Pritchard McDowell and the New Evil Genius PDF

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nternational Phenomenological Society

McDowell and the New Evil GeniusAuthor(s): Ram Neta and Duncan PritchardSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Mar., 2007), pp. 381-396Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041049 .Accessed: 14/02/2014 20:14

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McDowell nd the New EvilGeniusRAM NETA

DUNCAN PRITCHARD

Philosophy nd Phenomenological esearchVol. LXXIV No. 2, March 2007 2007 International henomenological ociety

University f North Carolina,ChapelHill

University f Edinburgh

0

Many epistemologists both internalists nd externalists regard theNew Evil Genius Problem (Lehrer & Cohen 1983)as constituting

an important onsideration n favour of (one or another version of)epistemological nternalism, nd as requiring substantial qualifica-tion in (one or another version of) epistemological externalism.According to these epistemologists, or any non-object-dependent

proposition ?, nd for any time /, you cannot be more ustified, t/, in believing hat p than your recently nvatted physical duplicateis.1 In other words, these epistemologists ccept what we call theNew Evil Genius view :

(NEG) The extent o which S is justified t t in believing hatp is just the same as the extent o which 5 s recentlyenvatted uplicate s ustified t t in believing hatp.

Our epistemological ntuitions re supposed to apprise us of the truthof the New Evil Genius view, or (NEG), as we'll henceforth efer o it.(NEG) is widely ccepted both by internalists nd by externalists. n

fact, there have been very few opponents of (NEG). TimothyWilliamson e.g., 2000) rejects NEG), for reasons that have by nowreceived great deal of scrutiny.2 ohn McDowellalso rejects NEG),but his reasons have not received he scrutiny hey deserve. This is inlarge part because those reasons have not been well understood. We

1 We specify hat the duplicate s recently nvatted n order to allow for ameness ofintentional ontent, ven given the truth f standard versions f semantic xternal-ism.

2 For a recent iscussion f Williamson's iew n this regard, ee Joyce 2004).

MCDOWELL AND THE NEW EVIL GENIUS J5l

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believe that McDowell's challenge to (NEG) is important, worthy ffair assessment, nd maybe even correct. n this paper, we explainMcDowell'schallenge o (NEG), and also explain how McDowell can

address seemingly atalobjection o his view.

1We beginby etting ut a bigproblem n understanding cDowell'sview.The problem egins oemerge f we ask: is McDowell an epistemologicalinternalist, r an epistemological xternalist? f course, this questionrequires larification. ontemporary pistemology earswitness o severaldifferent internalism-externalism isputes concerning ustification(nevermindknowledge). or instance, onsider hefollowing hree heses:

(1) S's epistemic ustification or believing hat p is constitutedsolelyby S's mental tates.

(2) 5's epistemic ustification or believing hat p is constitutedsolelyby facts hat S can know by reflection lone.

(3) 5 s epistemic ustification or believing hat p is constitutedsolelyby properties hat S has in common with her recentlyenvatted hysical uplicate.

Each of theses 1), (2), and (3) is a version of internalism. he denialof each of these theses s a version f externalism. nd so there re, itseems, t least three ifferent internalism-externalism isputes.

In fact, here re many more han hree ifferent isputes: fwereplaceis constituted y with supervenes olely upon in theses 1), (2), and

(3),weget three ifferent nternalist heses, ach of which efines notherinternalist-externalist ispute. And we can ring other hanges on (1),

(2), and (3) by, for nstance, eplacing epistemic ustification orbeliev-ing that /? with epistemic easonto believe that /? , r by specifyingthat epistemic ustification s to be understood s propositional, r asdoxastic, ustification, r by specifying hether he ustification t a par-ticular ime / s supposedto be constituted nly by states, acts, r prop-erties t /, nd so on. Byringing uchchanges n (1), (2), and (3),we canspecify iterally undreds f internalist-externalist isputes. Many ofthese disputes re actual, and many of them re not adequately distin-guished rom ne another.

Now parties to such debates have long recognized hat theses 1)and (2) above are logically ndependent neither ntails the other. SeeAlston, 1986,Conee and Feldman, 2001.)But what s not so commonly

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McDowell (1998a)allows, for example, that one's empirical easonfor believing certain external world proposition, ?,might be thatone sees that p is the case. Seeing that s factive, however, n that

seeing that p entails p. However, McDowell also holds that such fac-tive reasons can be nevertheless eflectively ccessible to the agent- indeed, he demands (though not in quite these words) that theybe accessible for they must be able to serve as the agent's reasons.In criticizing what he calls the hybrid conception of knowledge ,McDowell writes:

In the hybrid onception, satisfactory tanding n the space ofreasons s onlypart f what knowledges; truth s an extra equire-ment. o two subjects an be alike n respect f the atisfactorinessof their tanding n the space of reasons, lthough nly one ofthem s a knower, ecause nly n her ase is what he takes o beso actually o. But if its being o is external o her operations nthe spaceof reasons, ow can it not be outside he reach of herrational powers?And if it is outside the reach of her rationalpowers, ow can its being o be the crucial lement n an intelli-gible onception f her knowing hat t is so what makes he rele-vant difference etween er and the other ubject? ts being o isconceiveds external o the only hing hat s supposed o be epis-temologicallyignificant bout the knower erself, er satisfactory

standingn the

paceof reasons.

McDowell, 998a, 03)This passage requires some interpretation. irst, we interpret heexpression outside the reach of [an agent's] rational powers n such away that, for some fact p to be outside the reach of [an agent's]rational powers is for p to be unable to serve as an agent's reasonfor belief. econd, there s a question about why McDowelltakes t tofollow from ?'sbeing outside the reach of an agent's rational powers- and so, on our interpretation, ?'snot being able to serve as anagent's reason for belief that p cannot be an epistemologically ignif-icant feature f the agent herself.

We suggest hat McDowell is willing o make this nference ecausehe holds the following iew:for p to be able to serve s an agent's rea-son for belief, he agent must be able to know that /?, nd know t byreflection lone. Furthermore we take McDowell to hold only whatthe agent can know by reflection lone can be an epistemologically ig-nificant eature f the agent herself. Here is some further extual up-port for this nterpretation f McDowell:

I agreewith Elizabeth ricker] hatwe osethepoint f nvoking hespaceof reasons f we allow omeone o possess justification ven fit s outside is reflectiveeach.McDowell 998b, 18)

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McDowell'sposition learly hallenges hetraditional pistemologicalpicture hat has (R) at its core. On the one hand, t nsists hat he gent(at least the knowledgeable gent) be able reflectively o accessthe factors

that make her ustified n her beliefs. his requirement eems o make hisview nternalist. n the other hand, however, t also demands hat n cer-tain cases one's epistemic tanding requires hat certain outer factsobtain other han the truth f the believed roposition, nd this eems omake his view externalist. nce (R) is rejected, however, hese twoaspects of the view are no longer n conflict. McDowell'sacceptanceofreflectively ccessible factive easons particularly here these reasonsconcern mpirical ropositions entails hat he facts hat one can knowby reflection re not restricted o the inner n this way, nd can instead,

as it were, eachright ut to the external world, o the outer . One hasreflective ccessto facts hat would not obtain of one's recently nvattedduplicate, n McDowell'spicture. f this s correct, t suggests hat thepopular epistemological istinction etween inner and outer whichderives from R) should be rejected, r at least our understanding f itshould be radically evised.

It is their prior commitment o (R) that has ensured thatcommentators n McDowell'sposition have failed fully o engagewithhis view. For example,when Crispin Wright 2002)reads McDowell,he

doesn't akethe factivity f empirical easons eriously, nly hereflectiveaccessrequirement. ccordingly, n his reading, what one has reflectiveaccess to are simplynon-factive mpirical easons, nd thus McDowellends up offering fairly amiliar orm f epistemic nternalism. n partic-ular, Wright rgues that, trictly peaking, he grounds hat are reflec-tively ccessible to one are not factive mpirical reasons, but ratherdisjunctive easons of the following eneral form in the case of seeingthat): ither ne sees that ?, r one is in a delusional tate. Naturally, hisdisjunction oes not entail ny empirical act, incefor heentailment ofollowone would first eed to be able to

dischargehe second

disjunct,something hichWright hinks s impossible ecause of the possibility fsceptical cenarioswhich re ndistinguishable rom veryday ife.On thisreading, hen,McDowell is ust a classical nternalist hoemphasizes heimportance of reflectively ccessible reasons without allowing suchreflective ccessto apply to factive mpirical easons.3

3 We think hat the presence f the scepticalproblem here confuses he issue, sinceeven f one grants hat one could have reflective ccess to factive mpirical easons,it is a further uestion whether his concession enables McDowell to adequately

respond o the scepticalproblem. Accordingly, y running he two ssues together tcan seem that the problem s the existence f reflectively ccessiblefactive mpiricalreasons, rather han the applicability f such reasons to the scepticalproblem. Foran argument gainst a McDowellianemployment f empirical factive reasons inresponse o the sceptical roblem, ee Pritchard 2003).




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In contrast, prior commitment o (R) has prompted others toregard McDowell as offering straightforward ersion of epistemicexternalism. ohn Greco (2004), for example, takes McDowell's dis-

cussion of the factivity f reasons seriously but downplays, as aresult, his claim that such reasons can be reflectively ccessible. Con-sider the following assage:

According o McDowell,genuineperception ives one a satisfactorystanding n the space or reasons, whereas mere llusiondoes not. Inother words, genuine erception, ut not llusion, ivesrise to positiveepistemic tatus. But on McDowell's view, the difference etweengenuine perception nd mere llusion s not something hat s know-able by introspection lone. Hence, McDowell's view entails EE

[epistemic xternalism].Greco, 2004,8)

Although Greco is right o suggest hat McDowell does not think hatone can tell, ust by introspection, hat one is the victim f a radicalscepticalhypothesis, e is wrong to think hat on McDowell's view ittherefore ollows hat ometimes ne's knowledge,where t s supportedby a factive empirical reason, must also be supported by furthernon-reflectively ccessiblefacts. nstead, McDowell's thesis s that allthat s required for knowledge n these cases is that one forms ne'sbelief n the

target ropositionn the basis of one's

(possessionof

the)reflectively ccessiblefactive eason.4As with Wright's iscussion f McDowell,(R) is lurking n the back-

ground here. Greco's guiding thought seems to be that since onecannot tell the difference etween ossessing factive mpirical easonand merely eeming o possesssuch a reason perhaps becauseone hasbeen radically eceived), t follows hat the epistemic tanding f one'sbelief rests upon the combination f what is reflectively ccessible thedisjunctive roposition hat one is either, ay, seeing that p or in adelusional state)

plusthe relevant non-reflectively ccessible fact

obtaining that one is not in a delusional tate). Whereas Wright akesMcDowell's demands for reflectively ccessible empirical reasonsseriously, nd thus downplays he factive dimension f these reasons,Greco takes the factivity f the reasons at face value and therefore

4 Of course, t has to be the case and will be the case, if she has the relevant nowl-edge that the agent s not in a delusional tate, but the point s that the obtainingof this fact, while entailed by the agent's knowledge, s not a pre-requisite f the

agent's knowledge ut merely logical consequenceof it. That

is,one can know

that p simply n virtue f being n the possessionof a reflective ccessible factivereason for p and believing on this basis that the existence f this knowledgeentails further acts hat are not reflectively ccessible o the subject does not showthat this knowledge ests n further on-reflectivelyccessiblefacts.

MCDOWELLAND THE NEW EVIL GENIUS387



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holds that for McDowell the epistemic tanding of one's true beliefrests n further on-reflectivelyccessiblefacts btaining.

On neither reading, however, do we accurately capture

McDowell's view, and this is because McDowell rejects R). If weare to evaluate McDowell's position t is essential hat we notice thisfeature f his view.

2

So, as we read him, McDowellaccepts 1) and (2), but he rejects R),(3), and (NEG). We take it that one key worry hat commentatorsmay have about McDowell's grounds for rejecting R)- a worrywhich may prompt them to suppose that McDowell can't possiblyhold the position that, in fact, he does hold is that McDowell'sgrounds for rejecting R) seem to generate counterintuitive esult,one that mirrors he much discussed McKinsey-style eductio f thecombination f a standard version f content xternalism nd the the-sis that we have privileged access to the contents of our ownthoughts.5 howing that this counterintuitive esult does not followfrom McDowell's view should therefore e useful in helping manyepistemologists o take his position more seriously. n this section,we will first xplain McDowell's grounds for rejecting R), and thenwe will set out the counterintuitive cKinsey-like esult hat may bethought o follow from hosegrounds.

So, first, what are McDowell's grounds for rejecting R)? Consid-er again the contention that one's reasons are always reflectivelyaccessible to one. The natural way to interpret his claim is assaying that one is always in a position to know, by using onlyone's reflective apacities, uch as introspection nd a priori reasoning,what one's reasons are. Call this the reflective ccessibility f reasonsthesis:

(RAR) One is in a position to know, by using only one'sreflective apacities, what one's reasons are for believ-ing that p.

This thesis s quite popular. What is unusual s McDowell's conjoining(RAR) with he claim that there xist factive mpirical easons, uch asthat one sees that/?. all this the activity f reasons hesis:

5 See McKinsey 1991).For a collection f recent rticles n this reductio, ee Nucce-telli 2003).




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Intuitively, owever, this cannot be the case; how could one evercome to know, by reflection lone, facts about the external world? tseems that one cannot accept both (RAR) and (FAR), on pain of

absurdity. t is no wonder, then, that those who read McDowelldo not take his endorsement f both (RAR) and (FAR) at facevalue and instead treat him as emphasising he one thesis over theother.

3McDowell can rebut this objection. Notice that the conclusion wejust argued for is counterintuitive nly if the agent concernedis acquiring knowledge of the external world via reflection. f,for example, we could show that the agent could gain her reflec-tive knowledge of her own reasons only provided she already hadempirical knowledge of the relevant bit of the external world, thenthis would disarm the argument bove. Rather than being a reductioof McDowell's view, the argument ould be understood s showingthat if one already has empirical knowledge of the external world,then one is able to discover by reflection hat one has suchknowledge. But there is nothing obviously absurd about thatconclusion.

There is one reading of McDowell (though not one that weendorse, as we explain below) on which this way of disarming heproblem s directly vailable. According o this reading offered, orexample, by Barry Stroud 2002) it is part of McDowell's view thatif one is in possessionof a reason for believing then this will itselfentail that one has the belief hat p. Accordingly, ince nothing moreis required for knowledge hat p on the McDowellian view than thefactive reason for p and the belief, on this basis, that /?, t followsdirectly from the possession of the factive reason for p that oneknows p.

It ought to be clear that on this reading f McDowell he can evadethe counterintuitive onclusion of the argument above. After all,according o this nterpretation, o say that one can know by reflectionthat one is in possessionof a factive mpirical eason s tantamount osaying that one can come to know by reflection hat one is in posses-sion of empirical knowledge f the proposition which this reason is afactive eason for believing. f that s right, hen t certainly an't bethe case that one can use this reflective ccess in order to acquirereflective nowledge of the target empirical proposition, ince thereflective ccess to the reason already presupposes heempirical nowl-edge in question.

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In other words, ssume that one is able to know by reflection lonethat one is in possession f a factive mpirical eason:

(p) OKAP(R (p))One cannot be in a position to know by reflection hat something sthe case if it isn't the case, so it directly ollowsthat one must be inpossession f a factive mpirical eason:

(q) R (P)

On the view under consideration, owever, ne cannot have a factive

reason for believing without elieving on its basis:(r) B (p)

And since there s nothing more to knowledge on McDowell's viewthan the possession of a factive reason and the relevant belief(formed on this basis), it follows that one must have empiricalknowledge which we will abbreviate as 4K') of the target proposi-tion:

(s) K (p)

Accordingly, ne cannot come to know an empirical proposition byreflection lone, since n order to have reflective ccess to the fact thatone is in possession of the relevant active mpirical reason, t mustalready be the case that one has empirical knowledge f that proposi-tion. We can make this point explicit by employing onditional ntro-duction o derive t):

(t)OKAp(R(p)) -> K(p)

In words, f one is in a position to know by reflection hat one is inpossessionof a factive mpirical eason for /?, hen one has empiricalknowledge hat p. Of course it doesn't follow from his that one canacquire knowledge hatp by reflection lone.

4

There areproblems

for such areading

ofMcDowell, however,

forwithout gap between ne's factive easons and one's (knowledgeablyheld) belief, t is hard to understand ne's factive reasons as one'sreasons for one's (knowledgeably eld) belief, rather han ust being

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equivalent o one's knowledgeably eld belief.6 n any case, McDowell'sview is clearly that one can be in possession of a factive mpiricalreason for believing proposition nd yet not believe that proposition

(see, for example, McDowell,2002, 277-8).Given that this s the case,we need to see if there's nother way to block the seemingly ounter-intuitive onsequence f the conjunction f RAR) and (FAR).

The resolution f this problem ies in the fact that n order for theagent n our exampleabove to make the nference o the conclusion ?,she willneed to form he belief hat (if she has not already formed t nadvance of the nference). his, n combinationwith her possession f afactive mpirical eason for believing hat /?, nd her forming er beliefthat rationally n the basis of that reason,willguarantee hat ur agent

meets ll the conditions or mpirical nowledge hatp. Again, then, wecan show that, ven f the agent does acquire knowledge f the externalworld by going hrough heprocess f reflecting pon her factive easonsand making the necessary nferences, he knowledge hat she therebygains s empirical.An agent who performs heMcKinsey-style nferencein question atisfies ufficient onditions orhaving mpirical nowledgeof the onclusion, ven f t happens o be causallyrelevant o her gainingthat mpirical nowledge hat he engaged n some reflection.

To elaborate: suppose that our protagonist has gained reflective

knowledge which we will abbreviate s 4Kap) that she is in possessionof a factive empirical reason for believing /?, and has also gainedreflective nowledge f the relevant ntailment:

(a) KAP R (/?))

(b) KAP R (p) -* p)

Theproblematic

nference owimmediately

ollows:

(c) KAP p)

6 Suppose, for example, that one says that one knows a certain proposition, ?, ndone is asked, How do you know pT. Although here s a sense n which aying nresponse o this, can see that p\ is a little ike simply e-iterating hat one knows/?, note that this assertion oes add further nformation namely, hat you gainedthe knowledgevia your sight. Furthermore, his nformation bout the source of

your knowledge lso appeals to a certain pedigree of the knowledge dependingupon the proposition t issue, eeing hatp can be a better way of coming o knowthat p than, ay, hearing hatp. Thus, the citing f a factive eason s normally eenas offering pistemic upport for a knowledge laim, rather han simply epeatingthat laim n a different orm.

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(g) (KAP R (p)) & KAP R {p) -> p)) -> K (p)

But it follows from this that, on the present interpretation f

McDowell's view, one does not acquire knowledge of the externalworld by reflection lone. That's because the conditions that arenecessary for one to make an inference f the McKinsey-like ormdescribed bove are also sufficient or one to possess such knowledgeempirically. o either one makes the McKinsey-style nference, nwhich case one satisfies ufficient onditions for possessing mpiricalknowledge f the truth f the conclusion; or one does not make theMcKinsey-style nference, n which case one does not gain knowledgeof the truth of the conclusion by reflection lone. Either way, on

McDowell's view one cannot gain knowledge of the external worldby reflection lone.

5In summary, many ontemporary pistemologists ould accept that thefollowing wo-stage nference s truth-preserving:

(2) 5 s epistemic ustification or believing hat p is constitutedsolelyby facts hat S can know by reflection lone.

(R) The only facts hat S can know by reflection lone are factsthat would also obtain n S s recently nvatted uplicate.

(3) S s epistemic ustification or believing hat p is constitutedsolelyby properties hat S has in common with her recentlyenvatted uplicate.

(NEG) The extent o which S is justified t t in believing hatp is just the same as the extent o which S s recentlyenvatted uplicate s ustified t t in believing hatp.

Thus, they assume that anyone who accepts (2) must accept (NEG).But this s not so. McDowellaccepts 2), and is in this sense an inter-nalist, but he rejects R), (3), and (NEG), and therefore lso rejects(NEC) Why does McDowell reject R)? Because its denial is entailedby the conjunction f RAR) and (FAR).

This conjunction has been thought o lead to an absurd result. Aswe have argued, however, n either reading of McDowell the absurdresult hat's been allegedto followfrom he conjunction f (RAR) and




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(FAR) in fact does not follow from hat conjunction. f we are rightthat this counterintuitive esult has prompted commentators ot totake McDowell's avowed epistemological iew seriously, hen showing

that these wo theses do not generate hisproblem hould go some waytowards howing hat McDowell offers coherent lternative o stan-dard forms f internalism nd also to standard orms f externalism.8

8 Thanks to Michael Brady, Jessica Brown, Sandy Goldberg, Adrian Haddock, andAlan Millar for discussion f issues related o the topic of this rticle. Thanks alsoto two anonymous eferees.

ReferencesAlston, W. (1986).'Internalism nd Externalism n Epistemology'. hi-

losophicalTopics 14, 179-221.Conee, E. and Feldman, R. (2001). 'Internalism Defended', In: H.

Kornblith, (ed.). Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism.Oxford: Blackwell, p. 231-60.

Greco, J. (2004). 'Externalism nd Skepticism'. n: R. Shantz, (ed.).The Externalist hallenge:New Studies on Cognition nd Intention-ality. New York: de Gruyter.

Joyce, J. (2004). 'Williamson n Evidence and Knowledge', Philosoph-ical Books45, 296-305.

Lehrer, K. and Cohen, S. (1983).'Justification, ruth, nd Coherence',Synthese 5, 191-207.

McDowell, J. (1998a). 'Knowledgeand the Internal', Meaning Know-ledge, nd Reality, ondon: Harvard University ress, pp. 395-413.

McDowell, J. (1998b). 'Knowledge by Hearsay', Meaning, Knowledgeand Reality, ondon : Harvard University ress, pp. 414-43.

McDowell, J. (2002). 'Responses'. In: N. H. Smith, ed.). ReadingMcDowell:On Mind and World, ondon: Routledge, p. 269-305.

McKinsey, M. (1991).'Anti-Individualism nd PrivilegedAccess', Ana-lysis5\, 9-16.

Nuccetelli S , (ed.). (2003). New Essays on Semantic Externalism ndSelf-KnowledgeCambridge,Massachusetts:MIT Press.

Pritchard, D. H. (2003). 'McDowell on Reasons, Externalism ndScepticism'. uropeanJournal f Philosophy 1,273-94.

Stroud, B. (2002). 'Sense-Experience nd the Grounding of Thought'In: N. H. Smith, ed.). Reading McDowell:On Mind and World,London: Routledge, p. 79-91.

Williamson, T. (2000). 'Scepticism and Evidence'. Philosophy ndPhenomenological esearch 0, 613-28.

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Wright, . (2002). '(Anti-) Skeptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Mooreand John McDowell'. Philosophy nd Phenomenological esearch65, 331-49.


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