Presidential Perceptions and Nuclear Weapons: An Adaptive

Perspective

DAVID ORR LARRY TAULBEE

The assumption underlying this paper, briefly stated, is that the long-term survival prospects in a nuclear deterrent system are not very good. While by no means new, this view is perhaps less widely held than it was ten years ago. Despite the onrush of new technologies of violence and the resultant increase of destructive potential, the prevailing attitude is generally optimistic - reflec- ting the mood of super power detente. Yet while the reality of detente is beyond question, it is nevertheless punctuated by crises, military alerts, and by the steady accretion of nuclear arsenals.

As a starting point we suggest two sources of hazard internal to the deterrent system and likely to affect its overall stability. First and most suspect is the theory of deterrence which assumes that behavior can be moderated by the threat of great damage, that is negative sanctions. Such evidence as can be gathered from social psychology would suggest a reconsideration and perhaps revision of this assumption. Behavior at the individual and group level seems to be a t least as much a function of positive rewards as of the threat of sanctions.' Moreover, deterrence assumes an un-

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impaired ability to weigh rationally various alternatives and to avoid those portending great risk without commensurate gain. Since Freud and Hitler, however, rationality must be assumed with caution if a t all. There remains a recurring possibility of in- sanity in high offices and even collective irrationality or what Ir- ving Janus has called ‘‘groupthink.”2 In some circumstances willingness to jeopardize survival for values that momentarily appear to be supremely important can occur. Thomas Schelling has even suggested that in an ironic sense nuclear rationality may be linked to irrational behavior. We might question whether it is also linked to long-term survival. This is t o say that independent of any psychological frailities of decision-makers, the system can encourage irrational conduct. Indeed, the sine qua non of the system - the willingness to risk national suicide over some issues - may not meet a minimal definition of sanity.

A second destabilizing element in the nuclear equation is the tendency toward excessive complexity. At the risk of invoking the wrath of our more optimistic and technologically minded colleagues, we would suggest that in some human affairs “simple may be better.” As it stands, this assertion is little more than an expression of a vague sense of unease at the large stakes riding in part on the correct workings of a great deal of elaborate gadgetry. While the system is doubtless a tribute to our technological ingenuity, a somewhat greater sense of caution is encouraged by reflection on the outbreak of World War I, the Titanic, and one’s last correspondence over a faulty com- puterized bill. The apparatus of deterrence (which few if any un- derstand in its totality), has become an independent factor in determining issues of peace, war, and survival. In short, ac- cidents can and d o occur and we might prudently place fewer demands on our own technological handiwork.

A second aspect of the complexity of the nuclear equation concerns the system of communication between the principal adversaries. The calculus of deterrence is infinitely reflexive - resting on a portrayal of images or deterrent postures designed to convey messages of resolution to an adversary who in turn responds with similar signs of resolve. But as is characteristic of strategic games, messages are received and sent knowing that they know that 1 know that they know. . . adinfinitum. It is not clear that there is any stable resting point a t which expectations and behavior permanently converge.3 The “stability” of the

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system is ultimately thought to reside in the continual cultivation of mutual imagery suggesting resolution to commit the “unthinkable.” Because the threat must be attached to values that are frequently less than absolute in their importance both must labor to show that suicide is indeed preferable to some kinds of change in the status quo.

The dangers in the resultant edifice of imagery would seem twofold. First, since it is not entirely clear when an actor is deal- ing with image and when with reality, there is a continual possibility of misreading the intent of the other. This was manifestly true in the Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba in 1962. It would have been true in President Nixon’s decision to i n h e Haiphong Harbor in 1972. Bernard Brodie has suggested that in crises of this sort, even when an initial mistake has oc- cured in perceiving the intent of the other party, the existence of great risk will eventually induce ~ a u t i o n . ~ In both cases men- tioned crises were resolved by coolness and good judgment by major actors. But will this always be the case? There is again the issue of rationality under conditions of great stress.5 While the Cuban missile crisis is often cited as model of how to conduct a crisis, i t could have been otherwise if the available time had been hours and not days.6 Secondly, the communication of intent oc- curs in a situation in which there may be a natural erosion in the credibility of unfulfilled threats leading ironically to a greater chance of their eventual occurence.7 Logically such a process would require still greater investment in imagery keeping the spiral alive.

Having argued that the nuclear system is dangerous is not to suggest that there are easy or obvious alternatives. Decision- makers are caught in a dilemma in which the workings of the system itself constitute a threat to their survival beyond that customarily posed by adversaries. But no decision-maker is able unilaterally to disband expensive “defense” establishments without simultaneously courting the possibility of domestic and international disaster. Measures to deal with either threat can be seen as detrimental to progress to meet the other. Moreover, since the existence of nuclear knowledge cannot be erased, even a disarmed world must be alert to possibilities of clandestine cheating. The present situation is made more complex by the possible proliferation of weapons and the rise of the People’s Kepublic of China as a possible third superpower.8

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While nuclear weapons have thus wrought a transformation in the objective milieu there remains some disagreement as to the effect on state behavior. Some have suggested that nuclear weapons have moderated the inherent conflict between states by making war so destructive as to be rationally a ~ o i d e d . ~ Accor- dingly it is asserted that a stable balance has emerged from the recognition of the suicidal character of nuclear war. Stanley Hoffman, while noting elements of continuity between this and other international systems suggests that the “game of inter- national politics” has been modified:

. . . there are more people around the roulette wheel; the stakes are higher and more diverse; and the risk of death hovers over every player’s shoulder. The risks for the citizen, the state, and the system have been joined by a new risk - for the game itself, for the world. And yet the game continues, for the simple reason that the structure of international milieu has not been fundarnen- t a I I y trans formed. 10

Hoffman suggests that the structure of the game while preserving the risk of total destruction, leads to policies of “moderation motivated by the common desires for survival.” Thus actors in the international system are caught between the old and the new, oscillating between moderation and risk.

In contrast, others have argued that nuclear weapons have had little impact on the behavior of states. Thus one proponent of this view asserts that nuclear weapons:

. . . have not revolutionized the power structure of the world . . . Nuclcar weapons have not leveled differences in power, they have not frightened nations into blocs or out of alliances, and most important of all, they have not deterred nations from fighting for their national interests.”

Similarly Robert Gilpin has recently asserted that the effects of technology on international politics have been overestimated, thus nuclear weapons have not introduced changes “nearly as fundamental in character as many observers would argue.”l2

Inherent within this second view is the notion that decision- makers have failed to perceive fully the nature of the altered en- vironment. Thus as shown by the Sprouts, objective changes in the milieu are not necessarily acted upon unless perceived as such by the actors involved. Former diplomat, Charles Yost, has described this as follows:

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Despite much repeated warnings of the consequences of the change in the nature of warfare, it curiously continues to be minimized by experts, overlooked by the general public, and sub- ordinated by governments to the supposed requirements of national defense. There is an ever more extraordinary am- bivalence between the apocalyptic warnings of the consequences of using modern weapons and the still cherished and touching faith that these weapons will bring security.’]

Nations, accordingly, still seek security through the outdated methods of individual self-help, constructing larger armies, greater weapons, and faster vehicles of war because they have failed to perceive and act upon the new realities.

The question then remains as to the effect of nuclear weapons upon the behavior of state actors. There is little ques- tion that the objective environment has been transformed by the sheer magnitude of potential violence which states may employ and by the speed with which destruction may occur. But is it possible to detect what Kenneth Boulding has labeled “macro- learning” expressed in altered behavior patterns in the nuclear world?l4 Optimists have pointed to “learning” in the form of con- flict mediating devices such as limited war, and a growing number of arms control agreements. Pessimists have argued that such changes are insufficient and have led to a false optimism that progress in fact was being made thereby impeding more far- reaching measures.15

There is also a prior question as to the meaning of “learning” as applied to social and political phenomenon. While change is evident in international affairs, we should be cautious of asser- tions that states learn in a fashion roughly analogous to in- dividual learning. Learning (or preferably adaptation) as applied to states is much more complex, implying both altered intra- governmental behavior patterns as well as the inter- governmental coordination of expectations and behavior. Moreover, learning is a relative term which provides no clear measure of how much has occurred with how much should have occurred. Applied to a world of nuclear deterrence, the rate of adaptation expressed in part by the conclusion of arms control agreements, must be judged against some estimate of the probability of nuclear war. While estimates of this probability will vary, it is essential to begin with an explicit and, to the extent possible, accurate view of various probabilities and contingen- cies.

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With these caveats in mind, we suggest that adaptation be conceptualized as the ratio between the objective changes in the international milieu and the change in behavior of relevant ac- tors. The closer the ratio approaches unity, the greater the degree of adaptation. As used elsewhere, adaptation has connoted a conservative process of structure maintenance.16 In contrast, adaptation here implies simply the ability to survive - whatever the cost - including that of structural dissolution. Thus, for ac- tors in the international system, adaptation entails measures to defuse the possibilities of nuclear war. To the degree that nuclear war remains a significant possibility, adaptation may be regard- ed as incomplete. Arms control agreements thus represent an im- portant but partial step in this process.

A number of scholars suggest that adaptation entails more, including the restructuring of the current state system. Such a restructuring would alter the notion of sovereignty, and the idea of security through self-help. No less a Realist than Hans Morgenthau has advocated the transformation of the system through diplomatic means eventuating in the creation ofa world state.” While Morgenthau describes a transformation through diplomacy, others have suggested a broader attack on the divisive features of world politics. Quincy Wright for one urged a shift in political values from “dominance to welfare,” a strengthening of international law and organization, and gradual disarmament.I8 Richard Falk and Harold Lasswell have suggested that adaptation should occur by concentrating on a radical restructuring of the domestic political machinery. These changes would occur through a “parallel and simultaneous seizure of power in the principal sovereign states by national political movements committed in the establishment of a world- wide political system based on unity . . .”I9

All of these changes, however, are contingent upon a transformation of elite attitudes and values, especially those relating to violence and military power. Thus, state adaptation to the nuclear world is in part the result ofindividual policy-makers learning new attitudes toward adversaries and toward the relative usefulness of military power. In the research set forth below we suggest one possible approach to the analysis of the adaptive process.

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The Model

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At the risk of oversimplification, we suggest that inter- national politics of the post-war era posed a dilemma for decision-makers. The traditional paradigm of international politics might seem as a self-help one in which states responded to the perception of threat (T I ) with an increase in militaryspen- ding or creation of alliances (Rl ) . The new paradigm of state behavior imposed by the addition of nuclear weapons suggests a new threat - from the system itself (Tz), to which states can res- pond effectively only by cooperative means (R2). The dilemma arises in that while the new threat inherent in a faulty organiza- tion of power in the nuclear era is clearly of catastrophic propor- tions, the traditional threat posed by antagonistic nation-states has hardly diminished. Thus statesmen are caught between the essentially short-run state antagonisms which may shift rapidly and the ongoing threat posed by a nuclear warfare system.

Traditional behavior - Incorporation

Alliance, war

Integration Nuclear War

Figure One: The Model

R I R 2

Within the context of the model, adaptation represents a shift from self-help strategies to cooperative strategies, although not necessarily implying the formation of a world state. Further- more adaptation would be accompanied by a change in attitude toward military power in which decision-makers would in- creasingly regard military coercion as an unacceptable technique for state behavior. Such changes in international politics would be prefaced upon the recognition of the threat posed by the

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system of independent, nuclear armed states in which power had become absolute while authority and responsibility remained fragmented.

Research Strategy

The approach set forth below is based on three assumptions. First, we assume that adaptation might be measured through the examination of the values and attitudes of individual decision- makers.2() Systems approaches in international relations have assumed that systemic factors affect individual behavior without specifying the nature of the interaction. Similarly, studies on in- dividual perception discuss perception in the absence of evidence on the effect of systemic variables. Following the Sprouts, we suggest that system changes may affect decision-makers only to the‘ degree that changes are perceived and acted upon.

Second, we assume that for major policy changes, the sup- port and active involvement of a key decision-maker is absolute- ly essential. Raymond Bauer has suggested that policy analysts seek out “leverage points” in the policy process; similarly we suggest that a primary decision-maker is essential to the kind of changes entailed in the adaptative approach to world politics.21 Thirdly, we suggest that bureaucracy, while important for rou- tine (“incremental”) policy activity, is less likely to initiate adap- tive changes or possess the necessary leverage to bring about policy changes without the support and involvement of the “primary decision-maker.”

In practical terms we maintain that major policy changes re- quire the active leadership and support of a President, Prime Minister, Premier, etc. Thus the attitudes and policies of a Wilson, Lenin, DeGaulle, or Kennedy become more important for analyzing major departures than the consideration of bureaucratic politics. This is not to argue that “bureaucratic politics” is unimportant - manifestly not so, especially for the 9% of policy activity which is associated with administration or implementation.22 Within the United States the obvious leverage point for the study of foreign policy change is the President. Re- cent experience regarding Presidential initiatives toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic bear out the contention that Presidential support is essential for innovation in policy.

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Methods

The approach entails content analysis of 200 Presidential addresses on foreign policy between 1946 and 1970.23 To ensure a fair distribution, we selected two addresses per quarter which dealt with a t least three foreign issues and in which foreign policy was the subject of at least half of the address. This sampl- ing procedure eliminated messages in which the dominant sub- ject concerned a specific crisis situation while allowing us to emphasize those with the most general content. Thus we attempted to reach a reliable estimate of the relative importance of four themes:

I . the need for arms comtrol and/ o r disarmament 2. the need for and efficacy of military power 3. the threat posed by the Soviet Union/ world communism 4. the threat of nuclear war.

As adaptation occurred, we hypothesized that the relationship between theme 3 and theme 2 would decline and that between theme 4 and theme 1 would increase.

In addition to frequency scores we recorded the data in masked form and requested that assistants sort the themes accor- ding to the intensity of perception each contained. Following the rules for the Q-sort method, themes were separated into a forced nine cell distribution approximating a normal dis- t r i b~ t ion .2~ The scores obtained from this method are not com- parable to other data except in the trends derived. Thus we could determine whether the perception of the Soviet threat was in- creasing or decreasing but not whether it was more or less than that for the nuclear threat. The Q-sort establishes a rank order based only on those statements being scaled. The mid-point or category 5 is the average level of intensity within the sample. In forcing judges to rank statements the method does not yield any absolute measure but it does provide a measure of intensity. Finally, to account for years in which frequency and intensity scores were highly discrepant we multiplied both to provide a summary score for the period.

Before going further we might consider that the public record is incomplete and that conclusions drawn from public sources might therefore be inaccurate. This argument can be diluted by several factors. First, the public record can be checked against actual behavior to determine if in fact there are notable

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discrepancies - for example between verbal emphasis on military power and Presidential budget requests. Secondly, public statements tend to acquire an importance independent of the speaker, especially in a democratic society, when statements tend to bind decision-makers to a public position. Moreover, statements by a head of state become a large input into the policy debates in other states. Serious discrepancies between public and private communications permit an adversary to choose whatever meaning he will. Normally the public statement, intended in part for domestic audiences, would be more hostile and would be more readily believed by an ad~ersary.~5 Thus while public sources are not the complete record, we suggest that they are valuable for measuring attitudes and perceptions and ,aspects on interstate relations.

Finally, we add one caveat - the scores derived from the content analysis do not represent a summary of adaptations, but do offer an indication of the changes (in this instance) in attitudes of American Presidents. To achieve an approximation of adap- tation the study would have to be expanded including com- parable data for the Soviet Union and other major actors in the international system. Findings might then be correlated with other data on the level of integration/ cooperation in the Inter- national System operationalized in the forms of total military ex- penditures, budget totals for international organizations, numbers of cooperative agreements and so forth.

Results

Of the 1351 statements coded, 38.8% (524) related to the ef- ficacy of military power. As portrayed in Figure 11, the theme was relatively consistent with a peak during the Korean war period 1950-1 952. During the Eisenhower years statements showed a biennial peaking indicative of the political significance of the theme in domestic politics. A second high is seen in the first year of the Kennedy administration coincidental with the Bay of Pigs, Congo and Berlin crises. The number and intensity of statements declined throughout the remainder of the 1960’s with exceptions in 1964 and 1969. While the 1964 score appears un- related to any external threats, the 1969 rise is probably linked to the Soviet missile buildup and Nixon’s support for new defense programs such as the ABM and MIRV.

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The visible decline in statements is surprising in that defense expenditures and the use of military power in Vietnam rose sharply. The apparent discrepancy between verbal enunciations and actions (i.e., budgets, Vietnam decision) might be explained in several ways. First, President Johnson may have felt it essen- tial to play down the notion of military power while under heavy criticism for its use in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Secondly, there would appear to be a split in Johnson’s thinking about the usefulness of military power in Southeast Asia and its usefulness in other areas of the globe. If so, one can explain the inconsistency between “bridge building” to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe while “stopping Communist aggression” in Asia. Finally, since we did not code statements dealing with specific cases, i t is possible that the distortion induced by the overwhelm- ing emphasis on Vietnam in the 1965-70 period produces a decline when in fact none existed.

The second highest theme in terms of frequency (32.2%) related to the threat posed by Soviet/ Communist expansion. For most of the period little distinction was made between those threats specifically from the Soviet Union and those from expan- sion of communism in the third world. Accordingly we did not draw distinctions where Presidents made none. Again as with the efficacy of military power, the theme portrayed in Figure I1 shows an overall decline. The peaks once again coincide with the Korean war period and the first year of the Kennedy administra- tion. The rise evident in 1969 and 1970 was primarily related to the Soviet missile buildup begun in the mid-sixties. In contrast to the earlier period, however, President Nixon did not openly equate the Soviet military buildup with ideological expansion.

The third highest frequency for the sample, amounting to 22.5% of the total, related to the need for arms control and disar- mament. Once again the peaks in combined frequency and inten- sity occur in the same periods noted above - 195 1 and 1961. This conjunction with the Korean war and with the crisis-laden first year of the Kennedy administration might be interpreted in several ways. Most obviously it might be dismissed as so much window dressing covering increased defense expenditures. Alter- natively, it could be depicted as a sign of genuine frustration at the apparent inaccessibility of a more peaceful world. The difference need not delay us here beyond noting that both views may be partially correct. Of the five Presidents during this

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period, Kennedy revealed the highest intensity with Truman a distant second.

The lowest theme (6.4%) in the sample related to the threat posed by nuclear war. The total numbers of statements (86) may be too small to support many observations aside from noting that again the highest frequency and intensity score occurs in the 1961-1962 period. Consistent with other themes there is a sharp drop during the Vietnam years, indicating that Presidential attentions were focused elsewhere. Ironically, despite the decline in expressed fears regarding nuclear war and for arms control, several agreements were concluded in this period, notably the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.

Discussion

We have suggested that adaptation in international politics might begin with a shift from emphasis on state rivalries to the threat posed by the nuclear deterrent system. To examine changes in perception, we divided the post-war era into three periods: the Truman administration, the Eisenhower-Kennedy administrations and the Johnson-Nixon administrations. The first break coincides with the end of the Korean War, while the second coincides with the Cuban crisis, the beginning of the Viet- nam War and a reorientation in domestic politics. Correlation coefficients for each period were computed for each variable pair. (Table I , Table 111). The resulting coefficients were then tested for significant difference between periods. (Table 11, Table I V ) .

While the data point to shifts in emphasis among the relationships between the four themes, it is clear that little or no change has occurred in the traditional relationship between force and perceived threat. The correlation between perception of Soviet threat and the efficacy of military power (EM P) remained high throughout the post-war period displaying remarkable con- sistency (Table 11). Military power obviously lost little of its role as an accepted method of dealing with major threats to national security, though as noted earlier the Soviet threat declined in in- tensity.

The dimensions of the change can be seen in the variations over time in the relationship between perception of Soviet threat and the other two variables presented in Table I: the necessity for

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arms control/ disarmament (ACDA), and the threat of nuclear war (TN W). We hypothesized that adaptation to the changed conditions concerning the use of force would be indicated by a decoupling of the perception of Soviet threat from that of nuclear war, and a corresponding movement toward cooperative strategies in the form of arms control and disarmament negotiations. This assumes the development of symmetry of rationality; that is, as both actors assess the potential costs of nuclear war, they should arrive at essentially the same meaning for the same observable facts.27 The resulting estimate of risk should then be reflected in a move toward cooperative strategies in an effort to assure non-nuclear resolution of conflicts.

The data support the hypothesis. Changes in the relationship between these three variables, Soviet threat, arms control/disarmament, and the threat of nuclear war, are both significant and in the directions hypothesized. (Table 11, Table IV). In particular, the movement toward arms control/ disarma- ment as a function of Soviet threat is highly significant ( Z = 5.01, p = .OOO I ) , as is the dissociation of Soviet threat from the threat of nuclear war (Z = 2.56, p = .005).

Table I Soviet Threat*

President ACDl EMP2 TNW'

Truman r = .0965 r S359 r = .4255 (N = 28) ( N = 28) ( N = 28) p = .313 p = .002 p = .012

J oh nso n- r = S461 r .4770 r = .0276 N ixon (N 28) ( N = 28) ( N = 28)

p = .001 p = .005 p = .445

*The correlation coefficient (r) represents the relationship between

'Necessity for Arms Control and/ or Disarmament 2Perceived Efficacy of Military Power .'Perceived Threat of Nuclear War

perception of Soviet threat and the column variables.

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Table I I Z Difference Soviet Threat*

Period ACDA EMP T N W

Truman- Z = -.I73 Z = .312 Z = -2.25 Eisenhower p .430 p = .378 p = .012 Kennedy

Eisenhower- Z = 2.62 Z -.313 Z = .576 K cnned y p .004 p = .378 p = .282 Johnson- Nixon

Truman- Z = 5.01 Z .281 Z = -3.03 Johnson- p = .OW1 p = .389 p = .OOl Nixon

*For the procedure used to test the difference between two correlations, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., SociofStalistics, New York(McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 310-31 I .

Table 111 Threat of Nuclear War

President ACDA EMP

Truman r .I528 r = .I017 (N = 28) (N = 28) p = ,219 p = .303

Eisenhower- r ,3443 r = .I407 Kennedy ( N = 44) ( N 44)

p = .I81 p .011

.Johnson- r ,4750 r = .2315 Nixon ( N 28) ( N = 28)

P ,005 p = . I 18

However, of more interest are the periods in which the shifts in perception occur. T h e correlation between the perception of Soviet threat and the perceived possibility of nuclear war is highest in the Truman period (Table I ) , while the major change

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occurs in the Eisenhower-Kennedy period (Table 11). In contrast the gradual shift toward acceptance of arms control culminatesin the Johnson-Nixon period (Table 11, Table IV).

We suggest above that adaptation to mutual risk would result in a move toward cooperative strategies. This is consistent with Eisenhower’s response to growing vulnerability to Soviet strategic weapons expressed in proposed cooperative ventures “Atoms for Peace,” “Open Skies,” and the Geneva Summit. As expected, however, the data reveal ambivalence in Eisenhower’s views.tx It is clear that he embraced the concept of arms control with reservations, based on suspicions of Soviet intentions (Table I ) . Without arguing that the emphasis on arms control and disarmament was insincere, the evidence supports the con- clusion that greater emphasis throughout was consistently given to the Soviet threat and the need for a military response. Despite acceptance in principle of the need to control nuclear weapons, arms control was not an overriding objective. The same conch-

Table IV Z Difference - Threat of Nuclear War

Period ACDA EMP

Truman Z = .807 Z = .I56 Eisenhower p .209 p = .438 Kennedy

Eisenhower- Z = .621 Kennedy p = .268 Johnson- Nixon

Truman Z 2.56 Johnson- p = .005 Nixon

z = .a3 p = .329

z = .793 p = .210

sion can be drawn for the Johnson-Nixon period. The limits of cooperation are indicated by the relationship between the threat of nuclear war and the efficacy of military power. The magnitude of the correlations (Table 111) as well as the lack of change over time (Table IV) support the conclusion that nuclear weapons have not greatly altered traditional perceptual patterns.

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Conclusion

The results evident in the empirical findings can hardly come as a surprise. Despite the conclusion of arms control agreements over the past 14 years, the nuclear deterrent system has not only survived but multiplied. Agreements to ban weapons from specific environments such as Antarctica, the deep sea-bed, and outer space were in large measure superfluous since neither superpower seriously contemplated these as operational moves. Similarly, the test-ban has been weakened by the refusal of the superpowers to stop underground tests.29 Because of the failure to control qualitative developments, the initial agreements from SALT are suspect unless followed by more far- reaching agreement. It would now seem apparent that the talks have served as a spur to arms competition. The desire to develop “bargaining chips” and strong negotiating postures has led both sides to expensive and unnecessary weapons procurement. The truth of John Stuart Mill’s observation that “Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it produces no result at all,” seems applicable.

The conclusions from the data on Presidential statements would suggest ambivalence on questions of arms control and national security. Presidents not only wanted to have their cake, but eat it as well. The result has been that successive Presidents have given lip service to the beneficial aspects of arms control while continuing to justify decisions on traditional grounds of self-help. The same has been true of the Soviet Union.

This, in a world of famine, poverty, ecological deterioration, and with an unknown possibility of nuclear destruction suggests a failure of existing political structures and elites. Solutions to these problems will not necessarily grow easier with the passage of time. There is, in short, a prudent case for a much greater sense of urgency regarding the control of nuclear weapons than the “realist” would concede.

Throughout the period under consideration there is little evidence of a well thought out strategy of arms control. The ap- proach of the 1950’s and 1960’s was based on national supremacy and self-help. It is not yet clear what effect the Strategic Arms Limitation talks will have, but competition appears to have shifted from quantitative to qualitative races. Throughout most of this period American Presidents might have profitably

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rephrased the question from “How do we guarantee our own security‘!” to “What can we do to lessen Soviet incentives to in- crease and/ or use their weapons?”30 This suggests rather sweep- ing changes in national behavior. A number of years ago Charles Osgood set forth an as yet untested proposal for reversing the arms spiral - GRIT might well be feasible as a beginning point for a strategy of adaptation.3’ The common view of Soviet behavior (and from their perspective of American behavior) k rooted in a worst case approach.32 This is a nightmare world of technological breakthroughs, surprise attacks, nuclear blackmail ad infiniturn. To the degree that this is self-fulfilling fantasy, we have become prisoners and victims of our own fears. Given the changes in the structure of the world and in the relative usefulness of military force, there may be as yet unperceived alternatives to a world threatened by holo~aust.~3

Finally, the research reported here on the perceptions of American Presidents could be extended to other national leaders including those of the Soviet Union. If problems of sampling and comparability could be managed, this might prove a useful measure of attitudes regarding force and cooperation. Combined with recent surveys of international events and data on military expenditures, the results might offer solid evidence for a theory of international adaptation.

‘David Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics X X l V (October 1971), 19-38; Also M. Deutschand R. Krauss,“StudiesofIn- terpersonal Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, V I (March 1962), 57-76; John Raser, “Theories of Deterrence,” in M. Haas, ed., International Sysfems. Chandler Publishing Company (New York, 1974); Richard Rosen- crance. “Deterrence in Dyadic and Multipolar Environments” in Rosen- crance, ed., The Future of the International Strategic System, Chandler Publishing Company, (New York, 1972); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense, Harper and Row (New York, 1962).

21rving L. Janus, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972).

.‘See Irving Goffman, Strategic Interaction (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), pp. 85-145.

4Bernard Brodie, War ond Politics, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), 430-43 1.

SFor an interesting scenario see John Raser,“The Failure of Fail-Safe” in Milton Rosenberg (ed.) Beyond Conflict and Containment, (New Brunswick: Transaction Bis.. 1972), pp. 140-142; see also Thomas C. Wiegele, “Decision-

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making in an International Crisis: Some Biological Factors,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, 3 (September, 1973).

(‘See Robert Kennedy’s comment to this effect in Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: Signet Books, 1969), p. 11 I.

’This view is common among some strategic theorists. See for example Hedley Bull, “Arms Control: A Stocktaking and Prospectus” in Problems of Logic of images in International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). p. 225.

“Rosecrance, “Reward, Punishment, and the Future,” in Rosecrance (ed.) The Future of the International Strategic System; Michel Tatu, “The Great Power Triangle: Washington-Moscow-Peking,” in The Atlantic Papers, Vol. Two (Lexington: D.C. Health and Co., 1972).

VK.J. Holsti, International Politics, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1867), p. 85.

loStanley Hoffman, n e s t a t e o f War,(New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 141. “Kenneth Organski, World Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1968). 335-6. ‘2Robert Gilpin, “Has Modern Technology Changed International

Politics‘?” in Rosenau et. al. (eds.) The Analysis of International Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 173.

ITharles Yost, The Insecurity of Nations, (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 80.

I4Kenneth Boulding, “The Learning and Reality Testing Process in the International System,” Journal of InternationalAffairs,21(1967), pp. 11-15.

15For example, William Epstein, “The Disarmament Hoax,” World Magazine. 2,8 (1973) 24-29; see also Milton Leitenberg, “The Present State of the World’s Arms Race,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (January, 1972).

‘”James Rosenau, nte Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political System Behavior and Transformation, McCaleb-Seiler, Inc. (New York, 1970); and Rosenau, “Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior: Some Preliminary Notes for a Theoretical Model,” Comparative Politics, 2( 1970).

“Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 481-550.

‘”Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). p. 1529.

lyRichard Falk, “The Trend Toward World Community: An Inventory of Issues” in Lepawsky, Buehrig, and Lasswell (eds.) The Searchfor World Order, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971), p. 363.

2’We agree with the approach set forth by Holsti, Brody and North (L. Kriesberg. (ed.), Social Processes in International Re1ations:A Reader, [New York: John Wiley and Sons, 19681, pp. 396-397) with one caveat. The Holsti cJt.al. framework is primarily designed to examine interactive crisis behavior while our concern is the effect of system change and not necessarily specific acts of another state.

21R.A. Bauer, f i e Policy Process, (New York: Free Press, 1971),p. 21.

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22G. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missle Crkk, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban M is le Crisis,” American Political Science Review, 66 (September, 1969), pp. 689-718; G. Allison and Mr. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics, (1972), Supplement, pp. 40- 79.

23Public Papers of the President, 1946-1970, (Washington: US. Govern- ment Printing Office).

24R. North el. al., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crkk, (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

25D. Pruitt, “Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of Inter- nal ional Action,” International Behavior: A Social- Psychological AnalysFF, ed. H . Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1966), pp. 405406; 0. Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia,” Enemies in Polirics, eds. Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen (Chicago: Rand- McNally, 1967).

ZhFor a more detailed analysis of this data, see Orr and Taulbee, “Deci- sion Perspectives, Arms Control, and System Change: A Research Note,” International Interactions (forthcoming).

27Robert Ladner, Jr . , “Strategic Interaction and Conflict,” “Negotiating Expectations in Accounting for Actions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (March, 1973), p. 179.

2XSeparate runs were made for the Eisenhower Presidency - the correla- tion coefficients obtained were almost identical to those reported in the text for the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations combined.

2 9 0 n Possibilities of a comprehensive ban see World Armaments and Disarmaments: SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, Humanities Press (New York, 1972), 389455.

-’?See Roger Fisher, International Conflict for Beginners, (New Y ork: Harper, 1969), pp. 1-26.

)‘Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War and Surrender, (Urbana: Un- iversity of Illinois Press, 1962); Graduated Reduction in Tension (GRIT); also Milton Rosenberg, “New Ways to Reduce Distrust Between the U.S. and Russia,” in Rosenberg (ed.), Beyond Conflict and Containment.

j2Andrei Sakharov has recently described a dialogue with Khruschev in I96 I in which he recommended against a resumption of nuclear tests to which Khruschev replied: “Only force - only the disorientation of the enemy [works] . . . that is the way it must be.”New York Times, (March 8, 1974), p. 8.

3JFor a good discussion of “Chardinist” alternative to the current Hobbe- sian world, see Walter C. Clemens, The Superpowersand Arms Control(Lex- ington: D.C. Heath, 1973), pp. 105-126.

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