Preventing Viable Engagement:The Prevent Counter-Terrorism Agenda and

the Construction of a ‘Moderate’ Muslim Public

Dan Nilsson DeHanasTherese O’Toole

University of Bristol

Outline of Presentation• Theoretical Background: John Dewey on

Publics• Brief Review of the PVE Agenda• PVE and the Problematic Construction of a

‘Moderate’ Muslim Public• Five PVE Case Examples• Discussion and Further Questions

John Dewey on Publics• The Public and Its Problems (1954) defines

publics as emerging from commonly experienced problems or situations– Publics are not pre-existing entities to ‘map’– Publics can be mobilised or constitute themselves– Constructing a ‘public’ creates reactive publics –

e.g., The boomerang phenomenon (Saggar 2009) is the emergence of an unanticipated public

– Pragmatic politics finds different solutions for different publics and situations; What works?

The Prevent Agenda• Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) is part of

the Govt’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare

• The counter-terrorism strategy is spread over various departments, including:– Home Office– Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT)– Department for Communities and Local Gov (CLG)

• Prevent’s budget 2008-09 was over £140 mil

Prevent: A Localised Agenda• Govt launched Preventing Violent Extremism:

Winning Hearts and Minds in April 2007, through the CLG:– Intended to be “community-led approach to

tackling violent extremism” via engagement with Muslims

– Over 90 local authorities were identified for PVE funds/monitoring based on percentage Muslim

– By April 2011, these local authorities will have received about £60 million in Prevent funding

Constructing a ‘Moderate’ Muslim Public• PVE aims to “Challenge violent extremist ideology and

support mainstream voices” – i.e., to bolster an imagined ‘moderate’ Muslim public

• Govt views Muslims in binary terms (good and bad; Birt 2009) and chooses from among existing Muslim groups to shape values and create ‘moderate’ allies– e.g., Govt has dropped (bad) MCB and fostered relations

with (good) Sufi Muslim Council– McGhee (2008) argues this is state-led “Evilization”

• Govt also seeks to re-shape Muslim publics by creating new bodies as its legitimate partners for engagement and consultation – e.g., Muslim Women’s AG, Young Muslims AG

Constructing a ‘Moderate’ Muslim Public• Yet constructing a ‘mainstream’ or ‘moderate’

public is not simply a state-led project• Many Muslim/civil society organisations also

operate with binary notions of which actors are legitimately within the public domain or should be eligible as partners with Govt– e.g., think tanks Policy Exchange and the Quilliam

Foundation have each listed Muslim orgs/actors that ought to be excluded

Constructing a ‘Moderate’ Muslim Public• Problematic because Muslim public

engagement is increasingly based on an eligibility criterion of commitment to a limited range of values:– e.g. ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’; ‘not Islamist’, ‘not

Salafi’; willing to de-link violent extremism from UK foreign policy...

• The boundaries of moderate or mainstream are highly contested, as is the appropriateness of invoking these as an eligibility criterion for engagement

Constructing a ‘Moderate’ Muslim Public“The atmosphere promoted by Prevent is one in

which to make radical criticisms of the govt is to risk losing funding or face isolation as an ‘extremist’, while those organisations which support the govt are rewarded. This in turn undermines the kind of radical discussions that would need to occur if young people were to be won over and support for illegitimate violence diminished.”

– Arun Kundnani, 2009 (emphasis added)

Constructing a ‘Moderate’ Muslim Public• The PVE agenda has produced Muslim engagement:– Some engagement has been positive/innovative– Other engagement may be opportunistic or even

exploitative, as orgs compete for PVE’s ‘moderate’ money• Most engagement with PVE has been reactive– Many Muslim orgs have refused funding, or issued

statements about the problematic nature of PVE– PVE has ‘boomeranged’ with a large negative reaction– However, this is evidence of an emerging public to engage

• PVE is a quest for an elusive ‘moderate’ public, rather than a public in which moderation can take place

• PVE thus tends to prevent viable engagement• Next: Case examples of PVE, and potential way

forward

Case Example: Quilliam Foundation• Led by Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz, former Islamists

with Hizb ut-Tahrir who are now extremism ‘experts’• Govt’s most generously funded PVE partner• Equates Islamism (politicised Islam) with extremism• Extremism is on conveyor belt towards violent extremism• Criticises govt focus on PVE and

argues for PE approach• A secret 2010 Quilliam report to

OSCT names Islamist/extreme orgs that Govt should avoid (e.g., MCB/Markfield Institute…)

Case Example: Cordoba Foundation• Led by Anas Al-Tikriti,

a leading Iraq War critic often considered Islamist

• Received Prevent funds for a public debate and invited a Hizb speaker. Funding was then pulled

• Publishes the Arches academic journal on Islam; hosting “Ways Forward for UK Counter-Terrorism”

• Mirror-image rival to Quilliam – Seeks to broaden the ‘moderate’ Muslim public to include Islamists

Case Example: Radical Middle Way• Runs roadshows for

Muslim youth, which feature Islamic clerics and intellectuals with ‘integrated’, ‘mainstream’ views on Islam

• Seeks street-cred through graffiti art, youthful preachers, glossy website, etc.

• “It’s nice to hear people speak… about the middle way and really brings home the meaning of what that exactly is. Too often the mainstream majority is too quiet.” – Participant quoted on website

• Selection of speakers is a more subtle approach to delimiting who ‘moderate’ Muslims are

Case Example: Muslim Contact Unit• A unit of the London Metropolitan Police that

built on community partnerships from 1990s• Led until 2007 by Bob Lambert, who has since

become an U. of Exeter academic and speaker• Partners with mosques to locate and dissuade

potential Al-Qaeda recruits• Innovative for not using an

eligibility criterion– i.e., Pragmatically partners with

Salafi and Islamist mosques to be closer to the problem

Case Example: Digital Disruption• Run by Bold Creative in Tower Hamlets• Bangladeshi young men learn about the

power of propaganda; They create their own propaganda and anti-propaganda videos

• No ‘favoured’ Islam• Youth leave with skills

to apply on their own terms against all forms of ‘extremism’

Discussion• In recent PVE practice, highly binary notions construct

eligibility criteria for entry into the public• ‘Moderate’/‘mainstream’ public (and ‘extremist’ other)

are not givens, but are vigorously contested:– RMW’s ‘mainstream’ leans towards Sufism– Quilliam and Cordoba debate the theological boundaries of

‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ Islam– MCU and Digital Disruption set aside binaries for what works

• A way forward? ‘Viable Engagement’ via pragmatism:– Let publics emerge; allow space for their creative responses– Engage pragmatically on the basis of solutions, not on the

basis of being ‘moderate’– Re-conceive ‘moderation’ as the meeting of varied

perspectives in open debate (c.f., RMW)– Bring engagement under democratic (not police) control

Further Questions• How can we discern a multiplicity of publics?

What are their interrelationships? • When publics emerge, how does one choose

which ones to validate? Engage with all?• When do individuals share an interest, yet not

emerge as a public? What are the underlying issues of power and inequality?

• What are effective modes of communication within and across publics?

• Which forms of partnership, debate, or deliberative democracy work best in practice for stimulating a more open public engagement?