Q21 Verses 78-79 a Qur'Anic Basis for Ijtihad

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for IjtihädlHamid Algar

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

78: Remember Dä3üd and Sulaymän, when they give judgement in thematter of the field into which the sheep of certain people had strayedby night; We did witness their judgement. 79: We bestowed under-standing thereof on Sulaymän, and to each of them We gave judge-ment and knowledge ...

An impressive number of mufassirün are of the opinion that the incident to whichthese two verses refer resulted in divergent verdicts from Dä3üd and his son,Sulaymän. It is held that when the father realised that his son's judgement was wiserthan his own, he revised the verdict he had just given, despite being vested with bothprophethood and kingship, and despite the extreme youth of Sulaymän at the time.This understanding derives in part from the opening words of verse 79, for they speakof a divine bestowal of understanding on Sulaymän to the apparent exclusion ofDä3üd. The verb expressing this bestowal, fahhamnähä, is, moreover, preceded by afä' that has been interpreted as a/ä' al-tacqib, suggesting that Sulaymän reached hiscorrect decision on the matter some time after his father had given his verdict.1Far more influential, however, have been a series of partly contradictory traditionsthat purport to supply details of the whole affair. Traditions of this type are, of course,commonly found not only in exegetical writings but also in books belonging to thegenre of qisas al-anbiyä'. In both cases, the principal aim is to enlarge on the pur-posefully laconic and allusive narratives the Qur'an devotes to the prophets. In thepresent instance, however, these traditions serve more than a literary purpose, for theyare adduced in support of the notion that ijtihäd has Qur'anic roots and was practisedby the prophets themselves. Baydäwi, one of the most prominent exegetes to explainthe verses as alluding to divergent exercises in ijtihäd, goes so far as to concede that'were it not for the [relevant] traditions' (law lä al-naql), Dä°üd and Sulaymän couldbe assumed to have delivered one and the same verdict, and the question of ijtihädwould not have arisen.2 For Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi, the evidence of 'the numeroustraditions' (al-akhbär al-kathira) detailing what had allegedly transpired was alsodecisive, although in a slightly different way. Convinced that the verdicts of father andson diverged, he thought it possible that in principle both should have been the resultof divine command but that the traditions made clashing exercises of ijtihäd a farmore likely explanation.3

2 Journal of Qur'anic Studies

Most of the traditions in question begin by clarifying that al-harth (lexically 'field','tillage') as it occurs in verse 78 has the meaning of al-karm (vineyard), for the prop-erty subjected to nocturnal invasion was supposedly a vineyard where 'the clusters ofgrapes hung low' and were all consumed by the marauding sheep.4 According to themost frequently cited tradition, that going back to Ibn MascOd, the owner of the vine-yard appealed to Dä°üd for justice on the day following the incident, and he awardedhim ownership of the sheep by way of compensation, presumably because the valueof the vineyard and that of the sheep was roughly equal.5 Sulaymän, reportedly elevenyears of age at the time, went to his father and told him: '[A judgement] other thanthis [is better], o Prophet of God'. Dä3üd then asked him what the preferable verdictmight be, and he responded: 'That you assign the vineyard to the owner of the sheepfor him to tend until it returns to its former state; assign the sheep to the owner of thevineyard so he may benefit from them until the vineyard is restored; and then returnthe vineyard to its owner, and the sheep to their owner' .6The circumstances under which Sulaymän learned of his father's verdict and made hisobjections known to him are related somewhat differently in a tradition going back toIbn °Abbäs. Sulaymän is said to have encountered the two parties to the dispute as

soon as they emerged from his father's court, for he was sitting next to the entrance.When they told him of Dä°üd's verdict he remarked, without going into detail: 'WereI to be given authority to settle this matter, I would render a different judgement'.Thereupon Dä°üd summoned his son to ask him how he would adjudicate the case.He explained: 'You should give the sheep to the owner of the field [for this is how IbncAbbäs evidently understood al-harth] so that he will have at his disposal their off-spring, their milk, their clarified butter, and other benefits deriving from them.Meanwhile, let the owners of the sheep sow the field on behalf of its owners, just asthey would usually do themselves. When the field is restored to its former state, itsowners will take possession of it anew, and they will return the sheep to their own-ers' .7 According to yet another version, attributed by Räzi again to Ibn Mascud as wellas to Shurayh and Muqätil but related by BaydäwT and AlüsT without mention of asource, Sulaymän told his father when suggesting a revision of the judgement:'[A verdict] other than this would be more favourable (arfaq) for the two parties'.Da3ud then adjured his son, invoking his claims upon him as father and prophet, totell him what would be 'more favourable'. He responded with the same proposal oftemporary exchange of property between the owners of the land and the owners of thesheep, prefacing it, according to this version, with the words, 'I am of the opinion(ara) that ...'.8

Despite minor differences in wording and detail, the upshot of all three traditions isthe same: that a defective and apparently hasty verdict on the part of Dä3üd was

annulled in light of his son's superior insight. The story is not unique. The tradition

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihädl 3

literature contains accounts of similar instances of what can be called prompt judicialreview on the part of Sulaymän, and several of them are cited in connection with theexegesis of the two verses under examination. Unlike the narrations with which weare principally concerned, none of them is in attempted explanation of Qur'anicreferences, and therefore lack any purported basis in revelation. One such story is,however, attributed to the Prophet in the Sahihayn. According to this tale, a wolfabducted two boys, each the son of a different woman, and only one survived theordeal. The two women then went to DäTid, each claiming the survivor was her son.Dä3üd was about to award the child without further ado to the older and moreinsistent of the women, when Sulaymän proposed that the object of the dispute bebisected and one half be awarded to each of the claimants. The suggestion was accept-ed by the older woman, but rejected by the younger, who renounced her claim ratherthan seeing harm come to the child. The veracity of her claim and the falsity of herrival's thus became apparent.9Another story belonging to the same genre, found in the Tärlkh of Ibn cAsäkir andcited in works of tafslr without sanad, relates that four men from the Banü IsräTlsought to seduce a woman of uncommon beauty. When she rebuffed all of them, theyconspired to avenge themselves by denouncing her for bestiality with a dog speciallytrained for the purpose. Dä3üd unhesitatingly sentenced her to death by stoning.Sulaymän was playing near his father's place of judgement as sentence was beingrendered, and decided to mimic what had just transpired in the trial. He playedthe part of the judge himself and had two of his playmates assume the role of theaccusers. He interrogated each of them separately concerning the color of the dog inquestion, and they gave him contradictory answers. Dä°ud observed the game and

applying the same investigative technique to the four actual accusers received fourdifferent answers. He thereupon urgently countermanded the sentence of executionand had the four slanderers put to death instead.10

A third account of dangerously erroneous judgement on the part of Dä'üd also relatesto a slanderous accusation of sexual misconduct. Two slave girls owned by a piousspinster were forbidden by her to have illegitimate contact with men. They thereuponforged evidence of apparent fornication on her part in the expectation that she wouldbe put to death and they would then be free to satisfy their urges. Dä3üd delivered theverdict they desired, which he was obliged to annul once Sulaymän had proved thepious woman's innocence by means of an inspired forensic technique.11Finally, a story related by KisäT in his Qisas al-anbiyW, although not cited by any ofthe mufassimn in connection with the episode of the sheep and the vineyard, is ofrelevance because it portrays Sulaymän as coming yet again to the aid of his judiciallyperplexed father. A man unexpectedly discovered buried treasure on a recently


purchased plot of land and, against the normal promptings of human nature, sued theseller to have him take possession of the treasure. The seller nobly demurred, declar-ing the sale of the land implicitly to have included whatever lay beneath it. Dä°üd wasleft nonplussed by this unusual display of abstemiousness, whereupon Sulaymänintervened with his father's permission. He asked one of the litigants whether he hada son, and the other whether he had a daughter. Both answering in the affirmative,Sulaymän proposed that they marry their offspring to each other and give them theunwanted treasure as a wedding gift.12It is conceivable that the apparent subordination of Dä^üd to Sulaymän that underliesall these stories is connected to another matter in which the son is seen to have out-done his father: completing the building of Bayt al-Maqdis.13 Be that as it may, theaggregate of the judicial anecdotes does suggest a dismal record of ineptitude on thepart of Dä^üd, redeemed only by the prompt intervention of Sulaymän on each occa-sion. Indeed, it would be difficult in light of these traditions to resist the conclusionthat DäTJd had difficulty in fulfilling the divine command to 'judge justly amongmen' (Q. 38:26). A whole series of mufassirün nonetheless cite one or more of themas proof that the differing judgements of Dä'üd and Sulaymän in the case of the sheepand the vineyard

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and, by implication, on the other occasions mentioned-

resultedfrom each in turn exercising ijtihäd in good faith; it is simply that the ijtihäd of Dä'üdproved inferior to that of his son. Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi, Baydäwi, Ebussuüd Efendi,and Alüsl are among the prominent exegetes to espouse this understanding of thematter. The precise wording of one of the traditions is regarded as decisive. Theoccurrence of the word arä (T am of the opinion') at the beginning of Sulaymän'sremarks to his father clearly indicates, it is held, that he had not received revelationon the matter, and that he was therefore engaged in ijtihäd. The same is indicated bythe fact that his father found it necessary to adjure him to speak his mind plainly, forif Sulaymän had received revelation on the matter he would in the nature of thingshave needed no prompting to proclaim it. And if Sulaymän was practising ijtihäd,it follows that Dä3üd must have engaged in the same when he pronounced hisoriginal verdict, not basing it on revelation, for it is axiomatic that ijtihäd cannotannul netss.14

The precise interpretation of the episode as involving the exercise of ijtihäd varies,however, according to the differing perspectives of the musawwiba and the mukhtiDa.The former regard every exercise of ijtihäd as yielding a correct result (sawäb), evenin the face of differing or contradictory judgements, and their view is summarised inthe formula, 'every mujtahid hits the mark' (kudu mujtahidin musib). The latter, bycontrast, assert that there is only one divinely approved and correct (wäqici) answerfor every possible case (mas1aid), so that a mujtahidmay err, but do so excusably andstill be rewarded for his efforts; their slogan is, 'the error of the mujtahid does

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for IjtihMl 5

not affect his status as mujtahid' (la yaqdahu khata* al-mujtahid fi kawnihimujtahidan).15The former viewpoint is exemplified, among the mufassirün, by Najm al-Din Räzi,best known as a Sufi but also the author of an important although still unpublishedtafsir, the Bahr al-macänl. He glosses the words, 'We did witness their judgement' inverse 78 as meaning, 'We were present with Our knowledge (hädirln cilman) whenthey gave judgement; they gave judgement in accordance with Our guidance, so nei-ther of them was in error. It is rather that We wished to make firm the structure ofijtihäd by means of their judgement, in order to honour and ennoble the mujtahidünand for them to follow [both] Dä3üd and Sulaymän by relying on their well-appreciated exertions in ijtihäd'. In other words, the episode is not to be interpretedas merely illustrating the practice of ijtihäd; the divine purpose for its entire occur-rence was establishing the principle of ijtihäd. Even Sulaymän's tender age is regard-ed as significant, for it indicates that 'the knowledge and understanding of ordinances,of their inner meanings and purposes, are the criterion to be used in assessing great-ness and accomplishment, not age'. Najm al-Din Räzi similarly glosses the words,'and to each of them We gave judgement and knowledge' in verse 79 to mean, '[Wedid this] in order that each of them might judge in accordance with knowledge andwisdom with Our support (hi ta'yidina), even though one of them might judge con-trary to Our wisdom, so that the validity of the practice of ijtihäd be established; everymujtahid attains a correct result (kullu mujtahidin musib)' ,16 This understanding ofthe matter involves two important disjunctions, or at least distinctions: one betweenthe wisdom of the mujtahid and the divine wisdom with which it may or may notcoincide with respect to a particular case (mas0aid); and the other between that divinewisdom and the higher and more general purpose involved in establishing theprinciple of ijtihäd.The position of the mukhtFa would seem to be indicated by the words, 'We bestowedunderstanding thereof on Sulaymän', for, it has been claimed, if Dä30d had also hadcorrect understanding, this statement would be meaningless. In response to this it wassaid by Ämidi that the verse does not negate correct understanding for Dä'üd, whileaffirming it for Sulaymän; the meaning of the statement may therefore be that theydelivered the same verdict in the case of the vineyard and the sheep, both by way ofijtihäd, but their joint ijtihäd was annulled by a nass which was revealed

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for what-ever reason

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only to Sulaymän. Another possible explanation, according to thisproponent of the musawwiba position, is that father and son gave differing judge-ments, each based on ijtihäd and each correct, but that the ijtihäd of Sulaymän wasconfirmed by wahy and therefore abrogated that of his father.17


Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi criticises the arguments of both the mukhti'a and themusawwiba, without making it entirely plain where he stands on the issue underdispute. The former are on weak ground, he affirms, because the divine bestowal ofunderstanding on Sulaymän may simply mean that an abrogating revelation came tohim of which Dä3üd was not aware at the time of his verdict; if that be the case

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clearly only a hypothetical possibility for Räzi, given his preference for ijtihäd as an

explanation for what transpired-

then Dä°üd was correct (musib) in his judgement.As for the musawwiba, their assumption that the bestowal of 'judgement and knowl-edge' on both Dä^üd and Sulaymän related specifically to their divergent verdicts isuntenable; the knowledge in question is rather 'knowledge of the methods of ijtihäd'(cilman bi-wujüh al-ijtihäd). Further, argues Räzi, the phrase, 'to each of them Wegave judgement and knowledge', is a form of praise, and no praise is due for theessentially passive act of receiving revelation; that which occasions abundant praiseis 'the vigour of mind and skill in deduction' that come into play when exercisingijtihäd.l% The word dim is thus interpreted by Räzi not in the sense of divinelybestowed knowledge that the context suggests, but as a branch of knowledge or

science.

In addition to thus discovering an allusion to 'the science of ijtihäd' in the Qur'anictext, Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi, followed by, among others, Ebussufld Efendi, affirmed thatthe allegedly divergent judgements of Dä'üd and Sulaymän corresponded respective-ly to rulings of the HanafT and ShäficI madhähib. The verdict of the father, theymaintain, corresponds to the Hanafi ruling that the owner of an absconding slave whocommits a crime must surrender him to the victim of the crime. Similarly, the son'sverdict conforms to the Shäfici ruling that if a stolen slave absconds from his usurp-er, the usurper must provide the legitimate owner with the monetary value of the slavepending his recapture. Ebussuüd remarks further that the ijtihäd of Dä3üd was basedon qiyäs (analogy) and that of Sulaymän on istihsän (judicial preference).19 The twoprophets are thus made to prefigure not only the principle of ijtihäd but also specificrulings by two of the four Sunni madhähib as well as two of the usül al-fiqh. Severalof the commentators concede that earlier sharä°ic may have been governed by pro-cedures different from those known to the Muslim jurists. It is nonetheless plain thatat least in this case the interpretation of the incident

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deduced from the verses of Sura21 but amplified by the stories we have reviewed

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has been heavily influenced by theprevailing concepts of fiqh, if not thoroughly subordinated to them.One problem with the interpretation of the episode as involving two successive anddivergent judgements, each based on ijtihäd, is the general impermissibility of oneijtihäd annulling another, since neither can be based on more than a supposition ofcorrectness: ijtihäd can be annulled only by a relevant nass which bestows certainty.It has therefore been argued that, supposing father and son to have given divergent

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihäa"? 1

judgements, both must have been in accordance with wahy, with the revelationreceived by Sulaymän abrogating that received by Dä°üd. From the viewpoint ofthose espousing the relevance of ijtihäd to the understanding of the episode, there area number of possible responses. First, argues, for example, Alüsi, if what is meant bythe principle of one ijtihäd not annulling another is that the ijtihäd of one personcannot void that of another, making its acceptance incumbent upon him, this is notrelevant to the case in question, presumably because Dä3üd was under no obligationto follow his son's ijtihäd. That he did effectively discard his own ijtihäd to followthat of Sulaymän may be because, as suggested above, he received wahy to deliver theverdict that his son suggested; if such was the case, Sulaymän's ijtihäd acquired theforce of revelation and legitimately annulled that of Dä3üd. Second, if what is meantis rather that one and the same person repeats the exercise of ijtihäd with respect tothe same problem, basing himself on a different dalil each time, this is entirely per-missible; ShäfiT, for example, is recorded to have held two opinions on the same

masJala, one in the early part of his career as a jurist and one in the latter part.20Finally, it may be the case that the principle of no ijtihäd being able to overturnanother did not apply in earlier sharäJic, so Dä'üd and Sulaymän need not beregarded as having been bound by the regulations of Islamic jurisprudence.21Views of the Jurists on Prophetic IjtihädThe entire invocation of ijtihäd in order to solve the perceived problem of two diver-gent judgements in the verses under review presupposes, of course, that the prophetsin general

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including most relevantly and significantly the Prophet Muhammad-

permissibly engaged in the practice, not a view that is universally held. The verseshave admittedly been cited as evidence for their view by such proponents of propheticijtihäd as the ShäfiTs Abu Ishäq al-ShiräzI and Sayf al-Din al-Ämidl as well as theHanbali Ibn Qudäma,22 and in his own commentary on them Alüsi claims withoutqualification that the permissibility of ijtihäd for the prophets 'has been expounded in[the science] of usül [al-fiqh]'P Matters are not, however, that simple, for opinioneven within the SunnI community was sharply divided on the question before theultimate emergence of the consensus echoed in AlOsi's lapidary statement.24 It wasprimarily the HanafTs who deemed the Prophet to have engaged in ijtihäd whenever,after a period spent waiting for revelation to be received, the adjudication of a prob-lem became urgent.25 ShäfiT-Ashcaris generally regarded ijtihäd by the prophets as

rationally possible, but withheld judgement on whether the Prophet actually engagedin it. The farthest Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni would go was to opine that 'it is notimprobable (lä yabcud) that when a certain event occurred the Almighty Lord shouldaddress His Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him, saying, "exercise youropinion (fajtahid ra'yak) on the matter; in whatever direction your opinion inclines,that is the truth".'26


His pupil, Abu Hamid al-GhazälT, likewise affirmed ijtihäd on the part of the Prophetas something possible and not conducive to any harm (mafsada), but instead offurnishing examples of his exercise of ijtihäd devoted himself to refuting thearguments of those opposed to the doctrine. It may be objected, for example, that theProphet was in a position to discover a ruling by means of revelation

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and hispredecessors, by implication, enjoyed the same advantage

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and had therefore no rea-son to engage in the fallible practice of ijtihäd. The answer, Ghazäll hypothesises, isthat the Prophet may have been told, 'We have decreed for you that you should makeijtihäd and be bound by it'. Were he to have been so instructed

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and Ghazäll doesnot actually claim that he was

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his failure to make ijtihäd would have been disobe-dience to God on his part, a manifest impossibility. As for the fact that ijtihäd as

commonly understood results only in zann, the supposition of correctness, not its cer-tainty, Ghazäll speculates that the Prophet may have been told, 'your zann has theforce of a ruling ('alämat al-hukm)'; his ijtihäd is, in other words, a privileged formof ijtihäd, its correctness divinely guaranteed, as Juwaynl himself had suggested in somany words. Another obvious objection is that one mujtahidmay legitimately disputethe ruling of another, so that the Prophet might legitimately have been opposed on amatter where his ruling was based purely on ijtihäd. Ghazäll suggests a twofoldresponse: that the ijmäc of the umma forbids any opposition to the Prophet; and thatin general the opinion (ra°y) of any ruler

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and a fortiori the Prophet-

must befollowed and obeyed for the sake of the public welfare.27At the same time, however, Ghazäll rejects firmly one argument advanced by the pro-ponents of ijtihäd by the prophets

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the view that if they were barred from engagingin it they would be deprived of its reward. Ghazäll counters that prophets receiveuniquely abundant reward for the infinitely more significant and demanding task ofconveying the divine message with which they are entrusted.28 As to whether theProphet actually engaged in ijtihäd, Ghazäll recommends suspension of judgement,although he regards it as improbable that he did: 'Rather the likelihood (al-zdhir) isthat everything was by way of explicit revelation, legislating in detail' ,29 In any event,he did not invoke the incident of the sheep related in al-Anbiyä' as proof for the exer-cise of ijtihäd by the prophets. By contrast, Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi used precisely hiscommentary on these two verses to argue strongly for the permissibility of ijtihäd bythe prophets, rejecting all other explanations as implausible.30Embracing even the possibility that the Prophet engaged in ijtihäd, with its potentialfor error, is at least at first sight difficult to reconcile with his inerrancy (cisma). Amode of reconciliation is achieved by Juwaynl and Ghazäll, who posit a kind ofdivine verification in advance for any and all instances of ijtihäd undertaken by theProphet. Fakhr al-DTn al-Räzi hypothesises in similar vein that God may have said tothe Prophet, 'if it appears overwhelmingly likely to you (idhä ghalaba calä zannika)

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihäd? 9

that a given ordinance is grounded in such-and-such a principle and then the samematter appears in another form, rule accordingly (i.e. by way of analogy with theexisting ordinance)'. Räzt goes so far as to explicitly link the ijtihäd of the Prophet towahy by asserting that its exercise derives from revelation, 'in a general sense'(calä'l-jumld) if not in the detailed results it produces.31 Finally, it has been said thatfor the Prophet, uniquely among all practitioners of ijtihäd, the evidence (cilla) onwhich he based his judgement was 'as plain as the midday sun', so that his ijtihäd wasintrinsically different from that of others.32 Such attempts to preserve the dignity andauthority of the Prophet by elevating his ijtihäd over that of others result at best in a

mixed category of ijtihäd and wahy, a blurring of the distinctions between falliblehuman judgement and the certitude bestowed by revelation; it is not unreasonable tocharacterise them as a distortion of ijtihäd?3 The problem becomes only slightly lessacute if the definition of cisma is not so rigorous as to exclude the commission ofminor sins (al-saghä'ir), as is proposed by Juwayni, albeit in his usual tentativemanner. He proclaims it rationally incumbent that prophets should not commitabominable acts (al-fawähish) that indicate turpitude and lack of religiosity, not how-ever that they always refrain from sins counted among the saghä°ir. He holds furtherthat there is no definitive transmitted proof (dalli qäfi samcT) either affirming ornegating the possibility of their commission of such sins. If pressed for an answer,however, he would answer that the possibility exists, 'as witnessed by stories of theprophets in certain verses of the Book ofGod, but God is best-knowing of the truth'.34Presumably the verses concerning the marauding sheep, once interpreted in the lightof the narrations, would fall into that category.Ibn Kathir, ShäfiT by madhhab, like Juwayni, Ghazäli and Räzi, duly recounts thenarrations pointing to divergent verdicts by Dä°üd and Sulaymän, as well as otherssuggesting judicial ineptitude on the part of the former, but seems to stop short ofregarding the incident as exemplifying ijtihäd by the prophets in their capacity as

such. For he stresses that 'all the prophets are inerrant, and supported by God,Glorious and Almighty, this being a matter on which there is no difference amongaccomplished scholars, whether of early or late generations', and suggests that theijtihäd practised by Dä3üd and Sulaymän on this occasion was purely judicial innature. In other words, they were engaged only in giving a verdict on a specific case,not in legislating an ordinance of general validity; the verb yahkumäni is certainlycapable of yielding both meanings. To support his exclusively judicial interpretationof the ijtihäd at issue in these verses, Ibn Kathir relates an anecdote concerning Iyäsb. Mucäwiya. Trembling with fear of hellfire when he was appointed judge, heregained his composure only when Hasan al-Basri pointed out to him that in Q. 21:79,God had indeed praised Sulaymän for his correct verdict, but not blamed Dä'üd forhis incorrect one.35


Ibn cArabi: a Sufi perspectiveIbn °ArabT holds a distinctive place among the upholders of prophetic ijtihäd as an

explanation for the alleged duality of verdict in the case of the sheep and the vineyard.While discoursing in the Fusils al-hikam on 'The Wisdom of Compassion in the Wordof Sulaymän', he interprets the divine statement, 'We gave Sulaymän to Dä3üd'(Q. 38:30), to mean that Sulaymän, as a token of divine generosity to his father, was,in his very person, 'a complete favour, irrefutable proof, and unmistakeable stamp'.If this be the case, it is not surprising that his knowledge should prove superior to thatof his father, as indicated by the phrase, 'We gave Sulaymän understanding thereof.It is true, as the verse immediately afterwards clarifies, that 'to both of them We gavejudgement and knowledge', but the knowledge of Dä3üd was 'an acquired knowl-edge, granted him by God, while Sulaymän's knowledge was God's own knowledgeon the matter, since He was Himself the judge in it without intermediary (bi-läwäsita) and Sulaymän was [no more than] a true expositor in a seat of veracity(maq°adi sidqY .36 According to Abdullah Bosnevi, one of the most authoritative com-mentators on the Fusils, the identification of Sulaymän's knowledge of the matterwith that of God Himself reflects the principle that 'to perceive a thing as it truly isin the divine presence and as it is known to the divine knowledge is itself divineknowledge; just as God had given Sulaymän as a gift to Dä'üd, He now gave thisknowledge as a gift to Sulaymän'. As for God being the judge 'without intermediary',this can mean only that 'God was the judge, in the form of Sulaymän (suret-i Siiley-man'da)'.37 A more recent commentator on the Fusüs, Ahmed Avni Konuk (d. 1928)explained the matter in comparable terms: 'Sulaymän in the seat of veracity becamethe true expositor by virtue of being a divine manifestation (bi-hasebi'l-mazhariyye).When the divine essence manifested itself {tecellt-i zäti indinde), Sulaymän's human-ness (beseriyeti) was effaced (fani oldu), his case being similar to the tree ofMüsä' .38Despite these explanations on the part of Ibn cArabi's commentators, it is not at allclear why the divine bestowal of understanding on Sulaymän should have endowedhim with a degree of knowledge superior to that of Dä3üd, for the verb fahhamndhdwould seem to imply a subject-object relationship no less than the verb ätaynä andtherefore the bestowal of a derived form of knowledge, one necessarily distinct fromthe divine knowledge. In any event, Ibn cArabI clearly believes that the tafhim in

question was a special divine favour given to Sulaymän as a prophet.It is therefore curious, at least at first sight, to see Ibn cArabi drawing a parallelbetween the receipt of this distinctive favor and something apparently much lesselevated, namely a correct decision arising from the use of ijtihäd. For he continueshis discussion of the episode as follows: 'Likewise, a mujtahid who attains the judge-ment of God in a certain case, whether by his own efforts or by means of what Godhas revealed to His messenger, will have two rewards, whereas the mujtahid whose

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihäd?

decision is erroneous will have but one reward, despite his having knowledge andjudgement. This community of Muhammad has been given both the rank of Sulaymän-

upon whom be peace-

in judgement and that of Dä3üd-

upon whom be peace; howexcellent a community it is!'39 Sulaymän is thus portrayed, once again, as theQur'anic prototype of the mujtahid musib and Dä3üd, as that of the mujtahid mukhti0.The tafslr commonly attributed to Ibn cArabi but most probably written by cAbdal-Razzäq al-Käshänt is not at all concerned with questions of ijtihäd, providing as itdoes an entirely allegorical interpretation of the episode. It does, however, uphold thetheory of two divergent verdicts, together with Sulaymän's superiority to his father,by presenting Dä°üd as representative of the speculative intellect (al-caql al-nazari)and Sulaymän as embodying 'the knowledgeable intellect' (al-'aql al-cilmi), i.e. theintellect imbued with divinely bestowed knowledge; this is essentially the same dis-tinction as that drawn by Ibn cArabi in the Fusils. The field mentioned in verse 78 istreated as an allegory for 'the ground of human capacity (ard al-isticdäd) with theperfections deposited in it since pre-eternity', and the sheep are the passionateinstincts in man that freely rampage in the dark night of corporeal nature. DäTid'ssolution was to surrender those instincts to the 'spiritual faculties' (al-quwäal-rühäniyya), who are the owners of the field, for them to slaughter by means ofestablishing dominion over them. Sulaymän, by contrast, determined that those samefaculties should indeed take possession of the instincts, but in order to nurture andreform them, not to destroy them, while the land they had trampled should be restoredto its former state by means of worship and ascetic acts of devotion.40Views ofMuctazilite and ShlT Scholars

Nazzäm, a MuTazilite scholar of Baghdad, as well as the leading MuTazilites ofBasra, all reject the possibility of ijtihäd for the prophets as incompatible with thedivine favor (luff) that necessitates the provision of mankind with infallible exponentsof the divine will. Thus JubbäT is reported to have said, with respect to the case weare examining: 'God Almighty bestowed on Sulaymän a revelation that abrogated theverdict Dä3üd had previously given. This was not by way of ijtihäd, for it is not fit-ting that the prophets should judge by means of ijtihäd'.41 JubbäT does not stateexplicitly that the abrogated verdict of Dä:>üd was similarly the result ofwahy, but thislogically follows from his argument, as is made clear by the celebrated MuTaziliteexegete, Zamakhshari. For after recounting the divergent verdicts

-

permanenttransfer of the sheep to the owner of the vineyard as intended by Dä3üd, temporarytransfer of their usufruct to him as advocated by Sulaymän

-

he explains them as

resulting from successive revelations to Dä3üd and Sulaymän respectively, the secondabrogating the first.42 This explanation effectively necessitates an understanding ofthe verb fahhamnähä as awhaynähä. Insofar as wahy is a defining attribute of the


prophets, it also creates the appearance of a simultaneity of prophets among the samepeople; such simultaneity is unknown to the Qur'an with the exception of Müsä andHärün, and it would exceed the concept of Sulaymän as a divinely appointed auxil-iary to his father that some mufassirün have discerned in Q. 38:20 ('We strengthenedhis [Dä°üd's] kingdom'). Further, it raises the question of why abrogation shouldhave been needed so quickly, given the absence of any change in the facts of the caseor the circumstances surrounding it.It is well-known that the Shfi doctrine of cisma of the prophets and of their divinelyappointed legatees is more consistently rigorous than its Sunn! counterpart. Theirinerrance was authoritatively defined by Ibn Bäbüya al-Qummi as excluding the com-mission on their part of any sin, major orminor, and forbidding the attribution to themof defect or ignorance in any respect.43 This would seem to exclude the possibility ofan even partially erroneous judgement having been delivered by Dä3üd in order tonecessitate the proposal of a correction by Sulaymän, whether by way of ijtihäd orthe receipt of abrogating revelation. Although the other instances cited above ofDä'üd being rescued by his son from judicial error are absent from ShicI sources, thestory of two judgements in the case of the vandalised field or vineyard, one sup-planting the other, has been ascribed to one or other of the imams of the Ahl al-Bayt.44Thus Muhammad al-Bäqir and JaTar al-Sädiq are both recorded as narrating the sameversion as that ascribed in SunnI sources to Ibn Mascud.45 In addition, when ques-tioned about the meaning of Q. 21:78, JaTar al-Sädiq suggests a rationale for thedivergent judgements: 'al-nafsh (straying) takes place [by definition] only at night. Itis the duty of the owner of the field, not of the owner of the livestock, to protect itduring the day; the owner of the livestock is not liable for any damage caused by hisanimals grazing during the day. There is, however, liability for damage caused bytheir grazing at night. Dä°üd

-

upon whom be peace-

ruled that the ownership of thesheep be assigned to the owner of the field, and Sulaymän ruled that he should receiveonly the milk and the wool that they should produce that year'.46 The extent andnature of the compensation to be awarded to the owner of the field thus differ accord-ing to the verdicts of Dä'Od and Sulaymän.Given the unacceptability of prophetic ijtihäd as an explanation for this divergence,the occurrence of which is apparently confirmed by these and other traditions fromthe imams, a number of ShicT mufassirün have inclined to the Muctazilite invocationof naskh. Thus after citing the opinion of Jubbä'I, Tabarsi remarks: 'This is thecorrect view of the matter in our opinion and that upon which we rely. Ibn Tsä andBalkhi have said that it [the divergence of verdict] may have resulted from ijtihäd,because the opinion of the Prophet

-

peace and blessings be upon him and his family-

[and by extension the preceding prophets] is more excellent than that of all others;if it be permissible to obey the ordinance of one other than a prophet at which he has


arrived by means of ijtihäd, how should this not be permissible with respect to theordinance of a prophet [similarly attained]?' To this Tabarsi responds that it wouldnot be fitting for prophets to employ ijtihäd given their access to revelation and 'firmknowledge on how to judge'. Moreover, if the prophets engaged in ijtihäd, other prac-titioners might legitimately oppose them, and opposition to the prophets is self-evidently kufr. 47

The circumstances under which the alleged abrogation took place are detailed in a

further hadith attributed to Jacfar al-Sädiq. When asked by a certain Abu Basirwhether or not Dä3üd and Sulaymän had arrived at a single verdict (qadiya wdhida)in the case, the Imam replied: 48

God had decreed by means of prophets preceding Dä°üd that if a flockof sheep trespassed on a field by night, the ownership of the sheepshould pass to the owner of the field; incumbent on the owner of thefield was its protection by day, and on the owner of the sheep, guard-ing them by night. Then God Almighty and Glorious revealed to

Sulaymän-

upon whom be peace-

that whenever sheep strayed intoa field by night, the owner of that field might lay claim only to off-spring subsequently produced by the sheep (mä kharaja minbutünihä). This ruling remained in force (kadhälika jarat al-sunnd)after Sulaymän, upon whom be peace. This is the meaning of thewords, 'and to both We gave judgement and knowledge'. Thus eachruled in accordance with God's ruling.

The scenario emerging from this tradition suggests, then, that Dä3üd ruled inaccordance with a pre-existing ordinance that revelation had not authorised him to

abrogate; the necessary revelation, once received by Sulaymän, was adopted by Dä'üdso that the resulting judgement was theirs jointly.49 The absolute infallibility of theprophets is thus preserved, despite the divergence of judgement between Dä'üd and

Sulaymän. There remains the problem that in the view of many Shlci jurists the abro-gation of preceding shard 'ic, in part or in whole, can be undertaken only by lawgivingprophets (ulü'l-cazm), a category to which Sulaymän cannot be assigned.50 It is alsocurious that Sulaymän should have received the abrogating revelation rather thanDä3üd, who as ruler of the day was primarily responsible for the resolution of the case.As Fakhr al-Dln al-Räzi, a proponent of ijtihäd as solution for the apparent dilemma,points out, if the two divergent verdicts in the case had both been founded on revela-tion and the second of them had abrogated the first, Dä3üd should have received theabrogating revelation just as he had received

-

or inherited-

the abrogated.51Another set of ShiT traditions suggest that Därad knew in advance of the verdictthat Sulaymän would render, and that he deliberately assigned him the case for a


particular purpose of his own. The same Abu Basir reports the following from ImamJacfar al-Sädiq:52

A certain man from among the Banü Isrä°il had a vineyard wheresheep belonging to another man once strayed at night and gnawed onthe branches, causing much damage. The owner of the vineyard camethe next day to Dä3üd and lodged a complaint against the owner of thesheep. Dä3üd

-

upon whom be peace-

told the two of them, 'Go toSulaymän so that he may judge between you'. So they went to

Sulaymän-

upon whom be peace-

and he said, 'If the sheep haveconsumed both root and branch, the owner of the sheep must forfeitthe sheep and whatever offspring they may be carrying. If they havedestroyed only the branches and not the roots, the owner of the sheepmust give their offspring to the owner of the vineyard'. This was theruling of Dä°üd; he wished only to inform the Banü Israel thatSulaymän should be his legatee and successor (wasiyyuhu bacdahu).They did not differ on the verdict; had they done so, God would havesaid [in verse 78], 'and We witnessed both their verdicts [kunnä li-hukmayhimä shähidln, instead of kunnä U-hukmihim shähidln]'.

A somewhat fuller narrative casts a rather different light on this nomination of

Sulaymän as successor, for it implies that Dä°üd himself was the first person whoneeded to be convinced of his son's worthiness. As in the previous version, the twoparties to the dispute came to Dä3üd on the morning after the incident. God thereuponordered Dä3üd to gather all of his sons and told him that whichever among them ren-

dered the proper verdict in the case should be his successor. Once they had all assem-bled, Sulaymän questioned both parties and ordered that the offspring and wool of thesheep be given to the complainant for the following year. Dä'üd then asked his sonwhy he had not ruled in accordance with the existing precepts of the Banü Isrä3il byassigning ownership of the sheep to the owner of the vineyard. Sulaymän replied thatit was because the vines had not been completely uprooted and would again bear fruitthe following year. God then revealed to Dä°üd that this was the correct ruling. Thiswas evidently unwelcome news to Dä'üd, for he had wanted the as yet unborn son ofhis favourite wife to succeed him. God therefore told him: 'O Dä3üd, you wanted onething, and We wanted something else', and Dä3üd broke the bad news to his wife inthese words: 'We are content with God's command and submit to it'.53 Underlyingthis narrative is the theme of abrogation invoked by Muctazilite and ShIcI scholars inexplanation of the episode, although here the abrogation is communicated to Dä3üdrather than Sulaymän, thus avoiding the problem of wahy given to other than a

prophet. There is also no question of dual verdicts.


It is true, of course, that the Qur'an itself makes explicit mention of Sulaymänsucceeding his father, 'and Sulaymän inherited from Dä3üd' (Q. 27:16), and that itthereby endows the question of succession with some significance. Both these tradi-tions seem, however, to display a special concern for having Dä3üd prefigure, throughhis appointment of Sulaymän, the distinctive ShlT principle of nass

-

the public or atleast witnessed nomination by an imäm macsum of his successor.54

Certain ShfT traditions thus support the same notion of two divergent judgements thatis broadly espoused by Sunn! mufassirün, while others point to a single ruling byfather and son. As one way of reconciling the apparent contradiction NTmatullähJazä3in proposes that hadith pointing to divergent rulings be dismissed as originatingin taqiyya, 'since they correspond to the manifestly erroneous views of the Sunnis (al-°ämma) concerning the permissibility of ijtihäd by the prophets'.55 This procedureseems somewhat arbitrary, for it is difficult to imagine circumstances that might havenecessitated a tag/yya-inspired interpretation of the verses in question; it might equal-ly well be the case that the hadith from Imam Ja°far al-Sädiq pointing to a duality ofverdict and thus raising the possibility of ijtihäd are simply inauthentic.TabätabäT's Rejection of Dual Verdicts°Alläma TabätabäT, author of the Tafsir al-Mizän, is the most categorical of all com-mentators, whether Sunn! or ShiT, in rejecting the thesis of two divergent verdicts.He reaches this conclusion largely by concentrating on a precise analysis of the word-ing of the verses in question, making only oblique reference to some of the narrativesdiscussed above; these, in any event, he segregates in a separate bahth riwä% inaccordance with his general method of 'interpretation of the Qur'an by means of theQur'an' (tafsir al-Qur°än bi'l-Qur'än).56 He begins his analysis by remarking thatthe matter under dispute was referred initially to DäTid because he was the ruler ofthe day among the Banü IsräTl, as indicated by Q. 38:26: 'O Dä3üd, We have appoint-ed you vicegerent on earth, so judge justly among men'. This being the case, any roleplayed in the affair by Sulaymän can only have been with the permission of his fatherand destined to serve a certain purpose, such as making apparent his worthiness tosucceed him. That role may well have consisted of consulting and discussing, for thedual verb idh yahkumäni is a historic present ihikäyat al-häl al-mädiya), indicating a

gradual process of mutual consultation, not the actual issue of a verdict for imple-mentation; the sense of the verb thus becomes, 'when they were consulting on theappropriate verdict' .57TabätabäT's interpretation of 'We witnessed their verdict' confirms his attribution ofthe ruling to both Dä°üd and Sulaymän as their joint accomplishment. He points outthat 'verdict' (hukmihim) is in the singular; were they to have issued divergent rulings,presumably the dual would have been used.58 As for the plural possessive ending, all


other mufassimn consulted for the purpose of this article explain it as embracing bothDä3üd and Sulaymän (as successive or simultaneous authors of verdicts) and the par-ties to the dispute, or as exemplifying the occasional Qur'anic usage of the plural torefer to only two persons, by way of laudation (tafkhim).59 Tabätabä3!, however, sug-gests that this ending may refer to the totality of the prophets. His explanation maybe questioned in that the word al-anhiyä3 does not occur in the immediate vicinity ofverse 78 to act as antecedent for the ending in hukmihim. However, it seems contex-tually justified given that narratives of the prophets form the entire content of the suraas well as furnishing it with its title. In any event, if his interpretation be accepted, thephrase, 'We witnessed their verdict', might be paraphrased as, 'We witnessed theirverdict as We witness the verdict of all the prophets'. The witnessing, moreover, is nota merely passive act of observation, but implies 'a protection from error' (sawn canal-khataD). The correctness of the single judgement put forth by Dä°üd and Sulaymänis further confirmed by the statement, 'We bestowed understanding thereof onSulaymän', for the understanding in question is 'the knowledge of God's true rulingin the matter' (hukm Allah al-wäqicT), something utterly different from a supposi-tional opinion (al-raDy al-zanni). Nor can this knowledge be assumed to have beengiven exclusively to Sulaymän, for the verse immediately continues, 'and to each ofthem We gave judgement and knowledge', meaning that their judgement derived fromdivinely bestowed knowledge, not from supposition.60 This portion of the verse isthus interpreted by Tabätabä3! in a sense diametrically opposed to the view that it pro-vides a Qur'anic warrant for the excusably fallible exercise of ijtihäd.After an exposition of the verses based entirely on an analysis of their wording,Tabätabä3! concedes some relevance to the Sunn! and Sh!cI narratives surrounding theincident by suggesting that although there was but a single verdict, 'there was a dif-ference with respect to the mode of implementation'. The differing modes were theaward of ownership of the sheep to the owner of the field as first intended by Dä30d,and the award to him of their usufruct for one year, as correctively proposed bySulaymän. Alone among the mufassimn, Tabätabä3! suggests that the value of theannual usufruct was the same as that of the sheep themselves, so that the amount ofthe compensation received by the owner of the field remains unchanged and the effec-tive unity of the verdict is preserved.61 Nonetheless, the distinction he draws between'different modes of implementation', a possibility he entertains, and two differingverdicts, a possibility he rejects, seems largely semantic and of a nature to undercuthis main argument. It may be that he was simply adhering to the traditional customof the mufassimn to include a variety of possible interpretations, even those theyregarded as unlikely, or that the pull of the riwäyät was too strong even for him to

fully resist.

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihäal 17

Conclusions

It has not been the purpose of this article to adjudicate among the differing interpre-tations of Q. 21:78-9 that have been reviewed

-

apart from certain preferencesimplicit in the foregoing

-

and still less to propose any new or original interpretation.Two conclusions will, however, be hazarded. The first is perhaps self-evident. Manyif not most of the interpretations reviewed above constitute efforts not so much toextract meaning from the Qur'anic text as to impose on its understanding legal andtheological doctrines that were elaborated several centuries after its revelation. For wesee read into this portion of the text

-

once amplified by the narratives-

such mattersas the ijtihäd of the prophets; the competing views of the musawwiba and themukhtFa; rulings of HanafI and ShäficI/zg/t; and IbncArab!' s typology of knowledge.It might of course be argued in response that ultimately all these concerns originatein a concern with and for the Qur'anic text and its indispensible complement, theSünna. However, the density and preponderance of these concerns, once reflectedback on the Qur'an, threaten to obscure or muffle its voice. The divergent interpreta-tions offered for the allegedly divergent verdicts of Dä^üd and Sulaymän illumine lessthe meaning of the Qur'an than they do the history of jurisprudence and theology.The second and related conclusion is prescriptive in nature. The narratives found inthe Sunni sources cannot be regarded as particularly authoritative, for none of themis marfüc, with the exception of the peripherally relevant tradition found in theSahihayn about the assignation of the disputed boy. Nor is the status of these narra-tives significantly elevated by Fakhr al-DIn al-Räzi's invocation of an alleged con-sensus on their authenticity among the Companions and the Followers.62 By contrast,the ShicI traditions go back, it is true, to one or other of the imams of the Ahl al-Bayt,and are thus at least putatively authoritative. They are, however, characterised by con-tradiction, and it is hardly conceivable that the entire welter of traditions narratedfrom Imam Jacfar al-Sädiq should actually have emanated from him, even if theprinciple of taqiyya is brought into play. Given these considerations, the utility ofextra-Qur'anic narratives concerning the prophets for interpreting or expanding on

the narratives the Qur'an itself provides seems at best questionable. Well-attestedtraditions of the Prophet (and of the Twelve Imams, for ShPI Islam) are undeniablynecessary for the understanding ofmany portions of the Qur'an. But in the case underreview

-

and others resembling it-

it seems advisable to lay aside the narrations andallow the Qur'an to speak for itself, clearly if often laconically. The task of theexegete might sometimes be easier

-

as Baydäwl put it-

'were it not for the narra-tions' (law lä al-naql).


NOTES

1 Fakhr al-DIn al-RäzI, al-Tafsir al-kabir (n.p., n.d.), vol. 12, p. 196.2 Baydäwl, Anwär al-tanzil wa asrär al-ta'wil (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-cArabiyya al-Kubrä,1330/1911), vol. 3, p. 44. The same opinion was expressed by Ebussuüd Efendi, the celebrat-ed Ottoman Seyhillislam, in TafsirAbi 'l-Su cüd: Irshäd al- caql al-salim ilä mazäyä 'l-Qur'än al-karlm, ed. cAbd al-Qädir Ahmad cAtä (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Riyäd al-Haditha, n.d.), vol. 3, p.719.3 Räzl, al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, p. 198.4 This was the view of Ibn Ishäq, Masrüq, and Ibn Mascüd. See Tabarl, Tdrikh al-umam wa'l-mulük (Cairo: al-Matbaca al-Misriyya, n.d.), vol. 1, p. 253; Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'än al-cazim (Beirut: Dar al-Macrifa, 1993), vol. 3, p. 195; Baydäwl, Anwär al-tanzil, vol. 3, p. 44;and Shihäb al-DIn al-Alüsi, Ruh al-macänl (Beirat: Där Ihyä3 al-Turäth al-cArabI, n.d.), vol.17, p. 73. Additional possibilities suggested by Tabarl are ghars (a planted area) and zarc (asown area), but he concludes, not unreasonably, that 'there is no harm in not knowing precise-ly what is meant' [Jänii' al-bayän, 2nd edn (Cairo: Mustafä al-Bäbl al-Halabl, 1373/1953), vol.17, pp. 50-1 ]. On the possible origin of the lexically improbable equation of harth with kann,see fn. 8 below.5 Muhammad Asad suggests in the commentary that accompanies his translation of the Qur'anthat despite this equivalence in value Sulaymän regarded his father's verdict as 'too severe,inasmuch as the sheep represented the defendant's capital, whereas the crops lost related onlyto one year's Income'. This seems a reasonable explanation, always supposing that father andson did indeed issue contradictory verdicts. Less reasonable is Asad's dismissal of the incidentitself as mentioned in the Qur'an

-

not the stories that seek to expand on it-

as 'legendary'. Ithardly behooves a mufasstr to discount as a legend what the Qur'an clearly depicts as an eventthat has actually occurred. See Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur'an (Gibraltar: Däral-Andalus, 1980), p. 496. Another modern reworking of the story of the two verdicts is pro-vided by Sayyid Qutb. After affirming that both verdicts were the outcome of ijtihäd, he char-acterises that of Sulaymän as a constructive form of justice, 'vital and positive', motivated bythe impulse to build and cultivate, as justice supplemented by a civilisational purpose [Fl nlälal-Qur'än, 5th edn (Kuwait: Wizärat al-Awqäf, 1386/1967), vol. 5, 'Sürat al-Anbiyä3' pp. 44-5(each sura is separately paginated within the volume)!.6 Tabarl, Jämlc al-bayän, vol. 17, p. 51; Ibn Kathir, Tafslr al-Qur°än al-cazlm, vol. 3, p. 195.7 Thaclabt relates the story additionally on the authority of Qatäda [Qisas al-anbiyd0 (Cairo:Maktabat al-Jumhüriyya al-cArabiyya, n.d.), p. 161).8 Räzl, al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, p. 195; Baydäwl, Anwär al-tanzll, vol. 3, p. 44; Alüsi, Rühal-macdni, vol. 19, p. 74. Although our concern here is to examine the use made of these nar-ratives by the mufassimn, not their putative origins, it is worth noting that a similar story isfound in an early Ethiopic source. The framework of the story is somewhat different. Baltasor,described as a Persian king, gives his daughter in marriage to Adrami, a son of Solomon, whomhe appoints ruler of Rome. Then, to test his judicial acumen, he invites him to pass judgementon the case of a vineyard destroyed by nocturnally marauding sheep. He awards the usufruct ofthe sheep for a period of one year to the owner of the vineyard, pending the repair of the dam-age by the owner of the sheep; at the end of the year, the sheep revert to their owner, and thevineyard to its owner. See D. Sidersky, Les Origlnes des Legendes Musulman.es dans le Coranet dans les Vies des Prophetes (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1933), p. 113. It may be significant thatthe damaged property is a vineyard, according to this legend, for there is no lexical justifica-tion for interpreting al-harth as al-karm.9 Bukhäri, hadlth 3427; Muslim, hadith 1720. The Solomonic proposal to bisect the disputed

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihäd! 19

boy is, of course, the same in its essentials as that related in 1 Kings 4, vv. 16-28. In the bibli-cal account, however, the two women are harlots; the dead child is unintentionally smotheredby his mother while she slept, not devoured by a wolf; and the incident takes place afterSulaymän has succeeded his father as ruler of the Banü IsräTl, not when he is effectively a judi-cial advisor to him.10 The story is cited without comment in Ibn Kathlr, Tafslr al-Qur'än al-cazlm, vol. 3, p. 196.11 For the details of this highly unedifying story, see Alüsi, Rüh al-macäni, vol. 19, p. 74, whocites it unquestioningly and without mention of a source or a sanad.12 KisäT, Qisas al-anbiyä', ed. Isaac Eisenberg (Leiden: Brill, 1922), p. 271. According toSidersky, the story has a Jewish origin, the source being a midrashic narrative in which, how-ever, the sole arbiter of the affair was a certain King Katzia, a contemporary of Alexander theGreat (Les Origines, p. 114).13 Tabarl, Tärikh al-umam wa'1-mulük, vol. 1, p. 252; Nicmatulläh al-Jazä3iri, Qisas al-anbiyä', ed. Muhsin °AqIl (Beirut: Dar al-Balägha, 1411/1991), p. 396. The theme of Dä3üd'sfailure to complete the building of Bayt al-Maqdis and Sulaymän's success in doing so isentirely absent from the Qur'an.14 Räzi, al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, p. 197; Alüsi, Rüh al-macäni, vol. 19, p.74.15 See cAlä° al-Din cAbd al-cAziz al-Bukhärl, Kashf al-asrär can usül al-Bazdawi (Beirut:Där al-Kitäb al-cArabI, n.d.), vol. 4, pp. 18-19.16 Cited in IsmäTl Haqql al-Burüsawi, Rüh al-bayän (Istanbul: Eser Kitabevi, 1969), vol. 5,p. 505.17 Cited in Alüsi, Rüh al-macäni, vol. 19, pp. 75-6. It is remarkable that none of the tafäsirconsulted for the purposes of this article have given much attention to the precise meaning ofthe verb, fa-fahhamnähä, although it is the only verse of the Qur'an where any form derivedfrom the root F-H-M occurs; they interpret it instead contextually in accordance with theiroverall understanding of verses 78 and 79. Räghib al-Isfahäm, however, paraphrases the rele-vant portion of verse 79 as follows: 'God appointed for him an abundant capacity of under-standing by means of which he comprehended it [=the verdict]'. Alternative possibilities thatIsfahänt proposes are: 'He placed it in his mind (alqä dhälikafl rücihi)', and 'He revealed it tohim in exclusivity (wa khassahu bihi)' [al-Mufradät fl gharib al-Qur°än (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, n.d.), p. 386]. It might be profitable to explore the possibility of a distinction betweenits meaning and that of the verbs commonly used in the Qur'an to indicate divine communica-tion with the prophets.18 Räzi, al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, p. 199.19 Ibid, vol. 22, p. 198; Ebussuud Efendi, Tqfsir Abi'l-Sucüd, vol. 3, p. 718.20 On this point, see Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynl, Kitäb al-Ijtihäd min kitäb al-talkhis, ed.cAbd al-Hamld Abü Zunayd (Damascus: Där al-Qalam, and Beirut: Där al-cUlüm wa'l-Thaqäfa, 1408/1987), pp. 85-94.21 Alüsi, Rüh al-macäni, vol. 19, p. 75.22 See respectively Sharh al-lumcafl usül al-fiqh (Beirut: Där al-Gharb al-Isläml, 1408/1988,)vol. 2,p. 1091; al-Ihkämfi üsül al-ahkäm (Beirat: Där al-Kutub al-cArabi, 1984), vol. 4, p. 173;and Rawdat al-näzir wajannat al-munäzir (n.p.: Där al-Fikr al-cArabi, n.d.), p. 193.23 Alüsi, Rüh al-macäni, vol. 17, p. 74.24 On the complex and contentious question of whether the Prophet engaged in ijtihäd, seeEric Chaumont, 'La problematique classique de V ijtihäd et la question de 1' ijtihäd du Prophete:ijtihäd, wahy et cisma\ Studia Islamica 75 (1992), pp. 105-41, especially pp. 114-37.


Chaumont's article is centered on the views ofAhm Ishäq Shlräzi as expounded in his al-Lumcaand the responses to it made by opponents. Nädiya Sharif al-cUmarfs Ijtihäd al-rasül (Beirut:Mu°assasat al-Risäla, 1401/1981) includes a survey of the views of earlier authorities on thesubject, but is primarily an enthusiastic endorsement of the principle, which she sees as man-dating a comprehensive practice of ijtihäd by contemporary scholars. See too H. YunusApaydm, 'Ictihad', Tiirkiye Diyanet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 21, pp. 432-3.25 See, for example, Abu Bakr al-Sarakhsi, Usül al-Sarakhsi (Beirut: Dar al-Ma°rifa, n.d.),vol. 2, p. 91.26 Juwayni, Kltäb al-Ijtihäd min kltäb al-talkhls, p.77. See also Khidr Muhammad al-Lajmi'scommentary on Juwaynl's al-Waraqät, al-Thamarät Calä'l-Waraqät (Hama: Maktabat al-Ghazäll, n.d.), p. 63.27 A parallel argument has been made recently in a quite different context, that of the IslamicRepublic of Iran. Imam Khomeini found it necessary to give ufatwd that the ruling of the wali-yl faqlh, as the highest constitutional authority, necessarily overrides divergent opinions heldby other mujtahtdün (Istiftäcät (Qum: Daftar-i Intishärät-i Islämi, 1375 Sh./1996), vol. 1, p.19).28 Ghazäll, al-Mustasfd fi ctlm al-usül, ed. Muhammad Ibrahim Ramadan (Beirut: Där al-Arqam, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 525-7.29 Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 528-32.30 Räzl, al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, pp. 195-9.31 Ibid, vol. 22, p. 196.32 °Abd al-cAH Muhammad Ansäri, Fawätih al-rahamüt, printed on the lower half of eachpage of Ghazäll's al-Mustasfd, vol. 2, p. 607.33 This characterisation is made by Chaumont, 'La problematique classique de Yijtihäd', p.137.34 Juwayni, Kitäb al-Irshäd, ed. Muhammad YOsuf and °Abd al-Muncim cAbd al-Hamld(Cairo: Muhammad al-Khänjl, 1369/1950), pp. 356-7.35 Ibn Kathlr, Tafslr al-Qur'dn al-caz.lm, vol. 3, pp. 195-6.36 Ibn cArabi, Fusüs al-hikam, ed. Abu'l-A'Jä3 al-°Afifi (reprint, Tehran: Intishärät-i Zahrä,1991), p. 156. I have used, with modification, the translation of R.W.J. Austin, The Bezels ofWisdom (New York: The Paulist Press, 1980), pp. 193-4.37 Abdullah Bosnevi, Arä'lsü'n-Nusus fi Manassati'l-Fusus (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Amire,1873), vol. 2, pp. 164-5.38 Ahmed Avni Konuk, Fususu'l-Hikem Tercüme ve ßerhi, ed. Mustafa Tahrah and SelcukEraydin (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Ilahiyat Fakiiltesi, 1990), vol. 3, p. 239.39 Ibn cArabI, Fusüs al-hikam, p. 156.40 Ibn cArabi (?), Tafslr al-Qur'dn al-karlm (Beirut: Där al-Yaqza al-cArabiyya, 1387/1968),vol. 2, pp. 84-5.41 Cited in Tabarsi, Majmac al-bayän Ii culüm al-Qur'än (Cairo: Där al-Taqrib bayna'l-Madhähib al-Islämiyya, 1394/1974), vol. 7, p. 109. It is not apparent from this citation whichof the Jubba3Is is meant, Abu CAH (d. 303/916) or his son, Abü Häshim (d. 321/933). Both ofthem were agreed on the impermissibility of ijtihäd for the prophets; see Chaumont, 'La prob-lematique classique de Vijtihäd', p. 114.42 Mahmüd al-Zamakhshari, al-Kashshäf (Cairo: Mustafä al-Bäbi al-Halabl, 1385/1966), vol.2, p. 579.

Q. 21:78-9: A Qur'anic Basis for Ijtihäd! 21

43 Ibn Bäbuya, Risalat al-ictiqadat (Tehran: Intishärat-i Tlmi, n.d.), pp. 125-6; translated byA.A. Fyzee as A Shi'ite Creed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 99-100. See alsoMartin McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid (d. 413/1022) (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1986), pp. 107-112, 355-8. Muhammad Khwäjagl Shiräzi makes it plain that fromthe Shici point of view the comprehensive inerrancy of the prophets begins with their birth andcontinues until their death and is not restricted to matters directly connected to their missions(al-Nizämiyya fi ictiqäd al-shlca, ed. CA1I Awjabi (Tehran: Nashr-i Qibla, 1375/1996), p. 129).For an exposition of the doctrine in philosophical terms, see cAbd al-Razzäq Lähijl, Gawhar-imuräd (Tehran: Kitäbfurüshi-yi Islämiyya, n.d.), pp. 267-8.44 The scandalous story of Bathsheba and Uriah, in more or less the same form as found in 2Samuel 11, is, however, included in NFmatulläh al-Jazä'in's Qisas al-anbiyä3, where it is con-nected with the events to which Q. 38:21-5 make allusion. A similar connection is made in a

variety of Sunnl works; see, for example, Tabari, Tärikh al-umam wa'1-mulük, vol. 1, pp.249-50. Ibn Kathlr pertinently remarks in his commentary on these verses: 'The exegetes havementioned at this point a story taken mostly from the IsräTliyyät; there is no firmly establishednarration from a macsüm that needs to be followed

...

It is best that one restrict oneself simplyto a recitation of the story [as it occurs in the Qur'an] and to leave the knowledge of it to God,for the Qur' an is true and whatever it contains is true" (Tafsir al-Qur'än al- cazim, vol. 4, p. 34).45 Tabarsi, Majmac al-bayän, vol. 7, p. 109.46 Ni°matulläh al-Jazä3iri, Qisas al-anbiyä', p. 412; cAbd CA1I al-cArüsi al-HuwayzI, Tafsirnür al-thaqalayn, ed. Hashim al-RasülI al-Mahalläti (Qum: Mu'assasa-yi Matbücätl-yiIsmäTliän, n.d.), vol. 3, p. 441.47 Tabarsi, Majmac al-bayän, vol. 7, pp. 109-11. Ibn Tsä and al-Balkhl were, presumably,two ShicIfuqahä3 who deviated from majority ShicI opinion by holding to the permissibility ofijtihäd by the prophets at a time when it was regarded as synonymous with rany (personal opin-ion); see al-Sayyid Muhammad Bäqir al-Sadr, al-Macäüm al-jadida li'1-usül (Beirut: Dar al-Tacäruf, 1401/1981), pp. 22-9. The theory of abrogation is also accepted by 'Abdullah Shubbar(d. 1826), in his Tafsir al-QurDän al-karim (ed. Hamid Hifnl Dä'üd, Cairo, 1397/1977, p. 320),a marginal commentary on the Qur'an that one might characterise as the ShI°I counterpart ofthe Tafsir al-Jalälayn.48 Fluwayzl, Tafsir nür al-thaqalayn, vol. 8, p. 442.49 Jazä'iri, Qisas al-anbiyä3, p. 414.50 Ibid.51 Räzi, al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, p. 198.52 Huwayzi, Tafsir nür al-thaqalayn, vol. 3, p. 443; CAH b. Ibrahim al-Qumml, Tafsir al-Qummi, ed. Tayyib al-MüsawI al-Jazä'iri (Najaf: Matbacat al-Najaf, 1386/1967), vol. 2, pp.73-4.53 Huwayzl, Tafsir nür al-thaqalayn, vol. 3, pp. 442-3, citing the Usül al-käfi of Kulaynl.54 The theme of nominating a successor by means of an examination is also to be found in atleast one Sunni source. The Qisas al-anbiyä' of Thaclabi (pp. 161-2) contains a somewhatbizarre story narrated on the authority of Abü Hurayra to the effect that God sent down toDä3üd from the heavens a book with a gold seal containing thirteen questions which he was topose to Sulaymän, together with the right answers; if Sulaymän answered them correctly, hewas to be his successor. So Dä^d assembled 'seventy priests and seventy rabbis', seatedSulaymän in front of them, and asked him the questions, all of which were in the nature of rid-dles. When he was done answering them, Dä'üd ordered the seal on the book to be broken, andSulaymän was seen to have answered correctly in every instance. The assembled dignitaries


were, however, unwilling to accept Sulaymän as successor to Dä3üd unless he proved able tosolve yet another riddle they wished to pose. When he gave the right answer, Dä'üd 'mountedthe minbar' and announced that he was appointing Sulaymän as his successor, in accordancewith divine command. But the chiefs of the Banü IsräTl, ever hard to please, claimed that therewere others better fitted for rule. Dä3üd therefore ordered that all the proposed candidates forthe succession, including Sulaymän, should provide him with their staffs, and if any of thestaffs proved capable of bearing fruit, its owner should become his successor. The staffs wereduly gathered, with the names of their owners inscribed on them, and locked for the night in a

room. The next day, the staff of Sulaymän alone was seen to have sprouted leaves and bornefruit. All resistance to the appointment of Sulaymän then ceased.55 JazäTri, Qisas al-anbtyd3, p. 414. Concerning the problem of evaluating Imamite hadiththat may have been uttered by way of taqiyya, see Majld Ma°ärif, Pazhuhishl dar tärikh-ihadith-l shica (Tehran: Mu'assasa-yi FarhangI va Hunarl-yi Darlh, 1374 Sh./1995), pp.264-84.56 The bahth riwd°i for the verses in question is found in TabätabäT, Tafslr al-mlzän, 4th edi-tion (Tehran: Där al-Kutub al-Islämiyya, 1363 Sh./1984), vol. 14, pp. 347-8. On his exegeticalmethod, see CA1I al-Awsi, Al-Tabdtabd'l wa manhajuhu fl tafsirihi 'al-Mizdn' (Tehran:Säzmän-i Tablighät-i Islämi,1363 Sh./1985).57 Although the idea of consultation leading to a verdict is deduced by TabätabäT from thewording of the verse, it also corresponds to yet another hadith from Imam Jacfar al-Sädiq,according to which he said: 'They were not both engaged in judging; rather they were debat-ing [the matter]'. See Huwayzl, Tafsir nur al-thaqalayn, vol. 3, p. 443, citing Shaykh Sadüq'sMan Id yahduruhu 'l-faqih.58 A variant reading of hukmayhimd is, in fact, mentioned by Zamakhshari {al-Kashshdf, vol.2, p. 579) and Räzl (al-Tafsir al-kabir, vol. 22, p. 195).59 See, for example, Alüsi, Ruh al-macdnl, vol. 19, p. 74.60 It might, of course, be remarked that the verb zanna occurs in Q. 38:24 precisely with ref-erence to Dä°üd, but it has been argued that in this case jann does not have its conventionalmeaning, signifying rather 'knowledge' (Räghib al-Isbahäni, al-Mufradät, p. 217, andTabätabäT , Tafsir al-mizdn, vol. 17, p. 203); or 'deductive knowledge, or strong suppositionapproximating knowledge' (Alüsi, Ruh al-macäni, vol. 23, p. 182).61 TabätabäT, Tafslr al-mizdn, vol. 14, pp. 341-2.62 Räzl, al-Tafsir al-kablr, vol. 22, pp. 195-6.

Q21 Verses 78-79 a Qur'Anic Basis for Ijtihad

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Transcript of Q21 Verses 78-79 a Qur'Anic Basis for Ijtihad