TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRACFACTS: Residents of barrio Sta. Elena filed complaints against the petitioner because of the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside his warehouse which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor, and dust emitted by the machine. A committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.. Respondent municipal officials further contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.Petitioner assailed the validity of the ordinance and averred that what is prohibited is the construction of warehouses and not the use of the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra. It also contended that the ordinance is discriminatory since other warehouses are allowed to operate within the vicinity without being prosecuted. ISSUES:Whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and voidHELD: Yes. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the Municipal Council of Virac and is not unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner.The Court also emphasized the criteria of a valid ordinance as follows: (1) It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) It must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) It must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) It must not be unreasonable.

LIM vs. PACQUINGFACTS: The City of Manila granted Association ofDevelopment Corporationto operate jai-alai pursuant to Ordinance No. 7065. Petitioners argued that Republic Act No. 954 entitled, An Act to Prohibit WithHorse Racesand Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation, effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board ofManilato grant franchises for gambling operations. They argued that the term "legislative franchise" in said act is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress. On the other hand, Association of Development Corporation contends that Republic Act No. 409 which created the Manila Chapter gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and it does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress. If such is the case, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board and consequently it was within the power of the City of Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in its jurisdiction.ISSUE: Whether R.A. 409 gives the City of Manila the authority to grant franchise.HELD: It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the permit or license was also franchised by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed fromlocal governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the Games and Amusement Board by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.

PADILLA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

FACTS:Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to becomposed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The said resolution providesthat the plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, majority of the votes cast were against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC, should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected like the 12barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In support of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.ISSUE; Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?

HELD;Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was concluded that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the resolution.

VILLACORTA vs. BERNARDOFACTS: This is a petition for certiorari against a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan annulling an ordinance adopted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The ordinance in question is Ordinance 22, or An Ordinance Regulating Subdivision Plans over parcels of land in Dagupan, passed by the Municipal Board.The court a quo declared the ordinance as void because it conflicts with and expands Act 496, which is a national law. First of all Sec.1 of the ordinance requires that all subdivision plans be submitted to the City Engineer before it can be approved by the Director of Lands. Sec. 3 of the ordinance further provides that a certification of the city engineer is needed before registration of subdivision plans can be made with the Register of Deeds. Section 2 also provides a service fee for subdivision plans. Lastly, the ordinance also imposes a penalty for violations committed. All of the aforementioned sections of the ordinance contravenes Act 496 as the latter does not require submission of plans to the city engineer, nor the issuance of a certification by the same, nor does it provide any penalties.The City of Dagupan argues that the ordinance brings to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. ISSUE: Is Ordinance 22 valid, considering the laudable purpose for its enactment?HELD: NO. The powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. This advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instantacase, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.

CRUZ vs. PARASFACTS: The municipal corporation of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibits the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with a nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the license previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The issue is whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses?ISSUE: Whether the act of the Municipality of Bocaue is legal?HELD: NO. It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTAFACTS: The Quezon City Council passed Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of Quezon CitySection 9 of said ordinance states that: At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. Then, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. It alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The trial court rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. ISSUE:Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police powerHELD: No. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

ORTIGAS COMPANY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANKFACTS:On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that: The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively for residential purposesDefendant-appellee, maintains that the area, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area had been declared a commercial and industrial zone. On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began construction of a building to be devoted to banking purposes. The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded that the construction of the commercial building on the said lots be halted. The latter refused to comply, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations. Because of this, Ortigas & CO. LTD (plaintiff-appellant) filed a complaint with the trial court, accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, against FEATI Bank (herein defendant-appellee). The trial court dismissed the complaint as well as its motion for reconsideration.ISSUES:Whether the trial court erred when it failed to consider that the Municipal Council had the power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee. HELD: Yes. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.

BALACUIT vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCEFACTS: Ordinance 640 Ordinance penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contest or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.Petitioners filed before the CFI, that the said ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The petitioners contend that Ordinance 640 is not within the power of the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Sec. 15(n) of RA 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan. Petitioners maintain that Ordinance 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. ISSUE: Whether Ordinance 640 is valid and constitutionalHELD: NO. This Court agrees with the petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficult in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. This Court see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners.

BASCO vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATIONFACTS: PAGCOR was created and was granted a franchise to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino Philippine Tourist. Subsequently, PD 1869 was passed to enable the government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following, among others, declared policy. b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, x x x (1) generate sources of additional revenue x x x, (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the countrys existing tourist attractions, and (3)minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct involvement. It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue.But the petitioners are questioning the validity of PD 1869. They contend that PD 1869: 1) constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees and 2) its exemption clause is violative of local autonomy.ISSUE: Whether PD 1869 is null and voidHELD: PD 1869 is not null and void. Their contention is without merit for the following reasons:The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter or statute must plainly show an confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it.

The Charter of the City is subject to control by Congress, which has the power to create and abolish Municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. If congress can grant the City the power to tax, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

The power of local governments to regulate gambling thru grant of franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees, which is a consequence of the issuance of licenses or permits, is no long vested in the City.

Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter. As such, it should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere local government.

Sangalang vs IACFACTS:Upon the instruction of Makati Mayor Yabut, studies were made on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel- Air Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to Bel-Air Village. The studies revealed that subdivision plan of Bel-Air were approved on a condition that its major thoroughfares connecting the public streets and highway shall be opened to public traffic.It is only necessary in the interest of the general public to open to traffic to traffic to Annapola, Mercedes, Zodiac, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit and Paseo de Roxas. The petitioner contended that Jupiter streets are for the exclusive use of BAVA residents. They also appeal that the demolition and opening of Orbit streets has loss of privacy of BAVA residents and deprivation of property without due course.ISSUE:Whether the Mayor of Makati may order the opening of the streetsHELD:Yes. The opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic congestion and public conveyance, same as the opening of Orbit Street. There is no taking of property or expropriation without just compensation. The act of the mayor is in the concept of police power.

MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCEFACTS: When PAGCOR opened a branch in Cagayan de Oro, there was an instant opposition from different sectors of the community, including the local government. In fact, the Mayor of the city of Cagayan de Oro brought this instant petition attacking among others, gambling as intrinsically harmful and citing various provisions of the constitution and several decisions of the court. The Sannguniang panglungsod passed an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinos in their place.ISSUE: Whether the Sangguniang Panglungsod may pass an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casinosHELD: NO. The power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games o chance remains unimpaired. PD 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.Casino gambling is authorized under PD 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro city to enact ordinances prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and prohibiting the operation of casinos. Those ordinances are contrary to PD1869 and the public policy announced therein, therefore ultra vires and void.

LLDA vs CAFACTS:Sec4 (K) of the charter of LLDA provides that the LLDA shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities affecting the said lake. Then RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, that municipality in the Laguna Lake region interpreted the provision of this law to mean that newly passed law gave municipal government the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.Sec 149 of RA 7160 states that municipalities shall have exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal government assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fish pen permits. Unregulated fish pen occupied almost 1/3 of the entire waters which is violation of Laguna lake carrying capacity. LLDA served notice to the general public to the concerned owner who illegally constructed their fish pen and fish cages.Fish pen owner filed injunction against LLDA on the ground that provision of LLDA had been repealed by RA 7160.ISSUE:Whether or not LLDA or the town or municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over Laguna Lake the issuance of permits for fishery privilegesHELD:LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits within the Laguna Lake Region. The charter of LLDA should prevail over RA 7160.

BINAY vs DOMINGO,

FACTS;The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants.

ISSUE; Whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held:Yes. Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas (use your property so as not to impair others) and Salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: Private respondent Colomidas purchased a parcel of land and claimed a road right of way which leads towards the National Road and ends at the portion of petitioner Pilapil's property where a camino vicinal exists all the way to said National Road. The Colomidas tried to improve the road or camino vicinal, but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them. The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal.ISSUE:Whether Colomidas act of improving the camino vicinal legal?HELD: NO. The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces, cities or municipalities. In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private property can interfere with such a right.Under Batas Pambasa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinance or regulations subject to the provision of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road

MACASIANO vs. DIOKNOFACTS: The Municipality of Paraaque passed an ordinance which authorizes the closure of certain streets and the establishment of a flea market theron. Through a resolution passed by the municipal council, the mayor entered into a contract for the operation maintenance and management of a flea market with respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative.Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction of said stalls. Petitioner Macasiano wrote Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.The trial court however upholds the validity of the ordinance.ISSUE:Whether the ordinance is constitutional?HELD: Yes. The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. (Art. 423, Civil Code). In the present case, the local roads are used for public service and therefore considered public properties. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. (Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga.) Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Section 10 of the Local Government Code provides closure of roads A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed.

CRUZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURTFACTS:Padre Rada market was authorized to be operated as a public market of the City of Manila by virtue of Resolution No. 230, as amended by Resolution No. 406, both series of 1949. The management of said market represent by petitioner Cruz wrote Mayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing three-fourths of the area of the market from the direct supervision and control of the City Treasurer's Office effective on June 15, 1970, and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a public market. Mayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal of the market as a public market in line with the decision that upheld the right of the operators of the Elcano Market to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating, among others, that approval for the withdrawal by the City of Manila is not even necessary. Herein private respondents questioned the said order. The trial court declared the order valid, in its amended decision, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether the City Mayor may validly withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market.HELD: NO. "it is axiomatic that only the power that created it can withdraw it." The Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allows the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city's constant supervision. The establishment and maintenance ofpublic marketsis by law among the legislative powers of the City of Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal board resolution and approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a public market.HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA vs. REYESFACTS: The Philippine Tourism Authority wishes to expropriate 282 hectares of land for development into integrated complexes of areas with potential tourist value. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of Public Use. They contend that the land is already for land reform and that it should seek the approval of the Court of Agrarian Relations. CFI granted writs of possession. Petitioners brought instant petition before SC to enjoin execution. The basic issues are whether or not there is non-compliance with the public use requirement under the eminent domain provision of the Bill of Rights; whether or not there is disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated; and whether or not there is impairment of obligations of contracts.ISSUE: Whether PTA has authority to expropriate such land?HELD: Yes. There is compliance with the requirement of public use. The states power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution. The policy objective of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public interest, and general welfare among others. To include specific programs like tourism as express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulk code and would require the framers to be impossibly prescient. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform, among others, merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other development programs. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded.

CHIONGBAN vs. ORBOSFACTS: Pursuant to Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Mindanao. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 authorizes the President to merge existing regions. On October 12, 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the administrative regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Article XIX, Section 13, of RA No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it unduly delegates legislative power to the President and provides no standard for the exercise of said delegated power. In addition, petitioners challenge the validity of EO No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge Regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao.ISSUE: Whether the act of the President in reorganizing the administrative regions in Mindanao is valid?HELD: Yes. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the county into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local government but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments (Abbas vs. COMELEC). The regions themselves are not territorial and political division like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and ensuring the efficient delivery of essential services. Finally, the reorganization of administrative regions in EO No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: 1) contiguity and geographical features; 2) transportation and communication facilities; 3) cultural and language groupings; 4) land area and population; 5) socio-economic development programs in the regions 6) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; and 7) number of provinces and cities.

ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA FACTS: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 7720 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code by arguing that Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA)are not income but merely transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Hence, the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be Php 20,074,581.97 is inaccurate as the Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation.ISSUE:Whether the Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA of municipalities is part of income or revenue?HELD: Yes. Petitioners contentions are untenable because IRAs form part of the income of Local Government Units. The funds generated by LGUs from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided in the Local Government Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local development projects. As such, for purposes of budgetary preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the LGU, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national utilization proceeds are considered items of income.TY vs. TRAMPEFACTS: The respondent court ruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160. It held also that said Code had effectively repealed the previous law on the matter, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area.ISSUE: Whether the tax imposed is under the municipal assessors jurisdiction?HELD: No. Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein; while Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned . . .It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing there two (2) provisions, the Court arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule as follows:The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.

Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9, P.D. 921. In the instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina, Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different assessors shall compare their individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and produce a schedule of values for their district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D. that they should evolve a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden the taxpayers.

The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a newspaper of general circulation and submitted to the Sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance, per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.

By this harmonization, the operative principle of decentralization provided under Sec. 3, R.A. 7160 encouraging local government units to consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and resources is fulfilled. Indeed, the essence of joint local action for common good so cherished in the Local Government Code finds concrete expression in this harmonization.

JAVIER vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS:Respondent Provincial Board of Antique abolishes the office of the Provincial Engineer. Petitioner questioned the said action and contends that the abolition was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the 1971 election. Respondents argue that the abolition was motivated by an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries, and operating expenses at the Office of the Provincial Engineer, and that the power of the Provincial Board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it.ISSUE: Whether the dismissal is valid?HELD: Yes. Section 18 of Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer. While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that office, absent, however, any contrary provision, the authority to abolish should be deemed embraced by implication from the power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact expressed that an implied power of the province x x x (should) be liberally construed in its favor and any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of local government and it should be presumed to exist.The abolition of the office in the present case could have well been justified except for the convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process taken by the board. The Court is not prepared, however, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of respondents.

MARIANO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFACTS: Petitioners assail section 2 of R.A. 7854 as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by meter and bounds, in violation of section 10 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code.ISSUE:Whether R.A. 7854 was unconstitutional by not providing the exact area of the land covered HELD:NO. The delineated area of the proposed city of Makati provides that: SEC. 2. City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted to highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory Municipality of Makati of Metropolitan Manila area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the Municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The importance of drawing the precise strokes of territorial boundaries cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Any uncertainty in the boundaries will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical description.

LIMBONA vs. MANGELINFACTS: In 1998, President Estrada issued EO no. 48 to facilitate the process of enhancing the capabilities of local government units in the discharge of their functions and services. The oversight committee has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective implementation. The Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created to address the funding requirements of the program. The DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG. The initial fund was to be sourced from the available savings of the national government. The committee has been authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the local government units.The province of Batangas represented by Governor Mandanas, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisions contained in the GAA of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion of the IRA for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund and imposed conditions for the release thereof.ISSUE:Whether the assailed provisions in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violates the constitutional precept on local autonomy.HELD: Yes. They are violative of the constitutional precept on local autonomy. As the constitution itself declares. Local autonomy, both administrative and fiscal, means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to among others, allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. The assailed provisions in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs. They cannot be upheld.

TAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFACTS:BP 885 was enacted to create a new province, to be known as the Province of Negros Del Norte, in the Island of Negros. It provides, among others, that Sec. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected x x x.Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional and it is not in accordance with the Local Government Code Sec 3, A. X1 of our Constitution mandates that, No province, x x x may be created, x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Sec. 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the condition which must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are: A province may be created if it has territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, x x x.Public respondents argue that BP 885 should be accorded the presumption of legality, claiming that the said law does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. They further argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros Occidental, not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, did not fall within the meaning and scope of the term unit or units affected.ISSUE:Whether BP 885 is constitutionalHELD: No, BP is not constitutional. It can be plainly seen that the constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Thus, it is inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province would necessarily be substantially altered in order that there can be created the proposed new province. Two political units would be affected: the first would be the parent province because its boundaries substantially altered and the other would be of those in the area subtracted from the parent province to constitute the proposed province.

FLORES VS DRILONFACTS:Pursuant to the provision of Sec 13 par (d) of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). Mayor Richard Gordon of Olonggapo City was appointed chairman and chief executive of SBMA. The appointment was question by the petitioners contending that Sec 13 par (d) infringes the provision of Sec 7, first par., Art IX-B of the Constitution, which states that No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.Respondent contended on the other hand that the appointment is allowed for by Sec 94 of the Local Government Code which permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary function of the office.ISSUE:Whether Sec. 13 par (d) violates the constitutional proscription against the designation or appointment of elective official to other government post.HELD:Yes, it violates the constitutional proscription. The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. Local Government Code, particularly Sec. 94 is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par (d) of RA 7227 for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.

VILLANUEVA VS CASTANEDAFACTS:There is in the vicinity of Public market of San Fernando, Pampangga a strip land what is commonly known as talipapa. The petitioner claim that they have the right to remain and conduct business in the area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by municipal government while the respondent deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal consideration on public property. Municipal Council of San Fernando adopted Res. No. 218 authorizing 24 members of Fernando United Merchant and Traders Association to construct permanent stags.The action was protested while the case is pending, the council adopted Res. No. 29 which declared the subject area the parking place and as the public plaza, impliedly revoking Res No. 218. The decision was apparently not enforced, the petitioner is not evicted. The Associations of Concerned Citizen and Consumer of San Fernando, Pampangga filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Res. 29 to restore the subject property to its original and customary use as a public plaza. VicenteA. Macalino, as officer in charge of the Office issued resolution to demolish the stalls in the area.Issue: Whether public plaza is susceptible for contractual obligation(lease).Held:NO. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any contractual undertaking. Article 1271 states that communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their nature outside commerce of man are those for public use, such as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains etc., The petitioner has no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contract.

CITY OF MANILA vs. CAFACTS:Irene Sto. Domingo buried her husband in a lot at the North Cemetery, which was leased to her by the City of Manila for a period of fifty years. Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975, of the City Mayor of Manila, prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc., subject Lot in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only, it was certified as ready for exhumation. The authorities of the cemetery authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot onAll Souls Dayin their shock, consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in inquiring and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot in question.ISSUE:Whether the operations of the cemetery is a corporate or proprietary function of the City.HELD: Yes. The operations of the City of Manila of the cemetery is a corporate function. The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.

MANILA vs. TEOTICOFACTS: Genaro Teotico file a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police for the damages he had sustained when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue as he stepped down from the curb to aboard a jeepney. City of Manila however contends that the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) and not by Article 2189 of the Civil Code, because Republic Act No. 409 is a special law intended exclusively for the city of manila. .CFI rendered a decision favoring the city of Manila, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CFIs decision but ordered city of Manila to pay damages.ISSUE:Whether the case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409HELDNo. The case is not governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 but by Article 2189 of the Civil Code. In Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.

JIMENEZ V. MANILA
FACTS: The evidence of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) shows that in the morning of August 15, 1974 he, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble home. He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita Mascardo. Despite the medicine administered to him by the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. He was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days due to high fever and severe pain.ISSUE:Whether City of Manila is liableHELD: YES. This issue has been laid to rest in the case ofCity of Manila v. Teotico(22 SCRA 269-272 [1968]) where the Supreme Court squarely ruled that Republic Act No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or any other law or ordinance or from negligence" of the City "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that:Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision, constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities ... liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case.

GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPANFACTS: It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978, Guilatco, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. accidentally fell into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital. She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced; during the period of her confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on October 9, 1978, to the present. Despite her discharge from the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has been unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she used to do prior to the incident.ISSUE: Whether City of Dagupan is liable?HELD: YES. The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATIONFACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a complaint for expropriation against private respondent, over two parcels of land to be used for a socialized housing project. Respondent filed an answer and alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because the complaint was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as required by RA 7160 and that the cause of action, if any, was barred by res judicata.ISSUE:Whether such is valid?HELD: No, A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code, particularly Section 19 expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the municipal council will not suffice. The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGU's. The latter, when authorized by Congress, is subject to the legislature's control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.Hence, the State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate once all the legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain but also clearly defeat social justice. The petition is denied without prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over the subject property

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of petitioner passed a resolution in 1988 authorizing the provincial governor to purchase or expropriate private property contiguous to the provincial capitol for the purpose of establishing a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees.The land sought to be expropriated belongs to the San Joaquins, which at the time the complaint is filed, the governing law was BP 337 which authorizes expropriation by mere resolution of the municipal council.The Court of Appeals suspended the expropriation proceedings and requires petitioner to submit the requisite approval of the DAR to convert the classification of the property from agricultural to non-agricultural. Hence, the present petition.ISSUE: Whether such is valid?HELDNO. The power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL or RA 6657) particularly Section 65 which requires the approval of the DAR before a parcel of land can be reclassified. CARL does not intimate in the least that LGU's must first secure the approval of DAR before petitioner can institute the necessary proceedings.The authority of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural land cannot extend to the exercise of eminent domain, otherwise DAR will have the authority to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public use or not. Ordinarily, it is the municipal council that determines whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated is for public use, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts will intervene only when no real or substantial relation is established between the undertaking and public use.Under the new concept, public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community. In the present case, the expropriation for the establishment of pilot development center is for a public purpose.

PATALINGHUG vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Davao City enacted ordinance number 363, for the expanded zoning ordinance of Davao City. Section 8 of which provide that funeral parlors shall be established not less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings.Petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor, but his permit to construct the building was cancelled because the construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius measured from the nearest residential structure owned by Wilfred Teepot, which is leased by laundry businesses. Petitioner argued that Teepot's building is for commercial purposes since a business was being undertaken therein, and its classification as residential in tax declaration is not conclusive.ISSUE: Whether such was considered commercial zone?HELD: Yes. Even if Teepot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. Furthermore, a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. Under Section 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, tax declaration does not bind a provincial or city assessor. In fact, a piece of land declared by the tax payer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as commercial because its actual use is commercial. More importantly, the declaration of the said area as a commercial zone through a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power

FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFACTS: On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition w/ the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified for not yet being a citizen of the Philippines. During the elections, Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as the elected governor. At 8:30 pm of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor. Frivaldo filed a new petition w/ COMELEC seeking the annulment of the June 30 proclamation of Lee and his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 w/c he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. The issue is whether or not repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? ISSUE:Whether Frivaldo can be elected?HELD:Repatriation is valid and legal. Under Phil law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Moreover, Frivaldos repatriation seasonably cures his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold office as governor. He possessed the citizenship requirement on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Section 39 of Local Government Code must be liberally construed. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Furthermore, Sec 39 speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications should thus be possessed when the elective official begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed. Lees argument that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate registered as a voter as under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines is untenable. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first.

GREGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSFACTS: Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.(New LGC NOT yet in effect then). Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor and won (New LGC already in effect). After his term, Basco sought reelection twice and won on both reelections. Petition for disqualification was filed against Basco, using section 40 (b) of the LGC but dismissed. The issue is whether or not the petition for disqualification was correctly dismissedISSUE: Whether dismissal was valid?HELD:No. It was correctly dismisses. Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC does not apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on Jan. 1, 1992. Bascos election to office as city councilor in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office. It must be noted that there was nothing to condone in the first place. Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC, which applies only to those removed from office on or after Jan. 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason to dwell on the matter.

MERCADO vs. MANZANOFACTS:Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.ISSUE:Whether Manzano can validly be elected as Vice Mayor having dual citizenship?HELD: Yes. The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship."This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.o begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle ofjus sanguinisis born in a state which follows the doctrine ofjus soli. Such a person,ipso factoand without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both statesDual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

DAVID vs COMELEC
FACTS:In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City
and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Alex L. David filed a
petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on
the second Monday of May 1997.Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its
president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to
declare as unconstitutional.1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows: (c) The term of office of
barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3)
years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994.2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the
costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections.Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How
long is the term of office of barangay officials? Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2
of RA 6653 "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ."
This is reiterated in RA 6679. Petitioners further aver that although Sec. 43 of RA
7160 reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law
applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all
other local government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA
6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concernedISSUE:Whether the term of the barangay officials should be limited only to three years HELD:Yes. In light of the brief historical background, the intent and design of the
legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided
under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal
rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the law. And three years is the obvious intent.

FARINAS vs BALBAFACTS:Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States. The Mayor, Angelo Barba, recommended Edward Farinas to fill the vacancy. He is also recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas directed to the Mayor. The resolution regarding to the recommendation was submitted to Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte in compliance with Section 56 of the Local Government Code. Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged to the Governor.On the other hand, despite the disapproval, the respondent still appointed Farinas. Later on, he took an oath. On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the RTC of Ilocos Norte a petition quo warranto and prohibition. The Trial Court uphold the appointment.

ISSUE:Who can appoint the replacement in case of a permanent vacancy in Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political part.

HELD:There is only one governing appointment to Sanggunian Bayan. Any vacancy therein caused by the cessation from office of a member with or without a political party must be made by the Governor upon the recommendation of the said Sanggunian.

BUNYE vs ESCAREALFACTS:The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended petitioners from office pending trial for violation of a provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for enacting Kapasiyahan Blg 45, and based on which they forcibly took the management and operation of the new public market in Alabang from Cooperative named Kilusang Magtitinda.Petitioner assailed said, suspensions will toll the operations of the LGU without the mayor, Vice mayor and 6 councilors who were suspended, one that nothing can possibly compromised or hampered by their remaining office since the proceeding will no longer be for the purpose receiving evidence, hence, they insisted that the order suspending them should be set aside as a grave abuse of the Courts decision.ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners arguments valid to reconsider the Sandiganbayans order of suspensionHELD:No. The court found no merit in the petitioners argument s. The sole objective of an administrative suspension is to prevent the accused from hampering the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witness or to keep him from receiving evidence, that preventive suspension is Mandatory.The fear of the petitioner that the Municipal corporation of Muntinlupa will be paralyzed for 90days when are preventively suspended is remote. There will still remain 8 councilors who can meet as the Sanguniang Bayan.

PUBLIC CORPORATION CASES-ATTY. LAPID-AUSL