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DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE

Provincial partisan patronage and national party

system stability in Argentina, 1983-2005

Gerardo Scherlis* -

Department of Political Science - Leiden University

gscherlis@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

Prepared for delivery at the workshop on “Political Parties and Patronage”, ECPR Joint Sessions, Nicosia, April 2005

I. Argentine party system. Between change and continuity

When Argentine democracy was restored in 1983, the same political parties that had

dominated politics from 1945 until the 1976 military coup emerged as the major political

players. The Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and the Peronist Party (PJ) had generated deeply

antagonistic loyalties, both of them claiming to represent the real national interest (McGuire,

1995). The Radicals had traditionally represented middle class citizens and were identified by its

followers as champions of civil rights and democratic institutions, which they felt were

threatened by the Peronists. Peronism, in turn, developed high levels of societal rootedness

among the working classes and the poor in general, who identified Perón and the movement he

founded with the cause of social justice. These strong political identities started to thaw in the

mid-80s, and shares of voters responding to party loyalty became increasingly volatile during the

1990s (Manzetti, 1993; Palermo y Novaro, 1998; Cheresky and Pousadela, 2004). However, the

PJ and the UCR undoubtedly dominated the Argentine two-party system from 1983 to 2001.

In the last quarter of 2001 Argentina underwent a severe political crisis, marked by an

upsurge of radical anti-party feelings. In the October legislative polls, almost fifty percent of the

citizens opted for what the media called an “anger vote”1 and two months later a massive civic

* Supported by the Programme AlBan, the European Union Programme of High Level Scholarships for Latin America, scholarship No. E05D050050AR. I want to thank Imke Harbers, Maria Spirova and Petr Kopecky for their help and comments. 1 Nearly four million blank and null votes—24% of the vote—were cast, more than what any one party obtained except for PJ, while there was some 24.5% of abstention.

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rebellion against the entire political class led to the resignation of the president. Neighbourhood

assemblies and, above all, movements of the unemployed [piqueteros] took to the squares and

the streets with a unified slogan that called every politician to quit: Que se vayan todos! For

several months Argentina teetered on the brink of anarchy (Levitsky, 2005).

In the light of these events, many considered this crisis a turning point in the Argentine

political system, including its party system. Observers predicted that the UCR would collapse in

the wake of De la Rúa’s government failure, while the PJ would survive but undergo a process of

deep internal fragmentation with unpredictable consequences (Ansaldi, 2002; Sidicaro, 2005).

The beginning of a “second transition”, in reference to a complete rearrangement of the party

system, was announced (Torre, 2003). Furthermore, President Kirchner (PJ), elected in a highly

atypical election which exposed the fragmentation of the party system,2 soon came to advocate

the idea that a new, “more coherent” party system, comprised of a centre-left and a centre-right

bloc, should emerge, leaving behind the traditional confrontation between Peronists and

Radicals.

Nevertheless, as shown in table 2, both traditional parties –though the UCR to a lesser

extent - have managed to keep their institutional dominance, while no third party emerged as a

potential electoral alternative (Malamud and De Luca, 2005). After the 2003 and 2005 legislative

and governorship elections it is clear that the party system did not suffer a Peru- or Venezuela-

style party-system collapse. Furthermore, the traditional parties remain largely as the first and

second blocs in both national chambers and in control of 22 of the 24 governorships.

(Tables 1 and 2)

The resilience of the national two-party system must be understood primarily as a

function of the strong partisan stability registered in most subnational arenas. Certainly, political

alternation and certain degree of volatility was much more common at the presidential level than

2 In April 23rd 2003, five candidates run with reasonable expectations. The PJ presented three different contestants, so resolving its primaries in general elections but also defying the most extreme minimalist definitions of what a political party is. Two candidates from the peronist party reached the second round, but former president Menem, regarding the unavoidable defeat foreseen by the surveys, gave up a few days before the date of the polls. In turn, the UCR’s presidential candidate got only 2,3% of votes, while two former UCR leaders run with new parties, obtaining the third and fifth places. (See Table 1).

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at the provincial executives from 1983 to 1999, but the gap between these two tiers became more

striking since 2001.

(Table 3)

This stability of the provincial party systems has been attributed mainly to the

characteristics of the Argentine institutional design, particularly to its electoral system (Calvo

and Escolar, 2005; Malamud and De Luca, 2005). In brief, it is argued that the three electoral

arenas in which national positions are elected– president, senators, and deputies- present strong

majoritarian biases. These pose an effective barrier to the emergence and rise of third parties thus

consolidating the dominance of the established PJ and UCR. In addition, according to the federal

system of government, every one of the 23 governors of the provinces and the chief of

government of the Federal Capital are directly elected by their constituencies, enhancing even

more the concentration of the vote in the provinces. Finally, malapportionment in both

legislative chambers benefits PJ and UCR who dominate small-sized overrepresented provinces.

I find these arguments convincing, but still insufficient. If they explain why many provinces

present obstacles to third parties’ emergence they do not account for significant disparities across

provinces with similar institutional features.

In this paper I attempt to make a contribution by proposing a complementary explanation

which turns the attention to the issue of provincial party-patronage. Patronage is frequently

underlined as a major institution of the “informally institutionalized” Argentine democracy

(O’Donnell, 1997) and it has been suggested that the provincial electoral machines are one of the

reasons for the persistence of main parties (Levitsky and Murillo, 2003). However, the

development of more comprehensive studies on the mechanisms that enable provincial political

systems to avoid the fragmentation that took place at the presidential tier remains a major

pending task. As an attempt in this direction, I suggest that party patronage is a main component

of party clientelist networks at the provincial level, which in turn plays a key role in maintaining

provincial party stability in a number of constituencies.

More precisely, the main hypothesis of this paper is that provinces with higher levels

of patronage present lower levels of political alternation and more closed and stable party

systems. From the observation of the presidential tier it seems reasonable to conclude that the

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Argentine party system is changing from a relatively closed and predictable two-party system to

a more open and unpredictable one. Nonetheless, this apparent change is softened by the closed

nature and the stability of many subnational party systems. I argue that these features, often

manifested by predominant party systems and absence of alternation rest, in a significant number

of districts, on the electoral impact of party patronage.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, it highlights the factors that make the provinces not

only the locus of Argentine party politics but also of party patronage. Second, it shows how

patronage combines with clientelism to generate an electoral impact. In this part the study

propose an original proxy for assessing the electoral impact of party patronage in Argentine

provinces. Thirdly, the main hypothesises are empirically tested. The final section is devoted to a

discussion of some inferences drawn from the data.

2. Decentralized Party Patronage

2. a. Decentralized Public Administration

Argentine public administration is highly decentralized. Around fifty percent of the total

national expenditure are spent at subnational level and provinces concentrate more than seventy

percent of total public employment of the country. While the size of the central government

public sector fell dramatically during the early 90s due to the process of market-oriented

economic reform, the levels of provincial public employment remained stable and started to rise

again after the 2001-2002’s crisis (See table 4).

(Table 4)

Provincial administrations’ revenues, however, finance less than a quarter of their

expenditures whereas the rest is provided by a set of transfer mechanisms from the central

government.3 In recent years, a number of studies have shown how these transfers of funds are

subjected to discretionary criteria, usually linked to the stance adopted by provincial officers

with regard to the central governments’ bills and policies. Scholars agree that these trade-offs

benefit small and overrepresented provinces, which manage to keep high levels of public

employment by granting political support to national governments in exchange for side payments 3 The major of these mechanisms is the Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement, by which provinces delegate tax authority to the national government, which in turn “devolves” the collected funds to the provinces.

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in the form of funds and subsidies (Remmer and Wibbels,2000; Jones et al. 2000; Gordin 2005).

Being small-sized and politically overrepresented in both national chambers, these provinces

have been called “low-maintenance constituencies”, in reference to the comparatively

inexpensive payments that the national executive power has to make to obtain their legislators’

support (Gibson and Calvo, 2000).

The fact is that the shrinkage of national public sector reduced the scope of opportunities

for patronage at national level but reinforced its relative share in the provinces where the absence

of civil service regulations - often mentioned as a reference to national public administration - is

even more noticeable (Calvo and Murillo, 2004). In any case, and regardless the significant

variances across them, the rate of provincial public employment in all Argentine provinces is

comparatively very high (Benton, 2003). At the same time, provincial governors, as well as the

chief of government of the Federal Capital, exercise substantial autonomy, enjoying considerable

and discretionary powers over the administration of budgets and public policies (Eaton, 2004).

Actually, even when the president is still the axis of the Argentine political system he coexists

with powerful governors, who have turned into major political players (Spiller and Tomassi,

2002; Benton, 2003). The significance of governors, in comparison with other senior officials, is

well illustrated by the fact that in the last two decades holding a governorship became the

necessary stepping stone to the presidency.4

2. b. Provincially-centred parties

It is well-established that the Argentine party system is provincially centred (Calvo and

Murillo, 2004; Jones and Hwang, 2005). Federalism stimulates parties to organize and compete

at the sub-national level, orienting their activity to the control of local political institutions (Jones

and Mainwaring, 2003).5 The process of political and economic decentralization implemented

during the 1980s and early 1990s, transfered functions and funds to subnational administrations

and reinforced the role of provincial political institutions even more (Eaton, 2004). In a context

of disaffection with politics and ideological vacuum, decentralization favoured the

“territorialization” of political parties and, more in general, of Argentine politics. With regard to

4 From 1989 onwards, not only every elected president held at the moment of his election a governor position, but also – excepting for one single case in 1995, the runner-up. 5 It must be noted that Argentina has a significant number of parties that only compete in one province, the so called provincial parties, some of which are dominant or the main opposition in their districts.

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intra-party politics, since ideological motivations lost preponderance it turned inconceivable that

internal tendencies arose out of programmatic differences—as it was the case to some extent in

the past. By contrast, the predominance of material resources encouraged the development of

factions centred around the management of financial resources, which appeared to be attainable

at the provincial level.

Although both PJ and UCR nominally remain national parties, their structures

increasingly resemble that of loose and heterogeneous leagues of provincial organizations

(Levitsky and Murillo, 2003). Fragmented competition and lack of homogeneous and cohesive

parties have become rampant in Argentina. The level of fragmentation is such that lately major

parties have contested elections under different labels in many provinces, forming contradictory

alliances in different districts.

It is clear, at the same time, that the provincial branches of the parties are the locus of

Argentine politicians’ careers. Given that national legislators are nominated and elected by

subnational branches, they remain beholden to provincial leaderships. In the overwhelming

majority of the cases, successful politicians are those who follow the “cursus honorum” within a

provincial section and manage to dominate and strengthen it (Jones et al, 2002). As I try to

demonstrate below, in the dominance of these subnational organizations in which the core of

Argentine politics takes place, patronage plays an essential role, constituting the main fount for

obtaining and conserving leadership.

3. Party patronage, clientelism and votes

3.a. Disentangling concepts

The argument I present in this paper alludes to the linkage between three concepts often

used as if interchangeable, namely: patronage, clientelism, and pork barrel. Even when the three

of them may be conceived as a means of securing electoral support for a party, a faction or a

particular contestant through particularistic exchanges, they do differ in three major aspects: the

content of the “supply”, the actors involved, and the suppliers’ main purpose.

In mass democracies, party clientelism entails the provision of a wide variety of goods

and/or services. In general terms, it is a way of wooing people’s support to a party, faction or

contestant through satisfying some of their daily needs. The clients are usually poor and even

marginalized people and the providers are politicians linked to the state apparatus. Regardless of

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the undeniable complexity of these relationships, which usually include elements of identity and

loyalty (Auyero, 2000; Piattoni, 2001), in simple and general terms it may be said that the

suppliers’ primary goal is obtaining of clients’ votes. Pork barrel, in turn, refers to the

implementation of particularistic policies, as the provision of funds or the enactment of a law

which benefit particular constituencies, in order to obtain their political support. The actors

involved are usually elected officials on the one hand and their constituencies – as a collective

subject- on the other. However, as the Argentine case clearly illustrate, pork barrel

simultaneously supposes trade offs between sub national officials and central government, the

former demanding transfers of funds and others side payments in exchange for the latter’s

political support (Gibson and Calvo, 2000). The concept of party patronage, finally, is much

more restricted, as it connotes the allocation of appointments and jobs in public and semi-public

positions by a political party or faction, which acts as a collective patron. Party patronage has

been usually referred to as a tool for satisfying party organizational needs rather than an electoral

strategy (Panebianco, 1988; Müller, 1989; Blondel, 2002; Rybar, 2006, van Biezen and

Kopecky, 2007). In contemporary cartel parties, devoid of appeal to voluntary activism,

embeddness in the state apparatus allows politicians who hold office to use patronage for the

recruitment of supporters (Van Biezen, 2004). In this sense, as Kopecky (2006) underlines,

clientelism is a much more penetrating and diversified phenomenon, but which requires the

previous existence of patronage, since “without an ability to control appointments within the

state institutions, political parties would not be in the position to distribute selective benefits.”

In accordance with this literature, patronage functions in Argentina as a resource for

building party organizations. However, these party organizations built and feed by patronage are

primarily electoral machines which, in turn, make use of the resources extracted from patronage

to develop the clientelist networks, crucial for winning elections. In reference to Argentine

municipalities, a recent study sharply differentiated between clientelism and patronage to stress

that only the former is effective in buying votes (Brusco et al, 2005). Nonetheless, it remains true

that clientelist practices are unthinkable without patronage. If appointments do not entail by

themselves necessarily an electoral impact, they allow electoral machines to work. As Jones

(2004) puts it in reference to party primaries in Argentina, “patronage positions are particularly

important for maintaining the support of second and third tier party leaders, who in turn possess

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the ability to mobilize voters.” Hence I assume that patronage has an electoral impact as well and

thus consider it is worthwhile to assess whether and when this impact is relevant.

3. b. Patronage and electoral machines

During the 80s and 90s party primaries spread as a mechanism for candidates selection in

Argentine political parties. Likewise, primaries were increasingly held to vote uppermost parties’

positions (Mustapic, 2002; De Luca et al., 2002). This implied the impossibility of climbing up

within the parties’ structures without the ability to win a primary.

It must be noted that when democracy was restored, in 1983, thousands of activists joined

party organizations, which had, during the so-called democratic spring, huge popular support.

However, disenchantment with politics and disaffection with political parties came soon, and

politicians and parties were increasingly perceived as untrustworthy.6 As ideologically-motivated

activists stopped being active, party structures turned into semi-state agencies absorbed by, and

increasingly dependent on the state’s resources for their functioning. Access to state positions

thus became needed for organizational survival.

At the same time, the extension of both intra and inter party competition from 1983

onwards boosted the search for a new kind of resources, the electoral clienteles. Given the dearth

of an ideologically-motivated membership, internal competition turned into clientelist-based

struggles among factions and primaries became clashes between electoral machines (Palermo,

1986; Levitsky, 2003). As De Luca et al. (2006) argues, the core task in a primary consists in the

mobilization of clienteles to the polls, which entails significant spending in several kinds of

goods and services, from the salaries of the neighbourhood brokers (punteros), hired by the

provincial or municipal governments, to the monies for buses, taxis and drivers to transport

voters to the ballot rooms. In the primaries there are not ideological issues involved, and

contestants’ backgrounds do not matter either. The victory is solely determined by the amount of

resources at disposal and the efficiency in the use of them. Consequently, patronage is the

cornerstone on which politicians fund their leadership and upon which depend their careers.

(Jones et al, 2002).7

6 While political parties were positively evaluated in 1984 by 84 percent of the population, they had fell to 63 percent in 1988, to become the least trustful institution along the nineties, with only 4 percent of the interviewed manifesting some confidence in 2002 (Catterberg, 1991; Adrogué y Armesto, 2001; Latinoabrómetro Report, 2002). 7 It is worth noting that the networks of brokers stretching, particularly over ever-increasing poor sectors, are not the result of a systematic plan deliberately promoted by the national party for external competition; rather they are an

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In sum, the control of the provincial section of the party requires a well-developed

electoral machine, for which resources obtained from patronage are indispensable.8 As it was the

case in many American cities in the early 20 century (Scott, 1969), in Argentine provinces

patronage constitutes the basis for building the machines which, in turn, extend the clientelist-

based networks for gaining votes.9 It seems logical to infer, accordingly, that higher rates of

politically appointed jobs should lead to broader and more influential political machines.

3. c. Party Patronage: Public employment and Party membership

Certainly, data on patronage is always soft. As Geddes stresses, “in the real world, there

is no way to measure amounts of patronage or how much influence on the vote it has.” (1994:

105). That is the reason why, when scholars try to assess patronage impact, proxy measures are

necessarily employed. In this paper, following some of the most recent approaches on the subject

(Gibson and Calvo, 2000; Remmer and Wibbels, 2000; Calvo and Murillo, 2004), I make use of

provincial public employment as a proxy for party patronage. Definitely, almost every provincial

job in Argentine provinces might be counted as patronage, insofar as there are no civil service

laws preventing political appointments. However, since this study aims at assessing the influence

of party patronage in keeping provincial party systems stable, it is not solely concerned with the

number of jobs discretionally appointed by the ruling party but, more specifically, with the

electoral weight of those voters encouraged to support the ruling party as a payment for getting

or keeping their jobs. For that purpose, public employment figures by themselves would seem to

be too rough. For instance, it is natural that Patagonian provinces, due to their hard geographic

conditions and sparse population, show higher rates of public employment than metropolitan

districts, where population is much more concentrated, this not necessarily entailing a partisan

bias. Furthermore, higher rates of public employment could as well result from more developed

state–run services, as schools or hospitals, in a country in which provinces exhibit large

disparities in those fields. Therefore, I attempt here to refine the proxy by using a control unintended by-product of a relatively autonomous dynamics, associated with internal factions competing for power in the party (Auyero, 2000). 8 State financing, however meaningful for newcomers and small parties’ very first organizational needs, is by far less significant for established and major parties, and definitely scarce for the building of the machine required for primaries (De Luca 2004; Jones and Hwang, 2005). 9 The scope for clientelist practices was enlarged in the context of the neoliberal model implemented in the 90s. With the state’s abandonment of certain essential functions, palliative welfare aid became a method of political struggle among the internal factions of parties (Brusco et al, 2004).

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variable, i.e. ruling party membership. In this section, resuming the argument exposed in

previous paragraphs, I explain why and how I do so.

Provincial electoral machines, arisen from internal competition, remain at disposal and

are utilized for general elections as well. However, given that the main goal in the development

of the machines refers to the local internal competition within the party, it is not far-fetched to

expect that those citizens involved are registered as party members, as a sine qua non for getting

the handouts.10

In every provincial section, power tends to be concentrated in the hands of a single boss

or a reduced group. In the cases of provincial ruling parties, the governor is the natural party

leader, sustained by his unequal access to material resources. His ability to allocate jobs is

crucial for the construction and the control of party electoral machines (Jones, 2004, De Luca,

2004), providing him and his group with a position that guarantees a large advantage over any

potential intra-party competitor. Nonetheless, provincial party leaderships strive to enlarge and

strengthen their supporting machines. They have two major reasons to do so. First and foremost,

they need to discourage the emergence of any potential challenger. Even when the governor is

seen as the unquestionable party local boss, he is well aware that potential challengers, despite

their initial disadvantaged position, might emerge at any moment (De Luca et al, 2006). These

potential challengers can be mayors of large cities and national legislators, allied to other

provincial leadership or even to the president, when the latter envisages the governor as a threat

for his own leadership. In fact, when candidacies and party’s positions are not submitted to

primaries it is because the leadership appears to be too powerful to be challenged.11

In second place, just as the number of affiliate members one broker can mobilize

provides the parameter for determining his power vis-à-vis his peers, the size of the political

machine, measured by party membership, determines the position of the local boss within the

national party. That is because the number of delegates every province sends to national

conventions, and thereby its presence in party national boards, depends on the amount of its

10 Not affiliated voters, who have been increasingly allowed to take part in candidate selection primaries, have never represented a significant share of the turnout. In 2005, when all the electorate was allowed to take part in party primaries, only 3.2 percent voted. Simply put, clients are useful for the brokers only if they join the party. 11 However, it is to be expected that the electoral machines swell more when the internal competence actually takes place. So happened in the context of a hard internal dispute in the Peronist Party in the Province of Buenos Aires in 2004, when 700.000 new members were reported. See Clarín newspaper, 12-10-2004: “La Interna del Peronismo. El PJ bonaerense dice que sumó 700 mil afiliados en un solo mes” http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/10/12/ elpais/p-00601.htm.

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affiliated members. Furthermore, the provincial boss’ image as a leader within his own party is

reinforced when party membership in the district he controls remains high and surges up. It is

not by coincidence that of the three Peronist presidential candidates in 2003 all were the bosses

of sections with the highest rates of party membership.

These reasons make it understandable why party membership has never stopped to rise in

Argentine political parties even when, as noted above, parties are discredited as untrustworthy

institutions. While in 2000 only five percent of Argentine citizens admitted to be part of a

political organization, in the same year the number of party members reached 8.3 million,

surpassing one third of the total voters.12 The linkage between patronage practices and

increments in ruling party membership has been underlined in some other cases of democratized

countries (Sotiropoulos, 1996; Rybar, 2006). In the context of recent Argentine political studies,

however, party membership has remained a black hole, most scholars dismissing the data as not

reliable. Certainly, parties’ registers of members are inflated, not reflecting the real dimension of

their organizations. Once a citizen signed the form, he remains a member, without any duty to be

fulfilled, unless he/she decides to cancel the membership.13 Undoubtedly, many people joined

the parties between 1982 and 1984, and stayed so regardless of their virtually non existent

linkage to “his/her” party. These noticeable weak points notwithstanding, party membership’s

figures are not meaningless. Given the functioning of political machines exposed above I

consider them useful for checking the extent of party patronage. Remarkably, as Table 5

exposes, both PJ and UCR tend to increase their membership much more while in power than

when they are in the opposition.14

(Table 5)

As opinion polls display time after time and as it is evident for any observer of

contemporary Argentine politics, no large amounts of citizens joining these parties from 1987 –

once the democratic spring was definitely over- might be explained but for the intra-party

dynamics described above. Thus, it is my contention that the figures of party membership are

12 The case suggests a very cautious appliance of the variable “extension of party membership” as an indicator of democratic participation, recently proposed by Diamond and Morlino (2005). 13 Which entails much more complicated proceedings than those required to join the party. See Clarín newspaper, 12.10.2004: “La difícil tarea de desafiliarse de un partido” [The hard work of leaving party membership]. 14 Exceptions, as will become clear later, are confined to districts with low levels of patronage.

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linked to the enlargement of provincial political machines, which are mainly fuelled by party

patronage. In consequence, I suggest that the linkage between public employment and ruling

party membership, taking into account the processes of member recruitment exposed above,

offers a tighter – though still very rough- approach to the electoral reach of patronage. Therefore

I will use provincial public employment as a proxy for patronage, but I will control this variable

through the level of ruling party membership. Concretely, I will consider as patronage-oriented

those provinces that, having high levels of provincial public employment, exhibit at the same

time high levels of ruling party membership. (See Apendix)

In the next section I proceed to test the main contentions of this paper: a) That higher

levels of party patronage – understood as high provincial public employment alongside high

ruling party membership -- should go together with lower levels of political alternation; and b)

That higher level of party patronage should lead to more closed and stable party systems.

4. Provincial public employment and party competitiveness in Argentine provinces

A. Patronage and political alternation

Argentine provinces elect their governors every four years. Since 1983, most provinces

have had six governorship elections.15 Nine of the twenty four provinces have been governed by

the same ruling party with no interruptions,16 six had only one change in the provincial

executive17, two provinces experienced two alternations18 and, finally, in seven provinces there

were three replacement of the ruler party.19 Noticeably, continuity at the provincial level is much

more frequent than alternation. Nevertheless, provinces show important variations.

According to the data presented in Table 6, a strong correlation exists between high

levels of provincial public employment and low levels of alternation. Among the nine provinces

that had no alternation, six have high levels of public employment and two medium-high. In

contrast, alternation is higher among provinces with medium-low and low provincial public

employment. Nonetheless, following these parameters there are three deviant cases. Tierra del

15 A federal intervention led to one more election in Santiago del Estero. Tierra del Fuego and Ciudad de Buenos Aires gained political autonomy in 1990 and 1994, thus having four and three elections respectively. 16 La Rioja, Santa Cruz, Formosa, La Pampa, Jujuy, Río Negro, Neuquén, San Luis and Santa Fe 17 Buenos Aires, Misiones, Córdoba, Catamarca, Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Santiago del Estero. 18 Corrientes and Salta. 19 Mendoza, Tierra del Fuego, Chaco, Tucumán, Chubut, San Juan, Entre Ríos.

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Fuego, Chubut and San Juan, three provinces with high or medium high levels of public

employment (4th , 9th and 12th in national ranking) had, each of them, three alternations.

Table 6. Provincial public employment and Alternation

Public Employment

Alternation

High (Above 55 employees out of 1.000 inhabitants)

Medium high (between 45 and 55)

Medium low (Between 35 and 45)

Low (Below 35)

None La Rioja Santa Cruz Formosa La Pampa Neuquén Jujuy

San Luis Río Negro

Santa Fe

Low (1) Catamarca Santiago Misiones Bs As Cordoba Capital

Médium (2) Corrientes

Salta

High (3) Tierra del Fuego

Chubut San Juan

Chaco Entre Ríos Tucumán

Mendoza

Interestingly, when instead of provincial public employment we consider patronage as it

was proposed here -- i.e. public employment plus party membership -- the correlation

strengthens; there remain no deviant cases to the hypothesis. The three alluded provinces have, at

the same time, very low levels of ruling party membership and thus should not be classified as

patronage-oriented.

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Table 7. Patronage and alternation

Patronage Alternation

High Patronage Medium Patronage Low Patronage

None La Rioja Santa Cruz Formosa La Pampa Neuquén Jujuy San Luis

Santa Fe Río Negro

Low Catamarca

Santiago del Estero

Buenos Aires Córdoba Misiones Capital

Medium Corrientes

Salta

High Entre Ríos Mendoza Tucumán Chubut San Juan Chaco Tierra del Fuego

The province of Tierra del Fuego offers an extreme example of the combination of high

public employment with low ruling party membership. As it is the smallest Argentine province,

new parties there face the constraints imposed by the majoritarian biases of the institutional

design. Tierra del Fuego was recognized as a province by the National Congress in 1990, thus it

had its first democratically-elected government in 1991. The victor was then the local

Movimiento Popular Fueguino (MPF), which won again in 1995. At the end of its second tenure,

the province had the fourth highest rate of provincial public employment of the country.

However, after eight years in government a very small share of provincial voters (in comparative

terms) was affiliated with the ruling party (12.5 percent, 20th in the national ranking). This,

according to the parameters of this study, leads me to consider it as a non patronage-oriented

case. In 1999 the MPF was defeated by PJ which, in turn, was displaced by UCR in 2003. In

addition, the recently created ARI, a national centre-left party, set foot in the province, won the

2003 legislative elections and came out second in 2005. In brief, despite the institutional

constraints and its levels of public employment, the province shows high rates of political

alternation in the frame of an increasingly fragmented and volatile political scene.

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The other two provinces with high rates of public employment and high alternation,

Chubut and San Juan, also exhibit low levels of ruling party membership. Chubut has had, since

1983, high levels of provincial public employment, ranking permanently among the top-ten

provinces. From then on, the radicals and the peronists have alternated in power in the province,

both with extremely low levels of party membership. The UCR kept power for three tenures,

between 1991 and 2003, but – at least until 1999- it maintained the country’s lowest rate of party

membership. In 2003, UCR was defeated by PJ. San Juan, for its part, is also considered a “low

maintenance constituency”, and, in fact, its level of public employment is among the top-half.

Although both the provincial party Bloquista, which governed between 1983 and 1991, and PJ,

which governed between 1991 and 1999, raised their levels of membership while in power, none

of them did it in a comparatively significant extent, thus maintaining the province among the

bottom-half in this regard.

A thoroughly different picture is portrayed when analyzing provinces that have high or

medium-high public employment rates and high or medium-high ruling party membership. La

Rioja, La Pampa, Neuquén, Formosa, Santa Cruz, Jujuy and San Luis, have never had any party

alternation, whereas Catamarca had it only once.

Catamarca is particularly worthy of some remarks, given that – unlike the others,

permanently and undisputedly dominated by PJ - it reveals similarities in both major parties’

practices. From 1983 to 1990 PJ remained as the predominant party, unchallenged by any other.

In 1990 a criminal scandal in which members of the governor’s family were involved led to a

federal intervention, which in turn paved the way for the triumph of UCR in 1991. From then

onwards, UCR remained in power. Significantly, alongside their respective tenures at office,

both parties significantly increased their memberships, whereas both decreased when they were

in the opposition (see table 5).20

B. Patronage and closed provincial party systems

Regarding the structure of competition, Mair (1997) classifies party systems as closed,

and thus predictable, and open, and thus more unpredictable. The pattern of alternation, the type

of governing formula, and the range of parties gaining access to government are the key

20 Furthermore, observers of local politics have noted that UCR managed to retain power due to its resort to the same particularistic exchanges that peronists of Catamarca had used until 1990 (Gutiérrez, 1999).

16

indicators whose level of stability defines the type of party competition. Since 2001, when the

apparent collapse of party system took place, provinces with higher levels of patronage have

kept their party systems more closed and stable than their counterparts with low patronage

levels.

Certainly, the period since the 2001 crisis, which includes only one governorship

election, is too short to allow a rigorous analysis of provincial party systems change from then

on. However, some preliminary observations may be exposed, taking into account also national

legislative elections.21 The eight provinces identified as having the highest rates of patronage

(high or medium-high in both items) keep the same closed structure of competition after 2001

than that they had had for the previous eighteen years. In six of them Peronists appear as

unbeatable as ever, the Radicals remaining as the main opponent and reaping the corresponding

institutional rewards, i.e. one senator and several deputies. In Neuquén, the local Movimiento

Popular Neuquino (MPN) seems as invincible as it has been since 1983, the PJ being the runner-

up. In Catamarca, the dominance of the Radicals has been, since they took power in 1991,

threatened by Peronists, and it is still so. Exactly as it had been from 1983 to 2001, PJ and UCR

(and the MPN in Neuquén), are currently the main political actors in these political systems

whose structure of competition has not showed perceivable changes.

The scene is much more complex when trying to analyze the provinces with the lowest

levels of patronage (low or medium-low in both items). In two of them, Misiones and Buenos

Aires, where PJ and UCR had disputed even elections, Radicals suffered an electoral collapse,

leaving PJ as the unchallenged ruling party. In Córdoba, where UCR had been the predominant

party from 1983 to 1999, PJ took its place. A new party, the local centre-left Frente Nuevo (New

Front), became the runner up, so displacing UCR to a far off third place, and reasonably

expecting to achieve the governorship in next elections. In Santa Fe, a third party, the Socialist,

became the main opposition to the long-standing predominant PJ. Leading an alliance with a

severely diminished UCR (which until mid-90s had been a real threat to PJ), Socialists defeated

Peronists in 2005 legislative elections and are considered to be the most probable winners in the

next governorship contest in 2007. The Federal Capital, finally, exhibits the most extreme case

of party system change, being affected on the three cited factors (pattern of alternation,

governing formula and the openness in access to government). The Radicals, who had governed

21 From 2001 up to now provinces passed through three national legislative electoral rounds.

17

from 1996 to 2000, vanished completely. The centre leftist Frepaso, who succeeded the Radicals

in government, virtually disappeared in the wake of the 2001’s crisis, but the chief of

government still managed to be re-elected in 2003 with the support of an heterogeneous

coalition, including the explicit support of the recently elected President. New forces, such as the

centre left ARI and centre right PRO, gained prominence, while PJ resurged in 2005 after several

elections in which it had remained almost non existent. When considering the 2007 chief of

government elections, a large number of personalities rather than traditional parties must be

considered as the major players in this district.

Interestingly, while until 2001 both PJ and UCR used to obtain similar shares of

legislators in the whole country, or even larger shares in districts with low levels of patronage, an

opposite tendency is visible since 2001. Third parties, most of them based on the popularity of a

single personality but simultaneously identified with centre-left or centre-right programmes,

managed to establish footholds in non patronage orientated districts. UCR and PJ, by contrast, as

illustrated in table 8, keep a large predominance over highly patronage-oriented ones.

The notorious difference between high and low patronage districts is also illustrated

when examining electoral performances in 2003 and 2005 (Table 9). Successful third parties –

letting aside the long-standing local MPN in Neuquén- emerged only in non patronage districts,

whereas PJ and UCR – though the latter to a lesser extent- remain the two main parties in highly

patronage-oriented constituencies.

(Tables 8 and 9)

Finally it must be noted that the relation between patronage and the presence of dominant

parties can be proposed exactly in the opposite direction, i.e. that predominant party systems lead

to higher levels of patronage.22 However, in this case, disparities among the provinces’ levels of

public employment have not significantly increased over time. Instead, those provinces that

exhibited higher levels of public employment in 1987 and that developed strong political

machines fast turned to be closed and with predominant party systems. Furthermore, most of the

provinces with high rates of patronage exhibit at the same time significant rates of opposition

parties’ membership, which says more about a shared way of doing party politics in some

22 That is the argument exposed by Grzymala Busse (2003) and O’ Dwyer (2004) for Eastern Europe countries.

18

districts rather than anything else. In any case, it is a self-reinforcing process. If patronage

constitutes a key factor for electoral predominance and for keeping party systems closed, it is to

be expected that the persistent control of the government in the absence of a strong opposition

facilitates the usage of state resources with electoral purposes.

Concluding Remarks: Patronage in Peronist and Radical persistence

At the beginning of this paper I pointed out that it aimed to contribute to the

understanding of the resilience of many sub-national party systems, and the consequent

maintenance of the two-party system at national level as well.

I argued that mainline explanations, focused on institutional design, are satisfactory but

still insufficient, insofar as they do not account for disparities among provinces with similar

institutional constraints. The notion of low maintenance constituencies presented by Gibson and

Calvo proves to be also useful since it explains how some provinces manage to keep higher

levels of public employment than others. However, nor this takes into account differences in the

functioning of political systems in provinces with similar rates of employment. Low

maintenance constituencies also performed differently, some showing more alternation than the

others, some enabling the appearance of third parties while others did not.

Another distinction between Argentine provinces is also common. On the one hand, the

so called “metropolitan” provinces, those five districts where the bulk of Argentina’s population

and productive structure is located23; on the other, the remaining nineteen districts, named as

“peripheral”. If it is possible to win a presidential election just with the vote of metropolitan

provinces (since they concentrate 70 percent of the population), governance at the national level

requires legislative support coming from both areas. Due to the overrepresentation assigned to

the sparsely populated peripheral provinces, 30 percent of the population holds 76.3 percent of

seats in the Senate and 44.8 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

While none of the metropolitan provinces was here classified as patronage-oriented,

according to my findings eleven of the nineteen peripheral provinces were considered as highly

or medium-highly patronage-oriented. These eleven provinces represent 16 percent of the

national vote, but provide 45.8 per cent of the Senate seats and 25 per cent of the Chamber of

Deputies. This implies that patronage, though not decisive for winning a national presidential

23 Province of Buenos Aires, the Federal Capital, Santa Fe, Córdoba and Mendoza.

19

election, is extremely relevant in terms of gaining institutional power, namely governorships and

seats in both national chambers.

Fragmentation and volatility impinge on the lowly patronage-oriented areas much more

than on the others. This phenomena has made the presidential tier a more open and unpredictable

one. Popular leaderships, loosely linked to any political organization, are able to gain large

shares of votes there. Nonetheless, patronage oriented districts remain closed to new forces, thus

ensuring the legislative predominance of the traditional major parties.

A recent study labels the Argentine political system as wholly clientelist (De Luca et al,

2006). Paraphrasing Kitschelt (2000) I find it more appropriate to say that Argentine provinces

exhibit two different predominant linkages between citizens and politicians. Briefly, in

metropolitan districts, politics resemble Manin’s (1997) Audience Democracy, politicians

appealing to the public mostly through the media, and citizens selecting among personalities and

issues much more than established political organizations. In telling contrast, in those provinces

characterized as highly patronage-oriented the clientelist linkage and traditional parties

predominate.

Certainly, both types of linkages are present in every province. The functioning of the

political machines described here are not circumscribed to particular districts. In fact, the most

well known political machine (object of permanent criticism, media reports, and academic

research) is the Peronist apparatus of the largest province of Buenos Aires. This study, however,

is not concerned with the absolute amounts of political machines’ members but rather with its

electoral reach. A big and well established machine does not suffice to win open elections by

itself in big constituencies. In Córdoba, where more than 2.1 million people vote, Radicals

developed a large apparatus, increasing its membership from 253.562 to 343.762 in four years

(1995-1999), but just to lose provincial elections for the first time since 1983.

Particularistic exchanges are definitely not confined to poor and underdeveloped areas

(Piattoni, 2003; Kristinsson, 1996). Moreover, in advanced societies, patronage – as the

discretional allocation of appointments- becomes increasingly restricted to high officials and

upper classes (Theobald, 1992). Nevertheless, it is noticeable that in societies in which poverty is

rampant, political demands will be closer to the clientelist type than to the autonomous citizen’s.

As a recent study on the effectiveness of vote buying in Argentina shows, poor voters are more

likely than the electorate as a whole to be involved in clientelist vote-seekers networks (Brusco

20

et al, 2004). The provinces that were here identified as patronage-oriented are within the so-

called by O’Donnell “brown areas” (1993), neofeudalized regions in which guarantees of

democratic legality have almost no effectiveness. As O’Donnell remarks, “the parties operating

there, even if they are nominally members of national parties, are no more than personalistic

machines anxiously dependent on the prebends they can extract from the national and the local

state agencies. Those parties and the local governments function on the basis of phenomena such

as personalism, familism, prebendalism, clientelism, and the like.” The mechanisms of partisan

recruitment exposed above make it clear why party membership is higher in these poorer and

traditionally acknowledged as less politicized provinces than in metropolitan areas. As table 10

shows, on average, in highly patronage-oriented provinces 11.2% of voters were provincial

public employees and 24.8% were members of the ruling party by 1999. In contrast, in lowly-

patronage oriented districts the figures were 5% and 14.2% respectively.

(Table 10)

Even when patronage is to be found at every province, it spreads in the form of diverse

particularistic exchanges in some of them more than in others, thus having very different

electoral impacts. Those in which the weight of patronage is heavier are those provinces less

open to political competition.

As Gordin suggests, “the most important political source of patronage is the nature of

political parties and more general party systems” (2002). The nature of major Argentine parties,

however, change substantially across Argentine provinces. Successful parties are those who

manage to adapt themselves to changing situations and to divergent fields. In Argentina, it means

that parties must have the ability to develop different kind of linkages with citizens, depending

on the province they operate in. The Peronist Party have showed an enormous capacity to do it.

It may function as a well-lubricated machine responding to a local boss who appears to be the

provider of goods and services in the brown areas while, at the same time, portrays itself as a

progressive centre-left modern party in the Federal Capital. Doing so, undoubtedly, the PJ

surmounted the crisis. It controls national government, rules 15 of the 24 provinces, and counts

with large legislative blocs that, glued by patronage and pork barrel, vote together backing the

national executive in relevant issues.

21

It is harder to account for the much less noticeable, more uneasy, but still remarkable

resilience of UCR. Due to its long-lasting middle class constituencies and its strength in

metropolitan areas, patronage and other particularistic exchanges were less associated with the

Radicals since 1983.24 Nonetheless, the widely proclaimed Radical collapse was mainly confined

to its more traditional strongholds, constituencies in which it was blamed for the failure of

national and local administrations. Its votes and institutional power are currently concentrated in

peripheral provinces. UCR remained as the main opposition in the majority of patronage-

oriented provinces, ruled by PJ. This condition is crucial for its institutional presence, ensuring

one senator and several deputies per province. As noted, seats filled by the eleven constituencies

I classified as patronage-oriented account for 25 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 45.8

percent of the Chamber of Senators, but the UCR gathers 27.5 percent of its deputies and 53

percent of its senators there . These figures are in sharp contrast to usual UCR performances

from 1983 to 2001.

Any party attempting to establish itself in Argentine political system must be able to set

foot in the two different scenes. That of the metropolitan areas, in which clientelist linkages may

be useful to gain internal control of the party but not to win general elections, and that of the

peripheral provinces, in which particularistic exchanges are critical for any electoral success. The

huge political crisis that took place in Argentina remained mostly circumscribed to the former. It

is when focusing on these areas that politicians, journalists and some scholars talk about the

rearrangement of the party system in terms of a centre-right and a centre-left bloc. It is there

where UCR suffered its major breakdowns and where new electoral forces successfully emerged.

In the other scene, where interchange of particularistic goods and services remain as the

dominant linkage, the traditional organizations that have provided these goods for decades

remain alive and predominate. This has proven to be crucial for the relative resilience of

Argentine national two-party system.

24 A recent study have shown that Radicals, due to their constituencies’ comparatively higher incomes, are less rewarded than Peronists for rising expenditures on salaries in the provinces they rule (Calvo and Murillo, 2004).

22

APPENDIX

Variables are operationalized as follows: First, levels of provincial public employment are classified by

comparing the averages of provincial public employment out of 1.000 inhabitants published by INDEC (National

Institute of Census and Statistics) from 1987 to 2004. With these figures, I distribute the 24 provinces in four

groups. The first group, high public employment, includes the eight provinces with larger shares of public

employment, above 55 employees. The second group, medium-high public employment, includes the 6 provinces

between 45 and 55 employees. The third group, medium-Low public employment is formed by 5 provinces having

between 35 and 45 employees. Finally, the five remaining provinces, with less than 35 employees each, compound

the fourth category, low public employment. It is noteworthy that, regardless very small nuances, during the whole

registered period (1987-2004) provinces kept same positions in the ranking.

Levels of political alternation are labelled as: None = 0; Low = 1; Medium = 2; and High = 3.

Levels of ruling party memberships are determined by the percentage of ruling party members with regard

to the registered voters of the province. Also here provinces were classified into four groups. Three provinces stand

out from all the rest, by having over 26% of voters affiliated to the ruling party. A second group, medium-high

membership, is composed by nine provinces with similar shares, between 21 and 26 percent. Four provinces are

included in the third group, having between 15 and 21 percent of membership. Finally, nine provinces, with scores

below 15 percent, were classified as low ruling party membership. The figures of ruling party membership taken

into account are those from 1999, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it was not possible to collect more

recent and reliable data across all the provinces. Second, one of the goals of this study consists in examining how

provinces with high shares of patronage at the moment of the 2001 crisis managed to remain more stable than the

others. Thirdly, in 1999 20 of the 24 provinces were ruled by a party going by – at least- its second tenure. Finally, it

is to be noted that, although variable in absolute terms, provinces remain highly constant in the ranking of ruling

party membership from the period of which we have data, 1987-1999. Of course, this study would be much more

valuable counting with more complete and updated data. By the moment I consider it still may be useful to pose

some ideas on how to contemplate the relationship between patronage, public employment, party membership and

votes in Argentina.

Finally, provinces were classified as highly patronage-oriented, medium patronage-oriented, and lowly

patronage-oriented, according to the following criteria. Those provinces having high and medium high levels of

public employment and, at the same time, high or medium high levels of party membership – thus occupying the

four top-left squares were classified as highly patronage-oriented. Provinces with medium-low levels of

employment and high and medium-high levels of membership were classified as medium patronage-oriented.

Lastly, those provinces with low levels of public employment, regardless their shares of membership, and with

medium-low and low membership, regardless their shares of public employment, were classified as lowly

patronage-oriented.

23

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26

TABLES

TABLE 1: Presidential Elections, 1983-2003

1983-1999

Party

Election Year

PJ UCR Main Third Party

1983 40.2 51.9 2.3 PI

1989 47.3 32.4 6.3 UCD

1995 49.8 17.1 29.2 Frepaso

1999 38.1 48.5* 10.1 APR

* Alianza UCR + Frepaso

2003

Candidate Party % of Valid Vote Carlos Menem PJ 24.5

Néstor Kirchner PJ 22.2

R. López Murphy Federal Recreate Movement (Centre-right) 16.4

A. Rodríguez Saá PJ 14.1

Elisa Carrió Alternative for a Republic of Equals (Centre-left) 14.1

Leopoldo Moreau UCR 2.3

Patricia Walsh United Left 1.7

Others 4.7

27

TABLE 2: PJ and UCR. Votes and Institutional Power, 1983-2005

2.A. PJ and UCR vote. Elections for the National Chamber of Deputies. 1983-2005.

PJ UCR PJ + UCR Main Third Party

1983 38.35 47.83 86.18 2.77 (PI)

1985 34.87** 43.58 78.35 6.07 (PI)

1987 41.46** 37,24 78.70 5.80 (UCD)

1989 44.83 28.75 73.58 9.92 (UCD)

1991 40.72 29.02 69.74 5.29 (UCD)

1993 42.46 30.23 72.69 5.78 (Modín)

1995 43.03 21.70 64.73 20.69 (Frepaso)

1997 36.27 36.26* 72.53 3.87 (APR)

1999 33.70 43.56* 77.26 7.60 (APR)

2001 37.40 23.10 60.50 7.20 (ARI)

2003 42.55** 14.07 56.62 5.02 (ARI)

2005 48.4** 15.2 62.6 7.7 (ARI)

* ALIANZA, coalition between UCR and Frepaso for elections from 1997 to 2001. ** The PJ contested through more than one list in some districts

2. B. PJ and UCR institutional power. Governors, Senators and Deputies.

2. B. a. Seats in the Chamber of Deputies

PJ UCR PJ + UCR

1983-1985 43.7 50.8 94.5

1993-1995 49.4 32.7 82.1

1999-2001 38.5 31.9 70.4

2001-2003 47.1 25.3 72.4

2003-2005 54.9 17.9 82.8

2005-2007 60.7 15.9 76.6

28

2. B. b. Seats in the Chamber of Senators

PJ UCR PJ + UCR Provincial Parties Others

1983-1986 45.7 39.1 84.8 15.2

1992-1995 64.6 20.8 85.4 14.6

2001-2003 57.1 32.9 90. 8.6 1.4

2003-2005 57.8 28.2 86. 9.9 4.2

2005-2007 61.1 23.6 84.7 8.3 6.9

2. B. c. Governorships

PJ UCR PJ + UCR Provincial party Others

1983-1987 54.6 31.8 86.4 13.6

1987-1991 77.3 9.1 86.4 13.6

1991-1995 60.9 17.4 78.3 21.7

1995-1999 58.3 25. 83.3 16.7

1999-2003 58.3 29.2 87.5 8.3 4.2

2003-2007 66.7 25. 91.7 4.2 4.2

TABLE 3: Alternation at National and Provincial level. 1987-2005

Total Number* % of Alternation

Presidential Elections 4 75%

Governorship Elections 116 26.7%

*The inaugural 1983 elections are, for obvious reasons, not included.

TABLE 4: National and provincial public sectors

1989 1994 2004 National Public Sector 874.182

(44.4%) 190.414 (14.7%)

457.853 (24.8%)

Provincial Public Sector 1.093.651 (55.5%)

1.102.732 (85.2%)

1.381.918 (75.1%)

Total 1.967.833 1.293.416 1.839.771

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TABLE 5: Party membership in government and opposition. PJ and UCR. 1987-1999.

PJ UCR Province Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Buenos Aires 1987-1999

+ 14.7% 1987-1999

+ 95.2% Capital Federal

1996-1999 - 20.2%

1996-2000 - 4.4%

Catamarca 1987-1991 + 20.5%

1991-1999 - 11.1%

1991-1999 + 91.4%

1987-1991 - 20.8%

Chaco 1987-1991 + 17%

1991-1999 + 6.7%

1995-1999 + 3.3%

1987-1995 -13.3%

Chubut 1987-1991 + 72.8%

1991-1999 -13%

1991-1999 - 2.7%

1987-1991 - 26.2%

Córdoba 1987-1999 + 6.2%

1987-1999 + 85.4%

Corrientes 1987-1999 - 26.6%

1987-1999 - 3.7%

Entre Ríos 1987-1999 + 103.1%

1987-1999 + 35.0%

Formosa 1987-1999 + 24.7%

1987-1999 + 11.8%

Jujuy 1987-1999 + 50.5%

1987-1999 + 49.6%

La Pampa 1987-1999 + 54.8%

1987-1999 + 28.9%

La Rioja 1987-1999 + 68%

1987-1999 +53.8

Mendoza 1987-1995 -17.9%

1995-1999 - 5%

1995-1999 - 4.3%

1987-1995 + 21.8%

Misiones

1987-1999 + 63.8%

1987-1999 + 25.,0%

Neuquén 1987-1999 + 163.9%

1987-1999 - 34.8%

Río Negro 1987-1999 + 15.1%

1987-1999 + 49.9%

Salta 1987-1991 + 18%

1991-1995 + 10.7%

1995-1999 + 0.7%

1987-1999 - 26.8%

San Juan 1991-1999 + 27.9%

1987-1991 + 27.4%

1987-1999 - 22.7%

San Luis 1987-1999 + 40.4%

1987-1999 + 9.0%

Santa Cruz 1987-1999 + 55.9%

1987-1999 + 10.5%

Santa Fe 1987-1999 - 13.1%

1987-1999 + 30.2%

Santiago del Estero

1987-1999 - 12.8

1987-1999 - 36.8

Tierra del Fuego

1991-1999 + 76.6

1991-1999 - 8.2%

Tucumán 1987-1995 - 11.5%

1995-1999 + 13.86%

1987-1999 - 38.0%

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TABLE 8: Deputies and Senators: 1983, 1993, 2005. Patronage and non patronage provinces. 6. 1. Percentage of Seats in the Chamber of Deputies obtained by PJ and UCR in High and Low Patronage-oriented provinces. 1983, 1993, 2005.

1983 PJ UCR PJ + UCR Provincial Others High Patronage provinces 48.8 41.4 90.2 9.8 - Low Patronage provinces 43.6 54 97.7 - 2.4 Total of the Country 43.6 50.8 94.5 3.1 2.4

1993 PJ UCR PJ + UCR Provincial Others High Patronage provinces 48.8 39. 87.8 12.2 - Low Patronage provinces 49.4 31.9 81.3 7.2 11.5 Total of the Country 49.4 32.7 82.1 9.3 8.6

2005 PJ UCR PJ + UCR Provincial Others High Patronage provinces 73.1 17 90.2 9.7 - Non Patronage provinces 59. 12.9 71.9 3.2 24.6 Total of the Country 60.7 15.9 76.6 6.6 14.8

6. 2. Percentage of Seats in the Chamber of Senators obtained by PJ and UCR in High and Low Patronage-oriented provinces. 1983, 1993, 2005.

1983 PJ UCR UCR + PJ Provincial Others High Patronage provinces 68.7 6.2 74.9 18.8 6.2 Low Patronage provinces 37.5 62.5 100. - - Total of the Country 45.7 39.1 84.8 15.2

1993 PJ UCR UCR + PJ Provincial Others High Patronage provinces 81.2 6.2 87.3 12.5 - Low Patronage provinces 62.5 37.5 100. - - Total of the Country 64.6 20.8 85.4 14.6

2005 PJ UCR UCR + PJ Provincial Others High Patronage provinces 66.6 25 91.6 8.3 Low Patronage provinces 66.6 8.3 74.9 12.5 12.5 Total of the Country 61.1 23.6 84.7 8.3 6.9

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TABLE 9: Electoral Results in High and Low Patronage provinces: 2003 and 2005.

High Patronage

2003 2005

Province PJ UCR Main third party

PJ UCR Main third party

La Rioja 65.4 30.4 2.4 91.5* 5.4 2.5 Santa Cruz

74.6 20.6 2.6 57.9 27.5 7.4

Formosa 71.9 24.4 1.8 59.4 28.3 6.2

Catamarca 37.1 54. 1.8 62.8 33.1 1.6

La Pampa 67.9* 26.4 1.8 34.9 31.2 13.9

Neuquén 13.1 3.3 45.1 35.2** 49.3(MPN)

Jujuy 56.7 33. 2.2 IU 47. 31.3 9

San Luis 71.1 12. 10.6 82.6* 7.3 3

Low Patronage

2003 2005

PJ UCR Main third party

PJ UCR Main third party

Córdoba 33.3 17.6 26.3 37.9 18.5 24.8 Santa Fe 51.6 32.6 *** 33.1 42.8 *** Ciudad - 3.3 35.3 20.3 2.2 33.9 Mendoza 35.9 35.6 9.8 21.4 32.4 12.8 Pcia Bs As 40.1 9.8 10.5 65.7* 7.9 8.5 Misiones 83.1* 14.2 1.7 73.4* 11.2 7.2 Tucumán 21.2 17 29.7 63.8 4.6 8.4 Salta 48.6 16.5 23.2 47 8.1 23.6

* PJ contests with two or three different lists ** Alliance PJ + UCR *** UCR participates in an alliance with PS, being clearly the minor part.

32

TABLE 10: Provincial Public Employment and Ruling Party Membership. % of the total voters in highly and lowly patronage-oriented provinces. 1999. High Patronage Public Employment Ruling Party Membership Catamarca 11.5 21.8 (UCR)

Formosa 12.1 23.2 (PJ)

Jujuy 8.4 22.2 (PJ)

La Pampa 8.3 24.2 (PJ)

La Rioja 13.7 34.7 (PJ)

Neuquén 12.8 27.3 (MPN)

San Luis 7.3 21.8 (PJ)

Santa Cruz 15.7 23.2 (PJ)

Average 11.2 24.8

Low Patronage Public Employment Ruling Party Membership Buenos Aires 4.5 14.7 (PJ)

Federal Capital* 4.5 8.5 (UCR)

Córdoba 3.4 16.2 (UCR)

Mendoza 5.9 10.5 (PJ)

Misiones 6.6 17.4 (PJ)

Santa Fe 4.7 12.4 (PJ)

Tucumán 5.6 20.1 (PJ)

Average 5 14.2

* The Federal Capital had its first elected mayor in 1996.

Sources: http://www.diputados.gov.ar, http://www.senado.gov.ar, http://www.guiaelectoral.com.ar, Calvo and Escolar (2005), Jones (2004), and http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/10/24/elpais/p-00401.htm