Public and private orderings in

parking Björn Hasselgren, PhD Arkitektur och samhällsbyggnad VTI Transportforum, 8 januari 2015

Research questions

How can the use of local (off) streets, such as parking

regulation, in cities be effectively managed and organized?

Is it true that public sector governance is the most efficient?

What happens when different governance models collide?

What alternative models might be viable and in which

situations? Spontaneous ordering? Local governance?

Some parking related research

Parking regulation as part of urban planning – standards,

good practices, economic benefits etc (Marsden)

Parking regulation as related to road use and congestion

management (Button)

The balance between regulation and markets (Shoup,

Barter)

Explorations of private ordering-models in parking

(Pennington, Roth, Klein, Levinson)

Public or private goods (common pools)?

Roads and streets

on different geographical levels

Public goods

non-rivalrous, non-excludable, externalities

Private monopoly or association

Public monopoly

Private goods

(rivalrous, excludable)

Market

Public sector provision

Market failure?

Government failure?

Government failure?

Market failure?

Spontaneous order

Centralized planner

Market failure Government

failure

Management models (Hayek, Ostrom)

Coordinated

Un-coordinated

Centralized

knowledge

Individual

knowledge

- Parking

regulated by

public

regulation but

adjusted

through

customs

- New regulation

implemented,

”one size fits

all”

- Customs and

local

spontaneous

order broken

Institutional levels, governance and change (Williamson, similar in Ostrom)

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS – Language, Culture 100 - 1000 y

INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT – Created rules and regulations, politics

10 - 100 y

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION 1-10 y

RESOURCE ALLOCATION – Prices and incentives Continuous

Private and public squares

(Wagner, 1997/2007)

- Private ownership - Collective ownership

- Voluntary - Coercive

- User financing - Tax financing

- Agreement - Regulation

Private

square

Public square

Commercial and Guardian syndromes – and

”monstrous hybrids”

Jane Jacobs

”Systems of Survival”

Commerce Syndrome Guardian Syndrome

• Shun force • Compete • Be efficient • Be open to

inventiveness and novelty

• Use initiative and enterprise

• Come to voluntary agreements

• Respect contracts • Dissent for the sake of

the task • Be industrious • Be thrifty • Invest for productive

purposes • Collaborate easily with

strangers and aliens • Promote comfort and

convenience • Be optimistic • Be honest

• Shun trading • Exert prowess • Be obedient and

disciplined • Adhere to tradition • Respect hierarchy • Be loyal • Take vengeance • Deceive for the sake of

the task • Make rich use of

leisure • Be ostentatious • Dispense largesse • Be exclusive • Show fortitude • Be fatalistic • Treasure honor

Tensions between carriers of guardian and commerce syndromes shape “monstrous moral hybrids”

Different models for organization of the society

Public and private (Levinson, Roth, Foldvary)

Private, Local Private, Corporate

Private

Public

Local National

Private

roads

Streets,

Commons

Motor-

ways

Monstrous hybrids and market failure (or a

possible Coasean bargaining area)? (Jacobs,

Coase)

Efficient

Inefficient

Local National

Public

management

Private

management

?

Incentives aligned?

- From

regulation to

local

management

- Private or

association?

- Possible

revenues

transferred

to local

residents

(Shoup)

Conclusions

How can the use of local streets, such as parking regulation, in

cities be effectively organized? A variety of models according to

the situation are possible.

Is it true that public sector governance is the most efficient? No that

is probably true only for “true” public goods, which might be

scarcer than generally thought of.

What happens when the different governance models collide?

Monstrous hybrids created. Clash of local use and formal

regulation occurs.

What alternative models might be viable and in which situations?

Spontaneous ordering? Local governance? Private ordering,

associations, public sector, corporations.

Björn Hasselgren, PhD

KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Architecture and the Built Environment

+46-70-762 33 16

bjorn.hasselgren@abe.kth.se

www.kth.se/blogs/hasselgren

@HasselgrenB