psychophysical parallelism

7/29/2019 psychophysical parallelism

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T:he American Catholic Philosophical Association 51D.cation of chemical compounds in aperiod table according to theiratomic weights, and in subst ituting one based on the relative numberof electrically eonstituted hydrogen nuelei, with the result that whereasformerly the eompounds were looked upon as differing substantially,they are now looked upon as differing only aeeording to the numberand the grouping of the fixed and free eleetrieal units in the respeetiveeomplexes. So also these new realists in a similar way-and it 8eemsto be more than a mere eoineidenee-have in their extreme reaetionagainst idealism and subjeetivism, eliminated all grounds for an es-sential distinetion between bodies, and between bodies and mind, andpulled up, not at a monism of energy, but at a monism of quality-eomplexes.But be that as it may, it seems abundantly elear that just beeause

of its simulation of genuine realism, and just beeause of it s eonstantand subtle appeal to seienee and seientific methods, the academic idolsof the day, New Realism will be able, unless properly exposed, to dofar greater damage to the welfare of sound philosophy than anysystem of philosophy that has appeared within modern times. It isto philosophy what modernism is to religion, a synthesis of many olderrors trimmed up in ambiguous terminology and offered to the publieas original thought.

CHARLES C. MILTNER.University 0/ N otre Dame.

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PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLEL1SM"THE problem of the exact nature of the relations betweensoul and body is of very secondary importance from aphilosophical pointof view, as compared with the vital ques-tions: 1s there an i m m a t e r i ~ l soul at all? and, 1s there reason:for supposing that such a soul will have a future life ?" 1

From this position of a very careful thinker and writer Imust venture to express partial dissent. The history of philos-ophy will show that men have held firmly to the immateriality

1 Maher, Ps'yc1uJlogy, 5th ed., p. 559 1


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52 Proceedings of the Second Annual Meetingand immortality of the soul, while expressing the most widelydivergent views on the relations of the soul to the body. Froma practical standpoint, one who is right on the subject of thenature and destiny of the soul is holding to essentials and,except for the demands of consistency, might seem entitled tosome latitude on such a matter of detail as the exact relationof the soul to the body which it animates. But I believe thatthe more recent method of approach to the problem of psychophysical relations has altered the comparative importance ofthese questions. When the supposed nature of the psychophysical relations is made the ground for attack on the existenceof the soul as a distinct reality, i t would seem as if the questionof these relations has become fundamental. I f I am right inso thinking, this conviction may be the appropriate apology forbringing before you a subject which has not even the advantageof being new. Psycho-physical parallelism, though very modern in some of its formulations and, in one or other of the varieties in which it appears, often to be met with in current philosophic thinking, is in reality a product of the very early daysof what we call modern philosophy and has its roots in a muchmore remote past.

Parallelism began as an attempt to explain the relations ofsoul and body in man without the necessity of admitting anyform of interaction between them. As the problem of theserelations presented itself to the earlier parallelists, body andsoul were understood in the Cartesian sense of res extensa andres cogitans, two disparate existents which had nothing in com-mon. Descartes admitted conscious activity only as belongingto the soul; all other forms of activity belong to matter and areto be mechanically accounted for as movements of matter.How, then, can the purely spiri tual soul be acted upon by anymovement of matter, or how, since movement of matter is produced only by impact, can the soul be the cause of such movement? Descartes himself was satisfied to place the soul in the

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The American Oatholic Philosophical Association 53pineal gland, where it was in intimate rapport with the animalspirits and through them ruled the movements of the body.But if the essence of the soul is thought, as Descartes haddefined it, its relation to the body as the motor thereof is leftunaccounted for. There is indeed a correspondence of bodilymovement to the thought in the mind, but thinking has notcaused the movement. It was evident that the problem couldnot rest in such a solution. On the premises provided by Descartes' system interaction seems impossible. His followers wereto turn in the direction of parallelism.Geulincx and Malebranche, carrying on the Cartesian tradition, introduced a kind of parallelism inasmuch as they deniedany causal efficiency of mind on body or body on mind, andattributed all effects, both physical and psychical, to the immediate and direct action of God. The correspondence betweenthe physical and the psychical they accounted for by the supposition of a divine decree which ordained that material eventswould be the occasions for God to produce the effects which mywill appeared to be concerned in producing. The physicalevent, therefore, corresponds to the psychical as if it were itseffect, but in reality there has been no such interaction ; not somuch for the reason that interaction between body and mindis unthinkable, but because no created being can cause anything.God alone is the only cause. This was the system of occasionalism and it reached an explanation of the correspondence ofthe physical with the psychical at the cost of denying causalityto created things and falling back on the continually to be repeated miracle of the special and immediate intervention ofGod as the first and only cause.

This need of the miraculous Leibniz eliminated by his doc-trine of pre-established harmony. The universe, he taught, ismade up of monads which are aU endowed with the power ofrepresentation. In the higher monads, such as the human soul,this power of representation is conscious; in the lower monads


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54 Proceedings of the Second Ann-ual Meetingit is unconscious. But it is thought of nevertheless as beingthe same power throughout. Monads differ, not by possessingdifferent kinds of power, but by the greater or less perfectionwith which they represent all the other monads of the universe.All change in a monad is immanent and consequently no monadever acts on any other. But by reason of a divinely pre-established harmony the changes in any one monad are always exactlyparallel to the changes in every other monad in the universe.Thus, if we think of a perfectly spherical raindrop suspendedin the air, its surface would, theoretically, reflect the wholeuniverse, and any change in any part of the universe would berepresented in the reflecting surface of the drop. Besidesadopting the denial of interaction from his predecessors, Leibnizemphasized more strongly the idea of parallelism, and introduced panpsychism by attributing a psychic element, the powerof representation to every monad in the universe. The conceptof panpsychism is not, of course, original with Leibniz.Klimke 2 traces its parentage from the hylozoism of the earlyIonians through Heraclitus and the Stoics to Giordano Bruno,and from him to the modern panpsychists. Other elementsfrom the system of Leibniz which have found their way intomodern psycho-physical parallelism are his insistence that thechain of physical causation must be regarded as a closed circle,and the claim that interaction of any kind is inconsistent withthe law of the conservation of energy.Thus parallelism begins as a substitute for interaction whichDescartes' system had made impossible to explain. Its fundamental position is thus expressed by Paulsen: 3 " Two propositions are contained in the theory of parallelism: (1) Physicalprocesses are never effects of psychical processes ; (2) Psychicalprocesses are never effects of physical processes."

Der Moni8mu8, p. 110. ln.trooootion to Phiwsophy, English trans. by Thilly, p. 87.


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T'he America,n Catholic Philosophical Association 55This is the negative side of the theory-the mere denial of

interaction. On the positive side is the assertion that everyphysical event in the universe has a psychical event parallel andcorresponding to it, and every psychical event has a parallelphysical accompaniment. Such an assertion would seem to gofar beyond the requirements of the original problem which wasconcerned with the relations of body and soul only. But tolimit the theory within these terms and to recognize the psychical side of reali ty as something that makes its appearanceonly in connection with definitely organized' matter, is to introduce a break in the continuity of the structure of reality andto create a new problem out of the emergence of consciousness.Consequently parallelism finds itself compelled to accept whatProfessor J ames called a " modernized hylozoism," and to makeits own Spinoza's formula: a Omnia" quamvis diversis gradi-bus" animata.JJSuch, then, is psycho-physical parallelism in its broadest out..

lines. Your presence at this c o n v ~ n t i o n is the last event in aphysical series which we ma y consider as beginning with yourreceiving the announcement of the time and place of the meeting. Al l the physical events that followed up to the point ofyour presence here, Professor Paulsen's "omniscient physiologist " would account for in terms of purely mechanical reactionto stimuli. These reactions, taken together, form a chain ofphysical causation in which there is no link that is not physical.The psychical element has not at any point interrupted its continuity. The other series of concepts and volitions which ranparallel to this physical series is not needed to explain thephysical fact of your presen,ce. I t accompanied the physicalseries, but did not influence it. Thus physical science is conceded its right to explain physical facts in terms of purelymechanical activity, while at the same time the situation issaved from developing into crude materialism and the reality01 the spiritual is maintained by the admission of the parallel


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56 Proceedings of the Second Annual Meetingpsyehieal series. Parallelism is thus made to appear as ameans of effeeting what Paulsen asserts is the purpose of philosophy-U to 1'econcile the religious view of the world with thescientific explanation of nature," 4 though the reeoneiliationmay appear very mueh like a peaee that is won by eoneedingeverything the enemy demands.

There is, however, a flaw in the solution, apart fi'om thediffieulties its assumptions may arouse. It does not aeeount forthe parallelism whieh it reeognizes between the psyehieal andthe physieal. Oeeasionalism had aeeounted for the eorrespondenee of the bodily movement to the idea in the mind by attributing all effeets to God as the only eause. Leibniz explainsthe parallelism of his theory by his supposition of pre-established harmony. But mere parallelism leaves the eorrespondenee as mueh a mystery as it finds it.

I t was to obviate this diffieulty that the aid of the identityhypothesis was invoked. I f mind and matter are not two different things, but rather two faees or sides or aspeets of onefundamental reality, the eorrespondenee of tbe physieal and thepsyehieal is not any longer a mystery. Physieal and psyehiealare but two aspeets under whieh the one fundamental reali tyshows itself. They are as inseparable as tbe eonvexity and theeoneavity of the eurve in Feehner's illustration of a eircle. Anobserver within the eircle and remaining in the plane of theeircle sees the eurve as eoneave. To the outside observer theeurve lS eonvex. But no eurve ean be simply eonvex or merelyeoneave. The eonvexity and the eoneavity are really onIy onereality viewed from two different standpoints. So, as an insideobserver of my own psyehie aetivity, I know it as eonseiousness,and it is onIy from the standpoint of an inside observer thatan aetivity ean ever be reeognized as eonseiousness. But anoutside ob server, if he eould be pIaeed in a position to wateh

Preface to English translation of the IntrodtJtion to Philosophy, p. xii.


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The American Oatholic Philosophical Association 57what is going on during the process ot what we call a consciousactivity, would see only the physical side of it-merely themovemel1t ot moleeules in the brain. It is then through ident ity that parallelism is to be accounted fore

Fortunately tor the needs of psycho-physical parallelismSpinoza's doctrine of substance and attributes was at han.d tohelp Ollt the identity-hypothesis. By definition, in Spinoza'ssystem, substance must be one and infinite; and this one, infinite substance is all that really is. It is God 01' Nature. Theattributes of thought and extension are not really differentiations in the substance itself, but only in our w'ay of conceivingit. We think of it as res c o g i t a n s ~ 01' thinking substance, 01' asres extensa} extended substance, as God 01' as Nature. But initself it is one reality conceived under different attributes whichturn out to be merely different aspects of the same reality.

Here, then, is the suggestion required to account for the parallelism of the physical and the psychical. Physical and psychical are two aspects 01' sides of an otherwise unknown reality.Whether this reality is to be interpreted as one 01' mallY, willdepend on the bent of the individual thinker toward monism01' toward pluralism. Whether, again, this theory will tllrn011t to be a kind of refined materialism, regarding the psychicalelement as merely an epiphenomenon, ,viII be decided only bythe peculiar bent of the mind through which it passes. Psychophysical parallelism as modified by the acceptance of the identity-hypothesis, is a very elastic theory suited to fit almost aI1Ybent of mind except the strictly theistic. This illclusiveness isa feature which will count in i ts favor with very many at thepresent time.

Still, though it finds itself able to dispense with th.e substantial soul of spiritualistic philosophy and the substantial atom 01mechanistic science, it has not ent irely rid itself of the objectionable idea of substance. The reality of which physical andpsychical are the two aspects is substance, either one or many,


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58 Proceedings 0/ the Second Annual Meetingdepending, as was said above, on the individual bent of thethiilker who holds the theory. This last blemish is removed inthe interpretation given to the theory by idealistic monismwhich is the last phase of psycho-physical parallelism. To theidealistic monist there is no x or unknown reality of whichthe physical and the psychical are two aspects. Consciousness isthe one and only reality. Modern views on the unconscious andthe subconscious make it a simple matter to accept the psychical, whether actually conscious or not, as partaking in thenature of this only reality--eonsciousness; and modern viewson epistemological questions make i t just as easy to relegate thephysical to the realm of the purely phenomenal. Wehave stillthe two aspects of reality, one, the psychical, which is the truereality; the other the physical or phenomenal, which exists onlyfor the thinker. Given the thinker, then, that is to say, grantedthe existence of consciousness without which there would be noreality, the physical will always be found to accompany thepsychical, for' the physical is reality as it appears to the thinker.But reality in and for itself is consciousness only.

Doubtless the first reaction of common sense to the presentation of any form of the psycho-physical theory is one of amazement that such an attempt at the explanation of the nature ofreality should claim or receive serious attention. It is bristlingwith assumptions and not strong in supporting evidence, exceptsuch strength as analogies can lend. But rather than take uptime to point out its weaknesses, I believe it would be moreprofitable to try to find some of the sources of the strength ofthe appeal which its wide acceptance proves that it has. Wegain lit tle for ourselves and, certainly, we make small impression on others, by the use of an argument like, Atqui hoc estabsurdum; ergo. A theory which is widely accepted must havesomething to recommend it, and at the same time there must besome lack in alternative theories or, at least, in men's understanding of them to explain why they do not find an equally


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~ h .A.merican Oatholic Philosophical .A.ssO'ciation 59favorable reception. Will it not be better, then, to proceedalong this line of inquiry, and leave it to your judgments toevaluate the claims of psycho-physical parallelism as a theoryof reality? A refutation contributes to personal satisfaction;but better than any such personal gratification is an understanding of the reasons and motives which impel men in what theythink and what they do. With such an understanding we arein a better situation to present the claims of the truth for whichwe believe we stand.

In the first place I think we shall find that one ground ofappeal is, as Professor McDougal1 reminds us, the very remoteness of the theory from the findings of common sense. Thisattribute of remoteness in atheory would be a poor recommendatioll if it were not for the fact, which I think we must admit,that the professional mind does set some store on being different.Scholastic philosophy in finding itself in so close alliance withcommon sense, finds itself also at a disadvantage in competitionwith theories that seem to open up the mind because of the newness and the strangeness of the views they set before it. Whetherwe can do anything about this situation, I do not know; but itis weIl to keep it in mind as a warning that there may be sornethings about: a riyal theory which not all the cogency of logiccan quite counteract.

Some support, too, is found in what I think I roust call thethreat that, if you do not accept it, you will be thrown backinto interaction. " WeIl, in that case," says Paulsen,5 " we aremanifestly compelled to return to the theory of interactinn andall i ts difficulties. . .. One or the other; there is no otheralternative." The full significance of this threat is not appreciated unless you recall that in the mind ol a modern philosopher the r e t l ~ r n to interaction implies the return to the acceptance of the idea of substance and of the soul-atom, and other

5 Introduction, pp. 88-89.


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60 Proceedings of the Second Annual Meetingconcepts of what they call " a n outworn metaphysics." Weourselves make use of similar threats at times, as when we pointou t that the refusal to accept a certain thesis will lead inevitablyto skepticism, or to pantheism, or to materialism; but unfortunately the alternatives we can point to have not about themthe same stigma of out-of-date-ness. I t may be weIl to keep inmind, however, that such logical threats are not really convincing to reason, and that the sineere thinker will rather say: I,etme accept your dreaded alternative, r at he r t ha n be bullied intothe admission of a thesis if it has no more evidenee than thisbehind it.

Again, there is the attraetiveness of that broad inclusivenessspoken of above. H you abjure interaction and make yourprofession of faith in the law of the eonservation of energy, youean enjoy a wide latitude of opinion on other points withoutbeing excluded from the eommunion of parallelism. I t is hardto see just how we ean riyal this attractiveness by anything inour philosophy. We cannot grant t hat t ru th ean have fellowship with error. Still there is one feature of the philosophyof St. Thomas whieh we might weIl set ourselves to imitate,and that is the large-minded and kindly ingenuity he uses intrying to interpret sayings of St. Augustine in an aeeeptablesense.

Finally, not to weary you with counts, paraIlelism, at leastaeeording to Professor Paulsen, ean make the claim of beinga philosophie ground on whieh the rivalries of seience andreligion are reeonciled-a higher synthesis in whieh the differenees between these two are found to merge into an agreement.I t is an attraetive thought to many that they ean find such aphilosophie ground as will allow them to be as " seientifie" inoutlook as the most meehanistie materialist and yet indulge theirreligious instinets to the top of their bent. Th e fact that thereligion whieh is reeoneiled with seienee is too tenuous andmisty to be worth the trouble of saving from the eneroaehments


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The American Oatholic Philosophical Association 61of " science" does not detract from the comfortableness of thephilosophy which actually saves it for its possessor. Comfortableness is always an attraction in a philosophy. With adefinite religious faith to hold to we cannot make an unconditional surrender to " science," as parallelism feels free to makein the name of reconciliation; but I believe we can do moreto make it evident that Scholastic philosophy is not antagonisticto the achieved results of real science, nor to its reasonable aimsand claims.These are some of the grounds on which psycho-physical

parallelism makes its appeal for acceptance, and makes it, too,with much success. I t must be evident that to offset them weneed, not so much reasoned argument, as counter attractions ofa similar kind in the system of philosophy we offer as a substitute. But it would be unfair if we left the impression that inour minds psycho-physical parallelism made its claim for acceptanee merely on the ground of these infra-rational motives. I thas its appeal to reason as weIl, and some of its lines of reasoning will repay examination.

In the first plaee there is actually a certain parallelism between the physical and the psychical in conseious activity.Consciousness goes along with, even if it is not more closelyrelated to, certain physical activities of the nervous systemwhich physiology reveals or infers. There is some commonground here for all philosophies. I f our thinking is to progresson the underlying assumption of a universal evolution (and itmust be admitted that this assumption does underlie very muchof modern thinking), is it not more reasonable on such groundsto suppose that the psychical which ultimately emerges as eonsciousness in man was present in some simpler form from thebeginning, rather than to conceive it as arbitrarily breaking inon the continuity of development? Aside from complexity ororganization, the matter whieh accompanies consciousness inman is the same matter which is found elsewhere throughout


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62 Proceedings 01 the Second Annual Meetingthe universe. No system of universal evolution can admit tbatfull-blown consciousness can appear in nlan unless some simplerform of psychic activity went along with all matter. Pan-psychisln is thus seen to be a necessary consequence of universalevolution. Granting the original assumption, it is no mereextravagance, but a logical requirement. The obvious comment is: Why entertain assumptions that lead to such extravagant cOIlsequences? But I am concerned with finding the reasons baek of psycho-physical parallelism rather than with refuting it.We object, as strongly as any panpsychist can, to admittingthat the whole story of reality is told when we are shown howmoleeules and masses of matter are moved from without according to rnechanical laws. St. Thomas 6 teIls us that materialand efficient causes are the explanation of the effect's existence,but that they are not sufficient to account for the fact that theeffect hus goodness, that is, suitableness to itself and others.If an efIicient cause acts in connection with a material cause,an effect will be produced; but will it be produced weIl or illThere is no answer to these questions in a mechanical system.The efficient cause will act up to the full extent of its powerunless irnpeded by some opposing influence or limited by thelimited receptivity of the material cause. But the whole causality oi the efficient cause is to exercise its activity on the effectwithout reference to the suitableness or unsuitableness oi whatis produced, unless the activity of the efficient cause is appliedin a certain measure in view of the purpose to be accomplished.Thus heat applied without measure or purpose wil l be simplydestructive. Tf its effect is good, it must be because the heatwas applied in measure and with purpose. Therefore unlesswe admit some other cause besides efficient and material causes,we cannot explain why the effect produced is suitable. This is

es QQ. De Veritate, q. 5, a. 2'.


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T1he A.merica,n Oatholic Philosophical AssO'cia,tion 63the reasoning which shows the necessity of admitting fornlalcauses to account for the intrinsic finality oi things in the universe. I need not remind you that the strength of the argument for the existence of intelligence on the part of the Oreatorof the universe is derived from this intrinsic finality ratherthan from any show of external order and arrangement. l'hepanpsychists recognize th e objection to mere mechanism ,vhichSt. Thomas points out; but where he finds i n i nt ri ns ic finalitya r eq ui re me nt o f intelligence on the part oi: the efficient cause,they make intelligence a constituent of the universe. The pointis, however, that we have in our system of philosophy the answerto the need for which panpsychism was thought out; but unfortunately the modern philosopher does no t think of looking forit there.

I do not think I Ollght to take time for lnore than one otherof th e reasons on which psycho-physical parallelisln rests it sclaims, bu t that one ought to be it s opposition to interactionism.The desire to find some refuge from illteractionism is not asunreasonable as it may at first Eight appear. We must bear inmind that interactionism, as the adherents of p s ~ y c h o - p h y s i c a lparallelism represent it to themselves, is based o n Ca rte siandualism. The soul is pictured as seated in the pineal gland,or in some other part of the brain, and theIlce, like the captainof a very modern ship, with the ship's telegraph before hirn,controlling th e steering and progress of the ship. I n SllCh ap ic tu re t he afferent impulse coming in to the brain ends in apsychical state, an d from this psychical state, or some other,causally connected with it, th e motor or efferent jmpulse goesout to th e muscles. Has th e physical nerve-impulse producedthe psychical state? Or has th e psychieal state caused themotor impulse? I i interaction must answer in the affirmative,we have run into difficulties wi th the principle oi th e conservation oi energy. What has become oi the physical energy 015


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64 Proceedings o[ the Second Annual Meetingthe afferent impulse? And was the energy of the motor impulsederived from the psychical state? How can the physical betransformed into the psychical, or vice versa? Does not theprocess of reflex action show that the physical nexus betweenafferent and efferent is complete and continuous?

The law of the conservation of energy is an empirical generalization based on findings in the realm of non-living things.We are not pledged to maintain its universal validity. Nor arewe constrained to hold that the plan of the reflex action must fitthe action that is consciously controlled. But neither, on theother hand, should we l ightly disregard the indications thesemay furnish of the nature of psycho-physical activity. Thesethings, after all, we do know with some assurance; but how thephysical can impinge on the psychical, we must confess we dl)not know.

In rejecting psycho-physical parallelism we must be on ourguard against allowing ourselves to be enticed into a defense otCartesian dualism. St. Thomas treats the subject of the unionof soul and body in the eight articles of the seventy-sixth question of the first part of the Summa. In the course of thesearticles he calls attention seven times in as many distinct statements to the difference between his doctrine and the doctrinethat holds the soul to be the motor of the body. . In the genuineScholastic tradition body and soul form a compound being, anunum per se, of which the soul is the form. The activities of acompound are radicated in the form; yet it is the compositebeing that acts, not the matter alane or the form alone. Souland body are not, therefore, two separate existents acting the oneon the other, but one composite being which acts. We have not,then, a dualism such as psycho-physical parallelism contemplates in its protest. The body, as acting, is matter informedwith a soul; and the soul, though some of its activities surpassthe capacity of matter, is still a form united to matter, thoughin part transcending it. I believe that a solution of the psycho-


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The meric'an Oatholic Philosophical ssociation 65physical problem which would make a theory like psycho-physical parallelism appear altogether unnecessary as a protestagainst interactionism, is indicated in the articles in which St.'rhomas deals with the union of soul and body. Of course hewas not treating the problem quite from the angle of the psychophysical problem, and the significance of his doctrine as a solution of this problem needs to be pointed out in more detail.The germ of the solution exists, I believe, in passages like thefollowing:I. Q. XXVII. A. I. ad 3um ,: "Action belongs to the com

posite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists.Now the composite has substantial existenee from the substantial form; and it operates through the powers which resultfrom the substantial form."I. Q. XXVI. A. IV ad 2um : "The soul does not move the

body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motivepower, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul; so that the soul by its motive power is thepart that moves; and the animate body is the part that ismoved."I. Q. CX. A. 11. ad l UID : "Our soul i:s llnited to the body

as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to beformally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with acertain bodily change, is subject to the cOlJamand of reason."Contra Gent1ilesJ 11. Chap. LXVIII: "For one thing to beanother 's substantial form, two condition8 are required. Oneof them is that the form be the principle of substantial beingin the thing of which it is the form; and I speak not of theeffective, but of the formal principle, whereby a thing is and iscalled a being. Hence follows the secolld condition, namelythat the form and matter combine together in one being, whichis not the case with the effective principle together with that towhich it gives being."


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66 Proceedings of the Second Annual MeetingLike ancient philosophy modern thought has failed conspicu

ously in its attempts to account for reality in terms of mateTialand efficient causality. These, of course, are the only kinds ofcausality it knows. The insufficiency of these causes Aristotlehad already pointed out in his crit icism of his predecessors.I f the greater richness of the Scholastic concept of causalitywere better known to modern philosophy, I believe our thinkerswould recognize the possibility of help for the solution of theirproblems they could derive from this source.

JOIIN F. MCCORMICK.Marquette University.

CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION

A s the title indicates the subject-matter of this paper is thecurrent conception of religion, treated synthetically.There will naturally be, here and there, a system whieh doesnot fit into our synthesis, but on the whole it seems to do justieeto most of them. It will generally not treat anything beyondthe last ten years, that the presentation may be more aetualand living. The point of view will be philosophieal, and notpsyehological or historieal. Psyehology of religion whieh deseribes religion from the phenomenal point of view and thehistory of religion which treats religion from the genetie andtemporal point of view are outside the scope of this paper.Finally, this paper is purely expository, and at no time eritieal.Being part of a larger work whieh is already in preparation,we reserve our critieism to a later date. I f the traditional doet rine of religion is introdueed, it is merely to serve as a contrastto the contemporary ones, for most often new ideas are bestclarified by comparison with the old ideas which they hope tosupplant.Every study has its material and formal object. The mate-

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