PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TO PERFORM MANEUVER OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL

ENVIRONMENT WITHIN THE REGION OF INTEREST

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies

by

ANTHONY J. EGAN, MAJ, AUSTRALIAN ARMY B.A., Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria, Australia, 1998

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ii

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Anthony J. Egan Thesis Title: The Recommended Force Structure for the Australian Army to Conduct Maneuver Operations in the Littoral Environment in the Region of Interest Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair LTC Louis A. Dimarco, M.A., M.M.A.S , Member LtCol Colonel Colin G. Magee, M.A. , Member Harold S. Orenstein, Ph.D. Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

iii

ABSTRACT

THE RECOMMENDED FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TO CONDUCT MANEUVER OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION OF INTEREST, by MAJ Anthony J. Egan, 91 pages. At the commencement of the twenty-first century Australia finds itself questioning the employment of its military and once again seeking to define its role in an environment characterized by threats from nonstate actors and the advent of successive coalition wars in the Middle East. The world, and in particular Australia’s region is characterized by areas of complex terrain in which jungle and increasingly urban terrain figure prominently. However, the need to meet the national interests in an operational environment of terrorism and regional threats while performing the dual concepts of Maneuver operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) and control operations doctrine requires a more robust force structure to meet those threats. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the doctrine of MOLE and control operations against a regional threat and to develop force structure recommendations to conduct MOLE in the complex terrain of Australia’s region of interest.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The genesis of this thesis was in Australia whilst acting as a projects officer at

Headquarters 3rd Brigade in Townsville over the period January to June 2003, and

participating in amphibious preparation exercises for the brigade. My special thanks to

my thesis committee who assisted me in refining the content and controlling the flow. To

my chair LTC Lou DiMarco I extend my thanks for his guidance and clear-headed

analysis of my various drafts. To Lieutenant Colonel Colin Magee of the Canadian Army

I offer my thanks for assisting me in refining the scope of the study Thanks also to Dr

Harry Orenstein for guiding me through the necessary pain of redrafting and ensuring the

flow of the argument. I also wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mr Michael Browne

and the other reference and staff of the Combined Arms Research Library whose research

and advice was invaluable. Finally to my wife Edwina, and to my family all of who

sacrificed their time to allow me to complete this study.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............. ii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................iv

ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1

Strategic Framework........................................................................................................1 MOLE Concept................................................................................................................4 Control Operations...........................................................................................................6 Thesis Format ..................................................................................................................7 Literature Review ............................................................................................................8 Research Method. ..........................................................................................................10

CHAPTER 2. REGION OF INTEREST...........................................................................12

Defining Australia’s Region..........................................................................................13 Oceania ......................................................................................................................15

Papua New Guinea.................................................................................................15 Solomon Islands.....................................................................................................19 Fiji..........................................................................................................................21

Southeast Asia............................................................................................................23 Indonesia................................................................................................................24 Philippines .............................................................................................................29 Malaysia.................................................................................................................34

Regional Impacts of Urban Expansion ......................................................................35

CHAPTER 3. GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE AND ARMY TASKING .........................38

Impacts of Defense Update 2003...............................................................................39 Defense Update 2003 and Implications for MOLE ...............................................43

Defence Update 2003 and Shaping Operations .................................................43 Shaping and Flexibility......................................................................................44 Shaping and Mobility.........................................................................................46 Shaping and Readiness ......................................................................................47 Entry from Air and Sea (EAS) and Flexibility ..................................................48 EAS and Mobility ..............................................................................................49 EAS and Readiness............................................................................................50 EAS and Sustainability ......................................................................................51

vi

Decisive Actions and Flexibility........................................................................52 Decisive Action and Mobility............................................................................53 Decisive Action and High Readiness Forces.....................................................55 Transition Actions..............................................................................................57

CHAPTER 4. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM REGIONAL ANALYSIS .....................59

MOLE and Capital Equipment Requirements ...............................................................60 US Navy and US Marines Corps ...............................................................................61 United Kingdom ........................................................................................................65 France.........................................................................................................................68

Outlining Force Structure Determinants ........................................................................70 Command and Control in MOLE ..............................................................................71 Regional Determinants ..............................................................................................72 Indicators from the Wider Region.............................................................................74 Regional Threat Indicators for Force Structure .........................................................75

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....................................79

Conclusions....................................................................................................................79 Force Structure Conclusions ......................................................................................81

Recommendations..........................................................................................................83 Force Structure Recommendations ............................................................................83

Equipment Recommendations .......................................................................................86 Tactical Maneuver Recommendations.......................................................................86 Operational and Strategic Level Maneuver Recommendations ................................88

REFERENCE LIST...........................................................................................................92

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................96

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT .................................97

vii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page Figure 1. MOLE Continuum of Actions ...........................................................................5

Figure 2. Australia’s Region of Interest ..........................................................................14

Figure 3. Papua New Guinea...........................................................................................17

Figure 4. Indonesia..........................................................................................................25

Figure 5. The Philippines ................................................................................................29

Figure 6. MEU(SOC) Wiring Diagram...........................................................................64

Figure 7. Proposed C2 arrangements for MOLE. ...........................................................72

Figure 8. Proposed Light Infantry Brigade Structure......................................................84

Figure 9. Proposed Mechanized BrigadeStructure..........................................................85

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Strategic Framework

At the commencement of the twenty-first century Australia finds itself reassessing

the employment of its military, seeking to define its role, and responding to the threats of

nonstate actors and the advent of coalition style warfare. Over the past forty years

successive Australian governments have provided strategic direction for the military and

focused doctrine and strategic guidance on fighting mid- to high-level intensity

conventional war. Australia’s decisions to deploy its military forces have been based on a

criterion of either “Forward Defence” or “Defence of Australia.” Australia’s recent

successful contributions to coalition operations in the Middle East and the South East

Asian region have been motivated by a more difficult to define criterion, namely, “the

Defense of Australia’s Interests.”

Clearly Australia has a desire to participate on the international stage, and the

recent defense document, Defence 2000 (D2000): Our Future Defence Force, articulates

the government’s desire to “sustain a brigade deployed on operations while maintaining

at least a battalion group available for deployment elsewhere” (Australian Government

2000, xiv). The same document outlined Australia’s national interests in the form of

Australia’s strategic interests, objectives and priorities. It is prudent to take a moment to

consider these priorities in view of recent changes within the global security

environment. The government listed its interests and objectives in priority order as

follows: “Ensure the defence of Australia and its direct approaches, foster the security of

our immediate neighborhood, promote stability and cooperation in southeast Asia,

2

support strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region, and support global security”

(Australian Government 2000, 30). While the impact of the attacks on 11 September

2001 in the United States and 12 October 2002 in Bali have significantly altered the

global security environment, they have also altered Australia’s responsibilities within it.

The threat of terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction have forced the

Australian government to recognize that the biggest threat, and therefore Australia’s

greatest responsibility, lies within the region

Australia’s endorsed concept for conflict in the region, maneuver operations in the

littoral environment (MOLE), presents a dilemma for force structure designers and policy

makers now confronted with emerging nonstate regional threats. The purpose of this

thesis is to offer force structure recommendations that meet the requirements of the Army

to defend the nation’s “interests” and execute MOLE.

Complicating the challenge is the nature of the environment within Australia’s

region of interest (ROI). For the purpose of this thesis the ROI is an area bordered by the

nations of the Philippines to the north, Indonesia to the west, and Papua New Guinea

(PNG) and the Solomon Islands to the east. Complex terrain dominates the ROI, whether

it is the close jungle terrain of Indonesia, the PNG highlands, or the urban terrain of the

major primate cities of Manila and Jakarta. To successfully conduct military operations

within any of these types of terrain is difficult, even more so for a force that is not

equipped or sufficiently trained for the tasks. The Army has long recognized the utility of

cross training to achieve success in a variety of terrains or levels of operations. However,

the changed operating environment and threat within the ROI require investigation to

arrive at a suitable formula for determining force structure. The MOLE concept is

3

acknowledged by the Army and accepted by government as the Army’s contribution to

the joint fight within the ROI, however, it does not determine the force structure to

effectively performs its actions.

A partial response to this complication is the “Army development concept for

control operations” (Future Land Warfare Branch 2002, A2). Dr Russell Glenn of the

RAND Corporation, writing in “Meeting Every Urban Challenge” his draft review of the

Australian Army’s development concept for control operations, notes,

The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) deployment to Somalia put its diggers in the town of Baidoa. The largest deployment in the nation’s recent history found Dili, the capital of East Timor, a primary focus. The country’s soldiers did well both in Africa and closer to home, but urban operations’ historical challenges made themselves apparent. Command and control was often decentralized. The density of civilians and structures made effective communications at once essential and difficult. Armed engagements demanded almost instantaneous decisions; a wrong choice could leave a fellow soldier or a noncombatant dead. The new security strategy [force projection] would require another concept to assist in dealing with these and urban operations’ many other formidable tasks. (Glenn 2003, ix)

However, the need to meet the national interests in an operational environment of

terrorism and regional threats while performing the dual concepts of MOLE and control

operations doctrine requires a more robust force structure to meet those threats. The

purpose of this thesis is to analyze the doctrine of MOLE and control operations against a

regional threat and to develop recommendations for a future force structure for operations

in complex terrain within the region. Therefore, to establish a frame of reference for the

reader, the concepts of MOLE and control operations are first discussed in broad terms.

Chapter 1 then outlines the format of the thesis and relevant literature and concludes with

a discussion of the research methodology.

4

MOLE Concept

The MOLE concept developed from an identified requirement in D2000. By

identifying the need for a force capable of service within Australia’s ROI, the Army

sought to satisfy the guidance of D2000 and yet produce a force capable of service across

the broad spectrum of conflict. The concept received broad support from the Army. In a

2002 presentation to the National Press Club in Canberra, Chief Of Army (CA)

Lieutenant General Peter Leahy stated, “[t]he Army believes that forces structured for

littoral maneuver will possess the ingredients for success across the likely spectrum of

future conflict” (2002). The key to the MOLE doctrine is, that it was developed to

articulate a concept for operations within littoral regions where Australia could anticipate

deploying its forces. It does not describe a concept of operations or offensive or defensive

doctrine; rather it “describes how land forces in the future could be employed as part of a

joint force within the immediate neighbourhood” (Willis 2002, 2).

The concept is summarized from the concept thesis as follows:

The MOLE concept relies on rapid and simultaneous actions against an adversary to create shock--a state of command paralysis that renders an adversary incapable of making an effective response. This concept can be employed either proactively or reactively. . . .The MOLE concept has four actions which may be conducted concurrently or, at times, consecutively--they are Shaping, Entry from Air and Sea, Decisive Action and Transition. The intent is to make the movement between these actions as rapid and smooth as possible. The five key requirements for the MOLE concept are: Excellent intelligence preparation; rapid fusion and sharing of information across an integrated Joint C3I system; the ability to conduct simultaneous landings; the ability to reachback; and generating overwhelming fighting power to achieve decision. (Willis 2002, ii)

The MOLE concept in its original form, therefore, does not anticipate the conduct

of decisive actions in any particular form. It does, however, envisage that any decisive

action will seek to maintain the momentum achieved by a successful entry. Figure 1

5

refers to this and acknowledges the continuous nature of MOLE. Maintaining momentum

may include actions that further generate shock. Given the increasing prevalence of urban

fringes along the littoral regions of the world, operations in complex terrain will figure

prominently in those actions.

E n t r yf r o m A i r

a n d S e aD e c i s i v eA c t i o n s

T r a n s i t i o n

M O L E

S h a p i n g A c t i o n s

Figure 1. MOLE Continuum of Actions

Source: Paul Willis, MOLE Concept Thesis, Future Land Warfare Branch, Canberra, ACT

MOLE is likely to involve urban operations and it is “therefore essential that

combat capabilities are developed to deny this terrain to an adversary” (Sanders 2002). It

is therefore appropriate that some analysis of the force structure to conduct complex

operations as a decisive action of the MOLE is conducted, especially when considered in

concert with control operations.

6

Control Operations

Control operations, like MOLE, are an emerging concept within the Australian

Defense Forces (ADF). Control operations are “military operations that lead to the

manipulation of people’s activities and the flow of information within the urban area”

(Sanders 2002, A4). Control operations acknowledge that shaping the civilian population

is as important as shaping the enemy. Success is measured equally by successful

operations against a foe and the ability of the friendly force to convince the civilian

population that their best interests are served by accepting the friendly force’s strategic

objectives as their own. Tactical actions against the enemy are linked to the psychological

shaping operations against the civilian population. In effect, the force that successfully

shapes the civilian inhabitants stands a greater chance of success. This in itself is an

indicator of force structure for the Army and suggests that civil-military operations teams

(CMOT) will play an important role in control operations within the urban environment.

The authors of the control operations concept define shaping operations as

follows: “Shaping actions are those taken to set the pre-conditions for the successful

application of force. Shaping actions at the strategic and operational levels will set the

pre-conditions for success within the operational theatre. Of greatest importance will be

the management of the local population’s perceptions to elicit their support for the

conduct of operations against an adversary” (Sanders 2002, A16).

The development of the control operations concept, like the MOLE concept, helps

define the capabilities that the ADF will be able to field within the region. Control

operations envisage a conflict that requires technical dominance to overcome “the clutter

that is characteristic of urban terrain” (Sanders 2002, A12). To overcome this clutter

7

technology may not be the only answer. Success will require technical dominance

coupled with a balanced force capable of operational effectiveness.

Thesis Format

The primary research question this thesis will investigate is, “What is the optimal

force structure of an Australian brigade conducting MOLE in region?” This question

incorporates several secondary questions to inform force structure for future operations in

the region:

1. Is the control operations concept complementary to the MOLE concept for the

successful conduct of operations in the ROI, particularly in complex urban terrain?

2. How is the ROI defined in terms of state and government organizations, civil

agencies, population, geography, and threats?

3. Does current Australian strategic guidance reflect global changes as a result of

the war on terror and what, if any, are changes required in force structure to operate

against those threats?

4. How can recent experiences of the US Army and Marine Corps, United

Kingdom, and French Armies inform Australian Army doctrine and structuring of forces

for the performance of MOLE in the ROI?

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 contains the definition of the

research question, provides background on the dual concepts of MOLE and control

operations, discusses the relevant literature, sets out the research method, and discusses

the structure of the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 defines the region and the threat and

establishes the framework for the force structure analysis. The implications of changed

strategic guidance from the government and the continuing applicability of the MOLE

8

concept to drive improvements in Army capability for the conduct of operations in the

region and the wider region are addressed in chapter 3. MOLE will be assessed against

government guidance “that future capabilities will take into account the new strategic

environment to ensure a more flexible, mobile force with sufficient levels of readiness

and sustainment to achieve outcomes in the national interest” (Hill 2003, 24). It will

focus on the continuing suitability of the MOLE concept and will assess that against the

threat to determine force structure and recommendations for change.

Chapter 4 analyzes the planned future force structure of the Army and its

continuing ability to contribute to the MOLE concept in a joint environment. Implications

of changed strategic guidance from the government due to increases in the threat both

regionally and in the wider region will be applied and recommendations made. Examples

of structure that have been employed by other nations conducting similar types of

operations will be assessed for their applicability in future force structures of the Army.

Finally, in chapter 5, a future force structure that enables the conduct of MOLE either

within the ROI or in support of commitments to coalitions in the wider region will be

recommended. Conclusions and recommendations will ultimately inform future doctrine

and force structure. Criteria for assessment during chapters three and four are based on

government guidance contained in Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update

2003, the guidance directs that future forces are required to be more flexible, and mobile

with higher levels of readiness and sustainability.

Literature Review

Dr. Russell Glenn’s Meeting Every Urban Challenge: A Review of the Australian

Army Development Concept for Control Operations-Draft is a key document for the

9

conduct of analysis, particularly when discussing the relevance of control operations for

the conduct of urban operations. This work has been commissioned by the ADF Defence

Science and Technology Organization (DSTO) and is particularly relevant to the author’s

thesis, as it identifies deficiencies within the current force structure and future force

projections against a near peer threat. Dr Glenn an urban operations analyst from the

RAND Corporation, notes his concern during his summary, stating: “The doubts are few

for contingencies involving limited threats and urban areas of lesser size and population.

Given confrontation with a near peer competitor in a town or city of virtually any size,

however, and those concerns increase exponentially” (2003, xv).

Literature allowing a careful construction of the threat within the region includes

Robert Kaplan’s, The Coming Anarchy, Bruce Hoffman’s (Rand) Preparing for War on

Terrorism, and Robert Bunker’s Non-State Threats and Future Wars. These texts will

contribute to research of chapter 2, defining the environment, and chapter 4, the future.

Additionally Stanley Brunn and Jack Williams Cities of the World, World Regional

Urban Development will contribute to an understanding of the region and the

infrastructure and apparatus of state.

Government documents, such as the recently released Australia’s National

Security A Defence Update 2003 and the Defence Capability Review 2003, contribute to

the analysis on the continuing applicability of the MOLE concept, given global changes

in the threat. The government notes that, because of recent changes in Australia’s

strategic environment as a result of the “stabilizing effect of US determination and

willingness to act” (Hill 2003, 23), there is less likely to be a need for ADF operations in

defense of Australia. Rather, the government envisages that for the foreseeable future any

10

ADF operations are likely to occur within the context of regional contingencies, the war

on terror, and efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

or to otherwise enhance global security and stability (Hill 2003, 25).

Literature allowing consideration of topics as either comparison or contrast

include doctrinal examples from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) for both

military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) and expeditionary maneuver warfare.

Recent operational studies that focus on force structure and doctrine and tactics in urban

and littoral regions, will also be useful. Documents from the US Department of Defense

(joint doctrine) and the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization

Program (ABCA) provide an example of like nations doctrine. It is planned to apply

these doctrinal constructs to assist in developing recommendations for Australian

doctrine. There are also a number of after-action reviews (AARs) and lessons learned

from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and related journal and Internet articles focusing on

threat, structure, and concepts, all of which will be useful research material for

subsequent analysis.

Research Method.

The thesis analyzes the primary question by identifying the key concepts that

support MOLE within the ROI. These concepts are introduced and then assessed for

suitability against a threat that can realistically be expected within the region. The thesis

will focus on establishing a definitive description of where Australia’s regional interests

lie (South East Asia and the Pacific Rim are the areas of primary focus). Recent

operations and alliance partner joint concepts will also be reviewed for applicability to

Australia’s force structure. Chapter 2 commences with a discussion of the key countries

11

and major urban areas of the ROI. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the

major security threats that exist within the ROI.

12

CHAPTER 2

REGION OF INTEREST

The Australian governme nt has demonstrated its resolve to act strategically by

recent contributions to the ‘coalition of the willing;’ however, it is also equally

committed to seeking solutions other than force when attempting to solve diplomatic

crises within the region. The argument that changes in the international system will

reduce the importance of force in relations between nations over the coming years is

noted within D2000; however, this position does not account for the emergence of

nonstate actors over the past five years. D2000 notes: “The Government does not dismiss

these views, and indeed it places a high priority on working with others, at both the

regional and global level, to further minimize, and if possible to eliminate the risk of war.

The continuing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes these efforts

all the more important” (Hill, D2000, 2000, 9).

The purpose of this chapter is to develop an understanding of littoral urbanization

within the Asia-Pacific region and to identify threats and nonstate actors active within the

region. The chapter will begin by defining the region and the wider region. Secondly the

chapter will examine major nations within the region, their principal agencies of

government, geography, physical features and characteristics, state institutions, and civil

agencies. Thirdly the chapter will identify the principal urban centers within the region

and identify the layout, size, demographics, influences, and institutions within the city.

To conclude, the threats that exist in the major nations shall be discussed. The discussion

will involve outlining the type of organization background, capabilities, and the

13

individual methods of operating. Understanding the operating environment as detailed in

the chapter will provide defense planners a frame of reference when considering force

structure implications in the future. Those implications will be discussed in subsequent

chapters.

Defining Australia’s Region

Australia’s region has experienced considerable change in recent years. This

includes: firstly, the increased importance of southeast Asia (SE ASIA) as a powerful

global economic trading zone; secondly, the increased military capability of a number of

former colonial outposts; and thirdly, the increased religious fundamentalism-linked

terrorism within the region. Major population centers in Indonesia and the Philippines

have continued to grow disproportionately to the national population as a whole.

Jakarta’s population has expanded tenfold over the period from 1950 to 2000,whereas

Indonesia’s population expanded only fivefold over the same period.

Australia’s ROI is a triangular-shaped area with the Philippines located at the

point of the triangle. Running from the point east and west are two lines that encompass

the nations of Fiji, the Solomon’s, and PNG to the east and Indonesia and East Timor to

the west. The base of the triangle encompasses the region to Australia’s immediate north.

Figure 2 indicates the area discussed. Australia’s wider region is inclusive of the areas of

north Asia, east Asia, and the Middle East and includes countries such as South Korea,

Japan, Afghanistan, Iraq, India, and Pakistan.

14

Figure 2. Australia’s Region of Interest

Source: University of Texas, Oceania Map [Website] available from http://www.lib. utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/oceania_pol_97.jpg; Internet; accessed on 1 March 2004.

According to Barry Buzan, in People States and Fear, “The institutions of the

state comprise the entire machinery of government, including its executive, legislative,

administrative and judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they

operate” (1991, 82). The institutions mentioned by Buzan are perhaps more vulnerable to

threats from within than they are to threats of direct attack from outside the country. This

internal threat is very capable of causing a state of instability to exist. The insurgent

groups operating within the Philippines and other religiously motivated groups within SE

Asia are examples of these types of internal threats (Buzan, 1991, 87).

15

The region to be discussed includes the subregions of Oceania and SE Asia;

however, it does not include discussion on the cities of east Asia, north Asia, or the

Middle East. Considering each subregion and its major cities will assist in the analysis of

the institutions of the state that could support ADF operations, and illuminate deficiencies

in the major urban areas of the region. Understanding the environmental characteristics of

the region, coupled with the threat groups that exist within the region, enables the ADF to

plan for contingencies within the region and make informed decisions on force structure.

Oceania

Papua New Guinea

The major cities of the subregion of Oceania are the major cities of Australia and

New Zealand. These two countries will not be covered any further within this chapter.

The key countries of concern to Australia and New Zealand within this subregion are the

island nations of New Guinea and the Solomon’s, and the island province of

Bougainville. All three have a common history with Australia; however, due to the

vicious fighting that occurred from 1941 to 1944 along the Owen Stanley Ranges and the

famous “Kokoda Trail,” New Guinea ties are felt the strongest historically.

Papua New Guinea has a population of approximately five million, of which

approximately one million live in urban areas. Its total land mass is 462,840 square

kilometers, which is equivalent to the size of California. By comparison the coastline is

only 5,152 kilometers, and over 98 percent of the country is forest or jungle.

Port Moresby is located on the south coast of the country at the east end of the

Gulf of Papua, (see figure 3) and has a population of just over one million people. The

main town straddles a series of headlands surrounding the natural harbor and is generally

16

elevated. A small amount of flat land is located at Boroko four miles away from the city,

and houses the shopping areas and the international airport. To cater for the rapid

expansion of the city the satellite township of Waigani has been established eight miles

away from the coast and is linked by a multilane boulevard. The government’s offices are

located here, as well as numerous diplomatic missions. The increase in migration to the

urban areas of Port Moresby has also witnessed an increase in squatting and shantytowns

along the coast.

The most common religion within PNG is Christianity, though the tribal groups

have a number of tribe-specific religions and languages. Physical characteristics of tribal

groups vary widely, and over 870 distinct languages are spoken throughout the country.

The diversity of the population and the variation in density pose a number of unique

political challenges. The political system is based on a modified Westminster model, with

only one house of parliament. Representatives are elected for a five-year term and are

loosely aligned to a political parties, though allegiance to a particular ideology is weak

New Guinea provides some difficulty for the Australian government due to the

level of unrest, continued aid, and the continued expectation of aid that flows in from

Australia. John Howard’s Liberal government has done more than any recent government

to enforce accountability on the various governments of New Guinea. The problems that

have arisen within New Guinea are not surprising, given the speed at which independence

came. The problems manifested themselves prior to, and soon after formal independence

in 1975.

17

Figure 3. Papua New Guinea

Source: Asia Source, New Guinea Map [Website]; available from http://www.asiasource.org/profiles/ap-mp-03; Internet; accessed on 9 February 2004.

A. James Rose, writing in Cities of the World, World Urban Regional

Development, noted: “Papua New Guinea (PNG) is engaged in the task of transforming

its society literally from the stone-age conditions to integration in the modern world

within two generations. The Australians barely laid the necessary infrastructure of

communications and transport links and the rule of law and development of local

government and education systems when independence over took the country” (1983,

189).

D2000 reflected the government’s concerns are reflected in D2000, “Australia

will continue to offer substantial support to Papua New Guinea (PNG) defense reform.

Australian assistance to help stabilize the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) in

the short-term will be linked to the long-term reform of the force” (2000, 43). The

government’s continued support clearly anticipates a PNGDF that is loyal and responsive

18

to political control (2000, 43). Australian governments have demanded greater

accountability from the PNG government, yet Australia continues to maintain a

substantial presence diplomatically and economically. PNG is resource rich and

Australian companies continue to mine gold and copper from the highland regions.

Military presence within PNG is limited to a small staff that coordinates military

exchanges and training activities. PNG remains an important component of the region for

Australia, and because of that. the social unrest that exists in Port Moresby is of primary

concern. This concern has necessitated significant ADF planning for a services-protected

evacuation (SPE) and services-assisted evacuation (SAE) from Port Moresby harbor and

airport.

The threat that exists within Port Morseby is a microcosm of the threat that exists

with PNG in general. Difficulties of language and culture clash with the warrior lifestyle

and are played out between coastal man and highlander, Papuan against New Guinean

(Rose 1983, 189). PNG is one of the most heterogeneous nations, with over 300 different

community groups. Port Morseby is predominantly ethnic New Guinean, the only

distinction being whether an individual is rural or urban, however the diversity of

community affiliations is very important.

The primary threat group is the “Rascals,” a grouping of violent unemployed rural

men and boys who prey on the international elements that support foreign government

investment and programs within PNG. The Rascals employ tactics similar to other gang-

oriented groups in the US: car jackings, violent home invasions, street robberies, rape,

and intimidation. Most foreign governments have established their personnel inside

security compounds that are patrolled by private security firms. The Rascals are an

19

unsophisticated group that lacks formal training and access to weapon systems; however,

a change in tactics that targets law enforcement and military compounds may be

successful and provide these groups with a limited number of handguns and semi

automatic weapons. If this occurs the Australian government may be forced to take action

to protect its citizens and investments in the country. Mass personnel evacuation by the

ADF is nothing new in the region. A successful evacuation, as conducted from Honiara in

the Solomon’s in 2000, is a contingency that has been war-gamed in the past number of

years by the ADF.

Solomon Islands

In the past four years the ADF has conducted two SPE operations from the

Solomon Islands and the Army is currently involved in a peace stabilization mission,

having intervened at the request of the Solomon Islands government. The force, named

the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and comprised of 2,220

personnel drawn from the ADF, the Australian Federal police, the Australian Protective

Services, and regional defense forces, entered Honiara on 24 July 2003.

The east Solomon Islands are a chain of six large and numerous small tropical

islands located 300 miles to the east of PNG. The islands were established as a British

protectorate in 1893, and following the Anglo-German agreement of 1899, the west

Solomon Islands (Bougainville and Baku) became part of German New Guinea. The

Solomon Islands were the scene of some of the bloodiest battles of World War II between

the occupying Japanese forces and the liberating allied forces. Interim self-government

was instituted in 1976 and independence was granted in July 1978. The Solomon Islands

has a population of just under 500,000, predominately ethnic Melanesian people. The

20

population is concentrated on the Island of Guadalcanal, and, apart from the major urban

center of Honiara, where over 65,000 people live, most of the population lives along the

coastal fringes of the islands. The principal organized religion is Christianity, and most of

the major European religions are represented.

Ethnic tensions on the island have simmered for some decades; however, it

escalated to dangerous levels late in 1998. The principal protagonists are the native

Solomon Islands group; the Isatabu Freedom Movement, who are Melanesian; and the

native Malaitan Islands residents, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), who are Polynesian.

The MEF are settlers from neighboring islands who have settled on Honiara and its

environs, drawn by the lure of greater economic opportunities (DFAT Solomon Islands

Country Brief, 3). In this regard the urban migration is very similar to the population

increases that occurred in Jakarta and Manila. The landscape is a mixture of open farm-

land and vegetable areas with some regions of heavy vegetation.

The situation on the Solomon Islands has continued to deteriorate over the past

five years and has necessitated the intervention by RAMSI. RAMSI’s mission is to

restore law and order to the islands and to create an environment in which the effective

functioning of the lawful Solomon Islands democratic institutions and services can

recommence (DFAT Solomon Islands Country Brief, 4). Australia’s intervention at the

request of the lawful Solomon Islands government has confirmed the legitimacy of

Australia’s actions and its intent to intervene to effect positive outcomes within the ROI.

Militarily, the commitment effectively forestalls the possibility of a further slide into

lawlessness and the possible negative impact on neighboring islands, such as

21

Bougainville. The action confirms the Australian government’s commitment to acting

preemptively when it serves its best interests within the region.

Fiji

The final country to be considered from Oceania is Fiji. Fiji lies approximately

2,700 kilometers north east of Sydney, Australia. It comprises four major islands and

over 800 small islands and atolls. It has a land area of 18,333 square kilometers, divided

predominantly between the two main islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. The

population is just under one million people. The country is characterized by racial

diversity, the principal ethnic groups being ethnic Fijians, who account for a little over 51

percent of the population, and Indians, who account for approximately 44 percent. The

Indians originally came to the islands as indentured labor to work the vast sugar cane

fields in the late 1870s. The capital city of Suva is located on the island of Viti Levu. A

cultural class system exists in Fiji due to the fact that a majority of native Fijians refused

to work as laborers to develop the nation’s resources. As Rose notes, “Native Fijians and

the descendants of the Indians have maintained a rather high degree of social and

locational distance ever since. Indigenous Fijians express a preference for rural

environments and are protected by law in that they alone have rights of land ownership.

The Indo-Fijians may lease and cultivate land, but are most active in commerce and small

industrial activities . . . the indigenous people have somewhat of a strangle hold on

employment in the government service and the military forces" (1983, 193).

The undercurrent of tensions that results from this overt rivalry has resulted in one

successful coup in 1987 and one unsuccessful coup attempt in 2001. Power has

transitioned back to the people, yet the rules on land ownership continue to hinder the

22

democratic process and could cause a similar rise in tension in the future. The situation in

Fiji and the threat to Australian citizens are of concern to the Australian government due

to the number of companies, such as Colonial Sugar Refineries, which operate facilities

and offices in Fiji. Regardless of the fact that the two recent coups have not resulted in

loss of life, there is a potential threat to ADF personnel if the Fijian Armed Forces ever

opposes foreign evacuation operations. Fiji’s Army is an infantry-based force of one

brigade with additional combat support and combat service support, which is well led and

very experienced due to extensive peacekeeping service in the Middle East since the

early 1980s. The Fijians were reportedly dug in on the beaches around Suva in 1987,

ready to repel any attempted landings by Australian forces during “Operation Moris

Dance,” which was the Australian government’s military response to the 1987 coup and

involved the deployment of a company of infantry in four surface vessels.

Intensive diplomatic negotiations ensued to prevent the use of force, as the

instigators of the coup guaranteed the safety of Australians and other foreign nationals

(Horner 1990, 307).

The requirement to be prepared to conduct a services protected or assisted

evacuation (NEO) within the Pacific region from cities such as Port Morseby, Suva, and

Honiara remains. Recent operations in the Solomon’s and East Timor have proven the

ADF is capable of mounting amphibious operations. In such an event it is likely that

political and social unrest will be rife and the potential for aggressors to retaliate against

ADF forces or Australian citizens exists. In such a situation, a capable force, structured to

achieve the fundamentals of command and control, mobility, and protection, is a

23

constant. Firepower and maneuver are not, and would require careful consideration at the

time of planning.

Southeast Asia

SE Asia is a region that includes the nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,

and Singapore. “Southeast Asia is principally an agrarian based society. It is one of the

least urbanized regions in the world and yet the growth rate of urban places is much

higher than the population growth rate. In 1950 only two cities had a population over one

million. By 1980 there were eleven” (Brunn and Williams 1983, 371). The major cities of

the region are Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, Hanoi, and Singapore. Their rapid growth

plagued the development of infrastructure and services as large numbers of migrating

rural workers flocked from the outlying areas, only to discover that employment was

difficult to find, especially if they were unskilled (Brunn and Williams 1983, 372).

The rapid influx of people from the rural areas into the largest Asian cities has

contributed significantly to the increased populations and expansive shantytowns along

the urban fringes of cities of Jakarta and Manila. The problems associated with expanding

urban centers and the subsequent strain on infrastructure has preoccupied the

governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. The additional pressure of

achieving a resolution to separatist and insurgent movements has left more vulnerable in

the region. Member nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) are

highly conscious of their growing vulnerability to Chinese military power and yet are still

unwilling to establish a shared security dialogue to combat it. Indonesia and the

Philippines are committed to seeking military solutions to the serious internal security

problems that threaten to undermine the fabric of their nations. In the process both are

24

ignoring nonmilitary initiatives, such as dialogue, that may assist in removing the internal

threat and allow the development of a shared response with other members of ASEAN to

the Chinese threat.

According to the Australian government, the stability of the SE Asia region is

underpinned by ASEAN. ASEAN in its infancy envisaged a forum that would provide

stability by it existence. Member nations, through the medium of political dialogue,

sought to solve conflicts diplomatically. As noted in D2000: “ASEAN continues to

provide focus for the sense of shared interests and common goals which has been so

important to SE Asia over recent decades” (Australian Government 2000, 20). Yet the

inclusion of a nonintervention clause that prevents one nation interfering in the internal

affairs of another has undermined the treaty from the outset. The reluctance to intervene

has forced other non-ASEAN nations to intervene within the region

Indonesia

Indonesia is an important nation within SE Asia due in part to its population size

and in part to its position astride the major straits separating the Indian and Pacific oceans

(see figure 4). The major city within Indonesia is Jakarta, and like most of urban SE Asia

“it is a blend of cultural influences which have affected urbanism. Influences from

Indians, the Chinese, Arabs, Europeans, and more recently, the Americans and Japanese

have shaped the material form and the cultural milieu of the cities” (Brunn and Williams

1983, 372). The population of Indonesia is approximately 232 million, of whom forty-

five million live in urban areas. The population is predominantly Javanese, Maduran, and

Balinese, the islands of which are home to almost two-thirds of the population. Indonesia

comprises 17,500 islands of varied size and character. The predominant religion is Islam,

25

though the religious practices of the many islands and villages differ according to local

traditions and customs. The total surface area is almost two million square kilometers,

with fifty-four thousand kilometers of coastline. Forest and jungles cover over eighty

percent of the country. Figure 4 graphically depicts Indonesia and its various islands.

Jakarta is heavily influenced by colonial architectural characteristics of the

Portuguese and Dutch that served as a model for its development over the past five

hundred years. A rapidly expanding city of eleven million people, it suffers from

deficient infrastructure, a problem that is common to many other large SE Asian cities.

The predicted population in 2015 is expected to be over seventeen million. Waste

disposal, water, power, buildings, and telecommunications all require improvement,

though funding for such ventures is difficult to identify as the government continues to

struggle against burgeoning internal security problems in a number of states.

Figure 4. Indonesia

Source: Asia Source, Indonesia Map [Website]; available from http://www.asiasource.org/proflies/ap-mp03; Internet; accessed on 9 February 2004.

It is the emergence of nonstate threats within Indonesia that is the greatest

concern to the Indonesian authorities. As Tim Huxley notes in his Insecurity in the

26

ASEAN Region thesis, “Indonesian defense policy remains pre-occupied with internal

security problems: the armed forces still see external threats as remote and minimal”

(1993, 56). The government is clearly concerned with the current number of separatist

and autonomy movements within Aech, Ambon, and West Papua, and the recent East

Timorese solution yet appears unable to prevent the spread of militant Islam within the

nation, encouraged by recent successful terrorist acts within SE Asia countries.

Certainly it is in the interests of the US and Australia for Indonesia to tackle the

increased threat posed by the rise of militant fundamentalism within the country,

however, until the Bali bombing this was not a priority. A moderate Muslim Indonesia is

a far greater contributor to regional security than a fragmented society intent on

preserving internal security while ignoring the threat posed to the region by acts of terror.

Improved human rights may pave the way for regional solutions that are acceptable to the

Indonesian government and the separatist groups alike. For Australia and the United

States, dealing with Indonesia as a regional power with its provinces intact makes more

sense strategically than supporting piecemeal separatist independence claims against

Indonesia.

A possible catalyst for the rise of terrorism within Indonesia has been the loose

links established between some members of Jamar Islamiah (JI) and members of al

Qaeda. Those links are traced back to common training of individuals from both groups

received in Afghanistan. As Reyko Huang and Colin McCullough, writing for the Center

for Defence Information, note in their article In the Spotlight Jemaah Islamiah,

Investigating the terrorist network in Southeast Asia reveals why the global war on terrorism may have yet to see its most difficult phases. Here one finds scattered but substantial pieces of evidence that several radical Islamic groups,

27

overcoming national and geographical barriers, have maintained deep and long-running ties with one another toward a shared fundamentalist goal. Their clandestine, elusive "cells" are dispersed throughout everyday-life places, functions, and businesses, rendering Afghanistan-style military campaigns impractical. Furthermore, many of these organizations forged partnerships with al Qaeda long before authorities began unearthing the scale of their transnational reach. JI is at the core of this extensive, complex, and resilient terrorist labyrinth in Southeast Asia. (2002, 2)

Though D2000 noted the emergence of intrastate conflict as a cause for concern,

no recognition was made of the emergence of nonstate actors, such Osama Bin Laden’s al

Qaeda, as a threat to peace and stability within the region. His principal agents of terror

within Australia’s direct area of influence have been JI. A recent article in the BBC News

noted:

JI formed in the mid-1980s by two Indonesian clerics, evolved its terrorist edge in the mid-1990s when one of its founders, the late Abdullah Sungkar, established contact with Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. . . . The JI's principal goals are the establishment of Islamic governments across the region followed by the formation of a unified South East Asian Islamic state. This state would stretch from southern Thailand, through the Malay Peninsula (including Singapore), across the Indonesian archipelago and into the southern Philippines. (Wright BBC News August 15,2003)

Indonesia must act in defense of global security, as the acts of violence

perpetrated by JI operatives have dragged the international spotlight onto the region. As

Huang and McCullough note, “The region's own initiatives remain the single most crucial

factor in controlling terrorism in Southeast Asia. Indeed, with the exception of Indonesia,

which has been criticized from abroad for its irresolute participation in the global effort,

the region's countries have generally acted rapidly and effectively in response to the

needs of the new security environment” (2002, 3).

Australia has acted in its own interests within the region and engaged actively

with the nations of SE Asia more effectively since the labor government of Bob Hawke

28

came to power in 1983. The Indonesian government has accepted Australia’s renewed

interest in SE Asia with suspicion and on occasion has been critical of Australia’s

motives. That suspicion is partly due to Australia’s strong ties with the US and poor

diplomacy by successive Australian governments towards Asia.

Regardless, Indonesia’s position astride the Straits of Malacca and the continued

investment within Indonesia by Australian companies necessitate a secure and stable

Indonesia. The threat posed by terrorist groups such as JI and the means available to

Indonesia’s government agencies to combat the threat will necessitate further examples

of information sharing and joint operations of the type that was conducted by Indonesian

and Australian police following the Bali bombing. As noted in D2000, “Australia’s

fundamental interests and objectives in having a good defense relationship with Indonesia

remain as important as ever. The government is committed to working with the

Indonesian government to establish over time a new defense relationship that will serve

our enduring shared strategic interests” (2000, 15). Force structure implications for future

combatant and noncombatant operations suggest that any Australian force must be

capable of operating successfully in the littoral along Indonesia’s coasts against an

unconventional insurgent threat.

Effective diplomatic and defense liaison with the various levels of Indonesian

government and military is also essential if a greater understanding is to be reached

between Australia and Indonesia. As the Defense Update 2003 reaffirms, “The Australian

Government attaches great importance to supporting the Indonesian government and its

people as it manages its many challenges. Indonesia’s territorial integrity remains in

Australia’s national interests” (Hill 2003, 19).

29

Philippines

The Philippines are located north of Indonesia adjacent to the South China Sea

and are home to over 85 million people. The predominant religion is Roman Catholic. It

is a country that has strong historical ties with both Spain and the United States. The

groups of islands that make up the Philippines are over three hundred thousand square

kilometers, almost 67 percent of which is covered by forest and jungle. The islands also

have thirty-seven thousand kilometers of coastline (see figure 5).

Figure 5. The Philippines

Source: Asia Source, New Guinea Map [Website]; available from http://www.asiasource.org/profiles/ap-mp-03; Internet; accessed on 9 February 2004.

30

Within the Philippines, the major city of Manila, located at the peak of the

triangle that encompasses, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and PNG, has expanded

significantly since 1900. Due to its location on rising ground adjacent to the harbor of

Manila Bay, and surrounded on two sides by lakes and delta river systems, it has

significant infrastructure problems. The population of over 11,000,000 is expanding at a

rate of over two percent a year and is predicted to be 14.8 million by 2015. While Manila

is one of the richest cities within SE Asia it does have significant problems with its water

supply and connection to a reliable sewerage system and power supply. It is the

sustainability of a reliable water supply that threatens the continued health of the city.

Manila, like its larger regional neighbor, Jakarta, is not attracting the level of

government funding necessary to sustain its current expansion. Increased urbanization

has spawned the growth of extensive settlements that lack even basic amenities. Jakarta

and Manila attract large numbers of the rural population drawn by the lure of

employment and a better life, only to discover that employment is difficult to find and the

cost of living expensive. These people are then forced to live in makeshift shantytowns

on the city’s fringes. It is in these sprawling shantytowns that separatist organizations are

able to recruit willing participants, disaffected by the imbalance of wealth and inequality,

to take the battle to the government forces.

The security situation within the Philippines is as difficult as the situation within

Indonesia. As William Tow notes in Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations, Seeking

Convergent Security, “Many contemporary assessments of the Philippines’ national

security start with the fundamental assumption that addressing external threats is less

central to maintaining its security than are the tasks of resolving internal socio-political

31

conflicts and completing a tenuous process of nation building” (2001, 143). Like

Indonesia, Philippine society is dominated by a political and military structure that does

not favor absolute democracy. Rather, the populace is not fully involved in the

democratic process. As Tow further notes, “Security in the Philippines can only be

realized when the ruling oligarchy is supplanted by the institutionalized participation of

the country’s populace” (2001, 143).

The government of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has struggled to overcome two

other significant factors that have impacted on the Philippines’ ability to deal with the

internal security problem. The Asian financial crisis has impacted on military

modernization. With the exception of the purchase of two logistical support ships, some

trainer jets, and forty armored personnel vehicles, there are no immediate plans to expand

to meet any increased internal threats. Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea are the

second serious impact. The construction of airstrips on the disputed Spratly Islands, has

been called by one government commentator, former Philippines Defense Secretary

Orlando Mercado, “a dagger at our underbelly” (Tow 2001, 144). The Philippines have

been unable to react in a significant fashion because of serious constraints brought on by

the Asian financial crisis and ultimately the strategic imbalance between the Philippines

military and the Chinese military. In addition to the Philippines and China, the Spratly's

are also claimed by Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. This area was considered a

possible flashpoint for the region as little as five years ago and may prove to be so again

within the future. Any conflict is likely to be between a coalition of nations and China.

ASEAN and its “embryonic multilateral venture” (Leifer 1996,53), the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF), have failed to approach the problem from a cooperative

32

viewpoint. According to Leifer, the ARF “can be seen as an imperfect diplomatic

instrument for achieving regional security goals in that it seeks to address the problem of

power which arises from the anarchical nature of international society without provision

for either collective defense or conventional collective security” (1996, 53). The lack of a

suitable mechanism to enforce the collective decisions of ASEAN and the ARF will

continue to undermine the effect of this body within the region if conflict were to reoccur.

The internal security problems of the Philippines represent a real security threat

to the region. Philippine militant organizations have links to international terror

organizations and, according to Huang and McCullogh, “taken together, what one finds

in Southeast Asia is an international terrorist network as well-grounded, well-supported,

far-reaching and threatening as al Qaeda, but without the option of using U.S. military

power to quell the network, as we saw in the anti-Taliban campaign” (2001, 3).

Principal among the terrorist threats within the Philippines are the Abu Sayyaf

and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). According to Emily Clark, writing for CDI,

the threat of these two groups has transcended the borders of the Philippines and has

spilled into the international arena:

Abdurajak Janjalani, an Islamic scholar and mujahedin in the Afghan-Soviet war, founded Abu Sayyaf after he, like the contemporaries that formed his initial recruiting crop, returned from studies in Saudi Arabia and Libya determined to fulfill the Muslim ideal of an Islamic state. The group first mobilized in August 1991, with the bombing of a ship in Zamboanga harbor and a grenade attack on a performance by Christian missionaries. Attacks on Catholic congregations--hand grenades thrown into churches--attacks on ethnic Chinese and abduction of priests, nuns, and teachers in the Catholic community soon followed. Abu Sayyaf's activities were domestic in scope and remained relatively unknown until it blasted out of obscurity with the April 23, 2000, kidnapping at Sipadan.

The MILF is the vanguard of the Islamic movement in the Bangsamoro homeland in Mindanao and the neighboring islands. The MILF was formed in

33

1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported by ethnic Maguindanaos from Mindanao, split from the Moro National Liberation Front, advocating a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward the government. In January 1987, the MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its goal of independence for Muslim regions and accepting the government's offer of autonomy. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the next largest faction, refused to accept the accord and initiated a brief offensive that ended in a truce later that month. The Mindanao-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front fields around 2,900 troops. (2002, 2)

Both of these groups are particularly important to the international community, as

they are viewed as groups with established links throughout the remainder of the region.

As Huang and McCullogh note: “Here one finds scattered but substantial pieces of

evidence that several radical Islamic groups, overcoming national and geographical

barriers, have maintained deep and long-running ties with one another toward a shared

fundamentalist goal” (2001, 1). These established ties include common training and

capabilities that go beyond the common terrorist methods of suicide bombings and car

bombings. These two groups have developed an offensive capability that can inflict

proportionately heavy losses on military formations. Since 1997 the Philippine Army has

suffered over 300 casualties. Tactics include kidnapping, conventional attacks, and

extensive use of booby traps, demolitions, and snipers.

The commitment of US Special Forces training teams to assist the Philippine

authorities to confront the threat of Abu Sayyef and MILF in the Philippines indicates

that the US and its coalition partners are committed to stamping out the threat of militant

terrorism within SE Asia. Yet, this deployment also indicates that the US expects tough

action in return against terrorism if those same SE Asian nations are to receive further

military and financial assistance in the future.

34

Malaysia

Malaysia, like the other representative countries of SE Asia is heavily influenced

by other cultures, and in particular by colonialism. A nation sitting at the southern end of

the SE Asia landmass, Malaysia has benefited from its position between the South China

Sea and the Indian Ocean, and has become the most prosperous of the developing

nations. Malaysia’s population is approximately 22,000,000, based on the 2001 figures,

predominantly on the Malay peninsula. The Malay coastline is over 4,500 kilometers

long and is a mixture of the peninsula and the major states of Sabah and Sarawak.

Singapore was a part of the Malaysian Federation for eight years in the 1960s; however,

it chose to break away and adopt its current island nation status. Malaysia is officially an

Islamic country, however, non- Muslims are free to pursue their own religious beliefs and

worship as they please.

The government is formed from a process of multiparty elections; however, all

prime ministers since independence from the British have also been leaders of the

predominant political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). There is

a royal family, however, it is the prime minister, who is elected for five years, that is also

the leader of the Islamic faith in Malaysia and is the most powerful individual in the

country. In a system unique to Malaysia, members of the national council or senate, are

appointed by the paramount ruler and by the thirteen states. The general population has

no role in the process. Representatives in the lower house or the people’s council are all

elected by universal adult suffrage. The legal system is also based loosely on the British

system. Decisions of the lower level courts; the high courts, are reviewed by the higher

level court, the Supreme Court, in a system that is similar to the British common law

35

system. In deference to the predominant religion, Islam, Syariah law applies nationwide

to all Moslems, though all matters of appeal for these courts rest with the ruler of the

respective states.

Malaysia’s relationship with Australia, Indonesia, and Singapore is marked by

outbursts of rhetoric, predominantly from the most visible leader of recent years, the

recently retired Dr Mahathir Mohamad. A recent profile of Dr Mahathir in BBC News

described his relationship with the West as follows: “ While his colourful reputation

abroad stemmed from frequent barbed comments about the West and his scant regard for

human rights, his authoritarian but essentially pragmatic policies at home won him much

popular support and helped transform Malaysia into an Asian economic tiger” (BBC

News 2003, 1). Australia’s recent relationship with Malaysia has been stormy, partly due

to the Mahathir’s rhetoric and partly due to a perceived arrogance of Australian political

dialogue with SE Asia. Dr Mahathir described this perception during a recent press

conference to announce continued dialogue on PNGs acceptance into ASEAN. He notes

“his nation had a good relationship with Australia, but too often some politicians tried to

tell his country what to do” (2003, 1). If Australia is going to be successful in developing

closer diplomatic, trade, informational, and military relationships with Malaysia then

acceptance of Malaysia as an influential partner in the region must be forthcoming.

Clearly Malaysia has developed significantly in the past forty years and will continue to

do so, benefiting from shrewd government investment and economic expansion.

Regional Impacts of Urban Expansion

The principal population expansion in SE Asia and the Pacific over the past forty

years has been in the urban littorals. Increasing numbers of the rural population have

36

migrated to coastal regions, increasing the pressure on already overcrowded urban

centers, and infrastructure, under stress because of inadequate funding, has not coped.

The funding required to improve the situation has instead been channeled to the military

to counter internal security threats such as the Indonesian and Philippine fight against

separatist movements. As Russell Glenn notes in his essay “Cleansing Polluted Seas” in

Robert Bunker’s Non State Threats and Future Wars,

The movement from rural to more densely populated region is nearly universal, but the rates in developing nations exceed those of their more economically fortunate counterparts. Cities and towns are sources of wealth. Migration from the countryside carries the promise of higher wages, and relief from social isolation, especially attractive to the young. The resultant growth often outpaces urban economies’ capabilities to provide housing, utility infrastructure, and human services support. Concentrations of dissatisfied newcomers make it easy to understand why [nonstate actors] are so successful in their pursuits. Disgruntlement born of unmet expectations grows in the soil enriched by observations of the wealthy living in close proximity, by oppression of those new rural arrivals and the collocation of groups harboring long-standing antipathies. (2003, 110)

Separatist groups therefore have a fertile recruiting base upon which to draw in

these dense urban developments. The threat posed by these organizations within

Indonesia and the Philippines is significant for their neighbors, including Australia. The

degree of threat to Australia and the region posed by threat groups in PNG and the

Solomon’s is not considered as serious, but is potentially dangerous. A force structure is

required that will enable the ADF to interact with the existing government and state

agencies that have been established to deal with the terrorist threat, but the force must be

able to sustain itself for indefinite periods without having to draw extensively on the

underdeveloped capabilities of the host nation. Self-sustainment was difficult to maintain

in the recent East Timor deployment, which was conducted within 1,000 miles of

37

mainland Australia. The government has articulated this need in the Defense Update

2003, noting that a future force must be mobile, flexible, ready, and sustainable.

38

CHAPTER 3

GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE AND ARMY TASKING

In view of the far-reaching potential for change as a result of the release of

Defense Update 2003, MOLE and control operations still remain the key concepts for

employment of the Army in a joint environment within the region. The relevance of both

documents still remains; however, the nature of the threat envisaged when both

documents were developed has changed somewhat, as identified in chapter two. The

purpose of this chapter is to identify the current capabilities available to the ADF and to

analyze those capabilities against the operating environments identified in chapter two

and the government’s most recent strategic guidance. The criteria to be used for

assessment are based on the government guidance included in the recently released

Australia’s National Security, A Defense Update 2003 (Defence update 2003): “These

new circumstances indicate a need for some rebalancing of capabilities and priorities to

take account of the new strategic environment, changes which will ensure a more flexible

and mobile force with sufficient levels of readiness and sustainability to achieve

outcomes in the national interest” (Hill 2003, 24).

The security situation in the Asia Pacific region presents many challenges for the

ADF, specifically the Australian Army. In view of the October 2002 Bali bombing, the

growth of separatist movements in Indonesia and the Philippines has created the most

significant regional security issue for Australia in recent memory. Perhaps in part due to

the rise in prominence of groups such as JI, the Australian government deemed it

necessary to release an update on D2000 in February 2003. The government’s key

39

strategic document until February 2003 was D2000, which acknowledged threats both

domestically and within the immediate neighborhood. However, the recently released

Defense Update 2003 noted a significant change within the region. It recognized less of a

need for ADF operations in the Defense of Australia, acknowledging that, more

significantly, Australian national security interests could be affected by events outside of

Australia’s immediate neighborhood, necessitating ADF involvement in coalition

operations (Hill 2003, 23). The impact of the release within the region has been mixed,

drawing negative comments from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. To understand the

change in government strategic policy it is necessary to identify the contributing factors.

Impacts of Defense Update 2003

The government rationale for moving ADF operations forward and away from

more traditional areas of operations is linked to a change in security and stability in the

region. The region refers to the triangle of sovereign states from Indonesia, Malaysia, and

Singapore, to the Philippines and New Guinea. In the recently released Defense Update

2003 it was noted that: “The changed global strategic environment, and the likelihood

that Australian national interests could be affected by events outside of Australia’s

immediate neighborhood mean that ADF involvement in coalition operations further a-

field is somewhat more likely than in the recent past” (Hill 2003, 23). The government

rationale for redefining the criteria for deploying the ADF either within the region or in

the wider global sphere articulated in Defence update 2003 is twofold. Firstly, the

government has linked the rise of terror organizations within the region to existing threat

organizations within the Middle East and East Asia. While not attempting to justify any

future deployment of forces to Iraq, Defense Update 2003 attempted to link a reduced

40

threat of a direct attack on Australia to increased US strategic dominance within the

region (Hill 2003,9).

Secondly, the government identified the threat of WMD available to rogue states

within North Asia and the Middle East as directly affecting Australia’s interests. There is

no doubt that a significant change has occurred within the region and Australia’s security

has become more problematic as a result. However, there has been immediate impact

within Australia and within the region to the release of the document. Within Australia

the government’s motives have been criticized, as Peter La Franchi notes: “[Defence

Update 2003] contrasted with the quality and content of earlier analyses [leaving]

Defense Update 2003 vulnerable to criticisms that extensive political involvement in its

preparation has resulted in the release of a manifesto geared to the current domestic

political concerns of the government, rather than the substantive strategic document it

could have been” (2003, 23). La Franchi’s criticism may be warranted, however, renewed

strategic guidance from government to defense was required to account for the rise of

nonstate threats within the region.

The impact of the new strategic guidance within the region was almost

immediate, and controversial, particularly after Prime Minister Howard responded to a

hypothetical question during a press conference to discuss the policy. Malaysia and

Indonesia were particularly vocal in their criticism, due in part, to their interpretation of

Mr Howard’s comments, believing them to endorse unilateral military responses to

threats identified in regional countries. As noted by Dan Murphy writing in the Christian

Science Monitor, “Howard's comments have created a regional uproar, with Indonesia,

Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines all condemning Howard's echo of the emerging

41

US ‘pre-emption’ doctrine as a threat to their sovereignty. Yesterday, Malaysian Prime

Minister Mahathir Mohammed threatened to break off counter terrorism cooperation with

Australia. And Philippines Foreign Secretary Blas Ople said earlier that ‘this proposal has

no ghost of a chance to be supported in the UN General Assembly’" (Murphy 2003, 1).

Australia is clearly desirous of good working relationships with its regional

neighbors, particular in regard to combined operations against terrorism. However, it will

not sit by and allow those same regional neighbors to pay lip service to achieving

tangible gains against the threat. The right of a particular nation to act preemptively

against an identified threat remains a valid weapon of deterrence. Legitimacy for

employing preemptive strikes is based upon the fact that nonstate actors are acting

independently of any government or country and are therefore outside the confines of

international law. This position has been taken by many Western nations apart from

Australia, such as the US and the UK in Afghanistan, to justify their actions. While the

reaction of Asian nations is understandable, their relative inaction through their formal

alliance organizations such as ASEAN and the ARF has forced the hand of nations such

as Australia, particularly within the Asia-Pacific region. As Thomas Friedman noted in a

recent a recent essay in the New York Times, “Hand in Hand with Islam,” “We cannot

change other societies and cultures on our own. But we cannot just do nothing in the face

of this mounting threat. What we can do is partner with the forces of modernization

within these societies to help them fight the war of ideas. Because this is a struggle within

the Arab-Muslim world, and we have to help our allies there” (January 8, 2004).

Australia is extremely confident of the ability of regional initiatives among

ASEAN’s member nations to tackle terrorist organizations and their links. However, even

42

with the success of joint Indonesian-Australian investigations after the Bali bombings,

progress has been slow. Australia has proven that it is willing to adopt a unilateral

approach and conduct military operations against the will of nations in the region. The

need to intervene in East Timor was not a time to be wary of treading on eggshells.

Action was required and plainly the Indonesian military proved unable or unwilling to

prevent the descent into anarchy that occurred after the vote for independence. ASEAN’s

policy of nonintervention against the sovereign status of another member nation will

continue to make realistic achievements within the Asia Pacific region difficult. A

regional security force that is composed of forces from ASEAN’s member nations and

funded by ASEAN and other interested nations, such as Australia, Japan, Singapore and

the US, warrants further investigation.

Defense Update 2003 concluded that, for the foreseeable future, any ADF

operations are likely to occur within the context of the following regional contingencies:

the war on terror, efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD, or operations to enhance

global security and stability. The MOLE concept is validated by the implications for

defense as a result of the changes identified in Defense Update 2003. While the prospect

of operations against the war on terror farther a field than Australia’s immediate region

exists, the most likely scenario is the ADF supporting coalition efforts against the war on

terror within the immediate neighborhood. As Defense Update 2003 states: “SE Asia and

the South Pacific face major challenges due to the political weakness, decline in

governance, difficulty in grappling with terrorism and the economic effects of terrorism.

If these trends continue, there may be increased calls on the ADF for operations in

Australia’s immediate neighborhood” (Hill 2003, 23). In view of the government’s

43

determination to act within the region, it is prudent at this stage to discuss the

implications for MOLE actions arising from the release of Defense Update 2003.

Defense Update 2003 and Implications for MOLE

MOLE envisages four specific actions to achieve successful operational

outcomes. These are shaping operations, entry from air and sea (EAS), decisive

operations, and transition operations. This section will analyze these four actions against

the four force capabilities identified within Defence Update 2003, namely: flexibility,

mobility, readiness, and sustainability. The aim is to assess the regional threat against

MOLE’s key actions and the strategic and military taskings identified in the Defense

Update 2003, to provide generic force capability recommendations for successful

operations within the region. Subsequent chapters will develop the generic force

recommendations into a force structure to successfully perform MOLE actions in a region

characterized by an unconventional threat in countries with expanding urban populations,

culturally dominant religions, and inadequate infrastructure.

Defence Update 2003 and Shaping Operations

Shaping operations within MOLE rely on continuous actions to establish the

conditions for success. Forces assigned conduct operations that will eventually enhance

their ability to generate sufficient shock to dislocate or disrupt the adversary’s capacity to

react. The primary threat within the region identified in chapter two is an unconventional

force employing indiscriminate acts of violence in predominantly urban terrain. Threats

emanate from within the ROI, but particularly from terror cells in Indonesia, Malaysia,

and the Philippines. These threats are representative of a global terror threat with mooted

terrorist links to the Middle East and East Asia. Successful shaping operations demand

44

isolation of that threat. Regionally this is difficult due to the limited knowledge and

substantiated proof of the activities of terror organizations such as JI, Abu Sayyef, and

MILF.

Shaping operations commence some time prior to the subsequent actions of EAS

and direct action (DA) and are defined as those operations that set the conditions for a

force to be able to generate shock. As noted in the MOLE concept “Shaping actions occur

at all levels from the national strategic to the tactical. Shaping actions are inclusive of

actions that reinforce future friendly force action as well as targeting the adversary’s

ability to collect and gather information on which to plan a coherent and appropriate

response and their ability to fight” (Willis 2003, 6). Therefore, the messages associated

with a successful shaping operation are required to be consistent throughout the conduct

of a particular operation. Consistency will assist in the achievement of the overall aim of

the particular operation and of convincing the intended target of the legitimacy of the

message. The generic force structure implications for a successful shaping operation

within the region must include a heavy emphasis on economy of force operations, such as

military intelligence, psychological operations (PSYOP), and information operations

(IO), all of which place particular importance on developing a commander’s situational

awareness and conditioning the reaction of threat forces and indigenous populations.

Shaping and Flexibility

Flexibility in this context contends that a force must be suitably balanced in its

initial structure to allow commanders to adjust to suit changes in the threat or operational

situation. The Army has access to a number of assets within its current structure to

adequately perform shaping operations, in addition to those other offensive capabilities

45

that are part of a joint operation. There are a number of sensors and capabilities available

to a commander to provide flexibility. These are as simple as UAVs and light observation

helicopters (LOH). Both of these systems have been employed successfully in East Timor

by INTERFET and on Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and OIF in

Iraq by Australian forces to complement the efforts of other intelligence sources, such as

HUMINT. The key to successful intelligence gathering appears to be the successful

layering of assets to achieve satisfaction of priority intelligence requirements and specific

intelligence requirements.

One asset may not be as effective in a particular environment as another;

therefore, a commander must be flexible in the application of those assets rather than

rigidly insisting on the same asset in each environment. As Brigadier Vince Williams,

Commander Headquarters Sectorwest noted after his involvement in UNMISET:

“HUMINT was absolutely important, but I would not put all my eggs in one HUMINT

basket. [The] LOHs were great. I have significant concern we are taking the LOH s out of

the inventory and replacing them with an armed system that will not be providing the

same capability” (2003, 35). It is a significant issue for force structure in the ADF for

operations within the region if the LOHs are not replaced with an equally capable

platform. Due to the nature of the terrain, which is predominantly rural but tending more

towards urbanized, the ability of the Army to gather intelligence to support shaping and

the subsequent phases of MOLE could be impacted upon. Recent operational reports

from stability operations in Iraq have indicated the superiority of the Kiowa OH58D over

the performance of the Apache AH64 when employed in areas of complex terrain.

46

Observations from the US Army Joint Readiness Training Center noted: “During

stability and support operations the UAV becomes less capable. Small enemy forces over

large geographic areas degrade the systems ability to cover numerous NAI. . . . Collection

managers seem to be overwhelmed keeping up with these tasks and getting the UAV at

the right place at the right time to support maneuver commanders. . . . By the time the

system leaves the departure airfield to the target, the event will most likely be over”

(JRTC 2003, 3).

This is not to say that strategic UAVs do not have their place; in fact for some

government level force commitment decisions they may be absolutely vital. However,

with respect to the operations in which the Australian Army is likely to be involved, and

given the identified difficulty associated with operating UAVs, low-level models with

medium-term endurance and the ability to operate line of sight have real application for

operations in the region. UAVs are also a suitable source of information when employed

well forward for the provision of short-term information to the force that deploys them.

Force capabilities to enhance a commander’s ability to counter the threat within the

region and provide successful and flexible shaping operations therefore include military

intelligence assets, IO and surveillance sensors, and assets that allow economy of force

operations, such as Special Forces.

Shaping and Mobility

The second action described in Defence Update 2003 is mobility. Its application

during shaping operations as part of MOLE is to assist in setting conditions for success.

The ability of a force operating in the region to be successful stems, in part, from its

ability to generate effects such as fixing. If the intelligence assets of the force are

47

coordinated and achieve a layered effect, the information available to a commander will

dictate his next actions with regard to his fixing forces. For the Army to successfully

perform shaping operations it must contain an element that provides enhanced tactical

mobility and the necessary firepower to fix a threat force. A tactical mobility platform

should also seek to achieve protection and survivability to provide the ground

commander the ability to conduct subsequent operations and continue to set the

conditions for the decisive operation. As CA Lieutenant General Leahy noted in a recent

speech to the United Services Institute in Canberra: “A direct fire protected mobility

platform represents an important building block of both the combined arms team and a

hardened networked Army” (2003, 17).

Shaping and operational mobility may require additional lift assets that are

capable of operating on dispersed landing fields to support forward troops such as Special

Forces. The aircraft can be coordinated into a target area by a combination of ground

forces and AWACS and contribute to the supported commander’s shaping options.

Strategic mobility allows deployment of larger forces for protracted deployments within

the region and may include assets capable of projecting larger than the usual high

readiness company-sized groups. Force capabilities to enhance tactical, operational, and

strategic mobility when conducting shaping operations within the region require further

coordination with current and projected programs to ensure that government guidance is

being met.

Shaping and Readiness

The size of the ADF has led the government to consider niche capabilities the

solution to force structure when committing troops to coalition or UN operations. Recent

48

commitments of troops to OEF and OIF are examples, with the force limited to Special

Forces, Naval assets, a squadron of Air Force fighters, support elements, and

headquarters elements.

However, to be effectively prepared for operations to provide security in the

immediate neighborhood and support wider interests (key tasks from D2000) suggests

that two brigade-sized forces, the first based on a light airmobile brigade capable of

conducting airmobile operations from amphibious platforms, and the second a medium-

weight force with integrated offensive fire support, also amphibious capable, are a basic

requirement. The guidance from government in Defence Update 2003 describes the need

for high readiness in deployable forces. By continually reverting to niche contributions

the government is contributing to the overall ineffectiveness of the ADF in two ways.

Firstly it is denuding the combined capability of the larger organization, such as regular

infantry brigades for the benefit of a highly capable but considerably smaller organization

such as Special Forces. Secondly, the over commitment of capabilities such as Special

Forces, refueling aircraft, and naval platforms risks burn out. To effectively shape the

battlefield, the force available must be structured to be ready for short notice deployments

as a formation that is supplemented by additional specializations that enhance the overall

capability of the force and deal with the regional threat.

Entry from Air and Sea (EAS) and Flexibility

MOLE envisages a phased entry of forces for effective operations within the

region. Entry is a complex phase that will require considerable coordination to be

successful. The actions of Defence Update 2003 remain relevant to the conduct of entry

operations and will be covered in turn. Firstly, considering flexibility, this phase requires

49

forces to be ready for deployment and is characterized by rapid transportation in either

strategic air or sea mobility assets. For a contingency that allows greater flexibility in

reaction time and preparation, the deployment of a heavier mechanized force by sea may

be appropriate. By doing so the commander has greater flexibility when he transitions his

force from EAS to DO as the landed force will have greater integral mobility and fire

power. In contrast for a contingency that requires a more rapid response with reduced

lead times for deployment, a light force deployed by strategic air assets would be

appropriate. This requirement has significant implications for the current state of the

ADF’s strategic lift. The current fleet of C103Js is sufficient to sustain deployed forces of

up to a brigade-sized force, though only when supplemented by AN124 aircraft or similar

aircraft for troop movement.

EAS and Mobility

The operational mobility of a light initial entry force is characterized by maneuver

either by air assault from a limited number of embarked helicopters or by parachute or

air-land operations from a forward staging base. This situation has force structure

implications, as the Army at present cannot maneuver sufficient forces to an area of

operations to conduct concurrent entry operations and decisive actions as envisaged by

MOLE doctrine. The rounding out of the 1st Brigade, currently located in Darwin, to

include an additional mechanized battalion will provide the Army with a balanced and

capable force for shaping and entry operations. The provision of modern tanks will

enhance the forces’ ability to conduct entry operations and subsequent decisive actions.

Mobility for either light or heavy forces by strategic amphibious lift assets is currently

limited to only a battalion group sized force at present. Clearly this does not provide the

50

government or the joint force commander a significant amount of flexibility when

planning force options. To allow the Army to contribute a significant force to counter the

type of threat envisaged within the ROI, a significant enhancement of the amphibious

capability must be pursued.

EAS and Readiness

The impact of increased threat within the region has forced the government to

reconsider the degree of ADF amphibious deficiencies, and it is prepared to upgrade the

current amphibious capability to meet the requirements of MOLE. As previously

discussed, increased readiness of a larger proportion of the Army is suggested as a viable

alternative for the government and meets its guidance outlined in Defence Update 2003.

Rather than continuing to offer niche forces for commitments, the ability to draw larger

building blocks of capabilities from extant organizations that are trained and compatible

makes as much sense. Current government guidance is that the replacement for HMA

Ship Kanimbla, a former US Navy Landing Ship Tank (LST), and HMA Ship Tobruk

will be larger amphibious vessels in the order of 26,000 tons. The replacement vessel for

HMA Ship Manoora, also a former US Navy LST, will be a larger capacity sealift ship.

The first new amphibious vessel to come on-line will be the replacement for HMA Sip

Tobruk some time after 2010.

As the Australian Strategic Policy Institute document The Defense Capability

Review 2003: A Modest and Incomplete Review notes: “There are advantages and

disadvantages with purchasing larger ships. A smaller number of larger more capable

ships have the advantage of requiring fewer assets to be protected by escort vessels.

Larger ships can transit more comfortably in higher sea states, have a longer range and

51

can operate a larger number of helicopters, but they can also provide only the same

number of docking spaces as smaller ships. This means that a larger number of smaller

ships would have more amphibious lift than a smaller number of larger ships” (Borgu

2003, 9).

EAS and Sustainability

While the decision to purchase newer, more capable amphibious vessels for the

ADF is a significant enhancement of the Army’s ability to perform MOLE, the decision

suggests changes in strategic direction. The government’s recent decision to consider

changes to the Defense Capability Review (DCR), which was originally linked to D2000,

supports the suggestion. Whatever the reason, the government is now committed to

replacing all three amphibious vessels and support ships. A possible solution for

consideration is the purchase of fourth generation roll-on roll-off (4G RoRo) ships to

replace the current three amphibious ships. These ships, built in South Korea by

Wallenius-Wilhelmsen Lines, are “designed to be generalist ships, able to move 5.500

cars, 1600 containers, locomotives, heavy machinery, whole aircraft . . . upgraded, each

4G Ro Ro can simultaneously act as an AOR (confirm acronym), transport a full light

brigade, it stores, vehicles, personnel and fuel as well as 24-36 helicopters” (Asia Pacific

Defence Reporter, September 2003, 7). In effect, the purchase of one of these ships

would meet the government’s requirements of readiness and sustainability for entry

operations, as they are capable of carrying sufficient stores, equipment, and fuel to

sustain a brigade for eighty days. The cost of this option will make it attractive to

government.

52

The key tasks for the ADF listed in D2000 were the defense of Australia and

operations in the immediate neighborhood. Aldo Borgu suggests that “the government is

moving towards placing the defense of Australia and regional requirements as equal

priorities with respect to force structure decisions” (2003, 3). That may be the case;

however, the fact remains, if the Army is to conduct shaping or entry operations

concurrent with decisive actions within the region then the force structure requires

enhancement.

Decisive Actions and Flexibility

The Army’s ability to effectively execute Decisive Actions (DA) in MOLE with a

flexible force as capable as discussed in Defense Update 2003 is dependent on the force

structure. The force must be capable of operating across the spectrum of combat with a

mix of forces to meet the most anticipated contingencies. The enhancement of

amphibious capability is significant; however, DA is likely to be conducted concurrently

or at times consecutively with other shaping and entry operations. As noted in the MOLE

concept thesis, “Decisive actions reinforce EAS by maintaining the tempo of operations.

Successful entry does not necessarily preclude the need for subsequent tactical actions to

further generate shock. Consequently DA forces will need to be rapidly deployable by air

and amphibious means in order to maintain tempo, prevent the loss of initiative and

overwhelm the adversary’s ability to adapt” (Willis 2002, 7). Effective solutions for troop

and equipment carriage are available as previously discussed; however, the capability

afforded by improved intelligence and information-gathering capabilities will

significantly enhance the flexibility the ground commander has in deciding on a course of

action.

53

Rapid deployment by air, within the region is currently achievable by the ADF.

However, in terms of timely responses the ADF is severely limited if a conventional

parachute response is required. Currently the ADF has three units capable of conducting

parachute operations: the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), Fourth Battalion, the

Royal Australian Regiment, Commando, (4 RAR Cdo), and Third Battalion, the Royal

Australian Regiment (3 RAR). The first two units are Special Forces units while 3 RAR,

a Third Brigade unit, is the sole conventional force capable of such a response. Third

Brigade will generally deploy by amphibious means, given its experience in airmobile

operations, directly from those platforms to EAS or DA tasks. To reduce the parachute

capability to two Special Forces units would seriously erode the government’s strategic

flexibility to react conventional forces to short-notice contingencies, especially if those

Special Forces units are operational elsewhere.

Decisive Action and Mobility

DA in the region that is dominated by large island populations with significant

coastlines and extensive urban centers will require an extremely mobile and rapidly

deployable force. To consider the implications of mobility when conducting DA the

thesis will discuss mobility from a strategic, operational and tactical perspective. A force

capable of strategic mobility is limited, within the ADF, to the F111. The aircraft, though

aging, are still an effective and capable platform that could operate and strike land targets

within the ROI and directly support land forces The range of munitions available to the

F111 and its payload make it a vital element in successfully prosecuting DA. Any

decision that removes the F111 from active duty without identifying a suitable alternative

effectively removes the capacity to provide a platform capable of strategic strike and DA.

54

Strategic mobility may be provided by additional sealift, however, amphibious shipping

is not capable of DA. It is the embarked forces that conduct DA, though the naval assets

may provide a shaping effect in the form of naval gunfire support. Operational mobility is

capable of being provided by amphibious shipping for the forces embarked to perform

DA. A mobile and agile aircraft capable of operating over the shore to distant objectives

and medium weight armored variants offering protected mobility and effects-based

firepower will enhance the Army’s ability to conduct DA.

The current structure of the Army necessitates well crafted planning that

effectively husbands resources such as Army aviation and mechanized vehicles. DA is a

method of operation with emphasis on maintaining tempo and striking at an adversary’s

vulnerabilities and ultimately destroying the center of gravity. DA may be conducted

concurrently with other shaping or entry operations. However, if force structure remains

at current levels, then conducting the actions of MOLE consecutively will allow a greater

chance of success. Russell Glenn, discussing the implications of decisive operations,

notes: “[The] orchestration of joint capabilities is another way that the ADF can free

Army forces for commitments to urban interiors” (2003, 55).

Successful EAS operations from strategic platforms of either an amphibious or air

nature will set the conditions for DA within the region. While a mature amphibious

capability is likely within the next ten years, as previously discussed, current

contingencies are barely supportable with the existing three amphibious ships. Air

insertions for DA tasks are more problematic, if the government envisages deployments

to operational theaters more distant than the region. The planned purchase of air-to-air

refueling aircraft will give the ADF the ability to refuel its strategic air assets (currently

55

C130J aircraft) in flight. It follows that, for contingencies requiring a quicker response

than by sea, a light force option with limited tactical mobility is the most likely force

Enhancing the tactical mobility of light forces should therefore be a key consideration for

the Army’s force development organizations.

Tactical mobility is currently provided by M113 armored personnel carriers,

closely supported by tanks. The inclusion of an armored variant that is significantly more

capable than the current tank, the Leopard 1, was identified as necessary to provide an

Army medium weight brigade with the ability to operate more successfully in the

complex terrain of the ROI. Operations in support of coalition partners in the wider

region are more likely for the medium weight force with the inclusion of a tank such as

the M1 Abrams. However, the remaining armored variants of the Army, such as those

that provide tactical mobility to dismounted infantry, must also be capable of

withstanding engagement by a variety of shoulder fired rocket propelled grenades. If such

a level of protection is not achieved then those additional armored vehicles will continue

to be titled armored personnel carriers rather than true infantry-fighting vehicles. Current

operations in Iraq have shown that the US Army’s Stryker vehicles (very similar to

LAV’s) are particularly vulnerable to mass-produced RPG-7 shoulder fired rocket

launchers. The latest variants are two stage rockets designed to penetrate up to 2 inches of

reactive armor and explode inside the crew compartment. Even the M1 Abrams and M2

Bradley fighting vehicles are vulnerable to these weapons from the rear.

Decisive Action and High Readiness Forces

The readiness implications for the Army to perform DA tasks are significant if the

government also expects Army forces to perform concurrent EAS tasks. The Army would

56

benefit from an additional mechanized infantry battalion allocated to the medium-weight

1st Brigade to allow concurrent EAS and DA tasks. Brigades of medium and light design

maintained at high readiness with capabilities sufficient to conduct DA within the region

could conceivably fulfill the Australian government’s future commitments to operations

within the region or in the wider region, including coalition operations. However without

an increase of at least one infantry battalion or re-rolling of a current battalion to

guarantee six, the ability to perform concurrent EAS and DA tasks would be difficult to

sustain.

A recent Australian Strategic Policy Institute document, Pay Your Money and

Take Your Pick: Defence Spending Choices for Australia, outlined five options for

defense. Two options looked at the implications for capability by spending more than

programmed, two looked at spending less than programmed, and one looked at the

current published plan. Option four was titled stepping up, and aimed to address

weaknesses in option three (the current budgeted plan) by “outlining an expanded force

that would deepen Australia’s current range of capabilities significantly” (Thomson 2003,

35). In essence it advocated an increase in the ability to deploy and sustain land forces by

adding a program to harden and expand the Army.

The increases included additional air and maritime capabilities and additional

command, communications, and intelligence capabilities for the ADF. The utility of this

document is that it contributes to the debate on future defense capabilities and costs of

any increases of forces and capital equipment. For the Army to conduct MOLE within the

region or contribute to a coalition operation in the future, additional forces and

capabilities are required. As Dr Thompson notes, “For a relatively moderate increase in

57

spending, substantial increases in capability, and significant additional strategic options

for government [are possible.] The expanded and hardened Army would give [Australia]

additional land options, but with the added advantage of being able to more confidently

deploy and protect those land forces with air and naval capability” (Thomson 2003, 36).A

possible consideration maybe to include a role for the Army Reserve within the force

structure. Re-rolling the Army Reserve to defending key elements and headquarters when

deployed, reduces to some degree, the requirement of higher readiness forces to perform

such tasks.

Transition Actions

The decision of how to structure a force to conduct operations in the region, given

the changed strategic circumstances in which Australia now finds itself, is a particularly

difficult one. The costs associated with providing defense capability are significant;

however, the government has shown that by reviewing the current Defense Capability

Plan (DCP) it is willing to consider more expensive options. As this chapter has argued,

the force structure to support the government’s strategic intentions within the region

requires forces capable of performing shaping and entry operations and decisive actions.

The force, however, must also be capable of conducting transition actions to establish the

conditions for handover of responsibility either to a peacekeeping force or host nation. In

effect the force is responsible for actions across the spectrum of operations and may be

deployed for a significant period of time.

Plainly the force structure that results has to be capable of performing all of the

MOLE actions in a joint environment in the region or the wider region as either the lead

nation or as part of a coalition. Transition actions are generally stability and peace

58

support operations; however, the force must be as capable of performing DA as it is of

performing transition operations. Forces most likely to augment DA forces when the

transition actions occur are military police, engineers, civilian police, military

intelligence, and civil affairs personnel.

The purpose of this chapter was to identify the implications of Defence Update

2003 on the Army and its ability to fully perform the MOLE actions, and to consider the

impact of the threat identified in chapter two. The Army is in the midst of a transition as

improved technology is slowly introduced into service and formations benefit from

increased levels of operational service. As Defence Update 2003 notes, contributions to

coalition operations are more likely in the future, though the structure of those force

contributions remains difficult to assess. Chapter four will assess the key determinants of

force structure identified in the thesis: MOLE requirements, regional requirements,

supporting wider interest requirements, and threat mitigation requirements.

59

CHAPTER 4

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM REGIONAL ANALYSIS

The ongoing migration of the world population to cities on or near the coasts, combined with growing reach of modern weapons, makes the objective area for decisive military operations more accessible to naval expeditionary forces, which places even greater demands on carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. (2002, 407)

George V. Galdorisi, Expeditionary and amphibious warfare. In Globalization and maritime power.

An inference from the release of Defence Update 2003 and a return to a “Forward

Defence” policy is that the government has abandoned the policy of the “Defence of

Australia,” which was the cornerstone of the 1986 Review of Australia’s Defense

Capabilities. The government’s clarification that increased strategic presence of the US

within the region of SE Asia makes the likelihood of direct attack on Australia unlikely is

noted; however, this can only be counted on if the interests of the US within the region

remain convergent with Australia’s.

To transition the ADF from a force geared towards the ‘Defence of Australia,’

“with all the logistics luxuries that local support infrastructures offer” (Bostock 2003,

28), to a force that is capable of projecting itself thousands of miles away and sustaining

itself for long periods of time is going to be difficult. Bostock suggests, contrary to the

view of many, that the decision to shift the operational focus of the ADF from ‘Defence

of Australia’ to a more expeditionary focus was caused by the events of September 11

and Bali. He believes that “Careful observers of Australia’s defense and security outlook

have known that the writing of change has been on the wall for some time; that the

transformation of Australia’s defense stance commenced several years ago, and is

60

gathering momentum” (2003, 28). If this is the case then those careful observers did not

include the government, given the emphasis that defense of Australia received in D2000.

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the parameters for the development of a

suitable force structure to perform the key actions of the MOLE concept. After a short

introduction the chapter will analyze four specific elements of the region and conflict

spectrum to arrive at a recommended force structure: coalition amphibious force structure

lessons, regional indicators, the wider area of interest indicators, and, finally, regional

and global threat indicators. Examining these four intrinsic components in detail will

reveal limitations in the current structure, and the recommendations that follow will form

the basis of chapter five.

MOLE and Capital Equipment Requirements

The thesis has already discussed in some detail the specific actions of the MOLE

concept and identified possible force structure considerations based on the region. While

Australia has recently successfully conducted a number of amphibious operations to

support operations in East Timor and the Solomon’s, neither of these operations involved

sustained effort the type of which is envisaged by MOLE. It is therefore pertinent to

review the operational techniques, equipment, and structures of likely partners in the

region and the wider region to seek relevant force structure recommendations for the

ADF. The nations and forces to be considered are UK, France, and the US.

Recommendations based on analysis of those forces will provide guidance

towards the most suitable force structure for the Army to perform littoral power

projection in a joint environment in Australia’s region of interest (ROI). As Michael

Evans noted in his recent monograph, Developing Australia’s Maritime Concept of

61

Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942: “In addition to harmonizing littoral

maneuver and amphibious concepts and capabilities, the ADF needs to come to grips

with the broader role of naval operations in the 21st century. While sea control remains an

essential feature of maritime operations (as demonstrated by the ADF’s recent experience

in East Timor), its purpose has undergone considerable change since the end of the Cold

War. Western navies are in the midst of a transition from oceanic to littoral warfare

where the emphasis will be on joint power projection from the sea to the land” (2000,

77).

The scope of this chapter does not support detailed recommendations on the

capital equipment investments required by the government to allow the ADF to

successfully prosecute MOLE. It is not clear what sort of capabilities the ships will have.

Studying Western forces with like strategic and operational goals, however, may provide

some clearer guidance on the type of ships that are available and the types of forces that

can operate from them in the littorals of Australia’s ROI.

US Navy and US Marines Corps

The lessons the ADF can take from the recent experience of the US Navy and US

Marines Corps (USMC), in the context of developing like capabilities in MOLE, must be

preceded by an understanding of the current capabilities and USMC doctrine. As Bostock

notes: “Some of Australia’s more outspoken defense analysts suggest that the ADF of

2010-15 need to resemble the US Marine Corps (USMC), although on a smaller scale;

but of size and potency nonetheless that enables a joint amphibious taskforce to project

significant power ashore in undertaking, then supporting, land operations” (2003, 28).

62

While not advocating that the Australian Army abandon its primary role of

fighting and winning its nation’s land battles to accept the role of a regional sheriff, some

analysis of the concept of expeditionary warfare is prudent. The USMC is a unique

organization in that it is able to draw on a variety of capabilities that are indigenous to

their organization when a contingency requires it. As the USMC doctrinal publication

(MCDP) 3, Expeditionary Operations, notes: “An expedition is a military operation

conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country”

(Krulak 1998, 31). The USMC is structured to be capable of rapidly responding to a crisis

throughout the world either from a forward base or from afloat in purpose-designed

amphibious assets. The capability of the ADF is very similar to this USMC description,

though Australia’s ability to project strategically is questionable. The USMC advocates

structuring a force to be capable of forcible entry at all times, but prefers to use other

operational techniques that do not require the seizing and holding of a beachhead, for

example, ship to objective maneuver (STOM).

USMC doctrine refers to enabling actions, which are very similar to the ADF’s

shaping actions. “Enabling actions are those preparatory actions taken by the

expeditionary force to facilitate the eventual accomplishment of the mission” (Krulak

1998, 41). The USMC does not differentiate between enabling actions and entry

operations, preferring to combine both actions. This reflects more the capability of the

USMC to conduct concurrent operations that are all enabling actions. The ADF would be

better served retaining the current MOLE doctrine of shaping actions and EAS due to the

size of the ADF relative to a USMC unit.

63

The USMC maintains up to four different forces of varying size that are tailored

to a specific contingency. It typically deploys and employs combined arms teams known

as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). All MAGTFs share four basic elements: a

command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a combat

service support element. The structure of a MAGTF is relevant to the ADF, as future

contingencies involving the ADF within the region could require a similar structure. The

air component of any joint task force (JTF) that the ADF establishes (less any embarked

helicopters), would only be able to operate within the endurance range of the aircraft in

relation to the Australian mainland until a forward airfield was established. MAGTFs

have the ability to serve as a JTF headquarters or as a component headquarters of a JTF.

The second USMC force is a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). The MEU

operates forward deployed from the sea, and according to the USMC Expeditionary

Maneuver Warfare concept, “ the MEU is unconstrained by regional infrastructure

requirements or restrictions imposed by other nations. Because of its forward presence,

situational awareness, rapid response, planning capability, and organic sustainment, the

MEU will continue to be the JFCs immediately employable combined arms force of

choice” (Jones 2001, 5). The MEU is also special operations capable. The internal

structure of the MEU includes infantry, combat support, combat service support, aviation,

armor, reconnaissance, and field artillery elements. It can be termed a big battalion or a

small brigade (see figure 6).

64

Figure 6. MEU(SOC) Wiring Diagram

Source: Marine Corps Publication MCRP 5-12D [Website]; available from; http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/ind.nsf/publications/ Internet; accessed on 27 March 2004.

The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) is larger still and is optimized to

respond to a full range of crises. It can be deployed strategically by air or by sea and

provides the JTF a “robust sea-based forcible entry capability” (Jones 2001, 5). The role

of the MEB, and its complimentary capabilities from other services is to locate and

counter the adversary’s access denial system. The MEB is then designed to close on

critical objectives to achieve decisive results by air, land, or sea. The real lesson for the

ADF from the employment of the MEB is the imbedded capabilities that the force

contains, rather than the size. At a numerical size of 15,000, the MEB is well beyond the

65

force projection capability of the ADF. Each branch is represented in the force; however,

unlike the ADF, all of these capabilities are also Marines capabilities. This thesis is not

advocating the establishment of a separate Army fixed wing capability or naval field

artillery units; rather the success of the MEU, MAGTF, and MEB in achieving their

missions suggests that a force that is tailored for operations is a possible answer for

MOLE. (The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) is the largest of the USMC formations

and given its capabilities and size it is not relevant to discuss it any further in this thesis.)

The USMC is currently serviced by three classes of amphibious ships: the San

Antonio class amphibious transport dock (LPD), the Wasp class amphibious assault ship

(LHD), and the Tawara class (LHA). Each of these ships has capabilities that enhance the

ability of the embarked forces to conduct STOM. The Wasp class ships are capable of

accommodating the AV-8B Harrier jump jet and the LCAC hovercraft, along with the

full range of Navy and Marine helicopters, conventional landing craft, and amphibious

assault vehicles. The LHA and the LPD, while not as large as the 40,000-ton LHD, have

specific capabilities to move Marines ashore by air and by sea and in their own way are

also unique. The amphibious capability of the USMC is second to none in numbers and

capability, and when comparing these three classes of ships the ADF should note that the

US Navy has designed ships to achieve a wide variety of mission profiles rather than to

fit a specific sized force. The ships are capable of embarked mission specific force

structures as a result.

United Kingdom

The UK has not shelved it desire to maintain a leading edge blue water navy to act

in defense of its interests across the globe. On the contrary it has reinforced this desire by

66

announcing it plans to build two new aircraft carriers. It is planned that these ships will

house air operations for the short take off and vertical landing version of the joint strike

fighter.

While the UK has maintained a strong capability with its blue water fleet, it is the

developing amphibious capability that is of particular interest to Australia. The UK

currently maintains a dedicated amphibious force based on the Royal Marines of 3rd

Commando Amphibious Brigade. The principal platform of the force is the HMS Ocean,

a helicopter carrier capable of operating medium and heavy lift helicopters and

concurrent well deck operations for a variety of armored and amphibious landing craft.

Recent noncombatant and show of force operations in Sierra Leone demonstrated the

capability of this vessel to operate effectively in the littoral waters off the African coast.

The amphibious helicopter carrier was originally conceived in the mid 1980s to provide

the sort of amphibious assault capabilities last offered by HM Ships Albion and Bulwark.

The ship's primary role is to carry an embarked military force supported by twelve

medium support helicopters, six attack helicopters and four Landing Craft Vehicle

Personnel Mk 5 Landing Craft. Her secondary roles include afloat training, performing as

a limited anti-submarine warfare platform and a base for antiterrorist operations. The

commandos in HMS Ocean are supported by their own assault engineers, gun batteries,

logistics personnel, and an assault squadron. When combined with their air group they

form a completely self-sustaining unit, which can deploy from beyond the horizon and

over one hundred miles inshore. HMS Ocean and her support vessels also carry a vast

quantity of field rations and ammunition to keep them supported and over thirty air-

transportable vehicles to give them maximum mobility ashore

67

Two key lessons for the project team developing Australia’s new amphibious

ships are, firstly, the HMS Ocean is not capable of off loading heavy armored vehicles

and, secondly, it does not have a well deck capacity for its indigenous MK V landing

craft. It is forced to rely on stern door marriages or along side port and starboard cross

loading techniques. In heavier weather this would be an obvious disadvantage. One

advantage of the vessel for consideration, however, is its capacity to conduct refueling

operations for all UK helicopters. It can conduct helicopter and refueling operations

simultaneously.

While the HMS Ocean does have minor design deficiencies it is a very capable

platform for operations farther afield than the closer littoral regions of the UK. The hull is

based on the same hull upon which the Invincible class aircraft carriers are built, and,

therefore, the Ocean is a genuine blue water amphibian. As a recent Janes article noted:

“Amphibious forces played a leading part in the operations in Iraq. [HMS] Ark Royal,

configured as an amphibious ship, led a group comprising [HMS] Ocean and four landing

ships to conduct an attack on the A-Faw peninsula, the first helo-borne landing since

Suez in 1956” (Janes Fighting Ships May 2003, 4) A key lesson to consider from the UK

experience is in both Sierra Leone and the A-Faw Peninsula is that at least two large

amphibious platforms, supported by additional landing ships, were required to generate

sufficient combat power quickly on the objective.

The UK has also entered into a twenty-five year agreement with a civilian

contractor to be build six Roll on Roll off (RoRo) ships that will be crewed and

maintained by the contractor to improve the strategic sealift. Designed with transporting

military equipment in mind, the vessels can dock at a wide variety of ports, loading from

68

either the stern or side. The ships also carry a forty-five-ton crane, have enhanced

stability, and have ice-breaking capabilities (DPA 13 June 2003, 1). The ships were

delivered twenty months ahead of schedule and ready for service to deploy elements of

the UK contribution to OIF.

France

In the past ten years the French have made extensive acquisitions to their naval

fleet, particularly in amphibious shipping. The recent purchase of two 21,000-ton

multipurpose amphibious ships is the culmination of a trend that saw France “mount no

major expeditionary operations between the end of the Algerian War in 1962 and the

1991 conflict in the Gulf” (Thomas 2000, 17). France has been extensively reviewing its

military since 1991 to rationalize the three arms and allow the government to generate

sufficient force to respond to short-term contingencies. Recent contributions to the

NATO effort in Bosnia and Kosovo have gone some way to restoring France’s ability to

operate in a coalition environment, but until the review and restructuring is complete

there will be difficulties in meeting its defense commitments (Thomas 2000, 20).

The French amphibious vessels will be designed to allow France to participate in

coalition operations. According to the French Ministry of Defense, “the aim of the two

ships is to serve as pre-positioned command platforms and landing docks for joint and

multinational amphibious operations. They will also be capable of conducting non-

combatant evacuations and humanitarian relief” (Lewis and Scott 2000, 1). Though as

Thomas notes, France did not conduct any significant expeditionary operations for nearly

thirty years, it did conduct frequent small-scale interventions along the African coast in

that same period. So it is significant that the new ships will have the capability of

69

supporting not only conventional multinational operations, but also humanitarian

operations.

When the request for tender for the planned replacement of the Royal Australian

Navy LPAs is released, consideration of load capacity, offload capabilities, and internal

load configuration options should be a priority. An amphibious platform dock/helicopter

that is capable of operating up to six heavy lift helicopters and the replacement for the

landing craft heavy appears to be the best option. Three ships of this capability could

conceivably lift an entire brigade group. This is a significant increase in embarked

capacity considering that the current three amphibious ships can only lift a battalion

group.

Requirements to address the significant lack of sea-based offensive support for

the entry force should also be addressed during the tender selection process. The current

five-inch gun on the ANZAC class frigates is a mooted solution, though the weapon

system performed extremely effectively on recent operations in Iraq, each ship is armed

with only one variant. Unless more than one ship is allocated to the force to allow

engagement of more than one land based target at the point of entry, the capacity to

suppress multiple targets is not possible.

Fitting the amphibious platforms with a missile system capable of attacking land-

based targets may assist the entry forces until artillery and mortar systems can be brought

into action. A local defensive capability for the amphibious ships should be considered to

allow operations closer to the coast and reduce turnaround time for air insertion assets.

This close in protection from attacks, such as occurred to the USS Cole, and may also be

prudent, given the sophistication of threat forces in the region. The Phalanx Close-in

70

Weapon-System is a possible solution. Fitting the ships with systems that allow

protection from antiship missiles or low flying air attack, such the Raytheon Rolling

Airframe Missile (RAM), may reduce the burden on the planned anti air warfare

destroyers. Regional implications suggest that these defensive and offensive weapons

systems should be capable of precision guidance to reduce the likelihood of unintended

civilian casualties.

Outlining Force Structure Determinants

The successful conduct of MOLE by the Army in Australia’s ROI requires more

than an improved amphibious capability. The provision of more capable amphibious

platforms will supply the embarked force with greater flexibility when planning for entry;

however, the current force structure of the deployable brigades requires evaluation. The

size of the Australian Army and the wide range of tasking will not allow Australia to

develop a specialized entry force based on the USMC model. However, force structure

models that result in greater offensive capability and a more integrated combined arms

force are possible.

The 2002 3rd Brigade Capability Development Plan identified that for a 3rd

Brigade entry force to be successful it required improved integral light infantry fire

support, improved situational awareness, protected mobility at combat team level,

accurate and reliable sea-based fire support, and an improved command, control and

communications network (Coutts 2002, 27). Possible equipment-focused solutions for the

infantry are planned within various Army and ADF procurement projects; however,

equipment goes only part of the way to improving the Army’s ability to perform the

MOLE concept’s actions.

71

Command and Control in MOLE

Command and control (C2) of the force is acknowledged as difficult under

existing arrangements, and further consideration of the options available is required to

arrive at a suitable recommendation. Under existing arrangements Commander Australian

Theatre (COMAST) exercises command of all Australian operations under delegation

from the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). The CDF has subordinated COMAST to be

responsible for the planning and conduct of combined and joint campaigns, operations

and other activities as directed by the CDF (Treloar 1999, 2). The issue of commanding a

force in MOLE is contentious as it is more than likely to be a joint force, and all services

would have an opinion on who should command. This thesis recognizes the recent

developments the Navy has made with regard to commanding the ADF’s amphibious

ships. Extensive experience has been gained from consecutive deployments to the Persian

Gulf supporting the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq and as a command

platform for the ADF’s contribution to fighting the GWOT. However, to successfully

command and control a joint task force in the conduct of MOLE with elements from all

three services it is recognized that the recent experience of the deployable joint force

headquarters (DJFHQ) is more relevant.

DJFHQ could command an operation aboard a suitable amphibious platform with

a maritime component, a land component, and an air component subordinated to it. The

environmental commanders would each command their respective forces however, to

support simultaneous air and sea entries the land component commander would have

additional capabilities under his command to allow more responsive coordination of

those forces. Figure 6 indicates a possible C2 model for MOLE. It should be noted that

72

the overall command of the JTF falls to the commander, DJFHQ. The model of this C2

structure has all components of the entry force commanded by the entry force HQ,

whether it be a division or brigade level HQ.

DJFHQ

AIR COMPONENTSPEC OPS COMPONENTHQ ENTRY JTFMARITIME COMPONENT

CATF

CLF

ESCORTS

SOLO

AMPHIB GP COMD

LF

AVN ELM

AMPHIB SHIPS

LAND CRAFT/ABT

JTF AIR ELM COMD

Abvn:

ABT Aslt Beach Team

CATF: Comd Amphib Task Force

CLF: ComdLand Force

DJFHQ: Deployable Joint Force HQ

JTF: Joint task Force

LF: Landing Force

SOLO: Spec Forces Liaison Offr

Figure 7. Proposed C2 Arrangements for MOLE

Regional Determinants

The recent experience of the US, UK, and France in the conduct of amphibious

operations provides valid lessons for the ADF. The lessons that are of prime concern for

this thesis are based on force structure and methods of operations. It is worth noting that

all three nations are building amphibious ships of roughly the same type and capacity,

and are likely to contribute those ships to coalition operations in the future. Therefore, the

73

ADF should consider the ramifications of building vessels capable of carrying a

combined size of a brigade when committing to coalition operations in the future. The

Australian government has directed the DCR to investigate the possible employment of

the Wallenius-Wilhelmsen Lines Tamesis class RoRo vessel as a multi-role ship (MRS).

The recent UK experiences in OIF and ADF experience in East Timor demonstrated that

strategic lift considerations can be met through innovative contracts using commercially

available shipping modified for military service.

Earlier analysis in this thesis focused on the key characteristics of the cities within

Australia’s ROI. That analysis determined that the nations of Indonesia, Philippines, and

PNG had, to varying degrees, characteristics that were similar. Drawing on those

characteristics contributes to developing an understanding of the type of force structure

that may be necessary for the Army to operate successfully within the region. The

principal nonmilitary characteristics of the ROI that require specific consideration when

tailoring a force structure for operations are issues of culture, government structure,

infrastructure, civil programs, and geography.

To lodge a force and operate successfully on another country’s sovereign soil

requires cultural sensitivity, especially if there is a demonstrated anxiety within the

populace to the military’s presence. The force can improve its chances of success by

including elements such as robust civil affairs elements to work closely with local

leaders, both political and religious, with the aim of improving the living conditions and

basic amenities of local inhabitants.

Advanced cultural awareness training will assist the landed force in understanding

its surroundings and possibly assist in breaking down barriers with the local inhabitants.

74

This training should focus on religious tolerance, language, history, traditions, and

cultural considerations. Representatives of the Australian government should also be

included as a part of the force structure. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

personnel working closely with the force commander and local diplomatic officials can

enhance the ability of the force to get its message across at the highest levels. Military

intelligence personnel, physiological operations and information operations specialists

working closely with civilian police from both Australia and the sovereign nation can

access and develop quite detailed databases of threat forces and provide a collection

focus early in the operation.

Military engineers may initially be required for mobility and survivability tasks to

lodge and secure a landed force. However, once the EAS or DA tasks are complete the

engineers can refocus their efforts on transition. Public mobility, repairs to vital lines of

communications, improved sanitation, and water collection, are tasks most likely within

the region. Combat engineers will be suitable for the initial tasks; however, subsequent

infrastructure tasks will require support engineers with plant equipment and more specific

trade specialists with the capacity to reach back to more detailed engineering expertise.

Indicators from the Wider Region

Direct requests from the United Nations or from other sovereign governments

have been assessed under the same criterion, that is, national interest. This trend is likely

to continue in the future. Operations further from Australia’s shores and similar to the

recent commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq remain a distinct possibility in the future as

a result. Defending Australia’s national interests by contributing to coalitions operations

globally remains a likely option for the government. Coalition operations are, by their

75

very nature, more complex, due in part to the additional planning factors involved.

Interoperability in communications and command is an important consideration for the

government. The impact of providing specialized organizations, such as Special Forces or

field hospitals away from Australia’s direct area of strategic of influence is another

legacy that the government must consider when structuring a force commitment. If

Australia is to contribute capable and credible forces to a mid-to-high level contingency

in the future then those forces must be based on a highly mobile and robust mechanized

force. The force is to be more than a regiment of new tanks, however, it should also

include mechanized infantry vehicles, armored cavalry, self-propelled artillery, and

requisite combat service support vehicles and equipment.

Other force elements that could enhance this force and provide a viable option for

the lead country when considering contributing nations are imagery analysts, military

intelligence, electronic warfare, Special Forces, command and control organizations, and

combat engineers. A subsequent requirement for military police and civil affairs

personnel may also be considered. A key to successful integration of this type of force is

the ability to operate within the primary structure of the coalition without having to add

significant command and control networks to be effective.

Regional Threat Indicators for Force Structure

A review of the threat outlined in chapter two indicates that a variety of threats

exist within Australia’s ROI. Threats vary from the PNG problem of tribal warfare to

juvenile and young adult males who prey on the relatively affluent international and

civilian community. Threats within Indonesia and the Philippines are more significant, as

groups such as JI, MILF, and ABF are more indiscriminate in their actions, targeting

76

moderate Muslim and non-Islamic governments, as well as Western targets, and have

proven themselves more than capable of successfully containing the military responses to

their actions (Hill 2003, 12). The successful integration of higher-level intelligence

provided by the United States into the Philippines military response, however, has

effectively forced the MILF back to the negotiating table with the Philippines

government. The effectiveness of the intelligence and US Special Forces training teams

for the Philippines conventional force intervention against the MILF cannot be

underestimated.

Success in the Philippines and Indonesia against the separatist and terrorist

movements requires a greater funding effort from the two countries’ respective

governments, but also from other governments in the region, including Australia.

Combined military operations may be some way off at present; however, intelligence

sharing and combined police operations may go some way to preventing the wider spread

of terror or another Bali style bombing. The links of JI to al Qaeda within Indonesia

remains a significant threat to Australia’s continued security. The level of the threat

demands that the government maintain good working relationships with its counterparts

within Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines at a strategic level, as well as continuing

to foster the developing relationships between the militaries and police forces at the

operational level.

Successful integration of intelligence, Special Forces, civil affairs, and other

mission specialists such as engineers are key elements for future shaping operations as a

prelude to entry and DA by conventional light infantry forces. The level of threat will

dictate what type of force conducts the entry and DA, whether a low-level peace support

77

mission or a mid-to high-level intensity counterinsurgency operation within the ROI.

Regardless, the threat posed by the internationally linked terrorist organizations within

Australia’s ROI have attracted international interest and response forces acting on

excellent real-time intelligence and have proved effective. This method of operation must

continue to be endorsed by the regional political and religious leaders if eventual security

is to return to the region.

In PNG, however, the threat is relatively unsophisticated, and could be countered

by a more effective police force or international police intervention force if so requested

by the PNG government. A view of the tactics employed if the situation were to escalate

to more than random violence against soft civilian targets could be found in a study of the

now disarmed Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The BRA initially, under the

leadership of Francis Ona and, following his ousting, Sam Kuoana, waged a successful

campaign against the PNG government and PNGDF. Tactics included systematic

destruction of the power generation capacity to the Bougainville copper mine. The

company, which is Australian owned, was forced to close down operations after the

threat to its personnel became too significant. Ona and Kuoana employed hit and run

tactics against the PNGDF, performing some minor demolitions and raid and ambush

tactics to effectively forestall the efforts of the Army. The international Peace Monitoring

Group, commanded by Australia and New Zealand on rotation, has recently withdrawn

from the island after nearly eight years of weapon hand-backs and negotiations.

This analysis has indicated that the successful conduct of MOLE by the Army in

Australia’s ROI requires more than an improved amphibious capability. The provision of

more capable amphibious platforms will supply the embarked force with greater

78

flexibility when planning for entry; however, the current force structure of the deployable

brigades requires enhancement to successfully operate against the identified threat in the

ROI and the likely threat in the wider region. Force structure determinants for successful

operations in the region included cultural awareness training, knowledge of government

services and civil infrastructure, and inclusion of mission specialists such as civil affairs

personnel and engineers. Wider regional investigation revealed the utility of personnel

such as Special Forces, imagery analysts, military intelligence, civil affairs and military

police. Finally, investigation of regional threats indicated that successful integration of

civilian police, military intelligence personnel, psychological operations personnel, and

Special Forces personnel would significantly enhance the capabilities of the force.

This thesis has concentrated on four themes throughout. Firstly it examined the

government’s strategic guidance and its impact on the Army and the ADF. Secondly it

investigated the threat within neighboring nations in the region, and the contributing

factors to the development of those threats. Thirdly, it reviewed the most recent strategic

guidance from the government and the relevance and impacts on the Army’s key doctrine

in the region MOLE. Finally, it investigated four key elements to determine broad

indicators of force structure to draw lessons and guide recommendations of force

structure and capital equipment within the future ADF. The final chapter will provide a

synthesis of the thesis and make conclusions and recommendations of force structure and

equipment for the Army to contribute to a successful conduct of the MOLE.

79

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The significant turmoil that resulted from the global terror attacks since 1999, has

altered the governments strategic rationale for committing the ADF to operational

theaters. The defense of Australia, long the cornerstone of Australian strategic policy, has

been discarded due to the governments desire to act in the national interest. Threats posed

by nonstate actors within the ROI and by state sponsored terrorism are the principle-

identified threats. A direct consequence is the need to develop strategies and concepts for

operations within the ROI that effectively combat the threat. The MOLE concept

represents the Army’s contribution to joint operations within the region and has been the

focus of this thesis.

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the doctrine of MOLE and control

operations against a regional threat and to develop recommendations for a future force

structure for operations within the ROI. Initially the thesis discussed the key priorities

and interests of the Australian government as noted in D2000. Those priorities were:

ensure the defense of Australia and its direct approaches, foster the security of its

immediate neighborhood, promote stability and cooperation in southeast Asia, support

strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region, and support global security. However,

the release of Defense Update 2003 provided a broader focus for the ADF and identified

the requirement to provide forces for operations within the ROI and to be prepared to

provide forces for coalition operations in the wider region. The recent deployment to the

Solomon Islands has reinforced the Howard government’s concerns of the threat that

80

resonates within the region. However the government is equally concerned and prepared

to contribute significant forces to mid-to high-level intensity coalition operations, if

requested or required, as evidenced from recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.

This thesis focused on developing recommendations for a force structure to

support the MOLE concept within the ROI. In doing so, two geographic areas within the

ROI that are of direct interest to Australia were identified, specifically SE Asia and

Oceania, each with their own unique problems. With the exception of Singapore, it was

observed that the other nations of SE Asia have a series of critical infrastructure

deficiencies that mar the urban cities of Jakarta, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur. Problems

associated with inadequate power, water supply, sanitation, and sewerage within the

cities proper, and especially to the shantytowns on the urban fringes, continue to draw

heavily on reduced government funding. Conflicting priorities of whether firstly, to fund

solutions for the urban infrastructure problems or to confront insurgent and separatist

movements, challenge the governments of Indonesia, Philippines and to a lesser extent

Malaysia.

The region of Oceania and the South Pacific has its own unique problems,

stemming primarily from economic deficiencies. Poor standards of living and inadequate

government support are common in the countries of PNG, the Solomon Islands, and to a

lesser extent Fiji, which relies on an effective tourist trade for economic prosperity.

Ultimately, if Australia wishes to limit regional conflicts that have the potential to lead to

failed states, such as in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, then diplomatic

arrangements that actively engage these governments and allow them a voice in the

development of the region, such as the South Pacific Forum, are vital.

81

Force Structure Conclusions

As Chapter 2 identifies, threat groups, such as MILF, Abu Sayyef, and JI, feed on

the discontent of the urban poor, recruiting willing accomplices to perform acts of terror

throughout the region. This further undermines the efforts of regional governments to

prevent that discontent. Infrastructure problems and the regional threat will severely limit

Australia’s ability to successfully operate in this region if the force structure is

insufficient. A force structure based on a brigade size unit of action with robust

capabilities that enable liaison with government agencies and civil infrastructure

organizations is vital. In addition to extant brigade units such as infantry, cavalry,

artillery, service support and communications additional capabilities including specialist

engineer elements, civil affairs liaison teams, military police, military intelligence teams,

civil police organizations, and DFAT specialists are required. Effective liaison will

enable a smooth passage to transition operations at the completion of shaping and DA. It

is recommended that a senior level DFAT advisor be made available to the JTF

commander as a standard augmentation for operational deployments in the ROI to enable

smoother interaction with existing regional agencies.

A force that conducts operations within the ROI must be self-sustaining for

indefinite periods without having to draw extensively on the underdeveloped capabilities

of the host nation. The limited support that will be available to the force cannot be relied

on during the planning phase and should therefore be discounted until suitable contracts

with specialist organizations can be arranged. Contractual arrangements are unlikely until

well into the transition phase. A point to note for sustainment planners for operations in

the ROI is the recent experience from the East Timor operational deployment; self-

82

sustainment was difficult to maintain even when conducted within 1,000 miles of

mainland Australia.

To be effectively prepared to provide security in the immediate neighborhood

and support wider interest (key tasks from D2000 and reinforced within Defence Update

2003) it is suggested that a force structure consisting of two brigade-sized forces, the first

based on a light airmobile brigade capable of conducting airmobile operations from

amphibious platforms, and the second a medium-weight armored force with integrated

offensive fire support, also amphibious capable, is a basic requirement. These two

formations already exist within the current force and are trained to operate independently

on specific tasks. The operational tempo of the Army has prevented combined training of

these two forces above battalion level in recent years. However, to maintain a high level

of readiness to effectively conduct shaping operations in the region in the future,

combined training must be increased. Thus allowing the organizations to achieve a higher

state of interoperability and to complement and supplement one another. This permits a

more efficient use of the overall capability, higher readiness and greater flexibility in

tailoring responses to specific contingencies. It also permits transition between the

various actions of MOLE.

If the Army is to be capable of conducting concurrent shaping and EAS actions

then both brigades are going to be required. Training for specific operations is difficult in

the current operational environment, given the variety of tasks for which the Army is

required to train. However, the maintenance of two brigades trained and sustained for

short notice deployments by air and sea is achievable and would continue to meet the

government’s guidance in D2000, and reinforced in Defence Update 2003, to have a

83

brigade-sized force ready for deployment with an additional battalion group on

operations simultaneously.

Recommendations

Force Structure Recommendations

The government has identified that involvement in coalition operations is

somewhat more likely to occur than in the recent past and considers that contributing

important niche capabilities is the most likely form of commitment from Australia (Hill

2003, 23). Interestingly, Defence Update 2003 does not clearly separate operations in the

ROI and support of coalition operations and appears to advocate niche commitments to

both types of operations. Rather than endorsing the niche capability concept for

contingencies in the ROI, this thesis suggests that the Army should focus on developing

two units of action, based on brigades of light and medium weight for operations within

the ROI.

The proposed force structure is in contrast to the commitment of individual

niche (specialist) capabilities as the government desires for coalition operations. The

brigades, based on the Townsville-based 3rd Brigade, and the Darwin-based 1st Brigade,

are offered as a building block, allowing tailoring with additional specialist capabilities to

enhance the already existing organization. The recommended attachments include

capabilities such as Special Forces, intelligence, specialist civil affairs personnel,

linguists who speak both the traditional languages of the region as well as the colonial

languages imposed on the region by former European colonial powers, and command and

control assets that will improve the brigade’s capacity to perform MOLE and operate in

84

the ROI. Figures 9 and 10 provide a recommended force structure to meet the

requirements of MOLE within the ROI for both a light and medium weight force.

HQ 3 BDE

ARTYREGT

WPN COY

CAV SQN BRT CSSB CER

TPT

MED

INF BN

CIVIL AFFAIRS ADA BTY IMAGERY

MOBILITY COY

DFATSOLO

ADA MIL INT

RAEME

RIFLE CO

CAV

RISTA UAVLAV ADMIN

WHLLAV

RIFLE

CA WPNPL MI

TOW HMGMOR SNIPER

ARTY

OP SPTBTY ADMIN

RADARFIST MOB

CSR

RAD DIGT IS BCSS

TSPSIG

CER

DOG SPTFE IRS

CIV POL

INF BN

INF

RECON WPNINF ADMIN

WHLLAV

Figure 8. Proposed Light Infantry Brigade Structure

A crucial determinant of the force structure recommended within the thesis was

the need for the force to be capable of simultaneous shaping and EAS actions as a

precursor to subsequent decisive actions. By achieving that level of capability the Army

could be considered capable of conducting MOLE operations successfully within the

ROI. The light infantry model focuses on maneuvering company and battalion sized

85

forces from strategically located forward bases or platforms by air or amphibiously. The

priority is a force structured to perform the shaping and EAS actions of MOLE that can

command itself from a central HQ, that is familiar with all aspects of its internal

capabilities and is trained to deploy at short notice by either air or amphibiously.

HQ 1BDE

ARTYREGT

WPN COY

CAV REGT BRT CSSB CER

TPT

MED

INF BN

CIVIL AFFAIRS ADA BTY IMAGERY

MOBILITY COY

DFATSOLO

ADA MIL INT

RAEME

RIFLE CO

CAV

RISTA UAVLAV ADMIN

WHLLAV

RIFLE

CA WPNPL MI

TOW HMGMOR SNIPER

ARTY

OP SPTBTY ADMIN

RADARFIST MOB

CSR

RAD DIGT IS BCSS

TSPSIG

CER

DOG SPTFE IRS

CIV POL

INF BN

INF

MOB EFFINF ADMIN

WHLLAV

ARMOR

A ECH UAVM1 A/ARMR

TECHPOL

ARMOR

Figure 9. Proposed Mechanized Brigade Structure

86

The force structure recommended for the medium-weight brigade force is a

reflection of the likely tasks that such a force could expect within the region. Mechanized

infantry, supported by armored cavalry providing intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance capabilities, and armored engineers to provide mobility and enhanced

survivability, makes this force an extremely capable alternative for DA in the region. The

addition of armored vehicles, particularly tanks, provides the force with greater

protection and firepower for operations in the increasingly complex terrain of the ROI.

The use of asymmetric tactics by regional threat forces against the ADF is likely as these

forces seek methods of operations that challenge the strengths of the ADF. The brigade is

also to be commanded from a central headquarters, and be capable of performing the

EAS and DA actions of MOLE. The force should be held at short notice readiness and be

trained to deploy by both strategic air and amphibious lift. Both brigades will be rounded

out with additional capabilities, tailored to suit the specific contingency.

Equipment Recommendations

Tactical Maneuver Recommendations

To enable the recommended force structure to successfully perform shaping and

EAS actions simultaneously as a prelude to subsequent DA requires a force that is

equipped to achieve mobility, protection, and survivability. Operations in the ROI and in

a coalition force supporting wider national interests have perhaps driven the government

to endorse the replacement of the Leopard 1 fleet. This argument has merit as all peer

nations in the region have a platform that is equal or superior to the Leopard 1. The

choice of the M1 demonstrated that the government was determined that the successful

variant must come with sufficient additional equipment to enable tanks to operate and be

87

supportable within the current CSS systems. Obviously the decision to purchase the M1

will have a significant impact on the Army logistics system, as these vehicles will require

a new variants of transport, fuelling platforms, and servicing and replenishment variants.

There is a down side to the decision to purchase the M1 tank. No other armored

variant within the Army is as capable as the M1 tank. The Army is overdue to provide a

replacement vehicle for the M113 as even the upgraded variant cannot survive a direct hit

from a shoulder-fired antiarmor system such as the multistage RPG-7. Recent experience

from the Gulf indicates the relative ease of procuring these weapons and their

effectiveness against all armored and light vehicle variants, including the M1 Abrams,

M2 Bradley and Stryker variants. As John Jorsett, writing in the Free Republic, public

website notes: “The RPG-7V1 fires three types of ammunition and is arguably the most

power handheld anti-tank weapon on the market. The plain high-explosive warhead is

capable of penetrating 600mm of steel armor (twice as powerful as an RPG-7) and the

tandem warhead (designed to penetrate explosive reactive armor on tanks) is even more

powerful. If hit by either warhead, a Stryker Combat Vehicle would be risk being

completely demolished. RPG-7V1s are highly favored by guerrilla fighters and terrorists

alike and don’t be surprised if a few Strykers in Iraq fall victim to this weapon in the

coming months. The Bradley is also vulnerable to the RPG-7V1, as are M-1 tanks, if hit

in the side or rear” (2004, 1).

It is conceivable that any threat force operating in the ROI will have access to

such weapons and therefore ADF soldiers are at risk should they be employed against

them in future deployments. It is therefore recommended that the government endorse the

purchase of an infantry fighting vehicle, such as a U.S. Bradley or U.K. Warrior, that is

88

capable of surviving a flanking or frontal direct hit from a shoulder-fired antiarmor

system. The ability to sustain a direct hit from other varieties of antiarmor systems such

as wire or terminal guided weapons is not required, as the addition of a comprehensive

defensive suite would allow detection and enable superior maneuver to defeat such a

threat. Additionally the nature of complex terrain in which those weapon systems would

have to be employed, would make their effectiveness limited.

Operational and Strategic Level Maneuver Recommendations

A variety of options have been presented for replacing the current amphibious

platforms HMAS Tobruk, Manoora, and Kanimbla, although the government has not

committed to a specific type. The government has revealed, however, that the ships will

be replaced by a combination of platforms that are significantly larger and more capable

than at present. It is believed that the two ex US Navy Newport class LSTs, Manoora and

Kanimbla, will be replaced by 25,000-ton variants that are capable of carrying 1,000

troops each, with landing spots for up to six medium lift helicopters and hangar space for

an additional twelve and attack helicopter variants.

Replacement of the vessels is only half the solution. Specific consideration must

be given to solving the command, control, computers, and communications (C4) issues of

a JTF when performing MOLE within the ROI. The discussion in this thesis of the

lessons learned from successfully operating the LPAs highlights the crucial nature of

solving the C4 issues in the design phase.

The concept of the JTF commander remaining afloat creates difficulties for the

Army if the JTF commander is also the land component commander (LCC). Improved

lightweight communications for the LCC headquarters will go some way towards solving

89

this dilemma. Recent training exercises and operational deployments have practiced the

ground component headquarters (LCC) as the JTF and this has been proved workable.

However the current structure of the various headquarters within the Army requires that

the LCC move ashore at some stage to command. If the Army were to adopt the

recommendation of this thesis to fully man and employ medium and light ‘niche

brigades’ for MOLE, then employing the DJFHQ as the JTF headquarters should also be

endorsed.

The LCC could then deploy ashore when required, allowing the DJFHQ

commander to retain control afloat. It is recommended that the C4 fit of the replacement

amphibious vessels allow for both the JTF staff and the LCC staff to have discrete

operations and planning areas sufficiently separated to allow command of the current

operation and planning of future operation. This is an identified deficiency of the current

layout on the LPAs, especially when the DJFHQ is embarked as the JTF HQ.

The concept of infantry brigades based on a light or medium structure tailored

with a mix of artillery, cavalry, armor, and service support, all amphibious capable and

trained to operate in concert, will provide a force capable to prosecute a wide variety of

operations. As the CA notes in his essay Land Force for the future: “In broad terms, if we

incorporate the characteristics of rapid deployment, adaptability, lethal fires and acute

situational awareness, we will have developed the kind of joint force that can decisively

contribute to success in the range of operations that we are likely to face” (Leahy 2002,

27).

This thesis identified that the degree of threat to Australia and the region posed by

threat groups in SE Asia with links to worldwide terror organizations was significant. To

90

effectively operate against such a threat with the current force structure of the Army

when performing MOLE requires the addition of specialist capabilities to the existing

brigade structures. The inclusion of civilian and military police, civil affairs, military

intelligence personnel, psychological operations, DFAT specialists, and engineer

personnel will enable the ADF to interact with the existing government and civil agencies

that have been established, and allow a smoother transition to subsequent stabilization

operations.

Analysis of the implications of the Defence Update 2003 identified that

government guidance to transition to a force structure that is flexible, has improved

mobility, is capable of high levels of readiness, and is self-sustaining would have force

structure implications. Analysis in this thesis concludes that the government guidance did

not reduce the effectiveness of MOLE as a suitable concept for littoral maneuver in the

ROI. What it did was emphasize how crucial synchronization would be throughout

MOLE’s four phases. Analysis indicated that the existing brigade structures are

insufficiently manned with specialists. Inclusion of those specialists will enhance the

capability of the brigade to conduct MOLE’s actions, while establishing conditions for

the conduct of economy of force operations. The inclusion of a JTF style HQ based on a

DJFHQ will improve the force’s capacity to command and control multiple shaping and

entry operations across the actions of MOLE.

Ultimately, the force structure recommended in this thesis is based upon analysis

of a number of contributing factors: a consideration of the threat that exists within the

ROI, analysis of the characteristics and capabilities of government, civil and

infrastructure agencies within the ROI, a comparison of the Australian Army’s existing

91

force structure with other coalition forces, and analysis of the Defence Update 2003 and

the MOLE concept. The force structure recommendations that are noted within this

chapter are recorded to generate further discussion and analysis on this subject. The

implication is that, as improved and more capable capital systems are accepted into

service, the Australian Army’s capacity to perform MOLE will be greatly enhanced.

92

REFERENCE LIST

Abizaid, John, General. 2002. Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations. Washington:

Cornerstone Industry, Inc.

Breaking the Funding Logjam. 2003. Asia Pacific Defence Reporter. September, Volume 29, No. 6, Brighton, Le Sands, NSW, Australia: Ventura Media Asia Pacific Pty, Ltd.

Australian Government. 1986. Review of Australia’s defence capabilities. Canberra, A.C. T, Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service.

________ 1987. The Defence of Australia. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Australian Government Publishing Service.

________ 1994. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Directorate of Publishing.

________ 1995. Serving Australia, The Australian Defence Force in the twenty first century. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Directorate of Publishing.

________ 2000. Defence 2000, Our future Defence Force. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Defence Publishing Service.

BBC NEWS.World Edition. 2003.News On-line. London.: BBC News, 2003, accessed 20 March 04. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/2059518.stm. Internet.

Bonner, Janelle, and Gary Brown, ed 1994. Security for the twenty first century, Australia’s Defence White Paper. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre.

Borgu, Aldo. 2003. The Defense Capability Review 2003: A Modest and Incomplete Review. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Bostock, Ian, 2003. Expeditionary objectives. Janes International Defense Review, November, 20.

Brunn, Stanley D., Jack Williams, and Michael E. Bonnie. 2003. Cities of the world: world regional urban development. 3d. ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Buzan, Barry. 1991. People states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post cold-war era. 2d. ed. Hertfordshire, Great Britain: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

93

Carriers and Amphibious Ships in Naval Technolog.[Database on-line. London.: SPG Media Limited, 2003, accessed 16 January 2004. Available from http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/index.html; Internet.

Clark, Emily, 2002. Terrorism project: In the spotlight Abu Sayyaf: Washington: Center for Defence Information.

Cooper, Brian, Brigadier (Retd).2003. Army and MOLE. Asia Pacific Defence Reporter September 2003. Vol. 29, No 7. Brighton Le sands, N.S.W., Australia: Ventura Media Asia Pacific Pty, Ltd.

Coutts, Andrew. 2003. 3rd Brigade Capability Development Plan. Townsville, Q.L.D, Australia: Headquarters 3rd Brigade.

Evans, Michael. 2000. Developing Australia’s maritime concept of strategy lessons from the Ambon disaster of 1942. Duntroon, A.C.T., Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre.

Freidman, Thomas. 2004. Hand in hand with Islam, in The New York Times, 8 January 2004. NewYork: New York Times.

Galdorisi G. V. 2002. Expeditionary and amphibious warfare. In Globalization and maritime power, ed. Sam J, Tangredi. Washington: National Defense University Press.

Glenn, Russell. 1999. We band of brothers: The call for joint urban operations doctrine. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

________. Cleansing the polluted seas: In Non State threats and future wars, ed Robert Bunker.

________. 2000. Urban operations: Density of challenges. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

________. 2003. Meeting every urban challenge: A review of the Australian Army development concept for control operations. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

Hill, Robert. 2003. Australia’s National Security Review, A Defence Update 2000. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Commonwealth of Australia.

Horner, David. 1990. Duty First, The Royal Australian Regiment in war and peace. North Sydney, N.S.W., Australia: Allen and Unwin.

Howard, J. Solomon Islands troop commitments press conference on Radio Australia. Article On-line. Radio Australia, Canberra: Australian Broadcasting Corporation,

94

2003, accessed 20 March 2004. Available from http:// www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview382.html; Internet.

Janes Sentinel Security Assessments. Assessment on-line. Coulston Surrey: Janes Information group, 2003, accessed 16 April 2004. Available from http://www.janes.com/K2docprint.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/oceasu/aust/html; Internet.

Jorsett, John. 2004. Armored Warfare: The RPG-7V threat in The Free Republic. Fresno, C.A.: Free Republic LLC.

Krulak, Charles. 1998. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication Three, Expeditionary Operations. Quantico, Maryland: Department of Navy.

Leahy, P, Lieutenant General. 2003. A land force for the future, The Australian Army in the 21st century, Australian Army Journal. 1 (June): 19-28.

Lewis, J. A. C., and Richard Scott. Janes Defence Weekly. Magazine on-line. Coulston Surrey.: Janes Information Group, 2003, accessed 19 January 2004. Available from http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/jdw001220-1_n.shtml. Internet.

Murphy, D. Terror pre-emption talks roils Asia in Christian Science Monito.[Article on-line. NewYork: Global Policy Forum, 2002, accessed 22 December. Available from http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/analysis/2002/1205preemption.htm; Internet.

Reyko, Huang and Colin, McCulloch, In the Spotlight Jamah Islamiah. Article on-line. Washington, DC.: Center for Defense Information, 2002, accessed 2 May 2004. Available from http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ji.cfm; Internet.

Sanders, T. 2002. Army development concept for control operations: The Australian approach to operations in the urban environment. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Future LandWarfare Branch.

Thomas, Fredrick T. 2003. Janes Fighting Ships. Ed. Commodre Steven Saunders. Coulston Surrey: Janes Information group

Thomas, James P. 2000. The military challenges of transatlantic coalitions. London: Oxford University Press.

Thomson, Mark. 2003. Pay Your Money and Take Your Pick: Defence Spending Choices for Australia. Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Treloar, R. Air Vice Marshall. 1999. Concept for command of the Australian theatre. Sydney, N.S.W., Australia: Headquarters Australian Theatre.

95

Turabian, Kate L. 1996. A manual for writers. 6th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

UK Ministry of Defence. Press release on-line. London.: MOD press office, 2003, accessed 16 January 2004. Available from http://www.mod.uk/dpa/mod_ delivery_of_roro_htm; Internet.

Williams, Vince, Brig. 2003. in Meeting Every Urban Challenge: A review of the Australian Army development concept for control operations, ed. Russell Glenn, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation.

Willis, Paul. 2002. Concept for Maneuver operations in the littoral environment (MOLE). Canberra, A.C.T., Australia: Future Land Warfare Branch.

Wright, Neville. Jemaah Islamiah is still a threat. Article on-line. London. BBC World News, 2003. Accessed 17 January 2004. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2983612.stm. Internet.

96

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314 Defense Technical Information Center/OCA 825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 Australian Defence Staff Embassy of Australia 1601 Massachusetts Ave, NW Washington DC 20036 LTC Louis A. Dimarco Combat Studies Institute USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 LTC Colin G. Magee Department of Joint and Multinational Operations USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 Dr Harold S. Orenstein Combined Arms Doctrine Development USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

97

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 18 June 2004 2. Thesis Author: MAJ Anthony J. Egan 3. Thesis Title : Proposed Force Structure for the Australian Army to Perform Maneuver Operations in the Littoral Environment Within the Region of Interest 4. Thesis Committee Members:

Signatures:

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below: A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL. 6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below: EXAMPLE Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s) Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12 Critical Technology (3) / Section 4 / 31 Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32 Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below: Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s) / / / / / / / / / / 7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:

98

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals). STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following: 1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information. 2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government. 3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application. 4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware. 5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation. 6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination. 7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes. 8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2. 9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority. 10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage. STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above. STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above. STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R. STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).