1

A.J. Muis – 1450778

arnemuis@outlook.com

06-26471082

Dr. Louis Sicking

Diplomacy, War and Peace 1000-1600

7701 words

The influence of privateering and prize law cases on the relation between England and the

Netherlands in the first half of the sixteenth century.

2

Table of contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………3

The politics of privateering and prize law………………………………………………………………………………………..….5

The International relations of Early Modern Europe…………………………………………………………………………..8

The Case of Geryt van Ouderschie and Robert Masse……………………………………………….………………………10

The Anglo-Netherlands relations and privateering……………………………………………………………………………14

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……17

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………18

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………19

3

Introduction

At the end of the middle ages and the start of the early modern period systems of diplomacy,

international relations and law were frequently interrelated. While law has never been entirely

devoid of politics, early modern Europe constitutes a time and a place where such a separation was

not deemed particularly useful or necessary. As the separation of powers had not yet been

introduced court cases could and would have a decidedly political character. This was especially true

for prize cases, as these almost exclusively dealt with cases in which the conflicting parties originated

from different states. The resolution of prize cases was a regular topic of discussion on diplomatic

missions, and frequently included in peace treaties between states. If a plaintiff commenced a case

as an international conflict came to an end, or the sovereigns were not particularly eager for a

renewal of hostilities, these were factors that would quite probably influence the court’s decision.

This political dimension to the early modern judiciary, at least insofar as prize cases are

concerned, has been well documented by naval and legal historians, and the undeniable intertwining

of politics and law quite conclusively established. The existing historiography has thus already

provided valuable insights, on which this paper intends to build.1 This paper will illustrate the political

and diplomatic dimensions underpinning prize law cases by asking what the influence of privateering

and prize law cases was on the relation between England and the Netherlands in the first half of the

sixteenth century, focusing in particular on the 1530s and 1540s. This particular question and era

have been chose in part because there is considerable historical evidence on the basis of which

interesting observations can be made, and in part because the pre-Elizabethan, and pre-1568

privateering practices have remained somewhat understudied. There is no particular reason why this

should be the case, as the foundation for later privateering practices as well as later prize law was

laid in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

In its first chapter this paper will outline the political and theoretical framework that is

relevant for the understanding of prize law, and the place of privateering in international relations in

the early modern era. The second chapter will provide a summary overview of the relevant

constellations and developments in the international relations of early modern Europe. It is in the

context of these larger political events, such as the Italian Wars, and the near-constant struggle

between France and the Habsburg Empire, that the diplomatic role attributed to prize law cases must

be understood. In the third chapter attention will be given to a specific case before the Great Council

of Malines. The case which will be dissected on these pages is the 1542 ruling in the case of Geryt van

Ouderschie against Robert Masse. Van Ouderschie captured a French vessel in 1537 carrying goods

belonging to the English merchant Masse. The Admiralty court in Veere had already ruled that these

should be returned, and restitution provided for the booty already sold. Van Ouderschie disagreed

with this ruling and brought the case before the Great Council. Unfortunately for van Ouderschie, the

Great Council confirmed rather than overruled the initial judgement.

This was not the first or the last case in which rulings favourable to English plaintiffs were

given. There were strong economic and political ties between England and the Low Countries that

had to be upheld. The former in particular necessitated good relations between the two regions.

Overzealous privateers might put a strain on the good relations by capturing one too many merchant

ships. In a legal system in which escalation of mutual hostilities was a real possibility through the

issuing of letters of reprisal against entire communities, this was an undesirable scenario. Therefore, 1 For instance Sicking’s Neptune and the Netherlands and Roelofsen’s Studies in the history of international law,

Thomson’s Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns.

4

prize courts served not merely to ex post legalize the booty hauled back to harbour by privateers, but

also to adjudicate on rather more sensitive issues of political expediency which could have significant

implications on international relations. It is entirely possible that van Ouderschie found himself on

the wrong side of such political expediencies.

The fourth chapter will attempt to elucidate the English perspective on the influence of

privateering and prize law cases on the relationship with the Netherlands, by analysing the several

mentions of these matters in the Calendar of State Paper and Acts of the Privy Council. It will be

found that here also, the necessity to remain on good footing with the Habsburg Empire exercised

considerable influence on the outcome of prize law cases.

In all, this paper will thus attempt to place prize law cases in the context of international

relations in the sixteenth century, placing special emphasis on the proceedings from the case of

Geryt van Ouderschie, and several cases mentioned in the Calendar of State Papers and Privy Council

Acts that contribute to elucidating the relation between privateering and international relations.

5

The politics of privateering and prize law

At the dawn of the Early-Modern period the concept of a standing navy was still in its infancy,

and the practice of naval warfare still largely a private matter. The monopolization of violence by

central authorities, and its corollary, the curtailing of private warfare, was not a doctrine that

particularly characterized this era. Piracy, a naval activity which “has no justification except the thirst

for booty and which is not accountable to any specific authority”2, was therefore rampant. The

disadvantages of wide-spread piracy to economic activity are obvious, but as private warfare was

considered to be a legitimate activity, a clearer legal framework was required to separate the

justified from the unjustified seizures. Central authorities thus began to differentiate between legal

and illegal forms of prize capture around the end of the middle ages, by creating recognizable

distinctions between pirates and privateers. The former being neither subject of, or licensed by, any

given authority. The latter being able to justify his conquests on the basis of letters of marque and

reprisal, issued by established sovereigns.3

The letter of reprisal was a legal document, usually court-issued, which entitled the bearer to

claim compensation for damages sustained by a pirate, either from the pirate, or another member of

the community to which he belonged.4 A letter of marque was issued as an act of war on the

enemies of the authority which issued it.5 Issuing letters of marque had clear strategic and financial

advantages to sovereigns, for it provided them with uncostly private resources that could be directly

employed towards achieving both maritime policy and war aims.6 By the middle of the sixteenth

century, privateering was considered to be conventional state policy. On 20 December 1544, for

instance, Henry VIII issued a general proclamation inviting his subjects to go upon the king’s enemies

at sea. This general ordnance was exceptional in that it waived the Admiral’s customary share of the

booty. It is not certain exactly how successful this auxiliary navy was, as a predictable result was that

a spike in privateering activity resulted in aggravating the difficulty of recruiting seamen for the

King’s ships. However the greatest difficulty lay in preventing privateers from plundering friend and

foe without distinction. This habit, somewhat particular to privateers, was deplored in every official

pronouncement. Yet an effective remedy remained absent.7 Naturally, now that his subjects had the

option of unrestricted private warfare at sea, they extended their range of targets from specifically

the French to any neutral shipping that appeared tempting prize. As the rich trade between Spain

and Flanders was a natural target, Charles V became rapidly less enamoured by his recent ally.8

It was thus clear that Issuing letters of marque possessed certain distinct disadvantages. For

one they detracted from the pool of available seamen, making it harder for the sovereign’s navy to

fully man their ships. Also a privateer might take excessive liberties with their letters of marque,

capturing friend and foe alike while claiming to act within the scope of their privileges. Furthermore a

privateer might continue to capture prizes after his letter of marque has expired, or unwittingly

capture vessels that he has no right to seize. Seeing as a wide range of such actions regularly

occurred, many of these cases being far from clear-cut transgressions or actions of overt illegality,

this constituted something of a grey area. Such conflicts affected a wider audience than the privateer

2 Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands, p. 420

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. p. 421

6 Ibid., Thompson, Mercenaries, pirates and sovereigns, p. 21

7 Loades, England’s Maritime Empire,p. 130

8 Rodgers, The Safeguard of the Sea, p. 182

6

and his prize. Both parties generally came from different states, and so clear adjudication was

required to prevent privateering activity from escalating into a breach in international relations

The aforementioned factors are some of the reasons why prize courts were being set up at

the beginning of the early modern period. Sometimes these merely provided the fig-leaf of legality

that was required to declare ships good prize in a practice that could surmount to little more than

piracy by another name, as the difference between the two was mostly the jurisdiction of a

competent authority, since privateers always pursued private rather than public goals.9 In an era

when the lines distinguishing legal from illegal forms of private maritime violence were more often

than not blurred, the procedures involved in declaring a just prize in a court of law were by their very

nature highly politicized, and therefore such a situation might be expected. In such uncertain

circumstances the principle of legality becomes flexible, and ambiguity thrives. In principle, however,

it was the task of prize courts to adjudicate on matters that could not be resolved on a diplomatic

level. As early modern governments were largely unable to come to effective bilateral resolution of

prize cases, the adjudication of violence at sea remained the prerogative of national judicial

institutions.10 This brought judicial institutions into the diplomatic process, as courts had become

stakeholders in resolving the cases of contention between sovereign states. For instance, Sicking has

documented that the great majority of plaintiffs at the admiralty court in Veere were foreign,

predominantly English. This was the case as it was often advantageous to bring a case before the

admiralty court where the perpetrators resided, as in times of rapprochement that “the vague

distinctions between hostilities at sea, privateering and piracy would be tackled in a sensitive

fashion”.11

The practice of privateering was officially restricted by stringent conditions which predicated

the legality of its actions, and its relations to the government. Cornelis de Schepper wrote in a letter

to Mary of Hungary in 1551 that in times of war the admiral issued letters to those who were willing

to operate on their own accord against the enemies of the sovereign. These letters stipulated that

only enemy ships were to be taken, that 10 percent of their prize money was destined for the

admiral. In order to prevent piracy such letters were only issued to trusted or trustworthy

individuals, who would be obliged to support the war-fleet should the admiral require it.12 Letters of

marque would usually refer explicitly which enemies were fair game, mention the name of the

privateer, as well as the name and size of his vessel. The legality of every captured prize was to be

adjudicated by the admiral.13

Not every privateering license was ordained individually. On certain occasions sovereigns

would issue general letters of marque to enrol entire regions in their war effort, as Charles V did by

the ordinance of 1536, inviting the Flemish to join in his war against France,14 or Henry VIII in 154415.

Such general declarations were often curtailed so as not to incur ruptures in diplomatic relations.

Only one month after Charles V had issued a general letter of marque, he issued a prohibition on the

attack of the English.16 Letters of marque were issued when war broke out, and “retracted or

9 Thompson, Mercenaries, pirates and sovereigns, p. 22

10 Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands p. 450

11 Ibid. pp. 450-453

12 Ibid. p. 426

13 Ibid. p. 427

14 Ibid.

15 Thompson, Mercenaries, pirates and sovereigns p. 23

16 Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands p. 427

7

declared invalid” as soon as a truce was established or a peace treaty concluded.17 As such, Admirals

did not follow their own privateering policy, but rather complied with the maritime policies set by his

Sovereign.18

The legitimacy of prizes seized by subjects of rival sovereigns had been a bone of contention

in international relations since the last quarter of the fifteenth century. The resolution of these cases

had since become an integral part of peace negotiations, and was regularly mentioned in peace

treaties. As bilateral negotiations on the legitimacy of prize cases rarely came to a successful

conclusion, most cases were resolved on national or provincial level, giving rise to the maritime

courts.19 This was predominantly the case as the settlement of prize cases after a truce or peace

came into being was mostly a political issue. Favourable resolutions of prize cases were gestures of

goodwill to former enemies, and bargaining chips to be used in allowing the interests of one’s own

subjects to prevail wherever else still possible.20

Both the prevalence of privateering practices, and the ease with which a privateer might

resort to piratical practices are exemplary of the limited naval effectiveness of early modern

governments. Where letters of marque were in principle restriction upon the actions a privateer

could undertake, in practice there was often little ex-ante measures the issuing sovereign could do to

prevent the privateer from capturing neutral vessels. Overly zealous privateers could easily cause

ruptures in the diplomatic relations between states, and therefore from the 1450s onwards efforts

were made to more effectively control the issuing of letters of marque.21 Examples are the Anglo-

Castilian treaty of Medina del Campo of 1489, and the 1497 Anglo-French agreement to supress

piracy and reprisals. In 1537 a meeting took place at Bayonne between French, Portuguese and

Imperial representatives to discuss the issue.22 The dearth of examples in which problems arising

from privateering were effectively resolved through diplomatic channels goes to show that

resolution of prize cases remained on a lower political level.

17

Ibid. p. 428 18

Ibid. p. 423 19

Ibid. p. 438 20

Ibid. p. 450 21

Anderson, The origins of the modern European state system, p. 29 22

Ibid. p. 29-30

8

The International relations of Early Modern Europe

The Habsburg Empire and France were frequently embroiled in conflict throughout the

sixteenth century, often referred to as the Habsburg-Valois wars. This conflict was a near-constant

presence in the early modern power struggle over the European state system, yet the details of the

series of wars that unfurled between 1494 and 1559 do not concern this paper. It is however

important to take note of the contemporary power constellation, to understand the context of the

court case between Robert Masse and Geryt Ouderschie.

Hostilities between France and the Habsburg empire had been renewed when a French army

invaded Savoy and Piedmont in February 1536. The conflict was relatively short-lived, mostly due to

the innumerable problems of logistics and finance made it difficult to launch successful large-scale

invasions, and support a during war of attrition.23 A truce was signed at Monzon in Spain, already in

November 1537, followed by a series of papal-supervised meetings in 1538 between the belligerents

which resulted in a truce meant to last 10 years. This turned out to be overly optimistic, and in July

1542 France again declared war, bolstered by promises of a large-scale Turkish attack on Habsburg

territories. Despite this apparent setback Charles V was successful in consolidating his hold on his

Netherlands-territories, and persuading Henry VIII to side with him against France. Again, the

hostilities were neither won nor lost on the battlefield, but in the exchequer. The sheer cost of

carrying on the war made continued fighting impossible, and a peace agreement was reached in

1544, basically restating the terms already reached at Cambrai.24 The later Italian wars are still

relatively understudied, as they lack the usual military excitement of pitched battles that often draws

scholars into episodes of conflict.25 The Italian wars, however, were among the more complex and

constant struggles of early modern Europe, with intricate and ever-varying diplomatic constellations

and enormous consequences on the geographic and political make-up of Europe. To adequately

address these in a short paper would not do them justice. However it is important to note that they

were a constant factor in Habsburg diplomacy, and their existence had a direct impact on the Low

Countries.

Summarily it can thus be stated that the relations between the Empire and France were far

from amicable in this period. Compared with this constant feuding the relation between the Empire

and England looks remarkably cordial and stable. In particular the relation between England and the

Low Countries was upheld with good reason. As Roelofsen puts it “Economic as well as political

reasons had brought about something like a traditional entente between England and the

Netherlands”.26 Ancient economic ties had been forged by the many venues of trade between the

two regions, cloth in particular. A series of treaties was established between England and the Low

Countries to protect and promote this beneficial interdependence. The most important of these

being the Magnus Intercursus of 1496. Although Henry VII had attempted to alter the treaty in 1506,

creating a running dispute and series of negotiations lasting well into the next century, no ultimate

settlement was reached.27 Remarkably, with the exception of several short spells of war,

23

Anderson, The origins of the modern European state system, p. 110-111 24

Ibid. p. 114-116 25

Black, European warfare 1494-1660,p. 80 26

Roelofsen, ‘Early Dutch prize law: some thoughts on a case before the court of Holland and the Grand Council of Mechelen 1477-1482’ Netherlands International Law Review, 27: 1980, p. 223 27

H. J. Smitt (ed.), Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis van den Handel met Engeland, Schotland en Ierland: Tweede Deel: 1485–1585) assemblesthe main documentary sources for the Anglo-Netherlands commercial relationship.

9

disagreement and competition, these treaties would remain the basis for Anglo-Dutch economic

relations until the series of navigational acts of the seventeenth century.

Aside from the economic benefits that applied to both parties, England had another good

reason to remain on friendly footing with the Emperor. England’s international position within the

European constellation of Catholic states was precarious at best under the turbulent rule of Henry

VIII. Through his troubled relations with the Roman Catholic Church he had prepared his country for

Protestantism, which placed England on a permanent footing of potential conflict with the other

great powers of Europe. One of Henry’s most important legacies was that every subsequent English

sovereign now had a permanent threat to their legitimacy: the breach with Rome had opened the

door to permanent instability and potential weakness. 28

Charles V also had a definitive interest in keeping England on his side, as he severely needed

Henry’s support on the battlefield. The Habsburg Empire surrounded France on all sides, but was far

from a stable and coherent entity. The domestic instability, the considerable distances between the

different Habsburg territories spread all over Europe, and the staggering costs of conducting

extended wars and maintaining standing armies posed a constant threat to the overextended

Habsburg dynasty.29 Adding to internal difficulties and the aggravated costs of the Italian wars was

the Franco-Ottoman alliance of 1536. Through this imaginative diplomatic move the French and

Ottoman states had joined forces against the Habsburg Empire, which was since threatened not just

from the French borders, but also in Eastern Europe and on the Mediterranean. In short, an ally to

threaten the Northern French border was highly advantageous, and would be a stimulant for decent

relations between the English and Habsburg sovereigns. As such, mutual hostility to France brought

the English and the Habsburgs in a self-interested tandem. Although relations would sour after the

Franco-Habsburg peace treaty of 1544, up and until that time the Emperor attempted to remain on

proper footing with the English. Throughout the second half of the sixteenth century relations

between the Habsburgs and the English cooled rapidly, but do not concern this paper.

Geryt van Ouderschie captured the French vessel carrying goods belonging to Robert Masse

in 1537, when a state of war existed between the France and the Habsburg Empire. At that time, nor

at the time of the court cases in Veere and Malines, no formal political alliance existed between The

Habsburg Empire and England. Yet it would have been considered important not to alienate too far

the useful English crown. This short overview of the hostilities during both the capture of Robert

Masses ship by Geryt van Ouderschie, and the cases at Veere and Malines goes to show that Charles

V had a definite interest in keeping England on his side, as he severely needed Henry VIIIs support on

the battlefield. The courts of Veere and Malines will quite possibly have weighed this interest in their

judgements.

28

Rodgers, The Safeguard of the Sea, p. 178 29

On the many difficulties facing the Habsburg Empire, see Kennedy, The rise and fall of great powers, p. 31-70

10

The Case of Geryt van Ouderschie and Robert Masse

The case under discussion is that of Geryt Claeszoon van Ouderschie against Robert Masse.

The former was a Dutch shipper, the latter an English merchant. Van Ouderschie had captured a

French ‘warship’ on route from Cherbourg just before the English port of “Weymuiden”.30

After having captured this vessel, he sold some of its cargo in English harbours and took his prize to

Veere for adjudication. At Veere the prize was first declared to be good, and yet upon review

sentenced van Ouderschie to provide restitution for the goods and ship he had captured. After which

van Ouderschie appealed to the Great Council of Malines,

This chapter will attempt to make a detailed analysis of the case brought forth by Geryt van

Ouderschie, and how the ruling eventually came down against him. This case has previously been

researched by Roelofsen, who based himself on the records of the court of Holland and the

sententiën of the Great Council of Malines. Sicking has also referred to the van Ouderschie case in

Neptune and the Netherlands, based on those same documents. Since Roelofsen published his

research, a small series of new documents has come to light in the archives of the Great Council. This

paper employs some of these documents, notably the file Beroepen Holland 1123. These documents

hold the depositions given by Geryt van Ouderschie and his shipmates at the trial in Malines.

Although unfortunately the document does not provide insights that significantly change our

knowledge of the court case, it does elucidate his version of events in a way that was possibly not

entirely available to Roelofsen.

Geryt [or Gerard] van Ouderschie31 was the recipient of a letter of marque from the

Stadholder of Holland, and set out to sea in September 1537. Together with several Flemish vessels

van Ouderschie captured an English ship carrying French goods, and brought it to Veere. Sicking

points out that he should have rather taken his prize to Holland to have it adjudicated there, seeing

as this was the location where his letter of marque had been issued. Van Ouderschie must have had

his reasons for doing so, although they presumably came down to Veere’s proximity, and the notion

that his was a good price. At the admiralty court of Veere, Dominicus van den Nieuwenhove, the

admiral’s deputy, issued a judgement in favour of van Ouderschie, declaring his capture good prize.

Upon hearing this English merchants wrote to Mary of Hungary claiming rightful ownership of the

prize. The admiralty court thereupon reviewed the case and passed a definitive verdict favouring the

English. Van Ouderschie was made to pay compensation, and had his prize confiscated. Van

Ouderschie, as could be expected, was not particularly pleased with this verdict, and denied the

admiralty’s jurisdiction over him, as he was a licensed privateer from Holland. He thereupon

appealed to the Great Council of Malines. The States of Holland, although invited to take part in the

proceedings by van Ouderschie, decided to remain aloof. They feared that partaking in the court case

would provide a dangerous precedent of recognition of the admiral’s jurisdiction. This had ironically

already been done by van Ouderschie himself, who had forfeited his right to legal exception (or at

least his argument for it) by approaching the admiralty of Veere in the first place.

Also the States were anxious to avoid detrimental effects of van Ouderschie’s actions to the

entire province of Holland.32 In the Netherlands, glaring differences of competence for the issuing of

30

It is unclear exactly where this port is, Weymuiden may refer to Weymouth, a port city in Dorset. As it lies directly north of Cherbourgh, and West of the Isle of Wight, where one of van Ouderschie’s crewmembers reports as having sailed to afterwards, this seems a plausible possibility. 31

Alternatively referred to as van Ouwerschie or van Onderschie in the court documents 32

Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands, p. 455-457, Roelofsen, Studies in the history of international law, p. 14

11

letters of marque existed between the provincial or central authorities, the Stadholder, and the

states of Holland. An administrative inconsistency that was occasionally exploited by privateers.33 It

makes sense that Van ouderschie would also attempt to do this, but had already foregone his chance

by appearing before the admiralty of Veere rather than the court of Holland. And so, with Holland

abstaining, van Ouderschie appealed to the Great Council unassisted by their political pressure. At

Malines, van Ouderschie claimed to have unrightfully been forced to remunerate Masse for the sum

of 140 pounds, 6 shilling and 8 kleinen Sterling.34 The depositions were taken by Ghelain Zeeghers.

Van Ouderschie was deposed, as well as several of his shipmates. In the deposition of Boruelis Jans

from Delffschehaven, probably one of van Ouderschie’s crewmembers, it states that van Ouderschie

his crew, and several smaller vessels, numbering either thirty or thirty-one men in total, set sail in

1537 carrying a letter of marque issued by the Stadholder of Holland. This letter ordered the

privateer to “help injure and damage the French as they at this time are enemies of His Royal

Majesty”.35

Carrying this license van Ouderschie and his crew sailed to England, where they docked at

the harbourtown of Weymuyden, henceforth Weymouth, where they saw a ship approaching on a

course that would suggest it had come directly from France. The merchant ship was carrying

“cramerye ende canevas” as well as being armed with two or three small cannon. Van Ouderschie,

upon spotting the ship left the harbour and set course for the merchant, meeting him at open sea. A

terrible firefight ensued, forcing the merchants to abandon the rudder. Possibly this was because it

was damaged, or that the steering deck was taking the heaviest fire, the deposition documents do

not specify. Rudderless, the merchants were fish in a barrel, and let the ship float on to the beach.36

The Dutch had apparently pursued the runaway vessel, and boarded it whilst it was stuck, possibly

run aground. The Dutch took command of the vessel, and sailed it to a different English harbour

roughly four miles from Weymouth. Strangely the name of this particular town was no longer

remembered at the time of the deposition. The ships lay there for fourteen days “sonder

datter yemandt naer taelde”, and no-one came forward to claim their prize.37

The cargo was thereupon sold to the locals, for which approximately 110 or 111 crowns was

paid. The only exception being four or five rolls of canvas for making new sails. Van Ouderschie split

the profits evenly between his ship and the other vessels in his entourage. The ships then departed

England for Dunkirk, from which they then returned to “Delffschehaven”. Another deposition, by

Lucas Janssoen, reproduces a similar narrative, with the addition that three French fishermen were

also captured on route, and taken to Delffschehaven. Pieter Joosten, another crewmember, in his

deposition claimed that the crew of the attacked merchant had abandoned ship after heavy fire, and

33

Sicking , Neptune and the Netherlands, p. 424 34

ARA Brussel, Grote Raad, Beroepen Holland, inv. Nr. 1123. No document or folio numbers, listed in appendix as photo 18. The last currency is unclear, at best estimate it says leun, which doesn’t seem to be a currency, hence it is denoted here as kleinen, which seemed a possibility 35

ARA BH 1123, photo 32. “zeeckere bestel hem ghegheven bij den grave van Hoochstraeten als stadthouder generael van Hollandt het welcke hem deposant den anderen gesellen tot twee oft drie reysen voor gelesen werdt eer zij van lant staecken te helpen crencken en beschadigen die Franchoysen alsdoen ter tijt vyanden wesende vand KMt” 36

“hebben zoe vreesselycken geschoten dat die vyanden t roer verlieten van huer schip ende tselve sulcxs lieten dryffven an de stranghe ende was aldaer vast leggende…” Beach seems a sensible translation for stranghe 37

ARA BH 1123 foto 33. Which makes the claim of amnesia somewhat unreliable. It may have been very convenient to find a rather inaccessible natural harbour for this purpose, making it neigh impossible for a claimant to find out the ship had been captured, and reclaim it.

12

that the ship was therefore rudderless. He also was unable to remember the name of the English

harbour in which van Ouderschie and his crew had spent a fortnight. Another deposition, by Dirk

Janssoen, names the second English harbour as “Indewickt”, and claims that the privateers acted as

they felt right, seeing as they believed the price they captured to be French, enemies of his Majesty.

He also recounts the capture of several French fishermen, who were taken captive, locked in the

merchant vessel together with its French crew and taken to Delffschehaven. The deposition of Jacop

Geryts is interesting in the respect that it differs somewhat from that of his shipmates. For one, he

remembers that they took their prize to “an island of England called eelowicht in a harbour named

oermuyt” possibly Yarmouth on the Isle of Wight.38

Unfortunately these cases tell very little of the legal arguments employed in van Ouderschie’s

defense, but they do provide a rather clear picture of the events that took place. Interestingly, none

of the crewmembers seems to have noticed, or was willing to admit, that the goods on board of the

captured merchant vessel in fact belonged to the Englishman Robert Masse. The fact that the

merchant came sailing from France was damning evidence, and reason for capture. The depositions

are similar yet different enough to assume that the events probably unfolded as they have been

recounted. Several aspects of these depositions do however seem to fall short of events as they went

down. For instance, if it was an English vessel, why is this not mentioned anywhere? The vessel is

continuously described as French, or coming from France. Its crew, or what remained of it, was

apparently taken captive, where their nationality should have been noted. The depositions make no

mention whatsoever of having the case adjudicated in Veere, but go straight from England to Dunkirk

to Delffschehaven.

The first of these peculiarities might be accounted for by the fact that the crewmembers

either simply did not know the legal difference of ownership between a French and an English

merchant, or did not care for it. In their position it would seem likely that they preferred to have

their capture declared good prize, and would therefore want to downplay any English associations,

and rather present their prize as a part of the war effort against His Majesties enemies. On the

second issue, it might be that they had the merchant declared good prize by the vice-admiralty of

Veere in Dunkirk, although no mention of this is made in the depositions.

On 4 March 1542 the Great Council reached a verdict that found Geryt van Ouderschie to be

in the wrong. The ruling found the defendant had the right over the claimant, and as such upheld the

earlier ruling that van Ouderschie should return and remunerate the possessions of Robert Masse

and his consorts.39 The exact reason as to why the verdict should go this way is not entirely clear.

One might muse as to the extent that English ownership of the goods and ship were the decisive

factor, but the fact that they were from France might have warranted a legal capture. In fact, the

legal principle of “infection hostile” would, or should, have given a certain air of legality to the

capture of any ship carrying enemy goods.40 Roelofsen writes that under the intercourse of 1468,

1478 and 1496 very little scope was left for enemy trade, as enemy character of any cargo could

imply enemy provenance, even if neutral shipowners could prove their bona fide ownership.41 In fact,

throughout the 15th and 16th centuries trade with an enemy power rendered neutral ships liable to

38

ARA BH 1123, foto 40. 39

Chronologische Lijsten van de geëxtendeerde sententiën berustende in het archief van de grote raad van mechelen, IV, nr. 144. Sententie 841.138, pp. 1341-1348. 40

Roelofsen, ‘Early Dutch prize law: some thoughts on a case before the court of Holland and the Grand Council of Mechelen 1477-1482’ Netherlands International Law Review, 27: 1980, p. 225 41

ibid.

13

capture.42In earlier cases, however, this also did not sway the Great Council to rule against neutral

(i.e. English) shipowners carrying contraband goods. 43 One might argue that it was because the

defendant was an English rather than a French citizen that there was no apparent change in verdicts

between Veere and Malines, but there is not necessarily any evidence to directly support such a

suggestion, and the existing evidence should not be spread too thin. The claimant was from Holland,

the defendant was from a state with which there were both political and economic incentives for the

Low Countries to remain on good terms with. It is certainly possible that the wheels of justice would

have turned against Geryt van Ouderschie in any situation other than outright war between the

Habsburg Empire and England. Yet simply ascribing the verdict to political factors alone might also be

too easy, but as the judges of the Great Council did not motivate their verdicts, the actual reasons for

their decision can’t be established with any real certainty.

42

Ibid. p. 226 43

Ibid. p. 225-226

14

The Anglo-Netherlands relations and privateering

Just as the Habsburg rulers would do well to keep England in their corner, so the English

could ill afford to be indifferent to the Netherlands. Their wealth, proximity and geographical

position as springboards for a possible invasion made it a natural English priority to pay attention to

the political fate of this region. She could ill afford to stand idly by in “the great contest between

French and Habsburgs”.44 Although the reverse was not entirely true, the Habsburg Empire certainly

had greater use for English friendship than English animosity. Therefore both sides had an obvious

interest in maintaining good relations. The favourable position that English merchants occupied in

the case law of privateering cases in Veere and Malines has been well-documented, and conclusions

from this have already been drawn above. It could be interesting to see how the English perceived

this actions by taking the documents of the Calendar of State Papers into account. The specific case

of Geryt van Ouderschie is not mentioned in the Spanish or Foreign series of the Calendar, yet

privateering is an infrequently returning item in the both series. The Foreign series only began as a

fully separate category of the Calendar of State papers from the rule of Edward VI in 1547, but are

collected for earlier reigns as well, in the letters and papers foreign and domestic of Henry VIII.45

Curiously the terms privateer and privateering both do not receive noteworthy mentions relating to

the Anglo-Netherlands relations.

Over the course of the entire Spanish series there are fifteen mentions of the word privateer,

and one of privateering.46 This alone would hardly be enough to credit privateering with a dominant

role in the Anglo-Habsburg relations, although it does make it a theme of substance. Yet many of

these mentions do not refer to Dutch or Flemish privateers, but rather to their French, Spanish or

Portuguese counterparts. One mention that does concern the Netherlands is in a letter from

Habsburg Ambassador Eustace Chapuys to Mary of Hungary sent on 18 April 1543. In it Chapuys

writes to confer the Henry VIII’s inquiry as to why the Low Countries fleet had not yet been issued to

be deployed against the French. Privateering is mentioned almost casually, and refers to the

guarantee that English privateers will do the Habsburg fleet no harm: “his ships, when at sea, will

take care not to harm those of the Emperor's subjects, as will also the privateer vessels, which some

of the guilds … of this city have, with his permission, armed against the French, having previously

received to that effect sufficient guarantee and proper charter.”47

Another such letter was sent by Chapuys to Charles V on 11 June 1543. In It he wrote to

confer the King’s complaint at the Flemish for granting of safe conduct to French vessels asking

“openly, and without disguise … to urge You [Charles V] to refrain in future from granting safe

conducts to French vessels, as otherwise the owner of the vessels would be deceived, and the English

privateers, finding they are baffled in their calculations will not in future respect safe conducts, but

will throw them into the sea, and board and capture any French vessel they meet with, whether she

has one or not”.48 On 24 June 1543 Chapuys wrote to the Emperor again on the same matter,

confessing not to have raised the issue of safe conducts with the King “as, moreover, there is no time

44

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 19 45

http://www.british-history.ac.uk/catalogue.aspx?gid=126 46

Determined through the search tool of British History Online. For results: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/search.aspx?query=privateer&rf=source%3a136 47

Chapuys to Mary of Hungary, 18 april 1543. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=88110&strquery=privateer 48

Chapuys to Charles V, 15 June 1543. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=88116&strquery=privateer

15

for a full explanation of Your Majesty’s motives in recommending the grand of the said safe conducts

…. I have debated long, and will again debate, its expediency with the privy councillors”.49 Chapuys

was apparently successful in his efforts of persuasion, as “they [the privy councillors] have lately

released without the least difficulty three vessels belonging to the Guicciardini laden with wine, that

were captured three or four days ago in this channel by an English privateer”.50

The general tendency of these aforementioned documents in the Spanish series thus seems

to be on English state policy, and English privateering towards subjects of the Emperor. In that

respect it is interesting to note, particularly in the final missive, that the English are making an effort

to maintain good relations in the face of naval irritants. Interesting to note also, is that the majority

of these efforts seem to be made as the Anglo-Habsburg relations were about to rupture. In 1544

Charles V would sign a peace treaty with France, leaving England the sole combatant. Perhaps the

English had become to the conclusion that this was likely, and desired to charm their ally, or

alternatively there was a run-up of diplomatic irritants leading to the eventual breach, although

probably having no causal relation to it. The political dimension to these cases also springs forward in

several of the missives, particularly the last letter by Chapuys, in which apparently the privy council

saw the political imperative in releasing three vessels captured by privateers for the expediency of

good relations with the Emperor, even if the King apparently disagreed with the illegality of their

capture.

The Acts of the privy council are recorded in print only from 1542, and do not make extent

mentions of the relation between privateering and diplomacy. Although references to privateering

appear several times in the first volume of the series (1542-1547), these exclusively deal with licenses

given by the King to English privateers. Yet there is a rich source of interesting records under the

heading of piracy rather than privateering. On 10 may 1545, for instance, the privy council decided to

order Sir George Carew and the Mayor of Plymouth to provide restitution for “a certeyne shippe

called Les Troys Royes”. This ship was carrying French wines and had therefore been captured as

prize, yet it “clerely appeared that the same apperteyned to themperoures subjects and to no

Frenchmen”.51 The next day it was decided that the mayor of Plymouth should also provide

restitution for a Spanish ship named Santa Maria de Guadalupo, which had been taken by a certain

Mr Wyndam. No further reason is provided, but it appears that the ship’s nationality seems to have

sufficed for release.52 On 5 July the council wrote to the mayor of Hastings for “restitution to be

made by oone John Ragles” for the value of goods taken “out of a hoye called the Egle of

Roterdame”, presumably a Dutch ship that had previously been declared good prize, a judgement

that was now reversed.53

Plymouth appears to have been a centre of rogue privateering, as the mayor and citizens of

this city are frequently mentioned in the Privy Council records as having been ordered to provide

restitution for captured Spanish goods. For the mayor in particular this behaviour seems to have

carried real consequences. On 27 July 1545, “uppon sondry comlaints and supllications” deliverd by a

Spaniard called John de Quintanaduenas against the mayor of Plymouth and William Hawkyns, his

deputy, were called before the Council. They were found to be severely at fault in handling the

49

Chapuys to Charles V, 24 June 1543. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=88118&strquery=privateer 50

Ibid. 51

Acts of the privy council of England volume 1, 1542-1547, p. 159. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/source.aspx?pubid=1176&sp=3&pg=158 52

Ibid. 53

Ibid. p. 208. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/source.aspx?pubid=1176&sp=3&pg=208

16

possessions of de Quintanaduenas which had been captured at sea. These “wer dispersed and solde

under foote, wherof a goode parte remained yet in his [Hawkyn’s] custodie”. It was thereupon

decided that Hawkyn’s should “make full recompence unto the said John de Quintanaduenas in

suche sorte as doth ensue”.54 The matter was not resolved by mere compensation, in fact because of

“his contempt of the Cownselles letters and the slack accomplishing of the same, the said Majour

and William Hawkyns were committed unto pryson” where Hawkyns was to remain until he had

fulfilled all his obligations of restitution to the Spanish merchant. Condoning overenthusiastic

privateering, and dragging their feet on the Privy Council’s orders certainly did not pay off for these

two gentlemen.55

The entries relating to piracy continue much along the same vein throughout the rest of the

volume. The Council records cited above provide a rather clear picture of the English government’s

disposition towards Habsburg privateers. Spanish and on occasion Dutch ships, most of whom we

can assume must have been on route from Spain to Flanders or vice versa, when captured as prize,

were frequently returned to their owners. There is in fact a certain parallel to be found between the

case of Geryt van Ouderschie, and that of the owner of the “Troys Royes”. In both cases ship carrying

French goods were seized by privateers, and initially had their captures declared good prize, only to

have this judgement revoked by a higher judicial authority, presumably for political reasons, when

the nationality of the ship’s owner was not French. Noteworthy too, is that when the Spaniard de

Quintanaduenas complained as to the behaviour of the Mayor of Plymouth and his deputy, his

complaints were taken into serious consideration and merited a vigorous response from the Privy

Council. It would appear that the political consideration of upholding good mutual relations was a

recurring theme both in the Low Countries and England, and played a considerable role in the judging

of prize law cases.

54

Ibid., p. 220 http://www.british-history.ac.uk/source.aspx?pubid=1176&sp=3&pg=220 55

Ibid. p. 221

17

Conclusion

Prize law cases in the early modern period had a decidedly political dimension. That in itself

Is by now, following the recent historiography, works by Roelofsen, van Rhee and Sicking in

particular, not a controversial statement. As privateering was both a conventional method of

conducting naval warfare, extending the maritime resources of a sovereign, as well as a judicial

method of privately acquiring retribution for lost goods, it was an ever-present phenomenon. And an

ever-present nuisance at that. Since the early fifteenth century the resolution of prize law cases had

been a bone of contention among sovereigns, and was frequently tabled at diplomatic encounters.

Bilateral resolution of prize law cases remained decidedly ineffective, thereupon giving rise to

admiralty courts. These judicial institutions came to play a crucial role in interstate diplomacy, as

their rulings had real consequences on the relations between different states. As such, the admiralty

courts might be considered as non-state actors in the field of diplomacy, placing them well within the

field of new diplomatic history. Although higher judicial and political institutions remained, such as

the Great Council or the Privy Council, these would frequently uphold decisions made by the

admiralty courts, or intervene when decisions in prize law cases became possibly harmful to the

political relations with a friendly state. From the cases studied for this paper, Geryt van Ouderschie

before the Great Council of Malines and the privy council judgements relating to Habsburg ship

owners, it becomes clear that the consideration of maintaining good relations between England and

the Habsburg empire was considered a primary objective in the resolution of prize cases on both

sides of the Channel, and considerable lengths were gone to, to ensure that privateers did not get in

the way of diplomacy. The influence of privateering and prize law cases on the relations between the

Netherlands and England in the 1530s and 1540s can thus be characterized as a constant threat of

diplomatic ruptures, and their (politically-inspired) resolution as a constant soothing of these

irritants. It was economic, political and military reasons that bound England and the low countries

together in a relation somewhat resembling a political entente, and these were simply too important

and mutually beneficial to be thwarted by the private gains of their respective subjects.

18

Bibliography

Primary sources:

ARA Brussel, Archieven Grote Raad, Beroepen van Holland, inv. Nr. 1123, no document or folio

number. (transcriptions attached in appendix)

ARA Brussel, Archieven Grote Raad, Sententiën, register nr. 841.138, pp. 1341-1348

Bergenroth, G. A., Calendar of state papers Spanish series volumes 1-9, (1862 until 1912). available

online at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/catalogue.aspx?gid=136

Dasent, J. R., Acts of the Privy Council of England volume I 1542-1547, 1890. Available online at

http://www.british-history.ac.uk/source.aspx?pubid=1176

Smidt, J. Th., Chronologische Lijsten van de geëxtendeerde sententiën berustende in het archief van

de grote raad van mechelen, IV. Koninklijke Commissie voor de Uitgave der Oude Wetten en

Verordeningen van België. 1985

Secondary sources

Anderson, M.S., The origins of the modern European state system 1494-1618, Longman (1998)

Black, J., European Warfare 1494-1660, Routledge (2002)

Kennedy, P., The rise and fall of the great powers, Vintage Books (1989)

Loades, D., England’s maritime empire: power commerce and policy 1490-1690, Longman (2000)

Rodger, N.A.M., The safeguard of the sea: a naval history of Britain, 660-1649, Penguin (1997)

Roelofsen, C. G., Studies in the history of international law: practice and doctrine in particular with

regard to the law of naval warfare in the Low Countries from circa 1450 until the early 17th century,

Proefschrift Universiteit Utrecht (1991) (contains all cited articles by Roelofsen in reprinted versions

with original citation and page numbering)

Sicking, L., Neptune and the Netherlands: state, economy and war at sea in the renaissance, Brill

(2004)

Thomson, J.E., Mercenaries, pirates and sovereigns: state-building and extraterritorial violence in

early modern Europe, Princeton University Press (1994)

Wernham, R. B., Before the Armada: the growth of English foreign policy 1485-1588, Jonathan Cape

(1966)

19

Appendix

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 31, geen p. nr.

Naer vermoghen zeeckere opEn Lren van comissie geexped.t

Inden grooten Raide des keys.s ons E heere bij forme

Van surrogasie up meesters Jan van Duvenvoerde ende

Ghelain zeghers. Raden in Hollandt E Den gheenen van hem

Beyden die daer toe best zoude moghen [v]acheren in date den

Xxien

dach van junio xvc een ende veertich ome te maecken

Dencgueste van schipper geryt claeszoon van ouderschie

Beroeren[de] den processen hangen[den] ..oo..den ..onss grooten raide

Tusschen hem als appellant vandie vans admiraliteee ende

Impetrant van requeste civile van eenre zijnde ende robberht

Masse engelsman zou hij procedeert geinthimeerde ter andere

Syde hebbe ick ghelain zeeghers vorss tot my genomen

Hebbende als adiom.. met ….. willem van dam s….rRa..yd

Vanden hove van hollandt tot gersourhe vande ….. appellant

[ende] impetrant van requeste civile den …en july. Anno xv

Een ende veertigh begonnen te hooren ende te examineeren die getuygen

Hier naer volgen[de] daer toe by jacob ….. ende ………

Der henss. July grooten raide barcss by un ……. Vorcss

Daer toe near vermoghen myne varcss ..omiss..e gecommitteert

Verdeachnaer tenynde die welcke zoe hy un relateerde verdack..

Hadden den vorcss netuthemeerde ende die vorcss getuyghen

Te sien sweren die welcke sopareerde en[de] naer iik eenighe

Vanden voirss getuygen ssy synder presencie geerdt hadde

Consenteerdt dat … voorts ..n syn affwesen prcederen soude

Tot …eden en[de] ……… van gan alsulcke getuyghen als die

Goncss appellant.. en[de] impetrant van requesk …… ..oor…

Soude willen beleyden. Midts dat ick hem off syn p…..

Nade bourss getuygen gehoerdt so…. Syn soude leveren die

Zy gehoerde zoutn zyn tweech ick zulcxe ykedaen daer op

Ende voorts geprocedeert zoe..er nae.. ..olckt

Zerst

Bormld jand ende woonen[de] tot delfschehaven ..udt ……. Souden

Beleyt uyden boirss appellant[data, geen idee…]

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 32, geen p. nr.

Articulen vand. Scriftueren mitsgaders opt recolement

van eender certificatie beginnende. Wij scepenen ind. Hage

van date upten lesten dach in april anno XVc en veertich

naer schrijven t bisdoms van Uuytrecht hier by gevoucht

tuycht ende zeydt bij zijn. eede upte voors. articulen [marge: dat hij deposant van dien inhouden van den

zelven articulen] anders

int zeecker nyet en weet dan dat hij deposant ind. jaere

'36 mede gevaeren en es op zijn buyt ende aventuere vand

zee mit scipper Geryt Claess van Ouwerschye omme mit

20

hem ende andere die in zijn schep waeren in getale van xxx ofte

xxxi naer zijn onthoudt daer off nu ter tijt eenighe zijn

in zee als Dirck Janssz van Rijswijck, Claes van Willigen

van Rotterdamme, Claes But, oeck van Rotterdamme, Jan

Jacobsz van Delfschehaven ende andere oostwaert gevaeren

ende eenighe oock die uuyten Briele waeren des. werelt

overleden navolgende zeeckere bestel hem ghegheven bij den

grave van Hoochstraeten als stadthouder generael van

Hollandt het welcke hem deposant den anderen

gesellen tot twee oft drie reysen voor gelesen werdt

eer zij van lant staecken te helpen crencken en beschadigen

die Franchoysen alsdoen ter tijt vyanden wesende vand KMt

ende des. zijnre Ma.t landen die zij upter zee souden moghen

becommen ende zulcxs gedenckt hem wel dta zij gevaeren

zijnde tot in Engelandt in een haven genaempt Weymuyde

zij hebben commen zien zeylen dwers over uuyt Vranckerijcke

een coopscip mit een mersch twelck bevracht was met

cramerye ende canevas ende oeck op hadde twee ofte drie

cleyne stucken van geschut, te weeten haeckbusschen

welck coopschip alsulcx varende eenighe van hemluyden

tot zesse ofte zeven in getaele jeghens gevaren zijn buyten de

havene ende alle vrijdom in zee mit een boot soe zij met het

groote schep soedrae daer nyet bij commen en consten ende

hebben zoe vreesselycken geschoten dat die vyanden t roer

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 33, geen p. nr.

verlieten van huer schip ende tselve sulcxs lieten dryffven an de

stranghe ende was aldaer vast leggende op te stranghe

eer hij deposant ende andere die int groote schip gebleven

waere daer bij quamen ende tselve schip zulcx becrachtigt

ende beweldicht hebben syn sdaechs daer an daerm meede

ghevaeren omtrent vier mylen van Weiimuyden in een andere

haven van Engelandt [doorgestreept]

die hij bij name nyet onthouden en heeft [marge: aldaer zij de goeden int zelve schip boven]

naer zij veerthien daghen daer gelegen hadden sonder

datter yemandt naer taelde als prijs ende gevonden zijnde

upten bodem van den vyanden vercocht ende gebuyt hebben ende

maeckten dair aff naer zijn beste onthoudt omtrent hond[er]t

ende thien off elff croonen daer scipper geryt off behielt

voor syn schip deen helft ende die andere gesellen die

wederhelft dewelcke wederhelft hy hen beyden deelde

ende distribueerde eer zy van daen voeren ende behielden

noch vier off vyff rollen cainfaes die zy ongebuyt ende

ongepaert lieten omme niyeuwen zeylen tot heure schepen

daer off te maecken t welck zy deden ghecomen synde inde

haven van duynkercken in vlaenderen van daer sy

wederom[m]e uuytgevaren zyn in zee eer zy wedere ghecomen

zyn tot delffschehaven

seydt voorst upt recolement[en] der vors certificatie

21

dat hy vans saecke anders nyet en weet dan hy voer[noemd]

getuycht en heeft soe wie voirs{voorschreven} certificatie anders

schynt te luyden twelck hy geloeft dat toeghecomen es

by onverstandt want tgoedt twelck in voirs coopscip

Genomen werdt nyet ghebrocht en es binnen delffschehaven

Naer mark wel westen dat zy eeniche goedt twelck zy

Buyt ander cleyn schep genomen hebben tot delffschehaven

ghebrocht hebben maer daer en es hy deposandt nyet

mede gheweest ende nyet meer en weet op alt gevraecht

me sc.t scribere

Lucas janssoen woonende up delffschehaven omtrent xxv

Jaeren beleyt als voeren upt 9e 10

e 11

e 12

e 13

e 14

e

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 34, geen p. nr.

Arlen

vande scriftueren mitgaders upt Recolement der

Voirs certificatie tuycht ende seydt by zyn eede upte

Vans arlen {artikelen| dat hy depsant daer mede gewheest

Es op het paert van mr pieter schoudt van delffschehaven

Upt schip van schipper geryt claessz ind jaere xxxv

Welcke scipper geryt bestelbriefe Hadde vanden

Grave van hoochstraaten terselver tyt stadthouder generael

Van hollandt om den franchoysen die hij upter zee soude

connen becommen te crancen als vyanden doen ter tyt

Vand k mat ende dese zynre mat{majesteits} landen ende alsulcxs

Gedenckt hem wel dat die voerscr scipper geryt met

Hem deposant ende zijn andere gesellen int selve schip

Wesen tot twee off driendertich in getale naer zyn

Onthoudt daer off nu eenighe in zee andere gevaeren

Oost ende andere dese werelt overleden Syn gevaren synde

In een haven van Engelandt genaempt weymuyden

vandaer hebben zien comen vanden ende seylend dwers

over uuyt franckrijk een koopschip bevracht met

cainfaes ende cramerye ende tselve ziende zyn eenighe

van hen lieden tot zess off zeven in getale daer hij deposant

een off was met een boot tselve schip ind wilde zee

buyten allen havenden ende vrydom teghens gevaeren ende

hebben daer jeghens inne geschoten zulcxs dat die

gheene die intvorst schip waer heur Roer verlaetten

ende alsulcxs tselve ship laetten dryffven hebben

upte strange daer zy tselve schip geweldich geworden

zyn ende des anderen daechs zyn daer mede voorts

gevaren in een ander haven van Engelandt gelegen vier

mylen van daer aldaer zy tgoedt int voors schip

bevonden naer zy daer xiiii daghen gelegen hadden

daer nae nyemandt en quam taellen verkocht ende gebuyt

hebben ende maeckten daer of hondert ende thien off elff

croonen daer off deen helft behielt schipper Geryt

ende dandererhelft zyn gesellen ende zeylden voorts naer duynkercken

22

ende van daan wederomme in zee zonder te delffschehaven

te commen houdende heure gevangenen franschoyssen intschip

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 35, geen p. nr.

Ende namen noch drie fransche visschers die sy alle

Drie metten anderen gevangen van tcoopschip tot

Delffschehaven brochten

Seydt voorts upt recolement der voirs

cerificatie dat hy daer van anders nyet van

Weet dan hy hier voeren. keseydt heeft …..

…..

Pieter joosten zijnen woonende tot Delft oudt omtrent xxv

Jaeren beleyt als …. Upt ixxxv [data]

Arlen vanis cristinen suycht ende zeydt by zynen

Elde uptie voirs arlen dat hij deposant met noch

Vyff off zesse andere inlestaere xxxvi lestleden als

Wesende gesellen van schipper geryt gevaren zyn in

Engelandt in een haven genaempt weymuyden ende als

Wesende hebben uuyt vraicherych zien comen zeylen

Een coopschip den scuien schepe mit een boot teghens

Gevaren zyn indie wilde zee buyten alle havenen

Ende vrydom laeten hueven grootschip metten anderen

Luide ghesellen blyffven inden voirs banen ende

Naeckenis tvoors coopschip hebben sterck los

Geschoten zulcxs dat dei in tvoors coopschip

Waerende hebben verlaeten hens roer ende alsulcxs heur

Schop laeten dryffuen up t stranghe daer zy

Tschie schip oeck eensdeeld toestierde ende van daer

Zyn mitt zekieschip tot henen hebbende heur groot schip

Ende huiden medegesellen daer inne wesende zyn gevaeren

In een andere havene van Engelandt geleghen

Omtrent vier mylen van daer sonder dat hy de zelve

Haven by name onthouden heeft …… die lanchen

Conden tyde dattet gheleden es ende mettet zelve

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 36, geen p. nr.

Coopscip luyden ende goedt daer inne wesende inde

Zelve haven gelegen hebbende omtrent xvi daghen

Hebben tvorcs goedt twelck was esamtrye ..cocht

Ende gebuyt als prys ende genomen van vyanden vains

St mat ende dese syne mt landen waervermoghen

Zeechis bestellinghe die schipper coeyt daertoe hadde

Ende hem ende den anderen zynde medegesellen eer zy van

Tlandtstaecken[doorgestreept] voe[rden?] gelesen geweest was van

Welcke goedt zy maeckten gondert ende thien off elff

Croonen ende zyn daer naer gevaren hebbend noch

Hvier off vyff rollen canifaes die zy ongebuyt gelaeten

23

Hadden om nyeuwe zeylen daer off te maecken

Gevaren tot duynhkercken in vlaenderen ende van

Daer wedercome in zee daer zy noch eenighe

Visschers onder vraicheryck vuiyken metten

Welcken ende henre eerste ghevangtuen van

Tcoopschip zy ghecomen[de] zyn uuterzee ende voozts

Tot delffschehaven ende nyet meer ……

Als gebraecht zynde nesret scrvere

Wouter willenss.. van delffschehaven oudtamt..

Xxvi jaren beleyt als voeren upt xie xe xie xiie

Xiiie ende xiiiie arlen vanis scriftueren ..uycht ende

Teydt by synen eede upte vorxs arlen dathy ….

Ins jaere xxxvi uuyt..eniel van schipper geryt

Mitten welcken hy uutgevaeren was in zee mit meer

Andere gesellen tot twee of driendertich toe in

Getaele omid den franchoysen ter zee te beschadigen

Ende te …reyucken naer vermoghen zeeckere bestellyce

Die schipper geryt daer toegagadile ende hem ende de

Anderen voeren ghetesen was eer zy van landen

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 37, geen p. nr.

Staecken gevaeren zynde in een haven in Engelandt

Genoempt weymuyden ende van daer ziende uuyt …

Vranckerych comende een coopschip met noch vyff off zesse

Van zyn medegesellen die zelven scepe in een boot ind

Wilde zee jeghens gevaeren zyn buyten allen havenen

Ende vrydomme ende den scluen schepe naeckende hebben zoe

Geschoten dat die inden selven schip waeren heur roer

Verlaeten hebben zulcxs dat zy tselve schip machtich

Geworden zyn ende zyn dissanderen daechs metten selven

Schepe alle gheleyck gevaen in een andere havene van

Engelandt omtrent vier mylen van daer genaempt

Indewickt ende naer zy daer geleghen hadden omtrent

Xiiii daghen ende nyemandt naer tgoedt ofte luyden in

Voirs schip wesende quam taellen hebben tvoirs goet

Twelck was cramerye verkocht ende underhughe

Gepaert ende gebuyt des prys ende genomen vans francsoyss

Ter zelver tyt vyanden vans keyser ende des zynre mat

Landen laettende ongebuyt vyff off zesse canifaes daer

Zynede gevaren zyn tot duynkercke in vlaenderen daer

Zy lieten nyeuwe zeylen off maecken ende van dae

Weisdime in zee getog…. hebben noch eenighe fransche

visschers gevanghen die welcke zy mitten anderen gevangenen

die zy int voirs coopschip gevanghen hadden ghebracht hebben

tot delffschehaven ende voorts tot delft ende nyet meer

en weet up als gebraecht ….. ….

Andere getuyghen gehourdt inden hage den xxen

24

July anno voors

Duick janssoen woonende tot delffschehaven ondt omto xxix

Jaeren velent als voeren upt ixe xe lxie ende tlescendeel

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 38, geen p. nr.

Vans lxiiie arlen vains screiftveren ..uyckt ende sryt by

Zynen eede up alle die voirs arlen dat hy deposant

Ins daere xxxvi oft daer omtrent naer zyn onthoudt

Mit meer andere scippers mede uuyt gebaeren geweestes

Mit scipper geryt alhier appellant in zee uwe naer …….

Zeeckere bestelureffuen die hy haedt vans grane van

Hoochstraeten als stadthouis gnael van hollandt van sheyss

Weghen die hem die spreeckt ende zyn medeytsellen eer zy

Van landt steecken voor yelesen die franschoysen up die tyt vyand

Skeysers voirs ende des zynre mats nederlanden ende

Alsulcxs gedenckt hem deposant wel dat die voirs

Scipper geryt mit syn schip ende zyne bootsgesellen datr

Hy deposanten off was gevaeren zynde in een haven van

Engelandt genaempt weymuyden hebben zien comen vanden

Uuyt vranckerych een coopvaerder ende alsoe zy met heur

Groot schipsse drae met vloetten en mechten hebben zesse

Ofte zeven van huin medegesellen in een boot ofgevaerdicht

Ende den voirs coopvaerder teghens gesoms wel

Voersen van geschut ende hebben die zelve ghesellen bycomende

Den voirs coopvaerder sulcxs gheschoten dat die

Gheene die int schip waeren ende tsolck twelck by

Inne hadde geweldich gewordden ende dessanderen dachs

Zyn metten zelven coopvaerder ende luyden ende goedt

Twelcke hy in zyn schip hadde voorts gevaeren in een ander

Haven van Engelandt omtrent vier mylen van daer

Gelegen aldaer zy naer zy acht off thien daghen naer zyn

Onthoudt gelegen hadden allt goedt in tvoirs schip wesen

Vercocht ende gebuyttet hebben uuytgesoms twee off drie

Rollen canifaes daer zy gecomen zyn te duynkercken

In vlaenderen een fock ofte zeyl off lietten maecken voer

Hoer schip ende tselve ghedaen hebbende zyn van daer

Andermael in zee gevaeren ende hebben genomen drie

Visschers franchoyssen met die welcke zy met hue zien

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 39, geen p. nr.

Gevanghenen die zy daer te voeren int schip vanden coopvaers

Gevanghen hadden ghecomen zyn tot delffschehaven ende van

Daer voorts tot delft daer eenighe vanden een wyle tyts

Gevanghen laeghen ende nyet meeren weete up als

..ndere tuyge gehoudt ins hage den derden

Octobres anno xxv een en veertich

25

Jacop geryts zynde van delffschehaven ondt …. Xxv jaeren

Beleyt als voeren upt ixe xe xie xiie ende xiiie arlen vains

Scriften mitgais upt recolement van zyn deposicie ins

Voirs certificatie ghedaen tuycht ende zeydt by synen eede

Up alle die ….. alren dat hy deposant vanden inhoude

Vans zelven arlen anders inf zeecker meten weette getuyghen

Dan dat hy deposant als bootsgeselle met meer andere

Bootsgesellen in getaele van zeven ofte achten veertigh

Schip van oorloge van delffschehaven uuytgevaeren es

Mit Geryt claes zijnde van ouderschie appellant als wesen

Capitain vantselve schip enne naervolgende zeeckere

Bestelbrieff den zelven appellant byden Grave van hoochstraten

Dienter tyt stadthouder gnael vanden landen van hollandt

Gegheven die welcke bestelbrieff hy deposant dycwils

Gelesen heeft te creynchen ende te beschadighen den franschoyss

Als wesen ten zelver tyt vyanden vans h mat ende des

Zynen nederlanden ende gevaren zynde tot in Engelandt in

Zeeckere haven genaempt weymuyden hebben zy zien comen

Vaeren uuyt vranckeryche zeeckere schip inde wilde zee in

Tselve ziende es hy deposant met eenighe andere bootsgesellen

Tot zesse off zeven in getaele gegaen in een roeyboot alsoe

Zy heur grootschip soedrae met vloeuck gemaeckten in

Mochten ende syn daer mede int openbaer ende inde wilde zee

Buyten allen havenen van Engelandt tvoors schip an boort

Beroepen van Holland 1123, foto 40, geen p. nr.

Gevallen … es … heur groot schip gevolcht ende

Hebben zoe veele ghedaen dat zy tvoeirs franschoysschip

Geweldich gewordden zyn ende zyn van daen mettetselve

Franchoysschip luyden ende goeden daer inne wesende

Gevaeren in een eylandt van engelandt genaempt eellowicht

In een haven genaempt oermuyt ende ald ghecomen zyn hebben

Deur tlandt laetten hourighen oversteden ende dorpen dat

Wye alsulcks goeden coopen wilden als zy in zeeckere

Franchoysschip als prys genomen hadden die elve daer comen

Souden ende naer zy daer omtrent xiiii daghen gelegen hadden

Ende veelal de voersgoeden in tvoirs schip benodenx cost

Hadden zyn van daer ghereyst in een haven van vlaenderen

Genaempt Duynkercken ende van daer voorst gecomen in

Hollandt tot Delffschehaven daer zy heure gevangenen

Franchoyss ende de rest vans goers vrachten dewelcke

Langen tyt bynnen der stadt van delft gevanghen laeghen

Ende seeckere merckelycken tyt daer nae zyn wedsinie

Gevarende in zee ende worde heul onlancxs daer naek…

Schip affhandich ghemaeckt byden vartoenen in een haven

Van engelandt genaempt Ry ofte de camer

Seydt voorts upt Recolement der voirs cirtificatie

Near hem die wen gelesen was dat tg….onden vandien

26

Warachtiches daer hy alsnoch by blyft ende nyet meer

En weetsn deposant up als ende vraecht ondersont

Gesrreven by my t aros geryt zoon

[handtekeningen]