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Perspektiven der A nalytischen Philosophie

Neue Folge

Herausgegeben von Georg Meggle und Julian Nida-Rümelin



Gerhard Preyer • Georg Peter (eds.)

The Contextualization

of Rationality

Problems, Concepts and I i eories of Rationality

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INTRODUCTION:

PROBLEMS, CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF RATIONALITY

In contemporary philosophy and social science the features of rationality

play a new significant role in the theory of mind, language, action, decision

theory and in questions of cross-cultural understanding. The approaches

do not conceive of rationality as a subjective a priori principle of reason-

ing; they present a different attitude towards questions of conceptualizing

rationality, and this is a first step towards contextualized understanding of

rationality. We can only grasp what rationality means in this way. Ratio-

nality is not given but is rather a result of our conceptualizing and a matter

of contextualization, and this is also a question of rationalization of means

for our personal and our collective goals.

Concepts of rationality play in particular a significant role in the philos-

ophy and theory of language and science advocated by Willard van Orman

Quine and Donald Davidson as well as in the theory of decision, action

and collective goals. The naturalization of epistemology and rationality

and Davidson's theory of interpretation are, however, not witliout their

critics. There are doubts about the Quineian paradigm and Davidson'sreceived view of interpretation as a conceptualization of the intelligible

redescription of behavior according to normative standards of truth. Some

epistemologists do not agree with Quine's naturalism and his commitment

to instrumental rationality as an overall epistemic normativity. Decision-

and game theory as a conceptualization of rational choice serve as para-

digms for their picture of a rational agent. But this paradigm comes up

against limiting factors: the social stance and rational collective goals are

contexts which are not reducible to the features of individual intentionsand endeavors. Therefore, we need a conceptualization of rationality

which allows us to understand social context and rational collective do-

ings.

Traditionally conceived, rational action is action founded on reasons.

Reasons involve the propositional attitudes — beliefs, desires, intentions,

and the like. Davidson's theory of radical interpretation plays a significant

role in the theory of speech, meaning, and action today. On this account

for successful interpretation it is necessary to presuppose that the network

of beliefs of any speaker, who is to be interpreted, is — in a minimal sense

— consistent and coherent. This assumption follows directly from the

holistic nature of beliefs. If our ascription of beliefs to people is successful,

it must be possible to redescribe their utterances on the basis of the ascrip-

tion of a minimal consistent set of beliefs. On this account there is an



Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter

interconnection between charity and rationality, so that an agent's posses-

sion of propositional attitudes is a matter of that agent's being interpret-

able in a particular way. Such a view accounts for the propositional con-

tent of the attitudes, but threatens to undercut their causal and explanatoryroles.John Heil, following Davidson's theory of interpretation, examines

Davidson's so-called received view of interpretation in "The Propositional

Attitudes" and investigates the Suggestion that the explanatory value of

appeals to propositional attitudes is best understood in the analogy with

measurement systems. He argues that, despite appearances to the contrary,

this conception of the propositional attitudes can be reconciled with the

idea that reasons are causes.

Davidson's theory of interpretation is based on the principle of charityand the assumption that rationality is a normative concept. On what has

become the received view of this principle, charity is a fundamental meth-

odological constraint on interpretation, namely, that we find people's

intentional states patterned in ways that are characterized by norms of

rationality. The basic notion of epistemic rationality arising in much natu-

ralized epistemology is that the cognitive processes through which our set

of beliefs are generated and maintained are truth-oriented. David K.

Henderson argues in "Epistemic Rationality, Epistemic Motivation and

Interpretative Charity" that this recommended use of normative principles

of rationality to inform intentional description is epistemically unmoti-

vated. To say that the received view lacks epistemic motivation is to say

that to interpret as recommended would be epistemically irresponsible

and, in important respects irrational. On the alternative that Henderson

proposes descriptive psychological generalizations are what properly

inform us about interpretation. One can readily understand the epistemic

motivations for so interpreting, for they are the familiar reasons for in-

forming description with background descriptive information. So a "prin-

ciple of explicability" must be introduced. No parallel motivation for the

received view seems possible. In the context of the contributions of Heil

and Hendersen, Gerhard Preyer analyzes the relationship between radical

interpretation of linguistic behavior and Davidson's move to a distal the-

ory of meaning and cognition. He argues that there is an intrinsic relation-

ship between Davidson's conception of language and the ascription and

individuation of elementary propositional attitudes in the triangulation of

speaker, interpreter and the world, given by distal causation. In passing, he

gives an outline of Davidson's philosophy. But he shows in a further step

that for the redescription of utterances we require a broader frame of

reference in order to make behavior intelligible, and — following

Henderson in some points — to treat rationality as a normative concept.



Introduction: Problems, Concepts and Theories of Rationality

Indeed, it is a problematic notion. However, the question of how much ra-

tionality we need for understanding speech acts, actions and intentionality

still remains. So we are moving toward a radical contextualism.

There has been intensive and extensive debates on whether intentio-

nality requires rationality and, if so, what kind of rationality. The leading

problem in these debates is Stephan Stich's question "How much rational-

ity is required for intentional description". He argues in his book The

Fragmentation of Reason that certain passages of Quine's Word and Ob-

ject are the source of what he calls "the conceptual argument". This argu-

ment claims there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and

rationality: intentionality requires rationality. Stich rejects the idea that

intentionality requires either perfect or fixed bridgehead rationality, but heconcedes that it requires minimal rationality. After explaining Stich's

position and a criticisnm of it offered by John Biro and Kirk Ludwig, Roger

F. Gibson sketches an alternative to the conceptual argument in "Stich on

Intentionality and Rationality". The alternative developed by Gibson

claims that rationality requires psychological plausibility and/or smooth-

ness of communication, not intentionality. However, these are contextual

features making attitudes intelligible by redescription.

Quine has argued that there is nothing like a Cartesian epistemology.Our scientific knowledgc has no foundation beyond our standards and

techniques of natural science and the hard core of logic. In the view of

Quine, our descriptions of behavior give us all the significant criteria about

the meaning of the sentences of natural speakers there are. This sort of

behaviorism is not accepted by Davidson. Debates about the role of this

scientific epistemology play a central role in recent theorizing about ratio-

nality. Paul K Moser and David Yandell argue in "Against Naturalizing

Rationality" that recent obituaries for traditional non-naturalistic ap-

proaches to rationality are not only premature but demonstrably self-

defeating. One prominent obituary appears in the writings of Quine,

whose pessimism about traditional epistemology stems from his scientism,

the view that the natural sciences have a monopoly on legitimate theoreti-

cal explanation. Quine also offers an obituary for the a priori constraints

on rationality found in "first philosophy" and rests on his rejection of the

"pernicious mentalism" of semantic theories of meaning. Quine's pro-

nouncements of the death of traditional rationality conceptions in episte-

mology and in the theory of meaning are premature, because his own

suggestions are self-defeating. In addition, Quine's naturalistic epistemol-

ogy is subject to damaging skeptical worries which cannot be escaped by

ignoring them. A non-naturalistic approach to rationality is here to stay,

whether friends of Quine's naturalism like it or not. Any sweeping claim



10erhard Preyer, Georg Peter

that non-naturalistic accounts of rationality are dead will face insurmount-

able obstacles in unavoidable questions about its own rational justification.

Such questions will keep non-naturalistic epistemology and first philoso-

phy alive for ever, or at least as long as philosophers endure.

Advocates of naturalized epistemology who wish to secure epistemol-

ogy's normativity want normativity to be restricted to instrumental con-

cerns, because these can be understood naturalistically. On the contrary, in

the view of Harvey Siegel in "Naturalism, Instrumental Rationality and

t he Normativity of Epistemology" epistemic normativity cannot be so

limited. A `categorical' type of normativity must be acknowledged. Natu-

ralism can neither account for nor do away with this sort of normativity.

Hence naturalism is at best a seriously incomplete and therefore inade-quate meta-epistemological position. A comprehensively naturalistic

account concerning epistemic rationality and normativity cannot be devel-

oped from within the confines of naturalism.

Ascribing actions on the base of redescription of behavior, we presup-

pose propositional attitudes, intentions and goal-orientations of an actor

and also reasons for his doings in order to make his behavior intelligible.

We conceptualize these reasons with the main connecting thread: What

would it be rational to bring about or make happen? But what is the na-ture of intention and of rational intention in particular? The answer to

these questions deals with the connections among our beliefs and our will

to do something, reasons for action and forming an intention. In analytical

philosophy of action the classical problem has been to spell out the rela-

tionship between intention, forming an intention, intentional action and

reasons. G. Kavka's toxin puzzle has spawned a lively literature about the

nature of intention. In "Rational Intentions and the Toxin Puzzle" A.R.

Mele provides a critique of two recent responses to the puzzle that focus

on the connection between rationally forming an intention to A and ratio-

nally A-ing, one by D. Gauthier and the other by E. McClennen. It also

critically assesses the two main morals Kavka takes reflection on the puz-

zle to support, morals about the nature of intention and the consequences

of a divergence between "reasons for intending and reasons for acting".

The toxin puzzle shows that the conceptual connection between intention

and intentional action, i.e. the traditional account `S intends to A' entails `S

believes he will A' and `S intentionally A-ed' entails `S intended to A', is

not so clear as it is often taken to be. Mele's conceptualization of the

relationship between intention and action explains the role of reason and

rationality in forming an intention to do something.

Our understanding of actions, communicative acts and connections is

not result of the naturalization of behavior or stimulus meaning given by



Introduction: Problems, Concepts and Theories of Rationality

otlier people. Naturalized epistemology fails to conceptualize social com-

munication. The social area has its own structure. Especially, human actors

can not alter this structure. Being rational in social doings requires concep-

tualizations of social stance and orientations in social action systems. The

fundamental question about conceptualizing rationality in the context of

social stance is: Is the object-level of social order, social norms and values

reducible to individual rationality and intentions?

Peter Gärdenfors introduces in "The Social Stance" the notion of a

social Intention, which is an Intention that cannot be replaced by individ-

ual intent. The assumption of such intentions is helpful for understanding

language and other social conventions. He also discusses the relation

between social intentions and social valuucs. Gärdenfors argues — followingP. Pettit — that to recognize a social Intention we presuppose "con-

textualism" in order to explain behavior. He elaborates the concept of the

social so as not to reduce it to individual Intention. In his critic of C. Tay-

lor's concept of "irreducibly social goods", he distinguishes between the

"content" and "value" of these goods. The key to his critic is that the

accepting of social goods with irreducibly social "content" do not imply

the irreducibility of values.

The standard view of rationality distinguishes between instrumentalrationality and the rationality of ends. T. Airaksinen and K. Kaalikoski

discuss this conception briefly before introducing an alternative theory.

According to this conception, means and ends are interconnected so that

the means will produce the ends. In other words, the means are used to

shape our ends. The authors describe and discuss this view, asking whether

it can be called rationality. It is clear that this alternative view has many

irrational features. But at the same time, it is clear that much of our tech-

nological culture is based an this view so that it, too, is hampered by

emerging irrationality. Airaksinen and Kaalikoski conclude by discussing

the case of genetic engineering as a technology they cannot possibly ac-

cept. Its characteristic ends may be of the wrong sort.

Constructions of social stance require an analysis of rational coopera-

tion. The classical analysis of the Prisoner Dilemma cannot resolve this

problem in the view of the fact that participants of cooperation are prison-

ers of their own orientations and conceptions of individual rationality.

Typically ethicists try to convince us that both collectively and individu-

ally we will be better off in the Jong run if we each adopt cooperative

strategies despite the temptations of immediate profit offered by straight-

forward maximization policies. After reworking the notion of "straight-

forward maximizer" so that it makes sense to say that I may sometimes

have rationally good reasons to perform actions that do not in the circum-




stances, taken individually, maximize mny utility as lang as the best-for-me,

accessible-to-me possible world is realized. One is able to show why it is

the rase that in social interactions which mirror iterated Prisoner's Dilem-

mas the constraints of ethics on straightforward maximization are redun-

dant.

R. Tuomela elaborates a new way of understanding rationality in social

context. He argues in "Rational Cooperation and Collective Goals" that

full-blown cooperation requires collective goals in a strong sense, ones

which satisfy the "Collectivity Condition". According to this condition, a

collective goal is one which is satisfied iiecessarily, due to the goal-holder's

acceptance of the goal as their collective goal. It is satisfied for all goal-

holders, if it is satisfied for one. Not only collective goals but also othergroup-factors — such as possibly institutional "group-mode" preferences

and utilities — are relevant for rational cooperative solutions of collective

action dilemmas. Tuomela's concept for analyzing rational cooperation is

the "notion of `strictly' rational action" as a normative notion and not a

sort of prudential reasoning. The concept of "collective reasons" and the

acceptance of collective goals are significant for this account. The point is

that social norms and values are not to be analyzed on the base of individ-

ual Utility. Tuomela introduces the concept of "comprehensive rationality"as a link between the maximization of utility for private goals and collec-

tive goals, and preferences. Individual rationality — intentions, attitudes,

and goals — reflects the membership conditions of a person's group and

society.

The "Why be moral?" problem has been one of the more persistent

problems of ethics. The problem is typically posed as a conflict between

what is straightforwardly maximal for a person to do in specific circum-

stances and what is recommended by the principles or rules of ethics,

usually what is communally optimal, in those circumstances. The policy of

straightforward maximization that P. French in "Rationality and Ethics"

defends is more flexible that of cooperation. It reaps the benefits of coop-

eration when they are to be had and avoids the disasters of cooperation

that lurk in every encounter one has with potentially treacherous strang-

ers. Where the policy of straightforward maximization departs from ethi-

cal choice, French argues that it does so because making that choice would

be sacrificial or supererogatory, even from the moral point of view. Acting

ethically by constraining one's straightforward maximninization cannot

therefore be rationally justified. So, we must conclude, there is a plurality

of good reasons for action. An adequate theory of practical rationality has

to be compatible with it even if it requires certain modifications of our

everyday reasoning. Usual theories of practical rationality do not pass this



Introduction: Problems, Concepts and Theories of Rationality3test. It is envisaged how to revise adequately our understanding of practi-

cal rationality. Julian Nida-Rümelin gives in "The Plurality of Good

Reasons and the Theory of Practical Rationality" a sketch of a „structural

theory of rationality" with the intent to criticize the consequentialism in

the theory of decision and in moral thinking. He presents different struc-

tural types of reasons like such from obligations, principles etc. with the

aim to show that a normative concept of rationality integrates the plurality

of good reasons in his theoretical framework. Nida-Rümelin shows that

our cooperative reasons for acting are essential non-consequential reasons,

and this concept of reasons is not only to apply on circumstances of com-

munication but also on the coordination of single Person plans and goal-

orientations.Rational explanation is the sort of explanation we practice when we try

to make intentional sense of a person's attitudes and actions. We may

postulate various obstacles to rationality in the course of offering such

explanations but the point of the exercise is generally to present the indi-

vidual as a more or less rational subject: as a subject who, within the con-

straints of the obstacles postulated — and they can be quite severe — dis-

plays a rational pattern of attitude — formation and decision-making. Philip

Pettit, in "Tllree Aspects of Rational Explanations", wants to draw atten-tion to three distinct, and progressively more specific, aspects of such

rational explanation. He does so, because he believes that they have not

always been sufficiently distinguished. The firnt aspect of rational explana-

tion is that it is a programming variety of explanation, the second aspect is

that it is a normalizing kind of explanation, and the third is that it is a

variety of interpretation: if you like, it is a hermeneutic form of explana-

tion, and this is a matter of contextualization of rationality. Conceptual-

ization of rationality depends on the reasons we have for accepting and

preferring what we do. But where do reasons come from? What makes

what I accept a reason for a conclusion or what I prefer a reason for ac-

tion? Keith Lehrer claimed in Knowledge (1974) that knowledge entails

belief. But he argued in "The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowl-

edge" (1979), in Justification and Knowledge, G.S. Pappas (ed.), that this is

mistaken: knowledge entails acceptance, which he explicates in terms of

competition. Lehrer claims that with tlse distinction between acceptance

and believing a causal theory of knowledge is invalidated. In a further step

Lehrer explains in "Rationality and Trustworthiness" where reasons come

from without postulations or regress. The explanation relies on our trust-

worthiness combined with our acceptance of it and our preference for it.

The explanation reveals that theoretical and practical reason are inter-

twined in a loop of trustworthiness concerning what we accept, what we




prefer and how we reason. The loop is the basis of our rationality. But

trustworthiness is no naturalistic conception, it brings a dynamic aspect

itito the theory of knowledge. These features are aspects of social context

because people's changing what they accept is a precondition of evaluation

trustworthiness, and preferences of others.

Most debates in philosophy about the concept of rationality might be

primarily characterized as discussions about justified single person beliefs.

Thus, in this context rationality has been characterized epistemologically.

By contrast, other debates have dealt with the problem of justification of

illocutionary acts within the concept of the entire communicative situation

as context. Alexander Ulfig examines the conception of justification devel-

oped by Herbert Schnädelbach (1977), following Paul Taylor. In Ulfig'sview, there is a fundamental distinction between justifications in everyday-

life and a theoretical level of justification, so-called discoursive justifica-

tion. Ulfig discusses the hierarchy of justifications provided by

Schnädelbach and evaluates it in a semantic perspective. The hierarchy of

justifications ends an the level of rational choice of our way of life as the

only ultimate point of view of evaluation "rationality".

Nicholas Rescher (1988) has developed a overall theory of rationality

and argues that the problem of the "unity of reason" lies in its intercon-nectedness with the inherent normativity of rationality. But the project of

inquiry into the nature's modus operandi faces extensive and deep-rooted

dlifficulties. Rationality consists in the intelligent pursuit of appropriate

ends. In "Reason and Reality" Rescher identifies four major problems in

particular. First the data undetermine theories, secondly the theories

undetermine facts, thirdly the reality transcendends the descriptive re-

sources of language, and fourthly reality transcendends the explanatory

resources of language. For Rescher the lesson of these deliberations is not

the skeptical despair but a healthy dose of cognitive humility. In pursuing

the aims of science we can expect improvement but not completion:

Rescher's conclusion is that deeply we pursue our inquiries into nature, we

cannot get to the bottom of things.

As main questions for conceptualizing rationality we propose: why

should our redescriptions of linguistic behavior according to normative

standards be truth- or acceptance-oriented? Why all beli.efers have to

conform to normative standards? Why is constitutive rationality the essen-

tial feature of all epistemic rationality and rational collective goals? In

general, epistemic and social norms are correct, if cognitive and social

activities lead to success in epistemic and collective goal-orientations. But

this is not a intrinsic property of beliefs and social goals but a matter of



lntroduction: Problems, Concepts and Theories of Rationality5selection, a natural or social one, regarding the confirmation of beliefs and

actions in different contexts.

The results of our project on rationality show in this reader: rationality

is poly-contextual and a question of conceptualization. Its core is not to besought an ontology of human beings but in the features of consistence and

coherence of attitudes, methods, and rational — also collective — goals. The

evaluation of individual and collective goal-orientations is not to decide

with the theory of consequentialism as paradigm of a rational agent. The

result is: there is not an overall theory of rationality. It is to develop a

theoretical framework to debate the plurality of good reasons. But the

links between the features of rationality are not simply given. We must

construct them with standards which stem from our own (ethnocentric)understanding of rational methods and goals. However, it is a mistake to

believe that the conceptualizing is exclusively based on individual purposes

and goals; it is also rooted in the context of non-reductive social stance.

People in a polycontextual world are not familiar with all contexts. Conse-

quently, all idealizations break down insofar as rationality is a matter of

contextual features. The world may be an unmarked space (N. Luhmann)

but all recognition of distal stimuli and all redescriptions of behavior make

context distinctions. In everyday life there is enough evidence that weexpect both: rationality and irrationality. It may be not desirable in our

western community, but at the saure time inconsistency is often the price

paid for more and new information.

The project on rationality was initiated and planned by the research

project Protosociology, and the periodical PROTOSOCIOLOGY . An

International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research, Johann W. Goethe-

University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany World Wide Web:

http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/protosociology. The editors would like

to thank the contributors, and in particular the following people for coop-

eration Paul K. Moser, Nichols Rescher, Keith Lehrer, and Roger F.

Gibson.

Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter

J.W. Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main

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