19

PROCESS THEOLOGY

Published by:

Religious and Theological Studies Fellowship 38 De Hontfort Street Leicester LEl 7GP

RTSF publishes a series of short booklets and monographs on a wide range of theological topics. For a free catalogue and order form write to the above address.

Preface

The purpose of this monograph Is to Introduce the reader to the central tenets of Process theism and some of Its implications for Christianity. To this end I have attempted to let it speak for itself by the liberal use of quotes, while explaining some of the more Important concepts, elucidating Its obscure vocabulary and drawing out some of Its radical implications.

Hy own critical comments are largely restricted to the final chapters. However, I hope that readers will not be tempted to miss out the earlier chapters as that would destroy the whole point of my work which is to enable them to enter into a dialogue with Process thought. As Karl Barth once wrote,

'We cannot anticipate which of our fellow workers from the past are welcome In our own work and which are not. lt may always be that we have especial need of quite unsuspected (and among these, of quite unwelcome) voices'

(Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 1]).

Lawrence Osborn 1985

Contents

Introduction

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

1·

Some Elements of Process Metaphysics

From Actual Entitles to the 1Rea1 1 World

Whitehead's Theistic Hypothesis

God in Process Theology

God and the World

Process Thought and Biblical Christianity

Conclusion

Suggestions for further reading

Bibliography

3

s 12

15

19

22

27

32

33

34

Introduction

A basic difficulty In trying to write an introduction to Process thought and Its relevance to theology Is that of Its diversity. The term 'Process Theology' Is often used In a narrow sense to denote the school of thought which grew up at the Chicago Divinity School In the 1930's under the Influence of A N Whitehead's writings. However the term Is also frequently used In a.broad sense to describe theologians as diverse as H N Wleman (the American radical empirical theologian), W Temple, and Pierre Tellhard de Chardln.

Process thought (In the broad sense) may be seen as one of the po.sslble responses to the nineteenth century Interest In evolution. Both before and after the publication of The Origin of Species a number of attempts were made to Integrate evolutionary thought Into a world view. These ranged from the evolutionary agnosticism of Herbert Spencer to explicitly theistic evolutlorary systems such as that of Henry Drummond. •

This trend continued Into the twentieth century with contributions from such men as C L Horgan (1852-1936) and S Alexander (1859-1938) in Britain and H Bergson (1859-1941) In France. However the real father of Process thought was, without doubt, the British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947).

Whitehead began his academic career as a mathematician (in fact suspect that In this country he Is better known for his collaboration with Bertrand Russell on 1Prlnclpla Hathematica 1 than for his later philosophical works). According to his autobiographical note in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed Schllpp, 1941) he began hTS work on philosophy In 1918 though his interest In this field seems to date from under-graduate days.

The philosophical work that he engaged In in 1918 turned out to be a major revision of Western metaphysics In the light of evolutionary thought and Its emphasis on the temporality of our experience. lt has sometimes been dismissed as a realist revision of Hegel's metaphysics but In this context lt Is worth noting Whitehead's own comments on Hegel, 1 1 have never been able to read Hegela I Initiated my attempt by studying some remarks of his on mathematics which struck me as complete nonsense'. (Schllpp, 1941, 7) In any case a glance at the table of contents In Process and Reality reveals a much broader concern on Whitehead's past. This work (based on his Gifford lectures for 1927/1928) att~pts to modify and unite what he regarded as the two main streams of metaphysical tradition (Aristotelian objectivism and Cartesian subjectivism) while at the same time integrating a proper regard for temporality Into the whole system.

In 1924 he accepted an Invitation to join the Philosophy Department of Harvard University. Consequently his philosophical work has had far greater Influence In the United States of America than in Europe. This is particularly true in theology where the methodology favoured

3

by European neo-orthodoxy Is diametrically opposed to the more scholastic approach of American Process theologians.

Process theology Is therefore a largely American phenomenon. The men mainly responsible for Introducing Whltehead 1 s thought to American theologians were H N Wleman and C Hartshorne (both professors at the Chicago Divinity School). As already mentioned Wleman•s thlnklng · ted him to adopt a radically empiricist approach so the Process school of thought can be said to originate with Charles Hartshorne (and most of the present generation of Process theologians acknowledge their indebtedness to his work).

Before going on to deal with Process Theology In more detail lt Is worth noting one Independent British application of Whitehead's thought. This Is to be found In The Incarnate Lord by L S Thornton. The orthodoxy of this work Is In sharp contrast to the radicalism of much Process thinking. (The few American references to Thornton I have found dismiss him as a supernaturallst). What he attempted to do was re-cast traditionally Christian doctrine In the language of Process thought rather than revising the content of that doctrine. Thornton later became disenchanted with Whitehead's metaphysics and In the years before his death In 1960 tended to favour Teilhard de Chard in.

4

1. SOHE ELEMENTS OF PROCESS METAPHYSICS

An adequate Introduction to Whitehead's metaphysics Is beyond the scope of this work. However a brief outline is necessary, to Introduce the reader to some of the technical vocabulary peculiar to Process thought. This vocabulary may Initially strike one as unnecessary jargon but, In fact, lt plays an Important role In the development of Whitehead's thought. The point Is that lt lacks the connotations of traditional metaphysical vocabulary and so does not tend to channel the user towards the traditional answer (a parallel can be seen In the way new branches of physics or mathematics are often associated with new technical languanges). Those who are familiar with the writings of Edward de Bono may recognise the idea as one of the techniques of lateral thinking.

Contrary to popular belief Process metaphysics did not simply develop by Inference from the scientific view of the world in the 1920's, although, of course, lt was Informed by Whitehead's scientific understanding. Rather lt began with reformulation of Aristotle's baste metaphysical problem, le 'The final problem Is to conceive a complete fact', (Adventures of Ideas, 203). Whitehead went on to affirm the Aristotelian principle that, 'apart from things that are actual, there Is nothing' (Process and Reality, 40). This principle (usually known as the Ontological Principle) Is the starting point for Whitehead's entire system.

Whitehead's Procedure Unlike many of his contemporaries, Whitehead regarded Imaginative generalization as of central Importance in the pursuit of a metaphysical system. He saw the philosopher's task as 'the search of premises • not deduction' (Modes of Thought, 143). This search Is partly empirical In that lt proceeds by observation of the world guided by a set of . worklng hypotheses. lt Is prevented from degenerating Into sheer speculation by the application of certain rati;nallstlc principles. Thus Whitehead can sum up the procedure of metaphysics as follows.

'The first requisite Is to proceed by the method of generalization so that certainly there Is some application• and the test of some success Is application beyond the Immediate origin. In other words, some synoptic vision has been gained • • • • • The second con.tltlon for the success of Imaginative construction Is unflinching pursuit of the two rationalistic Ideals, coherence and logical perfection'. (Process and Reality, 5f)

The ideal of coherence Is particularly important. What it means to Whitehead is most easily explained by describing its opposite. For Whitehead, Incoherence means the adoption of principles or ideas which have only an arbitrary connection with the other principles In one's system of thought. Cartesian dualism is a good example of a

5

metaphysical system which falls to meet this standard. The adoption of such a system would be, in Whitehead's view, tantamount to Irrationalism. Implicit In this Ideal Is the assumption that everything can be described In terms of a single set of Interconnected explanatory principles. Or, In Plttlnger's words, 'This Is one world, however diversified lt may be' (Process Thought and Christian Faith, 17).

Actual Entitles or Actualities These are the basic building blocks of process metaphysics. The primary significance of the term Is the same as that of •substance' or 'monad', ie 'that which ls 1 but unlike the other Items it does not have connotations suggesting what the nature of reality Is. Whitehead says of them

'"Actual entities" ••••• are the final real things of which the world Is made up • They differ among themselves• God is an actual entity, and so Is the most trivial puff of existence In far-off · empty space. But, though there are gradations of Importance, and diversities of function, yet In the principles which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, actual entitles'~ (Process and Reality, 18)

Since Ontological monism and dualism both fall to satisfy the Ideal of coherence, Process metaphysics is unashamedly pluralistic. There are many ultimate realities (or 'final facts') but, while they may differ functionally, they are all generically of one kind -actual entities.

The Problem of Change Change and changelessness ar~ unquestionably phenomena of the world In which we live, but one of the classical problems of metaphysics has been how to explain both adequately. Plato's solution was to opt for ontological dualism but this Is ruled out by the acceptance of Aristotle and Whitehead's Ontological Principle. Aristotle's answer was to treat changelessness as essential and change as accidental (le, pertaining to qualities and relations). Thus changing phenomena could be analysed into final realities devoid of change.

Process metaphysics regards this solution as a violation of principle of coherence. If actualities exist without change then cannot be the reason for change. Therefore one must appeal to actuality of a kind generically different from those consideration. The system therefore becomes incoherent.

the they some

under

Whitehead's conclusion (following Descartes) Is that there cannot be existence without change or activity. Being and becoming are inextricably united. 'How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is • Its "being" is constituted by Its

6

11becomlng 11 • This Is the "principle ?f process'"· Reality, 23).

Process

(Process and

For Whitehead this term means, primarily, the bec~nlng, or, coming Into being, of an actual entity. lt Is not to be regarded as a transition In which the actuality remains passive. On the contrary, the actual entity Is the agent In the activity of Its own becoming. Actual entitles are, thus, to some extent self-caused or self­creative.

Process thought may have restored change or temporality to Its rightful place In metaphysics. But, on the face of it, it has done so at the risk of abandoning the notions of changelessness and Individuality. How Is it possible to maintain the idea of changelessness If the ultimate realities are regarded as themselves changing?

Whitehead agrees that these difficulties arise, but only If process Is conceived of as continuous. By using the work of the Greek philosopher Zeno, he demonstrates that attempting to treat process as a continuum leads to an Infinite regress. Thus If B supercedes A the assumption of continuity makes it impossible to pinpoint the transition from A to B. This leads Whitehead to reject the notion of continuity In favour of atomicity. 'The ultimate metaphysical truth Is atomlsm. The creatures are atomic' (Process and Reality, 35). In other words, Whitehead proposes a radical quantlzatlon of space and time (Interestingly the former has become, Independently of Whitehead, a commonplace of contemporary physics).

But this does not go far enough, for If Zeno's method threatens the con.tlnulty of process as a whole lt also threatens the individual processes of becoming, the actual entitles themselves. To avoid this, Whitehead asserts that, 'In every act of becoming there Is the becoming of something with temporal extension, but • the act Itself Is not extensive In the sense that it Is divisible Into earlier and later acts of becoming' (Process and Reality, 69). This Is the so-called epochal theory of actuality, ie, actual entitles are to be regarded as being temporally undivided, or epochal.

Creativity The notion of the self-causation of actualities is one that is alien to orthodox Christianity (with Its Insistence that only God is self­caused). However Whitehead Is adamant that the reservation of self­causation to one particular entity results in incoherence. Self­causation thus Indicates that creativity is an activity generic to all actualities. Whitehead regards the notion of creativity as 'Another rendering of the Aristotelian 11matter 111 (Process and Reality, 31) and goes on to explain it as follows. 'it is that notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. lt cannot be characterized,

7

because all characters are more special than Itself' (Process and Reality, 31). lt Is ultimate but not the ultimate reality because lt only exists as lt Is Individualized In actual entities.

Creativity implies that each actuality Is a process which results In novelty. But novelty appearing ex nlhllo would be a violation of the ontological principle. The novel creature must originate from existing data. These da.a are provided by antecedent actualities. Whitehead terms this process of becoming, or 'growing together', from past actualities 'CONCRESCENCE•.

If this were the whole story there would be no real place for creativity. To account for novelty there must be data other than those provided by antecedent actualities. Whitehead does this by postulating another type of entity.

Eternal Objects Each individual actuality has a particular form or character (otherwise it would not be an Individual). Form is therefore an essential component of any actual lty. In other words, to exist at all an actual entity requires Its definiteness to be determined by a particular kind of entity - Its FORH or ETERNAL OBJECT. Whitehead acknowledges his Indebtedness to Plato (and Aristotle) at this point by admitting, 'These forms of definiteness arc the Platonic forms, the Platonic ideas, the medieval universals' (The Function of Reason, 26). Once again his use of a new term for this concept Is designed to eliminate misleading connotations attaching to the older terminology.

The purpose of the eternal objects is to introduce an element of unrealised potentiality into Whitehead's metaphysics. As he points out, 'The alternative is a static monistic universe, without unrealised potentlalities1 since "potentiality" is then a meaningless term' (Process and Reality, 46).

But Whitehead goes further and asserts that all non-actual entities (and this includes actualities which have completed their process) must be potentials for actualities. This is enshrined In Whitehead's PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY (a misleading term since it has nothing to do with a better known principle of the same name)•

'The potentiality for being an element in a real concrescence of many entities into one actuality is the one general metaphysical character attaching to all entities, actual and non-actual! and • every item in its universe is involved in each concrescence. In other words, it belongs to the nature of a "being" that it is a potential for every becoming' (Process and Rt:al ity, 22).

The corollary to this is that every actuality must actively receive those potentials 'in its universe', ie, those which are 'given' as objects or ingredients in its process of becoming. Since rejection

8

Is a form of reception, non-reception means that the question Is not 'In the universe' of the actuality; completely unrelated.

Actualities as Subjects

entity In they are

The discussion so far has outlined the way in which Whitehead has modified Aristotelian metaphysics to give the dynamic aspect of reality a central role. But to leave lt here would be one-sided for Whitehead Is also Indebted to Oescartes and the subjectivlst tradition. Following Oescartes, he accepts that the human subject is an Instance of actual entitles. In fact, actual entities must be experiencing subjects.

Where Whitehead departs from Oescartes Is In the latter's limitation of experience to conscious experience. Whitehead notes that a subjectlvlst view of reality entails the rejection of the traditional dichotomy between substance and quality. Bowever, Cartesian subjectivism Is unable to do this without lapsing into solipsism. Whitehead's form of subjectivism avoids this difficulty by recogn1s1ng that, 'The "objects" of exper lence are external things which are In some respect Immanent In that subjective occasion of experiencing' (Leclerc, Whitehead's Metaphysics, 121). Accordingly his notion of experience Is broadened to Include any activity of receiving, or Including, entitles as objects.

Prehension Whitehead follows the ~nplrical school ~f thought rather than the rationalists In regarding perception as the fundamental element in human experience, However, he again departs from tradition by denying that perception Is to be equated with sense perception (or PRESENTATIONAL IMMEDIACY as he calls it). The latter he regards as a very sophisticated Instance of a much broader phenomenon. He suggests that even the lowest form of actuality possesses 'A dim unconscious drowse, of undlscrlmlnated feeling'. (The Function of Reason, 63)

Once again, he coins a word to denote this 'dim unconscious drowse'; he calls it PREHENSION. Not only does the new term avoid the unwanted connotations of terms like 'perception', but it also expresses the fact that the process of becoming Is an activity1 'The activity whereby an actual entity effects Its own concretion of other things' (Process and Reality, 52).

The description of prehension as an activity of 'undiscriminated feeling' is significant. lt indicates that Whitehead regards the basis of all experience as emotion or feeling rather than sense­perception, and it also suggests that emotion is an activity in which the subject engages. Hence, his use of the term SATISFACTION to denote the completion of a prehension.

In analysing the idea of a prehension, Whithead recognises three

9

essential factors. Taken In Isolation these factors are mere abstractions, but together they constitute a concrete act of prehension. He sunmarlzes his analysis as followss •(a) the 11subject11

which Is prehendlng, namely, the actual entity In which that prehension Is a concrete element1 (b) the "datum" which Is prehended1 (c) the "subjective form" which Is how that subject prehends that datum' (Process and Reality, 23).

A clearer idea of what an act of prehension Involves can be gained by examining the case of a SIHPLE PHYSICAL FEELING (or PREHENSION). By PHYSICAL feeling Is meant a feeling In which the data are actual entitles (if the data were eternal objects, it would be a CONCEPTUAL feeling). A SIHPLE feeling Is one which has only one datum (In reality the principle of relativity rules out simple feelings but the Idea is useful as a step towards the understanding of complex feelings). Whitehead regards prehenslons of this sort as acts of causation. 1The actual entity which Is the Initial datum Is the "cause", the simply physical feeling Is the 11effect11 , and the subject entertaining the simple physical feeling Is the actual entity "conditioned" by the effect. This "conditioned" actual entity will also be called the "effect"' (Process and Reality, 236).

At the same time it must be remembered that an act of prehension Is an act of feeling or perception. Since the datum Is another actuality (and therefore also constituted by an act of prehension), the prehending actuality must feel the feeling of the datum. 1 A simple physical feeling Is one feeling which feels another feeling• (Process and Reality. 236). In other words the prehending actuality re-enacts the feeling of the datum.

This transference of feeling from object to subject can be explained in terms of the eternal objects involved. The feeling of the datum actuality was defined by a particular eternal object. When that feeling is re-enacted the same eternal object Is the form of the feeling of the prehending actuality.

Whitehead's treatment of prehension involves the explicit rejection of the representative theory of perception. Instead 'This transference of feeling effects a partial identification of cause with effect • lt is the cumulation of the universe and not a stage­play about it 1 (Process and Reality, 237). This gives rise to the Process doctrine of the objective immortality of the past. The objectification of an actuality as it Is prehended by another actuality is the inclusion of the past actuality In the present.

The Dlpolarlty of Actualities The above treatment of a simple physical feeling overlooks an essential feature of actual entities, that of their dipolarity,

'In each concrescence there is a twofold aspect of the creative urge. In on~ aspect there is the origination of

10

shnple causal feellngs1 and In the other aspect there Is the origination of conceptual feelings. These contrasted aspects will be called the physical and mental poles of an actual entity. No actual entity Is devoid of either pole1 though their relative Importance differs In different actual entitles•. (Process and Reality, 239)

The mental pole of an actual entity Is that aspect of Its becoming which Is open to the source of novelty. lt Is therefore essential In Whitehead's system (with Its dependence on eternal objects to explain novelty).

As we shall see later the dipolarlty of actual entitles plays an Important part In Process discussions of God.

11

2. FROH ACTUAL ENTITIES TO THE 1REAL 1 WORLD

A problem which Process metaphysics shares with most other metaphysical systems Is that of how it relates to the world of everyday experience. In spite of Whitehead's Identification of the experiencing subject as an actual entity the Idea of an actuality Is not one which we can easily identify with the objects of our experience. Physicists who specialize In nucleur physics may recognise some of the characteristics of actual entitles as equally characteristic of sub-atomic particles but the further step of identifying one with the other Is warranted by neither nuclear physics nor Process metaphysics.

Societies of Actualities The most natural way of relating an atomlstlc metaphysical system to the everyday world is to regard objects as collections of the basic building blocks. This is precisely what Whitehead does.

At the simplest level, any Interconnected group of actualities forms what Whitehead calls a NEXUS (pl.a NEXUS). A nexus Is called a SOCIETY if it displays some type of SOCIAL ORDER, which can be defined as followsa

1A nexus enjoys 11social order11 where (I) there Is a common element of form Illustrated In the definiteness of each of Its included actual entitles, and (11) the common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehenslons of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehenslons Impose that condition of reproduction by reason of their Inclusion of positive feelings of that common form' (Process and Reality, 34).

Notice that it is not enough for the members of the nexus to share a dominant common characteristic. A society exists only when the members share such a characteristic by Inheritance from each other. Perhaps the simplest example of this would be SERIAL ORDERING In which actuality Is so strongly prehended by Its successor as to give rise to a virtual replica. The society which results from this Is called an ENDURING OBJECT. At one time it was possible for Process thinkers to equate enduring objects with protons and electrons (and some still do so in spite of the developments in nuclear physics which suggest that these are, in fact, quite complex entities).

Most ordinary physical objects can be analysed Into many inter­related strands of enduring objects. Whitehead calls these objects CORPUSCULAR SOCIETIES. The implications of the term 'corpuscular' is that the enduring objects are somehow united. Thus a sample of gas would not be a corpuscular society.

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Life Whitehead distinguishes Jiving cells from corpuscular societies by virtue of the degree of novelty exhibited by the former. A corpuscular society consists simply of enduring objects which result from primarily physical feelings (cf the discussion of simple physical feelings In Chapter 1). Novelty Is minimal, since lt Is a function of conceptual rather than physical feelings.

Whitehead draws the conclusion that life Implies the actual entitles In which conceptual feelings are primary. it,

presence of As he puts

1Llfe Is a characteristic of 11empty space11 and not of space 11occup I ed11 by any corpuscular socIety. • • • • Life 1 urks In the Interstices of each living cell, and in the Interstices of the brain.• (Process and Reality, 105-106)

Life Is not directly accessible to sensory perception since our senses (and detecting Instruments) operate In the realm of physical prehenslons.

There Is a certain lack of clarity over the transition from non-life to life (as one would expect In a system informed by contemporary science). To say that something Is alive Is to say that •entirely llvlng 1 nexus are dominant over a corpuscular society. (Notice that Whitehead does not regard living nexus as societies because of their non-occurrence apart from corpuscular societies). Just as in biology this leads to doubtful cases.

The social organisation of the Jiving nexus in any entity is regarded as a measure of that entity's degree of sophistication. At the lowest level, plants and bacteria are 1 democratic 1 organisations, le there Is no single dominant entity amongst the nexus (perhaps •anarchic• would have been a more appropriate term for them!) Proceeding to higher forms of life we observe the emergence of a dominant or presiding actuality. This gives rise to the notion of living persons (which In Whitehead's view Is equally applicable to man and the higher animals).

Actualities and Personality According to Whitehead,

1An endur lng of occasions completeness Reality, 350)

personality In the temporal world is a route in which the succesors with some peculiar

sum up their predecessors• (Process and

Because of Its element of continuity, personality cannot be ultimate reality in Process metaphysics. Hartshorne confirms this when he states that,

13

'The only strict concrete Identity Is seen as belonging to the momentary self, the true unit of personal existence

Each momentary self Is a new actuality, however intimately related to Its predecessors' (The Logic of Perfection, 18)

In other words personality Is an abstraction from reality which consists of a series of presiding momentary selves as Hartshorne calls them).

the underlying actualities (or

raises major questions about the rationality of human souls or life after death in the context of

In fact, at least one leading Process theologian of personal Immortality as not only Irrational but so far as it supposedly gives one a motive for acts

This doctrine talking about Process theism. regards the idea also inmoral (in of . love).

A further implication of Whitehead's view of personality Is that it raises the possibility of creating points of contact between Christianity and Eastern religions such as Buddhism. As Hartshorne has pointed out,

'In Whitehead we have a major system In which the Buddhistic resolution of souls, and substances generally, Into special sorts of sequences of events becomes a central doctrine' (Some Thoughts on 'Souls' and Neighbourly Love, 14S).

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3. WHITEHEAD'S THEISTIC HYPOTHESIS

As we have already seen there Is an important causation or self creation In every actual entity, this Is,

element of self­One Implication of

'that In the primary phase of the subjective process there be a conceptual feeling of subjective aim' (Process and Reality, 224).

In other words, for any activity to take place there must be some definite aim Involved at the outset.

The ontological principle requires that the subjective aim must Itself derive from somewhere. And, of course, that 'somewhere' can only be another actual entity (since they are the only realities In Whitehead's metaphysics). However, the principle of relativity means that any completed actual entity Is Included in subsequent actual entitles as an object1 how lt Is Included depends not on itself but on the 'decision' of the actuality which Is using it as a datum. Since that actuality Is only one of vast number of data and can be used in many different ways by many subsequent data it is difficult to see how any one past actuality can provide a subjective aim in the way required. As Whitehead points out,

'These data In their own separate natures do not carry any regulative principle for their synthesis' (Adventures of Ideas, 328).

And yet, that Is precisely what the ontological principle seems to require.

God as a Unique Actual Entity To solve this dilemma Whitehead postulates the existence of a unique actual entity with the function of providing the subjective aims of the other actual entitles. In other words, God is,

'-The principle of concretion- the .1rlnciple whereby there is Initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity' (Process and Reality, 345).

As Whitehead points out in Science and the Modern World, this solution is precisely parallel to that adopted by Aristotle when facing an analogous metaphysical problem.

On the face of it, the introduction of a unique actual entity risks violating the coherence principle which he uses with such rigour elsewhere. Whitehead's answer to this is to insist that God's uniqueness is functional rather than generic. Hence his famous assertion that,

15

•God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification' (Process and Reality, 225).

As an actual entity, God is subject to the same metaphysical principles as all other entitles.

This denial of God's metaphysical uniqueness Is fundamental to Process theism. Not only does lt seek to prevent the system from collapsing into incoherence, but as we shall see lt has wide-ranging implications for the Process view of God.

God and Creativity One immediate implication of the above Is that God can no longer be thought of as a transcendent reality who creates and sustains the physical universe by acts of will. God Is simply one reality among many, albeit a reality with a unique function.

An important question which arises is that of the relationship between the God of Process thought and the creativity which Whitehead regards as the necessary 'ground' of the universe. In a sense, God may still be regarded as the creator of other actual entitles. This is so because each ordinary (or temporal) actuality derives from God Its basic subjective (or conceptual) aim. Without such an aim there can be no definiteness or Individuality, without God, other actual entities would not exist. However Whitehead is unhappy about the use of the t'erm 'creator' In relation to God. As he says,

'The phrase Is apt to be misleading by Its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe Is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true metaphysical position Is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies Its action. lt is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character. But, of course, there Is no meaning to "creativity" apart from its "creatures", and no meaning to 11God11 apart from the 11creativity11 and the "temporal creatures11 , and no rr~aning to the "temporal creatures" apart from 11creativ : ty11 and God'"· (Processand Reality, 225)

Whitehead's description of God as 'the aboriginal instance of creativity' should not be taken to mean that God was once the solely existing actual entity. As can be seen from the last sentence of the above quotation, the interconnectedness of God, creativity, and temporal creatures is such that any one would be meaningless without the other two.

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The Function of God In order to act as the principle of concretion God must have perfect conceptual prehenslons of the subjective alms of all other entities. Since the data of conceptual prehenslons are eternal objects this means that,

1God conceives or envisages relevance for actualization constituting the world' Hetaphys I cs, 196).

eternal objects In their by the actual entities

(Leclerc, Whitehead's

This must Involve an activity of selection on God's part, and so enta 11 s

'the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. This Is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on which creative order depends' (Process and Reality, 32).

Thus God Is the basis of order in the universal process. In addition, Whitehead points out that lt implies in God 'an urge towards the future•. God Is the driving force behind the actualization or realization of the eternal objects• the basis of evolution and novelty.

Implicit In the above discussion of God's functions In relation to the world Is a further function In relation to the eternal objects. The selection of eternal objects entails their existence, but, by the ontological principle, they can exist only as realized In some actual entity. Whitehead argues that their 'existence' Is constituted by God's primordial conceptual prehension of them. The mental pole (or primordial nature) of God Is, thus, the location of the eternal objects.

God as Dipolar Like all other act·ual entitles God must have both a mental pole and a physical pole. The former has been discussed above In dealing with God's conceptual prehenslons. The latter means that there Is an aspect of God which prehends and Is affected by other actualities. Whitehead gives this aspect the name 'CONSEQUENT POLE'. He summarizes this pole as follows•

'The consequent nature of God is conscious1 and lt is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom. The primordial nature is conceptual, and the consequent nature Is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts• (Process and Reality, 345).

lt follows that God, In his consequent aspect, functions as a sort of cosmic mind, prehending all past actualitites and present and

17

future possibilities.

God as Eternal and Temporal Again, like any other actual entity, God Is In processa perishing and being re-enacted (changing all the while, influence of other actual entitles).

continually under the

'Each unit of becanlng In God's existence Is immortal in his succeeding units of becaning' Whitehead's Metaphysics, 20]).

objectively (Leclerc,

Thus God is subject to time ,., the same way as other actual entitles.

However, Whitehead insists that God's mental pole Is literally non­temporal or eternal. He bases this assertion on the all-lncluslveness of God's conceptual prehenslons, which Implies that each re-enactment of his mental pole will be exactly Identical to the previous one. Thus his mental pole continues unchanged throughout all time (strictly speaking it is everlasting rather than eternal). ·

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4. GOD IN PROCESS THEOLOGY

In the course of Its development Process theology has, on the whole, remained true to the basic conception of God In Whitehead's metaphysics. Thanks largely to the work of Charles Hartshorne Its development has been by way of a sustained dialogue with the philosophical tradition which Hartshorne describes as classical theism (Its representatves In Philosophers Speak of God include Phllo, Augustine, Anselm, al-Ghazzall, Haimonldes, Aqulnas, Descartes, Lelbnlz, Kant, Channlng and von Huge!).

The Rejection of Classical Theism In Its search for a rational concept of God, Process theism rejects the classical account on three main counts. First and foremost, classical theism falls to meet Whitehead's requirements for a rational metaphyslcial system. We have already seen that Whitehead regarded the traditional conception of God as transcendent creator as being Incoherent. Hartshorne goes further and accuses classical theists of using the notion of paradox as a smokescreen to hide blatant self­contradiction. Thus the notion of a necessary creator Is actually incompatible with the notion of a contingent creation. Similarly divine omnipotence rules out human freedom, and divine immutability rules out any meaningful concept of divine love.

The last point Is also an Instance of the second critlcisma in failing to account for the divine love, classical theism shows Itself to be Inadequate as a description of the God of the Bible. Thirdly, the monarchical concept of God in classical theism is immoral In that it leads to power worship. On a larger scale classical theism as a whole can be seem to be immoral in the way that it lends support of other-worldliness, moralism, and obscurantism. (One occasionally gets the impression that one is listening to an evangelist denouncing an heretical sect rather than a philosopher discussing a theological position!)

The Meaning of Divine Perfection One important point at which Hartshorne takes issue with the classical conception Is the question of what Is meant by divine perfection. He objects to what he sees as the classical Insistence on absolute per feet Ion.

'If perfection is defined as that which in no respect could conceivably be greater, and hence is incapable of increase, then we face paradox' (The Divine Relativity, 19f).

In other words the classical view of divine perfection is self­contradictory.

How can rat Iona 11

the concept of divine perfection be modified to make it The necessary adjustmen.ts may be i 11 ustrated by exanin i ng

19

the notions of omniscience and perfect love (both of which Process theologians want to retain) In the light of Process metaphysics.

In process thought, knowledge Is a function of prehension. The relationship of knower to known Is precisely analogous to that of the actuality In process to the past actualities which provide the data for Its process1 lt Is a relationship of dependence. Thus Hartshorne finds himself agreeing with Aqulnas that,

'lt Is the knower who Is really related to the known, not the known to the knower' (The Divine Relativity, 7).

lt follows from this that

'Nothing is so variously relative, dependent, as the knower' (The Divine Relativity, 8).

However, following Whitehead's Injunction (see page 14 above), Hartshorne refuses to make divine knowledge an exception to this principle. God's omniscience Is constituted by his perfection and complete prehension of all past actualities and of all eternal objects. Thus God Is supremely dependent on past actualities for the content of his knowledge. (Notice that the capacity for omniscience does not seem to be dependent on other entitles In the same way. Rather, it would appear to be a defining characteristic of God as the principle of concretion).

What Is the meaning of love In Process metaphysics? Again, lt is a function of the basic experience of prehension. To love means to be sympathetic, to be passive or relative towards another actuality (le, to allow that entity to Influence your own process of becoming). Hartshorne's description of finite human love bears this out. Having quoted Charles Wesley on the love of God he goes on to say,

'All other beings limit their compassion at some point. They are sympathetic, passive, relative, In some directions, not In all. Their love Is not pure, but mixed with indifference, hardness of heart, resistance to or Incapacity for some relatlvltles. We do not "love" literally, but with qualifications, and metaphorically.• (The Divine Relativity, 36).

He concludes that,

'Love, defined as social awareness, taken literally, Is God' (The Divine Relativity, 36)

The key feature of perfect love, as of omniscience, Is the supreme capacity to be affected by other entitles. In other words, God is supremely relative rather than absolute. To express this idea, Hartshorne has coined the term SURRELATIVISH. The same idea Is expressed in Hartshorne's modification of Anselm's definition of Goda

20

'that Individual being than which no other Individual being could conceivably be greater, but which Itself. could become greater.• (The Divine Relativity, 20).

Divergence from Whitehead Contemporary Process theology Is divided over the question of whether God Is an actual entity or a serially ordered society of entities. Whitehead Is sometimes accused of having been Inconsistent In answering this question. In fact both elements seem to be necessary In talking of God (just as both are necessary In talking of human beings). The underlying reality must be an actual entity (because only actual entitles can be reasons or causes). However, an entity which exists for a quantum of time before perishing (to be replaced by another entity) cannot provide the element of continuity necessary In the concept of God. There Is always an actuality which prehends the principle of concretion so strongly that it becomes, In Its turn, the principle of concretion. lt Is convenient to regard this succession of actualities as an enduring personality, namely, God.

Nevertheless, there Is a tendency to emphasize one or other of these aspects. Whitehead himself seems to have put the emphasis on God as an actual entity. On the other hand, Hartshorne prefers to regard God as a society of entitles. This difference In emphasis seems to be related to a similar difference of emphasis In their metaphysics. Whitehead's emphasis lends Itself to a more pluralistic outlook than Hartshorne 1 s (because it makes God one actual entity among many). Hartshorne, on the other hand, emphasizes the aspect which enables him to adopt a mind/body analogy for God's relationship to the world (with the result that God can be seen as a world-transcending unifying factor).

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5. GOD AND THE WORLD

So far I have restricted myself to a description of Process thought and some of Its Implications for the concept of God. In what remains I want to turn to a more critical approach and highlight some of the difficulties facing anyone who wishes to use the concepts of Process thought In Christian theology.

The Hind - Body Analogy Traditional natural theology has tended to treat the relationship between God and the world as analogous to that which exists between a person and his actions or products. However, as Heynell points out

1Hartshorne1 s view world is construed on to his feelings Hartshorne, 145).

of the relation between God and the the model of a person's relationship and sensations. (The Theology of

As already pointed out this analogy has Its roots In Hartshorne's preference for a social conception of God. Thus God Is immediately related to every other actuality In the same way as mind (or, more accurately, the presiding actuality) Is related to Its associated body. (The details of the Process view of the mind -body relationship are beyond the scope of such a short work. Suffice it to say that they would not commend themselves to the majority of contemporary psychologists).

Whether one opts for Hartshorne or for a more Whlteheadlan approach one finds the same Insistence on the complete Interdependence of God and the world. This Is brought out particularly clearly by the mind­body analogy because of Whitehead's assertion that living nexus (Including conscious ones) are 'socially deficient•, le unable to exist without the support and protection of a corpuscular society (or body). The same Idea Is present In the doctrine of God's supreme relativity. God cannot be conceived of apart from the world.

There can be no possibility of any meaningful doctrine of creation In such a system. Quite apart from the positive assertion that God and the world are completely Interdependent, Process thought would dismiss the notion of ex nlhllo creation as Incoherent. The world of actual entities Is eternal and God Is Its eternal ground of order and novelty.

The Function of God's Consequent Pole The physical, consequent or concrete pole of any actuality Is the pole through which it prehends other actualities. lt re-enacts them In such a way that they are made constituents in Its own process of becoming. According to Hartshorne, God is the suprene example of this. He perfectly prehends all other actualities. In so doing he ensures them of objective Immortality in his own being (by virtue of

22

their effect on Into what he Is. supreme effect. cosmic memory.

him). Taken as a whole the world process moulds God Thus God can be said to be supremely passive or the In a sense God's consequent pole functions as a

This has an Implication which Is of great Interest to physical scientists. Perfect prehension entails complete and perfect knowledge of all past actualities. This Is only possible If there exists some frame of reference (or vantage point) from which the entire past Is visible. In other words it requires an absolute present from which God can prehend an absolute pasta time must be absolute. Now this is in direct contradiction to Einstein's Special and General Theories of Relativity. In Itself. of course, this does not constitute a criticism of Process theism but it does undermine claims that Process thought can be the basis for uniting contemporary science and rei iglon.

A more serious question from the theological point of view is that of what Process theism does to the concept of divine love. Ye have already noted that love Is considered to be a function of the prehension of other actualities. In fact, Hartshorne seems to equate love and prehension when he defines love as social awareness. Thus 1 God Is love• becomes a cipher for 1 God prehends perfectly•. If perfect prehension really does entail complete passivity In the face of the objective Influence of other actualities then this is a totally inadequate account of love.

To be fair to Process theology one should note that there Is little agreement about the degree of passivity required by perfect prehension. Those who follow a more Yhlteheadian line would insist that prehension is an action. They would also allow God the freedom to prehend negatively as well as positively. This allows for the objective annihilation of an actuality which would otherwise exert a negative Influence on God and through him on the world process as a whole. Thus, for example, God could eliminate Adolf Hitler (or rather, the corresponding presiding actuality) fr~n the •cosmic memory•.

The Function of God 1 s Conceptual Pole . This has already been described In discussing 1 Yhitehead 1 s Theistic Hypothesis•. lt can be summarised by saying that God is the ground of order and novelty. Sometimes the terms 'lure•, •urge•. •call' or 1 persuaslon 1 are used In this connection. Thus Schoonenberg says of him,

1God can be conceived of as eternal memory, same time he Is opening the future by persuasion. As such he Is the source of all world 1 (Process or History in God, 41).

and Yhitehead says

23

while at the his call and novelty in the

'He Is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire' (Process and Reality, 344).

Once again, it Is possible to raise several questions about such a conception of divine reaction.

In the first place it Is misleading to talk of this aspect of God's activity as 'persuasion' because lt suggests that we are dealing with conscious activity. However, Whitehead claims that it Is the consequent pole of God which Is conscious. lt follows, by the 'Law of Polarity', that his conceptual pole Is unconscious. Thus God's 'call and persuasion' must be an unconscious activity.

Secondly, we must look more closely at how God acts to maintain order and bring about novelty. Since an actuality can be aware only of the past actualities which constitute Its data lt follows that there Is no room In Whitehead's system for the conscious action of one entity upon another. God can Influence others only In so far as those other actualities prehend God as an object In their past.

Taking these first two points together we conclude that, as the source of order and novelty, God Is an unconscious objective Influence. If this Is so, then there seems little point In continuing to regard God as persona 1 •

A third point to notice Is that most Process theologians make the tacit assumption that God, In his capacity as the source of novelty, Is calling actualities towards greater good. This Is really another form of the Neo-Piatonlc equation of being with goodness.

Finally, God Is the source of the subjective aim of all actualities. This Is equally true of the distraught father, the dying child and the malignant tumour. God Is 11 terally In all things. lt has been sa Id of the God of Process that he does everything In general and nothing In partlcularl One Is tempted to regard the God of Process as redundant except In so far as he prevents Whitehead's metaphysics from collapsing Into Incoherence.

Dlpolarlty and Paradox A further criticism, at least of. Hartshorne's view of God, Is that, In spite of his attitude towards paradox, lt Is not noticeably superior to classical theism In this respect. Take, for example, the so-called 'Law of Polarity' which Hartshornes uses In talking of the dlpolarlty of God. lt states that

'ultimate contraries are correlatlves, mutually Interdependent' (Philosophers Speak of God, 2).

Is this not every bit as paradoxical as the assertions of classical theism?

Further paradoxes become apparent when you examine the functions of God In relation to his dlpolarlty. Thus God Is passive with respect to his consequent pole and active with respect to his conceptual pole. But lt Is generally agreed that the conceptual pole Is abstract. Therefore the divine activity must be abstract. Alternatively one may conclude that God Is active only In so far as he Is Impassible. (eg C Gunton. Becoming and Being. pp35-53).

Divine Action and Divine Acts I comm_ented earlier that the God of Process thought 1 does everything In general and nothing In particular•. This Is no mere rhetorical

· comment but the 11 teral truth as we can see from the work of 1 eg, Schubert Ogden (one of the most consistent of Process theologians).

In an essay entl tied

1What Sense Does lt Hake to Sa • 1God Acts In Hlstor 1 71

characterizes the divine action by developing the mind body mentioned earlier. Thus he can say that

he analogy

1 the primary meaning of God 1 s action Is the act whereby. In each new present. he constitutes himself as God by participating fully and completely In the world of his creatures• (The Reality of God. 177).

and that

1 the whole world is. as it were. his sense organ. and his Interaction with every creature Is unimaginably Immediate and direct• (The Reality of God. 178).

His conclusion Is worth quoting at some length.

1 God 1 s action. In Its fundamental sense. Is not an action In history at all but an action that transcends it -just as. by analogy. our own Inner decisions as selves are not simply Identical with any of our outer acts of word and deed. but rather lie behind them as the decisions In which our words and deeds are grounded and to which they give expression. Likewise. God's actions as the Redeener cannot be simply Identified with any particular historical event or events • • it Is an act that transcends the world as the world's ultimate consequence.• (The Reality of God. 179).

Notice that Ogden does not entirely rule out God's action In history. He can be said to act In history In two sensesa

in the sense that all events are to some extent the actions of God1 and

2 'Wherever or In so far as an event in history manifests God's

25

characteristic action as Creator or Redeemer, lt actually Is his act In a sense In which other historical events are not 1 (The Reality of God, 182)

What this does Is to eliminate any possibility of supernaturallsm or Interventionism. Thus, for example, the parting of the Red Sea (If lt was a historical event at all) has to be Interpreted as a natural phenomenon which by virtue of Its Implications for the Hebrews may be said to be an act of God. As we shall see this has important Implications for Christian theology and Its use of the Bible.

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6. PROCESS THOUGHT AND BIBLICAL CHRISTIANITY

There Is a general agreement amongst Process thinkers that Jesus was a man of unparalleled significance. For example, Plttlnger says of him (with reference to 1 John ~a16 and Matthew 22a37)

•one who said the latter and who In his life embodied a human expression of the former Is on any reckoning an 11 lmportant11 person• (Process Thought and Christian Faith, 66).

Similarly, Whitehead can say that 1The essence of Christianity Is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of his agency In the world. 1 (Adventures and Ideas, 21~) Thus we are led to Investigate the life and teachings of this man.

Process Theology and Biblical Interpretation 'The great virtue of Christianity has been that it is not so much a metaphyslc seeking some historical grounding as lt Is an historical fact seeking for metaphysical explanation.• (Whitehead clt. in Plttenger, Process Thought and Christian Faith, /3).

The Implication of this dictum Is that we are to approach the Biblical tradition (and, Indeed, the entire history of the Christian Church) as If lt were a collection of raw data awaiting analysis and Interpretation In the light of some metaphysical scheme. Process theologians sometimes claim that they use Process metaphysics because it Is congruous with what Is disclosed In Jesus. In fact it would be more consistent to reverse this statement. Since Process metaphysics is their Interpretive scheme they could be said to be using Biblical traditions because they are found to be congruous with Process thought! lt Is hardly surprising that Process theology is usually developed as a natural theology.

If we adopt this method we rapidly run Into what appears to be a basic Incongruity between Process thought and the Biblical tradition. This Is 'none other than the Process view of divine action dealt with in the preceding chapter. On the face of it this Is diametrically opposed to the Biblical tradition with its explicitly supernaturallst emphasis. In this situation Process theology opts for a scheme of demythologlzatlon to ensure the desired congruity. Any story which suggests that God really does act In space and time is treated as mythological. In fact, Schubert Ogden even criticizes Bultmann for failing to be completely consistent In his demythologizationa

'By saying that God acts to redeem mankind only in the history of Jesus Christ he subjects God's actions as the redeemer to the objectifying categories of space and time and thus mythologizes it. 1 (The Reality of God, llJ).

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An Example of Process Chrlstology A proper treatment of Process Chrlstologles Is beyond the scope of this work but, for the sake of completeness, I shall outline briefly the main points of John Cobb's approach to Chrlstology. This could be described as a Chrlstology 'from above' since he begins by examining the meanings of the concepts of 1logos 1 and 1Chrlst 1 for contemporary society. His findings are summarized as follows•

'The Logos Is immanent in all things as the Initial phase of their subjective aim, that Is, as their fundamental Impulse toward actualization •••• But In living persons a new feature appears• the Initial aim Is at a relevant novelty rather than a re-enactment. The novelty that Is aimed at is one that allows maximum incorporation of elements from the past In a a new synthesis. This novelty must struggle for actualization against habit, anxiety and defensiveness. To whatever extent the new aim Is successful, to that extent there Is creative transformation. This creative transformation Is Christ.• (Christ In a Pluralistic Age, 76)

To refer to the logos In this way Is to Imply that lt is God as he Is prehended by each actuality. Thus Cobb Is able to equate it with 'the principle of concretion, the principle of limitation, the organ of novelty, the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire, the divine Eros, and God in his Primordial Nature.• (Christ In a Pluralistic ~· 71), This Is perhaps not unreasonable given the tendency of Christians in earlier eras to see 'logos• In terms of Hellenistic thought.

However, Cobb departs significantly from orthodoxy when he redefines 'Christ• as any successful actualization of an Initial subjective aim. It is true that he also says that 1Chr I st 1 1 refers to Jesus In a particular way, namely, as the incarnation of the divine• (Christ in a Pluralistic Age, 66), but he makes it clear that he does not regard this as a distinctive feature of Jesus. On the contrary, it is to some extent true of us all, and, indeed, 'If creative trans­formation is Christ, lt must be discernible in all life.• (Christ in a Pluralistic Age, 63). Cobb can even say that 'Christ names the creative transformation of theology by objective study which has broken the correlation of faith and the sacred, and made pluralism possible.• (Christ in a Pluralistic Age, 45). lt follows that the appropriate expression of faith in Christ today is the affirmation of pluralism!

How does this concept of Christ relate to Jesus of Nazareth? Cobb places a great deal of importance on the teaching of Jesus. Listened to with an open mind his words destroy our complacency and make us open to the news ie to creative transformation. In other words, his teaching is 1 the occasion for the realization of Christ within the hearer•. (Christ in a Pluralistic Age, 100)

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But what of the person of Jesus1 As we have already seen, Cobb can call him the Incarnation of God or of the logos, but with the proviso that the logos Is Incarnate In all things. What then Is distinctive about Jesus1 Cobb's answer to this appears to be that, 1 1n the fullest Incarnation of the logos, Its presence must constitute not only a necessary aspect of existence but the self as such. 1

(Christ In a Pluralistic Age, 138). He later claims that to say Jesus Is consubstantlal with the Father In Godhead and consubstantlal with us In manhood means that he was a 1nan whose selfhood was eo­constituted by the logos. The Introduction of the prefix 1co- 1 -rs significant for, without it, the answer quoted above points In the direction of Apolllnarlanlsm as well as denying the autonomy of actualities which Is so basic to Whitehead's system. Unfortunately for Cobb the prefix also destroys the distinction between Jesus and other men for, as we have seen above, all actualities are to a greater or lesser extent eo-constituted by the logos. Cobb tries to maintain the distinction by asserting that most of us experience the logos as an external force (but, In Process metaphysics an experience Is, by definition, an Internalization of other entitles. That which remains external Is not experienced.)

Alternatively, Cobb suggests that Jesus• distinctiveness lies In his conscious recovery of unity with the logos. Presumably this is a function of the completeness with which Jesus prehended God as the principle of concretion. However, If this Is so, there Is no justification for denying, as Cobb does, that this could be true of other actualities. We have to conclude that this particular attempt at a Chrlstology has, so far, failed to produce a coherent account of the distinctiveness of Jesus.

Christian Hope The final Issue I wish to touch on Is the question of what vision of the future Process theology holds out for Christian believers, given the fact that Hartshorne and several of his pupils reject the notion of personal Immortality.

With respect to a future life the key to their response Is the Whlteheadlan notion of objective Immortality. The living nexus which constitutes my self must cease to exist when my body dies. However Its influence lives on In so far as it has been prehended by other actualities and especially by God. For example, Peter Hamilton claims that

1We have during our lives achieved an everlasting effect which cannot perish. Our later actions may modify the total effect that we have upon God,. but when those actions cease their total effect lives on, In God, everlastingly' (The Living God and the Modern World, 126).

But this has the effect of undermining the notion of forgiveness of sins for although

29

'my subsequent actions may modify and Improve the total effect of my life upon God •••• my earlier actions have already had their everlasting effect which cannot be expunged' (The Living God and the Hodern World, 127).

Precisely the same notion Is used by Hamilton to demythologlze the resurrection and ascension.

'The total action of Jesus lives on In his Church, and thus possesses a livlngness and everlastingness which is, however, dependent on the continuity of the Church •••• But his total action Is literally everlasting In that it Is included within the consequent nature of God' (The Living God and the Hodern World, 233).

What this means is that we can hope to enrich God's experience through his prehension of us. This Implication of objective immortality is clearly regarded as unsatisfactory by a number of Process theologians, who, as a result, claim that, while personal or subjective Immortality Is not a necessity In Whitehead's metaphysics, lt Is not Incoherent to accept that lt does occur. Something of this can be seen in the following comment by Cobb.

'In objectifying a past occasion, a new experience does not simply present Its object to Itself In terms of the forms the object exemplified. Instead, it feels the subjective feelings of the datum occasion •••• The subjective form of the new occasion has its own Immediacy, but what Is felt has Its immediacy as well. There Is a flow of feeling from object to subject. Elements of the past are thus genuinely preserved and renewed in the present'. (Christ In a Pluralistic Age, 246)

In its context this passage suggests that a degree of personal continuity is possible after death. This raises the possibility that we experience God's prehension of usa a form of unity with God. lt is worth noticing, in relation to this possibility, that several Process theologians equate God's consequent pole (his 'cosmic memory') with the Kingdom of Heavenl

All this means that Process theology is thoroughly non-eschato­logical. Instead of a future fulfilment we are faced with the eternal process of the enrichment of God in which we may or may not take a conscious part. One is reminded of the doctrine of eternal ascent which may be found in the Neo-Platonist theology of Gregory of Nyssa.

Conclusion As can be seen fr~n the preceding material Process thought runs into difficulties In its treatment of several key Christian doctrines including the doctrine of creation,. Christology and eschatology. One

30

could also mention Its rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity as a mythological expression of unity- In- multiplicity (God Is dipolar not triune). In order to remain true to Its metaphysical basis lt Is forced not merely to translate the 'substance• language of the creeds Into 'process• language but to revise the very content of Christian belief.

believe that the root of this problem lies In the theological method adopted by the Process school, le, the approach via natural theology. lt Is assumed that the Christian tradition must be Interpreted In terms consistent with what they believe to be the best secular metaphysical system. The result Is that Process metaphysics becomes a bed of Procrustes on which Biblical Christianity Is stretched beyond recognltlonl

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7 CONCLUSION

Whitehead's metaphysical system Is by any standards a superb example of rational speculative thought. The rigorous way In which he gives expression to the contemporary organic world-view makes him a much more Important figure than any of his theological successors. His Influence can be detected In a wide variety of contemporary wr i ting on science and philosophy (the latest example being Nobel prize-winning chemist llya Prlgoglne In his book 'Order out of Chaos' (Helnemann, 1984). However, as I have noted earlier, lt Is doubtful whether Process thought Is really compatible with contemporary physics.

In spite of Its Internal diversity , Process theology continues to gain ground (especially amongst American liberal theolglans). Several reasons can be cited for this trend. Its explicitly rationalistic approach and the reinstatement of Internal theology must commend lt to those who are seeking an answer to neo-orthodoxy. At the same time Its panpsychlsm permits a mystical dimension which was sometimes missing from earlier forms of liberalism. But perhaps the greatest attraction Is Its claim to Incorporate God as a necessary part of a contemporary scientific understanding of the world, and lt thus stands In a long line of liberal apologetic systems.

Does Process thought present any real threat to Biblical Christianity? I suspect that If it does the danger lies not so much In what lt affirms as in Its critique of classical theism. A hysterical response could cause evangellcals to defend theological positions which are, In fact, alien to Biblical thought, eg a doctrine of divine omnlcausality under the guise of a proper respect for divine sovereignty.

To end on a positive note, If Process thought Is successful In underlining some of the weaknesses of classical philosophical theism then lt will have served a useful purpose. lt has certainly helped to convince me that a metaphysics of 'substance' Is not an appropriate vehicle for expressing Biblical truths If we are to give due account to the dynamic elements of reality. However, lt has also convinced me that as lt stands Process metaphysics does not succeed any better than Its predecessors.

32.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

In addition to popular Introductions such as those by P Hamilton and W N Plttenger I would recommend the following•

PROCESS METAPHYSICS I Leclerc, Whitehead's Hetaphyslcs (1958) Is a well written Introduction to the metaphysical thought behind Process Theology.

A N Whitehead, Hodes of Thought (1938) Is probably the easiest of Whitehead's own works.

A N Whitehead, Process and Reality (1979) Is the seminal work of Process thought. Use the corrected edition If possible as earlier editions are minefields of typographical (and other) errors.

PROCESS THEOLOGY J B Cobb, Jr, A Chr lstlan Natural Theology ( 1966) Is a useful lntroduct Ion.

C Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (1964) Is one of the clearest works by the senior member of the Process school of thought.

J B Cobb, Jr, Christ In a Pluralistic Age (1975) Is an example of how Process thought has been used to produce radical reconstructions of Christian doctrine.

CRITIQUES There are relatively few book-length critiques of Process theism but you could trya

C Gunton, Becoming and Being (1978)a a major critique of Hartshorne In the light of Barth 1 s doctrine of God.

R G Gruenler, The Inexhaustible God (1983)• the only full scale evangelical critique of Process thought. Unfortunately lt assunes a familiarity with Process thought which many British readers will not have.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

J B Cobb, Jnr

S T Davis

R G Gruenler

C E Gunton

P Hami 1 ton

C Hartshorne

A Christian Natural Theology (based on the thought of Alfred North Whitehead) (Londona Lutterworth Press, 1966)

Christ In a Pluralistic Age (Philadelphia• Westminster Press, 1975)

God the Had Scientist• Process Thelogy on God and Evil (Themelios, 5a1, 1979, 18-23)

The Inexhaustible Goda Biblical Faith and the Challenge of Process Theism (Grand Rapidsa Baker Book House, 198 3 )

Becoming and Belnga The Doctrine of God In Charles Hartshorne and Kart Barth (Oxford University Press, 1978)

Process Theology's Concept of God (Expository Times, 84, 1972/3, 292-6)

The Living God and the Hodern World (Londona Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1967)

A Natural Theology for our Time (La Sa11e, 111 inoisa Open Court, 1967)

Religion and Culture (Londona SCM, 1959)

Some Thoughts on 1Souls 1 and Neighbourly Love (Anglican Theological Review, 55, 1973,144-147)

The Divine Relativity (Yale University Press, 1964)

The Logic of Perfection (La Salle, lllinoisa Open Court, 1962)

C Hartshorne and Philosophers Speak of God (University of Chicago W L Reese Press, 1953)

I Leclerc

I Leclerc (ed)

J Hacquarrie

H Heynell

S Ogden

W N Plttenger

L PrIce (ed)

Whitehead's Metaphysics (Londona George Alien and Unwln, 1958)

The Relevance of Whitehead (Londona George Alien and Urwln Ltd, 1961)

Tventleth Century Religious Thought (Londona SCH, 1963)

The Theology of Hartshorne (Journal of Theological Studies, 24, 1973, 143-157)

Christ Without Hyth (Londona Colllns, 1962)

The Reality of God (and other essays) (Londona SCH 1967)

Process Thought and Christian Faith (Welwyna James Nlsbet and Co, 1968)

The Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead (New Yorka Hen tor, 1956)

P A Schillp (ed) The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Evanston and Chlcagoa Northwestern University Press, 1941)

P Schoonenberg

L S Thornton

D Tracey

A N Whitehead

Process or History In God1 (Theology Digest, 23, 1975. 38-44)

The Incarnate Lord (Londona Longmans, Green and to Ltd, 1928)

God's Realltya The Host Important Issue (Angll~an Theological Review, 55, 1973, 218-224)

Adventures of Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 1933)

Hodes of Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1938)

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0 0 Will lams

Process and Reality (corrected edition ed. by 0 l Griffin and 0 W Sherburne, New York• The Free Press, 1979)

Religion In the Haklng (Cambridge University Press, 1926)

Science and the Hodern World (Cambridge University Press, 1929)

The Function of Reason (Prlnceton University Press, 1929)

The Spirit and the Fonms of love (Welwyn• James Nlsbet and Co, 1968)

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