Public Safety Minister Vic Toews

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Rights and Freedoms Bulletin (ISSN 1923-998X) is a public service of provided by KateysFirearmsFacts.com and KM Publishing Inc., P.O. Box 21004, Chilliwack, BC V2P 8A9 Welcome to my weekly news Bulletin! As always, I will be including links to online resources Text like this means you can click on it to view a resource online if you want more information about the topic that is being discussed. Now for the latest... is statement, made on the Sun News Network, should shock every Canadian out of their civil rights slumber. Speaking to Ezra Levant on the February 16, 2012 edition of his show “e Source”, (http://ezral- evant.com/2012/02/addressing- bill-c30.html) Vic Toews made it very clear that bureaucrats from all kinds of government depart- ments, including such things as the Competition Bureau, already perform warrantless searches and invade the privacy of Canadians on a regular basis. Well, right now regulatory authorities have the power to do warrantless searches. at is very standard practice. So, without talking specifically, what I can say is when it that comes to the, uh, the personal, uh, web surfing habits or the emails of ordinary Canadians, indeed any Canadian, police are not allowed to access that unless they have a judicial warrant. at certainly is our intent and that should be the focus of the law.” Ezra Levant made a point of asking the Minister about the information that police and bureaucrats would no longer, by law, require a search warrant. ese “indicators” as Minister Toews calls them, are contained in Section 16(1) of Bill C-30: “...every telecommunications service provider must provide the person with identifying information in the service provider’s possession or control respecting the name, address, telephone number and elec- tronic mail address of any subscriber to any of the service provider’s telecommunications services and the Internet protocol address and local service provider identifier that are associated with the subscriber’s service and equipment. Minister Toews then went on to say that police routinely ask for and receive this information already, and that all the Minister is doing is adding a protective framework around the process to protect the privacy rights of Canadians. I guess simply stopping police from performing all these warrantless searches was too much to ask, so Justice Depart- ment bureaucrats wrote legisla- tion to make it all nice and legal. ose are the six identifiers that are required in order to get a warrant, Ezra. It gets into a Catch- 22. People say ‘Well you should get a warrant to get any information.’ You can’t get a warrant without that information.Nice try, Minister Toews, but that dog just don’t hunt. If police don’t already know who you are, where you live and what crime they believe you have committed, how do they know they’re demanding an Internet Service Provider to hand over the name, address, telephone number, email address, IP address of the right person? ey don’t. Public Safety Minister Vic Toews warrantless searches are “very standard practice”

Transcript of Public Safety Minister Vic Toews

Page 1: Public Safety Minister Vic Toews

Rights and Freedoms Bulletin (ISSN 1923-998X) is a public service of provided by KateysFirearmsFacts.com and KM Publishing Inc., P.O. Box 21004, Chilliwack, BC V2P 8A9

Welcome to my weekly news Bulletin! As always, I will be including links to online resources Text like this means you can click on it to view a resource online if you want more information about the topic that is being discussed.

Now for the latest...

Th is statement, made on the Sun News Network, should shock every Canadian out of their civil rights slumber.

Speaking to Ezra Levant on the February 16, 2012 edition of his show “Th e Source”, (http://ezral-evant.com/2012/02/addressing-bill-c30.html) Vic Toews made it very clear that bureaucrats from all kinds of government depart-ments, including such things as the Competition Bureau, already perform warrantless searches and invade the privacy of Canadians on a regular basis.

“Well, right now regulatory authorities have the power to do warrantless searches. Th at is very standard practice. So, without talking specifi cally, what I can say is when it that comes to the, uh, the

personal, uh, web surfi ng habits or the emails of ordinary Canadians, indeed any Canadian, police are not allowed to access that unless they have a judicial warrant. Th at certainly is our intent and that should be the focus of the law.”

Ezra Levant made a point of asking the Minister about the information that police and bureaucrats would no longer, by law, require a search warrant.

Th ese “indicators” as Minister Toews calls them, are contained in Section 16(1) of Bill C-30:

“...every telecommunications service provider must provide the person with identifying information in the service provider’s possession or control respecting the name, address, telephone number and elec-tronic mail address of any subscriber to any of the service provider’s telecommunications services and the Internet protocol address and local service provider identifi er that are associated with the subscriber’s service and equipment.

Minister Toews then went on to say that police routinely ask for and receive this information already, and that all the Minister

is doing is adding a protective framework around the process to protect the privacy rights of Canadians.

I guess simply stopping police from performing all these warrantless searches was too much to ask, so Justice Depart-ment bureaucrats wrote legisla-tion to make it all nice and legal.

“Th ose are the six identifi ers that are required in order to get a warrant, Ezra. It gets into a Catch-22. People say ‘Well you should get a warrant to get any information.’ You can’t get a warrant without that information.”

Nice try, Minister Toews, but that dog just don’t hunt.

If police don’t already know who you are, where you live and what crime they believe you have committed, how do they know they’re demanding an Internet Service Provider to hand over the name, address, telephone number, email address, IP address of the right person?

Th ey don’t.

Public Safety Minister Vic Toewswarrantless searches are “very standard practice”

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Privacy Rights

The hidden gag order in Bill C-30: the “Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act”

by the Canadian Privacy Law Bloghttp://blog.privacylawyer.ca

While much attention has been focused on the general problems with Bill C-30 - Protecting Chil-dren from Internet Predators Act, we are starting to see some very good commentary on the details.

One detail that hasn’t really seen the light (and it may not be an accident) is the hidden gag order.

Not only will the police, national security folks and the competition cops be able to get customer names, addresses, IP addresses and e-mail addresses without a warrant, there’s a gag order that means you’ll likely never find out you’ve been the subject of such an inquiry even if you ask your ISP.

Section 23 looks like it was designed to be obscure and obtuse:

23. Personal information, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Personal Information Protection and Elec-tronic Documents Act, that is provided under subsection 16(1) or 17(1) is deemed, for the purposes of subsec-tions 9(2.1) to (2.4) of that Act, to be disclosed under subparagraph 7(3)(c.1)(i) or (ii), and not under para-graph 7(3)(i), of that Act. This section operates despite the other provisions of Part 1 of that Act.

Unless you’re familiar with the Personal Infor-mation Protection and Electronic Documents Act, you’ll probably miss what this means.

In short, by default everyone has the right to ask any company that is subject to the law what infor-mation they have about him or her, how they’ve used it and to whom they’ve disclosed it. That is, unless that right is overridden by Section 9.

Section 23 of C-30 essentially says that any personal information that is handed over without a warrant under the lawful access law has to be treat-ed in the same way under PIPEDA as information disclosed in response to a law enforcement request.

Here’s where the gag order kicks in.If the person exercises his lawful right to seek

his or her personal information and accounting of

its use, the ISP is prohibited from telling him or her unless the police, national security agencies or competition cops give their OK. And they can refuse to give their OK on a number of relatively flexible bases.

This is the opposite of transparency, and it looks like it was designed this way.

For statute nerds, the particular subsections of PIPEDA referred to in Section 23 of C-30 are:

Information related to paragraphs 7(3)(c), (c.1) or (d)

9(2.1) An organization shall comply with subsection (2.2) if an individual requests that the organization

(a) inform the individual about (i) any disclosure of information to a

government institution or a part of a government institution under paragraph 7(3)(c), subparagraph 7(3)(c.1)(i) or (ii) or paragraph 7(3)(c.2) or (d), or

(ii) the existence of any information that the organization has relating to a disclosure referred to in subparagraph (i), to a subpoena, warrant or order referred to in paragraph 7(3)(c) or to a request made by a government institution or a part of a government institution under subparagraph 7(3)(c.1)(i) or (ii); or

(b) give the individual access to the informa-tion referred to in subparagraph (a)(ii).

Notification and response

(2.2) An organization to which subsection (2.1) applies

(a) shall, in writing and without delay, notify the institution or part concerned of the request made by the individual; and

(b) shall not respond to the request before the earlier of

(i) the day on which it is notified under subsection (2.3), and

(ii) thirty days after the day on which the institution or part was notified.

Objection

(2.3) Within thirty days after the day on which it is notified under subsection (2.2), the institution or part shall notify the organization whether or

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not the institution or part objects to the organiza-tion complying with the request. The institution or part may object only if the institution or part is of the opinion that compliance with the request could reasonably be expected to be injurious to

(a) national security, the defence of Canada or the conduct of international affairs;

(a.1) the detection, prevention or deterrence of money laundering or the financing of terrorist activities; or

*(a.1) the detection, prevention or deterrence of money laundering; or

*[Note: Paragraph 9(2.3)(a.1), as enacted by paragraph 97(1)(c) of chapter 17 of the Statutes of Canada, 2000, will be repealed at a later date.]

(b) the enforcement of any law of Canada, a province or a foreign jurisdiction, an investigation relating to the enforcement of any such law or the gathering of intelligence for the purpose of enforc-ing any such law.

Prohibition

(2.4) Despite clause 4.9 of Schedule 1, if an organization is notified under subsection (2.3) that the institution or part objects to the organization complying with the request, the organization

(a) shall refuse the request to the extent that it relates to paragraph (2.1)(a) or to information referred to in subparagraph (2.1)(a)(ii);

(b) shall notify the Commissioner, in writing and without delay, of the refusal; and

(c) shall not disclose to the individual (i) any information that the organization

has relating to a disclosure to a government institu-tion or a part of a government institution under paragraph 7(3)(c), subparagraph 7(3)(c.1)(i) or (ii) or paragraph 7(3)(c.2) or (d) or to a request made by a government institution under either of those subparagraphs,

(ii) that the organization notified an insti-tution or part under paragraph (2.2)(a) or the Commissioner under paragraph (b), or

(iii) that the institution or part objects.

What ever happened to the conservative part of our so-called Conservative government?

Search and Seizure Violations

Needed: 12 REAL conservative CPC MPsby Connie Fournier, FreeDominion.com.pa

Are there 12 men and women in the CPC Caucus who have enough principles to stand against the tyranny that their government is imposing with their lawful access bill?

This bill does not have to pass. The opposition is united against it, so we just need 12 brave Members of Parliament to vote against it, or 24 to stay home.

Dear CPC MPs,

Maybe you don’t understand what you are voting for with this bill. Maybe you don’t realize that you will be signing away your own privacy, too.

If you vote for this bill, private companies will store on their computers your complete browsing history, emails, text messages... anything you do online.

Anyone who works for those companies could gain access to that unsecured data, and your private life could wind up on display at wikileaks!

We are not suggesting you have anything to hide, but everyone has personal emails and texts that are not meant for public consumption.

If yours are to be stored on an unsecured ISP computer, you will have to vet every word you type, and every site you visit as thoroughly as you would a constituency mail-out.

If you can’t vote against this terrible bill for the sake of your constituents, PLEASE take a moment to think about how vulnerable YOU will be with such a system in place.

It’s not too late to stop this thing. Please vote against it, or just stay home.

All the great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom; justice; honor; duty; mercy; hope

~ Sir Winston Churchill

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The government is about to push through a set of electronic surveillance laws that will invade your privacy and cost you money.

The plan is to force every phone and Internet provider to allow “authorities” to collect the private information of any Canadian, at any time, without a warrant.

This bizarre legislation will create Internet surveil-lance that is:

Warrantless R : A range of “authorities” will have the ability to access the private information of law-abiding Canadians and our families using wired Internet and mobile devices, without justification.

Invasive R : The laws leave our personal and financial information less secure and more suscepti-ble to cybercrime.

Costly R : Internet services providers may be forced to install millions of dollars worth of spying technology and the cost will be passed down to YOU.

If enough of us speak out now the government will have no choice but to stop this mandatory online spying scheme. Sign the petition now, and forward it to everyone you know.

The BC Civil Liberties Association has written a report about the implications of what the government calls ‘lawful access’ and what it really means for Canadians and their privacy rights.

The BCCLA report that analyzes Canada’s domestic spying plan is called “Moving Toward a Surveillance Society: Proposals to Expand “Lawful Access” in Canada” and can be downloaded from the link below:

http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/Moving-toward-a-surveillance-society.pdf

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Unlawful Access

Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lawful Access, But Were (Understandably) Afraid To Ask

by Michael Geist

Public Safety Minister Vic Toews is expected to introduce lawful access legislation tomorrow in the House of Commons. An Act to enact the Investigat-ing and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communi-cations Act and to amend the Criminal Code and others Acts, likely to be Bill C-30, will mark the return of lawful access in a single legislative pack-age. While it is certainly possible for a surprise, the bill is expected to largely mirror the last lawful access bills (C-50, 51, and 52) that died on the order paper with the election last spring.

This long post tries to address many of the most common questions and misconceptions about lawful access in Canada. The questions and answers are:

What is lawful access? RWhat is Bill C-30 likely to contain? RIsn’t ISP customer name and address infor- R

mation similar to phone book data that is readily available to the public without privacy concerns? (first prong)

Isn’t the mandatory disclosure of ISP Rcustomer information necessary for police investiga-tions? (first prong)

Didn’t former Public Safety Minister Stock- Rwell Day pledge not to introduce mandatory disclo-sure of ISP customer information without court oversight? (first prong)

Who pays for the surveillance infrastructure Rrequired by lawful access? (second prong)

Does lawful access create a new regulatory Rframework for the Internet? (second prong)

Does lawful access create new police powers? R(third prong)

Does opposing lawful access mean question- Ring the integrity of law enforcement?

Don’t other countries have the same lawful Raccess rules as those found in Canada?

What do Canada’s privacy commissioners Rthink about lawful access?

Are these lawful access proposal constitu- Rtional?

Does the government seem somewhat incon- Rsistent on its crime and privacy policies?

Where can I learn more about lawful access Rand what can I do?

Update: Bill C-30 was introduced on February 14, 2012. One important change from the last bill to the current bill is that the list of data points subject to mandatory disclosure without court oversight has shrunk from 11 to six. The IMEI numbers, discussed further below, are no longer on the list.

What is lawful access?The push for new Internet surveillance capabili-

ties goes back to 1999, when government officials began crafting proposals to institute new surveil-lance technologies within Canadian networks along with additional legal powers to access surveillance and subscriber information. There have been several attempts at passing lawful access legislation, but each has died on the order paper without progress-ing through the legislative process. In fact, no lawful access bill has even made it to the committee stage for hearings and detailed examination.

What is Bill C-30 likely to contain?Assuming the bill mirrors the previous Conserva-

tive government approach, the bill will likely feature a three-pronged approach focused on information disclosure, mandated surveillance technologies, and new police powers.

The first prong mandates the disclosure of Inter-net provider customer information without court oversight. Under current privacy laws, providers may voluntarily disclose customer information but are not required to do so. The new system would require the disclosure of customer name, address, phone number, email address, Internet proto-col address, and a series of device identification numbers.

While some of that information may seem rela-tively harmless, the ability to link it with other data will often open the door to a detailed profile about an identifiable person. Given its potential sensitiv-ity, the decision to require disclosure without any oversight should raise concerns within the Canadian privacy community.

The second prong requires Internet providers to dramatically re-work their networks to allow for

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real-time surveillance. The bill sets out detailed capability requirements that will eventually apply to all Canadian Internet providers. These include the power to intercept communications, to isolate the communications to a particular individual, and to engage in multiple simultaneous interceptions.

Moreover, the bill establishes a comprehensive regulatory structure for Internet providers that would mandate their assistance with testing their surveillance capabilities and disclosing the names of all employees who may be involved in interceptions (and who may then be subject to RCMP background checks).

The bill also establishes numerous reporting requirements including mandating that all Internet providers disclose their technical surveillance capa-bilities within six months of the law taking effect. Follow-up reports are also required when providers acquire new technical capabilities.

Having obtained customer information without court oversight and mandated Internet surveil-lance capabilities, the third prong creates a several new police powers designed to obtain access to the surveillance data. These include new transmission data warrants that would grant real-time access to all the information generated during the crea-tion, transmission or reception of a communication including the type, direction, time, duration, origin, destination or termination of the communication.

Law enforcement could then obtain a preservation order to require providers to preserve subscriber information, including specific communication information, for 90 days. Finally, having obtained and preserved the data, production orders can be used to require the disclosure of specified communi-cations or transmission data.

While Internet providers would actively work with law enforcement in collecting and disclosing the subscriber information, they could also be prohib-ited from disclosing the disclosures as court may bar them from informing subscribers that they have been subject to surveillance or information disclo-sures.

Isn’t ISP customer name and address infor-mation similar to phone book data that is readily available to the public without privacy concerns? (first prong)

No. The last bill included the following data

points:

name and address »telephone number »electronic mail address »Internet protocol address »mobile identification number »electronic serial number (ESN) »local service provider identifier »international mobile equipment identity »

(IMEI) numberinternational mobile subscriber identity »

(IMSI) numbersubscriber identity module (SIM) card »

number that are associated with the subscriber’s service and equipment.

This data goes well beyond phone book data and can be used for invasive investigations without court oversight. For example, IMSI catchers can be used to capture all IMEI numbers in a geographic location so that anyone with mobile device would have this information captured. Law enforcement could use this tool to capture information all cell-phones in a given area - say at a G20 protest, visit-ing Parliament Hill, or at a community event - and then require Canada’s telecom companies to disclose the corresponding names and addresses. All without court oversight. Christopher Parsons provides a detailed look at this issue.

Isn’t the mandatory disclosure of ISP customer information necessary for police investigations? (first prong)

No. To date neither the government nor law enforcement agencies have provided evidence that the current law - which permits disclosure without a warrant but does not mandate it - has created an investigatory barrier. Indeed, earlier this month, police in Ontario arrested 60 men on child pornog-raphy charges after obtaining information on hundreds of IP addresses using the current law.

This is but one example of numerous success-ful child pornography investigations in Canada in recent years (here, here, here, and here). These successes have not stopped Toews from arguing opponents of lawful access will make things easier for child predators Similarly, the succesful anti-terror investigations involving the Toronto 18

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involved computer and Internet-based investiga-tions using current law.

Given the lack of evidence on the need for these changes, politicians and police have been scrambling to find justifications for the change. In 2009, then-Public Safety Minister Peter Van Loan pointed to a 2009 kidnapping case in Vancouver as evidence of the need for legislative change, describing witness-ing an emergency situation in which Vancouver police waited 36 hours to get the information they needed in order to obtain a warrant for customer name and address information. That sounds like a credible case, but according to documents obtained under access to information, no Internet provider records were actually sought during the investiga-tion. More recently, Open Media obtained internal police documents seeking examples of why legisla-tive change is needed. The document acknowledged that previous efforts “lacked a sufficient quantity of good examples.”

David Fraser has also looked at this issue here.

Didn’t former Public Safety Minister Stock-well Day pledge not to introduce mandatory disclosure of ISP customer information with-out court oversight? (first prong)

Yes. Former Conservative Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day stated in 2007:

“we have not and we will not be proposing legisla-tion to grant police the power to get information from Internet companies without a warrant. That’s never been a proposal. It may make some investigations more difficult, but our expectation is rights to our privacy are such that we do not plan, nor will we have in place, something that would allow the police to get that infor-mation.”

Toews has now backed away from that pledge. According to a letter sent to NDP MP Charlie Angus in November 2011, Toews wrote:

It is correct that former Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day did, at one time, endorse a subscriber information regime that would have required a warrant in order to access the information. However, since that time, the Government has consulted further with law enforcement and justice officials and determined that a warrant requirement for basic subscriber information would negatively impact the ability to carry out inves-tigations and would introduce an additional burden on the criminal justice system.

I have filed Access to Information requests with Public Safety, Justice, the RCMP, and CSIS on these consultation. Thus far no one has provided any documentation or evidence.

Who pays for the surveillance infrastructure required by lawful access? (second prong)

Cost is a big question mark on lawful access, though costs will ultimately borne by the public. According to documents obtained under the Access to Information Act, many telecom and Internet providers have been primarily focused on the costs associated with installing surveillance equipment and with processing law enforcement requests. The government may provide financial assistance to smaller Internet providers to help address their costs or provide an implementation delay. Some smaller providers have indicated they may be forced to close if they bear the costs alone. Providers will likely also be able to charge fees for complying with law enforcement requests.

Does lawful access create a new regulatory framework for the Internet? (second prong)

The lawful access proposals create what can only be described a new regulatory environment for Internet providers. Every provider must:

submit a report within six months on their »equipment and surveillance capabilities

submit a report on new equipment if acquire »another provider

face possibilities of audits from the RCMP »and others

assist law enforcement with testing facilities »for interception purposes

provide the names of all employees involved »in interceptions. The RCMP may conduct back-ground checks with consent

meet operational requirements to enable »interception, isolate communications, provide proscribed information, and conduct multiple inter-ceptions

Does lawful access create new police powers? (third prong)

Yes. As noted above, it envisions at least three new warrants. By definition, these involve court oversight. The warrants are:

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Transmission warrants, which cover infor- »mation related to the transmission of informa-tion such as routing or addressing, along with all the additional header-type information created by messages.

Preservation orders, which require the »temporary retention of data on particular subscrib-ers or communications

Production orders, which can require disclo- »sure of transmission data, tracking data, financial data or information on specified communications

Does opposing lawful access mean question-ing the integrity of law enforcement?

In Toews’ November 2011 letter to Angus, he states:

For you to suggest that authorities would use these identifiers to track individuals without first obtaining the necessary judicial authority is to question the integ-rity of those entrusted to keep our communities safe.

We can expect more of this line of argument in the months ahead. All Canadians recognize the need for security and to ensure that law enforcement has the tools they need. Yet the experience in other jurisdic-tions points to the dangers of blanket powers with no oversight. For example, in the United States, the National Security Administration has admitted in “over-collection” of domestic email messages and phone calls. In Greece, more than 100 cell phones owned by the Prime Minister and senior govern-ment officials were surreptitiously wiretapped. Despite the best of intentions, mistakes happen which is why oversight and reporting is crucial.

Don’t other countries have the same lawful access rules as those found in Canada?

Some do, but the experience in other countries is illustrative of why the Canadian approach is so dangerous. Christopher Parsons recently released a detailed paper (PDF) that examines the experiences in countries such as the UK and the U.S. In the U.K., there are dozens of examples of errors over the last few years. Moreover, the rules have been used for things such as ascertaining “a family’s eligibility to send their children to a local school.”

In the U.S., similar surveillance powers have been used thousands of times with ISPs and Inter-net companies. Targets have included journalists

conducting investigations.

What do Canada’s privacy commissioners think about lawful access?

Canada’s privacy commissioners have been unani-mous in their criticism of the government’s lawful access proposals. A letter signed by all Canadian commissioners can be found here.

Privacy Commissioner of Canada Jennifer Stod-dart posted a follow-up open letter in late October 2011 (an As It Happens interview here). Ontario Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian has also been very active on the lawful access issue with a full website that includes video from a symposium, a public letter to Toews with detailed legal analysis, an op-ed, and a Search Engine podcast.

Are these lawful access proposal constitu-tional?

The Supreme Court of Canada may ultimately be asked to answer that question. One of the most comprehensive legal and constitutional analyses of the lawful access proposals comes from Pippa Lawson in a recent paper titled Moving Toward a Surveillance Society: Proposals to Expand “Lawful Access” in Canada (PDF), commissioned by the BC Civil Liberties Association.

Does the government seem somewhat incon-sistent on its crime and privacy policies?

If by inconsistent you mean supporting the crea-tion of widespread surveillance capabilities, remov-ing foundational privacy principles requiring court oversight, and claiming the need to support police investigations, while:

killing the long gun registry over the objec- »tions of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police

planning to delete the data from the long »gun registry on privacy grounds (Toews: “to main-tain the registry and the information is a complete violation of law and the principles of privacy that all of us in the House respect”)

scrapping the mandatory long-form census »on privacy grounds

then, yes, they seem somewhat inconsistent.

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Where can I learn more about lawful access and what can I do?

Given the widespread concern, there are many excellent resources on lawful access. These include:

Unlawful Acces » s, a 15 minute video that includes interviews with many Canadian experts including Andrew Clement, David Fewer, David Lyon, David Murakami Wood, Dwayne Winseck, Ian Kerr, Natalie Des Rosiers, and Ron Deibert (I’m in the film as well).

CIPPIC FAQ on lawful acces » sChristopher Parson » s posts on lawful accessDavid Frase » r’s posts on lawful access

If you are concerned with lawful access, speak out:

Ontario Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavou- »kian has a form to send a message to your MP

Open Media is » running a petitionMake your voice known to your elected »

representatives, to the Minister of Public Safety, Vic Toews and to Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

While the Harper government seems intent on ignoring the concerns raised by Privacy Commis-sioners across Canada, perhaps those of us who send these folks to Ottawa can make them listen.

Bill C-30 is un-Canadian By Dale Jackaman, Richmond News Feb 17, 2012

An open letter to Minister Vic Toews,

Re: Bill C-30

I’m the president of a licensed private inves-tigative firm that works in the area of cyber-crime primarily in the counter industrial espionage field.

As a law enforcement professional myself (and a veteran) I most assuredly do not support Bill C-30, if for no other reason than that it is un-Canadian.

I was not impressed with your characteri-zation of those of us who oppose this kind of legislation. I have voiced my opposition quite publicly.

Your statements were not the best way to engender support for this or any other kind of legislation, Mr. Toews.

As is typical of your government in many areas, you are long on ideology, short on evidentiary decision-making and profoundly disturbing in your penchant for being an ultra controlling secretive government with decid-edly un-Canadian neo/theo-conservative values.

Your Canada is not the Canada for which I became a veteran.

Dale Jackaman

Richmond