Property Case Digests 1

7/28/2019 Property Case Digests 1

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Chavez vs PEA-Amari

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamationprojects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as

reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares ofthe Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila

Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEAas private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations

from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the FreedomIslands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public

domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable naturalresources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a privatecorporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for beingcontrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporationsfrom acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the AmendedJVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas ofManila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands ofthe public domain.

Laurel vs Garcia

9MAY

G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990

G.R. No. 92047, July 25, 1990 OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYMACARAIG, JR., et al

FACTS:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and

agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by thePhilippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956,and is part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property andtheir suffering during World War II.


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As intended, the subject property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter wastransferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to the failure of our government to providenecessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador toJapan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanesefirm where, at the end of the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied andused by the Philippine government. On August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committeeto study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe.

On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens orentities to avail of reparations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the firstWhereas clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing,with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The

property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at $225 million.

ISSUES:The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?;and

(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sellthe Roppongi property?

In G.R. NO. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to alienate theRoppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296, the petitioner alsoquestions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or Disposition of PhilippineGovernment Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.

HELD:The petition is granted. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside thecommerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership forgeneral use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides inthe social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it isintended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. (Takenfrom 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines,1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Codeas property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesnot automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if theproperty is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for privateappropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to


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withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make itpatrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannotbe inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to thegovernments own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair andimprove the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]).Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of theRoppongi propertys original purpose.

Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an authority to sell, does not have a provisionin this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for thegovernment sector. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not toFilipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition.

Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. Itmerely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) theAgrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.

Moreover, President Aquinos approval of the recommendation by the investigating committee tosell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change inthe public character of the Roppongi property. It does not have the force and effect of law sincethe President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for morethan a year. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there isanother obstacle to its sale by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, andthus, the Court sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitionerOjeda.

Malabanan

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTCof Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324square meters.

Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and hispredecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peacefulpossession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was

originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, LinoVelazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban the fourth beingAristedes s grandfather. Upon Lino s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided itamong themselves. But by 1966, Esteban s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator ofall the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Estebanand Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that wassold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.


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Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environmentand Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified tobe within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 establishedunder Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed toprove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, andthat the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the mannerand for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

Rural Bank of Anda vs. Archbishop

CARPIO,J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 15 October 2001 and theResolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478.

The Facts

The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. CadastralLot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas Park, whileon Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help ofChristians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.

Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name ofrespondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 isbeing claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horsemanure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.[3] The concrete fence enclosingLot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot736 at any time of the day.[4]

On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed andapproved Resolution Nos. 104[5] and 105.[6] Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from aninstitutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter


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into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 withan area of 252 square meters.[7]

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fencewas being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor ofBinmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the

situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for theRural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fenceand restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent thatthe construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willingto discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions,Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court ofLingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction.

On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is herebyrendered in favor of the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]:

1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;

2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete

wall with iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawalifence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly andseverally, and

3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, tothe plaintiff the amount of P25,000.00 as litigationexpenses, attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00 andthe costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that theawards of litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appealssubsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and theRural Bank of Anda.

The Ruling of the Trial Court


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The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the nameof respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 ispublic in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man.Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adoptedResolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot andauthorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank

of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of publicdominion and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaleyare mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court ofAppeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot bethe object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for publicuse, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership. Thus,

Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the SangguniangBayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the RuralBank of Anda is therefore void.

The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality ofBinmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayanof Binmaley are valid.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has nomerit.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title overLot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Servicesin Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to theiroffice.[9]

Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and

uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnessesfor respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, andplayground.[10]

On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality ofBinmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However,these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural


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Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey[11] of Lot 736, whichwas surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.[12] Thecadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation[13] of Lot 736 which was likewisecontracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or

the church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.[14] Lot 736 was also used forparking and playground.[15] In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736.Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode ofacquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in

Hong Hok v. David:[16]

There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was everacquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title fromthe Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any othermeans for the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be

public domain. For it is well settled that no public land can be acquired byprivate persons without any grant, express or implied, from thegovernment. It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title fromthe state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. The mostrecent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.Reyes follows: The applicant, having failed to establish his right or titleover the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the presentcontroversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired byany private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, theproperty is and remains part of the public domain.

This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all landsand waters of the public domain.[17] Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: Alllands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces ofpotential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resourcesare owned by the state.

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government landswithout prior grant from the government.[18] Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, theSangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105.Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between theMunicipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.


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Property Case Digests 1

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