, isnot conditional but simple and absolute.

Now, this is the kind of necessity that the

necessity of foreknowledge is, because it iseternal. Therefore, it is simple and not

conditioned.

Praeterea, quolibet numero finito potest esse

aliquis maior. Sed numerus praedestinatorum

est finitus. Ergo eo potest esse aliquis maior:ergo non est certus.

6. A number larger than any finite number is

possible. But the number of the predestined is

finite. Therefore, a larger number is possible,and the number of the predestined is not

certain.

Praeterea, cum bonum sit communicativumsui, infinita bonitas non debet terminum ponere

suae communicationi. Sed praedestinatis divina

bonitas se maxime communicat. Ergo non est

7. Since good communicates itself, infinitegoodness should not impose a limit on its

communication. Now, the divine goodness

communicates itself to the predestined in the



eius statuere certum praedestinatorum

numerum.

highest possible degree. Therefore, it does

not belong to the divine goodness to establisha certain number of predestined.

Praeterea, sicut factio rerum est ex voluntatedivina, ita et hominum praedestinatio. Sed

Deus plura potest facere quam fecit: subestenim ei, cum voluerit, posse, ut dicitur Sap.

XII, 18. Ergo similiter non tot praedestinat

quin plures possit praedestinare; et sic idemquod prius.

8. Like the creation of things, the predestination of men depends on the divine

will. Now, God can make more things thanHe has made, because, as we read in Wisdom

(12:18): “His power is at hand when He

wills.” Similarly, He has not predestined somany men that He cannot predestine more;

and so our original argument returns.

Praeterea, quidquid Deus potuit, adhuc potest.

Sed Deus potuit ab aeterno illum praedestinare

quem non praedestinavit. Ergo modo etiam potest eum praedestinare, et sic potest fieri

additio numero praedestinatorum.

9. Whatever God was at one time able to do

He still is able to do. But from eternity God

was able to predestine one whom He did not predestine. Consequently, He is still able to

predestine him, and so an addition can be

made to the number of the predestined.

Praeterea, in omnibus potentiis quae non suntdeterminatae ad unum, quod potest esse, potest

non esse. Sed potentia praedestinantis ad

praedestinatum, et potentia praedestinati ad

consequendum praedestinationis effectum sunthuiusmodi, quia et praedestinans voluntate

praedestinat, et praedestinatus voluntate

effectum praedestinationis consequitur. Ergo praedestinatus potest esse non praedestinatus,et non praedestinatus potest esse

praedestinatus; ergo idem quod prius.

10. In the case of all powers not determinedto one course of action, what can be can also

not be. Now, the power of the one

predestining with respect to the one to be

predestined, and the power of the one predestined with respect to his obtaining the

effect of predestination, belong to this class

of powers, because the one predestining predestines by His will, and the one predestined obtains the effect of

predestination by his will. Consequently, the

predestined can be non-predestined, and thenon-predestined can be predestined. Hence,

the conclusion is the same as before.

Praeterea, Luc. V, 6, super illud: rumpebatur

autem rete eorum, dicit Glossa: in Ecclesiacircumcisionis rumpitur rete, quia non tot

intrant de Iudaeis, quot apud (Deum ad) vitam

erant praeordinati. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum potest diminui, et ita non est

certus.

11. In commentary on that verse in Luke

(5:6), “And their net broke,” the Gloss reads:“In the Church, the net of circumcision is

broken, for not as many Jews enter as were

preordained by God to life.” Consequently,since the number of the predestined can be

diminished, it is not certain.




Dicit Augustinus in libro de correctione et

gratia: certus est praedestinatorum numerus,

qui nec augeri potest nec minui.

1. Augustine says: “The number of the

predestined is certain and can neither be

increased nor diminished.”

Praeterea, Augustinus in Enchiridio, dicit:

superna Ierusalem mater nostra, civitas Dei,

nulla civium suorum numerositate fraudabitur,aut uberiori etiam copia fortasse regnabit. Sed

cives illius civitatis sunt praedestinati. Ergo

praedestinatorum numerus non potest augeri

nec minui, et ita est certus.

2. Augustine says: “The heavenly Jerusalem,

our mother, the City of God, will not be

robbed of any of the number of its citizensnor will it reign with more than the

predestined number.” Now, the citizens

mentioned are the predestined. Consequently,

the number of the predestined cannot beincreased or decreased. Hence, it is certain.

Praeterea, quicumque est praedestinatus, ab

aeterno est praedestinatus. Sed quod est ab

aeterno, est immutabile; et quod non fuit abaeterno, nunquam potest esse aeternum. Ergo

ille qui non est praedestinatus, non potest esse

praedestinatus, nec e contrario.

3. Whoever is predestined is predestined

from eternity. But what exists from eternity is

unchangeable, and what did not exist frometernity can never be eternal. Consequently,

he who is not predestined cannot be

predestined and, conversely, he who is predestined cannot be non-predestined.

Praeterea, omnes praedestinati post

resurrectionem erunt cum corporibus suis in

caelo Empyreo. Sed locus ille finitus est, cumomne corpus sit finitum: duo etiam glorificata

corpora, ut communiter dicitur, non possunt

esse simul. Ergo oportet esse determinatum

praedestinatorum numerum.

4. After the resurrection, all the predestined

will be in the highest heaven with their own

bodies. Now, that place is finite, since all bodies are finite, and, as is commonly held,

not even two glorified bodies can exist,

simultaneously [in one place]. Consequently,

the number of the predestined should bedeterminate.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod circa hanc quaestionem

quidam ita distinxerunt dicentes, quod numerus praedestinatorum certus est, si loquamur denumero numerante, sive de numero formaliter;

non autem est certus, si loquamur de numero

numerato, sive materialiter accepto; puta, sidiceretur, quod certum est esse centum

praedestinatos, non autem est certum qui

centum sint. Et istud dictum occasionem

Treating this question, some have

distinguished, saying that the number of the predestined is certain if we mean numberunderstood actively or formally, but not

certain if we mean number understood

passively or materially. For example, onecould say that it is certain that one hundred

have been predestined, but it is not certain

who these one hundred are. The occasion for



sumere videtur ex verbo Augustini supra

inducto, in quo innuere videtur quod unusamittere possit, et alius accipere

praedestinatam coronam, numero tamen

praedestinatorum nullatenus variato. Sed sihaec opinio loquatur de certitudine per

comparationem ad causam primam, scilicet

Deum praedestinantem, omnino apparet

absurda: ipse enim Deus habet certamcognitionem de numero praedestinatorum et

formali et materiali: scit enim quot et qui sint

salvandi, et utrumque infallibiliter ordinat, ut

sic, quantum ex parte Dei est, respectuutriusque numeri inveniatur certitudo non

solum cognitionis, sed etiam ordinis.

such a position seems to be the words of

Augustine mentioned previously. Augustineseems to imply that one can lose and another

receive the predestined crown without the

number of the predestined at all varying. But,if those holding this opinion are speaking

about certitude of predestination in its

relation to the first cause, that is, to God who

predestines, then the opinion is entirelyabsurd, because God Himself has definite

knowledge of the number of the predestined,

whether the number be taken formally or

materially. He knows exactly how many andwho are to be saved, and, with respect to

both, His ordination is infallible.

Consequently, with respect to both numbers,

God has certitude, not only of knowledge, but also of ordination.

Sed si loquamur de certitudine numeri

praedestinatorum per comparationem adcausam proximam salutis humanae, ad quam

praedestinatio ordinatur, non erit idem

iudicium de numero formali et materiali.

Numerus enim materialis aliquo modo subiacetvoluntati humanae, quae est variabilis,

inquantum salus uniuscuiusque est sub libertatearbitrii constituta, sicut sub causa proxima; etsic numerus materialis aliquo modo certitudine

caret. Sed numerus formalis nullo modo cadit

sub voluntate humana, eo quod nulla voluntas

se extendit per modum causalitatis alicuius adtotam integritatem numeri praedestinatorum; et

ideo numerus formalis remanet omnibus modis

certus. Et sic potest praedicta distinctiosustineri, ut tamen simpliciter concedatur, quod

uterque numerus ex parte Dei certitudinem

habet. Sciendum tamen est quod numerus praedestinatorum secundum hoc dicitur essecertus, quod additionem vel diminutionem non

patitur.

On the other hand, if we are speaking about

the certitude that can be had about thenumber of the predestined from its relation to

the proximate cause of man‟s salvation (to

which predestination is ordained), then our

judgment about the formal number and thematerial number will not be the same. For,

since the salvation of each individual has been produced through free choice as throughits proximate cause, in some way the material

number is subject to man‟s will, which is

changeable. Consequently, the material

number in some way lacks certainty. But theformal number is not determined in any

manner by man‟s will, because by no kind of

causality does the human will affect thenumber of the predestined taken as a whole.

Consequently, the formal number remains

completely certain. In this way theaforementioned distinction can be sustained,as long as we concede, without any

qualifications, that both numbers are certain

as far as God is concerned.

Secundum autem hoc pateretur additionem, si It should be noted, moreover, that the number



aliquis praescitus posset praedestinatus fieri,

quod esset contra certitudinem praescientiaevel reprobationis; secundum hoc autem posset

diminui, si aliquis praedestinatus posset effici

non praedestinatus, quod est contracertitudinem praedestinationis. Et sic patet

quod certitudo numeri praedestinatorum

colligitur ex duplici certitudine: scilicet ex

certitudine praedestinationis, et certitudine praescientiae vel reprobationis. Sed hae duae

certitudines differunt: quia certitudo

praedestinationis est certitudo cognitionis et

ordinis, ut dictum est, certitudo autem praescientiae est certitudo cognitionis tantum.

Non enim Deus praeordinat ad peccandum

homines reprobos, sicut praedestinatos ordinat

ad merendum.

of the predestined is certain in this respect,

that it cannot be increased or diminished. Thenumber could be increased if one who was

foreknown [as lost] could be predestined; but

this would be contrary to the certainty offoreknowledge or of reprobation. Again, the

number could be diminished if it were

possible for one who is predestined to

become non-predestined; but this would becontrary to the certainty of predestination.

Thus, it is clear that the certitude about the

number of the predestined is made up of two

certitudes, the certitude of predestination andthe certitude of foreknowledge or

reprobation. These two certitudes differ,

however; for, as has been said, the certitude

of predestination is the certitude ofknowledge and of direction to an end, while

the certitude of foreknowledge is merely thecertitude of knowledge. For God does not

preordain the reprobate to sin as He ordains

the predestined to merit.


Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa

est intelligenda non de numero praedestinatorum, sed de numero eorum qui

sunt in statu praesentis iustitiae; quod patet ex

interlineari, quae ibi dicit: numero et merito. Numerus autem iste et augetur et minuitur,

quamvis praefinitio Dei, qua etiam istum

numerum praediffinit, nunquam fallatur.Diffinit enim quod uno tempore sint plures et

alio pauciores; vel etiam diffinit per modum

sententiae aliquem certum numerum secundum

rationes inferiores convenientem, quae

definitio mutari potest; sed praediffinit alium per modum consilii secundum rationes

superiores; et haec praefinitio invariabilis est,quia ut dicit Gregorius: Deus mutat sententiam,

sed non consilium.

1. That quotation from Deuteronomy should

be understood as referring, not to the numberof the predestined, but to the number of those

who are in the state of present justice. This is

clear from the Interlinear Gloss, which adds:“In number and in merit.” Now, this number

of those in present justice is both increased

and diminished; but God‟s appointment,which predefines this number, too, is never

wrong, because it is He who decrees that

there be more of these at one time and fewer

at another. Or we could even answer that

God defines a certain number in the mannerof a judgment in harmony with inferior

reasons, and this limitation can be changed; but He predestines another number in the

manner of an election in harmony with

superior reasons, and this limitation cannot

be changed. For Gregory says: “He changes



His judgment but never His election.”

Ad secundum dicendum, quod nulla

praeparatio disponit ad habendam aliquam

perfectionem nisi suo tempore; sicut naturaliscomplexio disponit puerum ad hoc quod sit

fortis vel sapiens, non quidem tempore pueritiae, sed tempore perfectae aetatis.

Tempus autem habendi gratiam est simul cum

tempore praeparationis naturae; unde non potest inter utrumque aliquod impedimentum

intercidere; et sic in quocumque invenitur

praeparatio naturae, invenitur et gratia. Sed

tempus habendi gloriam non est simul cumtempore gratiae; unde inter utrumque potest

medium impedimentum intercidere; et propterhoc non est necessarium quod praescitus qui

habet gratiam, sit habiturus gloriam.

2. No preparation disposes anything to have a

perfection at a time other than its proper

time. For example, his natural temperamentmay dispose a boy to be brave or wise — not,

however, in the days of his childhood, but inthe days of his manhood. Now, the time

when one obtains grace is simultaneous with

the time when nature is prepared.Consequently, no barrier can come between

them. Thus, when the preparation of nature is

found in a person, grace is also found in him.

But the time when one obtains glory is notsimultaneous with the time when he has

grace. Consequently, a barrier can come between these two. For this reason, one who

is foreknown to possess grace will notnecessarily possess glory also.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est neque ex

defectu gratiae neque ex defectu dantis

gloriam, quod habens gratiam gloria privetur,sed ex defectu recipientis, in quo

impedimentum intervenit.

3. That one who had grace is nevertheless

deprived of glory is not due to failure either

on the part of grace or on the part of Himwho gives glory. It is due rather to a failure

on the part of the recipient, in whom an

impediment has arisen.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquis esse praescitus, ponitur nonhabiturus finalem gratiam, cum cognitio Dei

feratur ad res futuras sicut super praesentia, ut

alibi dictum est; et ideo, sicut huic quod estnon esse habiturum finalem gratiam, est

incompossibile hoc quod est eundem esse

habiturum finalem gratiam quamvis in se sit

possibile, ita est incompossibile ei quod estesse praescitum, quamvis in se scit possibile.

4. When we affirm that a person isforeknown [as lost], we thereby affirm thathe will not have final grace; for, as we

pointed out previously,” God‟s knowledge is

directed to future things as though they were present. Consequently, just as the condition

of not having final grace cannot be

reconciled with the condition of having final

grace, even though the former condition is possible if taken by itself, so the condition of

having final grace cannot be reconciled with

the condition of being foreknown [as lost],even though the former condition is also

possible if taken by itself.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est defectus 5. The fact that such a thing known by God is



ex divina scientia, quin scitum a Deo sit

simpliciter necessarium, sed est defectus excausa proxima. Aeternitatem autem, ut sit sine

principio et fine durans in medio, habet

praedicta necessitas ex divina scientia, quaeaeterna est, non ex causa proxima, quae est

temporalis et mutabilis.

not absolutely necessary comes, not from a

defect in God‟s knowledge, but from a defectin the proximate cause. On the other hand,

the reason why this necessity is eternal —

without beginning and end, and, as it were,without succession —comes from God‟s

knowledge, which is eternal, not from the

proximate cause, which is temporal and

changeable.

Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis de ratione

finiti numeri non sit quin possit esse eo aliquis

maior, tamen hoc potest esse ex aliquo alio,

scilicet ex immobilitate divinae praescientiae,ut in proposito apparet; sicut quod aliqua

quantitate in rebus naturalibus accepta, non possit alia maior inveniri, non est ex ratione

quantitatis, sed ex condicione rei naturalis.

6. Even though finite number as finite

number does not prevent a larger number

from existing, the impossibility may come

from another source, namely, from the fixedcharacter of God‟s foreknowledge, which is

apparent in the problem at hand. Similarly,when we consider the size of some natural

thing, we see that a larger size cannot exist,not because of the nature of quantity, but

because of the nature of the thing itself.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod bonitas divina

non communicat seipsam nisi secundumordinem sapientiae; hic est enim optimus

communicandi modus. Ordo autem divinae

sapientiae requirit ut omnia sint facta in

numero et pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap.XI, 21; et ideo convenit divinae bonitati ut sit

certus praedestinatorum numerus.

7. The divine goodness communicates itself

only under the guidance of wisdom, for thisis the best manner for its communication.

Now, as we read in Wisdom (11:2 1), the

ordering of God‟s wisdom requires that all

things be made according to “number,weight, and measure.” Consequently, that

there be a definite number of predestined is

in harmony with God‟s goodness.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod, sicut ex dictis patet, quamvis de quolibet absolute concedi

posset quod Deus potest eum praedestinare vel

non praedestinare, tamen supposito quod

praedestinaverit, non potest non praedestinare,vel e contrario, quia non potest esse mutabilis.

Et ideo dicitur communiter quod haec: Deus

potest non praedestinatum praedestinare, vel praedestinatum non praedestinare; in sensu

composito est falsa sed in diviso est vera. Et

propter hoc omnes illae locutiones quaesensum compositum implicant, sunt falsae

simpliciter. Unde non est concedendum quod

8. As is clear from what was said previously,while it may be granted with reference to a

determined person that God, absolutely

speaking, can predestine or not predestine

him, nevertheless, supposing that God has predestined him, He cannot not predestine

him. Nor is the opposite possible, because

God cannot change. Consequently, it iscommonly said that the following

proposition, “God can predestine one who is

not predestined or not predestine one who is predestined,” is false if taken in a composite

sense, but true if taken in a divided sense. All



numero praedestinatorum possit fieri additio

vel subtractio, quia additio praesupponit illudcui additur, et subtractio illud a quo

subtrahitur; et eadem ratione non potest

concedi quod Deus possit plures praedestinarequam praedestinet, vel pauciores.

statements, therefore, which imply that

composite sense are absolutely false. Thus,we must not concede that the number of the

predestined can be increased or diminished,

because addition presupposes somethingwhich is increased, and subtraction,

something which is diminished. For the same

reason, we cannot concede that God can

predestine more or fewer than He has already predestined.

Nec est simile quod inducitur de factione, quia

factio est actus quidam qui terminatur ad

effectum exterius; et ideo quod Deus facit primo, et post non facit aliquid, non ostendit

aliquam mutationem in ipso, sed in effectusolum. Sed praedestinatio et praescientia, et

huiusmodi sunt actus intrinseci, in quibus non posset esse variatio sine variatione Dei; et ideo

nihil quod ad variationem horum actuum

pertineat concedi debet.

Furthermore, the example drawn from the

making of things is not to the point; for

making is a particular action terminatingexteriorly in an effect, and the fact that God

makes something first and does not make itlater indicates no change in God but only in

the effect. On the other hand, predestination,foreknowledge, and similar things are acts

intrinsic to God; and no change can take

place in them without a change taking placein God. Nothing, therefore, that implies a

change in these acts should be granted.

Ad nonum autem et decimum patet responsio

per haec quia procedunt de potentia absoluta,

non facta aliqua praesuppositione de praedestinatione facta vel non facta.

9-10. The answer to these arguments is clear,

for they are based on an understanding of

God‟s power as absolute, not as modified bya supposition of predestination or non-

predestination.

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Glossa illa

intelligenda est hoc modo quod non intrant totde Iudaeis, quot sunt omnes qui sunt

praeordinati ad vitam, quia non soli Iudaei sunt

praedestinati. Vel potest dici, quod non

loquitur de praeordinatione praedestinationis,sed praeparationis, qua per legem

disponebantur ad vitam. Vel potest dici, quod

non intraverunt tot in primitiva Ecclesia, quiacum plenitudo gentium intraverit, tunc et

omnis Israel salvus fiet in Ecclesia finali.

11. That Gloss should be understood as

meaning this: the number of Jews entering isnot as large as the total number of all those

who have been preordained to life, for it is

not only Jews who have been predestined. Or

one could reply that the Gloss is not speakingabout the preordination of predestination but

about the preordination of preparation by

which the Jews were disposed for life bymeans of the Law. Or, finally, one could

reply that not as many Jews entered the early

Church as are predestined, because, as weread in the Epistle to the Romans(11:25-26):

“When the fulness of the Gentiles should



come in... all Israel will be saved” in the

Church at the end of time.

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Are the predestined certain of their predestination?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, 1, ad 4; I-II, 112, 5; In Evang. Johannis, c. 10, lect. 5 (P. 10:484b); In Psalm. 50 (P. 14:348b).]

Quinto quaeritur utrum praedestinatis sit certa

sua praedestinatioDifficulties

Et videtur quod sic. It seems that they are, for

Quia, ut dicitur I Ioan. cap. II, 27: unctio docet

nos de omnibus: et intelligitur de omnibus pertinentibus ad salutem. Sed praedestinatio

maxime pertinet ad salutem, quia est causa

salutis. Ergo per unctionem acceptam omnes

homines certi redduntur de sua praedestinatione.

1. The words of St. John, “His unction

teaches you of all things” (1 John2:27), areunderstood as referring to all things

pertaining to salvation. But predestination

pertains very much to salvation, since it is

the cause of salvation. Consequently,through an unction they receive, all men are

made certain of their predestination.

Praeterea, divinae bonitati convenit, cuius est

omnia optimo modo facere, ut homines optimomodo ducat ad praemium. Sed optimus modus

videtur ut unusquisque sit certus de suo

praemio. Ergo unusquisque certus redditur,quod ad praemium perveniet, qui illuc est

perventurus; et sic idem quod prius.

2. It is consonant with God‟s goodness,

which does all things in the best possibleway, to lead men to their reward in the best

possible way. Now, the best possible way

seems to be that each and every man becertain of his reward. Therefore, each and

every person who is predestined is given

assurance that he will come to his reward.

Consequently, the same must be said as before.

Praeterea, dux exercitus omnes quos adscribit

ad meritum pugnae, adscribit etiam ad

praemium; ut sicut sunt certi de merito, sic sintcerti de praemio. Sed homines certi sunt quod

sint in statu merendi. Ergo et certi sunt quod ad

3. All whom the leader of an army enrolls

for merit in battle are likewise enrolled for a

reward. Consequently, they are as certainabout their reward as they are about their

merit. But men are certain that they are in



praemium pervenient. Et sic idem quod prius. the state of meriting. Consequently, they are

also certain that they will obtain theirreward. We conclude as before.

Sed contra, To the Contrary

est quod dicitur Eccle. IX, 1: nemo scit utrum

dignus odio vel amore sit.

In Ecclesiastes (9:1) we read: “Man knows

not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.”

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod non est inconveniens alicui

suam praedestinationem revelari: sed secundumlegem communem non est conveniens ut

omnibus reveletur, duplici ratione. Quarum prima potest sumi ex parte eorum qui non sunt praedestinati. Si enim omnibus praedestinatis

sua praedestinatio sic nota esset, tunc omnibus

non praedestinatis certum esset se praedestinatos non esse, ex hoc ipso quod se

praedestinatos nescirent; et hoc quodammodo

eos in desperationem induceret. Secunda ratio

potest sumi ex parte ipsorum praedestinatorum.Securitas enim negligentiam parit. Si autem

certi essent de sua praedestinatione, securi

essent de sua salute; et ita non tantamsollicitudinem apponerent ad mala vitanda. Et

propter hoc a divina providentia salubriter est

ordinatum ut homines suam praedestinationem

vel reprobationem ignorent.

There is nothing inconsistent in the

revelation to some person of the fact of his predestination; but, in view of His general

law, it would be inconsistent if He revealedthis to all the predestined for the followingtwo reasons. The first reason may be found

by considering those who are not

predestined. Now, if all the predestinedknew that they were predestined, then all

those not predestined would know that they

were not predestined from the very fact that

they did not know if they were predestined.This would, in some way, lead them to

despair. The second reason may be found by

considering those who are predestined. Now,security is the mother of negligence; and if

the predestined were certain, about their

predestination, they would be secure about

their salvation. Consequently, they wouldnot exercise so great care in avoiding evil.

Hence, it has been wisely ordained by God‟s

providence that men should be ignorant oftheir predestination or reprobation.


Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur,

quod unctio docet de omnibus pertinentibus ad

salutem, intelligendum est de illis quorumcognitio ad salutem pertinet, non de omnibus

quae secundum se ad salutem non pertinent.

Cognitio autem praedestinationis non est

1. When Scripture says that His unction

teaches everything connected with salvation,

this should be understood as referring tothose things knowledge of which pertains to

salvation, not to all those things which, in

themselves, do pertain to salvation. And,



necessaria ad salutem, etsi ipsa praedestinatio

sit necessaria.

although predestination itself is necessary

for salvation, knowledge of predestination isnot.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod non essetconveniens modus dandi praemium, certificare

de praemio habendo certitudine absoluta; sedconveniens modus est ut illi cui praemium

praeparatur, detur certitudo conditionata; hoc

est quod perveniet, nisi ex ipso deficiat. Et taliscertitudo unicuique praedestinato per virtutem

spei infunditur.

2. It is not proper, when giving a reward, togive the person who is to receive it

unconditional assurance. The proper way isto give conditional assurance to the one for

whom the reward is being prepared, namely,

that the reward will be given him unless hefails on his part. This kind of assurance is

given to all the predestined through the

infusion of the virtue of hope.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam hoc non

potest esse alicui per certitudinem notum utrumsit in statu merendi, quamvis ex aliquibus

coniecturis hoc possit probabiliter existimare.

Habitus enim nunquam possunt cognosci nisi per actus. Actus autem virtutum gratuitarum

habent maximam similitudinem cum actibus

virtutum acquisitarum, ut non possit de facili

per huiusmodi actus certitudo de gratia haberi,nisi forte per revelationem inde certificetur

aliquis ex speciali privilegio. Et praeterea in

pugna saeculari ille qui est a duce exercitus

adscriptus ad pugnam, non certificatur de praemio nisi sub conditione, quia non

coronabitur, nisi (qui) legitime certaverit.

3. One cannot know with any certainty that

he is in the state of meriting, although he canknow, by conjecture, that this is probably the

case. For a habit never can be known except

through its acts, and the acts of the infusedsupernatural virtues greatly resemble the

acts of the acquired natural virtues.

Consequently, it is not easy to be certain that

acts of this kind have their source in grace,unless, by a special privilege, a person is

made certain of it through a revelation.

Moreover, he who is enrolled by the leader

of an army for a secular struggle is givenonly conditional assurance of his reward,

because one “is not crowned,— except he

strive lawfully” (2 Timothy 2:5).

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Can predestination be helped by the prayers of the saints?

[ARTICLE S.T., I, 23, 8; I Sent., 41, 1, 4; IV Sent., 45, 3, 3; C.G., III, cc. 95-96, 113.]

Sexto quaeritur utrum praedestinatio possitiuvari precibus sanctorum

Difficulties

Et videtur quod non. It seems not, for



Quia eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed

praedestinatio non potest impediri. Ergo necaliquo adiuvari.

1. What can be aided can be prevented, but

predestination cannot be prevented.Therefore, it cannot be aided in any way.

Praeterea, illud quo posito vel remotonihilominus alterum habet suum effectum, non

iuvat ipsum. Sed praedestinatio oportet quodsuum effectum habeat, cum falli non possit:

sive oratio fiat, sive non fiat. Ergo

praedestinatio orationibus non iuvatur.

2. When one thing has its effect whetheranother thing is present or not, the latter is no

help to it. But predestination must have itseffect, because it cannot fail whether prayers

take place or not. Consequently,

predestination is not helped by prayers.

Praeterea, nullum aeternum praeceditur ab

aliquo temporali. Sed oratio est temporalis, praedestinatio autem aeterna. Ergo

praedestinationem oratio praecedere non potest,

et ita nec eam adiuvare.

3. Nothing eternal is preceded by something

temporal. But prayer is temporal, and predestination is eternal. Therefore, prayer

cannot precede predestination, and,

consequently, cannot help it.

Praeterea, membra corporis mystici gerunt in sesimilitudinem membrorum corporis naturalis,

ut patet I Corinth., cap. XII, 12 ss. Sed unum

membrum in corpore naturali non acquirit perfectionem suam per alterum. Ergo nec in

corpore mystico. Sed membra corporis mystici

maxime perficiuntur per praedestinationis

effectus. Ergo unus homo non iuvatur adeffectus praedestinationis consequendos

precibus alterius.

4. As is clear from the first Epistle to theCorinthians (12:12), the members of the

mystical body resemble the members of a

natural body. Now, in a natural body, amember does not acquire its perfection by

means of another member. Consequently, the

same is true [of members] in the mystical

body. But the members of the mystical bodyreceive their greatest perfection through the

effects of predestination. Therefore, one man

is not aided in obtaining the effects of predestination by the prayers of another.


Est quod dicitur Genes. cap. XXV, 21: quod

Isaac rogavit dominum pro Rebecca uxore sua,

eo quod sterilis esset; qui exaudivit eum, et

dedit conceptum Rebeccae; et ex illo conceptu

natus est Iacob, qui ab aeterno praedestinatusfuerat; nec unquam fuisset praedestinatio

impleta, nisi natus fuisset. Quod oratione Isaacest impetratum; ergo praedestinatio orationibus

iuvatur.

1. We read in Genesis (25:2 1): “Isaac

besought the Lord for his wife because she

was barren; and he heard him, and made

Rebecca to conceive.” As a result of this

conception Jacob was born, who had been predestined from all eternity; and this

predestination would never have beenfulfilled had he not been born. But it was

effected by the prayer of Isaac.

Consequently, predestination is helped by prayers.



Praeterea, in quodam sermone de conversione

sancti Pauli legitur quasi ex persona dominidicentis ad Paulum: disposui in mente mea

perdere te nisi Stephanus servus meus orasset

pro te; ergo oratio Stephani Paulum areprobatione liberavit; ergo et per eam est

praedestinatus; et sic idem quod prius.

2. In a certain sermon on the conversion of

St. Paul, in which the Lord is represented asspeaking to Paul, we read: “Unless Stephen,

my servant, had prayed for you, I would have

destroyed you.” The prayers of Stephen,therefore, freed Paul from reprobation; and

so through these prayers he was predestined.

Hence, we conclude as before.

Praeterea, aliquis potest alicui mereri primamgratiam. Ergo eadem ratione et gratiam

finalem. Sed quicumque gratiam finalem habet,

est praedestinatus. Ergo aliquis potest iuvari

orationibus alterius ad hoc quod sit praedestinatus.

3. One can merit the first grace for someone.For the same reason, therefore, he can also

merit final grace for him. But whoever

possesses final grace is predestined.

Therefore, the predestination of one personcan be furthered by the prayers of another.

Praeterea, Gregorius oravit pro Traiano, et eum

ab Inferno liberavit, ut Damascenus narrat in

quodam sermone de mortuis; et ita videturquod ipse liberatus sit a societate reproborum

orationibus Gregorii; et sic idem quod prius.

4. As Damascene tells us in a certain sermon

on the dead, Gregory prayed for Trajan and

freed him from hell. It seems, therefore, thathe was freed from the company of the

damned by Gregory‟s prayers. Hence, the

same must be said as before.

Praeterea, membra corporis mystici sunt similia

membris corporis naturalis. Sed membrumunum iuvatur per alterum in corpore naturali.

Ergo etiam in corpore mystico; et sic idem

quod prius.

5. The members of the mystical body

resemble the members of a natural body. Butin a natural body one member is helped by

another. Consequently, the same is true in

the mystical body, and the above propositionstands.

Responsio. REPLY

Dicendum, quod praedestinationem iuvari

precibus sanctorum dupliciter potest intelligi.

Uno modo, quod orationes sanctorum iuvent ad

hoc quod aliquis praedestinetur; et hoc non

potest esse verum neque de orationibussecundum quod in propria natura existunt, quia

temporales sunt, praedestinatio autem aeterna;neque etiam secundum quod existunt in Dei

praescientia, quia praescientia meritorum vel

propriorum vel alienorum non est praedestinationis causa, ut supra dictum est.

That predestination can be helped by the

prayers of the saints can be understood in

two ways. First, it can mean that the prayers

of the saints help one to be predestined. This,

however, cannot be true of prayers, either asthey exist in their own proper condition,

which is temporal while predestination iseternal, or as they exist in God‟s

foreknowledge, because, as explained above,

foreknowledge of merits is. not the cause of predestination, whether the merits be one‟s



Alio modo potest intelligi praedestinationem

precibus sanctorum iuvari, quod oratio iuvet adconsequendum praedestinationis effectum,

sicut aliquis iuvatur instrumento, quo suum

opus perficit; et sic est inquisitum de hacquaestione ab omnibus qui Dei providentiam

circa res humanas posuerunt; sed diversimode

est ab eis determinatum.

own or those of another. On the other hand,

that predestination is furthered by the prayersof the saints can mean that their prayers help

us obtain the effect of predestination as an

instrument helps one in finishing his work.The problem has been considered in this way

by all those who have studied God‟s

providence over human affairs. Their

answers, however, have been different.

Quidam enim, attendentes immobilitatem

divinae ordinationis, posuerunt quod oratio vel

sacrificium vel huiusmodi in nullo prodesse

potest. Et haec dicitur fuisse Epicureorumopinio, qui omnia immobiliter evenire dicebant

ex dispositione superiorum corporum, quaedeos nominabant.

Attending only to the immutability of God‟s

decrees, some have declared that prayer,

sacrifice, and similar actions help in no way

at all. This is said to have been the opinion ofthe Epicureans, who taught that all things

happened necessarily because of theinfluence of celestial bodies, which they

called gods.

Alii autem dixerunt, quod secundum hoc

sacrificia et orationes valent, quia per

huiusmodi mutatur praeordinatio eorum ad

quos pertinet disponere de actibus humanis. Ethaec dicitur fuisse opinio Stoicorum, qui

ponebant res omnes regi quibusdam spiritibus,

quos deos vocabant; et cum ab eis esset aliquid

praedefinitum, orationibus et sacrificiis poteratobtineri ut talis definitio mutaretur, placatis

deorum animis, ut dicebant. Et in istam

sententiam quasi videtur incidisse Avicenna infine suae Metaph.: ponit enim omnia quae

aguntur in rebus humanis, quorum principium

est voluntas humana, reducuntur in voluntatesanimarum caelestium. Ponit enim, corpora

caelestia esse animata; et sicut corpus caeleste

habet influentiam super corpus humanum, ita

animae caelestes, secundum eum, habent

influentiam super animas humanas, et quod adearum imaginationem sequuntur ea quae in his

inferioribus eveniunt. Et ideo sacrificia etorationes valent, secundum eum, ad hoc quod

huiusmodi animae concipiant ea quae nobis

volumus evenire.

Others said that sacrifices and prayers help to

this extent, that they change the

preordination made by those who have the

power to determine human acts. This is saidto have been the opinion of the Stoics, who

taught that all things are ruled by certain

spirits whom they called gods; and, even

though something had been pre-established by them, according to the Stoics, such a

prearrangement could be changed by

placating their souls through prayers andsacrifices. Avicenna seems to have fallen

into this error, too; for he asserts that all

human actions whose principle is the humanwill can be reduced to the wills of celestial

souls. He thought that the heavenly bodies

had souls, and, just as a heavenly body

influences a human body, so, according to

him, the celestial souls influence humansouls. In fact, what takes place in things here

below is according to the notions of thesecelestial souls. Consequently, he thought that

sacrifices and prayers helped these souls to

conceive what we wished to take place.



Sed istae positiones a fide sunt alienae; quia

prima positio tollit libertatem arbitrii, secundaautem tollit praedestinationis certitudinem. Et

ideo aliter dicendum est quod praedestinatio

divina nunquam mutatur; sed tamen orationeset alia bona opera valent ad consequendum

praedestinationis effectum. In quolibet enim

ordine causarum, attendendus est non solum

ordo primae causae ad effectum, sed etiamordo causae secundae ad effectum, et ordo

causae primae ad secundam, quia causa

secunda non ordinatur ad effectum nisi ex

ordinatione causae primae. Causa enim primadat secundae quod influat super effectum suum,

ut patet in Lib. de causis.

These theories, however, are opposed to the

Faith. For the first destroys freedom ofchoice; the second, the certainty of

predestination. Consequently, we must

answer the problem differently, and must saythat, while God‟s predestination never

changes, prayers and other good works are

nevertheless effective in obtaining the effect

of predestination. Now, when consideringany order of causes, we must consider not

only the order of the first cause to the effect

but also the order of the second cause to the

effect and the order of the first cause to thesecond cause, since the second cause is

ordered to an effect only through the

direction of the first cause. For, as is clear

from The Causes, the first cause gives to thesecond cause the power of influencing the

effect.

Dico igitur, quod praedestinationis effectus estsalus humana, quae ab ea procedit sicut a causa

prima; sed eius possunt esse multae causae

aliae proximae quasi instrumentales, quae sunt

ordinatae a divina praedestinatione ad salutemhumanam, sicut instrumenta applicantur ab

artifice ad effectum artis explendum. Unde,sicut praedestinationis divinae est effectus quodiste salvetur, ita et quod per orationes talis vel

per talia merita salvetur. Et hoc est quod

Gregorius dicit in I libro dialogorum ea quae

sancti viri orando efficiunt, ita praedestinatasunt, ut precibus obtineantur; propter quod, ut

dicit Boetius in libro V de consolatione: preces,

cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt.

I say, therefore, that the effect of predestination is man‟s salvation, and this

comes from it as from its first cause. It can

have, however, many other proximate and, as

it were, instrumental causes, which areordered by divine predestination for man‟s

salvation, as tools are used by a craftsmanfor completing a product of his craft.Consequently, the effect of God‟s

predestination is not only that an individual

person be saved but also that he be saved by

certain prayers or certain merits. Gregoryalso said this: “What holy men effect by their

prayers is predestined to be obtained by

prayer.” Consequently, Boethius says: “If we pray well, our prayers cannot be without

effect.”


Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod nihil est

quod ordinem praedestinationis possitinfringere, et ideo impediri non potest; sed

multa sunt quae ordini praedestinationis

1. There is nothing that can check the

ordering of predestination. Consequently, predestination cannot be impeded. Many

things, however, are related to the ordering



subiacent ut causae mediae; et ista dicuntur

iuvare praedestinationem, modo praedicto.

of predestination as intermediate causes; and

these are said to further predestination in themanner described.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex quo praedestinatum est quod talis orationibus

talibus salvetur, non possunt orationesremoveri nisi praedestinatione remota; sicut

nec salus humana, quae est praedestinationis

effectus.

2. From the fact that it is predestined that acertain man will be saved because of certain

prayers, these prayers cannot be omittedwithout detriment to his predestination. The

same is true of man‟s salvation, which is the

effect of predestination.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit

quod oratio non iuvet praedestinationem quasicausa; et hoc concedendum est.

3. That argument proves that prayer does not

help predestination by being, as it were, itscause. This we concede.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod effectus

praedestinationis, qui sunt gratia et gloria, non

se habent per modum perfectionis primae, sed per modum perfectionis secundae. Membra

autem corporis naturalis, quamvis non iuventur

ab invicem in perfectionibus primisconsequendis, iuvantur tamen invicem,

quantum ad perfectiones secundas; et est etiam

aliquod membrum in corpore quod primo

formatum iuvat ad formationem aliorummembrorum, scilicet cor; unde ratio procedit ex

falso.

4. The effects of predestination, which are

grace and glory, are not, as it were, basic

perfections but secondary perfections. Now,even though the members of a natural body

do not help each other in acquiring their

basic perfections, they nevertheless do helpeach other to acquire their secondary

perfections. There is, moreover, a member in

the body which, having been formed first,

helps in the formation of other members — namely, the heart. Consequently, the

argument proceeds on a false assumption.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

Ad primum autem in contrarium concedimus. 1. We concede this argument.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod Paulus nunquamfuit reprobatus secundum dispositionem divini

consilii, quod est immutabile; sed solum

secundum dispositionem divinae sententiaequae accipitur secundum inferiores causas,quae quandoque mutantur. Unde non sequitur

quod oratio fuerit praedestinationis causa, sed

quod iuverit solum ad praedestinationiseffectum.

2. Paul was never reprobated according tothe disposition made by divine election,

because this is unchangeable. He was

reprobated, however, according to a[provisional] judgment of God in harmonywith lower causes, a judgment which

sometimes changes. It follows, therefore, not

that prayer was the cause of predestination, but that it furthered only the effect of

predestination.



Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis

praedestinatio et gratia finalis convertantur,tamen non oportet quod quidquid est causa

gratiae finalis, quocumque modo, sit etiam

causa praedestinationis, sicut patet ex supradictis.

3. Although predestination and final grace

are interchangeable, it does not necessarilyfollow that whatever is the cause of final

grace in any manner whatsoever is also the

cause of predestination. This is clear fromwhat has been said previously.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis Traianus

esset in loco reproborum, non tamen erat

simpliciter reprobatus; praedestinatum enimerat quod precibus Gregorii salvaretur.

4. Although Trajan was in the place of the

damned, he was not damned absolutely; for

he was predestined to be saved by the prayers of Gregory.

Quintum concedimus. 5. We concede the fifth argument.

Question 6- Predestination

Documents

Transcript of Question 6- Predestination