ProtoDUNE Side Penetration Introduction · B110069_ V 10_ SIL-R eport_ Pruss AG_ Han nover_ PPA...

Long-Baseline Neutrino FacilityLBNF

ProtoDUNE Side Penetration

Introduction

David Montanari

LBNF/SBN Cryo Panels Meeting

7-8 December 2016

LBNF

Outline

12.07.16 David Montanari | LBNF/SBN Cryo Safety Panels Meeting2

• Introduction

• Views of cryostat with inline safety valve

• Inline safety valve 2D Drawing

• Actuator SIL rating

• Draft of risk mitigation strategies

• Summary

LBNF

Introduction


• LBNF plans to use below the liquid level side penetrations in its cryostats with

inline safety isolation valves and secondary shut-off valves.

• As engineering and physics prototype, ProtoDUNE plans to prototype as many

features as possible of the future LBNF/DUNE project.

• ProtoDUNE Single Phase (SP or NP-04) and Dual Phase (DP or NP-02) each

has one below liquid level side penetration for LAr circulation with the same

inline safety isolation valve that is planned for LBNF.

• From this point of view the cryostats are identical. Only ProtoDUNE SP is

presented. ProtoDUNE DP uses an identical configuration.

• LBNF identified a cryogenic safety valve where the actual valve seal is inside

the tank/cryostat. This type of safety valve is used on flammable liquids (LNG)

and other cryogenic installations (e.g. ASUs), but also petrochem plants.

• The layout has been developed with GTT and CERN to meet their

requirements (e.g. minimize the load transferred to the GTT membrane and

Triplex). It is expected to be the same for LBNF.

• The current design has been approved by GTT.

LBNF

Protego inline safety valve specs


• Fail safe close.

• Pneumatic actuator (SIL 2 rated) to keep it open under normal

conditions.

• T_des = 77 K

• P_des = 2.1 bara (compatible with the LBNF installation)

• Design code: AD2000.

• PED certification.

• LOx cleaning.

• Leak check on Pressure and Vacuum retaining components.

• Dielectric breaks on the feet per ProtoDUNE specs (< 10 pF).

• Dielectric break on the discharge pipe inside LAr pump valve box.

LBNF

3D view of NP-04 cryostat with inline safety valve


LBNF

3D view of NP-04 cryostat with inline safety valve – Detail


LBNF

Section view of inline safety valve in NP-04 cryostat


Steel Support Structure

Insulation

Primary Membrane

Protego Inline Safety Valve

Valve Actuator Valve Body

Detector

Internal Piping

LAr



Insulation Detector


Primary Membrane

Internal Piping

LBNF

3D view of inline safety valve in NP-04 cryostat with valve box


Secondary isolation valve


LBNF12.07.16 David Montanari | LBNF/SBN Cryo Safety Panels Meeting9

10 mm SS plateTriplex1.2 mm membrane

LAr

Dielectric breaks

LBNF

Actuator SIL rating certification


B110069_V10_SIL-Report_Pruss AG_Hannover_PPA Seite 8 von 16

INGENIEURBÜRO URBAN – Dipl.-Ing. J. Urban Öffentl. Bestellung u. Vereidigung Zeichen für Sachverstand Unabhängigkeit Unparteilichkeit

Publicly certified The mark of quality in the expert profession Independence Impartiality Certificatión pública Señal de competencia Independencia Imparcialidad

© Ingenieurbüro Urban

Set of Components/Component Safety Data (acc. IEC 61508 and IEC 61511)

Set of Components/Component Pneumatic Diaphragm Actuator

Type PPA - N & U

Manufacturer Waldemar Pruss Armaturenfabrik GmbH

Component Type Type A Ref. IEC 61508-2

Mode of Operation Low demand operation

Safety Function Drive closing/opening in specified time

Safe State Drive in end position, fixed with defined force

Failure Rates [failure/109 hrs = FIT]

Failure Rate Distribution total safe dangerous detected dangerous undetected don’t care SFF [%]

SUM PPA - N & U

(with 6x Springs, no Diagnosis) 1,517 1,465 0 51 7 97

SUM PPA - N & U

(with 18x Springs, no Diagnosis) 8,288 8,081 0 207 7 98

Specification of component Architecture

Architecture 1oo1 1oo1 is the architecture of a single set of components/component of the analysed type.

Hardware Fault Tolerance

HFT 0

Due to HFT=0, one failure has impact on the safety function. The influence of HFT on SIL

capability is respected in (2) below.

MTTR [h] 32 MTTR is the time required for repair of the set of components/component in case of failure.

MTTR has marginal influence on the pfd-value.

Diagnostic Coverage DC [%] 0%

In case of missing automatic diagnosis (e.g. partial stroke test): DC = 0 %. In case of

implemented partial stroke test: DC > 0% (value depends on efficiency of partial stroke test). Safe

Failure Fraction SFF increased by higher DC. Influence of DC on SIL capability of the set of

components/component is respected in (2) below (via SFF).

PPA –N with 6x Springs - Verification of SIL Capability (examples) (see comments on next page/backside of this page)

Proof Test Intervall 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years

PFD (avg.) (IEC 61508-6, B3.2.2; λdu from FMEDA) 1.13 E-04 2.25 E-04 4.48 E-04 6.72 E-04 1.19 E-03

(1) quantitative achievable SIL (IEC 61508-1, Tab. 2) SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 2

(2) qualitative achievable SIL (IEC 61508-2, Tab. 2) SIL 3 (for HFT 0; Typ A;90% SFF 0% (value depends on efficiency of partial stroke test). Safe

Failure Fraction SFF increased by higher DC. Influence of DC on SIL capability of the set of

components/component is respected in (2) below (via SFF).

PPA –N with 6x Springs - Verification of SIL Capability (examples) (see comments on next page/backside of this page)

Proof Test Intervall 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years

PFD (avg.) (IEC 61508-6, B3.2.2; λdu from FMEDA) 8.49 E-05 1.68 E-04 3.35 E-04 5.01 E-04 8.34 E-04

(1) quantitative achievable SIL (IEC 61508-1, Tab. 2) SIL 4 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3 SIL 3

(2) qualitative achievable SIL (IEC 61508-2, Tab. 2) SIL 3 (for HFT 0; Typ A;90% SFF

LBNF

Protego references 2008-2014 – 1/3


CONFIDENTIAL

LBNF



CONFIDENTIAL

LBNF



CONFIDENTIAL

- Mainly LNG tanks, but also ASUs and petrochem.

- Sizes up to 10,000 m3 and 150,000 m3/hr.

- 71 NB/AP (Bottom drain).- 9 SI/DP (Side penetration).

LBNF

Draft Mitigation Strategies


• Isolation valve (Protego, inline safety valve, seal inside the cryostat).

• Secondary Isolation Valve (inline shutoff valve downstream of the Protego).

• Engineering of integrated cryostat-inline valve system. See talk “Side penetration integrated

design (Protego, GTT, CERN)”.

• Risk analysis of integrated cryostat-inline valve system.

• Protection from accidental hits (bracing/etc. around sensitive parts, crane restriction).

• SIL 2 rated actuator connected to SIL 3 rated safety PLC.

• Early detection of equipment failure (with vacuum gauges in vacuum jackets of transfer lines).

• Restricted access to the pit(s) or cryostat floor level (controlled access with work permits).

• Oxygen sensors (in the pits) and ODH alarms (in the pits and in the hall).

• Information signs and training of personnel.

• Emergency ventilation (suction points nearby the side penetration. Fans sized for the most

credible leak scenario).

• Evacuation plan (in case of ODH alarm).

• Two means of egress.

Details in the contribution “Overall ProtoDUNE Risk Mitigation Plan” from Olga B.

LBNF

Summary


• The construction of the ProtoDUNEs cryostats is in progress.

• Each one will have a below liquid level side penetration equipped with an inline

safety valve (with the seal inside the cryostat), which is fail safe close, and an inline

shut-off valve (before the connection to the LAr circulation pumps).

• The inline safety valve is a standard device from Protego (SI/DP 150). The

connection to the cryostat is tank-specific and it has no impact on the functionality

of the valve. The design has been done according to GTT requirements and

approved by GTT.

• A draft of the risk mitigation strategies has been presented and will be detailed in

Olga’s contribution. It addresses the following topics: engineering of the device,

risk analysis of the integrated system (membrane cryostat-in line safety valve-steel

support structure), physical protection of the device, early detection of equipment

failures, access restriction to pit level, Oxygen sensors and ODH alarms,

emergency ventilation, evacuation and egress.

• We believe that the system as designed and the proposed risk mitigation strategies

provide an adequate level of safety and we look forward to your feedback.

LBNF

Thanks


LBNF

Backup slides


LBNF

NP-02 Cryogenics



Insulation

Primary Membrane



Detector

Internal Piping

LAr

LAr Filters

LAr circulation pumps

Condenser

LAr Phase separator

LN2 Phase separator

LAr storage tank(NP-02/NP-04)

LN2 storage tank(NP-02/NP-04)

LAr Filters Regeneration(NP-02/NP-04)

LBNF

NP-04 Cryogenics



Insulation

Primary Membrane



Detector

Internal Piping

LAr

LAr Filters

LAr circulation pumps

Condenser

LAr Phase separator

LN2 Phase separator

LBNF

NP-02 and NP-04 Cryogenics



Insulation

Primary Membrane



Detector

Internal Piping

LAr

LBNF

LBNF Mezzanine


LBNF

LBNF LAr circulation pumps


LBNF

LBNF LAr/GAr Filtration systems (in Central Utility Cavern)


LAr/GAr Filters

LAr/GAr Filters

Particulate filters

Regen blowers

Particulate filters

H2 generators

H2 generators

PLC racks in situ

LN2 Cold Boxes

Detectors #1, 2

Detectors #3, 4

LBNF

Brief Description of the LAr Purification System


• We use LAr filters filled with Mol Sieve and Copper pellets to purify the LAr from Water and Oxygen.

The Mol Sieve adsorbs Water and the Copper pellets adsorb Oxygen. Inline particulate filters

upstream of the LAr filters prevent particles that might be present in the LAr to enter the LAr filters.

• After being exposed to air, the Mol Sieve and Copper pellets inside the LAr filters are saturated and

need to be activated with high Temperature (~220-240 C) and H2 prior to being put in service.

• With the high temperature the Mol Sieve releases the trapped Water. The Oxygen trapped inside the

Copper reacts with the H2 (at high T) and creates Water, which is then released. A simplified

activation/regeneration procedure follows:

- The LAr filters are pre-heated with Argon at ~180 C.

- An Ar-H2 mix (2.5% H2 or less) is heated up to 180 C and sent through the LAr filters.

- As the H2 reacts with the Copper, a heat wave is observed through the bed. The temperature locally increases to

~220-240 C. The process continues until the heat wave passes through and the dew point observed at the outlet is

about -40 C. The water content at the outlet is also measured and should be in a trend going down.

- Hot Argon gas is flow into the system to remove all H2, followed by cool Argon to lower the Temperature.

- The cool down process can be accelerated by pumping down the LAr filters.

• The same process needs to be repeated after several months of service (how many depends on the

initial purity of the LAr) to remove the Water and Oxygen that the LAr filters adsorbed from the LAr.

The process in this case is called regeneration, because the Mol Sieve and Copper only contain the

Water and Oxygen removed from the LAr, they are not saturated with air as at the beginning.

• To be able to continuously purify the LAr, there are two set of LAr filters, one in operation and one in

standby/regeneration.

ProtoDUNE Side Penetration Introduction · B110069_ V 10_ SIL-R eport_ Pruss AG_ Han nover_ PPA...

Documents

Transcript of ProtoDUNE Side Penetration Introduction · B110069_ V 10_ SIL-R eport_ Pruss AG_ Han nover_ PPA...