Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC Regarding Defense Of

8/4/2019 Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC Regarding Defense Of

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Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC regarding Defense of

Formosa

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v14p1&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254

v14p1.p0190&q1=chinese

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No. 85

611.93/3-2553

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern

Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State 1

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 25, 1953.

Subject: Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC regarding Defense of

Formosa 2

There is attached a draft directive to CINCPAC (Admiral Rad-

ford) from the JCS which authorizes basing patrol and reconnais-

sance aircraft on Formosa (they are now operating from Okinawa

and a tender in the Pescadores); establishing necessary facilities on

Formosa to permit the prompt basing of jet combat aircraft in the

event of an emergency (no combat aircraft are to be stationed there

without prior JCS authorization or an emergency which in the

judgment of CINCPAC is so great as to not permit of any delay);

stationing U.S. personnel at such U.S. installations to guard sup-

plies and otherwise to maintain the internal security of the instal-

lations.

The directive also provides that CINCPAC will coordinate with

the Chinese Nationalist Government plans for the defense of For-

mosa and the Pescadores against invasion or attack, such defenseto be by CINCPAC forces in coordination with Chinese Nationalist

forces. It also provides that CINCPAC will develop and coordinate

with the Chinese Nationalist Government plans for the offensive

participation of Chinese Nationalist forces. Combined training ex-

ercises of U.S. and Chinese Nationalist forces are also authorized.

CINCPAC is also to discuss with the Chinese, command relation-

ships with the view to obtaining at least tacit agreement to U.S.

command of combined forces in an emergency. In the event of air

I Sent through Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, who initialed it.


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2 The draft directive described here was not attached to the source

text;

a copy is

in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "China 1952-1953". Except for minortextual changes for

purposes of transmission and one substantive change, it was

identical to

JCS tele-

gram 935782, Document 90. The only substantive change was the

addition of

the

second sentence in paragraph 3.a.(6). Copies of the draft directive

were

given to De-

partment of State representatives at a State-JCS meeting on Mar. 6,

according

to a

memorandum of discussion of the meeting. (State-JCS Meetings, lot

61 D 417)

162

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

or sea attack against U.S. forces they will take immediate and ag-

gressive self-defense measures, but retaliatory action against tar-

gets on the Chinese mainland will be taken only with the approval

of the JCS. U.S. forces will not participate in the defense of other

Chinese Nationalist held islands unless Formosa or the Pescadores

are also attacked.From a military point of view, this directive is a logical and es-

sential step to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

The directive is well drawn up so as to minimize the cost to the

U.S. and the number of U.S. personnel required for the implemen-

tation of these measures. Coordinated planning for the offensive

use of Chinese Nationalist forces is also logical if the Chinese Na-

tionalist potential for action against the Chinese Mainland is to be

of maximum effectiveness in the event that a situation arises in

which the U.S. determines it should be utilized.


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It would also be useful to the U.S. to know what offensive oper-

ations the Chinese Nationalists are proposing or carrying out and

to be in a position to exercise influence over such operations. How-

ever, there are obvious problems in U.S. association, if only inplanning with Chinese Nationalist operations against the mainland

that may not fit in with U.S. planning. We believe that this portion

of the directive should be clarified to whatever extent may be possi-

ble and practicable, and plan to discuss this with the JCS.

Implementation of the Directive must of course be preceded by

discussions with the Chinese Nationalists and their agreement to

the measures necessary for the basing of patrol and reconnaissance

aircraft on Formosa and the stand-by facilities for combat aircraft.

The timing of both the discussions with the Chinese Nationalist

Government and of the implementation of various measures au-

thorized by the directive also need consideration and will be dis-

cussed with the JSC.

Recommendation:

Subject to the foregoing, it is recommended that you approve in

principle this draft directive to CINCPAC.

163

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Revision of CINCPAC Orders

General Bradley: We wanted to discuss the question of changing

CINCPAC's orders about Formosa. As of now, he does base a few

reconnaissance planes in the Pescadores, but none on Formosa.

Now that his mission has become a little more touchy than it was

before, we thought that some extra steps were called for.Admiral Fechteler: We propose under these draft instructions 2

to permit him to base patrol and reconnaissance aircraft on Formo-

sa and to undertake development of those installations which

would permit him to base other planes on Formosa in case of emer-

gency. We propose to give him authority to install communications

against an emergency. Further, the draft directive would give him

authority to conduct reconnaissance over all Chinese coastal areas.

As of now, he is limited on the south to Hong Kong. It calls for

authority for him to talk to Chinese Nationalists on plans for the


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defense of Formosa and to participate in combined training as nec-

essary. It would give him authority in event of an attack to base

other aircraft on Formosa and to augment other American person-

nel, with the exception of ground forces. It also gives him authorityto pre-stock materials and equipment which might be necessary in

an emergency.

General Vandenberg: I would like to raise the general question

as to whether we are completely clear on what we may be getting

into. As I understand it, we are getting ready, unilaterally, since

this is a purely U.S. undertaking, to protect Formosa. If the Chi-

nese Communists should mount an air attack on Formosa, we

would counter it. This would undoubtedly involve attacks on the

mainland. Given the Sino-Russian agreement, 3 there would be

every possibility that Russia would assist the Chinese Communists.

In that case, we would be really getting into a war with the

U.S.S.R. and China all by ourselves. It seems to me that if that is

the policy, everybody involved should clearly recognize the implica-

tions.

General Bradley: When we acted on this paper, we acted on the

basis that Radford already had instructions to defend Formosa, but

that he had no collateral instructions as to how to carry out this

defense.

General Vandenberg: I am not disagreeing with the directive. I

agree with the paper completely. The only thing is that I think ev-

erybody should be clear as to what the possible implications are. As

I see it, we have to realize that Chiang Kai-shek is a strong-headed

sort of person. He is going to have planes with which he can, if he

wants to, attack the Communist mainland. If he does, and if thereare Communist attacks in retaliation, I think we should fully un-

derstand the kind of flypaper that we are stuck on.

3 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Feb. 14, 1950; see footnote f, Document

50.

165

General Vandenberg: I guess my real question is as to whether

the Secretary of State has been fully advised from the purely mili-

tary point of view what the ramifications and implications of our


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position are with respect to Formosa. It seems to me that the

change of mission of the 7th Fleet was addressed primarily to a

cold war effect. I am not questioning the decision in any way, but I

do think that the Secretary of State should be fully advised on themilitary implications of the decision.

Mr. Nitze: There really are a series of questions. The first is, are

we prepared to defend Formosa against an unprovoked Communist

attack? This question we really settled two years ago when the 7th

Fleet was given its original mission. The second question is, wheth-

4 The quotation is inaccurate; section 4.b of the draft directive was

identical

to

section 4.b of JCS telegram 935782, Document 90.

166

er we are prepared to defend Formosa against Chinese Communist

attack if the attack is in response to Chinese Nationalist action.

This is the question on which I don't think as yet we have a firm

decision. The third question is the degree to which we should co-

ordinate planning with the Chinese Nationalists.

General Vandenberg: I wouldn't worry about the third question

if the implications of the second question were clearly evident in

the minds of the Secretary of State and the President.

Admiral Fechteler: I think we do have some control over Chiang

Kai-shek by reason of the paucity of his capabilities.

General Bandenberg: He is getting fighters now that he can use

if he wants to.

General Bradley: He could bomb the Chinese coast and thatmight well bring Communist retaliation. I am inclined to share

Collins' worry about joint offensive planning.

Mr. Nitze: Would Collins' point be met if we omitted reference to

4, b in paragraph 3?

General Collins: I think that would take care of it. Radford obvi-

ously has to coordinate with the Chinese Nationalists to carry out

a defensive mission.

Mr. Allison: There is, however, some language I believe in 48/5 5

which calls for the U.S. itself to prepare plans for possible use of


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the Chinese Nationalist forces.

Mr. Gleason: There is a new Formosa paper 6 now being worked

on in the Planning Board 7 which, as I remember, repeats some

such language. 85 For text of NSC 48/5, "United States Objectives, Policies and

Courses

of Action

in Asia", May 17, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. VI, Part 1,

p. 33.

6 Reference is to NSC 146, "United States Objectives and Courses

of

Action With

Respect to Formosa and the National Government of China," Mar.

27, 1953,

a paper

prepared by the NSC Planning Board. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351,

NSC 146

Series)

The statement of policy in NSC 146/2, Document 150, is a revised

version

of NSC

146.

7 The NSC Planning Board, created in March 1953, had assumed

the functions

formerly performed by the NSC Senior Staff. The Planning Board

consisted

of the

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,

chairman,and rep-

resentatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense;

the Office

of De-

fense Mobilization; and the Office of the Special Assistant to the

President

on Disar-

mament.

8 Paragraph 13 of NSC 146 reads as follows: "Enter into a program


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of coordinated

military planning with the Chinese National Government designed to

achieve

maxi-mum cooperation from the Nationalists in furtherance of over-all

U.S. military

strategy in the Far East." A memorandum of Apr. 6 by Lay to the

National

Security

Council, incorporated into the copy of NSC 146 cited above,

requested that

the para-

graph be revised, as agreed by the Planning Board, by deleting the

words

"in the

Far East" and adding the following sentence: "In undertaking such

a program of

coordinated military planning, secure a commitment that Chinese

National

Forces

will not engage in offensive operations considered by the United

States to

be inimi-

cal to the best interest of the United States."

General Bradley: I should think we could present them in con-

nection with the April 8 meeting, 9 or the Chiefs could comment on

the new Formosa paper.

9 NSC 146 was scheduled for discussion at the Apr. 8 meeting of theNational

Se-

curity Council; see the memorandum of discussion, Document 93.

168

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Chinese Nationalist Government as reflected in the attached

memorandum. As you know, Chiang Kai-shek will be very unhappy


8/12

if an armistice is achieved in Korea: he wants to broaden the con-

flict, not end it. He may well be tempted to undertake some adven-

tures with his F-84's either with or without a deliberate intention

of involving the US in a broader war with Communist China.I think we should study possible ways to prevent this happen-

ing. 2

2 Secretary Dulles replied in a personally drafted memorandum of

Apr. 4,

filed

with the Matthews and Stelle memoranda, which reads:

"I have your memorandum of March 31 with reference to the worries

of

the JCS

arising from the delivery of US F-84 Aircraft to Formosa. I share

these worries.

I

understand we are attempting to get an agreement with Chiang Kai-

shek that

he

will not use the new equipment we give him against the China

mainland without

our prior consent. I consider this of the utmost importance, and I

believe

that the

Defense Department should suspend any deliveries of aircraft

capable of attacking

the mainland until we get the political agreement we want.

"General Smith mentioned this same topic to me and I expressed to

himthe same

views."

http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?

type=turn&id=FRUS.FRUS195254v14p1&entity=FRUS.FRUS195254

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Ambassador Koo said that the reference in the U.S. draft note 3


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to "disposition of forces" was giving some difficulty to the Chinese

Government. Joint control over "disposition of forces" between

For-

mosa and the off-shore islands had not been proposed in the earlierstages of the negotiations.

Mr. Robertson said that we were concerned with the disposition

of forces which might be involved in offensive actions over which

we had no control. If the lack of provision for any Chinese control

over U.S. forces on Okinawa created a problem for the Chinese

Government, we would be willing to eliminate all reference to the

U.S. islands of the West Pacific in the Treaty. We thought that rec-

iprocity was established; it was a mutual defense pact and mutual

meant reciprocal. Free China benefited from all the efforts of the

U.S. to defend the Free World. Formosa was involved in unresolved

civil strife and was in imminent and constant danger of attack.

The situation was different from that in other countries covered by

defense pacts. The arrangements needed to be somewhat different.

Ambassador Koo said he had received a telegram from the Gen-

eralissimo on the night of November 11. Apparently the Generalis-

simo did not object to a U.S. veto on the use of Chinese Nationalist

armed forces, but he did emphasize that it was essential to use the

same language in reference to U.S. armed forces in the treaty area.

This was necessary in order to satisfy the Chinese people that the

sovereign equality of their Government had been maintained.

Mr. Robertson said that we could not use U.S. forces which

would be stationed on Formosa without Chinese consent any more

than the Chinese could use their forces without U.S. concurrence.

There was reciprocity. In order to make the treaty more responsive

to the needs of the situation and the wishes of the Chinese Govern-ment, the U.S. was volunteering to make a change in Article V,

substituting "an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed

against the territories of either of the parties" for "armed

attack . . . on the territories.... )' 4This would broaden the provi-

sions of the article by making it clear that a Communist attack on

territory other than Formosa was covered if such an attack ap-

peared to be eventually aimed at Formosa and the Pescadores. The

chief difficulty was how to make some provision for the off-shore

islands. This language represents an attempt to give some coverage


10/12

to the off-shore islands and to keep the Communists guessing as to

what U.S. intentions are as to the off-shore islands. The Defense

Department appeared to be willing to accept these broadened provi-

3 The draft note under reference has not been found in Departmentof State

files.

4 Ellipses in the source text.

890

sions. But its reaction to the latest Chinese proposal would be an-

other matter.

Ambassador Koo said the Generalissimo had no intention of veto-

ing the use of U.S. forces on Okinawa and Guam. He merely

wanted the reciprocal provisions for appearance's sake in order to

forestall the wave of discontent, despair and criticism which would

come from a unilateral restriction against Nationalist China. Am-

bassador Koo thought at the very least the reference in the U.S.

draft note to "military dispositions" could be eliminated.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that we would be involved with the

Chinese in the defense of the treaty area. The U.S. would have

major responsibilities. If nearly all Chinese troops could be moved

to say, Quemoy, leaving few Chinese forces to defend Formosa, the

U.S. in principle might be compelled to bring in U.S. infantry to

defend Formosa. Such a necessity of course should never arise, and

even though the possibility was remote, it seemed appropriate for

the treaty to recognize the vital interest of the U.S. in the disposi-

tion of Chinese forces in an area for the defense of which we have

joint responsibilities. The Treaty should realistically cover all con-

tingencies so far as possible, even if they were remote. The ChineseNationalist military strength was small compared to that of the

Chinese Communists. Both the U.S. and Chinese Governments

should work for the best disposition of available forces to meet the

threat.

Ambassador Koo thought the off-shore islands commanded the

invasion routes from the Mainland to Formosa and greatly de-

creased the danger of attack so long as they were held by the

forces of his Government. Mr. Robertson questioned this, pointing

out that an invasion attempt could bypass the off-shore islands,


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and that the off-shore islands could not eliminate the threat of air

bombing of Formosa.

Ambassador Koo said that his government desired reciprocity

and an elimination of formal U.S. control over Chinese Govern-ment military actions, mainly for political reasons. In practice the

U.S. had ample controls through the presence of the MAAG Mis-

sion on Formosa and control over the supply of practically all the

essentials of war. There were many practical ways in which the

U.S. could restrain the use of Chinese forces. Since any Chinese

Mainland operation without U.S. support in practice was out of the

question, it was unnecessary to invoke diplomatic language for this

purpose.

Mr. Robertson remarked that the matter of military dispositions

was fundamental. Provocative actions could involve the U.S. in

war.

891


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87&q1=struble&q2=chiang

Admiral Struble indicated need and desire return Formosa near

future in order firm up liaison details. Generalissimo recalled that he

took over Formosa as Allied Commander of Chinese theater pending

peace -treaty while General MacArthur took over Japan and other

areas ,as SCAP; now Chinese government was here, but he hoped

despite this fact Struble would not feel he coming to foreign territory

in visiting Formosa. He stated he has special regard for and real

friendship with each US naval commander in Far East; admired Navy

particularly because they always willing come to help of friends inneed.

Call of 40 minutes on Chen Cheng passed in exchange of

pleasantries

only.

'Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble was Commander of the United States

Seventh

Fleet.

'Adm. Charles M. Cooke, U.S. Navy (ret.), former Commander of the

Seventh


12/12

Fleet, was in Formosa in a private capacity; see footnote 4 to

telegram 181,

August 3, from Taipei, p3. 4'13.


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2.p0169&q1=struble&q2=chiang

b. Gimo appeared genuinely perplexed over recent change

command

of 7th Fleet.2 Seemed to feel such change either forerunner or

follow

up of change in US official policy toward Taiwan which might not

be best interests of ChiNats.

Comment: Practically impossible for most Chinese to comprehend

western democratic system of normal rotation and relief, especially

of high ranking officers.

Characteristic of Chinese never relieve a winner.

c. Gimo inquired as to job Maj Gen Chase3 will have on arrival

Taiwan. Also inquired as to relationship of Chase to me as Senior

Military Attache and to Chinese military.

Comment: Though he did not so state, Gimo gave appearance of

thinking Gen Chase might be colming here to assume position

similar

that of late Gen Stilwell 4 as Gimos Chief of Staff with demand and

strong backing of highest level US Govt for Chase take actual control

China's military.

2Vice Adm. Harold M. Martin had replaced Vice Admiral Struble as

Com-

mander, Seventh Fleet, on March 28.3 Maj. Gen. William C. Chase had been appointed Chief of the

newly-established

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa.

4Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U.S. Army

Forces, China-

Burma-India, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,

Supreme

Commander, China Theater, 1942-1944.

Proposed JCS Directive to CINCPAC Regarding Defense Of

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