QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE OF MUNICIPAL SERVICE

DELIVERY PROTESTS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Zacheus Matebesi

Department of Sociology

Paper presented at the 2nd European Conference:

Qualitative Research for Policy Making

26 & 27 May 2011, Belfast, United Kingdom

May 26, 2011

OUTLINE

1. Background

2. Research methods

3. Findings

4. Recommendations

AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE…

“Social control is a continuing function of every social system. When

the mechanisms of control [both formal and informal] weaken,

people may lose confidence in the existing system and try to

reform it through collective behaviour… Social control can

breakdown when the formal agents of control fail to perform

their roles adequately.”

Turner & Kilian, 1987)

1 BACKGROUND – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

• South Africa has three tiers of government:

– National

– Provincial

– Local (municipalities)

• Local Government (LG) - distinctive sphere of government, which is

interdependent, and inter-related with national and provincial

spheres of government.

•

1. BACKGROUND – SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS

• Apartheid-era - social protests against the political system used to be

widespread

• But, 17 years after the new political dispensation….

• “it might appear as if the rolling mass action of the end-of-apartheid

period had simply continued into the dawn of a democratic government

in South Africa”

1 BACKGROUND – SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS

METHODS (1)

• Presentation is based on four case studies:

1. Phumelela (Free State Province)

2. Phomolong (Free State Province)

3. Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape Province)

4. Khutsong (Gauteng Province)

• Gauteng case study differs – primarily about provincial boundary

demarcation

METHODS (2)

• Literature and media scan

• Secondary analysis –i.e. census figures

• In-depth interviews (100):

– current and previous councilors

– current and previous officials

– business owners

– security services personnel

– provincial officials

– community leaders

• Focus Groups (300 community members):

– Protestors and non-protestors

FINDINGS: REASONS FOR THE PROTESTSFREE STATE (FS) & EASTERN CAPE (EC) CASE STUDIES

1. Poor governance

• FS - no council meetings

• EC – IDP accepted after 4 years

2. Political in-fighting

3. Deficient client-interface

4. Ineffective management

5. Poor housing administration & management

REASONS FOR THE PROTESTSFREE STATE (FS) & EASTERN CAPE (EC) CASE STUDIES

• No coherent systems in place to measure service delivery or the

quality of the client interface

• An interviewee in Phumelela sums this up:

• “If I had to rate the municipality by means of the guidelines used to rate

the hospitality industry, I would give it ½ a star for water and

electricity, and a 0 star for sanitation before the unrest. With the slight

improvements since then, I can give it 1½ for water and electricity, and

a ‘minus 5’ star, whatever that means, for sanitation.”

GAUTENG CASE STUDY – PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY DEMARCATION

1. First 2 government notices – North West Province

2. Submissions to Demarcation Board – Gauteng Province

3. Gauteng Local Gov. Portfolio Committee – Gauteng Province

4. Gauteng Legislature – North West Province

5. Municipal Demarcation Board – North West Province

6. Municipal Demarcation Board - Gauteng Province

7. Parliament Portfolio Committee – Gauteng Province

8. National Council of Provinces & Minister of Loc. Government –

North West Province

9. Constitutional Court - a political solutions should be found

10. ANC (March 2009) – Gauteng Province

GAUTENG CASE STUDY

POOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

HISTORY OF UNCERTAIN HUMAN SETTLEMENT

Inadequate community

engagement

Lack of

appropriate inter-

governmental

relations

Political opportunism

CROSS-BORDER MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

SOCIAL UNREST

SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROTESTS

Eroding

social capital

• Education• Councilors chased out of Khutsong

•3 persons killed

• Hundreds injured

• Many lost jobs

Dented relations between

officials and politicians

Deteriorating levels of

mutual trust between

community members

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PROTESTS

• Damage to infrastructure

• Public infrastructure = estimated USD 35 million

• Private property = USD 5 million

• Service payments dropped from 50% (2007) to 20% (2009)

• Payment levels to Eskom dropped from 86% to 43%

• Municipality spent USD 8,301.51 a month on relocated councillors (2007-

2009)

POLICY IMPLICATIONS – LESSONS LEARNEDEARLY WARNING SIGNALS

• Councilors & ward committees are in a better position to detect early

warning signs

• Difficult to be picked up by intelligence systems of local police

SOME EARLY WARNING SIGNALS INCLUDED…

1. High levels of non-payment and municipal cash flow problems

2. Absence of regular ward committee meetings – record keeping is

essential

3. Continuous complaints about general service delivery

4. Ongoing gripes about certain individuals within a specific community

IN CONCLUSION…

1. Correct process alone would have avoided the unrest

2. Some opportunities for compromise not explored

3. Institutionalize mediation to defuse tension

4. Role of the media should be noted

5. Political or legal coercion DOES NOT minimize conflict

6. Understand; local in-migration patterns

7. Rethink development approaches in small towns

THANK YOU!