Promoting Minority Rights in Europe’s Last Dictatorship: Polish Actions to Protect Kin-Nationals in Belarus

1 April 2011

University of Glasgow International Master’s in Russian, Central and East European Studies Student Number: 0905828

Center for European Studies, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, PolandMaster’s in European Studies

Nr. Albumu: 1072182 Pesel: 86072600000

Word Count: 23,513

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents 1

Abstract 2

Introduction 3

Literature Review 4

Minority Rights 4

Origins of Belarus’s Polish Minority 15

Lukashenka’s Belarus 19

History of Poles in Belarus. 21

Contemporary Polish-Belarusian Political Relations 24

Political Context of the Situation 26

Legal Context of the Situation 27

Conflict over the Union of Poles in Belarus 28

Research Aims 30

Methodology 31

Outline of Contemporary Polish-Belarusian Relations 35

Media Analysis 39

Topic Analysis 40

Spokesperson Analysis 47

Framework Analysis 47

Conclusions 49

Conclusions 49

Bibliography 51

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Abstract

The Polish Minority in Belarus grew to exist over centuries of changing borders and ethnic identity. Relations between Poland and Belarus have evolved through the centuries, but were highly influenced by the Soviet time in which Poland was portrayed as the hostile ‘other’. Upon gaining independence, relations between the countries improved but many of the same forces still played a role. The Polish Minority in Belarus has suffered increasing repression since 2005, when Aleksander Lukashenka attempted to take over the organization intended to protect Polish rights and culture in the country, the Union of Poles in Belarus, also the only large non-government-run civil society organization in Belarus at the time. The result was a split in the UPB, with one Union recognized by the Belarusian Authorities, and one Union recognized by Poland. The conflict led to a cessesion of high level bilateral relations between Poland and Belarus, but relations were soon restored, though significantly cooler than they were before. They remained this way until 2010 when a Belarusian government attempt to take over the UPB threatened to cause a similar conflict. Civil and minority rights of kin nationals in Belarus are a concern for Poland, and protecting them is made ever more important, and simultaneously more difficult, due to the increasingly authoritarian nature of Lukashenka’s regime. Due in large part, however, to anti-Polish Belarusian propaganda, Poland has attempted to use EU institutions rather than simply bilateral relations in order to accomplish this goal. The dissertation examines the nature and effects of Polish actions to protect kin-nationals in Belarus, both bilaterally and through the EU.

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Introduction

Belarus was the most reluctant Soviet Socialist Republic to obtain independence in 1991, and its doing so has been more closely attributed to an elite desire to maintain the status quo, and the consequent need to separate from Gorbachev’s or Yeltsin’s USSR or Russia, than a popular call for change (Magdziak-Miszewska in Balmaceda et al 2002: 347). Despite this initial reluctance, it appeared to be progressing similarly to the other former SSRs, such as Ukraine, in the fields of democratization and westernization at this point. Due, however, to Belarus’s relatively small size and population, lack of any sizeable Western diaspora, and lack of historically or culturally significant cities, it was largely ignored by the West both in terms of policy makers and academics (Marples in Lewis 2002: 44). This meant that Belarus received relatively little support in its development compared to Ukraine, in 1991 the country in the most comparable situation (Marples in Lewis 2002: 44). In 1994, Aleksander Lukashenka was elected on an anti corruption platform, and he soon began to show authoritarian leanings, with disappearances, human and civil rights violations, and violations in media freedom all beginning to occur soon after his coming to power. These caused problems in Belarus’s relationship with the West, but its orientation was overwhelmingly toward Russia, both economically and politically, to the point where Russia could be considered the key element to the stability of Lukashenka’s regime. Thus, academics and policy makers both began to argue that isolation had actually been harmful to the development of democracy in Belarus, and that engagement was necessary, though there were differing views on the level of engagement and how. Some argued that economic and social cooperation were both beneficial and highlighted Belarus’s desire to maintain a neutral stance between Europe and Russia, and the potential for it to bridge the two. Others advocated a track of isolating the elites while reaching out on the societal level in multiple ways, and this was the track that the EU as well as most individual states, including Poland, took. The 2004 accession to the EU of, among others, Poland and Lithuania meant that suddenly the country described as the ‘Cuba of Europe,’ ‘Soviet theme park,’ and ‘last dictatorship of Europe’ bordered the European Union. Late 2004 and early 2005 then brought the Colour Revolutions to Georgia and Ukraine, highlighting the potential for a change to more Western oriented leadership and democratic reform in the transit states, an area at that point still very much in Russia’s sphere of influence. Belarus had a presidential election on 19 March 2006, its first since the wave of changes through the region. It was in the run up to this election in this atmosphere that Lukashenka began to move toward subjugating the Union of Poles in Belarus, an organization dedicated to aid for Belarus’s Polish minority, and the largest remaining independent civil society organization in the country.

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Literature Review

Belarus has remained one of the most understudied countries in Europe. Due, possibly, to the factors mentioned above, very few people write about it. There is a small group of scholars who focus on Belarus, most notably David Marples, Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, and Elena Korosteleva. Grigory Ioffe presents a viewpoint different to the others and, instead of focusing on politics, adopts a more sociology based perspective in attempting to discern why Belarus has gone down the totalitarian path more than other comparable countries. Apart from these authors, there have been some articles published in journals such as Transitions Online, available at the Central and Eastern European Online Library. A major source, also, of secondary source material is the OSW (Ośródek Studiów Wschodnych, or Centre for Eastern Studies) in Warsaw. Their publications focus on Poland and the EU’s eastern neighbours, including Belarus, and provide perhaps the largest amount of material on current affairs in Belarus, and certainly the largest amount on the issue of the Polish minority there. There is Polish literature in foreign policy journals which focuses on Polish Belarusian relations in more detail, a subject which necessarily incorporates the latter’s Polish minority to some extent, some on the origins and history of the Polish minority and Polish Belarusian relations, as well as some Polish language literature directly pertaining to the problems of the minority, itself, though this was not much more prevalent in Polish language literature than that in the English language. One important article which provided information none of the English or Polish language material did was Hermann Hohmann’s description in a German language article of Polish institutions in place to aid and protect the Polish minority in Belarus and other neighbouring countries prior to EU accession. These are the same institutions which remained in place after the accession, though the crisis caused the structure of the UPB to be changed. Literature focusing more generally on Belarus and its position between Russia and the West, however, had more analysis, which was useful to understanding and analyzing that specific situation. There were also some articles which were primarily descriptive in nature, giving an overview of events. Polish articles discussed the relationship between Polish and Belarus in general, a topic which necessarily involves conflict over the Polish minority, as well as providing much of the same information as the English language literature, but from a Polish perspective.

Minority Rights

In order to evaluate the minority rights issues of the Poles in Belarus, it is first necessary to establish what minority rights are, how they are approached by the international and European communities, and what organizations and agreements are in place to ensure their protection. This is not entirely straightforward, and the approach to minority rights has evolved dramatically since the League of Nations acknowledged their existence and legitimised their protection as an area of international concern (Pejic 1997:

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666). Binding international agreements had been the preferred method of protecting minority rights in the interwar years, but after the Second World War, the emphasis was solely on individual human rights (Gilbert 1996: 173), and it was not until the mid twentieth century that individual human rights became a focus of international law (Pejic 1997: 666). At this point, minority rights were considered a subset of human rights, meaning that negative rights, protecting the individual from state action and discrimination, were the focus (Dunbar 2001: 90). These actions included Conventions by the UN against discrimination in education, preventing and punishing Genocide, against racial prejudice, and on the elimination of religious intolerance (Pejic 1997: 675). The fall of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an increase in minorities and minority questions in the area and renewed international interest in minority rights (Pejic 1997: 666).

The most basic issue regarding minority rights is the definition of the term, ‘national minority’, and there is not an agreed-upon definition even in the vast majority of legislation which has been passed on the issue. It is not enough to simply comprise a number of people smaller than the rest of the population, but it is also not enough to simply be a non-dominant group in society. Furthermore, there is a question of whether the person in question must be a citizen, or even permanent resident, of the state to be considered a member of a minority. Currently, the definition of minority proposed by Francesco Capotorti is usually followed (Gilbert 1996: 164). According to this definition, a minority is

A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language (Gilbert 1996: 164).

The Poles in Belarus certainly fit this definition of national minority.

From there, the next question is what ‘minority rights’ entail. In order to do this, it must be determined ‘whether minority rights belong to the minority or to its individual members; whether minority rights are human rights; and whether legally justiciable rights are adequate on their own for the protection and promotion of minority groups’ (Gilbert 1996: 161). All of these issues have been the subject of much debate, and each international institution takes a slightly different stance on them. Supporters of minority rights as collective rights state that guaranteeing group identity and ensuring effective participation in society demands more than simply protecting individual rights (Dixon 1995: 271). Outlawing discrimination, they say, does not ensure equality. Opponents argue that according special status to a group within a state might lead to intercommunity

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conflict, especially in cases in which that group has connections, especially ethnic or national, with a neighbouring state (Gilbert 1996: 170). The vast majority of people and international organizations have concluded that minority rights do belong with human rights, that they are fundamental rights. The last question asks whether legal rights are sufficient to ensure minority rights, or whether political rights are necessary as well. Though legal rights are the means by which protection of the minority is most guaranteed, and though legal rights are considered ‘true ‘rights’,’ it is argued that ‘even individual rights would be enhanced where minority groups have political control over their own affairs,’ meaning that political rights would ensure a level of equality and protection that legal rights alone cannot (Gilbert 1996: 172).

In describing and evaluating minority rights protecting initiatives, these issues as well as those of positive versus negative rights and the nature of enforcement must be addressed (Pejic 1997: 672). Negative rights guard against actions which hurt or discriminate against the minority or its members, whereas positive rights use state intervention as a way to ensure a level economic playing field among all populations, even those traditionally disadvantaged (Donnelly 1999: 630). The nature of the agreement or organization whose policy is being examined also plays a role in how it is enforced; each of the organizations with potential influence in Belarus, the UN, the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union, differs with respect to this and the other factors. Apart from the ICCPR, none of them have legal binding force, but this does not mean they are ineffective. The majority of them are politically binding, meaning that there are still repercussions for failing to meet the standards, even though they may not involve legal action (Wright 1996: 193). Before discussing those organizations, however, the nature of minority protection in Polish and Belarusian law will be described.

The preamble to the Polish constitution, approved by the Polish National Assembly on 2 April and adopted by referendum on 25 May 1997 (Cholewinski 1998: 236), states that Poland’s citizens are ‘Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good – Poland’ and that Poles are ‘Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world’ (Www.sejm.gov.pl). Furthermore, Chapter 1 Article 6 states that ‘The Republic of Poland shall provide assistance to Poles living abroad to maintain their links with the national cultural heritage.’ (Www.sejm.gov.pl). The first of these addresses in a general way the issue of equality in Poland. The second two, however, show that it is a constitutional provision that Poland should help support its minorities abroad, as in the case of Polish Belarusians. There are provisions for minorities within Poland as well. Chapter 2 Article 32 says that there will be equality before the law and that no one may be discriminated against for any reason whatsoever (Www.sejm.gov.pl). This certainly falls solely under the purview of individual rights, protecting minority rights at the most basic level by banning discriminatory practices; it

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cannot be interpreted as positive rights either. Chapter 2 Article 35 directly addresses minorities, stating that ‘The Republic of Poland shall ensure Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain customs and traditions, and to develop their own culture’, and ‘National and ethnic minorities shall have the right to establish educational and cultural institutions, institutions designed to protect religious identity, as well as to participate in the resolution of matters connected with their cultural identity’ (Www.sejm.gov.pl). This is the core provision for minority rights in the Polish constitution. By providing the rights to the ‘citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities’, the constitution seems to be, again, providing solely individual rights, but in the second part, rights are granted to national and ethnic minorities’, seemingly conferring on them some level of collective rights (Cholewinski 1998: 255). This article also resembles Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which will be discussed later, but has also been argued to protect group rights for minorities (Cholewinski 1998: 255). Lastly, a stipulation is made in Article 27, which specifies that Polish is the official language of the Republic of Poland, that ‘This provision shall not infringe upon national minority rights resulting from ratified international agreements’ (www.sejm.gov.pl). This article not only echoes the provisions for minority language rights in various international organizations such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention, but makes direct reference to international agreements which would bind Poland to those organizations, as well as to other countries bilaterally. This provision only applies to language rights, though, and minority rights as recognized by the international community extend far beyond that. In drafting the Constitution, the relationship between international law and the Constitution, or the role international law would play in the Constitution, was highly debated; whether they were binding and enforceable within the domestic legal order and whether it should have priority over domestic law were both questions which needed to be addressed, and the answers to which did not initially favour international law (Cholowinski 1998: 257). Chapter 1 Article 9, however, binds Polish law to international law by stating ‘The Republic of Poland respects international law binding upon it,’ a provision elaborated upon in Chapter 3 Article 87, which states, ‘The sources of universally binding law of the Republic of Poland shall be: the Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements, and regulations.’ Cholowinski, however, argues that, as this ignores some types of international law, such as the decisions of international organizations, it does not fully bind Polish law to international law (Cholowinski 1998: 258). Viewing the constitution, it seems that Poland’s laws relating to minorities are aimed largely at protecting them from discrimination and protecting both individual and group rights, as well as adhering to international standards of minority treatment, though it does not confer positive rights.

The Belarusian Constitution was adopted in 1994, with changes and additions being adopted in 1996 and 2004 (www.Law.by). Its approach to both minority rights and

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international organizations is quite different from that of the Polish Constitution. The first noticeable difference is the emphasis on the State; the constitution does not merely grant equal rights, but rather emphasizes that it is the job of the State to secure them. Section 1 Article 2 states ‘The individual, his rights, freedoms and guarantees to secure them are the supreme value and goal of the society and the State. The state shall assume responsibility before the citizen to create the conditions for free and dignified development of his personality. The citizen shall assume responsibility before the State to discharge unwaveringly the duties imposed on him by the Constitution.’ Section 1 Article 14 dictates that ‘The State shall regulate relations among social, ethnic and other communities on the basis of the principles of equality before the law and respect of their rights and interests,’ and Article 15 that ‘The State shall bear responsibility for preserving the historic, cultural and spiritual heritage, and for free development of the cultures of all ethnic communities residing in the Republic of Belarus.’ This is fundamentally different from the Polish constitution as the emphasis is not on the rights of members of minorities, but of the responsibility of the state to provide for them. The Constitution ensures compliance with international law but does not bind it to domestic law, as the Polish constitution did, stating, ‘The Republic of Belarus shall recognise the supremacy of the generally recognised principles of international law and shall ensure the compliance of laws therewith. The Republic of Belarus in conformity with the rules of international law may on a voluntary basis enter interstate formations and withdraw from them. Conclusion of treaties that are contradictory to the Constitution shall not be permitted.’ Unlike Poland, which links parts of its constitution to international law, Belarus accepts it but with the right to withdraw from it. Section 1 Article 16 does stipulate that ‘Religions and faiths shall be equal before the law,’ but it also imposes the condition of compliance with the State on religious freedom, ‘The activities of religious organisations, their bodies and representatives that are directed against the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus, its constitutional system and civic concord, or involve violation of civil rights and freedoms of its citizens as well as impede execution of state, public and family duties by its citizens or are detrimental to their health and morality shall be prohibited.’ Furthermore, Article 17, which specifies that Belarusian and Russian are the national languages of the country, does not contain a provision like that in the Polish constitution, which states that this provision would not infringe on international standards of minority rights. Article 50, however, addresses the issue of minority languages by stating that ‘Everyone shall have the right to use his native language and to choose the language of communication. In accordance with the law, the State shall guarantee the freedom to choose the language of upbringing and instruction,’ thereby guaranteeing the right, but again with a stipulation, ‘in accordance with the law.’ Article 50, however, contains certain provisions for minorities which are absent from the Polish constitution. It states that ‘Everyone shall have the right to preserve his ethnic identity, and equally, no one may be compelled to determine or indicate his ethnic identity,’ which protects individual rights, but it goes farther and says ‘Insults to ethnic dignity shall be prosecuted by law.’

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This absolutely confers group rights and to an extent not approached by any other organization studied. Article 22, also, which states that ‘All shall be equal before the law and have the right to equal protection of their rights and legitimate interests without any discrimination,’ contains a qualifier, that the interests must be ‘legitimate,’ or deemed so by the State. In addition to the Constitution, Belarus has a Legal Act on National Minorities in the Republic of Belarus from 11 November 1992, amended 7 May 2007. This is based on both the Constitution and principles of international law, and both defines national minorities and outlines their rights in the Republic of Belarus. A national minority, according to the law, is a person ‘permanently residing on the territory of the Republic of Belarus and having citizenship of the Republic of Belarus whose origin, language, culture or traditions are different from those of the main population of the republic.’ This is ‘a matter of personal choice’ which ‘does not cause any unfavourable consequences.’ Article 3 specifies the obligations of the members of national minorities, namely to observe the Constitution and other acts of legislation, and to ‘assist the preservation of sovereignty and territorial unity of the Republic of Belarus, respect traditions of the citizens of all nationalities that populate the republic, their language and culture.’ This is a very important stipulation, as it states that members of minorities must work toward the enhancement and preservation of Belarus as a whole, and this has been an argument used against the UPB, which is said to work in favour of Poland, not Belarus. Direct and indirect limitations of rights and freedoms, attempts to assimilate them against their will and forcing people to indicate their nationality are all prohibited. They are guaranteed equal political, economic and social rights, including the right to use one’s native language, including in education, the right to ‘establish cultural bonds with countrymen abroad,’ the right to practice religion, preserve one’s heritage, create and enter public associations, and vote as well as the positive rights of state assistance for ‘developing national culture and education.’ They are also allowed to create consulting bodies to act on the local government level, to create ‘cultural and enlightenment institutions’ through public associations and to carry out entrepreneurial activity. Article 8 provides more positive rights stating that the state will give the necessary money from both republic and local budgets to create the conditions for the development of education and cultures. Their ‘historical and cultural values’ are protected by the state as part of the culture of Belarus. Discrimination is forbidden. Article 12, however, creates a vital condition for many of these rights, stating that ‘Creation and activity of public associations of citizens referring themselves to national minorities is prohibited if it contradicts legislation of the Republic of Belarus on public associations as well as if the mentioned public associations are organizationally connected or are a part of a political organization of a foreign state.’ This has particular implications for Belarus’s Polish minority, as the UPB is connected to Poland, though not as strongly as in other countries, where Polish organizations own the land.

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International organizations play a leading role in the establishment and protection of minority rights, and the UN is one of the foremost of these organizations. Most notably, the UN General Assembly passed the only legally binding, universal text which refers specifically to minorities, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966 (Pejic 1997: 669). Article 26 of the ICCPR pertains to equality, stating that ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’ (www.OHCHR.org). While this is relevant and important, the more noteworthy clause is Article 27, which deals directly with national minorities.

In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.

This Article is in many ways the standard of minority rights legislation, against which other provisions are compared. Its scope is admittedly limited, protecting the individual rights of people in the minorities, but not extending beyond limited recognition (Pejic 1997: 669). Furthermore, the wording ‘In those states in which minorities exist’ further limits it, allowing states to deny that they have minorities, which is not common but it has happened, most notably being argued by France (Pejic 1997: 669). Another peculiarity of the ICCPR is that being a national of the state is not required (Gilbert 1996: 168).

Beyond this article, the UN has adopted other measures in recent years, though they do not have binding force, such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of December 1992 (Wright 1996: 197). Again, it contains no definition of ‘minority’ (Gilbert 1996: 168). Article 1 of the UN Declaration of December 1992 provides further minority rights, saying

1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.

2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends. (www.un.org)

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This is noteworthy because it confers group rights (Wright 1996: 197). Article 2 again addresses the individual right of persons belonging to minorities to practice their own culture, religion and language freely, participate in all aspects of life, including economic and public, participate in decisions concerning them, maintain their own associations and maintain cross-border ties with others of the same nationality. Article 3 states that these rights may be exercised individually as well as ‘in community with other members of their group,’ and that ‘No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights set forth in the present Declaration.’ It should be understood, however, that this does not confer rights on the group, merely the right of individuals to form a group with others of their minority. Article 4 outlines the responsibilities of states toward minorities.

1. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law.

2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international standards.

3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue.

4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole.

5. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons belonging to minorities may participate fully in the economic progress and development in their country.

This Article is a strong example of positive rights for minorities in international law. Article 5 states that national policies and ‘programmes of cooperation and assistance among States,’ must be ‘planned and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to the minorities,’ Article 6 that ‘States should cooperate on questions relating to persons belonging to minorities,’ and Article 7 that ‘States should cooperate in order to promote respect for the rights set forth in the present Declaration.’

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Article 8 provides qualifiers to the Declaration, stating that nothing in it should ‘prevent the fulfilment of international obligations of States in relation to persons belonging to minorities. In particular, States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations and commitments they have assumed under international treaties and agreements to which they are parties,’ that the exercise of minority rights in the Declaration ‘shall not prejudice the enjoyment by all persons of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ that State action to ensure enjoyment of the rights ‘shall not prima facie be considered contrary to the principle of equality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,’ and that ‘Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.’ Article 9 addresses the nature and enforcement of the Declaration.

The specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system shall contribute to the full realization of the rights and principles set forth in the present Declaration, within their respective fields of competence.

The Declaration is not binding. The UN has the distinction of these organisations of being one which has legally binding legislation and being influential, and also one of which both Belarus and Poland are members. The Human Rights Council replaced the Commission on Human Rights in 2006 (Bieńczyk-Missala 2006: 119). Poland became a member with the desire to show that ‘respect for human rights is in Poland’s interest’ (Bieńczyk-Missala 2006: 119). Furthermore, it was argued that ‘Poland can only gain credibility on condition that it will not avoid taking a stance on controversial issues such as the question of democracy in the East’ (Bieńczyk-Missala 2006: 120). Poland’s membership of this council provides both an incentive and a means for Poland to promote human rights, including the rights of its own minority, in its eastern neighbours.

Apart from the UN, however, there are numerous organizations with legislation promoting minority rights, many of them regional European ones. Among these is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This organization is unique in its approach to minority issues in that it does not view minority protection as an end unto itself, but rather as a means to prevent interstate conflict (Wright 1996: 192). It established the mandate of the High Commission on National Minorities (HCNM) at the Helsinki Summit Meeting in 1992, and the wording is critical; the Commission is on National Minorities rather than for them, because of the fact that minority protection is simply an aspect of security (Wright 1996: 190). Even prior to the Helsinki Summit Meeting, the Helsinki Final Act – also known as the Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Declaration – which forms the basis of the organization’s activities, had addressed minority issues, but after the dissolution of the USSR, as the issue of minorities came into focus for the international community, it also became a priority for the OSCE (Wright

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1996: 190). This prompted the formation of the HCNM. Like the ICCPR, the Final Act has no definition of the term national minority (Wright 1996: 194), and like the UN Declaration of 1992, it has no binding force (Wright 1996: 193). Basket I Principle VII of the Final Act addresses the issue of minorities, stating that

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, language or religion. (www.osce.org).

Specific rights are elaborated upon, including the right of an individual to ‘profess and practice, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscious,’ equality before the law, and a reference to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with which it dictates States must act in conformity. Chapter VIII goes beyond individual rights, however, stating

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to the territorial integrity of states (www.osce.org).

This clearly confers group rights, stating that minority groups have the right to self determination, and that, not only the individuals, but the groups themselves have equal rights. Since 1975, however, the OSCE has evolved, and human rights were addressed in greater detail in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting from 1986 to 1989, which introduced the Human Dimension Mechanism, or Vienna Mechanism, to monitor the implementation of human rights standards (Wright 1996: 199). This was followed by a June 1990 meeting in Copenhagen which addressed minority issues and implementation of commitments regarding them and has been described as the ‘peak of standard setting on national minority issues both for the CSCE and more generally’ (Wright 1996: 196). The Moscow Document, created in 1992, adds to the Vienna Mechanism and allows for increased powers of intervention in states by kin states by allowing participating states to initiate a mission to report on facts and give advice on possible solutions regarding minority tensions in another state without that state’s permission (Wright 1996: 200). This was followed by the establishment of the HCNR in Helsinki in 1992, whose purpose is to act as an independent security instrument regarding national minorities to give an early warning of potential conflicts, so that early action can be taken before tension becomes conflict. Its goal is prevention, not reparation, and there is no definition of national minorities in its mandate (Wright 1996: 200). To this end, the Copenhagen meeting agreed to some positive rights (Wright 1996: 198). Again, Poland is an active member of the OSCE, even having the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights based in Warsaw. The Belarusian OSCE office is currently closed, having been

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open in 2003, but with its mandate not renewed when it expired in 2010; its failure to meet commitments had been a concern since the office opened, and at times there has been a tenuous relationship between the two and fear that Lukashenka would close Minsk’s OSCE office, and though some improvements were perceived, the 2010 elections in Belarus indicated that it was still far away from European standards (www.osce.org).

The Council of Europe also acts to promote minority rights, and though it has no power to enforce its laws, the sum of which, are called its aquis, does have political influence and create legally binding multilateral agreements between states. To the end of protecting national minorities, the CoE adopted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995 (Gilbert 1996: 174). Again, it presents no definition of a national minority (Gilbert 1996: 163). ‘Violation of politicality, but not legally binding agreements is as unacceptable as any violation of the norms of international law. In this respect there is no difference between politically and legally binding rules.’ (Gilbert 1996: 172). It is ‘the first legally binding multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities in general’ and attempts to transform the political commitments of the CSCE into legal obligations (Www.coe.int). This means it establishes a system for monitoring its minority rights regulations, but has no power to establish a supranational enforcement mechanism, like the EU does, and it leaves implementation to national legislation and government policy with all issues settled between states (Gilbert 1996: 174). Preceded by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which was focused on individual human rights and anti-discrimination but neglected to address collective minority rights, the Framework Convention was the CoE’s first concrete manifestation of its concern for minority, including collective minority, rights (Gilbert 1996: 173). It lacks, however, any sort of complaint mechanism for either individuals or groups (Gilbert 2002: 738). The Framework Convention addresses anti-discrimination issues (Article 4), individual human rights, such as association, religion, and expression (Articles 7, 8, 11, 13, and 14) (Www.coe.int). Article 17 ensures the freedom to establish cross-border contacts with kin-nationals (Www.coe.int). There are, however, some noteworthy Articles which address collective and positive minority rights. Article 5 dictates that States must ‘promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity,’ Article 16 that States must take no measures intended to alter the proportion of the population the minority represents in a particular area, and Article that States must ‘create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs’ (Www.coe.int). Furthermore, Articles 10, 14 and 13 assure the right to speak, learn and teach minority languages, even if state involvement is required to make this possible (Www.coe.int). Furthermore, Article 17.2 states

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The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to national minorities to participate in the activities of non-governmental organizations, both at the national and international levels.

This has special importance for the issue of the Union of Poles in Belarus. Since the adoption of the Framework Convention, Recommendations have been issued regarding minority rights (1492 in 2001, 1623 in 2003 and 1766 in 2006), and recalling them, the Parliamentary Assembly passed Resolution 1770 in 2010 (Www.coe.int). This stressed the issue of minority language rights and called on states which had not yet done so to ratify and implement the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Www.coe.int). The CoE has, in many ways, set the standard for human and minority rights protection in Europe. Poland, again, is a member of the CoE, taking a leading role in the region, but Belarus again fails to meet its standards, with violations against the Polish minority cited as evidence of the lack of progress (www.coe.int). Belarus is a member, for the time being, but has shown little concern for the standards and regulations set by the organisation.

Finally, the European Union acts to promote minority rights. The EU is different from the other organizations in that it has elements of being a sui generis, supranational organization, meaning, among other things, that its laws are created by its own organizations and enforceable by its own courts. Its approach to the rights of its citizens are addressed in and, in different ways, enforced by its Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Copenhagen Criteria, formed at the 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was created on 7 December 2000 and gained legal force with the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 (Nugent 2010: 166). EU actions and legislations must be consistent with the Charter, a point enforced by the European Court of Justice (Nugent 2010: 166). The Charter does not specifically address minority rights, and does not provide positive or collective rights, but rather individual rights and non-discrimination (Article 21). It is by the principle of conditionality, however, that the EU hopes to affect change in potential member states, bringing them to European standards of, among other things, minority rights. The Copenhagen Criteria were formulated in 1993 at the Copenhagen European Council, specifically considering the future accession of Central and Eastern European states (Wright 1996: 198). In order to join the EU, countries must fulfil the Criteria, including a ‘respect for and protection of national minorities’. These are not explicitly defined, however, as minority rights have not traditionally been a part of the EC and EU’s definition of fundamental freedoms and competences (Cadmus: 1). The definition, however, comes because the Treaty of Maastricht linked membership of the CoE with that of the EU, meaning that states must ratify the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Poland has taken a leading role in the EU with regards to the Central and Eastern European region, but

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Belarus is not and shows no desire to be a member. This means that EU law has no authority in Belarus. Traditionally the EU has used conditionality as a way to persuade aspiring member states to pursue reforms, but Belarus’s clear apathy toward EU membership means that this has no power either.

Polish Belarusian Historic Relations and the Origins of Belarus’s Polish Minority

‘In essence, it was neither Polish nor Russian, but has never in its long career been able to determine its own destiny,’ wrote Norman Davies of Belarus (Davies 1981: 31). Belarus occupies what has historically been the borderland of whatever empire it was a part of, the part most vulnerable to attack from formal powers, and least affected by control from domestic ones (Davies 1981: 31). It spreads over wide open lands which are weak in resources and not agriculturally attractive, making it neither easy nor valuable to defend and keep; its inhabitants, as well, possessed a weak identity, though they identified neither as Poles nor Russians (Davies 1981: 31). In the fourteenth century, Belarus fell in the territory of Lithuania, whose main language was Ruthenian, also known as Old Belarusian (Davies 1981: 115). For a while, Lithuania rivalled both her eastern and western neighbours, but by 1569, its inhabitants had converted to Christianity, and it had merged with Poland to create the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Davies 1981: 33). Belarusians were traditionally religiously distinguished from their Catholic western neighbours and Russian Orthodox eastern ones by the fact that they were members of the Uniate, or Greek Orthodox, Church.

At the time of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, ethnicity was a very minor issue (Davies 1981: 33). At that time, Polish was a political term which described people who had political rights in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, rather than people who spoke Polish or fit a definition of being ‘ethnically Polish’ (Davies 1981: 33). This, though, rarely included people who would today classify themselves as Belarusians, for those were overwhelmingly peasants (Davies 1981: 11).

In 1772, the First Partition of Poland gave Russia the majority of the territory of Belarus, though Austria was given the southern areas, with the majority of the population (Longworth 1994: 135). At this time, though, the landlords in the area were still overwhelmingly Polish, and the Belarusians almost exclusively serfs (Longworth 1994: 102). Polish schools also continued to operate in the area (Davies 1981: 231). In 1793, fears of Polish revolution prompted more aggressive action from Poland’s neighbours, culminating in the Second Partition of Poland, though it actually prompted revolt under Tadeusz Kościuszko, but in 1794, with the Third Partition, Poland ceased to exist as a political entity (Longworth 1994: 137). It was at this point, when no Polish state did exist, that the notion of Polishness became predominantly an ethnic and linguistic one, and also the point at which the former Rzeczpospolita’s minorities, such as Belarusians,

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began to develop their own national identities (Davies 1981: 12), and the idea of a separate Belarusian identity did not emerge until the mid nineteenth century (Davies 1981: 69). Soon, Russia began increasing its policy of Russification, and by the 1830s Polish schools closed (Davies 1981: 231). Additionally, a poll tax was introduced, much land was granted to Russians, Russian officials took over the higher regional positions, and state laws replaced the remaining Polish legal order that had existed provincially, though Polish landowners still retained much local control and privileges, with the hope of retaining their loyalty (Davies 1981: 44). The landowners of the region, however, were still overwhelmingly Polish, and the Belarusians overwhelmingly serfs, who were emancipated by Russia against the wishes of the landlords in the wake of yet another rebellion in 1863-1864 (Longworth 1994: 102). In this endeavour, about 25% of the Belarusian population, mainly in western, Catholic areas, supported the Poles (Thaden 1984: 140). In fact, Konstanty Kalinowski, a leader in Western Belarus during the uprising, though he was of Polish origin, is considered a Belarusian national hero, one of the fathers of Belarusian nationalism (Davies 1981: 354). Under the Congress Kingdom, from 1815-1874, people had been classified by their location; people who lived within the Congress Kingdom, regardless of language, were Poles, whereas those living in Russia were Russians, but after its dissolution, they were all considered Russians (Davies 1981: 12). In the 1870s, too, there was a mass conversion of Uniate Belarusians to Russian Orthodoxy, promoted by Georgii Konisski, and it was soon after this that promoting the Belarusian language was formalized (Davies 1981: 46). It is not difficult to see how this might be the case, for when what had been the defining feature which separated Belarusians from their neighbours no longer fulfilled that purpose, it was replaced by another crucial feature of national identity, even though the vast majority of Belarusians were illiterate. On the other hand, this illiteracy made it harder to integrate and russify the Belarusian population, which was considered by Russia to simply be Russians who had been forcibly detached by Poland and the Uniate Clergy (Davies 1981: 239). Throughout this time, however, the Belarusian national movement was extremely weak, prompting Lewis Namier, an early 20th century thinker, to state that it ‘could have been seated on one small sofa’, and was not taken seriously by either Russia, which only recognized its language 20 years after its formalization, or Poles, who considered the movement ‘no more than a cultural curiosity, and a political irrelevance’ (Davies 1981: 71). At this time, Russia did not allow Belarusians a separate identity, but Poles were also not allowed political expression (Davies 1996: 828).

This state of affairs continued until the First World War. During the war, Belarus was largely a battleground both physically and for the support of the population (Davies 1981: 378), and perhaps because of this Germany greatly supported and helped strengthen Belarusian national consciousness, and it was under the Germans that Belarusian language schools, bookstores, newspapers and publishers began to operate, as well as theatres, seminaries, pedagogical institutes and political parties, and indeed a

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Belarusian National Congress convened in December 1917, supported by the Germans when they had control of the region and opposed by the Soviets when they did (Davies 1996: 933). On 25 March 1918, the Belarusian National Republic, the first instance of an independent Belarusian nation, though it was not recognized by the majority of the international community, was formed (Davies 1981: 520). It lasted until December 1918, when the Soviets took over, incorporating it into the Lithuanian-Belarusian SSR, which lasted until the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920, when the majority of Belarus fell under Polish occupation (Davies 1996: 933). The Treaty of Riga at the end of the war partitioned the country in 1921, putting the western part of the country in the control of the Poles, and the eastern under Soviet control, and also eliminating any chance of Poland sponsoring a federation of independent nations on its eastern border (Davies 1981: 505).

Interwar Poland faced many internal disagreements regarding the future of the country, including questions of minorities. Jozef Piłsudski, for instance, who led the country from 1926-1935, favoured federalist ideals, whereas his main rival, Dmowski, had more nationalist aspirations (Davies 1981: 75). Piłsudski’s federalist ideals, however, were not embraced by Poland’s national minorities but rather mistaken as an attempt to recreate the old Rzeczpospolita (Davies 1981: 75). Western Ukraine and Western Belarus were the poorest and most heavily agrarian areas of Poland in the 1920s, and had no separate political or administrative status (Davies 1981: 409). What has been interpreted by some as a fear of minorities emerged in the new Polish state, and many of the policies adopted were reminiscent of those Poles had faced in Russia (Longworth 1994: 72). From the beginning, the ‘little brothers’ in Belarus and Ukraine were urged to assimilate (Longworth 1994: 72), but starting in 1924, Poland took actions against Belarusian separatism (Davies 1981: 409). The Belarusian language was not supported, Belarusian schools were put under Polish teachers, or closed, along with numerous Orthodox churches and Belarusian cultural societies (Davies 1981: 409). Furthermore, the Belarusian Hramada, or Commune, a democratic socialist group which had been at the forefront of actions to promote the Belarusian nation taken during the war (Davies 1996: 933), was closed down in 1928 (Davies 1981: 409). Belarusians in the Soviet Union formed the Belarusian SSR.

By 1939, Belarusians in Poland were still largely unpoliticized, but the ones who were politically active ‘showed little enthusiasm for the Polish connection’ (Davies 1981: 409). Soon this connection was broken, when the Red Army entered Western Belarus in order to ‘liberate our brothers of the same blood’ (Davies 1981: 444). Along with the Soviets came a wave of purges, deportations and repression prompting one of the few independent Belarusian scholars in 1956 to opine that the Polish rule of Belarus had been far preferable to that of the USSR (Davies 1981: 521). In 1940, the Belarusian SSR was reformed (Davies 1981: 506). The Second World War was a bloody time for Belarus in particular, falling victim to crimes of both the USSR and Nazi Germany, and losing the

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majority of its cities and almost a quarter of its population (Davies 1996: 933). After the war, it remained the Belarusian SSR. Its time in the Soviet Union was the longest period of Belarusian national consciousness (Ioffe 2008: 103). In the 1940s, as well, there were accusations of imperialism throughout the region, and Belarusian accusations mainly pointed to Poland (Davies 1981: 74). It held a privileged place in the USSR, being represented in the UN, forming part of the ‘Slavic Triad,’ with its nationals being well represented in the Soviet officer corps and encouraged to move to Siberia and Central Asia in skilled working positions (Karp 1993: 229). Furthermore, Belarus flourished economically at this time, having one of the highest standards of living in the USSR (Longworth 1994: 232) and there was a movement of unskilled Russians into Belarus (Karp 1993: 229). Official Soviet historiography promoted pro-Russian and anti-Polish sentiment at this time, by claiming that Belarusian history had been characterized by exploitation under Lithuania and Poland, while the peasant masses yearned for ‘reunification’ with Russia, a desire which was realized with Catherine the Great’s Partitions of Poland (Karp 1993: 229).

Belarus’s striving for independence was much weaker than that of Ukraine. Its main opposition movement, the ‘Renewal’, failed to become a mass organization like Ukraine’s Rukh (Longworth 1994: 234). Philip Longworth argues that anti-Soviet and anti-colonial sentiments were largely sparked by Chernobyl, for dissent from the Soviet regime and nationalism had been virtually absent in the Brezhnev years (Longworth 1994: 230). Under Glasnost’ and Perestroika, Soviet historiography was revised, and the ‘striving for reunification with Russia,’ was one of the first aspects to be changed, along with the replacement of an emphasis on Belarusian similarities to Ukrainians and Russians with an emphasis on unique aspects of Belarusian identity; its time in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not in the Rzeczpospolita Polska, however, was the era depicted as the ‘golden age’ of Belarusian language, culture and politics, and it was ties with Lithuania, not Russia or Poland, which were stressed (Longworth 1994: 229). After obtaining independence, Belarus suffered a sharp decline in its economic situation (Longworth 1994: 232). This, though not as strong as many other countries in the region, combined with the country’s historically weak national consciousness, led many Belarusians to favour unity with Russia – remaining far more dependent on it than any of the other former SSRs (Davies 1996, 933) – and feel a sense of nostalgia for the past. In 1992, for instance, 48% of Belarusians polled said the USSR should be restored (Longworth 1994: 232). Furthermore, in 1992 when the visiting doyen of the EP emphasized Belarus’s right to be a candidate for membership in the EC, his enthusiasm and optimism were not reciprocated (Davies 1996: 933). It is also noteworthy that Philip Longworth, in his book which was published in 1994, addresses the potential problem of minorities in Belarus, citing the effect of Polish and Russian cultural influences in shaping the Belarusian nation-building process (Longworth 1984: 82).

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Poland and Belarus have had a long mutual history, which is perceived in Belarus to have been largely dominated by Poles, a perception which was enhanced and solidified by Soviet historiography and which led to growing hostility toward Poland from Belarusians. Belarus’s weak nationalism developed as the ‘other’, not Polish and not Russian, though closer to Russian, culturally, linguistically and religiously.

History of Poles in Belarus

The presence of a Polish minority in Belarus, as indicated, is the result of competing Polish and Russian presence in the area. Initially, Poles were Catholic, Russians were Russian Orthodox and Belarusians were mainly Greek Orthodox, but the Belarusians converted to Eastern Orthodox in the eighteenth century, blurring the line between the other two and making Polish essentially synonymous with Catholic (Ioffe 2003: 1242). The Belarusian language was formalized in the 1890s, and its nationally conscious existence only began to emerge around that time (Ioffe 2003: 1244). At this point, it was in opposition to both Russian and Polish identity, and only a small group of people actively claimed to be Belarusian. The idea of a Belarusian nation, however, was first strongly and widely promoted in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, and while anti Russian propaganda was strictly prohibited at that time, propaganda presenting Poland as a threat intent on subjugating Belarus was used as political rhetoric throughout the Soviet era (Magdziak-Miszewska, 358). In Soviet Belarus, ethnic Poles suffered from discrimination, with Polish language schools and Catholic churches being forcibly closed, as well as all Polish clubs, companies and libraries in 1948 (Hohmann 2003: 41). Poles were classified as ‘Catholic Belarusians,’ rather than ‘Poles,’ and, though they were the single biggest ethnic minority in the country, were not recognized as such (Hohmann 2003: 41). Many anti-Polish actions in Belarus today are justified by similar rhetoric as was used at that time. Interestingly, in 1991 ethnic Poles were some of the strongest advocates of independence from the USSR in Belarus (Magdziak-Miszewksa, 350).

Poland has provided subsidies to and funded programs to support kin-national organizations in its neighbouring states since 1989, despite financial restrictions (Hohmann 2003: 40). These are provided both through the government and independent institutions (Hohmann 2003: 40). There are three main institutions involved in the support of Belarus, the Society for the Polish Community (Stowarzyszenie Wspólnota Polska), the Foundation for the Help of Poles in the East (Fundacja Pomoc Polakom na Wschodzie), and the Foundation for Polish Education abroad (Oswiata Polska za Granica) (Hohmann 2003: 44). The UPB acts within Belarus, and the other organizations in Poland operate largely through the UPB.

The Society for the Polish Community was founded in February 1990, and is funded about ninety percent by the senate chairmanship, and ten percent by the Education Ministry (Hohmann 2003: 44). The largest portion of Society funds goes to the area of

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education, including funding scientific events, schoolbooks and educational materials (Hohmann 2003: 44). It also awards a scholarship to people of Polish origin with no language test requirement (Hohmann 2003: 44). It began in 1993, giving 150 scholarships, but the program grew and by 2000, it was awarding 300 jobs per year (Hohmann 2003: 45). 80 Percent of these scholarships go to members of the Polish minority in Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania (Hohmann 2003: 45). Furthermore, the program gives payments for culture and ‘social and humanitarian help,’ including payments to army veterans and help for hospitals (Hohmann 2003: 45). It was the Society which funded the first Polish language schools in Belarus, one in Hrodna in 1996 and one in Vaukavysk three years later, though the Belarusian government is willing to allow Polish schools in the remote border areas, but hesitant in the case of cities such as Hrodna (Hohmann 2003: 50). In addition, in most of Poland’s neighbours, it is the Wspólnota Polska which owns the property used by the Unions of Poles in those countries. This is not the case in Belarus, however, due to legal restrictions, and this fact played a crucial role in the conflict over the UPB in 2005.

The Foundation for the Help of Poles in the East was created in January 1993 in response to a cabinet decision to provide special budgets to Poles in the country’s eastern neighbours. It was founded as and remains predominantly a government foundation (Hohmann 2003: 47). The priorities of the Foundation included supporting the press, mainly daily and weekly newspapers in the three countries; radio and television, including both starting stations in the countries and improving reception for Polish stations; universities, including awarding scholarships and funding Polish Studies departments and professorial chairs; Polish books; libraries; culture, which provides grants for teachers in Polish schools, primarily in Ukraine; and religion, including the renovation and modernisation of religious buildings (Hohmann 2003: 47). Since 1994, the Foundation’s main priority has been the publishing of Polish books, which are mostly sent to Polish schools and libraries (Hohmann 2003: 47).

The Foundation for Polish Education abroad was founded in 1991 focuses mainly on sending Polish language media, both print and electronic, and educational materials to teachers and facilities in the former Soviet Union (Hohmann 2003: 49). It is funded predominantly by Poland’s Education Ministry but works with the private foundation Semper Polonia to fund a scholarship for students of Polish origin to study in their home countries (Hohmann 2003: 50).

The core of many of the issues surrounding the Polish minority is the Union of Poles in Belarus (Związek Polaków na Białorusi). Formed in 1990, the Union of Poles is meant to promote Polish culture and education and defend Polish rights in Belarus (Eberhardt, 260). Before 2005, it published a newspaper (Głos znad Niemna) and a quarterly (Magazyn Polski), ran sixteen Domy Polskie, ran the Polish language schools in Hrodna and Volkavysk, and supported a number of smaller organizations dedicated to

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supporting Belarus’s Polish community (Eberhardt, 260). It is the largest non-government run organization in Belarus, and the third largest public organization overall (Eberhardt, 260). In addition, while the Wspólnota Polska is the owner of Polish Houses and properties in other countries, due to legal restrictions in Belarus, the UPB is the owner in Belarus (Kościński 2005: 1).

Lukashenka’s Belarus

Much literature has been devoted to the reason for Belarus’s return to and continued acceptance of authoritarianism, often addressed by comparing Belarus to other Successor States, especially Ukraine. The common consensus is that the situation in the country, economic, political, societal, and historical was not conducive to the formation of a democratic country, even that it was ‘Destined to failure’ (Kantareva 2007: 22), and most agree that it is still not. Most of these factors were also present in Ukraine, but a stronger national consciousness, longer history, more cities and centres of culture, along with the fact that its bigger size, population and western diaspora drew more attention from the West to Ukraine than it did to Belarus all helped to temper their effects more (Kantareva 2007: 17). With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus gained independence for the first substantial amount of time. As previously discussed, Belarus was one of the less enthusiastic republics to do so, but it did seem at first to be on a similar path as other Soviet Successor States, especially Ukraine, whose history, ethnicity, situation in the Soviet Union and political situation it most closely resembled at the time (Marples 2002: 44).

The fall of the Soviet Union and Belarus’s new independence left the communist leadership ‘in disarray’ (Kantareva 2007: 16). Furthermore, there was not a culture of campaigning and rallying support, and the Belarusian elites did not have the organization or knowledge to solidly keep their positions in the elections which were beginning to emerge throughout the region (Way 2005: 237). ‘Inexperience with political competition meant that incumbents who couldn’t effectively rally support were replaced with those who could’ (Way 2005: 251). In addition to these problems, strong, centralized state power and antidemocratic actions by officials, remained a legacy of the Soviet regime (Way 2005: 241).

Economically, too, the conditions for democratic reform were not present in Belarus. The economic output was very centralized, a fact which remained the case more so than in its neighbouring countries (Way 2005: 255). In 1993, the Ministry of State Property and Privatisation, Belarus’s main privatisation agency, was formed (Marples 2005: 240). The fact, however, that the government led the privatization meant that investors were less important, influential and prevalent, and that the workers’ desires, essentially survival of the organisations and the best salaries possible, were the most important (Marples 2005: 241). Though they were moderately successful in the early

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days, the continued existence and influence of the Ministry and other organizations caused them to quickly falter (Marples 2005: 244), and by 1994, only 15 percent of the GNP was produced in the private sector (as compared to about half in the Baltic states) (Marples 2005: 238). The lack of privatisation meant that no ‘powerful, quasi-independent oligarchic class,’ which would have provided an alternative to both economic and political power being concentrated solely on the state, emerged (Way 2005: 255). Furthermore, economic factors enhanced Belarus’s dependency on Russia. In addition, energy subsidies from Russia helped Belarus avoid the degree of economic downturn which was felt in its neighbouring countries (Way 2005: 255).

Belarusian history did not only dictate that it would have economically and politically poor environment for democratic development, and its elite were not the only ones ill equipped for the transition; Belarusian society lacked attributes which would help foster democracy. Firstly, there was a lack of civil society, which has been widely linked to democracy because it enables people with similar interests to unite to see those desires realized (Eke 2000, 541). Secondly, it had a largely impoverished background of people who had been peasants until very recently, and it could be seen that the strong state was a new representation of the paternalistic and egalitarian tendencies that had been valued until Soviet times (Ioffe 2008: 41). This was solidified, too, with the notion of class struggle, the result of which was an ‘entrenchment of authoritarianism and superpresidentialism,’ in other words, the class struggle had enhanced the strength of the authoritarian system (Kantareva 2007: 16). Most importantly and interestingly, however, the lack of national identity itself harmed the chances of successful democracy formation in Belarus. The most fundamental requirement for its successful emergence is that the ‘vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to’ (Kantareva 2007: 51). Belarus was not divided by regional or ethnic conflict (Way 2005: 255), but it did not adequately fulfil this fundamental requirement; the majority of Belarusians had mixed loyalty to the Belarusian government and to Russia (Kantareva 2007: 18). Many Belarusians, as stated, did not even speak Russian, and public opinion was very much in favour of Russia, which acted as a hegemonic power to some extent, and in addition to the economic ties to Russia, there were also political and military ties through the CIS and later Union of Russia and Belarus, all of which was supported by the society, many of whom even felt nostalgia for the Soviet times (Eke 2000: 540). There was support for democracy, but was not strongly anti-Soviet or pro-European; only five to eight percent of the parliamentary seats in 1990 went to anti-Soviet Belarusian nationalists, though opposition democrats won about a third (Way 2005: 254). A further implication of this was that Russian intervention in Belarusian politics, which supported Lukashenka, was uncontroversial (Way 2005: 255). It was this fact which led Silva Kantareva to say Belarusian democracy was ‘destined to failure’ (Kantareva 2007: 22).

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Even at that point, the EU considered the Central and Eastern European States and the Baltics to have more potential for accession than the CIS states, such as Ukraine and Belarus (Cowles and Dinan 2004: 270). Belarus soon showed signs, not only of a halt in progress, but of increasing authoritarianism. By 1994, for instance, only 15% of its GNP was produced in the private sector, compared to about half in the Baltic States (Marples 2005: 238). 1994 also saw the election of Aleksander Lukashenka, an uneducated former director of a state-owned farm, one of the founding members of Communists for Democracy, and virtually unknown parliamentarian who had taken charge of a parliamentary committee investigating governmental corruption in 1993 (Way 2005: 251). He defeated then-Prime Minister Kebich in a campaign focused largely on opposing corruption, even despite support of Kebich in the media and parliament, and probable stealing of votes in that election and became the successor to Stanislaw Shushkeyevich (Way 2005: 246). Lastly, 1994 saw the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Belarus and the EU, intended to promote political and economic relations between the parties, but it was not ratified due to EU disapproval of the Belarusian government’s increasing authoritarianism following Lukashenka’s election (Cowles and Dinan 2004: 270). Furthermore, the Belarusian anti-Soviets and nationalists, who had had 5-8% of the parliamentary seats before, lost all of them in 1995 (Way 2005: 254). Lukashenka’s election was a surprise for many in the government; he had only run a state farm and been a low ranking parliamentarian from a rural area before (). He was, however, able to rally support, unlike his opponents, taking a position on an anti-corruption committee and turning it into an anti-corruption campaign with which he won the presidential election (Way 2005: 251). Lukashenka soon ‘mastered the art of pseudo democracy,’ meaning he was able to take advantage and benefit from all of the anti-democratic tendencies hindering Belarusian democracy since the fall of the USSR (Rutland 2006: 1). The lack of privatisation meant he had more control via the economy, making it easier for him to maintain control, even without a strong elite organization supporting him (Way 2005: 237). Russia’s influence meant that any external pressure for change must come from Russia, not the West, and Russia supported Lukashenka (though neither of these things holds as true now) (Rutland 2006: 6). The centralized, authoritarian system which already existed helped to facilitate regime closure under Lukashenka (Way 2005: 255). Furthermore, the lack of a strong national identity makes it very difficult for Lukashenka’s opponents to argue that they better represent the nation (Way 2005: 233). The weakness of the concept of ‘Belarus’ is compensated for the strength of the concept of ‘Lukashenka,’ and there is no strong national identity which can be ‘framed in anti-incumbent terms’ (Way 2005: 238). In fact, the Belarusian political scene has become ‘so polarized around the personality of one man that no one can engage in serious debate about political or economic reform’ (Eke 2000: 542). Furthermore, as the Belarusian opposition has seen Poland as its most important ally since 1997, it can certainly be seen as a struggle of Belarusian identity (Magdziak-Miszewska 2002: 363).

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This authoritarianism was solidified through a series of referendums in 1995, 1996, and 2004, which collectively work to allow Lukashenka a lifetime presidency (Marples 2005: 895). The 1995 Referendum, apart from introducing new national symbols and making Russian an official language, promoted further economic integration with Russia and, most importantly, gave the President the right to dismiss the Parliament if it violated the Constitution (Marples 2005: 895). The 1996 Referendum, however, amended the constitution, was conducted in a non democratic way according to foreign observers, and presented a point after which Belarus’s relations with the rest of Europe deteriorated significantly (Kantareva 2007: 17). EU-Belarus bilateral relations were suspended at the ministerial level, as was EU TACIS assistance with limited exceptions aimed directly at humanitarian aid, civil society development and democracy promotion (Cowley and Dinan 2004: 270). The 2004 referendum effectively removed term limits (Kantareva 2007: 17). In 1998, after a dispute over the residences of Western ambassadors to Belarus, the EU and USA imposed diplomatic sanctions against Lukashenka and other high ranking officials; after that, the EU worked to monitor elections and promote human rights through the OSCE and CoE (Cowley and Dinan 2004: 270). After the 2004 wave of enlargement, though its internal situation continued to deteriorate, Belarus was listed as a target country for the New Neighbours Initiative (Cowley and Dinan 2004: 270).

Contemporary Polish Belarusian Political Relations

Approximately 400,000 ethnic Poles are currently living in Belarus, a country with a population of 9,503,807, and that combined with the fact that about 47,000 ethnic Belarusians live in Poland, population 38,116,000, the geographic proximity and historical connection of the two countries, Belarus’ increasingly authoritarian government and Poland’s entry into the European Union all contribute to Belarus being a foreign policy priority for Poland. Poland was one of the first countries to recognize Belarusian independence, and Poland and Belarus began trying to establish relations in 1992, when they sent ambassadors and expanded economic ties including Polish enterprises operating on Belarusian territory and significant Polish foreign direct investment in Belarus (Magdziak-Miszewska, 360). At this time, Poland and Belarus also began to develop the Treaty of Good Neighbourship and Friendly Cooperation in which they established standards of minority treatment, among other things, and which was signed on 25 June 1992 (Magdziak-Miszewksa, 360). This took many provisions almost word for word from a German-Polish treaty from 1991 (Hohmann 2003: 40). It did not contain group rights for minorities, and there is no legally binding definition for the term ‘minorities,’ but it did outline government obligations toward minorities, particularly kin-nationals, in the two countries (Hohmann 2003: 40). It also standardized the ‘facts’ of history and geography for textbooks (Hohmann 2003: 54). At this time, Poland recognized the need to be extremely careful to avoid giving the impression that it was trying to become a

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dominant power in the region (Magdziak-Miszewska, 358). Furthermore, there was and perhaps still is a ‘zero-sum game’ between Poland and Russia regarding Belarus, with the two states attempting to weaken the other’s influence in the country (Magdziak-Miszewksa, 353). This relationship between Poland and Belarus cooled in the mid 1990s due to multiple problems, including the Belarusian treatment of the Polish minority (Magdziak-Miszewska, 360). Belarusian authorities began to accuse members of the minority, including priests, of engaging in policies of polonisation, though the vast majority spoke Russian or Belarusian (Magdziak-Miszewska, 362). Furthermore, Poland was accused of polonising Chernobyl victims during rehabilitation stays in Poland (Magdziak-Miszewska, 362). Soon, given this and Belarus’s increasingly authoritarian nature, Poland began sending lower ranking officials to Minsk, in some cases people with no experience in international affairs (Magdziak-Miszewska, 362). When President Aleksander Kwasniewski came to office, he attempted to re-establish warmer relations with the increasingly authoritarian Belarus, but was unsuccessful, and widely criticized in Poland for his efforts (Magdziak-Miszewska, 362).

After 1998, with Lukashenka’s authoritarianism increasing, Poland’s approach to Belarus was dominated by a twin track approach, simultaneously voicing strong criticism of the authorities and promoting nongovernmental organizations associated with the opposition, leading the opposition to see Poland as its most important ally (Magdziak-Miszewska, 363). On 15 January 1999, the Polish Sejm issued a message to the Belarusian nation, expressing its support for the opposition and democratic institutions in Belarus and in response was accused by Minsk of having a hostile disposition to the country and being a potential threat to its citizens (Magdziak-Miszewska, 364). On 21 October 2003, the Council of Ministers adopted the Strategy of Polish Cooperation for Development, which set the priorities of Polish development assistance to the country, and which still influences Polish policy (Stryjek, 276). At the same time, with the possibility of entry into the Schengen Zone, it made it more difficult for people from Belarus to obtain visas to Poland, a development specifically contradictory to Poland’s goals and strategy in Belarus (Jedras, 2). Soon, Poland joined NATO, and in 2004, the EU, at which time it became a major player in the organization’s relationship with its eastern neighbours, including Belarus. Poland argued that, due to its historical and geographic connections to the country, it was uniquely qualified to help formulate EU policy, and proposed a strategy involving expanding education at all levels and in all ways, including high schools, universities and the media, the promotion of civil society, and dialogue with the Belarusian government, a position supported by Belarusian authorities (Round Table 2005: 50). The relationship between the two countries remained cool, however, and in 2005, conflict over the Polish minority brought tensions to a breaking point, in which both countries withdrew their ambassadors. At this point, however, Poland still announced its intention to establish ‘close and friendly relations with the Belarusian society,’ and intended actions to accomplish that goal, including

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allowing freer travel to Poland for Belarusian citizens and establishing an independent, uncensored radio station (Eberhardt, 268). Relations have been repaired somewhat at this point, but they have remained notably colder since 2005, and a 2010 conflict, again revolving around Belarus’s treatment of the UPB both made the relationship more tense again and highlighted the fact that the problems between the two countries had not been resolved.

Political Context of the Situation on Belarus’s Polish Minority

Both the 2005 and 2010 conflicts took place in the time before a Belarusian election, and it is not difficult to interpret Lukashenka’s actions as an attempt to weaken any potential opposition to his rule, but Polish internal politics also played a role. The conflict over the Union of Poles in Belarus began in 2005, a year of great regional and internal change. On May 1, 2004, Poland acceded to the European Union, and upon doing so aspired to become a representative of Central and Eastern Europe in the greater whole of Europe. This also brought EU borders to the former Soviet Union, including Belarus. In 2005, in addition to Belarus, Poland had election campaigns going on and the outcome of Poland’s is quite important, for it saw the rise to power of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), a right leaning party founded by brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński (Millard 2006: 1010). This was important because, though it was not a big part of the campaign, politicians from PiS were eager to support the UPB, whereas other, more left leaning parties such as Donald Tusk and Radosław Sikorski’s Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) tended to support attempts to improve relations with Belarus as a whole. The election occurred on 25 September (Parliamentary) and 9 October (Presidential) 2005, so after the majority of the events took place, but it still played a role because the debate over actions regarding the UPB had to be resolved by the parties in power, most notably the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and PO, before the election if it were to ensure its approach to the problem played a role. This led to criticism after the breaking of diplomatic relations, for instance, when ambassador Tadeusz Pawlak was sent back to Belarus earlier than many officials believed was wise, leading to speculation that this had occurred simply because it seemed that SLD would lose power (Pisalnik 2005: 1). The 2010 conflict took place before it was apparent that there would even be any elections in Poland, as it took place in January, whereas the plane holding president Kaczyński did not crash until April, and Polish internal politics were less relevant there, but on 14 June, near the time of the Polish presidential election, which was won by Bronisław Komorowski of PO in the second round of voting, Andżelika Borys resigned as president of the UPB, citing personal reasons. Any attempt to decipher the reasons for her resignation would be speculation, and it is important to avoid suggesting causation where there might be none, but noting the correlation is useful.

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Legal Context of the Situation on Belarus’s Polish Minority

The Polish Constitution clearly states that its citizens are ‘Bound in community with our compatriots dispersed throughout the world’ (www.sejm.gov.pl). Chapter 1 Article 6 specifies

1. The Republic of Poland shall provide the conditions for the people’s equal access to the products of culture which are the source of the nation’s identity, continuity and development.

2. The Republic of Poland shall provide assistance to Poles living abroad to maintain their links with the national heritage. (Www.sejm.gov.pl).

Poland is constitutionally bound to promote connections to Polish culture for kin-nationals. The Polish Nationality Law defines who is and isn’t eligible to be a citizen, and the Karta Polaka was created in 2007 to grant a special status to Poles even if they were ineligible for citizenship.

Beyond the provisions in Poland and Belarus’s Constitutions, further obligations regarding the treatment of minorities was placed on the two countries when they signed the Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation (Traktat o Dobrym Sąsiedztwie i Przyjaznej Współpracy) on 23 June 1992. In addition to issues such as border inviolability, security, nuclear disarmament, peaceful resolution of conflicts, the development of bilateral relations, border crossings, economic and other forms of cooperation, the treaty also promoted cross cultural development and contact of the citizens of the two countries and protection of the cultural heritage sites of the other nation. It also laid out provisions for minority protection in the two countries in Articles 13 through 17. Article 13 states that Poland and Belarus will ‘respect international principles and standards for the protection of minority rights,’ specifically the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension, and the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Article 14 ensured both group and individual rights ‘to freely conduct, develop and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, without any discrimination and in full equality before the law,’ and that membership of a national minority is ‘a matter of individual choice made by individuals and may not result in any negative consequences.’ Article 15 also ensures both individual and group rights with regard to the free use of the minorities’ native languages, maintenance of institutions, practice of religion, and cross-border contacts with those of the same ethnicity, as well as the use of legal means for protecting their rights. Article 16 addresses the responsibility of the states to cooperate on the issue, ‘treating them as a factor in strengthening mutual understanding and good neighbourly relations between Poland and Belarus,’ to take into account the social and economic

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interests of members of the minorities, the minorities, and their organizations, to ensure adequate opportunities of learning their native language and using it with public authorities, and to respect their right to participate in public affairs. Article 17 dictates the obligation of minorities to ‘comply with the legislation of the state of their residence.’

The Conflict Over the UPB

On 18 January 2005, the board of the UPB suspended Tadeusz Kruczkowski, the head of the organization (Eberhardt 2006: 1). He had been accused of acting to the detriment of the organization, even giving control of the Polish Houses to Belarusian authorities (Eberhardt 2006: 1). The Belarusian Ministry of Justice revoked this decision, citing procedural irregularities, and when a Congress was organized for 12 and 13 March in Grodno to decide the future leadership of the Union, the authorities attempted to pressure the delegates into supporting Kruczkowski (Eberhardt 2006: 3). His main rival, Józef Korzecki, was even arrested, preventing him from taking part in the Congress (Eberhardt 2006: 3). In addition, due to an increasingly tense political situation, high ranking Polish officials did not take part in the Congress (Adamski 2009: 1). Instead of Kruczkowski, however, Andżelika Borys was elected. She had been the previous head of the education department, and specifically articulated that she would be apolitical, that the UPB was not a political organization (Eberhardt 2006: 3). This meant both that she did not seek to align the UPB with Belarusian opposition and that she would not align it with the Belarusian authorities (Eberhardt 2006[2]: 2). Before the Congress was even over, on 12 March the Belarusian authorities declared it invalid, due again to procedural irregularities and arguing that Poland was using the UPB to influence the country politically (Eberhardt 2006[2]: 4). There was to be a rerun of the congress in Kruczkowski’s home town of Wołkowysk. At this time, Belarusian state television began to show anti Polish propaganda films (Adamski 2009: 1). On 17 May, Marek Bućko, council of the Polish Embassy in Minsk, was declared persona non grata, and Poland expelled his Belarusian equivalent (Eberhardt 2006: 4). On 15 July, Belarus made Andrzej Buczak, the Polish head of the Consular Department in Minsk, leave, and ten days later, Poland responded in kind (Eberhardt 2006: 4). On 26 July, Belarus expelled the charge d’affairs of the Polish Embassy, but Poland did not take further retaliatory measures(Eberhardt 2006: 2), and a day later, Belarusian police stormed the Grodno UPB office and arrested a number of activists, including Andżelika Borys (Wierzbowska-Miazga 2010: 1). The justification for their arrest came from Tadeusz Kruczkowski and his supporters, who took over the office, and was only the first of many times the new UPB activists were harassed by the police in that time frame (Pilecki 2010: 1). Borys, herself, was summoned to the court over eighty times in the months following the Grodno congress, and other activists were jailed frequently for alleged misconduct (Pilecki 2010: 2). In fact at one point Borys received a message warning her of the authorities’ intention to remove her from the scene, telling her they had planned for her

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the fate of an opposition activist who disappeared in the 1990s (Pisalnik 2005: 1). Tadeusz Pawlak was then recalled to Warsaw ‘for consultation’ (Eberhardt 2006: 3). On 27 August, the repeat congress took place, and the main supporters of Andżelika Borys were all prevented from attending, mainly because they had police questioning at the same time (Eberhardt 2006: 5). A pro authorities leadership was selected, comprised largely of ‘Poles’ who did not speak Polish (Pilecki 2010: 5). Poland declared the congress undemocratic, and began debating how to respond (Eberhardt 2006: 3). To stop funding the UPB entirely would waste the millions of dollars Poland had invested over the years, but it was clear that the organization was subjugated by the authorities at that point. Poland banned participants of the congress from its territory, to the point of including even people who had been war heroes (Eberhardt 2006: 8). A new organization based on the Grodno congress emerged and Poland, after some debate regarding the feasibility of such a plan, recognized it as an alternative to the Belarusian recognized UPB (Eberhardt 2006: 8). On 10 October, Tadeusz Pawlak returned to Minsk and relations resumed between the two countries, though the return was a highly controversial move and relations have remained considerably cooler since (Wierzbowska-Miazga 2010: 3).

Five years later, actions resumed against Andżelika Borys’s UPB. In January 2010, a civil suit, accusing her of accepting funds from Kruczkowski, was filed against Teresa Sobol, the leader of the Polish House in Ivyanets, who had supported Borys in 2005 (Pilecki 2010: 2). This was intended to intimidate leaders of the Polish minority. In February, an election to vote on the leadership of Ivyanet’s UPB branch was announced, initiated by Stanisław Siemaszko, who, though Sobol was reelected by a large majority, became head because Belarusian authorities intervened and initiated a court probe, which ruled in his favour (Pilecki 2010: 3). The Polish Foreign Ministry called an emergency meeting and discussed the possibility of freezing relations between the EU and Belarus (Wierzbowska-Miazga 2010: 1). The Belarusian Foreign Minister, Sergei Martynov, visited Poland on 12 February to discuss border issues, a very controversial event in Poland and when, a few days later, propaganda and harassment against the Poles took place, there was much speculation that allowing the meeting to go through had contributed to that (Pilecki 2010: 2). On 25 February, Lukashenka and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski met in Kiev, and the diplomatic conflict started to wane (Wierzbowska-Miazga 2010: 5).

On 14 June 2010, Andżelika Borys resigned as head of the UPB and refused to give a reason, simply citing personal reasons and the desire to pursue a PhD in Poland (). She was replaced by Anżelika Orechwo.

In December 2010, Belarus also held elections again, and these were surrounded by a wave of protests from people who opposed Lukashenka. These protests were brutally repressed.

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There has been speculation on the reason for Lukashenka’s action. Certainly the UPB was one of the last remaining independent civil society organizations in the country, and by far the biggest (Wierzbowska-Miazga 2010: 1). The crackdown also occurred at a time when, in the wake of the 2004 EU Enlargement and the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the future of authoritarianism the former Soviet bloc seemed uncertain. Lukashenka’s actions can, therefore, be interpreted in a few ways. One of these is that he, sensing the danger of democratization and westernization, sought to minimize that chance by eliminating the largest independent organizations and also reverting to the Soviet tactic of creating in Poland a common enemy against whom the people could be united. Another, even stronger interpretation is that Lukashenka desired to subjugate these organizations not just for the reasons above, but also so that he could maintain the illusion in the EU of democratization by having the support of a civil society organization composed of kin-nationals from one of the EU’s member states; he sought, not only to eliminate potential threats, but to use them as potential assets to increase his perceived legitimacy in the EU (Pilecki 2010: 12). Indeed after the 2006 elections, the issue stabilized, at least temporarily. It should be emphasized that Andżelika Borys intended to be a completely apolitical leader, but was pushed into a political position by the actions of Belarusian authorities (Eberhardt 2006[2]: 8).

Research Aims

While there is some literature regarding Belarus and its Polish minority, much of it focuses on the history through the transition period, and very little on the contemporary, post accession events. These are particularly interesting because they take place after Poland’s rise to being a regional leader in Europe through the EU. With that in mind, the subject of Polish actions to protect kin-nationals in Belarus becomes a particularly interesting one. Of the literature which is available, though some does speculate on Belarusian actions, seeking to use the conflict over the UPB to help understand Lukashenka’s regime more accurately, there is little real discussion of Polish actions and motivations. The primary research for this dissertation will focus specifically on the conflict surrounding the UPB and how it affects Polish Belarusian relations and EU Belarusian relations in the years since Poland’s accession to the EU from the Polish perspective. In order to understand the context of the situation, the history behind the Polish minority in Belarus, Polish Belarusian relations and the specific factors which are believed to have played a part in causing the 2005 crisis have been briefly explained. In order to achieve an understanding of the specific topic in question, post-accession Polish Belarusian relations will be outlined, drawing on official documents, and the Polish approach to the problem will be explored using a discourse analysis of two main Polish newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Before embarking on either of those tasks, however, a methodology section will explain exactly how the questions will be answered.

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Methodology

The research aim of this dissertation is specifically to analyse Polish actions taken to protect Belarus’s Polish minority since its accession to the EU, and how they have affected Polish Belarusian and EU Belarusian relations. This is most dramatically expressed through Poland’s involvement in the conflict over the UPB, and that will be the focus of much of this paper. The research aims will be ąchieved by focusing on specific research questions, namely ‘What is the relationship between Poland and Belarus?’, which will be answered further using public documents; ‘What has been Polish policy with regards to the minority?’, and ‘How has Poland used the EU to support its position?’, which will be answered using a discourse analysis of media articles. ‘How have these actions affected the relationship between Poland and Belarus?’ and ‘How have these actions affected the relationship between the EU and Belarus?’ will also be further explored using primary documents.

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of writing this dissertation was the extreme lack of secondary source material relating directly to the subject, and less extreme though still notable lack of secondary source material relating indirectly to it. Because of this, it was necessary to work with primary sources, including newspaper articles, official documents and an interview, as a majority of the research for the dissertation. The literature, however, did provide a foundation for understanding the conflicts and actions, as well as helping to answer the question of what Polish Belarusian relations are and have been since Poland acceded to the EU.

Official documents were gathered from official websites, the official EU website, as well as Eur-Lex and the Polish Parliament, Sejm and Senat Websites. These provide a direct way to view the Polish policy and actions, both in bilateral and EU terms. I also searched for documents which were mentioned in other official documents, in newspaper articles, or in secondary sources. They were used to form a framework so that the basic actions and government responses are known. The majority of the primary source work, however, involved a media analysis which provided insight into the media coverage of them. This is potentially problematic as information is being taken from the same sources which are being analyzed but the harmful effects of that are muted by the use of official documents and secondary sources where possible. These gave insight into Polish Belarusian relations as a whole, showing aspects such as border issues which, while not directly related, provide context for understanding the more central issues. They also gave insight into what the exact actions were, and what the debate was behind those actions.

In addition, multiple elite interviews were requested, but only one person was willing to give one, and he was unwilling to be identified or quoted in the work, so it should just be noted that the interview gave my research, interpretation and conclusions

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much guidance and focus, and did influence the outcome of this dissertation. This was the only section in which ethics were an issue, and care was taken to comply strictly with the guidelines. The interviewee expressed the desire to not be quoted, so he was not, and records from the interview will be erased after the completion of the dissertation.

Lastly, a discourse analysis of Polish media was conducted. This helped to answer all of the above questions. Reading the articles gave a more detailed account of what steps Poland actually took, and more importantly, the analysis itself gave insight into how Poland viewed the issue and policies, what it saw as the main problems, what it hoped to achieve in its actions and to what extent it considered them successful. This helped answer all of the research questions to some extent, but was primarily targeted at answering what Polish policy has been and how it has used the EU to support its position, giving insight into the reasons for Polish actions.

Media Analysis

The most significant and substantial part of the research was a discourse analysis performed on two leading Polish newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. The purpose of this analysis was to gain insight into motivations for Polish action, Polish interpretations of events, how important the UPB issue was in regards to important issues, to determine to what extent the left and right sides of the political spectrum differed in these areas, and if these changed over time.

The discourse analysis method applied came from consulting a number of sources, most notably Teun Van Dijk, the 2009 ESRC Review Paper on Discourse Analysis, and Douglas Gould’s article for the Communications Consortium Media Centre. From these, I decided to adopt an approach based on comparing two sources, both widely circulated with different political slants, a time frame around the main events, and to conduct a topic, spokesperson and framework analysis. The topic analysis was intended to give me insight into what subjects were connected most to the issue of the UPB, which would both show how it was approached and what ideas were perceived to be linked to it (Gould 2004: 4). The spokesperson analysis was then hoped to show which types of and which specific people were considered the most important and most authoritative (Gould 2004: 5). The framework analysis was, however, the most important, combining aspects of the other two and its own original analysis to discuss precisely what the approach and viewpoint of the two newspapers was. The spokesperson analysis was straightforward, as it simply meant counting the number of times people in different positions, and particularly noteworthy people, were quoted, and the topic analysis was, similar, categorizing topics and obtaining a quantitative value of how much they were referenced. The framework analysis was a bit more abstract, however, and to do that, it was necessary to first read the articles and determine what the potential frameworks were, using archetypal story frames to begin their construction

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(Gould 2004: 7). Then the stories were read to determine which ones fell into which framework. After these three things were constructed, the results were applied to the research questions, ‘What has been Polish policy with regards to the minority?’, and ‘How has Poland used the EU to support its position?’, to create a final analysis.

Selection of Sources

The media analysis focused primarily on the Polish newspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Polish newspapers were chosen because the dissertation is primarily concerned with Polish actions, and the relationship between Poland and Belarus. These were selected because of their wide circulation and influence, contrasting political views and the fact that they are both daily newspapers. Daily newspapers were selected because of their more continuous coverage and wider readership when compared to other text based sources.

Gazeta Wyborcza is, apart from Fakt, a tabloid, Poland’s largest daily newspaper. It is considered to have a centre left political slant, and has an average circulation of 672,000, though in 2010, this dropped to 319,000. It was founded in 1989. An archive of articles is available and searchable on the paper’s website. (www.gazeta.pl)

Rzeczpospolita has an average daily circulation of 260,000, but is the top newspaper for businesspeople and can be considered the other main opinion forming daily newspaper in Poland. Its political slant is centre right. It has been operating since 1980. Articles were accessed, again, by searching the archives on the website. (www.rp.pl)

In short, the choice of Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita gave a balanced and focused insight into Polish actions using well known and influential daily newspapers.

Choice of Search Terms

Union of Poles in Belarus (or Związek Polaków na Białorusi in Polish) was a clear choice of search term, as the conflicts between Belarus and Poland have largely emerged in response to Belarus’s treatment of this organization, and most of Polish actions to support the Union of Poles in Belarus have been through this organization. I did searches using other related search terms, Wspólnota Polska, Białoruś and the names of key figures such as Andżelika Borys, but Wspólnota Polska returned no results, Białoruś returned results not only related to the UPB, but also economics, borders, sports, and other irrelevant terms, and the key figures were always identified by their relation to the UPB, so using their names did not return extra results. Furthermore, I made a decision not to address the issue of the Karta Polaka in the media analysis because, while it would be an interesting and valuable topic to address in future research, conflict over it

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has been mild and recent, and focusing on it would take attention away from the longer term, more problematic issue of the UPB, to which it is not related.

Selection of Time Frame

The time frame for selection of articles was then selected. This was based around the key moments, tensions and conflicts in Polish Belarusian relations since Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. Additionally, the 2005 conflict was the first major one, and was the turning point of Polish Belarusian relations from friendly to hostile, so it was a clear choice. Since then, however, there have been numerous key points and a time frame around each was selected.

Around the 2005 crisis in relations, the events which lead up to which started on 18 January, with the suspension of the head of the UPB, but which was most volatile and relevant from 17 May, when the counselor of the Polish Embassy in Minsk was expelled, to 10 October, when the Polish Ambassador to Belarus, who had been recalled on 28 July was returned, a time frame from 10 May to 20 October was chosen. This covers the most significant part of the conflict, the part when Belarus’s treatment and Poland’s protection of the Poles in Belarus affected the relationship between the two countries. It could be argued that starting in early January would have also been appropriate, but this would have taken focus away from the central issue in the dissertation.

The next important event, then, is the 2010 crisis in relations. The events leading to it started in January, when a civil suit was filed against the head of the UPB in Ivyanets. The Polish Foreign Ministry held an emergency meeting in response to this hearing, and tensions increased in the time leading to the Belarusian Foreign Minister’s visit to Poland on 12 February. Tensions continued until 25 February, when Lukashenka and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski met. For this, articles from 10 January to 10 March will be examined.

The elections following the Smolensk plane crash dealt with the Polish minority in Belarus because protection of the minority was an issue in the campaign. It featured in the presidential debates and coverage of the specific issue of Belarus’s Poles as a campaign issue is a very interesting and revealing one as it will tell of Poles’ perception of their duties regarding kin-nationals, and how it influences political decisions. The elections were on 20 June and 4 July, and Andżelika Borys resigned on 14 June, so 14 June to 5 July will be the time frame studied.

The last event which will be investigated is the 2010 Belarusian elections. Analysing media coverage of this will show how important the UPB is perceived to be as a force for change in Belarus, and how vulnerable it is when those changes are being stifled. The elections occurred on 19 November and protests continued through much of December, so a time frame of 1 November to 20 December will be reviewed.

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Outline of Current Polish Belarusian Relations

Belarus and Poland have many common interests, many issues in which cooperation and collaboration would be beneficial to both countries, including energy security, common borders, economic ties, and trade, and indeed their relationship prior to 2005 had been fairly warm, with Poland being one of the first countries to recognize Belarusian independence and advocating a pro-Belarusian stance upon its entry into the EU (Adamski 2009: 135). The relationship between Belarus and Russia has deteriorated in recent years, starting with the 2004 gas dispute and worsening again in 2009 with a diplomatic dispute over the Georgian war (Bugajski 2007: 21). This cooling of relations with the country on which Belarus had remained fairly dependent since becoming independent has forced Belarus to seek financial support and connections elsewhere (Eberhardt 2010: 1). In this environment, Polish Belarusian and EU Belarusian relations should both have the opportunity to grow, but human and civil rights violations, epitomized by the actions against the UPB, have prevented this from happening.

The first, most basic issue for relations between the two countries is that they share a border. Since 2004, the vast majority of agreements between the two countries have covered issues directly related to the common border, border crossings, border traffic and the contact point of state borders. Even during the escalation in tension in 2005, agreements on this issue were covered by an exchange of letters (www.senat.gov.pl). Others dealt with issues which resulted from the proximity of the countries to each other, cooperation in combating crime, the recognition of the equivalence of university degrees, environmental protection, and one agreement on education. The subject of visas for citizens of the two countries has also been an issue, and though no bilateral agreement has been made, in December 2010 Poland waived visa processing fees for Polish visas for Belarusian citizens, a move it encouraged other European countries to take with regards to national visas as well as the European Commission with regards to the Schengen visa (www.osw.waw.pl). This, it hopes, will promote democratization in Belarus by fostering societal contact and exposing Belarusians to more information as well as life in democratic societies (www.osw.waw.pl).

More importantly, however, there are issues in which Polish Belarusian cooperation would benefit both countries. The most notable of these is the Druzhba Oil Pipeline, specifically the Northern Druzhba Pipeline. Currently the largest principal oil pipeline transporting oil from Russia to Europe, it passes through both Belarus and Poland, both of which benefit from this but a fact on which Belarus has come to rely economically (Bugajski 2007: 24). It has provided a substantial amount of income to the economy of Belarus, where much oil is refined, as well as giving Belarus lower prices in oil (Bugajski 2007: 24). Poland is the transit country of oil to Germany, which receives

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about 15% of its total consumption from the pipeline, as well as importing more than 75% of its total consumption from the pipeline and exporting a substantial amount of oil via ports Gdansk (www.osw.waw.pl). Russia has begun construction of another pipeline, however, the Baltic Pipeline System, which would bypass both of these countries and substantially reduce the flow of oil through the Druzhba Pipeline (www.osw.waw.pl). Since the beginning of its construction, both Poland and Belarus have seen the potential consequences of this for them. Belarus’s oil prices have been rising, however, causing economic problems as well as diplomatic ones between the two countries, most notably the 2007 Russia-Belarus Energy Dispute, one result of which was Belarus’s sale of 50% of its national gas supplier, Beltransgaz, to Gazprom, making Belarus even more dependent on Russia than it had been before (www.osw.waw.pl). Clearly this is a major issue for both countries but due to the cold relationship between Poland and Belarus, the two countries have not been able to successfully cooperate on the issue, but instead both countries have remained ineffective in promoting their interests (www.osw.waw.pl). Belarus turned to Ukraine, attempting to reach an agreement in which Belarus would be the recipient of oil from the Odessa-Brody Pipeline, which is diversified in its source, but still dependent on Russian companies (www.osw.waw.pl).

The relationship between Belarus and the EU had been problematic since long before Poland joined. In 1997, the process of the ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus was suspended, and in 1998 all senior Belarusian officials were banned from EU territory, and in 1999, a step by step approach to lifting sanctions based on Belarus achieving benchmarks set by the OSCE was adopted, and Belarus seemed to achieve some progress towards implementing the regulations (www.osw.waw.pl). In 2003, though, the European Commission began to investigate violations of freedom of association in Belarus, with the potential of withdrawing the Generalised System of Preferences from the country (2004/23/EC) (www.osw.waw.pl). On 28 April 2004, the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1371 on Disappeared Persons in Belarus (better known as the Pourgourides Report), which investigated the disappearances of four people and concluded that a proper investigation had not been carried out by the Belarusian authorities, and requested that they launch criminal investigations and a parliamentary committee of inquiry (www.coe.int). On 14 May, the EU Presidency issued a declaration in which it revealed its decision to restrict admission to its territory of the officials revealed by the report to be primarily responsible (www.europa.eu).

Poland’s priorities in and approach to relations with Belarus in 2004 remained consistent with those since the mid 1990s, funding educational and cultural endeavours for the Polish minority and maintaining criticism of Belarusian authorities while reaching out to Belarusian society in economic, social and local government spheres (Adamski 2009: 135). On September 12, 2004, the two countries signed an agreement on the

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cooperation between the ministries of culture which encouraged cooperation in the field of culture, such as culture days, music festivals, education, museums and films (www.senat.gov.pl). When Poland entered the EU, it and Lithuania advocated a more moderate EU stance towards Belarus (Roundtable 2004: 149). In the 129 th Bergedorf Roundtable conference, Poland articulated its motivations and approach, citing the Polish minority in Belarus, Belarusian minority in Poland and the fact that the countries were neighbours as a reason for its interest, and proposed a plan to be adopted by all 25 (at that time) EU member states. This involved education via schools and media, the promotion of civil society and a patient dialogue with the Belarusian administration (Sikorski 2010: 14). This contradicted other viewpoints which advocated demanding the complete adoption of EU norms as a precondition for talks, saying that the EU should play an active role in the transition process (Roundtable 2004: 149).

This state of affairs did not last for long, however, as in early 2005, the conflict over the UPB began. Adam Rotfeld became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2005, and in his first address to the Sejm, he addressed the issue of Belarus, saying that Poland is trying to help shape the West’s policy to ensure full solidarity with democratic and freedom tendencies in Belarus (www.sejm.gov.pl). He did not mention the Polish minority in Belarus, merely the fact of the shared border. Though the conflict began to escalate in mid January, dialogue continued between the two countries. Agreements were formed, for instance on university degree equivalence and cooperation in education, and modified, again much of it having to do with border crossings (www.sejm.gov.pl). The relationship between the countries seems to have remained fairly stable through June, but after 28 June, there is an absence of documents until 28 July, when the Senat adopted a Resolution calling for the Polish President and Government to take appropriate measures to protect the Polish Minority in Belarus, and the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee gathered to discuss Polish Belarusian Relations and the activities of the Commission (www.sejm.gov.pl). On 6 August, an agreement between Poland and Belarus, again related to the border, was signed (www.sejm.gov.pl). By 2006, bilateral relations were very low and there was only one amendment to an agreement signed, on cooperation in combating crime (www.sejm.gov.pl). An address by the Foreign Minister in February also mentioned the necessity of defending the rights of the Polish minority abroad, specifically in Belarus (www.sejm.gov.pl). There was a similar level of interaction in 2007, and Poland developed the Karta Polaka, or Pole’s Card, for kin nationals in neighbouring countries (Wandycz 2008: 98). In 2008, however, there were a few developments. Most notably, visa fees were removed for Belarusian citizens (www.osw.waw.pl). In addition, the inclusion of Belarus in the ENP was mentioned in the Senat’s policy strategy for 2009 (www.senat.gov.pl). In 2009, cooperation had increased again. Bilateral agreements were conducted more frequently and Radosław Sikorski’s statement on goals of Polish foreign policy included the hope that Belarus would begin to look westward along with a statement that the rights of the Polish

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minorities in Germany, Lithuania and Belarus must be supported (www.sejm.gov.pl). In 2010, too, the goal of developing a dialogue was mentioned, but the Smolensk tragedy occurred in April and could easily be the reason for the lack of a dialogue developing (Adamski 2009: 139). In short, Poland’s bilateral relationship with Belarus has been severely affected by the conflict surrounding the UPB. The stagnant but stable relationship which had prevailed since the mid 1990s became nonexistent during the diplomatic crisis in late July 2005, but dialogue has slowly begun to redevelop, or at least become a goal. The Polish minority has also become a greater factor in the relationship between the two countries, as focus on it before the crisis mainly revolved around funding education and culture, whereas protecting the civil rights of the minority became a central issue in the aftermath of the 2005 crisis.

Poland’s reaction to developments in Belarus vis-à-vis the EU was more complex. On the one hand, its position changed from one of advocating more conciliatory policy to one of advocating much more direct policy, and criticizing the EU for its lack of action. Its central idea was that the EU had the legitimacy to act in ways the Polish government would be ineffective in acting on its own, and some politicians went so far as to say that bilateral relations between the two countries should be downplayed whereas most of the action should take place on an EU level (Marczuk 2005: 1). Poland repeatedly called for a unified EU stance with regards to Belarus, and sought to highlight the influence of other countries (Marczuk 2005: 1). If the EU acted more strongly, it would not seem as much that Poland was acting because it had a unique interest in Belarus, but rather that it was taking a leadership role in issues in the region which were of common interest to all of Europe (Pisalnik 2005: 1). Polish officials recommended many potential EU courses of action, particularly in the 2005 crisis, including trivial actions such as excluding Belarus from sporting events, but also removing trade preferences from Belarus and making monetary aid dependent on Belarus’s fulfilment of certain democratic requirements (www.osw.waw.pl). The most important, however, was the idea of a radio station. If Poland created a radio station, it would simply be dismissed in Belarus as Polish propaganda, but if the EU collaborated and Poland did not take a particularly leading role, it would be much harder to make this claim (Koscinski 2005: 1). This did actually happen, and German company Deutschwelle was put in control of the radio station. This met some criticism in Poland when the radio was more moderate than was previously hoped or than Poland would have created had it been in charge, but an independent, European source of news was created for Belarusians (Koscinski 2005: 1). Poland pressed for action primarily through the EP, with officials as well as activists, primarily Andżelika Borys, speaking in Brussels. Furthermore, Poles took leading roles in EU delegations, both EP and Commission run, to Belarus (Adamski 2009: 145). Belarusian officials, also, were not invited to take place in Euronest, the Parliamentary assembly consisting of MEPs as well as Members of Parliament from states in the Eastern Partnership (www.europa.eu). In 2010, in a meeting between Sikorski and Martynau, the

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latter was given a non-paper on Polish compromise proposals, and potentially beneficial projects for Belarus which it would block if no compromise could be achieved. The danger in acting strongly would be that Belarus might turn to Russia, but relations between Belarus and Russia have also suffered in recent years, so this would be difficult for Belarus as well (www.osw.waw.pl). Recently, it has turned most to China for support (www.osw.waw.pl). Poland has sought to supplement its traditional approach to bilateral relations with a strong, unified EU backing both in isolating Belarusian officials and in extending a hand to Belarusian civil society.

Media Analysis

The search terms, time frames, and chosen sources yielded 236 results. Though they largely framed the events in the same way, the media analysis revealed significant differences in the way Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Wyborcza approached the events.

Rzeczpospolita provided much more thorough coverage of the events, with a much stronger and more consistent view that Poland should intervene and more concerned with EU involvement. Gazeta Wyborcza, on the other hand, spends much more time debating the correct course of events, and questioning the beliefs and opinions which Rzeczpospolita takes for granted in forming its conclusions. It also tends to support the idea of more EU intervention, but supports different types of action.

This difference is most immediately noticeable in the simple number of articles from each newspaper in each time period. They are as follows:

Newspaper Rzeczpospolita: 99 Gazeta Wyborcza: 43Type Opinion: 12

News: 77 Feature: 21

Krótko: 17

Opinion: 2 News: 25 Feature: 16

2010 Conflict Newspaper Rzeczpospolita: 43 Gazeta Wyborcza: 20Type Opinion: 5

News: 31 Feature: 7

W Krótki: 2

Opinion: 2 News: 4 Feature: 14

2010 Polish Elections Newspaper Rzeczpospolita: 10 Gazeta Wyborcza: 6 Type Opinion: 0

News: 8 Feature: 2

Opinion: 0 News: 2 Feature: 4

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W Krótki: 0 2010 Belarusian Elections Newspaper Rzeczpospolita: 10 Gazeta Wyborcza: 3 Type Opinion: 0

News: 7 Feature: 3

W Krótki: 0

Opinion: 0 News: 1 Feature: 2

Rzeczpospolita consistently had significantly more articles written about the Union of Poles in Belarus than Gazeta Wyborcza. Overwhelmingly, in both newspapers, these were located in the world (świat) section, unsurprisingly. They did, however, also appear occasionally in the opinions/letters (Rzeczpospolita 21, Gazeta Wyborcza 3), country (Rzeczpospolita 9, Gazeta Wyborcza 6), and specials/additions/features sections (Rzeczpospolita 6, Gazeta Wyborcza 9). A more detailed analysis shows the breakdown of article types for each period studied.

Furthermore, Rzeczpospolita had an additional feature, absent from Gazeta Wyborcza, ‘short’ (or ‘krótko,’ later ‘w krótki’) articles which provided paragraph long updates of stories or summaries of more minor events which were often left out of Gazeta Wyborcza entirely. These did not provide much analysis and if people were quoted, it was only briefly, and usually quotes which appeared in longer articles within a couple of days of their publication, but this fact did not diminish their usefulness to the analysis. Indeed they could be seen as even more useful because their brevity eliminated the option of presenting multiple viewpoints. Their numbers are indicated in the above table, though they are a subset of ‘news’ articles, and indeed the number of news articles includes the number of short ones, because the paper distinguished them as being separate, and because they did have a slightly different purpose from the others.

The time frames chosen occurred around important events in relations between the two countries and within the Union of Poles in Belarus, itself, and articles were fairly evenly distributed for those time frames.

Topic Analysis

Topic analysis reveals differences in how the issue was covered in the two papers, and is also the area in which there was most variation among events. There were some topics which were addressed consistently throughout all of the time frames, but largely there were differences between the conflicts and elections in how the UPB conflict was addressed. One thing that remained consistent among the time periods was Andżelika Borys’s problems being one of the most prominent topics featured, with nearly a third of overall Rzeczpospolita and sixteen percent of Wyborcza articles focusing on her. There

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was also, naturally, a large number of articles devoted specifically to the events in question, the background to them, and analysis of them, and in addition, the role of Russia in the events was discussed in many articles. Along with noting what topics are covered, specific attention will be given to the treatment of Polish Belarusian bilateral relations and EU involvement in both newspapers, as these are the essential ones to understanding the subject in question.

2005

Polish Belarusian bilateral relations was a topic in 31 of the Rzeczpospolita articles from the 2005 Crisis. Sixteen of these were published between July 21 and August 2, at the height of the diplomatic crisis. The others were fairly evenly distributed in periods from June 3 to July 16, when 8 articles appeared, and seven articles from August 8 to September 19. In the June 3 to July 16 time frame, as the government, itself was unsure what to do, the articles covered different aspects and developments of the relations. The first article says that Poland only recognizes the legally elected UPB, quoting a letter from Tadeusz Pawlak to the UPB headquarters in Grodno. Two discuss developments within the Polish government itself, emphasizing that this was the first time in years that Poland had conflict with Belarus, and two more on 15 and 16 July discuss the expulsion of Polish diplomats from Belarus. On 21 July, the diplomatic expulsion theme continued, but including Polish expulsions of Belarusian diplomats, though with an acknowledgement of issues which the Polish government desired to discuss with Belarus. The 27 July raid on the UPB only intensified the conflict, and the day after that the desire for regime change in Belarus was explicitly stated in one article, though with the fear expressed that that might destabilize the country. Poland quickly withdrew its ambassador, the withdrawal providing the subject matter of most subsequent articles, and it was at that point, when diplomatic contacts between the two countries were virtually nonexistent, that the Rzeczpospolita articles started to advocate a specific plan of Polish involvement in the issue, specifically a radio station, and support of civil society which was the focus of four articles. In addition, the Belarusian minority in Poland and potential problems for them as a result of the conflict was the subject of an article. Throughout this time period, though, there is a high amount of emphasis placed on potential problems in protecting the UPB and normalizing relations with Belarus. Nine articles, one of which is an interview with Andżelika Borys, focus on the anti-Poland nature of Belarusian media, and another talks of the paradox of not being able to appease, but at the same time avoiding pushing Belarus towards Moscow. Two articles provides a counterargument, discussing the pro Belarus stance Poland had taken since the fall of the USSR, but the EU is presented as the viable solution to this problem.

The EU is the topic of 27 Rzeczpospolita articles of the time. From 21 July to 2 August, when the majority of articles about Polish Belarusian relations were being printed, nine discussing EU involvement were, and in addition there were three articles

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posted on 3-4 August. Apart from that, again, the articles were fairly evenly distributed from 15 June to 9 July, five articles, and 9 August to 19 September, ten articles. The message presented remained consistent; Poland must seek international cooperation in order to be able to act effectively in Belarus. This was partially due to an awareness of the presentation of Poland in the Belarusian media, and there was also the argument that the EU had a duty to become involved in order to prevent increasing authoritarianism and human rights violations on its own continent. The intervention called for was almost invariably a radio station which would provide an independent source of information and news to Belarusians and be run by the EU so it had greater legitimacy than if it were solely a Polish venture, and this plan was realized. The articles also expressed the desire for the EU to act more strongly than it was acting, both with general articles expressing disappointment and theorizing why that was the case and with specific criticism of EU actions for being too moderate. Even the radio station was perceived as being given to a German company who would be less harsh in its appraisal of Belarusian authorities than others might be.

Gazeta Wyborcza was much more passive in its coverage of Polish Belarusian bilateral relations than Rzeczpospolita. It had 18 articles devoted to the topic, eight of which were published between 21 July and 2 August. Of these, one features an appeal for pressure on Belarusian authorities from the Polish government. Three present arguments against such actions, criticizing the government for focusing too much on Belarusian authorities and stating that supporting civil society and cultural interaction would be the more effective way, and that isolating Belarus would be beneficial to Lukashenka, and therefore counterproductive. One article goes so far as to say that support of the UPB is the wrong course of action, and that aid should be directly aimed at ordinary people rather than the organization. The radio station was supported in Gazeta Wyborcza as well, discussed in a number of articles. Two discussed Poland’s Belarusian minority as an issue and potential victim of the conflict. Nine discussed the Belarusian media, but this discussion was not linked strongly to the argument of EU involvement being necessary. For the most part it was largely descriptive, two articles argued that it was not very effective in convincing any but the older Belarusians, and the action which was argued for was a visit of a known Polish politician to Belarus to assure UPB members that it was not true.

Likewise, the EU played a smaller role in Wyborcza coverage of the events, being discussed in six articles from the time frame. Of these, two discuss specific events, one EU condemnation of Belarusian actions and the other the expulsion of a NGO working to study Polish Belarusian and EU Belarusian relations. The other four argue for the need of EU involvement in the situation, for the same reasons Rzeczpospolita gave, to avoid isolating Belarus and provide further legitimacy for action.

2010 Conflict

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Polish Belarusian bilateral relations were the subject of seventeen Rzeczpospolita articles. Two of these occurred within days of the conflict starting, discussing the possibility of sanctions. Ten of them occurred in the day preceding and ten days following a February 13 meeting of Sergei Martynau and Radosław Sikorski in Warsaw to discuss cross border traffic. Only the first three of these directly related to the meeting, itself, but three days after it took place, 40 UPB activists were arrested. The subsequent articles presented the Polish response to the event as well as opinions on Polish policy toward Belarus, largely arguing that Poland needed a stricter policy toward its neighbour. In addition, two discuss anti-Polish Belarusian propaganda. The remaining articles are not particularly focused on any time frame, and discussed a variety of issues, such as a letter to the Polish government urging them to stop a ‘smear campaign’ against the pro-authorities UPB, and a meeting of Sikorski and Lukashenka about the UPB.

By the 2010 conflict, Rzeczpospolita had significantly decreased its emphasis on the EU. The timing of the ten EU based articles coincided mainly with a February 24 visit by Andżelika Borys and Aleksander Milinkiewicz to the EP, with three such articles published in the week before and four in the week after the event. These articles mainly focused on the question of EU sanctions against Belarus for its actions, and there was certainly criticism of the EU for its lack of involvement, especially after Borys’s visit. Of the remaining stories, one was published in the first few days of the crisis, and two discussing the critical report of an EU envoy to Belarus. These discuss EU conditions for aid to Belarus.

Gazeta Wyborcza had eight articles devoted to Polish Belarusian relations. Four of them were reactions to Lukashenka’s arrest of the 40 UPB activists, with arguments that Poland must react strongly to the events. Two were very early in the conflict, one discussing a letter from the UPB to Donald Tusk asking for support, and one from January discussing the agreement of Sikorski and Martynau to meet. Finally, one discussed Sikorski and Lukashenka’s meeting, asking whether that meant Lukashenka had softened, and concluding that it did not. Sikorski’s meeting with Martynau was certainly discussed, but emphasized and criticized less in Gazeta Wyborcza than Rzeczpospolita, in which Polish Belarusian relations became a focus for the newspaper beginning with that event, headlines specifically dealt with it, and reservations about the meeting expressed before it even occurred, indeed the UPB wasn’t even mentioned in any Wyborcza articles from February 12 to February 15, during which time it was mentioned in three from Rzeczpospolita.

The EU was mentioned in eight Wyborcza articles. Unlike in Rzeczpospolita, these were not highly concentrated around Andżelika Borys’s visit to the EP, with only One article published in the week before and two in the week of and after her visit. Five were published before her visit, two of which mentioned the need for Poland to persuade the EU to join it in reacting strongly to repression of the UPB, one specifically discussing

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Warsaw’s desire for European institutions, including the IMF, to be able to protect the UPB, one discussing EU foreign ministers demonstrating solidarity with imprisoned activists, and one interview with Jacek Protasiewicz, who argued that Belarus was testing the EU. The final article focused on the report of the EU envoy to Belarus.

2010 Polish Elections

The analysis of coverage of the Polish elections was intended to determine whether the issue of the UPB played much of a role in Polish internal politics. In reading the articles, however, an event which had previously been unknown to me surfaced, the resignation of Andżelika Borys as head of the UPB, a subject which dominated coverage of the UPB for that timeframe. The EU is not as much an issue, as in the Polish and Belarusian elections, the articles which mention the EU and other international organizations are essentially using Belarus’s lack of participation in them to highlight its isolation as a country. This is to be expected, as they would have had little reason to press for EU involvement for elections.

In the 2010 Polish elections, the Rzeczpospolita articles were overwhelmingly about Andżelika Borys’s resignation and replacement with Anżelika Orechwo as head of the UPB. Seven of ten articles were about that. One dealt with Andżelika Borys’s potential bankruptcy due to her running Polonika, a company devoted to Polish education which was fined by the state for being an illegal charity. The other two Rzeczpospolita articles dealt with the election, specifically a presidential debate in which Belarus was a topic of discussion.

In Gazeta Wyborcza, two of six articles were about Andżelika Borys’s resignation. One dealt with the presidential debate. One discussed a camp for Polish children from Kazakhstan organized in part by Andżelika Borys, and the last two dealt with the fact that Robert Tyszkiewicz, a Polish politician, was stopped from entering Belarus on a ban he had received in 2007. The second of these two articles juxtaposed this to promises of Łukashenka to improve relations and congratulating Bronisław Komorowski on his election.

2010 Belarusian Elections

The analysis of coverage of the 2010 Belarusian elections was intended to determine how much the UPB affected Polish Belarusian relations during a time period when there was not an overt conflict.

The Rzeczpospolita articles did emphasize the issue of the UPB and Polish Belarusian bilateral relations. Two discussed the cancelling of a dance performance organized by the UPB because of signs Lukashenka was going to politicize it. Three dealt with a meeting of the Polish foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, the German

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foreign minister, Guido Westerville, and Lukashenka in Minsk. They noted that relations had been tense since 2005, and that the UPB would be an issue discussed, though Sikorski did not wish to discuss exactly what was said in the press conference. Two discussed Lukashenka’s interview in which he said that Belarus does not discriminate and there can be two Polish organizations, and one on the same day as the second article addressing the interview discussing Andżelika Borys’s potential of bankruptcy. Apart from those, one discussed a visa program, signed in the presence of Anżelika Orechwo, which would help the Poles in Belarus, and the last was an interview with deported Polish journalist, discussing Lukashenka’s repression, and how she has attempted to counter it.

Of the three Gazeta Wyborcza articles, again, one dealt with a Polish children’s camp organized in part by the UPB. The other two discussed Łukashenka’s claims about minorities in Belarus in a three hour show broadcast by Belarusian television, specifically that Belarus does not have any minorities or discriminate, all are ‘my people.’ One puts this in the context of all of Łukashenka’s promises, and one asks the question of whether things will actually change after these promises, with the conclusion that it is unlikely.

Spokesperson Analysis

The choice of spokespeople varied only slightly in the two sources, and remained fairly consistent throughout the time periods.

2005 Crisis Spokesperson Rzeczpospolita Gazeta Wyborcza Politicians Polish: 13

Belarusian: 8 European: 11

Polish: 4 Belarusian: 2 European: 0

Activists Polish: 74 Belarusian: 11

Polish: 25 Belarusian: 2

Academics Polish: 1 Belarusian: 2

Polish: 1 Belarusian: 2

Ordinary people Polish: 3 Belarusian: 1

Polish: 1 Belarusian: 1

2010 Conflict Spokesperson Rzeczpospolita Gazeta Wyborcza Politicians Polish: 17

Belarusian: 3 European: 5

Polish: 6 Belarusian: 1 European: 4

Activists Polish: 22 Belarusian: 6

Polish: 5 Belarusian: 0

Academics Polish: 1 Belarusian: 1

Polish: 1 Belarusian: 0

Ordinary people Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

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2010 Polish Elections Spokesperson Rzeczpospolita Gazeta Wyborcza Politicians Polish: 2

Belarusian: 0 European: 0

Polish: 2 Belarusian: 0 European: 0

Activists Polish: 9 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 1 Belarusian: 0

Academics Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Ordinary people Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

2010 Belarusian Elections Spokesperson Rzeczpospolita Gazeta Wyborcza Politicians Polish: 1

Belarusian: 2 European: 0

Polish: 0 Belarusian: 3 European: 0

Activists Polish: 2 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Academics Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 0 Belarusian: 0

Ordinary people Polish: 1 Belarusian: 0

Polish: 1 Belarusian: 0

Clearly, Polish activists were the most widely quoted in the articles from both of the conflicts over the UPB, a Polish activist organization, as well as the Polish elections which occurred in the same timeframe as Andżelika Borys stepped down as head of the Union. Polish politicians were the second most widely quoted. The activists of the pro-Minsk UPB and Belarusian authorities were often brought in to substantiate claims that were being made. Essentially, the spokespeople for the conflict were the ones involved, activists and politicians, rather than citizens or academics. This changed slightly during the Belarusian elections, when Belarusian politicians and citizens were more quoted, though coverage of these events and the number of people quoted was so small that no conclusions can really be drawn from it.

Framework Analysis

The approach of the two newspapers was fairly similar in the framing of the situation. With very few exceptions, the issue of the UPB was framed in one of two ways in each paper; it was either a problem of minority rights, or a problem of authoritarianism. There were minor exceptions to this rule. Rzeczpospolita, in the course of the four events, had two articles not framed in this way. Both of these were from 2005, and one was about a group of students from Belarus who, in a program the UPB helped to organize, went to Poland to learn about Polish history and culture, and the other was a feature on a small town in which few of the residents, either Belarusian or Polish

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had political convictions or felt affected by the situation at all. Gazeta Wyborcza had 7. Three of these, from August 2005 and July and December 2010 also dealt with the same and similar school trips. Two from 2005 dealt with people who had gone to Belarus, a July 2005 one about a German who grew interested in Eastern rather than Western Europe and had moved to Poland and then Belarus, and written for Głos Znad Niemna and an August 2005 one about a Polish priest who went to work in a poor region of Belarus. Two of them actively questioned Polish actions. One of these was from July 2005, saying that Poland should not make the minority a political issue, should direct aid at ordinary people, not organizations, and should focus on bringing Belarus into the EU. On the same day, the paper reprinted a Strana.ru article which presented the Russian viewpoint, noting that that particular source releases articles which are mainly in line with the Kremlin’s views. Another, from August 2005, presents the view that Poles do not understand Belarusians, that it focuses on the authorities, sees itself as better, and should only try to influence Belarus through high culture. The same article presents a fear that Belarusians living in Poland will be negatively affected by the events. Lastly, a small number of articles actively questioned Polish assumptions about Belarus, one from 2005 Rzeczpospolita, one from 2005 and one from November 2010 Wyborcza. These articles provided counterpoints to the general assumptions that Lukashenka was particularly harmful in acting against the Poles, and the idea that perhaps Poland should rethink its strategy in relations with Belarus.

Though these articles are noteworthy, they are only a small percentage of the articles published on the issue. The rest fall into two categories, either the oppression of the UPB is treated as a human/minority rights issue, or it is framed as a democracy issue. Certainly there is much overlap between the two, and indeed in many ways they are almost inseparable. Both frameworks deal with repression, which is the fundamental problem of the UPB, and for the most part in both types of articles, the same events were discussed, the same people were quoted, and both types of articles had descriptions of the events and conditions in Belarus intended to convince readers of the gravity of the situation. The difference, however, is in the attributed reasons for Lukashenka’s actions and why action should be taken. Though it is often subtle, the difference between these frameworks is extremely important, and analyzing the frequency with which each source adopted each framework can reveal differences in their approach to the situation.

Newspaper Rzeczpospolita 140 Gazeta Wyborcza 67 2005 Crisis Minority Rights: 80

Democracy: 17 Other:

Minority Rights: 33 Democracy: 5 Other:

2010 Crisis Minority Rights: 41 Democracy: 2 Other:

Minority Rights: 20 Democracy: 0 Other:

2010 Polish Elections Minority Rights: 9 Minority Rights: 3

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Democracy: 1 Other:

Democracy: 0 Other:

2010 Belarusian Elections Minority Rights: 8 Democracy: 2 Other:

Minority Rights: 5 Democracy: 0 Other:

In treating it as a minority rights issue, articles tended to focus on bilateral Polish Belarusian relations or simply present themselves as a straightforward explanation of events meant to inform the reader of events regarding Poles in Poland’s eastern neighbour. These articles often provided a background to the development being discussed, but identified the victims as Poles, without much description of the specificities of the Union of Poles in Belarus. Without the explanations provided in the democracy framework, the issue is seen clearly as a minority one. In addition, it was only in one July 2010 Rzeczpospolita article that Lukashenka’s aversion to Belarusian language and culture and the fact that he had also closed down Belarusian schools and universities was also discussed. This is not necessarily because there was an attempt to show only Poles as victims in Belarus, but simply because of the perceived duty to protect people in other countries who consider Poland their motherland. In simply discussing the events in Belarus and identifying their victims as Poles, the articles fell into a framework of presenting the issue as one of the rights of Poles in other countries, with the implicit, if not explicit, belief that they must be supported by Poland. These articles did not necessarily express the belief that the EU had a responsibility to get involved, though they certainly did at times. Of the 151 Rzeczpospolita articles in this framework, 35 mentioned the desire for EU involvement (only one short article), and of the 67 Rzeczpospolita articles in this framework, 11 did. Both newspapers adopted this framework for a majority of the articles.

On the other hand, treating the issue as a more general problem of democratization was linked to an argument that the issue was not simply a Polish one, and that the EU should become involved. These articles identified the victims of Lukashenka’s actions, not just as Poles, but as members of the largest remaining independent organization in the country, and discussing Lukashenka’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies. These articles linked Lukashenka’s actions with larger trends in both Belarusian politics and regional affairs, most notably the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. This framework presented Lukashenka as trying to eliminate all independent organizations, and having delayed on the Union of Poles because it did have Poland’s backing. The increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime was a response to regional democratization and westward looking developments, and the fact that Belarus now bordered the EU. Some articles even went so far as to speculate that, not only did Lukashenka desire to eliminate all independent organizations, but he actually desired to subjugate them in order to appear to win elections more legitimately, as it brought in

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different organizations and national minority organizations as supporters. This framework was almost inevitably linked with the argument that this was not just a Polish problem. Belarus has an increasingly dictatorial regime in the geographical heart of Europe, neighbouring the EU. Clearly, Rzeczpospolita wrote within this framework far more than Gazeta Wyborcza did (even percentage wise), and it is also noteworthy that that is a framework most frequently adopted in 2005, appearing in only five articles afterward.

Conclusions

From this media analysis, a few conclusions can be drawn. The first of these is that Rzeczpospolita covered the events much more thoroughly than Gazeta Wyborcza did. Given the fact that Rzeczpospolita is a more right leaning paper, this would seem to indicate that the issue of the Union of Poles in Belarus is a more right wing issue. Though no conclusion can be drawn on this, it could lead to speculation that a reason for Anżelika Borys’s resignation after Kaczyński’s death is that she did not foresee the UPB receiving the kind of support it received in the past from Poland. Others, however, are also relevant. Poland seems to desire EU support in order to gain legitimacy for its actions in the face of Belarusian anti-Polish propaganda, and it seems to use the argument that human rights and democracy, principles on which the EU is based, to convince the EU of the necessity of action, while bilateral relations are more directly influenced by the specifically Polish minority across the eastern border.

Conclusions

The conflict over the Polish minority in Belarus has been extremely important to the relationship between the two countries, as conflict relating to treatment of the minority organization, the Union of Poles in Belarus, has led to a significant cooling of relations, and it has also affected the relationship between Belarus and the European Union by highlighting its democratic problems in a conflict with the leading member state in the region. Polish policy has been affected by the desire for a democratic Belarus and the idea that it is particularly important to help protect the rights of the minority in a country in which they are so much in jeopardy, but it has not been motivated specifically by the desire to impose democracy on the country, as the Belarusian media claims. That said, however, it is quite possible that this will be an effect of Polish actions. The timing of the events related to the UPB suggest that Lukashenka felt threatened by the Colour Revolutions and possibility of a push for democratization in Belarus, and used actions against the Polish minority to help solidify his power. These have not been entirely effective, however, as statistics currently show that, while nearly half of the country’s population supports Lukashenka, his popularity among young people is extremely low, only 20% for people aged 18 to 29. His actions have only politicized an apolitical organization, and, though it was not aligned with the opposition before 2005, the UPB

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has become one of the main opposition organizations in Belarus, and the main voice for the Belarusian opposition on the international forum. In the wake of the 2010 elections, protests which were brutally suppressed made international news. Belarus’s new place at the borders of the European Union, in the heart of Europe, has caused more international attention to be placed on a country which was largely ignored after the fall of the USSR. Though Lukashenka’s propaganda accusing the West of using Poland and the UPB as a way of influencing the country was just that, propaganda, the possibility exists that this will, due to his actions, be the overall effect of the conflict. A result of the dissertation has been to raise many more questions related to its topic. There is much more research which could be done on the issue, many more questions which should be answered, how does Lukashenka’s treatment of the Poles compare to his treatment of Belarusian speakers in the country; how do Polish and Lithuanian policies differ with regards to Belarus; what are Lukashenka’s goals in suppressing the Polish minority; and what has been the effect of Polish and EU policies in supporting democracy in Belarus to start with. How should the West promote democracy in Belarus? Belarus may be a historically understudied country of Europe, but the recent changes in its situation, both domestically and in terms of its international relations, make it one of the most interesting ones at this point in time and one whose future could both influence and be influenced by future developments in the region.

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Media Analysis Articles

(2005) ‘Pisalnik Laureatem’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 September.

(2005) ‘Zwolennicy Anżeliki Borys Będą Walczyć’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 September.

(2005) ‘Związek Polaków Musi Zmienić Nazwę’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 September.

(2005) ‘Propozycja dla Andżeliki Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 September.

(2005) ‘Dyktator Traci Poparcie’, Rzeczpospolita, 2 September.

(2005) ‘Białoruś: Odłożone Procesy Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 September.

(2005) ‘Nieustające Przesłuchania Andżeliki Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 August.

(2005) ‘Opozycja o Pomoc Łukaszenkę’, Rzeczpospolita, 19 August.

(2005) ‘Będzimy Działać Mimo Represji’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 August.

(2005) ‘Gawin Pozostanie w Areszcie’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 August.

(2005) ‘Grodno nie dla Eurodeputowanych’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 August.

61

(2005) ‘Kłamstwa Łukaszenki’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 August.

(2005) ‘Rzeczowy Przegląd Prasy’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 August.

(2005) ‘Francja Razem z Polską’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 August.

(2005) ‘Dizałania Konsultowane z Polską’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 July.

(2005) ‘Związek Łukaszenki i Krudzkowskiego’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 July.

(2005) ‘Wojna na Dypolmatów’, Rzeczpospolita, 26 July.

(2005) ‘Polski Konsul Wydalony z Białorusi’, Rzeczpospolita, 21 July.

(2005) ‘Dypolomata za Dyplomatę’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 July.

(2005) ‘Pomóżimy Dziennikarzom’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 July.

(2005) ‘Łukaszenko Potępiony’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 July.

(2005) ‘Morderca Polki Aresztowany’, Rzeczpospolita, 25 June.

(2005) ‘Ekspresowy List do Łukaszenki’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 June.

(2005) ‘Nowe Szykany Wobec Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 June.

(2005) ‘Kruczkowski już nie jest w ZPB’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 June.

(2005) ‘OBWE Popiera Anżelikę Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 June.

(2005) ‘Polska Wspiera Związek Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 June.

(2005) ‘Polacy Zostali bez Głosu’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 June.

(2005) ‘Czuwanie w Grodnie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 June.

(2005) ‘Łukaszenko: Uważajcie na Sąsiadów’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 June.

(2005) ‘Białoruś. Kto dał ‘Głos’?’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 June.

(2005) ‘Białoruś. Polacy Proszą Łukaszenkę’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 June.

(2005) ‘Reżim Łukaszenki Ukarał Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 July.

(2005) ‘Zjazdem w zjazd’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 July.

(2005) ‘Niecierpliwy Felix’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 July.

(2005) ‘Łukaszenko Rosję Iży, ale jej się Trzyma’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 July.

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(2005) ‘Polowanie na Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 August.

(2005) ‘Jest Wspaniale’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 August.

(2005) ‘Pierwszy Chłopak w Postsowieckiej Wsi’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 August.

(2005) ‘Łukaszenko Robi Czystki’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 August.

(2005) ‘Rozprowa z Polakami’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 August.

(2005) ‘Pomagajmy, nie Zrywajmy’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 August.

(2010) ‘Minsk Stawia Warunki UE’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 January.

(2010) ‘Co Usłyszy w Poslce Szef MSZ Białorusi’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 February.

(2010) ‘W Skrócie’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 March.

(2010) ‘Opozycjioniści czy Terroryści?’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 March.

(2010) ‘Opozycjioniści Mimo Woli’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 March.

(2010) ‘Polacy na Białorusi Piszą List do Tuska’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 January.

(2010) ‘Białoruska Milicja Kontra Polacy’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 February.

(2010) ‘Polacy na Bialorusi nie Ustępują’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 February.

(2010) ‘Kustosz Pamięci Narodowej’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 February.

(2010) ‘Dom Polski nie dla Andżeliki Borys’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 March.

(2010) ‘Rewizja u Chłonkini Związku Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 June.

(2010) ‘Odejście Pani Borys Nieczego nie Zmienia’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 July.

(2010) ‘Gest ze Strony Mińska’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 July.

(2010) ‘Obiecanki Łukaszenki’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 December.

Adamski, L. (2005) ‘Zajazd w Grodnie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 June.

Adamski, L. (2005) ‘Sfałszowany „Głos Znad Niemna’’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 June.

Adamski, L. (2005) ‘Farsa, nie Proces’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 July.

Adamski, L. (2005) ‘Pomocy Mówimy Nie!’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 August.

Adamski, L. (2005) ‘Polacy nie Składają Broni’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 September.

63

Bartoszewski, W. et al. (2005) ‘Dyktatura – Postrach Europy’, Rzeczpospolita, 19 September.

Bielecki, J. (2005) ‘Białoruś Mało Znaczy dla Europy’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 September.

Bielecki, J. (2005) ‘Polska Stawia na Szweda’, Rzeczpospolita, 7 September.

Bakhurevich, V. (2005) ‘Kolejny Atak na Polskę’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 June.

Brzeziecki, A. (2005) ‘Pułapka Łukaszenki’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 July.

Bart. (2010) ‘Łukaszenka Lepszy dla Polaków?’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 November.

Borowski, M. (2010) ‘7 Propozycji, Pieniądze i Wspólny Głos’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 February.

Bart. (2010) ‘Poseł PO Zawrócony z Białorusi’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 July.

Czaczkowska, E. (2005) ‘Z Białorusi na Jasną Górę’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 August.

Chodkiewicz, A. et al. (2005) ‘Ludzie Przede Wszystkim’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 July.

Darashkevich, J. (2005) ‘Nie Zamierzamy Składać Broni’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 September.

Drachev, V. (2005) ‘Zjazd Pod Dyktando Łukaszenki’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 August.

Drachev, V. (2005) ‘Polska nie Uczna Nowych Władz’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 August.

Darashkevich, J. (2005) ‘Milicja Kontra Polacy’, Rzeczpospolita, 7 July.

Darashkevich, J. (2005) ‘Reżim Kontra Polacy’, Rzeczpospolita, 7 July.

Darashkevich, J. (2005) ‘Sposób na Dyktatora’, Rzeczpospolita, 7 July.

Fedosenko, V. (2005) ‘Zachód Potępia Łukaszenkę’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 August.

Furtak, E. (2005) ‘Ksiądz jest bardzo Zmęczony’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 August.

Fieduta, A. (2005) ‘Białoruska Puszka Pandory’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 31 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Milicja u Pani Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Adwokat Niewiele Może’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Farsa w Wołkowysku’, Rzeczpospolita, 27 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Anżelika Borys Nadal Nękana’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 August.

64

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Tajemniczy Apel z Grodna’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Co Wymyśli Łukaszenko’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Przesłuchania, Aresztowania, Propaganda’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Wojna z Dziennikarzami’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Ambasador Atakuje Polskę’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Prezydent Łamie Własne Prawo’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Najgorszy Jest Brak Wody’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 August.

Grzedzinski, W. (2005) ‘Polski Ambasador Wyjeżdża z Minska’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 July.

Grits, S. (2005) ‘Nocny Szturm na Związek Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July.

Grits, S. (2005) ‘To nie Tylko Sprawa Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July.

Grits, S. (2005) ‘Aleksander Łukaszenko I Stworzeni Przez Niego Wrogowie’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July.

Grits, S. (2005) ‘Atak na Związek Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July.

Grits, S. (2005) ‘Konsternacja, Szok, Oburzenie’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 July.

Gzell, T. (2005) ‘MSZ Ulega Łukaszence’, Rzeczpospolita, 15 July.

Giedrys, W. (2005) ‘Będziemy Działać Nadal’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 September.

Grochal, R., Wielinski, B. (2010) ‘Łukaszenka Mięknie?’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 February.

Gursztyn, P. (2010) ‘Prezes PiS to Prawdziwy Mąż Stanu’, Rzeczpospolita, 28 June.

Haszczynski, J. (2005) ‘Świat Przeciw Łukaszence’, Rzezpospolita, 19 August.

Haszczynski, J. (2010) ‘Męska Rozmowa o Andżelice Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 February.

Imielski, R. (2010) ‘Mińsk Zmusza Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 March.

Jame. (2010) ‘Poseł Non Grata’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 12 July.

Janke, I. (2010) ‘Nie Odpuszczać Łukaszence’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 February.

65

Jagielak, A. (2005) ‘Nie Chcą Cierpieć za Łukaszenkę’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 August.

Kessler, V. (2005) ‘Sami nie Dadzą Rady’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 September.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Kontrowersyjny Medal’, Rzeczpospolita, 31 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Polski Rząd nie ma Wyboru’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Namawiam Wszystkich do Współpracy’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 August.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Podejrzany Andrzej Pisalnik’, Rzeczpospolita, 26 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Polacy Się Nie Poddają’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Polacy Łukaszenki’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Wielkoduszność po Białorusku’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Polska Pomoże Represjonowanym’, 2 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Pisalnik Aresztowany’, Rzeczpospolita, 2 August.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Rewolucji Nie Zrobią Zadowoleni’, Rzeczpospolita, 2 August.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Reżim Zaostra Walkę z Polakami’, Rzeczpospolita, 27 July.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Chcą Wojny, Będzie Wojna’, Rzeczpospolita, 27 July.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Mińsk Krytykuje Polskę’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 July.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Prokurator Ostrzega Anżelikę Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 July.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Kto Wymyślił, że Szykujemy Rewolucję’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 July.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Dziennikarze Ukarani’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 July.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Polka Zamordowana’, Rzeczpospolita, 24 June.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Znowu Fałszywy’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 June.

Koscinski, P. (2005) ‘Przejąć Związek Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 June.

Kowalczyk, P. (2005) ‘Milicja Nęka Polskich Działaczy’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 June.

Kaczynski, A. (2005) ‘Nasilają się Represje Przeciw Polakom’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 June.

Kula, M. (2005) ‘Spór o Kolonie Białoruskich Dzieci’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 August.

66

Komorowski, B. (2005) ‘Putin Potrzebuje Łukaszenki’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 August.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Trzeba się Sprzeciwić „polityce salami’’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 January.

Koscinski, P., Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Polska Grozi Sankcjami’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 January.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Sami Określimy Tempo Zmian’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 February.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Czerwona Gwiazda nad Grodnem’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 February.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘MSZ Ostrzej Wobec Białorusi’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 February.

Koscinski, P., Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Dom Polski Zabrany’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 February.

Koscinski, P., Słojewska, A. (2010) ‘Mińsk nie jest Gotowy do Dialogu z Polską’, Rzeczpospolita, 25

February.

Kowal, P. (2010) ‘Męskie Rozmowy z Dyktatorem’, Rzeczpospolita, 1 March.

Koscinski, P., Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Szansa dla Pani Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 March.

Kościński, P., Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Andżelika Borys Rezygnuje’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 June.

Kaminski, K. (2010) ‘Komornicy Znowu Odwiedzili Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 June.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Łukaszenko Chce Grać Mazowszem’, Rzeczpospolita, 26 October.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Mazowsze nie Zatańczy w Mińsku’, Rzeczpospolita, 27 October.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Sikorski Jedzie do Łukaszenki’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 October.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Białoruś Między Rosją a Unią Europejską’, Rzeczpospolita, 2 November.

Koscinski, P., Lorenz, W. (2010) ‘Unijny Duet Naciska na Łukaszenkę’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 November.

Koscinski, P., Zychowicz, P. (2010) ‘Mińsk Ma Listę Białoruską?’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 November.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Łukaszenko: Nie Dzielcie Moich Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 November.

Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Nadieja dla Białorusinów’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 November.

67

Kutka, M. (2010) ‘Jestem Polakiem, Czyli Kim?’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 December.

Letowski, M. (2005) ‘Mapa Drogowa dla Białorusi’, Rzeczpospolita, 15 June.

Lorenz, W. (2010) ‘Białoruś Uderza w Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 February.

Lorenz, W., Koscinski, P. (2010) ‘Z Łukaszenką o Polakach’, Rzeczpospolita, 26 February.

Małecki-Tepicht, S. (2005) ‘Kto Zabroni Łukaszence’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 August.

Marczuk, M. (2005) ‘Apel do Władz Białoruskich’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 July.

Murochinski, J. (2005) ‘Sięgnąć Radiem na Białoruś’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 August.

Nowakowska, A., (2010) ‘Pierwsze Starcie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 June.

Owczarek, M. (2005) ‘Białoruskie Scenariusze’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 August.

Ostalowski, J. (2005) ‘Jesteśmy Zakładnikami Antypolskiej Gry’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 June.

Południk, E. (2005) ‘Narodziny Białorusinów’, Rzeczpopspolita, 29 July.

Południk , E. (2005) ‘Uczniowie „Partyzanckiej Szkoły’ Wyrosną na Białoruską Elitę’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 July.

Popowski, S. (2005) ‘Wsparcie od Putina’, Rzcezpospolita, 29 July.

Popowski, S. (2005) ‘Polska Zmienia Kurs’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 July.

Preobrazenski, I. (2005) ‘Zachód Dymisjonuje Łukaszenkę’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 July.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Jak Obroniono Dom Polski’, Rzeczpospolita, 22 January.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Polacy z Białorusi Piszą do Premiera’, Rzeczpospolita, 25 January.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Ciąg Dalszy Walki o Iwieniec’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Władze Znów Uderzają w ZPB’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Zniszczona Własność Działaczy ZPB’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 February.

Pisalnik, A. Zychowicz, P. (2010) ‘Białoruska Milicja Zajęła Dom Polski w Iwieńcu’, Rzeczpospolita, 9 February.

Płażyński, M. (2010) ‘Niezłomna’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Grodno Solidarne z Iwieńcem’, Rzeczpospolita, 11 February.

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Pisalnik, A., Zuchowicz, K. (2010) ‘Białoruś Usłyszała Warunki’, Rzeczpospolita, 13 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Łapanka na Polskich Działaczy’, Rzeczpospolita, 16 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Wszyscy Czekają na Ruch Aleksandra Łukaszenki’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Dom Polski w Cudze Ręce’, Rzeczpospolita, 18 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘W Skrócie’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 February.

Pisalnik, A., Szymaniak, M. (2010) ‘Polacy Zmuszani do Krytyki Polski’, Rzeczpospolita, 3 March.

Płażyński, M. (2010) ‘Walka i Nadzieje Polskich Liderów’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 March.

Pawlicki, J. (2010) ‘Dom Polski w Iwieńcu Przejęty Przez Mińsk’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 February.

Pawlicki, J. (2010) ‘Powiedzmy Mińskowi „Dość!’’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 February.

Pawlicki, J. (2010) ‘Co Powiemy Łukaszence’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 February.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Andżelika Borys Rezygnuje’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 June.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Anżelika Zastępuje Andżelikę’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 June.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Kontynuacja Działań Borys’, Rzeczpospolita, 20 June.

Polskie Radio. (2010) ‘Anżelika Zastępuje Andżelikę’, Rzeczpospolita, 21 June.

Pawlicki, J. (2010) ‘Nowa Szefowa Związku Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 June.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Kresowia Zamiast Poloniki’, Rzeczpospolita, 6 November.

Pisalnik, A. (2010) ‘Pół Miliona Polaków Pojedzie na Białoruś bez Wiz’, Rzeczpospolita, 12 November.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Telewizyjny Atak na Związek Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 June.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Wyrzucili Prezesa, bo Szkodził’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 June.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Na Ostro z Polską’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 July.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Zniszczyć Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 July.

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Radziwinowycz, W. et al. (2005) ‘Zniszczyć Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 28 July.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Co Polska Może Zrobić’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 July.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Władze „Normalizują’ Związek Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 August.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Kto się boi Andżeliki Borys?’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 August.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Oskarżeni o Grożenie’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 August.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2005) ‘Łukaszenko Przejął Związek’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 August.

Romaszewska-Guzy, A. (2010) ‘Polityka Dwóch Marchewek’, Rzeczpospolita, 17 February.

Radziwinowycz, W., Wronski, P. (2010) ‘Łukaszenka Ściga Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 February.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2010) ‘Z Łukaszenką Trzeba Być Twardym’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 February.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2010) ‘Europa Wspiera Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 February.

Radziwinowycz, W. (2010) ‘Łukaszenka Boi się Silnego Związku Polaków’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 February.

Słojewska, A. (2005) ‘Przyjaciel Polaków Skazany’, Rzeczpospolita, 8 October.

Serwetnyk, T. (2005) ‘Polacy Nadal Nękani’, Rzeczpospolita, 25 August.

Sonik, B. (2005) ‘Wzmocnić Fale na Białoruś’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 August.

Słojewska, A. (2005) ‘Łukaszenko Zastraszył Polaków’, Rzeczpospolita, 30 July.

Słojewska, A. (2005) ‘Bruksela Czeka na Sygnał Warszawy’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 July.

Serwetnyk, T. (2005) ‘Polacy Musieli Zostać Przed Drzwiami’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 July.

Serwetnyk, T. (2005) ‘Gadzinówka Zamiast „Głosu Znad Niemna’ i Praworządności’, Rzeczpospolita, 4 July.

Słojewska, A. (2010) ‘Bruksela nie Użyje Kija Wobec Mińska’, Rzeczpospolita, 23 February.

70

Słojewska, A. (2010) ‘Nie Domagam się Wprowadzenia Sankcji’, Rzeczpospolita, 24 February.

Słojewska, A. (2010) ‘Pani Borys w Brukseli’, Rzeczpospolita, 24 February.

Stróżyk, J. (2010) ‘Borys Broni Szefa Rozgłośni Nadającej na Białoruś’, Rzeczpospolita, 27 February.

Serwetnyk, T., Słojewska, A. (2010) ‘Kraje Partnerstwa Wschodniego Stają po Stronie Mińska’, Rzeczpospolita, 5 March.

Słojewska, A. (2010) ‘Europosłowie Ujmą się za Polakami na Białorusi’, Rzeczpospolita, 10 March.

Szymanski, W. (2010) ‘Białoruś Testuje Unię’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 February.

Szymanski, W. (2010) ‘Sankcje to Ostateczność’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 March.

Starowieyska, M. (2010) ‘Pogubieni w Metamorfozach Marszałka’, Rzeczpospolita, 29 June.

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72

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/id/d_by/default_en.htm, consulted 6.4.11

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74

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Eur Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:040:0001:0250:EN:PDF, consulted 6.5.11

Eur Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:040:0001:0250:EN:PDF, consulted 6.5.11

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European External Action Service Website, http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/initiatives/docs/fs_integrated_border_management_canciani_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European External Action Service Website, http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/initiatives/docs/fs_civil_protection_canciani_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Commission Website, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/initiatives/docs/fs_environmental_gov_canciani_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/depa/dv/depa_20100310_03_8_/depa_20100310_03_8_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d-by_20091118_01_/d-by_20091118_01_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d-by_20091015_01_/d-by_20091015_01_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d-by_20090930_01_/d-by_20090930_01_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d-by_20090930_02_/d-by_20090930_02_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d-by_20090930_03_/d-by_20090930_03_en.pdf, consulted 6.4.11

European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/delegations/publicationsDel.do?language=EN&body=D-BY, consulted 6.4.11

77

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Eur Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:349:0037:01:EN:HTML, consulted 6.4.11

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European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d-by_20100908_01/d-by_20100908_01en.pdf, consulted on 6.4.11

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European Parliament Website, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-by/dv/d_by_20110317_01_/d_by_20110317_01_en.pdf, consulted on 6.4.11

78

European Commission Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna Website, http://www.delvie.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_osce/eastern_europe.htm, consulted 16.5.11

European Commission Website, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/index_en.rss, consulted on 6.4.11

Eur Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:042:0054:01:EN:HTML, consulted on 6.4.11

Eur Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:010E:0001:0267:EN:PDF, consulted on 6.4.11

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83

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84

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85

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86

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87

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88

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89

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90

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91

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92

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93

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