Kandidatuppsats i Statsvetenskap

Putin’s authoritarian state –

the consolidation of an authoritarian

x regime through the use of ‘soft powers’

Författare: Rebecca Esselgren

Handledare: Daniel Silander

Examinator: Helena Eklund

Termin: HT18

Ämne: Statsvetenskap

Nivå: III

Kurskod: 2SK30E

Abstract

Putin’s authoritarian rule reaches all areas of Russian society, this can be attributed to the soft

powers that the regime uses to further establish their power. The basis of this research is a

theory from the book Authoritarianism goes global, where the authors describes the

importance of soft powers in an authoritarian regime. The soft powers analysed include

election monitoring, disinformation, cyberspace security and civil society repression. The aim

is to examine which soft powers play a part in the consolidation of the Russian regime, and

the strategies used to further legitimise their political agenda. The three questions answered in

this research is how did Putin’s first eight years in power affect the use of soft powers in

Russia today? What soft powers have led to the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in

Russia? And how does Putin use these soft powers to further legitimize his political agenda?

A qualitative text analysis was performed to answer the questions. The conclusions drawn is

that Putin’s actions today are heavily influenced by his first presidency. Furthermore he

extensively use the soft powers, and they have a significant influence on how the Russian

authoritarian regime manage to consolidate power. Moreover the proficiency shown while

manipulating these arenas leads to Putin being able to further legitimise his political agenda.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Purpose and questions .............................................................................................. 2

1.2 Method ..................................................................................................................... 3

1.3 Material .................................................................................................................... 5

2. Previous research and theoretical framework .......................................................... 5

2.1 Previous research .................................................................................................... 6

2.2 Theoretical framework ............................................................................................. 9

2.3 Definitions.............................................................................................................. 10

2.3.1 Election Monitoring ...................................................................................... 10

2.3.2 Disinformation .............................................................................................. 11

2.3.3 Cyberspace security ...................................................................................... 13

2.3.4 Civil society repression ................................................................................. 14

2.4 How do these soft powers interact with each another? .......................................... 15

3. Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 16

3.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 16

3.2 The importance of Putin’s first eight years in power ............................................. 17

3.3 Putin’s use of Election Monitoring in Russia ........................................................ 18

3.4 Putin’s use of Disinformation in Russia ................................................................ 20

3.5 Putin’s use of Cyberspace security in Russia ........................................................ 22

3.6 Putin’s use of Civil society repression Russia ....................................................... 24

4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 26

5. Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 28

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1. Introduction

For the past century there has been an increase of nations moving from authoritarian regimes

to liberal democratic countries. There are many underlying reasons as well as developments

that enable these states to advance from a restricted authoritarian state to a free liberal

democracy.1 However it seems as though some non-democratic countries are better at

resisting the changes that have the possibility of contributing to the development of a

democracy. One of these countries is Russia.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Boris Yeltsin elected president of Russia, in what

was considered a free and fair election. Yeltsin’s time in office was defined by a spark of

positive development with the introduction of the first democratic statute as well as a free and

strong press.2 Though Yeltsin advanced some areas in society, Russia was still characterised

by economic and political difficulties during his eight years in power. The chaos in both the

economic and political sphere was not resolved until Vladimir Putin came to power in the

year of 2000. Putin started his time in office by instating major reforms in the economic

spectrum and managed to reverse the issues, and the economy started to thrive. Behind the

scenes Putin was also centralising the power and started to constrict the media and the civil

society as well as increasing his control over the political arena.3

Putin’s time in office has been defined by restrictions on almost every area in society. The

constraints introduced to the media, the political domain as well as the resilient economy

together with a strong military has led Russia down a path from democratic development to

an authoritarian constraint.4 Right from the beginning Putin’s commitment to Russia has

never been a commitment to democracy which has meant not only a standstill for the possible

development of a democracy but a reversal of the already developed areas.5 Authoritarian

regimes now have a different agenda in that they no longer just want to stop democratic

development in their countries they want to reverse all traces of the democratic surge.6

1 L. Diamond, Spirit of democracy, – the struggle to build free societies throughout the world, New York,

HENRY HOLT and COMPANY LLC, 2008, p. 6. 2 S. Skott, Det nya Ryssland och arvet efter Sovjet, 2nd edn., Finland, Hjalmarsson & Högberg, 2009, p. 298. 3 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik – nio politiska system, Spain, Studentlitteratur, 2015, p. 220. 4 S. Skott, Det nya Ryssland och arvet efter Sovjet, p. 298. 5 Ibid, p. 339. 6 L. Diamond, M. Plattner, and C. Walker, Authoritarianism goes global – a challenge to democracy, Baltimore,

John Hopkins University Press, 2016, p. 7.

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The few signs that existed of a possible democracy in Russia during the 90s is today

something that is only a memory. There is no real threat to the sitting regime and Putin has

managed to establish his authoritarian state in every aspect of society.7 The mechanisms

called soft powers are used by regimes to assert their power both internationally and

nationally, these soft power arenas will be the focus of this research.8

Putin succeeded to set the foundation of his authoritarian state to such an extent that when his

growing power was noticed by the population it was hard for them to reverse the emergent

authoritarian regime.9 Coups by authoritarian forces was believed to be the real threat to the

growing democracy however the real threat turned out to be Vladimir Putin and his

supporters. They have managed to gain unhindered power while still holding elections, the

reasons for their stems from the government’s skills in manipulating the population, the

media and the political arena.10

1.1 Purpose and questions

The aim of the research is to investigate what soft powers play a part in the consolidation of

the authoritarian regime in Russia and what strategies the current regime uses to further

legitimise its political agenda. Manipulating different areas in society is something that

authoritarian regimes show great expertise in. Therefore, this research will investigate

different reforms of Russia, the areas included in the analysis is election monitoring,

disinformation, cyberspace security and civil society repression. These areas are chosen due

to the theoretical framework presented later in this study.

The purpose of this research is to examine what factors continue to affect the consolidation of

power in Russia and to what extent they affect the further development of an authoritarian

state. To answer the questions in the best way possible the timeframe for the investigation

will be focused on Putin’s time in office since 2012, this is because it relates to the

authoritarian regime in Russia today. To complement this a question regarding Putin’s first

presidency will be asked to give a further understanding of the conditions that exist in Russia

at the moment.

7 M. Bader and H. Schmeets, ‘Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from

Russia’, Journal of Representative Democracy, vol. 49. No. 4, 2013, p. 1-14. 8 L. Diamond, M. Plattner, and C. Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 3. 9 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 221. 10 A. Evans, ‘The failure of democratisation in Russia: a comparative perspective’, Journal of Eurasian Studies,

vol. 2, No. 1, 2011, p. 40-51.

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This research is relevant because examining this area is not just scrutinising Russia and Putin

but rather it is about researching the importance of a strong leader in an authoritarian state

and the use of different power mechanism to consolidate power, both which are ongoing

discussions within the social sciences. So in other words this study is a case of investigating

strategies used by regimes to stay in power.11

From a societal perspective this research is relevant because Russia is constantly discussed in

the media. Their supposed involvement in the US election, their participation in the Syrian

civil war as well as their constant place on the UN Security Council means that Putin has a

significant influence on the international arena. This means that what transpires in Russia

affects not just the local population but also the surrounding world. The importance of Russia

and their position in the world should not be underestimated.12

The questions that this research will answer is:

- How did Putin’s first eight years in power affect the use of soft powers in Russia

today?

- What soft powers have led to the consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Russia?

- How does Putin use these soft powers to further legitimize his political agenda?

1.2 Method

To complement the purpose and questions presented above the next part will discuss the

method that will be the outline of the analysis in this investigation.

The theory used will be the base of the entire research. This means that the formation that

will be used is theory-consuming. What will be discussed and analysed is based around the

specific case and the rest of the material that will be collected is in some way related to the

factors that will be analysed.13 The theory-consuming foundation that will be used is to some

extent also theory-testing since the theory-testing formation assesses the reliability of theories

and investigate the conditions of the theories used.14

11 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan – konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, 4th edn., Vällinby,

Nordstedts Juridik, 2012, p. 32. 12 D. Herspring, Putin’s Russia – past imperfect, future uncertain, 3rd edn., Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers, 2007, p. 203. 13 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 41. 14 A. George, and A. Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, BCSIA,

2005, p. 75.

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However to execute the analysis, the empirical research will be examined in relation to how

the theory works. Therefore the theory-consuming structure is the primary chosen formation

due to the fact that the theory chosen provides the foundation of the entire research, and the

factors discussed to explain the theory are secondary sources.15

There are many theories that discuss authoritarian states and the factors that affect the

regimes power, the present theory was chosen as it presents an extensive view of different

factors. The different areas of the theory manage to explain ways in which an authoritarian

state manages to stay in power and this is why it was chosen. Other theories could also have

been used, however to limit the research and answer the questions within a certain boundary

it was deemed appropriate to only use this theory. The method that will be used is a

qualitative text analysis. This method was chosen because the text that will be read is

analysed to see if there is a relation to the questions that will be asked. In this way of writing

the researcher has a focus on the importance of the text that is being investigated and whether

it is possible to draw any conclusions from the text.16

In this research this text analysis will be accomplished using the chosen theory and trying it

against different empirical material such as articles to see if the conclusions that are drawn in

the theory are trustworthy. What must be taken into consideration when using this method is

the issue of reliability since the texts analysed have the possibility of bias, to circumvent this

issue several texts will be analysed in hope that it strengthens the validity of the research.

Furthermore it is important to consider the researcher’s possible interpretations since

experiences and background can affect the understanding of a certain text. This issue can be

tackled by the researcher through trying to recognize their own particular understanding and

try to identify what social contexts and scientific culture the research is taking place in.17

There is a risk with using this type of research because when choosing different articles it is

possible to miss essential material since it is impossible to read every text about every

subject. However this method is deemed preferable as opposed to other methods due to the

fact that the entirety of the text is caught when using this type of research.18

15 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 42. 16 Ibid. 17 G. Bergström, and K. Boréus, Textens Mening och Makt – metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text och diskurs

analys, 2nd edn., India, Replika Press Pvt Ltd, 2005, p. 35. 18 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 210.

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The central message of the text is the focus point and to find the fundamental arguments in a

text is believed to be more important than only concentrating on parts of the text.19

Since the terms used in the research is defined early on it is easier to decide what relevant

areas in the texts should be used this means that the research becomes more achievable.20

1.3 Material

Now the basis of the material will be explained by going through how the material was

collected and how it will be used in the research.

The main material that will be used for this research is sourced from the book

Authoritarianism goes global – a challenge to democracy written by Larry Diamond, Marc F.

Plattner and Christopher Walker. The other material that will be collected is from other books

that discuss Russia as an authoritarian state. However the main source the material is

allocated from academic sources online, as there is a vast array of information available

electronically. Books will be used as the basis and to provide facts however the main

information will be taken from articles found through the Linnaeus University’s search

engine as well as Google Scholar. The articles found on these sites are considered to increase

the validity of the research and provide the analysis with high value sources since the articles

from these sights have been published in various journals. Though the journals used in the

research are respected academically in the international sphere and known to be non-biased

the fact that western authors as well as western based journals are used is kept in mind

throughout this investigation.

There are endless sources that can be chosen for this research however to limit the scope of

the investigation the articles that are chosen are deemed directly relevant for answering the

questions in the analysis.

2. Previous research and theoretical framework

In this part, previous research will be explained to further the understanding of the research

and gain knowledge surrounding other studies done in this area. Moreover the theoretic

framework will also be discussed, the entire research will be formed around the theory

presented and the analysis will be assembled with the main theory as its core.

19 P. Esaiasson, et al, Metodpraktikan, p. 210. 20 Ibid, p. 217.

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Further, the terms used in the research will be defined so that there can be no misconception

regarding the expressions in the investigation. In addition the different arenas will also be

discussed in relation to how they interact with each other.

2.1 Previous research

In this part an overview of prior studies will be presented to get a comprehensive outlook on

the research problem presented earlier. To understand this research one has to understand

how states achieve legitimacy. Further one must also recognise the importance of the shift in

the power mechanism of how states exercise their use of power. This part of the research is

discussed to explain the decision to have soft powers as the focus of this investigation and

consequently explain the indicators that this research is based on.

Researcher Bo Rothstein challenges the idea that a democratic country automatically achieve

legitimacy just because they represent the people in a direct way through elections.

According to Rothstein achieving legitimacy depends on the efficiency of the government

rather than the input side of the political system. Legitimacy needs to be created and

maintained and depends on the output of the government. People might accept their leaders

not just because of a fair election but also based on tradition, appeal and the government’s

success, or a belief of success. However, it is easier to reach legitimacy through an election

since the people feel as if they have taken part in the process and therefore accept that the

government officials represent them in a fair way. That is not to say to that legitimacy cannot

be achieved through other ways, it just means that the most direct way is through elections

according to the western belief. The population of a country can believe that the government

warrants legitimacy when in truth they are misled by the government.21

Traditionally states exercised their power through a hard approach which entailed military

operations done to cripple other states, this was the only way for a state to achieve legitimacy

both internationally and nationally. The use of hard powers seek to damage the initiatives of

the other state so that they submit to the will of the other. This differs from the soft power

approach in that instead it focuses on changing the ideals of a state through peaceful means

by for example education and counselling.22

21 B. Rothstein, ‘Creating political legitimacy – electoral democracy versus quality of government’, American

Behavioural Studies, vol. 53, No. 3, 2009, p. 311-330. 22 S. Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied, ‘Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: soft and hard power

approaches’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 47. No. 6, 2011, p. 652-665.

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The introduction of the soft approach led to the regimes finding it hard to justify the use of

violence when soft tactics has been seen to be successful. The development of soft powers

subsequently led to a change in the power mechanisms used by states. 23

Previously the common way to handle a security risk was to show off one’s military might

but suddenly the entire concept of defence started to mean social unity instead. That is not to

say that the hard power approach is not seen in today’s conflicts however a hard action can

only be taken when an issue has already arisen, by using a more soft method the roots of the

issue could be solved before the challenge has even presented itself. The decline in

acceptance of the hard approach has led to a development in the use of power mechanism

approaches.24 Therefore there lies an importance as to how states now use the soft power

approach, and it has become the more common way to exercise power.

Coalitions in modern times are more complex than they were previously in history since with

new actors in world politics comes new dimensions to security.25 The researcher Joseph Nye

states that since the mechanisms of power have changed so have the strategies of regimes.

The focus no longer lies on military force but rather on economic and ecological issues that

are now more important to people meaning they are more important to politicians.26 The

world’s leading countries are less able to use more traditional power resources to further their

influence, the reasons for this could be the new developments in economy, transnational

actors, the progresses in technology, and the changing issues in the political arena.27

Without the use of military force, information has become a central component in world

politics and so information has become power and especially if a regime is able to control it

whether that be by changing the information provided or containing it all together. With this

new information-based economy material resources have become less important and the

expertise of organisations have gained a greater importance. With these trends the regimes

that are successfully able to achieve their goals might get smaller states to follow their ideals.

So in this modern world it is more beneficial for a regime to use soft powers to change the

wants of a country rather than ordering them to change their beliefs.28

23 S. Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied, ‘Countering Terrorism in Maritime Southeast Asia: soft and hard power

approaches’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 47. No. 6, 2011, p. 652-665. 24 Ibid. 25 J. Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 80. No. 153, 1990, p. 157. 26 Ibid, p. 158. 27 Ibid, p, 161. 28 Ibid, p. 166.

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Additionally, as the scholar Geun Lee writes, soft powers are used when different regimes

choose to focus on changing or creating their own perception of an idea to the public of a

certain country. The tactic is used to set a certain agenda to achieve the goal of the regime,

the construction of the ideal the regimes project is done through symbolic resources that lead

to a behavioural change in others. The usage of soft powers is often applied when regimes

wants to settle an issue through peaceful measures rather than through military operations or

economic sanctions. That is not to say that using soft powers means the elimination of a hard

tactic as well, rather it means that the focus lies more on ideal than on material resources.

Using a soft power tactic relies on domestic support since failure can lead to national political

repercussions therefore it is important for regimes to consider their policy goals both

nationally and internationally before projecting their perception onto their population.29

Moreover as Martin Jacques claims in his article “The beginning of a new world order”

democracy is only one part of what decides a countries legitimacy, a high level of satisfaction

also represents a part in ensuring legitimacy of a country. As the relationship that the Western

world have with the developing world changes so could the current world order. Therefore

one can say that using soft power mechanism challenge the political hegemony currently held

by the West. It might seem implausible that the Western world would want to imitate the

governance of China for example since their regime does not have democratic values,

however by using soft powers successfully it could lead to a recognition of other strengths in

their state. In the Western world, democratic views are highly valued since they are believed

to be the best alternative at the present time and soft powers have the ability to change this or

at least make citizens question the importance of democracy.30

To sum up one can say that legitimacy is essential for a government to be able to stay in

power, and it can be achieved through many means, although elections are the most common.

Furthermore, previously power mechanisms was used to gain legitimacy through a hard

approach, but there has been a shift in how states exercise power. This has been influenced by

the development of globalisation and subsequently as information has become more

important, so has the use of soft powers.

29 G. Lee, ‘The clash of soft powers between China and Japan: synergy and dilemmas at the six party talks’,

Asian Perspective, vol, 34. No. 2, 2010, p. 113-117. 30 M. Jacques, ‘The beginning of a new world order’, New statesman, vol. 141. No. 5102, 2012, p. 22-27.

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The purpose of the discussion in this part was to broaden the understanding of legitimacy and

the power mechanisms that exist in both democratic and authoritarian states. These earlier

studies present the interpretation done relating to legitimacy and soft powers leading to a

clarification to the tools that will be used in this research.

2.2 Theoretical framework

To limit the research done, solely one theory will be the focus of this analysis. The theory is

taken from the book Authoritarianism goes global – a challenge to democracy written by

Diamond, Plattner and Walker. The authors claim that since the mid-2000s there has been a

backlash against democracy where regimes began to restrain independent voices in society.31

They refer to something called the ‘big five’ which is a reference to the countries that led the

backlash. These countries according to the theory is China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia and

Venezuela. As stated in the introduction the authors believe that these countries now have a

different agenda; they no longer just want to stop democratic development, rather they want

to reverse all traces of the democratic surge. The main focus of this research will be around

what the authors call soft powers, which are mechanisms used by the different regimes to

assert their power both internationally and nationally.32 There are multiple soft powers but for

the purpose of this research, the following have been selected:

- Election monitoring

- Disinformation

- Cyberspace security

- Civil society repression

According to this theory these four areas are either manipulated or used in authoritarian

countries for the regime to further establish their power. In the first chosen soft power the

theory claims that election monitoring has become an essential part of democracy in that in

watches over the civil representation and the accountability of the government. Authoritarian

regimes are able to undermine this part of the election process by evading responsibility

while using certain tactics to avoid being caught.33

31 L. Diamond, M. Plattner, and C. Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 3. 32 Ibid, p. 7. 33 Ibid, p. 10-11.

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The second chosen arena is disinformation which is when the state decides to convey their

ideas to the public by spreading false information rather than the truth.34 The third chosen soft

power is cyberspace security which in the last couple of years has turned into a powerful tool

that authoritarian states use to their advantage. The development of the internet means that

authoritarian regimes have another area of society that they are able to control by suppressing

and shrinking the space of the opposition.35 The last soft power chosen is civil society

repression, the space that the civil society offers in democratic countries is essential since it

represents the interest of the people. Authoritarian states chose to limit their countries civil

society by destroying all independent institutions due to the risk of potential opposition. Civil

society repression is necessary for authoritarian states in order to restrict the platform of the

opposition.36

2.3 Definitions

In this part of the research the different soft powers will be introduced so that the

understanding of the arenas are the same for all readers.

2.3.1 Election monitoring

Election monitoring is a common practice that countries use in today’s society, it has been

used for a long time however it was not until during the so called third wave during the

1970’s that it became an essential part of the democratic process. Election monitoring allows

for citizens and international organisations to view the election process to ensure that there is

no tampering during the course of the election. To achieve legitimacy both nationally and

internationally it has become a democratic norm to use this practice. The aim of using

election monitoring is to make sure that the citizens in a country vote in an election that

contains no deception.37 To establish credibility to an election, transparency must be present

and to uphold this transparency organisations act as the eyes of the citizens by implementing

the process of election monitoring and thereby confirming the elections’ validity.38

34 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 10-11. 35 Ibid, p. 12. 36 Ibid, p. 13. 37 Ibid, p. 139. 38 Ibid.

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Having elections are considered to be crucial to a democratic society therefore it is important

to make sure that the process retains a high standard. Election monitoring wants to uphold

this standard by ensuring freedom of expression and that everyone is able to participate.39

Election monitoring observe the media, the states transparency as well as equal treatment for

the entire population. The election monitoring observers note these factors to ensure the

validity of the election process. If even one of the factors are seen to be manipulated the

entire election comes into question, and loses its validity.40

For the monitoring organisations the process begins with a formal invitation from the state

where they will gain access to documents that they normally would not be allowed to

observe. The regime has some control of this process since they can decide on who they want

to invite to monitor their election, so some areas of the election process still lay in their

hands.41

Authoritarian regimes are still hesitant in allowing election monitoring to take place in their

country despite them having some control over preforms the monitoring. This is due to the

fact that many authoritarian states are known to manipulate their election and by allowing

observers into their country their manipulations are at a higher risk of being discovered. If

many different monitoring institutions come to the same conclusions about their election

process it could possibly undermine the power of the state in question.42 Different tactics are

therefore employed by the regimes to uphold a genuine election when it is anything but.

Because while the authoritarian states must use election monitoring to have legitimacy at the

same time they also have to manipulate the election process to be able to stay in power.43

2.3.2 Disinformation

Transparency is a vital component of a democratic country since the population should be

able to rely on their own government and trust that they provide them with the correct

information.44

39 J. Kelley, ‘Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The rise of the International Election Monitoring’,

International Organisation, vol. 62. No. 2, 2008, p. 221-255. 40 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 141. 41 J. Kelley, ‘The more the merrier? The effects of having multiple international election monitoring

organisations’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 2009, p. 59. 42 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 141. 43 Ibid. 44 D. Fallis, ‘What is Disinformation?’, Library Trends, vol. 63. no. 3, 2015, p. 401-426.

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Nevertheless it is common for authoritarian regimes to use oppression to further their stance

in society where one of the most common forces of oppression that regimes employ are

disinformation. This is when a regime deliberately misinform the information that is given to

the public.45 Misleading the public by giving them wrongful information have the possibility

of being harmful and does have a significant impact on the people. Disinformation can be

used through many different channels but in every route it is when the regime purposely give

wrongful information to the public to gain trust or do harm. A common way to use

disinformation is through deceiving advertisement that the regime provides to the public by

projecting an image they want their citizens to see and believe.46

Disinformation is something that has been used for a long time so it is not a new concept

however it has grown in the last couple of years due to the development of new technological

channels. These new developments such as social media has made the use of this practice

much easier since regimes has the ability to forbid certain websites and therefore

disinformation has become more common in recent years.47

Through time regimes have become apt at using the media and other areas to their advantage

and they have many strategies of gaining more control. For instance the information provided

to the public holds just enough truth about real events that are twisted in a skilful way so that

it works in the regime’s advantage. Through this the regime is able to increase their

authenticity.48 Disinformation, on the other hand, is more than just the regime providing their

population with wrongful information; it is qualified systematic disturbances by the

established order which are made through strategic planning meaning that for the average

citizen this deception is hard to detect.49 In a democratic country is it essential to be given

trustworthy information through the media and the freedom that this provides and its

importance cannot be underestimated. When information is given properly to the population

through all channels it has the possibility of increasing the validity of the regime and the

respect as well as the integrity of the government.50

45 D. Fallis, ‘What is Disinformation?’, p. 401-426. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline in

democratic order’, European Journal of Communication, vol. 33, no. 2, 2018, p. 124. 49 Ibid. 50 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 150.

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It takes more than simply providing proof that the information given to the population is

false, in order to overcome the issue of using disinformation. The change needs to go deeper

and this is done by repairing broken political institutions and developing the democratic

values of the citizens.51

2.3.3 Cyberspace security

The new developments in technology has led to an entire new arena emerging that

authoritarian states now use to their advantage.52 This arena is called cyberspace and it is

where electronics are utilised to exchange information through different network systems and

corporeal organisations. This arena is not specifically the internet, though internet is a part of

the cyberspace. Cyberspace is a man-made domain that is the result of the world-wide

interconnectedness that is globalisation. It has provided a forum through which ideas and

thoughts can be shared globally with half of humanity.53

The areas in which this component plays a major role is within the economic, political and

social sphere. This has led to cyberspace becoming a well-respected domain that to many is

considered equal to sea, space air and land.54 The new development of this area has also led

to new challenges for the authoritarian regimes, since they have had to adapt to the situation.

Autocratic regimes has shown great resilience to the new threats this arena presents and also

a good capacity for being able to tackle the new problems that has arisen.

It is often believed that authoritarian regimes do not have the ability to develop, however in

this case they have shown that they are anything but non-adaptable.55 To be able to control

the cyberspace the authoritarian regimes will apply more restrictions by filtering the content

the population have access to and limiting the internet access as well as monitoring the

behaviour of their citizens. The regimes can also use this area to their advantage by

promoting their interests and giving out their own perception of information that will further

legitimise their power.56

51 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order’, p. 125. 52 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 199. 53 R. Deibert, and R. Rohozinski, ‘Risking Security: Policies and Paradoxes of Cyberspace Security’,

International Political Sociology, vol. 4, no. 1, 2010, p. 15-32. 54 Ibid. 55 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 198. 56 S. Kalathil, and T. Boas, ‘The internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, Cuba and the

counterrevolution’, First Monday, vol. 6, no. 8, 2001.

14

Since cyberspace is available to people in every part of the world it also means that it

presents a new security risk, since the information is no longer contained just within a single

country. The state systems are not able to counter the threats this arena has created in the

same way. It is not possible for an authoritarian regime to claim control over the entire

cyberspace since it is such a vast space that is always evolving leading to some areas always

being able to avoid state control.57

2.3.4 Civil society repression

In a democratic country the civil society needs to be a well-functioning part of society that

works independently away from the state.58 The civil society in democratic countries is an

area that is respected since it allows for the state, organisations and individuals to create

bonds of cooperation. The economic and political arena both benefit from having a successful

civil society therefore it is considered advantageous to have an independent civil society,

further it also promotes democracy.59

For an authoritarian regime this is why they are hesitant in allowing a flourishing civil society

since it widens the opportunity for a democratic culture to develop.60 Having an independent

population where people have a chance at controlling their own lives and beliefs is for an

authoritarian regime a high risk. This is because the citizens could develop a more critical

view of the government and this is something that authoritarian leaders want to avoid to

further secure their own power.61 When there are no independent organisations the population

turns to the state-driven ones since they are the only ones left available, and when all

institutions are run by the sitting regime there is no space available for the individual to be

independent.62 The ultimate aim is to have a civil society that allows the citizens a safe haven

from the state powers and if it is fully functioning it should balance the power of the state so

that the quality of life is equal for everyone.63

57 R. Deibert, and R. Rohozinski, ‘Risking Security’, p. 15-32. 58 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 153. 59 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social capital, civil society and development’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 1, 2001, p.

7. 60 Ibid. 61 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 153. 62 Ibid, p. 155. 63 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social capital, civil society and development’, p. 8.

15

In the case of a non-functioning civil society the government can intervene to try and sort out

the individuals they feel are not capable of fixing the issues themselves. It is possible that

when this opening is presented to the state it is easy for them to insert a hand into the civil

society and through there into every part of society leading to a low level of opposition.64 The

social interaction that people have with each other are shaped by social capital which has a

close relation to the civil society.65

However social capital can only exist when there is a strong relationship between individuals

and this is only possible if there is a well-functioning civil society, since social capital is seen

in the patterns of behaviour of the interaction between individuals.66 The bonds of trust that

the civil society creates are important since it unites the population through cooperation and

through that the country’s social capital is endorsed. The collaboration between individuals

should not be underestimated since good cooperation leads to a stronger society. When the

average citizens is encouraged to work for independence it increases the development,

however having an independent society is something that every authoritarian regime fear.67

2.4 How do these ‘soft powers’ interact with each other?

The different soft powers chosen for this investigation are effective independently however

together they permit the regime to implement more control. The interaction between the soft

powers advance both the use of them as well as their efficiency. The information provided in

this part consists of conclusions drawn based on the different definitions presented above.

The regime uses disinformation to misinform the population and to twist the truth in their

favour.68 This enables the other soft powers since they all depend on the population not

protesting against the regime. Hence if the population is not aware of the full extent of the

regime’s strategical moves, forming an opposition is not something they consider doing.

Further repressing the civil society means that the connections between individuals are

limited and the citizens do not have a place to form their own ideas.69

64 F. Fukuyama, ‘Social capital, civil society and development’, p. 8. 65 A. Tewari, ‘Social capital, civil society and development: key to contemporary administrative reforms

approach’, Indian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 53, no. 3, 2007, p. 456-457. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order’, p. 123. 69 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 153.

16

The actions of the regime are often defended in the media with immense skill, so that when

critics point out certain areas that do not correlate such as election manipulation or

questioning restrictions, the calculated management done by the regime of the highest skill is

hard to object.70 The expertise that regimes exert when manipulating the media enables them

further use the soft powers since their actions are veritably undetectable. Alone these soft

powers could work, but together they act more efficiently and that adds strength to the regime

contributing to a solid affirmation of their powers.

3. Analysis

In this part of the investigation the questions of the research will be answered. This will be

done by applying the soft powers presented on a specific case which is in this study is the

Russian regime and Putin. Examples and articles obtained will be discussed to support the

evidence provided in relation to Putin’s Russia. To present a broader view of the

circumstances that exist in Russia at the moment the first part of the analysis will present a

brief background view of Russia. Then Putin’s first term in office between 2000 and 2008

will be discussed to see if his first presidency in some way enabled the use of soft powers at

the present. The second part of the analysis will present a view on Putin’s use of the different

soft powers and how they affect the current conditions in Russia.

3.1 Background

Russia was greatly affected by the fall of the Soviet Union since it resulted in an extensive

split in the region where the Eastern European countries found it problematic to move away

from the shadow of the former Soviet state, resulting in the authoritarian features managing

to take hold in their countries.71 When Boris Yeltsin came to power after a significant power

struggle in 1993 the country’s economy and political powers merged with each other when

personal friends where invited into the regime. This created a society where millions of the

population were living below the poverty line and starving due to the instability of the

government. Because of this the population began to associate democracy with an unravelling

society and when the economic crisis hit in 1998, the situation gradually worsened.72

70 L. Bennett, and S. Livingston, ‘The disinformation order’, p. 124. 71 L. Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, p. 191. 72 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 220.

17

The fact that the situation was not resolved until Putin was elected, made the population

grateful for the positive changes in their lives. The economic, social, and for some the

political, lives were improved by Putin. This fact has significantly influenced his ability to be

able to stay in power for so long.73 The goals that Putin had were clear from the start with a

defined focus on centralising the power by restoring state control through limited political

competition and taking control over communication areas, some of his goals went unnoticed

by the population due to his popularity.74

3.2 The importance of Putin’s first eight years in power

To understand how Putin uses the soft powers to consolidate his authoritarian regime and

how he uses them to further legitimise his current political agenda one needs to understand

how the present conditions have been impacted by Putin’s first presidency and his earlier

reforms. This part of the analysis will therefore present the conditions that have enabled Putin

to use the soft powers in today’s Russia.

Winston Churchill once said that “Russia is a riddle wrapped in an enigma” which still holds

true today.75 And in many ways this riddle has become much harder to solve since Putin

came to power due to the fact that he has managed to insert his influence into every area of

society while sill upholding his popularity and at the same time run a strong authoritarian

state. Why Putin is such a strong figure in Russia today has many reasons however the

conditions he inherited from Yeltsin is one important factor.76

Firstly it is important to point out that at the start the branches of government such as the

Duma were very vulnerable and the population was susceptible to change. These

circumstances allowed Putin to set the rules of the game and gave him the ability to further

cultivate his ideas. Furthermore Putin decided to reshuffle his cabinet under the guise of

diminishing the corruption and changing the government to a modern administration.77

73 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 220. 74 S. Fish, ‘Putin’s Path’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 12, no. 4, 2001, p. 71. 75 A. Applebaum, ‘Putin’s Grand Strategy’, South Central Review, vol. 35, no. 1, 2018, p. 22. 76 G. Graeme, ‘The Basis of Putin’s Power’, Russian Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2016, p. 46-69. 77 S. Hashim, ‘High-modernism and its limits – assessing state incapacity in Putin’s Russia, 2000-2008’

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 50. No. 3, 2017, p. 195-205

18

This could sound as an admirable idea, however in truth this only gave Putin the capability to

decide who he wanted in his government which means he could remove those who he

thought might oppose him.78 At the same time Putin also removed the elections for governors

and mayors which meant he could appoint those he deemed appropriate leading to even less

opposition in his government.79 This meant that the regime Putin established allowed him to

interfere at his own convenience in all areas of society these include, among others, the

judicial, military, economic and private spheres. This became possible due to the lack of

resistance that Putin created with his reforms. Further the elite became dependent on Putin

and his will which established his position even more.80 Together with this the economy was

for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union thriving leading to millions of Russian’s

joining the middle-class, which in turn made the population less worried when certain

questionable reforms became law.81

3.3 Putin’s use of Election Monitoring in Russia

Using election monitoring has become a democratic norm and Putin knows this so he uses

election monitoring to his advantage to be able to stay in power. However by holding up the

pretence that Russia is somewhat of a democratic country Putin is also putting himself and

his one party state at risk when the electoral rules to some extent also applies to his regime.

By keeping up the democratic appearances Putin is taking a greater risk by giving his

opponents a way to undermine his power. This means that maintaining a high standard in his

manipulations of the electoral process is necessary.82

A strategic move by Putin’s government is to specifically invite a certain amount of critics

and equally as many supporters meaning that a statement made by either side can be

disapproved by the other.83 Putin upholds this way of thinking in many areas, for example if a

protest is taking place with critics of his regime he allows this only if there is also a protest in

another part of Russia that showcases his supporters, by doing this neither side can have the

upper-hand. This also gives the illusion of democracy since he allows them to demonstrate.84

78 S. Hashim, ‘High-modernism and its limits’, p. 195-205. 79 P. Smith, ‘Putin’s Russia’, New York Times Upfront, vol. 145. No. 3, 2012, p. 16-17. 80 C. Monday, ‘Privatization to Putinization: the genesis of Russia’s hobbled oligarchy’, Communist and Post-

Communist Studies, vol. 50. No. 4, 2017, p. 303-317. 81 P. Smith, ‘Putin’s Russia’, p. 16-17. 82 S. Sestanovich, ’Putin’s invented oppositon’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 18. No. 2, 2007, p. 122-V. 83 J. Kelley, ‘The more the merrier? The effects of having multiple international election monitoring

organisations’, p. 59. 84 J. Nichol, ‘Russia’s March 2012 presidential election: outcome and implications’, Current Politics and

Economics of Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, vol. 37. No. 3/4, 2012, p. 357-373.

19

It can be said that election monitoring is done not only to please the population but also

allows a country to maintain legitimacy in the global arena, to gain international respect the

practice continues to be important. However, just because an election monitoring

organisation is considered trustful by the majority one has to consider that they can all be

impartial to some extent.85

One of the most prominent election monitoring organisations is the OSCE which stands for

Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This organisation is the head of many

smaller monitoring organisation, their final report holds a high value in the international

sphere.86 In their report of the 2012 election they do not state outright that the election was a

scam, however in some areas it is implicated; they claim that there was obvious bias towards

a specific candidate and the favour of the ruling party was clear. While they did not detect a

direct observation of fraud it is indicated in their report that certain actions can clearly point

to manipulations.87

As can be seen in the numbers of how many people voted in the election, the turnout being

exceptionally high is beneficial to Putin and his party, however conversely the numbers were

disproportional in that they were suspiciously close to round numbers which could have been

an indication that there was some fraud in the process; nevertheless, there is no concreate

evidence of this.88 The Western observers during this election did in the end conclude that the

election was free but not fair, their statement was disapproved by another election monitoring

organisation called CIS, also known as the Commonwealth of Independent States. This

organisation is made up of 10 former Soviet countries and in their report they claim that

democratic values were upheld which indicates that a fair election was held, their statement

directly opposes the Western organisations claims.89

85 J. Kelley, ‘Election observers and their biases’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 21. No. 3, 2010, p. 158. 86 Bader, M, and H. Schmeets, ‘Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from

Russia’, p. 1-14. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 W. Clarke, ‘The 2012 presidential election in Russia: Putin returns’, Electoral Studies, vol. 32, no 2, 2013, p.

374-377

20

Furthermore Putin is aware that there are doubts of his legitimacy and the authenticity of his

election, and he counteracts these doubts with confusion. The Central Election Commission

of Russia is the institution that provides the international organisations with the data collected

from the election, the information the Commission has is provided by the regime meaning

that they have direct control over what numbers they want to share.

Therefore the monitoring organisations cannot explicitly see if manipulation of the election

has taken place, all they can do is investigate other countries where fraud has been known to

happen and see if the numbers correlate. Meaning that their reports can be more easily

disapproved since the election monitoring organisations are not able to prove their claims to a

high level of certainty.90

To sum up, it can be concluded that Putin uses the election monitoring on his own terms, he

upholds some of the election principles while still manipulating the process just enough to not

get caught in the act. He does this by inviting a specific amount of election observers that are

made up of critics but also of supporters. He also manages to confuse the observers by

controlling the information that they are provided with. All of this indicates a high level of

skill.

3.4 Putin’s use of disinformation in Russia

In Russia the population gets most of their information from the government through the

television or through newspapers; this is what will be discussed in this part of the analysis.

Social media can also be considered an area that is affected by disinformation however that

part of the research will be brought up when cyberspace security is discussed since it falls

under that category. The more traditional ways of disinformation will be the focus during this

part.

Despite the fact that the internet has become a widespread phenomenon, it is something that

the rural population of Russia is not able to take part in. As a result, the television becomes

their primary source of information.91

90 M. Bader and H. Schmeets, ‘Does international election observation deter and detect fraud? Evidence from

Russia’, p. 1-14. 91 O. Lazitski, ‘Media endarkenment: a comparative analysis of 2012 election coverage in the United States and

Russia’, American Behavioural Scientist, vol. 58. No. 7, 2014, p. 899.

21

In Russia the regime has complete control over the state television and channels that do not

follow the ideals of the regime are threatened and can face forceful suppression by the

government.92

Additionally the sanctions that were installed in Russia after their involvement in the

annexation of the Crimean Peninsula had the ambition of damaging the elite of the country.

The economic difficulties that the sanctions presented affected the many rather than the few

at the top.93 The intention of restricting the regime instead impeded the opposition, when the

smaller competition companies were pushed out of the market leading to them having to give

their shares to the major stakeholders which are made up of either the regime, or strong

supporters of the regime. So while the intentions of the West might have been well founded

their actions only benefited the state-owned media companies. 94

Despite his violations of free speech, Putin is still considerably popular in Russia. This has

several reasons one of them being the Kremlin’s information war.95 The image that is showed

in the media of Putin is that he is a friend of all Russians, and those who oppose him are foes

to the normal Russian and wants to destroy the sovereignty of their homes. Political

campaigns in the media portray Putin in mortal combats where the morality of the opposition

is always presented as a threat.96

Putin even said this in his victory speech after the election in 2012, here it is important to

note that the media did not analyse Putin’s speech at all they just broadcasted what he said

meaning that the facts in his speech are not scrutinized for the population, they are just

presented as truth.97 A central part of how Putin manipulates the media is through

representing himself as a superhero; not many people have missed Putin riding bare chested,

scuba diving, or even arm wrestling. By presenting himself in this way Putin crafts an image

of himself as a remarkable man that takes actions when needed. If the portrayals of him are

true it is not a stretch for the population to believe that Putin is able to solve their problems

without much resistance.98

92 T. Hopper, ‘Pressing for change: Russia’s 2012 presidential election’, Harvard International Review, vol. 33.

No. 3, 2011, p. 9-10. 93 I. Kiriya, ‘The impact of international sanctions on Russia’s media economy’, Russian Politics, vol. 2. No. 1,

2017, p. 80-97. 94 Ibid. 95 T. Hopper, ‘Pressing for change: Russia’s 2012 presidential election’, 2011, p. 9-10. 96 O. Lazitski, ‘Media endarkenment’, p. 913. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid.

22

Further the manipulations of the non-Putin centred media is done through what some call a

‘staged play’ where fake interviews are conducted to display just enough truth together with

fabrications so for a normal citizens it will be hard to detect where the actual truth lies. Actors

are hired to play ‘victims’ of certain situations to portray a controlled image, fiction and fact

are mixed together and serious events are portrayed as an exciting TV-show rather than

news.99 The aim of the regime is not only to confuse the population by presenting critics such

as Ukraine and the United States as threats but in the long run prove that democracy is as bad

as the regime has claimed. This is done by spurring on conspiracy theories they themselves

have planted by using disinformation.100

To sum up one can say that using disinformation has not only one goal but several, these

include supressing the opposition by portraying them as threat while at the same time

presenting Putin as the saviour of Russia. Alongside this, the aim of undermining democratic

values always play a role in the misinformation given to the population.

3.5 Putin’s use of cyberspace security in Russia

Disinformation is closely intertwined with cyberspace, since the information that is provided

through social media and other parts of the World Wide Web is to some extent controlled by

the Russian regime. The focus of this part will be on more modern ways of information flows

as opposed to the earlier analysis of the more traditional ones. Though the cyberspace is not

explicitly the internet, though the internet is included in its spectrum and the importance of it

will therefore be a large focus.

Though the development of social media and the internet is fairly new, Russia has already

developed an efficient way of dealing with the difficulties that this area presents. Large

restrictions on how the citizens are allowed to use social media is already in place.101 In the

beginning regimes undermined the importance of the interconnectedness the internet would

create; today the internet encourages communication and transparency in the political process

and the effectiveness of discussion between the state and its subjects.102

99 P. Pomerantsev, ‘The Kremlin’s Information War’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 26. No. 4, 2015, p. 40-41. 100 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 50-51. 101 U. Mejias and N. Vokuev, ‘Disinformation in the media: the case of Russia and the Ukraine’, Media, Culture

and Society, vol. 39, no. 7, 2017, p. 18. 102 Z. Yu, ‘Political Activity of Russia’s Internet Audience on a Regional Level as a Constituent of Civil

Society’, European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 1. No. 1, 2015, p. 65-69.

23

The cyberspace can be considered to hold strategic competitions and Russia therefore sees

this arena as a chance to shift the global internet narrative in their favour and take back the

leverage that the United States currently has over the international internet governance. The

internet has for the regime in Russia turned in to a valuable foreign policy tool and their

stance on policy making in this arena is influenced by their traditional views of sovereignty,

so their actions in global internet matters are influenced thereafter. This can be exemplified

by the regime’s attempt at trying to get a resolution through at the United Nations that would

prohibit information aggression which can be deduced to mean that they do not want

ideological attempts to be able to undermine the stability of their regime.103

The importance of social media during the Arab Spring is something that the Kremlin is

acutely aware of, the internet is therefore perceived as a threat in Russia. Therefore they seek

to regulate the internet’s infrastructure and the social networks on different platforms, to

avoid a similar situation of Arab Spring happening in their own country. The fact that mass

demonstrations after the election in 2012 were coordinated on different social media

platforms raised the regimes anxiety over the power that the cyberspace has not only for them

to strengthen their position but also the chance it gives the opposition to strengthen theirs.104

Restricting social media cannot be done in the same way as traditional media is constrained

since taking away networks or restricting access is an obvious move while strategically lying

on television is something that can go unnoticed by the average citizen. The restrictions on

social media has decreased the loyalty to the Kremlin which poses a bigger threat to Putin.

The manipulations in this arena must therefore hold a higher standard since it is not as easy to

control.105 The regime is constantly promoting further boundaries on internet use by arguing

that different networks pose a threat to Russia’s autonomy leading them to be reviewed and

then restricted since they could be considered a risk to the national security.106 Russia

currently has laws that allow the government to observe all internet traffic and usage of the

population without having to get permission. This has allowed the regime to gain influence in

the social media sphere and even though this arena is impossible to fully control due to its

vast space, Russia has managed well to use what they can to their advantage.107

103 J. Noceti, ‘Contest and Conquest’, International Affairs, vol. 91, No. 1, 2015, p. 111-130. 104 Ibid. 105 N. Bode, and A, Makarychev, ‘The New Social Media’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 60. No. 2, 2013,

p. 53-62. 106 J. Noceti, ‘Contest and Conquest’, p. 111-130. 107 J. Stevenson, ‘The Trump-Russia connection’, Strategic Comments, vol. 23, no 3, 2017, p. vi-viii.

24

To sum up one can say that the Russian government sees both opportunities and

disadvantages with the existence of the cyberspace. To further their political agenda they are

trying to insert their ideas into cyberspace to influence other countries. However since the

cyberspace also gives the opposition and the general population a platform it needs at the

same time be restricted.

3.6 Putin’s use of civil society repression in Russia

A free civil society has the ability to pose a real threat to the Russian regime so to contain the

development of one Putin has restricted his country’s civil society. He justifies the reforms by

saying that they will improve Russia when in truth they just limit the space for the individual

and brings power to the regime.108 A fully functioning civil society could have the possibility

of the opposition growing stronger so restricting this area is a vital component to Putin’s

politics. However at the same time Putin has realised that some sort of civil society is an

essential component to having an active society, and therefore an important piece to be able

to stay in power.109

The regime strategy in Russia is to hold a firm distinction between the state and society so

that the Kremlin can dominate the civil society and leave little room for development. This

distinction allows for a certain leeway for the government’s strategy. By funding specific

organisations that the regime calls non-governmental organisations they are deceiving the

population into believing that the regime does support a thriving society. However, in truth

these non-governmental organisations are run by the state, and is dependent on their funding

as well as their continued support. This means that the organisations do not allow for

opinions that differ much from the regime and so Putin is still in control while at the same

time giving his society a space to function.110

108 S. Henderson, ‘Civil Society in Russia: state society relations in the post-Yeltsin era’, Problems of Post-

Communism, vol. 58, no. 3, 2011, p. 11. 109 Diamond, Plattner & Walker, Authoritarianism goes global, p. 159. 110 J. Richter, and W. Hatch, ‘Organising civil society in Russia and China: a comparative approach’,

International Journal of Politics, vol. 26. No. 4, 2013, p. 323-347.

25

When Putin was re-elected in 2012, further restrictions was instated on organisations that the

regime deems to be involved in political activities that they claim pose a threat. They use the

so called Foreign Agents Act as a means to be able to justify their anti-democratic actions

that are enforced in Russia. This Act means that civil society organisations must comply with

the ideological view of the government to be able to continue their activities, those few

organisations that do not want to comply has to do so in secret since the punishment for not

following the Russian ideals are something that they fear.111

To understand the Russian civil society one must not only understand Putin’s intentions but

also the mind-set of the population. When the new civil society was implemented in Russia

under Yeltsin during the 90’s it only produced negative social issues and the political and

economic domain suffered heavy consequences.112 So when Putin later managed to reverse

these issues that had left the Russian population in a vulnerable state through a centralisation

of power his ideas regarding the restrictions to the civil society did not seem so extreme due

to the earlier hardships that this area had produced. To this day Russians that grew up or that

lived during the troubling times of the 90’s still have a deep distrust of the whole public

sphere, so when Putin talks about new reforms it is not far-fetched for the population to

believe that what he says is justified because his previous action led to an improvement for

the majority of Russians which is something that the population remember.113

The people.s disinterest in the public and political lives is therefore an important reason as to

why the civil society in Russia has a hard time to establish itself; the tough restrictions does

play a part as well. However it is harder for a regime to supress a bigger crowd than it is to

supress a smaller one. Many Russians do not view their social and political sphere beyond

that of their family members therefore it is a stretch to believe that they would be willing to

sacrifice that to move against government officials. Nevertheless, there have been signs of an

increased protest activity in Russia.114 As time moves on so does the population and with

time fewer citizens will have experienced the harrowing situation during the 90’s and will

just have experienced repressions by Putin.

111 A. Sarang, ‘Civil society and drugs in Russia: moving towards the conservative agenda’, The Lancet, vol.

390, No. 10102, 2017, p. 1621-1622. 112 Z. Golenkova, ‘Civil Society in Russia’, Sociological Research, vol. 37, no. 4, 1998, p. 87. 113 T. Denk and C. Anckar, Komperativ Politik, p. 220. 114 A. Evans, ‘Protests and civil society in Russia: The struggle for the Khimki Forest’, Communists and Post-

Communist studies, vol. 45. No. 3/4, 2012, p. 233-242.

26

In summary one can say that a flourishing civil society poses dangers to Putin’s regime,

however allowing Russia’s civil society to function on his terms is favourable both to the

people and to the government. Further the disinterest of the population that stemmed from

their dreadful experiences in the 90’s also contributes to the current civil society.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this research was to investigate what soft powers play a part in the consolidation

of an authoritarian regime in Russia and what strategies the present regime use to further

legitimise their political agenda. The analysis did not only seek to investigate Russia and

Putin but also examine the importance of a strong leader in an authoritarian state and use of

different power mechanism to consolidate power. To make the purpose of the research

possible three questions were asked, and together with the evidence presented in the analysis

the response to the questions will now be presented. The questions will be answered

separately and the conclusions drawn will be based on the results obtained in the analysis.

The first question that the research sought to answer was how did Putin’s first eight years in

power affect the use of soft powers in Russia today? In response to this one can say that the

strong position that Putin established during his first presidency has resulted in him being

able to use the soft powers to his advantage. The earlier reforms enabled the current situation

in Russia and increased Putin’s place in the Russian society. The circumstances such as a

vulnerable Duma and a susceptible population that Putin took control over allowed him to

conduct his political agenda in the way that he wanted, which have in turn affected how he

uses the soft powers at the present. The foundations on which Putin’s power is based on has

had a significant influence over how he has managed to stay in power for so long. If this

investigation would have focused on the use of soft powers during Putin’s first period in

office the analysis would look profoundly different, since Putin’s actions today is heavily

influenced by his first presidency.

The second question this research sought to answer was what soft powers have led to the

consolidation of an authoritarian regime in Russia? The theory that this investigation is

based on suggested that authoritarian states use election monitoring, disinformation,

cyberspace security, and civil society repression to maintain and consolidate their power. As

can been seen in the analysis of this research, Russia is no exception. The Kremlin uses all of

the soft powers that are mentioned in the main theory of this investigation, some have a

greater importance however they all make an imperative imprint on the Russian society.

27

With the use of these soft powers Putin has managed to maintain a strong position in Russia

for a significant amount of time. Additionally the Kremlin shows a high level of expertise

while using all of these mechanisms to further consolidate his power. Only speculations about

Putin using these soft powers can be done meaning that the proficiency that Putin has in these

areas should not be underestimated.

The third question this research sought to answer was how does Putin use these soft powers to

further legitimize his political agenda? Putin uses all of the soft powers that the theory

suggested, he uses disinformation to deceive the population by converting the truth to fit his

political goals, this enables the other soft powers among them election monitoring. Putin can

convince the public that his elections are free and fair when in truth the election process in

Russia is manipulated to achieve the desired outcome. Additionally the cyberspace security

arena is a useful tool that is used to influence other countries however since it also gives the

opposition and the population the regime restrict it. The last arena is civil society repression,

this is an area that Putin allows to function on his own terms since a flourishing civil society

poses a real threat to the regime.

One can say that the Russian regime and consequently Putin uses all of the soft powers in

unique ways that are individually crafted to fit the goals that he has for that area, one thing

the arenas have in common though is the skill that the regime have when they manage them.

The Kremlin sees both opportunities and disadvantages with using soft powers however they

have decided that the additional prospects that the soft powers present to the regime should

not be undervalued. The soft powers are used on terms that are specifically created by the

regime and the manipulations of the different parts of society further legitimise the Kremlin’s

political agenda, this can be seen in the way that the soft powers are handled. Putin succeeds

in manipulating soft powers while seemingly maintaining an image of innocence this

indicates a high level of skill since his actions can never be fully proved.

To conclude one can say that the aim of the research was fulfilled. The three questions were

answered and even though more extensive research could have been done with more accounts

of the Russian regime discussed or more examples given, the purpose of the research was

achieved. Putin uses the soft powers to his advantage to further consolidate his power. With

time more challenges might appear for Putin to overcome however at the moment the

capability that the Russian regime illustrates when using the soft powers should not be

underestimated.

28

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