Prof. Seppo Hentilä14.3.2005Finland’s German Policy in the framework of European Détente

1. Difficulties of Finland’s relations to divided Germany

No other international controversy during the Cold War pulled Finland so tightly between the blocs as did the issue of a divided Germany --- until 1973

…walking on a tightrope, both ends of which seemed ending in Moscow… deadlock without a way out… etc.

Research Problem:Finland’s relations to divided Germany in the framework of the Cold War, with a special emphasis on the Finnish - Soviet relations

Arhcival Sources:•Auswärtiges Amt•East German Foreign Ministry•SED Politbüro•Stasi Archives (BStU)•Finnish Foreign Ministry•Urho Kekkonen’s Archives

When Germany was divided in 1949 the West recognised the Federal Republic of Germany, while the East recognised the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Until 1973 Finland was the only country, which could not establish full diplomatic relations with either of the two German states Finland’s German-policy dogma – the doctrine of non-recognition of divided states

The key of understanding of Finland’s German policy FCMA treaty, signed between Finland and the USSR on April 6, 1948 --- to remain outside the disputes between the superpowers If any problem in the Cold War world the German question was such a dispute – and the the G. q. brought the Cold War crisis to Finnish – Soviet relations

… “if Germany or some other state, allied to it were to attempt to invade the Soviet Union through Finland’s territory”

Under Article 2 - negotiations for Soviet assistance --- if Finland was unable to resist the invader

Germany defined as Finland’s and Soviet Union’s potential common enemy --- this explains the deadlock

In the first phase of the Cold War Finland’s space of freedom, given by the USSR, was extremely narrow

So Finland was not allowed to join such organisations like Marshall-programme (ERP), European Council, the OEEC or not even the Nordic Council, founded in 1952

December 1955, Bonn proclaimed the Hallstein Doctrine: it would regard recognition of the GDR as an unfriendly act towards the Federal Republic of Germany

2. Sonderfall Finnland – the most progressive – but the weakest

To use an analogy from ice hockey: The West Germans had to watch in Finland how the Soviet “Red Machine” was engaged in a steamroller power play on the GDR’s side, while the Federal Republic itself was sitting on the penalty box, unable to do anything but watch helplessly how its interests were being unscrupulously violated and how easy it was for the GDR bug to infect the Finns

Finland the only place in the world, where West Germans had to compete with the “so-called GDR” on equal footing

From time to time the Soviet leaders proposed to president Kekkonen that Finland should recognize the GDR

The widest movement for the recognition of the GDR was formed in Finland during the late 1960s

Why – and how did it manage?“DDR-Kulturzentrm”

Public opinion in Finland about the GDR?

Methods of persuasion: Direct influence on the political leadership and on the top of the civil servants, improvement of the knowledge of the citizens on the GDR and establishing contacts to researchers and other experts

The Finns should be made to believe that the GDR was a socially, economically and culturally important, rich and progressive country, which was treated unfairly by the international community

3. The framework of the ESCEuropean Security Conference--- Kossygin, summer 1966… Old soviet idea since the 1950s

Ambassador A. E. Kovalev,s proposal to Kekkonen, April 1969 …his government hoped that the German question could be solved as a part of a wide European arrangement

Additionally Kovalev hoped that the Finns would actively participate to the preparations of the ESC Kekkonen sceptical --- would this kind of a conference have success and lead to some results? Was afraid of failing just because of the opposite opinions of the two German states

Finland’s difficulty --- to prove her credibly to the West that she was acting in favour of her national interests and by no means fulfilling the Soviet will

Finland’s solution --- no preconditions, e. g. the existence of two German states, and the principle that the existing borders would be unchangeable --- in addition the United States and Canada should be called to the ESC

Finland’s initiative for the CSCE, May 5, 1969 ---Finland would suit better than any other European country to host the conference ---”Finland has good relations to all countries, which are concerned about the security in Europe, and its attitude to the most vital security problem, namely to the German question, has been highly acknowledged by the different parts.”

The motive of the CSCE initiative?

Keijo Korhonen, a former senior official at the Foreign Ministry: it was a “driving anchor” of Finland’s German policy --- the aim was to escort Finland’s policy of neutrality safely to the harbour in this most difficult matter, nothing else

This was the marching order, and the CSCE initiative was planned to be a tool of Finland’s policy of neutrality, and not a purpose as such.

4. Finland’ Fight for her Policy of Neutrality

…since the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1968 the phrase “Finland’s policy of neutrality” was banned by the Soviet leaders

… to grip the bull by the horns: active and peaceful policy of neutrality should be Finland’s way in her participation in the international politics

Acts of Activity:

•CSCE •Nordek --- free trade agreement with the EEC

•Max Jakobson’s canditature to the Secretary General of the UN

•”Good Services” to the international Commynity … e.g. hosting the SALT talks in Helsinki

Ostpolitik of Chancellor Willy Brandt --- main results in 1970

Kekkonen, too, began little by little to believe that new initiatives in her policy towards the divided Germany could be possible

Soviet Proposal for the Prolongation of the FCMA treaty in 1970 with another 20 years, although the term was not until 1975 --- why???

In May 1971, a plan for possible later use was prepared --- Germany Package 1. Establishing diplomatic relations on one hand

between Helsinki and Bonn, and on the other hand between Helsinki and East Berlin;

2. Concluding a treaty of abstinence from violence; 3. Solving open economic and juridical questions,

especially on the damages in Lapland, caused by the German troops in 1944–1945 and

4. Recognising Finland’s neutrality by both German states.

Challenges of the Germany Package to the Soviet Union

--- for example, an agreement to abstain from the use of violence would have rendered null and void the first article of the FCMA treaty

--- recognition of Finnish neutrality by a state from the West and from the East The ”Timing Man”

- Väinö Leskinen

Risto Hyvärinen

East German politburo on September 14th --- the GDR would like to open the negotiations as soon as possible

The Federal Republic criticized the Finnish proposal harshly and claimed that it was favouring the GDR and the Finns were obviously fulfilling the Soviet will

On October 11, 1971 the GDR deputy foreign secretary Paul Scholz, in the “Headquaters”, meeting his colleague N. V. Rodionov

“A wrong message to other socialist countries?” STOP!--- This quotation is one of the very few documents we have to prove why the SU refused to recognise Finland’s policy of neutrality just after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Finland’s example could be dangerous, because the European allies of the SUnion would appeal to it in order to achieve in their relations to Moscow the same status as Finland already had

5. Bonn blackmails with the CSCE

AA in February 1972: --- if Finland would hasten to recognise the GDR before the German – German basic agreement (Grundlagenvertrag) would be completed ---- that kind of mistake would bring “serious consequences” --- harmful to Finland’s acceptability as the host of the CSCE summit ---“Federal Republic would never take part to a conference in the capital of a country, in which the GDR had an embassy with full diplomatic rights.”

Up until the early 1970s, Finland was indubitably a more vexing issue for the FRG’s foreign policy than any other non-communist state --- it was certainly the weakest link in the blockade of the GDR based on the Hallstein Doctrine

Conversely --- it was the behaviour of the FRG that Finland had good reason to fear above all, since the SU might react to it by invoking the FCMA treaty -- this is what happened in 1958 and 1961 during the two Berlin crises --- every time when something happened in Germany, the Finnish – Soviet relations were shaken

As late as in May 1972, the foreign minister of the FRG, Walter Scheel, warned Finland --- Bonn would not accept that the CSCE preparations would begin in Helsinki, if Finland continues on the way of recognising the GDR Kekkonen’s comment in his diary: “Bonn is blackmailing”

Bonn was driving on two tracks at the same time

Publicly the FRG criticized Finland, but in backstage the AA was sending opposite messages--- Kekkonen got this kind of messages, not only from Bonn but from Moscow and East Berlin--- it was impossible the FRG to reject the CSCEcompletely --- it would have given to the SU a propaganda weapon and threatened to isolate the FRG from the West --- thus Bonn had to balance between slowing down the preparations of the CSCE and keeping them alive at the same time

Finland as “victim of the Hallstein Doctrine” --- until the bitter end --- in 1967 the FRG established diplomatic relations with Romania and in 1968 it restored relations with Yugoslavia, despite the fact that both already had relations with the GDR

---this looser interpretation of the Hallstein Doctrine did not appear to apply to Finland --- as long as the Basic Treaty between the two German states remained unsigned, the Federal Republic did not want Finland to recognise the GDR

6. Launching the Germany Package again

Kekkonen waited the answer from Bonn 10 months--- decided to open the negotiations with the GDR in July 1972Agreement between Finland and the GDR, signed in September 1972Only on one of the four package points was agreed – the diplomtic recognition---t he GDR promised to ”respect Finland’s striving to practice a policy of neutrality”

Equal treatment of both German states?

It would have been advisable to Finland to abstain from doing anything at all --- just to wait for the ratification of the Grundlagenvertrag between two German states

The normalisation of the German question on the basis of the two states model and as a part of the European détente, was evident to come --- recognised already in the treaty of 1970 by the Governments of the SU and the FRG

The most evident reason was, however, in the summer 1972 the CSCE reason

Also the EEC reason got more and more wind to sails, when the so called Zavidovo memorandum of Kekkonen’s talks with the Soviet leadership on August 12 – 18, 1972 leaked ten weeks later to publicity --- or more exactly, it was intentionally arranged by some leading Social Democrats that it leaked to the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter--- the coupling of the Zavidovo leak to the plan of securing Kekkonen’s re-election with a special law and Kekkonen’s threat to resign because of the leak?

In the publicity the CSCE reason appeared constantly in a negative light because the Bonn threatened Finland --- meaning just Finland’s suitability to the host of the CSCE conference

Finland’s decision to recognise both German states on Septemer 19, 1972 --- cold reactions from Bonn

SIC! --- negotiations on the Package between Finland and the FRG had not even begun

West Germans re-organising the negotiation table at Dipoli in November 1972 in the first round of the CSCE negotiations ---- R.D.A – R.F.A. instead of FRG – GDR

The action of the FRG was consistent and successful: the magic line was signing of the basic treaty between the two German states on December 21, 1972 --- then Bonn did not protest any more, when the recognition swell of the GDR began

The Highlight of Erich’s Life

7. Some Conclusive Remarks

Finland’s Germany Package --- a Success Story?

--- yes, when we take into account, how difficult and full of risks the international situation was

--- simultaneous recognition of both German states, as well as signing of equal treaties with them

--- any “final solutions” would not have been made unilaterally with only one German state

Soviet pressure on Finland?

Of course --- but after Finland had launched the CSCE initiative in 1969, the Soviet Union’s attitude was clear: --- Finland’s suitability as a pacemaker in the CSCE process and as the host for a possible summit was a much more valuable issue than the recognition of the GDR

The Federal Republic

The FRG did not stand idly by, though its activities were not visible and aggressive in the same way as the ones of the GDR

---Defending her most valuable national issue – the Re-Unification of Germany

--- On the other hand, Finland’s Germany package and the CSCE initiative were aimed at precisely the same as Brandt’s Ostpolitik – at easing tensions and calming down the situation in the heart of Europe

For this reason, the Federal Republic was forced to reassure Finland behind the scenes that it’s publicly expressed criticism and its bullying with the sanctions of the Hallstein Doctrine were just a prank

What should we have to learn from this all?

--- the military articles of the FCMA meant that Finland’s German policy was by its very definition subordinate to and dependent on its relations to the SU--- on the other hand, the Soviet policy towards Finland included motives, which were more far reaching than her relations to Finland--- in the Cold War Finland did not wage a separate war against the Soviet Union

Finland,s Finlandisation in the G. q.?