Public Affairs SymposiumJune 8, 2009

Mr. Robert O. Work

Under Secretary of The Navy

Department of the Navy

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Bozone (n)

The substance surrounding stupid people that stops bright ideas from penetrating.

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Dopeler Effect

The tendency of stupid ideas to seem smarter when they come at you rapidly.

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BLUF: Bottom Line Up Front

The mission of the CHINFO-PA team is to penetrate and break down the Bozone Layer and to counteract the Dopeler Effect every day, around the world, 24/7

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Just kidding… Here’s the real agenda

• Leadership Transition

• Touchstones, Issues, and Leading the Way

• A Challenging Time for the Department

• Refining the DoN’s Strategic Message

• Questions

Secretary of the Navy

Under Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy

Under Secretary of the Navy

Chief of Legislative Affairs

Chief of Legislative Affairs

DUSN forDepartmental

Plans, Policy, Oversight, and Integration

DUSN forDepartmental

Plans, Policy, Oversight, and Integration

Assistant Secretaryof the Navy

(Research, Developmentand Acquisition)

Assistant Secretaryof the Navy

(Research, Developmentand Acquisition)

Assistant Secretaryof the Navy

(Installations & Environment)

Assistant Secretaryof the Navy

(Installations & Environment)

Assistant SecretaryOf the Navy(Financial Mgmt.& Comptroller)

Assistant SecretaryOf the Navy(Financial Mgmt.& Comptroller)

Assistant Secretaryof the Navy

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)

Assistant Secretaryof the Navy

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs)

Chief of Information

Chief of Information

Judge AdvocateGeneral

Judge AdvocateGeneral

ChiefInformation

Officer

ChiefInformation

Officer

Naval InspectorGeneral

Naval InspectorGeneral

DirectorNCIS

DirectorNCIS

ChiefNaval Research

ChiefNaval Research

AuditorGeneral

AuditorGeneral

The DoN Secretariat

SecNavPers Staff

SecNavPers StaffGCGC

DUSN forBusiness Enterprise

Operations and Improvement

DUSN forBusiness Enterprise

Operations and Improvement

Office of theGeneral Counsel

Office of theGeneral Counsel

Administrative Assistantto the Under Secretary

of the Navy(AAUSN)

Administrative Assistantto the Under Secretary

of the Navy(AAUSN)

Director, Office ofProgram Appraisal

(OPA)

Director, Office ofProgram Appraisal

(OPA)

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Touchstones (in development)

• The Navy-Marine Corps Team• “Departmentalism” is more important than ever

• Taking care of our people…always

• Openness and transparency• Between ourselves• Between the Navy and Marine Corps• With OSD• With Congress • With the public

• Supporting the President’s and SecDef’s plans

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Issues (will change over time)

• Challenging fiscal and budget environment

• The Quadrennial Defense Review

• Force “wellness”• Safety• Suicides• PTSD and mental health

• Improved strategic communications• More on this in a moment…

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Leading the Way

• Acquisition reform

• Greening the Department

• Unmanned systems

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This is a particularly challenging time for the US military

• Continental Era (1783-1889)• North American phase• Pacific phase

• Oceanic Era (1890-1946)• Expeditionary phase• Insolationist phase

• Transoceanic Era (1947-1988)• Nuclear warfighting phase• Flexible response phase

• The Global Era (1989 – present)• Unilateral phase• Cooperative phase

All major wars fought on the North American continent

All wars fought “over there,” culminating in WWII

Frontier proxy wars along the front lines of freedom

Global expeditionary operations and homeland defense

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Threats to the nation have generally been clear and evident…but not now

• Continental Era (1783-1889)• Insular phase• Imperial phase

• Oceanic Era (1890-1946)• Expeditionary phase• Insular phase

• Transoceanic Era (1947-1988)• Nuclear warfighting phase• Flexible response phase

• The Global Era (1989 – present)• Unilateral phase• Cooperative phase

The sheer multiplicity of threats (radical extremism; WMD proliferations; rising and resurgent great powers; climate change) diminishes their perceived danger

Invaders and domestic threats, and threats against the Union

Invasions (from the sea) and threats across the oceans

The Soviet Union and communist ideology

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The Global Era has been a particularly challenging time for the Department of the Navy

• Continental Era (1783-1889) : A frigate-cruiser Navy• Insular phase• Imperial phase

• Oceanic Era (1890-1946): A “Navy second to none”• Expeditionary phase• Insular phase

• Transoceanic Era (1947-1988): A global power-projection Navy

• Nuclear warfighting phase• Flexible response phase

• The Global Era (1989 – present): A two-MCO Navy?• Unilateral phase• Cooperative phase

Global StationsMarines as ships’ complements

Battleship to carrier navyAn amphibious Corps

A new strategic deterrent fleet“Combat credible” forward presenceCVBGs, SSNs, ARGs, and MAGTFs

What type of Navy-Marine Corps Team do we need and want,and can afford?

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The need for a strong Navy-Marine Corps Team is not as evident as it was in previous eras

Barrett Tillman, “Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era”Proceedings, June 2009, pp. 16-21:

“If the ‘naval era’ is defined as the eras of sea control, it ended in 1945—the last year of Fleet-size combat operations. Because the most recent sea battle worthy of the name occurred in October 1944, we are now into the seventh decade of the post-naval era.”

“Why do we have a Navy?” “Why do we have such a big Navy when we hardly ever use it?”

“How do we justify a large blue-water Navy that has not fought a war at sea in three generations?”

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“Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era” (II)

“While the US Navy’s current status is nowhere as grim as the Royal Navy’s, the likelihood of serious cutbacks exists in the current and future political atmosphere.”

“Clearly the Navy has a public-relations problem…Shaping the public opinion to support the current force structure poses a daunting task tacitly admitted in the Navy’s official PR vehicle, an annual presentation depicting the service’s activities. The 2008 version contains some 118 images, of which four involved firing live ordnance (none in combat), while 20 or more depicted humanitarian or relief missions.”

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Barrett is dead wrong: the Navy-Marine Corps was never defined first and foremost by the potential clash of fleets

• The 283 ships in the current battle force can overwhelm any conceivable opponent, and are the ultimate guarantor of US global freedom of action

• The US Marine Corps has 31,000 personnel in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan

• As we speak, the US Navy has 4 BCT

equivalents on the ground in the CENTCOM AOR on the front lines of the Long War

• 40 percent of the TACAIR sorties in Afghanistan are provided by the DON

• 8 of 11 Navy air ambulances are supporting the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan

The Navy-Marine Corps Team has always been defined by the fundamental requirement to project US influence and power around the world

If a foreign navy stood in our way, then it became a focus of our attention

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“Preventing wars is as important as winning wars…”

• The theme of preventing wars found in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is an important one that resonates well in the Cooperative Phase of the Global Era of national security

• However, we must always remember that while there has never been a commission after a war which faulted the military for not preventing its occurrence, there have been commissions exploring why were weren’t ready to answer the call when the war started

• Perhaps the best way to think about this is to recall the famous Cold War motto of the Strategic Air Command:

“Peace is our profession…”

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Refining and driving home the Department’s strategic message is more important than ever

• The Navy-Marine Corps Team is perfectly suited to the Global Era and its global expeditionary posture, as well as a national strategy that emphasizes forward engagement, international cooperation, building partnership capacity, and deterring and defeating all threats

• We must develop a simple, compelling, and consistent story

• The SecNav, CNO, and CMC will refine and set the message (with your help), and the CHINFO-PA team will drive it home

• The CHINFO-PA Team is the “supported force” in this fight• We must be as effective at strategic and operational level communications as at the

tactical level

• Three key audiences:• The members of the Navy-Marine Corps Team• Allies• The American people (aka, Congress): Do we need a closer relationship between

CHINFO and OLA?

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Getting our message out will be quite difficult in today’s complex and chaotic global and national communication environment

• Wherever you are: think globally, act locally• Know the President's and SecDef’s plans• Know the support SecNav’s, CNO’s, and CMC’s plans and priorities

• Know the regional “battlefield of ideas”, and the best weapons to bring to bear:

• Print: someone should already be working on a spirited but measured response

• We need to develop more and more effective social media tools

• Be proactive, be honest, be open, and be yourselves

• Welcome debate; if the power of our arguments is not good enough, perhaps we should change them

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Finally… Get and stay on top of

developing stories!

Story

CHINFO-PA

This is not where you want to be!

“No Better Friend . . .

“No Worse Enemy:

“The Navy-Marine Corps Team”

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Questions?