A Quest for the Historical Socrates:

The Applicability of Historical Jesus Research

in Historiographical Approaches to Socrates

by

Andrew Messing

1. Introduction

One of the few certainties in the historiography of ancient persons is uncertainty.

No matter what biographical sketch is outlined or detailed, and regardless of the

individual in question, it is certain that this biography will fail to wholly encapsulate the

historical reality of that individual. Any modern historical account or biography of

Socrates, therefore is necessarily limited. Socrates as he actually was is beyond the

reach of any historian. Before proceeding, however, this view must be differentiated from

two other claims.

The first is that all historiography is a construction which not only inevitably fails

to reconstruct historical reality but which is in actuality little different from fiction.1

Although few historians or scholars in general wholly adopt this extreme position, a

common theme within modern (or rather post-modern, a term which situates this view in

its cultural context) historiography is expressing the ultimately fictitious nature of

historical writings and the conception that any historiography is closer to a construction

than to a reconstruction.2 The position adopted at the outset here is that while historical

reconstructions are just that, good historical methods make it possible for these

reconstructions to approximate historical reality. Thus, a modern biography of Socrates

may be more than simply (or mainly) a construction, and proper historical methodologies

can provide an account of the person which best approximates Socrates as he lived.

The other important distinction which must be made is not historical but

psychological: no one, not even Socrates himself, could tell us who Socrates was. Even

were it possible to capture on film every moment of Socrates life, including an in-depth

interview asking the man himself who he is, the nature of the Self is simply too

complex to capture, no matter the available evidence. Socrates own answer, for example,

would vary not only depending upon when in his life he was asked, but even as his mood

changed within a given day, or when a particular conversation, event, etc., made more

salient in his mind certain aspects of his character. In other words, any biography, no

matter the evidence available, will fail to encapsulate the Self of that individual simply

because the Self is neither a stative nor constant entity. It is not simple enough that who

an individual is (in her or his entirety) may be answered in any coherent fashion.

We do not possess, however, anything close to a videographic recording of

everything Socrates said and did. Nor are any of his thoughts, words, or descriptions of

his actions directly available to us through his own writings. What remains are

fragmentary and disagreeing accounts of what Socrates said and did and what he

believed, a historical issue referred to as the Socratic problem.3 The essence of the

Socratic problem is determining how to combine the varying representations of Socrates

in ancient history into a single biography which best approximates (in every detail or

generality it claims) the historical reality of Socrates. Providing a solution to this problem

is not the point, nor within the scope, of the present paper. Rather, what I argue here is

that there is another historical figure whose reconstructed biography presents challenges

and issues similar to those who face the Socratic problem. No single individual has been

the subject of greater historical scrutiny than Jesus of Nazareth, and if there is any merit

to biographical historiography at all, especially as it pertains to ancient persons, then the

best (and worst) methods are to be found by examining the Quest for the historical Jesus

while absorbing what is useful, and rejecting what is useless.4

2. The Socratic problem

Sources for any event or person in history are wont to diverge. Even modern

biographies and historical writings of living individuals, such as former presidents Bill

Clinton and George W. Bush, disagree. What makes Socrates, and the disagreement

between our sources for information of him, so different? The first part of the answer to

this question is simple. It is no coincidence that perhaps the only other individual to have

more scholarship devoted to his historical reconstruction is Jesus: in the case of both

the historical figures whose influence on the life of humanity has been profoundest, Jesus

and Socrates, indisputable facts are exceptionally rare5 The more interesting,

influential, and relevant to society a person is, the more people will want to know about

them. The name Socrates, as Jol poetically puts it, is ein Namehochgetragen von

der Liebe und Ehrfurcht der Jahrtausendei Of the three philosophers whose names

stand out from all others in the history of Western intellectualism (Socrates, Plato, and

Aristotle), Socrates may have contributed the least to this tradition, but in his capacity as

Platos teacher he made possible all that came from the other two. In fact, the lack of

direct contributions to Western intellectual discourse seems to have made Socrates more

interesting, simply because the absence of any copies of Socratic autographs makes i a namecarried high by the love and awe of millennia p. 730.

Socrates character more mysterious. This sense of mystery is only compounded by the

long tradition (originating particularly in the works of Plato) 6 of viewing Socrates death

as an unjust execution of the most just and noble of men. What emerges is an individual

who not only founded the most important philosophical tradition in the West (by teaching

Plato), but who gave his life for his beliefs and for his fellow citizens, whom he refused

to allow live unexamined lives.

All of the above lays the groundwork for a long and rich history of widespread

interest (not simply scholarly) in understanding Socrates life. The Socratic problem,

however, involves more than just an interesting figure and the typical problems with

sources (e.g., scarcity of data, divergent traditions, disagreeing sources, late and/or

pseudepigraphical sources, etc.). Actually, compared with many of Socrates rough

contemporaries for whom we have some historical evidence (e.g., Euripides, Antiphon,

Aristophanes, etc.), the extant texts which refer to Socrates are unusually numerous.

Additionally, several individuals who personally knew Socrates, namely Xenophon,

Aristophanes, and Plato, appear to give rather detailed accounts of the man himself in

some of their works. Relative to the normal paucity of data available to the ancient

historian, a lack of sources for information is clearly not the issue.

This is in fact the heart of the Socratic problem. Given the sources we have, and

their nature, it is hard to imagine that anyone who knew of them could conclude man

mag in dieses Problem sich lange Jahre und immer wieder versenkenund kann doch am

Ende von Sokrates sagen, was er von sich selber bekannte: wir wissen, da wir nichts

wissen.ii Yet Jol reached this conclusion, which other scholars have shared or do share,

ii [o]ne can immerse himself in this problem for many years, but can at the end only say of Socrates what he admitted himself: we know that we know nothing. p. 731.

after decades of study and several previous volumes on the subject. The Socratic problem

results from the desire to know as much about Socrates as possible, a lengthy history of

scholarly optimism concerning the difficulty of this task, and an increasing realization

that the disagreements and historical accuracy of our sources are not problems easily

surmounted. The figure of Socrates presented by Xenophon is just as different from that

of Platos and Aristophanes as theirs are from one another. Moreover, the very idea that

any of these individuals ever intended to represent the historical Socrates is questionable.

Duprel, for example, declared of the Socratic figure that cest la creation littraire

and that [a]u moral pas plus quau physique, la figure socratique ne constitue un portrait

d'aprs nature; elle est une composition trs travaille.iii Gigon likewise referred to all

the sources or works on Socrates (including modern ones) as Dichtung or poetic (literary)

compositions.7 Realizations like these were what caused Jols despair in any attempt to

find a solution to the Socratic problem.

Yet we have skipped ahead too far, as Gigon and Jol are both fairly recent

contributors to scholarship on the Socratic Problem, and in doing so we have prevented

any proper understanding of the context for this despair. One of the first biographers of

Socrates provides both a starting point at which we may begin exploring the sources, and

also perhaps the earliest historical consciousness of the Socratic problem. Diogenes

Laertius, a historian from the third century CE, wrote a number of Lives (or Bioi, early

biographies)8 of various philosophers, including Plato and Socrates. In his Life of Plato,

Diogenes reports that Socrates happened to hear someone reading Platos Lysis (a

dialogue in which the main character is Socrates) and exclaimed

iii it is a literary creation p. 334 The Socratic figure is not a life-like sketch, mentally anymore than physically; it is a well-wrought composition. p. 333.

.

.iv The historical accuracy of this account is debatable, but

it does indicate that by Diogenes Laertius time at least Platos depiction of Socrates had

been questioned.9 What, however, was this depiction anyway, and what was the basis

for questioning it?

2.2. Platos Socrates

If anything from ancient history can be known, we can be certain that Plato was a

student of Socrates, or at least spent a great deal of time around him listening to what he

had to say.10 In his own words, from perhaps the most unquestionably authentic of his

letters,11 Plato calls Socrates v and in most of his

dialogues Socrates is the main character. Clearly, then, Plato knew at the very least a

good deal about what Socrates taught and believed in his later years, and the doubt

expressed at or before Diogenes Laertius that the Socrates in Platos dialogues is not an

accurate depiction of the historical Socrates appears to be baseless prima facie. However,

even without comparing the Socrates of Plato to that of Xenophon or that of

Aristophanes, there are serious problems in equating Socrates in Plato with the historical

Socrates, for Plato himself does not appear to offer a singular Socrates upon whom a

historical reconstruction may be based.

There is a person named Socrates in many of Platos dialogues. In many, such as

the Republic or Apology, Socrates is the main character in that he that he is not only

active in the dialogue but he appears to more or less direct its subject matter. In others, iv By Hercules, how many times that lad [Plato] has lied about me! DL 3.35. v My elderly friend Apology 324c-324e.

such as the Sophistes or Timaeus, Socrates is present but oddly does not take part in the

discussion. Given Platos depiction of Socrates elsewhere (see esp. Apology 21b-23b) as

a man who can hardly resist questioning everyone and everything, his lack of

participation in some dialogues is peculiar. Even more troublesome, however, is the

apparent disparity, in thought and character, between Socrates as he is depicted in some

of the works in which he is a central character and others. In the memorable words of the

late scholar Gregory Vlastos, in various dialogues Socrates pursues philosophies so

different that they could not have been depicted as cohabitating the same brain

throughout unless it had been the brain of a schizophrenic. They are so diverse in content

and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy

you care to mention12 In other words, we can either accept that at least in some places

the Socrates of Plato is not the historical Socrates, or we will be forced to conclude that

the historical Socrates held such divergent beliefs that he might as well have been crazy.

It is not possible to examine every divergence or seeming contradiction of

Socrates character in Platos dialogues, but some important examples will suffice. In

Platos Apology, Socrates asserts that he is accused of

vi or of being a natural philosopher. Socrates then claims

.vii Yet in other works, Platos Socrates appears not

only interested in natural philosophy but a natural philosopher par excellence. Socrates,

in the Republic (616b-617c), gives an account of the structure and movement of celestial

bodies. In the Phaedo,13 Socrates gives an extraordinarily rich and detailed explanation of

the form of the earth and that which is beneath it. A similar contradiction exists between

vi investigating the things under the earth and celestial things Apology 19b. vii concerning these things [i.e. natural philosophy] I know nothing, neither great nor small.

Socrates statements on the immortality of the soul in the Apology and his view on the

same in the Republic. In the Apology, Socrates appears not to know what happens to a

person after death:

,

.viii This agnosticism stands in sharp contrast to the

view Socrates expresses in the Republic: ,

?ix Even within Platos dialogues, then, Socrates appears to

think radically different things, making it difficult in the extreme to decide what aspects

of Platos depiction are even intended to represent Socrates.

At least part of this is due to the extent to which Platos writings represent

original thought. An enormous hurdle, therefore, which prevents us from using Plato to

understand the historical Socrates, is the necessity of separating Plato (his thoughts,

theories, etc.) from Socrates. That is, how much of what Plato wrote was simply Plato

himself speaking through Socrates mouth? Platos theory of Forms ( or ), for

example, is perhaps his most influential and the most well-known of his contributions to

Western thought.14 In several places in his dialogues15 Socrates espouses and/or develops

this theory. Simply put, according to the theory of Forms all things (even abstract

concepts like Beauty) exist independently and in an ideal Form or Type. However,

according to Aristotle

.x Aristotle did not have firsthand knowledge of Socrates, but he did know

viii For either it is such that [death] is nothingness, and the dead have no awareness of anything at all, or it is as is oft said, that [death] is a change and rehabitation of the soul from this place to another. Apology 40c. ix Dont you [Glaucon] know[that] our soul[s are] immortal and never destroyed? Rep. 10.608d. x Socrates did not grant independent existence to universals or definitions. Metaphysics 1078b. cf. 1086b.

Plato very well and was certainly in a position to know the history and development of

Platos theory of Forms.16 It is difficult, therefore, to ignore Aristotles differentiation

between the historical Socrates and Socrates as he appears in Platos dialogues. After all,

according to Gomperz (among others) Aristotles testimony is zwar knappen, aber

unbedingt verllichen Zeugnisse...xi We can hardly conclude, then, that everything

Plato puts on Socrates lips may be traced back in some form to Socrates himself.

This position, however, has its proponents. Burnet and Taylor in particular argue

that Plato is not simply the primary source for the historical Socrates, but that the ideas,

views, and theories of Platos Socrates are almost entirely intended to represent those of

the historical Socrates, not Plato.17 This includes the theory of Forms,18 despite

Aristotles testimony. In support of this view, Taylor (agreeing with Burnet) notes that

Plato shifts from Socrates as the key speaker and center of the dialogues to a Socrates on

the sidelines and finally to dialogues in which he is absent altogether (e.g. Laws).19 The

explanation for this can only be that Plato did not wish to put ideas on Socrates lips

which werent his.20 There are several issues with this position, including the

discrepancies in Platos Socrates mentioned above, and the differences between this

figure and other depictions of Socrates (such as Aristotles). In addition, as Copleston

points out, if Plato never uses Socrates as a spokesperson for his (Platos) views, then

there is no reason to think he does so with any other character either (e.g., Timaeus).21 It

seems extremely unlikely that one of the greatest philosophers in Western history, and the

founder of the Academy, said almost nothing original in his writings and only reproduced

the thoughts of others. Furthermore, there is the issue of genre to consider. Plato was not

a historian, and as noted by Gigon and Duprel, the dialogues are literary creations. We xi admittedly scarce, but undoubtedly reliable evidence. 1896, p. 52.

must view them as such, rather than as primarily biographical depictions. Finally, even if

there are points in his dialogues where Plato intended his Socratic figure to resemble the

historical Socrates, nous sommes en face d'interpretations.xii We are limited not only by

Platos intentions, but also by his understanding of his teacher. If we had some reliable

means to discern where Plato intended to represent the historical Socrates, we would still

be left with the problem of deciding whether Plato was right.

2.3. Socrates in Xenophon

Thankfully, however, we are not left with only Plato to reconstruct the historical

Socrates. Xenophon also devoted a great many lines in his corpus to Socrates (in e.g., his

Oeconomicus and Symposium), including an entire work explicitly dedicated to his

recollections of Socrates (Memorabilia). Xenophon, like Plato, was a young friend of

Socrates. Moreover, unlike Plato, Xenophon was a historian, and even if his dialogues are

less concerned with history than some of his other writings, he is still a man to whom

historical recollections are important. His historical consciousness was, in fact, central to

Boutrouxs argument to restore Xenophon as a principle source for the historical

Socrates. Against Schleiermacher and his followers, Boutroux notes that it is Xenophon

seul de nos tmoins qui ft historien de profession... and that therefore lhistorien

a le droit aujourdhui, non seulement dinvoquer le tmoignages de Xnophon ct de

ceux de Platon et dAristote, mais encore de le mettre en premire lignexiii Once more,

then, we might expect to find a great deal of unproblematic information on Socrates, his

xii We are faced with interpretations. Robin, 1947, p. 211. xiii alone of our witnesses who was a professional historian & the historian has the right today, not only to invoke the testimony of Xenophon alongside those of Plato and Aristotle, but, moreover, to put it first. Boutroux, 1908, p. 17.

life and thought, in these sources. Indeed, there are some who have said that Xenophon,

not Plato, Aristotle, or Aristophanes, is whom we should turn to for a depiction of the

historical Socrates. As Hegel put it, wir uns in Ansehung des Inhalts seines Wissens,

und des Grabes, wie sein Denken gebildet war, vorzglich an Xenophon zu halten

haben.xiv

Unfortunately, just as with Plato, problems with Xenophon abound. In fact, in one

of the earliest modern attempts to solve the Socratic problem, Garnier declared that while

we could perhaps find in Xenophon le grand principes de la morale Socratique it is

not in Xenophon but dans Platon quil [Socrate] vit, quil respirexv The problems

with Garniers conclusion have already been exposed. What, however, is wrong with

using Xenophon as a source? An early and persuasive argument, originating with

Schleiermacher,22 against using Xenophons Socrates as the foundation for the historical

Socrates is how boring his Socrates appears to be. The Socrates in Xenophon is more or

less a moralizing preacher. His chief concern appears to be giving moral instructions,

rather than investigating morality, and he is uninterested either in metaphysics or other

philosophical concerns.23 If the historical Socrates was essentially equivalent to

Xenophons depiction of him, so the argument goes, it is hard to imagine how anyone

could have ever thought him to be an important and influential philosopher.

Nor is Xenophons work without the same problems found in Platos. As with

Platos Socrates, the Socrates in Xenophon is difficult to differentiate from Xenophon

himself.24 Whatever Xenophons skill as a historian, his writings devoted to Socrates are

xiv We have, principally, to look to Xenophon, with respect to the content of [Socrates] knowledge, and of the end point of the development of his thought. Michelet, 1842, p. 69. cf. Pfleiderer, 1896, Schlussbemerkung zum 1. Buch. xv The central tenets of Socratic morality & in Plato that he [Socrates] lives, that he breathes. Garnier, 1768, p. 163.

not histories but are just as much work[s] of art as the dialogues of Plato.25 And if

Platos depiction of Socrates is but his interpretation of the historical Socrates, then so

is Xenophons. Plato, however, was himself a philosopher, and therefore in a much better

position to understand Socrates thought than was Xenophon.26 Once again, without the

proper methodological approach, Xenophons writings are too problematic to use as a

source for the historical Socrates.

2.4. Aristophanes and Socrates

While the literary, rather than historical, nature of Plato and Xenophons writings

were revealed only through modern scholarship, the last important contemporary witness

to Socrates required no such analyses. Aristophanes, unlike Plato or Xenophon, clearly

wrote about Socrates while the latter was still living.27 Also unlike the other two

witnesses, Aristophanes plays portray Socrates in a negative light. Yet unfortunately

Aristophanes writings are quite clearly artistic rather than historical. They are comic

plays, and cannot therefore be used as a primary means for reconstructing the historical

Socrates.

2.5. Turning from (Historiographic) Despair

This does not mean we may not use Aristophanes as a historical source to

understand Socrates. None of the problems outlined above preclude the use of these three

witnesses in reconstructing the historical Socrates. Other sources too, such as Aristotle

and Diogenes Laertius, though problematic, are nonetheless of great value. Our problem

is not one of a lack of available data, but an inability to separate out fact from fiction in

the data that we possess. Since the Socratic problem was first identified in modern

scholarship over two hundred years ago, the tendency among scholars has generally been

one of selection. That is, most of their arguments consist of reasons to favor one source

over another, especially by pointing out problems with competing sources. The end result

of these efforts was a vast series of arguments (some small part of which we have seen

above) against using any and all sources, and once these became widely known, the

combination of these arguments left no source available. And with the realization that no

source was the magical key to unlocking the historical Socrates came despair:

But the Socratic question, as it was debated from the time of

Schleiermacher to the beginning of the twentieth century, is not only an

unsolvable problemas is shown by the lack of any agreementbut also

a pseudo-problem. If the logoi Skratikoi are works of fictions, allowing

their authors considerable scope for invention not only in the setting but

also in the ideas expressed by the characters including Socrates, then it

seems hopeless to try to reconstruct the thought of the historical Socrates

on the basis of the logoi Skratikoi.28

This despair, already expressed above by Jol, is echoed elsewhere.29 Other scholars,

rather than dealing with these problems, appear to reject all previous scholarship on the

Socratic problem and proceed to use the sources as if the past two and a half centuries of

historical Socrates scholarship had never been.30 Neither approach is useful, nor

intellectually defensible. Both are simply different versions of the same easy out: if the

sources are rejected utterly or uncritically accepted, we dont have to deal with the

penetrating analyses which are the nexus for the current state of the Socratic problem.

What is lacking is a methodological approach capable of sifting through all the

sources and determining holistically what pieces of the various portrayals of Socrates we

possess are likely to represent the historical Socrates. Luckily, however, the

methodologischen Schwierigkeiten for which Kuhn could not offer a Vorzeigung

eines Geheimschlssels31 have already been addressed, though not as they pertain to

Socrates. Questers for a different historical figure have already developed the necessary

criteria with which the historicity of any aspect of the Socratic figure may be evaluated.

The Quest for the historical Jesus has yielded hidden key to unlock the historical

Socrates. If we examine the history of the Quest for the historical Jesus, where it has

failed and where it has triumphed (or at least been productive), the applicability of

historical Jesus quest methodologies will become apparent.

3. Von Reimarus zu die Fnfte Phase32: A brief history of historical Jesus Quest

Jols declaration that the historical Socrates is unknowable has its parallel in the

Quest for the historical Jesus: Denn freilich bin ich der Meinung, da wir vom Leben

und von der Persnlichkeit Jesu so gut wie nichts mehr wissen knnenWas seit etwa

anderthalb Jahrhunderten ber das Leben Jesugeschreiben ist, ist.phantastisch und

romanhaft.xvi This oft quoted statement by Bultmann was a reaction against a long

tradition among historical Jesus scholars. Their approach and results were similar to those

of historical Socrates scholars: advocate one view, method, interpretation, and/or text

while criticizing alternative proposals, finally resulting in intellectual bankruptcy.

xvi I am certainly of the opinion that we can know almost nothing of the life and personality of Jesus. What has been written over the last roughly century and a half is fantastic and romantic. Bultmann, 1926, 10f.

3.2. Erste Phase: Reimarus zu Strauss

The period of time Bultmann was reacting against was not the first stage of the

Quest. It is, in fact, often referred to as the second phase.33Although Albert Schweitzer,

in his now famous survey of historical Jesus research (whence the title Quest for the

historical Jesus originates), began with Hermann Reimarus (1694-1768),34 there were

earlier and important historical-critical approaches (e.g., Thomas Chubb).35 What

differentiates these from the posthumously published writings of Reimarus is mainly the

scope of Reimarus work. While early critical approaches had challenged specific aspects

of the Christian tradition (e.g., miracles in the Gospels),36 Reimarus intended to attack

Christianity at its roots by exposing it as a tradition built on a historical distortion.37 The

method he used to achieve this goal began with an attempt to show that the historical

Jesus was not the Jesus of the Gospels. The historical Jesus was a political revolutionary,

a fanatic who desired and promoted radical change in Judaism and Israel, but who failed

and was executed. Next, Reimarus argued that Christianity resulted from the disciples

despair. These, he claimed, when they lost their leader, declared that he was raised and

would return. They thus transformed the conception of messiah from a largely political

and cultural one (someone who would restore the rule of Israel to the Jews) into a

spiritual and purely religious one. The first Christians, then, in an effort to solidify their

new religion, had transformed Jesus into something he wasnt: a Son of God who was

supposed to have died, and therefore who had not failed. Although Reimarus central

goal was to show the invalidity of Christianity by exposing the lies upon which it was

built, in attempting to do so he offered a thorough and historical-critical (rather than

religious) reanalysis of Jesus.

The publication of Reimarus writings quickly resulted in numerous attempts to

rescue the historicity of the traditional view of Jesus and the historical reliability of

the gospels.38 Despite their reactionary and defensive nature, these contributions are

important because they were historically grounded.39 History is concerned with what

most likely happened. Miracles, by nature, are unlikely, and therefore are precluded from

any historical analysis.40 After Reimarus, attempts to reconcile Jesus and the Gospels

with the historical-critical mindset of the day consisted of historical explanations for the

miracles within the gospels.41 The end of the first phase of the Quest is marked by the

devastating attack of D. F. Strauss (1808-1874) on these attempts.42 Strauss showed that

the miracles could not simply be explained away, because they were vital components of

the texts.43 By removing them or attempting to explain them away, one did not rescue

the texts but destroyed them, because this method failed to recognize the centrality of

non-historical elements in the texts.44

3.3. The Liberal Lives and the Lies of Liberalism

Thus began attempts to write biographies of Jesus. These are often referred to as

liberal lives because of the liberalism of the day which, according to these biographies,

the historical Jesus somehow embodied centuries earlier. This phase in the Quest, which

Bultmann and Schweitzer reacted against, did not simply try rescue the traditional

Jesus from critical analysis but attempted to uncover Jesus as he actually was.45 Alas, the

liberal questers faired no better than those who wished to uncover the historical Socrates.

Despite notable improvements in historical-critical methodology, historical Jesus questers

still lacked any coherent valid framework from which sound analyses could be

conducted. Schweitzer and Bultmann, among others, convincingly demonstrated that the

tools used to build the liberal lives of Jesus in the second phase were inadequate.46

3.4. The current phase

The reason the Quest for the Historical Jesus is so important to historical Socrates

research is not simply the problems faced by would-be biographers of both. The longer,

vaster, more nuanced, and more wide-ranging (in terms of both approaches and opinions)

nature of the historical Jesus Quest meant that the equivalent to the current state of

historical Socrates research was reached almost a century ago in the Quest for the

historical Jesus. The lack of defensible results from the initial stages of the Quest forced

scholars to borrow findings across fields and subfields (sociology, orality, psychology,

literary theory, etc.) and combine these with an increased understanding of the cultural

and historical context of Jesus and the sources for we have for him.47 This combination

allowed scholars to construct a firm methodological foundation for analysis.

3.5. Applicability to historical Socrates research

In order to see how these methods may be borrowed (or stolen) to reconstruct the

historical Socrates, we must first understand how the problems historical Jesus scholars

faced and overcame in a way never achieved by historical Socrates scholars were similar

enough to those facing historical Socrates scholars. There are, after all, clear differences.

The Gospels are religious texts, and therefore Jesus (unlike Socrates) is shrouded behind

the miraculous and theological purposes of the primary sources for him. The Gospels

were also written anonymously, while the primary sources for historical Socrates research

were written by people who knew him. Despite these and other differences, the problems

faced by those who would historically reconstruct the lives of Jesus or Socrates are

similar enough that certain methods (as well as the general approach) may be borrowed

from the current phase of historical Jesus research and applied to Socrates. First, as Navia

points out, neither Jesus nor Socrates themselves wrote anything we know of.48 Our

understanding of both Jesus and of Socrates is filtered through texts written by others.

Second, these texts were not intended solely or even primarily to represent the historical

figures in question. Genre, authorial intent, literary concerns, etc., are therefore all at play

in the primary sources for Jesus and Socrates, and a proper framework for understanding

each text and author is necessary before any historical content can be culled.

Disagreements among sources require methods which allow historians to determine

which source or sources are more likely to accord with history given any disagreement.

Finally, any historical reconstruction of either Jesus or Socrates requires a holistic

approach to the sources grounded in a cultural and social understanding of the period and

place in which they were written and to which they refer.

4. Lessons Learned: Successful methods and their application to the Quest for the

Historical Socrates

Given the similar problems facing questers for the historical Jesus and the

historical Socrates, what methods might a historical Socrates quester borrow from the

Quest for the Historical Jesus? We may leave for another time the comprehensive

application of useful historical Jesus methodology and the resulting reconstruction of the

historical Socrates, but simply pointing out the possibility that this application would be

fruitful is not enough. By way of compromise, let us therefore investigate some specific

examples of problems for historical Socrates research which might be resolved by

applying methods already used in historical Jesus scholarship. We may also divide these

into two broader categories: macro-level strategies and micro-level strategies. The former

help to lay a solid foundation for historical reconstruction by providing a way to approach

the texts, while the latter consists of the methodological framework for determining

historicity in the texts.

4.2. Texts, historicity, and genre

When looking for a solid foundation from which one may evaluate the historicity

of aspects or components of a text, it is only natural to begin with the proper

understanding of the texts themselves. Perhaps the most devastating attack on the validity

of the sources for the historical Socrates has been to identify them as literary, rather than

historical documents. This was a determination of genre: histories, like those of

Thucydides or even Xenophon, were valid sources for historical inquiry in a manner

impossible for literary works (whatever that might mean). A similar determination

dominated the Form-critical (or Formgeschichte) approach to the Gospels. Scholars like

Bultmann and Schmidt explicitly rejected not only the possibility that the Gospels are in

some sense biographies, but also that their authors were even interested in the historical

Jesus.49 The problem with these treatments, both that of Xenophon and Plato on the one

hand and the Gospels on the other, concerns a lack of proper understanding of genre and

of textual theory.

Genre is a framework of convention (often broad) which facilitates

communication.50 This wonderfully academic (and thus vague) definition, however, tells

us nothing useful. So let us move from description into exemplification. This text (the

one you are reading) is a part of the communicative process. Communication is the

relaying of information from source to receiver. Here, the author of this text is trying to

relay information about historiography, Socrates, the history of particular historiographic

approaches, and various other notions which will hopefully result in a coherent and

convincing argument. In order for this (or any) transmission to be successful, or even

possible, both sender (in this case, me) and receiver (a part played by you, and

spectacularly so, I might add) rely on shared understanding. The text you are reading is,

for example, written primarily in English. To anyone who cannot read English, this text is

meaningless, and no communication is possible. Yet shared language is not the only

necessary conventional framework for communication. Because the arguments made in

this text are academic, particular conventions are followed. Footnotes, citations,

quotations, formalized speech, particular lexical choices (e.g., the word lexical rather

than word or vocab) all result from conventional frameworks within which academic

discourse takes place. Academic is a rather broad category or genre, and we can and

should narrow it. Scholarship in the behavioral sciences, for example, utilizes few if any

quotes. As with scholarship in general, conventions in the behavioral sciences require

arguments to be bolstered by numerous in-text citations, but quoting from these same

texts constitutes a deviation from convention which erodes the communicative process.

The resulting text, no matter the content, is too unusual and unexpected to be considered

appropriate and therefore may simply be ignored. In literary studies, classics, philosophy,

and a number of other disciplines (particularly those which rely on texts, rather than

experiments, as their primary form of data and subject matter) not only allow quoting but

encourage it if used according to convention.

Of course, in academic discourse, as within all genres and other conventional

frameworks like registers (see below), variation is possible. Many academic texts do not

use the first person pronoun. This one does. Such variation is acceptable until the

deviation is too great. If the structure of this text resembled a Socratic dialogue, even if

the arguments for the thesis offered here were many times more convincing then they are

at present, the deviation from conventional academic discourse would render the text

useless. In communication, the receiver (reader, listener, etc.) possesses a stock of

communicative frameworks from which style, lexical choice, textual (oral or written)

structure, and so forth, serve as clues to aid understanding. Like the use of a particular

language, these clues convey information to facilitate communication. Academic texts

rely on conventional use of scholarly prose, erudite lexical usage, and complex linguistic

constructions. Poetry, by convention, deviates from typical linguistic usage in order to

communicate its artistic nature. Each genre, including oral genres,51 relies not only on

language but on conventional patterns to facilitate information.52 Within and across

genres, other similar conventions further govern structural and expressive components of

texts. Register, which often overlaps with genre, refers both to the context in which

communication occurs and the conventional patterns governing allowable structures

within that context.53 Religious contexts require religious registers, informal discourse

requires informal registers, and so forth.

The reason understanding genre and similar conventions is vital to reconstructing

the historical Socrates is due to the invalid divide between literature and history and the

conclusions drawn from this division. The Gospels are literary and religious documents.

They are clearly biased and apologetic, they include much which even ancient historians

like Thucydides would deem inappropriate to historical narratives, and are certainly not

biographies in the modern sense of the word. Nonetheless, after Bultmann and the form

critics failed to adequately account for the genre of the Gospels, a series of detailed

studies convincingly showed that the Gospels do indeed fit into a historical genre of

ancient biography or Lives.54 In other words, they accord well enough with a particular

conventional pattern (in style, structure, focus, etc.) that it is clear the authors desired

their creations to be read in a particular way and so wrote according to that (broad)

convention. While this does not mean the Gospels immediately become historically

accurate, it does mean that, contra Bultmann and the form critics, the authors were

interested in the historical Jesus and were also concerned to a certain extent with adhering

to history.

If the inclusion of mythical and miraculous accounts, as well as other artistic and

literary devices,55 does not preclude an ancient text from membership in a

historiographical genre, then neither should the use of dialogue, stories, and other literary

aspects in the writings of Plato and Xenophon. There is no reason to assume, a priori,

that just because Plato and Xenophons writings were literary and artistic creations, they

therefore were never intended to depict the historical Socrates.

Let us return, then, to a part of Dorions conclusion quoted earlier: If the logoi

Skratikoi are works of fictions, allowing their authors considerable scope for

inventionthen it seems hopeless to try to reconstruct the thought of the historical

Socrates on the basis of the logoi Skratikoi. First, even taking for granted the

categorization of this genre as fiction, the conclusion does not follow from this

premise. Dorions use of logoi Skratikoi implies genre: certain conventions dictate and

govern patterns within these text which make it possible to call them logoi Skratikoi.

This is also not a modern categorization. Aristotle, who opens his discussion of poetry

with the issue of genre,xvii mentions the lack classification when it comes to writings

.xviii Among these and other mixed types which

have no named genre, Aristotle includes . Ancient and

modern commentators agree, then, that the logoi Skratikoi belong at least in many ways

to a specific genre.

There is no reason to conclude that the conventions required by this genre do not

restrict or limit the invention of the authors in ways which allow historical

reconstruction of the type Dorion states is impossible. Perhaps, for example, while this

genre allows the character Socrates to do and say things the historical Socrates did not,

there may be limits to these. In other words, it may be that the character of Socrates could

not deviate from the historical Socrates in ways which completely hid his philosophy,

thought, and customary manner. The fact that Plato did not use Socrates as a character all

the time may indicate not that in all other instances he intended his character to be

Socrates, but that at these times the deviation was too great. Support for this

interpretation can be found in Diogenes Laertius. In his short biography of Simon the

xvii /concerning poetry both itself and the many forms it has Poetics 1447a. xviii Using bare words alone (i.e. prose without meter). Poetics 1447a-b.

shoe-maker, whom Diogenes credits with the invention of the logoi Skratikoi genre, he

states that

,.xix Whether the story itself is

accurate is hard to determine. However, what is important is that to an ancient historian

like Diogenes Laertius, these dialogues appeared to be a historical genre, in that they

sought in some sense to record actual conversations and sayings. We should remember

that it was Diogenes Laertius who recounted a story of Socrates calling Plato a liar, and

thus was clearly capable of understanding that these dialogues could contain fiction, yet

he describes them as historical nonetheless.

Therefore, before concluding that these dialogues are pure fiction and nothing in

them is intended (or required) to represent the historical Socrates, a better understanding

of this genre in these terms (i.e. to what extent, given that ancient history does not

preclude fictional components, are these dialogues designed to represent the historical

Socrates) is required. In what ways do various depictions vary, both within the respective

dialogues of Plato and Xenophon and between them, and in what ways are they the same?

What do other characters do which Socrates does not, particularly in dialogues in which

Socrates is present but does not speak or is not present at all? If conventional patterns in

the depictions of Socrates can be identified, it may very well be that the limits to these

conventions (i.e. how Socrates cannot be portrayed) will be instructive. Furthermore,

other methods (see below) may reveal that the fictional aspects of these dialogues are

not intended to prevent identification of the historical Socrates. As with the Gospels,

literary and fantastical elements do not, a priori, preclude historiographical intent.

xix Whenever Socrates came into his workshop and they discussed something, he would remember these talks and would take notes. DL 2.122.

4.3. Post-Easter Socrates

That neither Jesus nor Socrates wrote anything we possess is not the only

commonality between these two which is vital to developing a proper methodological

approach to the data. It is almost impossible to overestimate the importance of the

execution of both Jesus and Socrates. Nor is this importance limited to the impact of their

deaths in our sources. An enormous issue running through all the liberal lives of Jesus

Bultmann and Schweitzer demolished was the incongruence between their portraits of

Jesus and his execution. As Temple put it: Why anyone should have troubled to crucify

the Christ of Liberal Protestantism has always been a mystery.56 Jesus was executed,

and any biography of him must portray a Jesus who was objectionable enough to

contemporaries to be executed. The same is true for Socrates. Whatever aspects of

Xenophons writings may be traced back to the historical Socrates, it is hard to imagine

this moral preacher was ever considered harmful enough to be executed, and therefore

Xenophon left something out from, or even altered, his account of Socrates.

Our sources for Socrates, after all, were almost all written after his death, and

largely because of his death. In addition to the logoi Skratikoi genre, another entire

genre of apologies originated from Socrates death.57 These genres defined themselves

by their dedication to the memory of Socrates, and defenses against the charges he was

executed for, not to mention the trial itself, infuse them. We cannot even begin to analyze

the Socratic dialogues and texts without a conscious awareness of how the authors and

their literary products were shaped by Socrates death. Nor is the effect of his death

limited to a single trend or tendency as far as historicity is concerned:

La nature des , lamour et ladmiration de Platon pour

Socrate, entranent deux consequences. En vertu de la nature mme des

genre littraire quAristote classe parmi les imitations

qui plaisent notre sensibilit par leur vrit et par leur exactitude,

lidalization de Socrate dans les Dialogues ne saurait trop sloigner de

loriginal. Dautre part, ladmiration mme de Platon pour Socrate

tmoigne dune certaine fidlit du portrait. Mais seulement dune fidlit

relative parce quelle se trouve contrebalance par laspect crateur de

lart potique.xx

That two of our chief witnesses, Plato and Xenophon, were in some sense disciples of

Socrates and were attempting to honor, defend, and remember him in their works, was a

direct result of Socrates execution. Montuori is among the few to fully recognize the

importance of Socrates death in that it shapes virtually everything we possess about

him.58

As with Jesus then, any biography of Socrates must start from the

acknowledgment that he was executed. It is certainly true that this execution took place

during a period of religious fundamentalism and a wave of extremely conservative

thought.59 However, to conclude, therefore, that no truth lay in any of these charges is

foolish. This is especially true given what is contained in the only full depictions of

Socrates we possess which were written before his execution: those from the plays of

xx The nature of the Socratic Dialogues, the love and admiration of Plato for Socrates, engenders two consequences. By virtue of the very nature of the Socratic dialogue literary genre which Aristotle classifies among those imitations which are pleasing to our sensibilities by their truth and by their accuracy, the idealization of Socrates in the Dialogues cant stray differ much from the original. On the other hand, the same admiration of Plato for Socrates shows a certain faithfulness in the depiction. But only a relative faithfulness because it is counterbalanced by the creative aspect of the poetic art. De Magalh`es-Vilhena, 1952, p. 180.

Aristophanes. The coherence between how Socrates is portrayed in Aristophanes and

what Xenophon and Plato state he was accused of make it almost certain that at least

some people shared Aristophanes view of Socrates. Furthermore, that the Socrates of

Xenophon is virtually harmless, and the Socrates of Plato is the most just and wise of

men executed wrongly, are portrayals which must be understood in light of their post-

execution and apologetic realities. This does not mean that Aristophanes is unbiased or

that Plato and Xenophon cannot be trusted to accurately depict Socrates, simply that any

would-be biographer of Socrates must at every turn keep in mind two things: that

Socrates was executed for something, and virtually all our sources are laden with

reactions to that execution.

4.4. Accounting for the tradition

The importance of Socrates death in reconstructing his life is related to another

beginning methodological concern we may borrow from the historical Jesus quest.

Robins statement (quoted above) that we are faced with interpretations of Socrates rather

than Socrates himself is true, but there is perhaps a superior way of viewing our surviving

sources. We are dealing with Socrates as he was remembered, and these memories

(because of the importance and significance of the man behind them) quickly became

part of certain traditions. Part of these traditions involved the writing of texts according to

Socratic genres. Other aspects included stories of Socrates such as we encounter in

Xenophon and Diogenes Laertius. To be sure, not everything in the Socrates traditionxxi

consists of pure recollections recorded by eyewitnesses. However, just as with the

xxi The term Socrates tradition is used here in a way parallel to Jesus tradition within historical Jesus and NT scholarship. This usage also helps to differentiate between the Socrates tradition, or Socrates as he was remembered, honored, depicted, etc., and the Socratic tradition which is a philosophical one.

Gospels and other sources for Jesus,xxii this remembered Socrates constitutes the

foundation of the Socrates tradition. In reconstructing the historical Jesus, we must

envisage a Jesus who is big enough to explain the beginnings of Christianity.60 The

same is true of Socrates. In addition to a reconstructed Socrates consistent with a tried

and executed Socrates, any biography must also account for the fact that Socrates was

very influential in his day. Even before his death, Aristophanes clearly thought him

important. Aristophanes believed Socrates customs and manner dangerous, but if

Socrates had been a nobody, Aristophanes would never have thought it necessary ridicule

Socrates on the comic (and public) stage.61 Another aspect of the importance of the

Socrates tradition has already been discussed. The earliest Christians wrote letters and

Gospels. The followers of Socrates wrote dialogues and apologies. Understanding these

genres is key to understanding the Socrates tradition and therefore the historical Socrates.

Also important is the realization that despite a clear theme of witnessing and

remembering running through our sources for both Jesus62 and Socrates, for various

reasons (e.g., apologetic, a desire to know more, etc.) both traditions involved additions

and alterations. This is reflected in (among other places) the many stories which are

almost certainly unhistorical found in later works such as Diogenes Laertius Lives or the

infancy gospels of Jesus. To begin a valid reconstruction of Socrates, we must then utilize

an approach to the sources which aptly takes into account the effect of his death and their

membership in a tradition resulting from it (and from his life). The reconstruction of

Socrates must be consistent with a Socrates who was at once executed and also influential

xxii So important is the concept of a remembered Jesus to any historical approach to our texts that Dunn titled his large volume dedicated to the historical Jesus Jesus Remembered.

and important enough to have such a tradition. This reconstruction must also be based on

a view of the sources in light of this tradition.

4.5. The proper way to weight

The final component of the macro-level approach is not a novel contribution to

the Socratic problem. Rather, it is the Socratic problem. The Socratic problem began with

an awareness of disagreement among our primary sources for Socrates (Xenophon, Plato,

and Aristophanes) as well as secondary (particularly Aristotle). The Socratic problem

became the proper weight to give particular sources. Should Xenophon be ignored

because, in Russells words, he is not very liberally endowed with brains63 and is

therefore unworthy of consideration? Or can we trust Xenophon and not Plato, because

Platos Socrates is just Plato? These types of questions did not just frame discussion of

the Socratic problem, they were the Socratic problem. All solutions to the problem

therefore involved picking a source as the best or most accurate and if not stopping there,

then making that source the foundation for historical reconstruction. The unacceptability

of this method, and the beginnings of a better methodology, are already present in Lacys

Our Knowledge of Socrates:

The early Plato is rightly regarded as our main source, but no source can

be trusted or ignored entirely, and no source can be assumed to be equally

reliable throughout. We simply have to go about it the hard way and

examine the available evidence ad hoc for the particular problem that we

happen to be concerned with.64

Lacey is quite right to realize the necessity of a holistic approach to the texts, but quite

wrong to suggest that an ad hoc approach will work. Any analysis that doesnt have a

firm foundation and use a valid methodological approach will continue to lack the

hidden key Kuhn spoke of (see above). Much of this has already been outlined above,

but what is required now is a means for properly weighing the sources. The earlier

approach rightly rejected by Lacey did not fail because it sought to weigh the sources at

all, but because it involved equating to an unacceptable extent one author or set of

sources with the historical Socrates. Determining that certain sources are a priori more

likely to contain historical information is a necessary component of a framework for a

valid methodological approach.

The lessons (from successes and failures) of the historical Jesus quest are

instructive here. The difficulties involved in dating Platos dialogues relative to one

another, and how these have been ignored rather than overcome, have their parallel in

historical Jesus research. There is a tendency among scholars in any field to think know

or can know more than is actually possible. This is perhaps best represented in terms of

early Christian scholarship and historical Jesus research by treatments of Q. That a

common source lies behind parts of Matthew and Luke other than Mark (called Q) is

widely (but not universally) accepted among NT scholars.65 Even though this text is a

hypothetical reconstruction, some conclusions drawn from it are simply breathtaking in

how far beyond the evidence they go. As one commentator said in reaction to certain

treatments of Q of this type, to treat Q as a document at all is controversial. To treat it as

a gospelis more so; to postulate two or three stages in its development is to build

castles in the air; to insist that the document was composed in the fifties, and possibly at

Tiberias in Galileee, is to let imagination run riot.66 Assumptions are used to validate

assumptions, then treated as facts, and used to construct further assumptions.

Similar problems are at play in dating Platos dialogues. The earlier dialogues are

assumed to be those which more closely represent Socrates (rather than Plato), because

they date to a period where Plato was more concerned with remembering and honoring

his teacher rather than developing his own thought, which was too incomplete at this time

anyway.67 The dialogues then are sorted largely by how closely Plato adheres to Socrates

philosophy versus his own. Then this representation of Socrates can be used as a basis for

the historical Socrates. The first issue, of course, is that almost all of this rests on initial

assumptions about the philosophy of both Plato and Socrates, which are then used to

reconstruct those same philosophies.68 Often enough, these dating techniques are no more

than very erudite, scholarly, expert, and otherwise dressed-up versions of common

circular reasoning. Another issue in this approach involves the assumption of linear

development and expression of thought. In other words, grouping Platos works together

on the bases of certain linguistic expressions or themes assumed to constitute a stage in

his philosophical thought ignores the very real possibility that he could vary his rhetorical

techniques and themes at any stage. Moreover, this grouping also requires knowledge of

Platos philosophy and intent we may not possess. Rowe, for example, points out that one

common dating method is to characterize the early dialogues based on modern

understanding of their philosophical value, which probably distorts their intended

purpose and certainly isnt valid.69 Dorion, in his defense of Xenophons portrayal of

Socrates, argues that the modern characterization of Xenophon as anything but a

philosopher merely illustrates a disconnect between modern understanding of philosophy

and ancient.70 If we cant even understand ancient philosophical conceptions well enough

to know who would have been considered a philosopher, dating Platos dialogues based

on such understanding seems foolhardy. Finally, even if some rough chronological

divisions are more or less accurate, we cannot then simply decide that earlier ones will

inevitably better depict the historical Socrates.

This tendency to equate the early Platonic Socrates with the historical Socrates,

however, is an outgrowth of the Socratic problem and the approach to it which must be

rejected. A particular author or selection of texts (e.g. early Plato) should not be the

basis for historical construction. Rather, the likelihood that a given source will contain

more historical information is a matter of weighting the sources based on genre, the

authors knowledge of Socrates, the bias of the work, and so forth. This weighing should

also be dynamic. For example, Aristophanes (as a critic of Socrates) very likely offers us

a good many historical reasons for Socrates execution, and there is almost certainly an

element of truth in at least some of his depiction, given Socrates execution. In fact, that

all of our sources intended to portray a Socrates recognizable as Socrates means that there

is something of the historical Socrates distinguishable in them. However, because

Aristophanes wrote plays, which were intended to be comic distortions of reality, no

individual words or actions of Socrates should be deemed historical unless we have

independent reasons for thinking so (see below). In other words, we can heavily weight

Aristophanes when it comes to how Socrates was commonly understood, and for the

reasons behind his execution, but for details about Socrates philosophy and thought we

cannot give Aristophanes much weight. Plato and Xenophon, given their intimate

knowledge of Socrates, their desire to honor him and remember him, are a priori likely to

contain a great deal of historical information on Socrates, and in particular his philosophy

and thought. As with all sources, methodological criteria are required to sift through this

content, but these two witnesses should be given the most weight initially.

4.6. Criteria for historicity

This brings us at last to the methodological criteria we may borrow from the

historical Jesus quest. Once a firm foundational framework to approach the texts is

developed, we can use these criteria to determine the historicity of individual components

within them (e.g., reported events in Socrates life or his mannerisms). The most

important criteria for the historical Jesus quest are given by Meier,71 but we need not

proceed in the order that he does. Perhaps the most useful criterion is that of multiple

attestation. The fact that Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon agree that Socrates was

believed to be impious or an atheist very likely means people did think he was. We can

also note that our two chief witnesses, Plato and Xenophon, appear to agree that for

Socrates self-mastery is important. Xenophon opens his memorabilia with his memory of

Socrates and his capacity for enkrateia or self-control.xxiii Platos Socrates likewise states

,

.xxiv The reason for this agreement is very likely its relationship to the historical

Socrates, in that he believed this.

Of course, if the sources all agreed, we wouldnt have a Socratic problem in the

first place. The criterion of multiple attestation is useful, but what we really need are

xxiii Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2. xxiv Yeilding to ones self is nothing other than ignorance, while self-control is nothing other than wisdom.

criteria which allow us to decide what his more likely to be historical given disagreement,

not agreement. This is not to say that the criterion of multiple attestation is useless when

there is disagreement. As quoted earlier, the Socrates of Plato, in the republic, is very

clear that the soul is immortal. That this reflects Platos view more than it does Socrates

is likely first because Plato himself elsewhere depicts Socrates as more or less agnostic as

far as the souls immortality is concerned, and second because this view is attested to in

Xenophon. However, what do we do when there is disagreement but no third source

which supports either view, or when the third source is too remote (e.g., Diogenes

Laertius) or too unhistorical (e.g., Aristophanes) to count as multiple attestation? Here

other criteria are very useful. One such important criterion is the criterion of

embarrassment. By way of illustration, consider that Plato and Xenophon desired to

depict Socrates in a positive light. If either includes details about Socrates which are

embarrassing or weaken this positive depiction, they are likely to be there because they

are historical. Thus, for example, the Socrates of Xenophon is predictable, normal, and

agreeable in speech throughout almost all of Xenophons works. The Socrates of Plato,

however, is frequently depicted as being outrageous, rude, mocking, or otherwise

shocking with respect to his manner of speech.72 It is more likely that Xenophon, in an

attempt to portray Socrates in a better light, reduced the caustic or disturbing aspects of

Socrates style of speaking than that Plato added them. This is particularly true given the

depiction of Socrates in Aristophanes. Likewise, while Xenophons Socrates speaks

highly of political leaders like Pericles and Themistocles, Platos Socrates, in response to

an assertion that Themistocles and Pericles (among others) are great men and speakers,

responds [] .xxv Once xxv I am not able to speak that such a one exists among them. Gorgias 503c-d.

again, it must be remembered that Socrates was executed and (as shown in Aristophanes)

had a history of getting on peoples nerves. It is again, therefore, more likely that

Xenophon attempted to make Socrates more patriotic and Athenian than he was, and

that Platos Socrates, who is critical of politicians, is closer to the historical Socrates.

Another criterion worth mentioning is that of coherence. Once other methods

have established certain aspects of Socrates life and thought, we can use these to

determine the historicity of other pieces within our sources. If, for example, there is

evidence that Socrates really did attempt to test others to see if they were wise (as the

Socrates of Plato claims), then depictions of Socrates which cohere with this inquisitive

nature are more likely to be historical. This includes the portrayal of Socrates as

interested in natural philosophy found in Aristophanes and in parts of Plato (see above).

Xenophons Socrates, who completely lacks any interest in natural philosophy, can in this

respect be dealt with according to the criterion of embarrassment. Xenophon simply

wished to clear his teachers name.

5. Conclusion

There are, of course, other criteria of historicity used in the Quest for the

Historical Jesus. Some of them will be of no use for historical Socrates research, and

methods of historical reconstruction unique to the Socrates tradition will likely be

possible or even required. What we have seen, however, is that the Socratic problem, as it

is typically conceived and approached, is indeed a pseudo-problem. This does not mean,

however, that Dorion is correct in thinking that the reconstruction of a historical Socrates

is impossible given our sources. Similar problems, including more difficult ones, exist in

reconstructing the historical Jesus, and yet thanks to many brilliant minds and several

centuries of intense study a methodological framework was constructed making possible

historical reconstruction of Jesus. This does not mean that all scholars agree who the

historical Jesus was, or that it is even possible to know. Rather, the methods employed

allow us to determine a great many things that are certain or highly probable about Jesus

life and teaching, and propose other aspects which are less sure. The same is possible

with Socrates. It is time for us to leave the Socratic problem behind to embark on the

Quest for the historical Socrates.

1 The development and expression of this extreme view, and convincing arguments against it, may be found in Keith Windshuttles The Killing of History (1996). 2 ibid. Also, the motivation for this view resulted at least in part on wider critiques of academic disciplines and a resulting epistemological skepticism, such as the critiques of the new feminism or even earlier of Marxism. Outside of historical studies, a good review of the history and effect of such critiques may be found for psychology in Thomas Leos work on the subject (2005). Within historical studies see e.g. part IV of Lambert & Schofield (Eds.) Making History (2004). For examples of this constructionalist approach to history and/or the philosophy of historiography, see e.g. Goldstein (1996) and Munslow (1997). For defenses of reconstructionalist or realist views against the critiques offered by constructionionalist philosophies of history, see especially Appleby, Hunt, & Jacob (1994) Windshuttle (1996), & Harlon (1997). 3 The origin of the term appears something of an enigma. Navia (2007) states, We confront in the end a problem, the Socratic problem as this is known and so clearly indicates that the disagreement between sources is commonly referred to in this way. Much earlier, Popper (1966) refers to the so-call ed Socratic Problem [italics in original]. In an article in The Philosophical Review, as far back as 1927 Dubs wrote an article entitled The Socratic Problem. Yet just when it became common among English speaking scholars to refer to this historical issue with this designation is unclear, as is who first coined (or translated?) the term. Russell (1945) comments briefly on the issue, yet never uses this term. The highly influential scholar John Burnet (1914) discusses the issue at some length, yet again nowhere do we find this particular descriptor. 4 Bruce Lee 5 Taylor, 1932, p. 9. 6 , , , , , / such was the end, Echecrates, of our companion, a man such that we may say of him that of those living then whom we have put to the test, [he was] the best and the wisest and the most just. Phaedo 118a. 7 Gigon, 1947. 8 Momigliano, 1971. 9 Lest too much weight be placed on this early tradition, preserved or perhaps created by Stoics (who saw themselves as the intellectual ancestors of Socrates (Brown, 2009)), there is the even earlier statement from Platos second letter: , , / for these [reasons] I

have never yet written anything, nor is there any composition of Plato nor will there be, but rather the [compositions] so named are [instead] of Socrates become fair and young. 10 Rowe, 2009. 11 Navia, 2007, p. 94. 12 Vlastos, 1991, 46. 13 108d ff. 14 Russell, 1945. 15 e.g., Republic 7 & 10, Symposium. 16 Copleston, 1946, p. 103. 17 Burnet, 1914; Taylor, 1932. 18 Ibid. 19 Taylor, 1932, p. 25-27. 20 Ibid. 21 Copleston, 1946, p. 101. 22 Dorion, 2009. 23 Copleston, 1946, p. 99. 24 Lindsey, 1910, Introduction. 25 Ibid. 26 Taylor, 1932; Russell, 1945. 27 Socrates, for example, in Platos Apology (19c), mentions Aristophanes by name. This is said in the context of what Socrates has been accused of (19b), behaviors which are quite similar to those of Socrates as he is depicted in Aristophanes Clouds. 28 Dorion, 2009, p. 93. 29 Maier (1913), for example, does not simply discuss the problems with die Gestalt des Sokrates but explicitly states that this problem will remain hopelessly unresolved. 30 Nails (2009), for example reconstructs the trial and death of Socrates using Aristophanes, Xenophon, and Plato. She relies especially on the dialogues of Plato. However, no criteria for historicity are offered. Nor does she anywhere describe her reasons for determining that the works she uses in her reconstruction can be so used. Despite over two hundred years of critical investigation, Nails reconstructs the end of Socrates life as if no problems with the sources existed. 31 Kuhn, 1934, p. 135. 32 This header is a play on the title of Albert Schweitzers monumental work Von Reimarus zu Wrede. 33 Theien & Merz, 1996, 1.2. 34 Schweitzer, 1906. 35 Dunn, 2003, 4.2. cf. Wright, 1996, 1.3.1. 36 Dunn, 2003, 4.2. 37 Wright, 1996, 1.3.2. 38 Dunn, 2003, 4.2. 39 Ibid. 40 This does not mean, of course, that accounts of miracles cannot be the subject of historical analysis (see on this point e.g., Meier, 1994, chap. 17). That historical events seen by historical people have been interpreted as miraculous, whether they were or not, is certainly something with which historians can and sometimes must deal. It is, therefore, part of a historians responsibility (to the extent possible) to determine whether or not a particular magical or miraculous deed or event corresponds to something that actually happened (Jesus, for example, was almost certainly believed to have healed the sick). What a historian cannot do, without leaving the realm of history, is determine the historicity of the miracle itself, rather than the event behind it. 41 Ibid. 42 Theien & Merz, 1996, 1.1. 43 Dunn, 2003, 4.2. 44 Dunn, 2003, 4.2. 45 Theien & Merz, 1996, 1.3; Dunn, 2003, 4.3. 46 Schweizer, 1906; Bultman, 1926.

47 On the history of this approach, see e.g., Wright, 1996, chap 3, Theien & Merz, 1996, 1.3-5. On the general methodology used in this approach, see e.g., Meier, 2005; Dunn, 2005. For examples of historical Jesus research based on this approach, see e.g., 47 Theien & Merz, 1996, Wright, 1996; Dunn, 2003. 48 Navia, 2007, p. 16. 49 Bultmann, 1921; Schmidt; 1923. 50 Bawarschi, 2003; Burridge, 2006. 51 Orality studies often make use of terms from literary and textual studies, including terms like oral text or oral genre. The Gospels, for example, are typically seen as the product of oral transmission (see eg.., Kelber, 1983, Wansborough (Ed.), 1991). Of primary importance, then, is the proper model of orality used in the transmission of the Jesus tradition. If Jesus sayings and the stories about him were informally transmitted by anyone without any control, they could be added to and altered beyond recognition. If, on the other hand, various mechanisms of control (e.g., transmission by an authoritative source who was viewed as an expert, correction by the larger community, etc.) could limit this process. Additionally, the various oral genres which form this tradition could be handled differently. The teachings of Jesus, for example, might be transmitted in a more stable form than stories about him. Even his teachings could be broken down into different oral genres, such as apothegms versus parables. 52 Ibid. 53 Biber, 1988; Biber & Finegan, 1994; Ferguson, 1994. 54 Talbert, 1977; Aune, 1987, Burridge, 1992; Frickenschmidt, 1997. 55 A famous example of such a device is Wredes (1901) arguments for the messianic secret in Mark, a literary device with theological designs. 56 Temple, 1945, p. xxiv. 57 Navia, 2007, p. 74. 58 Montuori, 1984. 59 Nails, 2009; Janko, 2009. 60 Dunn, 2005, p. 168. 61 Navia, 2007, chap. 2. 62 Dunn, 2005. 63 Russell, 1945, p. 82. 64 Lacey, 1971, p. 49. 65 Meier, 1991, chap. 2; Theien & Merz, 1996, 2.2; Dunn, 2003, 7.4. 66 Wright, 1996, p. 48. 67 Copleston, 1946, 18.2; Navia, 2007, Chap. 4; Rowe, 2009. 68Dorion, 2009; Rowe, 2009. 69 Rowe, 2009. 70 Dorion, 2009. 71 Meier, 2005. 72 See e.g., Symposium 221d, Gorgias 494d, Phaedrus 229c.