President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy

7/27/2019 President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy

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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981-1986

Author(s): Christopher J. BaileySource: Journal of American Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, Was Irangate Really an "Aberration"?(Aug., 1987), pp. 167-181Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British Association for American StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27554830 .

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President Reagan, the U.S.Senate, and American ForeignPolicy, 1981-1986CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY

The Republican loss of majority status in the U.S. Senate following themid-term elections of 1986, and the disclosure of the Reagan Administration's secret arms sales to Iran and diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan

Contras, effectively brought to an end six years of senatorial deference topresidential foreign policy-making. From 1981 to 1986 the Republicancontrolled Senate had generally afforded President Reagan a degree oflatitude in the making of foreign policy which not only contrasted

markedly with that of his immediate predecessors, but also prepared theatmosphere for the type of adventures pursued by Colonel Oliver North.Whereas the foreign policy initiatives of Presidents Nixon, Ford, andCarter had been subject to considerable scrutiny by senators, therebyforcing a detailed examination of their consequences, the forbearanceshown to the Reagan Administration by the Senate encouraged a muchless diligent approach to policy-making.

To a certain extent, therefore, the Irangate scandal may be viewed asa consequence of a change in presidential-senatorial relations. Predictionsthat the pattern of conflict which had characterized relations between thesetwo institutions for most of the 1970s might change following the 1980elections were made by a number of observers. Typical was the suggestion

made by James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver that, "it was plausible toproject that Reagan and the new Republicans in the Senate might justsucceed in ushering in a new period of presidential domination of theCongress/'1 With hawkish Republicans replacing liberal Democrats innine of the twelve seats which the GOP gained in 1980 the RepublicanDr Christopher J. Bailey is Lecturer inU.S. Politics at Keele University, Keele, StaffordshireST 5 5BG, England.

1 James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and the American PoliticalSystem (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), no.

Journal of American Studies, 21 (1987), 2, 167-181 Printed in Great Britain

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168 Christopher ]. Baileytake-over in the Senate promised to provide President Reagan withnumerous potential allies on foreign policy issues. The willingness of

Republican senators to depart from the bipartisanship, which had generallygoverned American foreign policy since the Second World War, hadalready been signalled inMay 1978 with the publication of a DeclarationonNational Security and Foreign Policy} This was a thirty page critique ofthe Carter Administration's policies, which together with a declaration by

Minority Leader Senator Howard Baker (R. Tenn.) that it was time toreassess the wisdom of restraining partisan criticism of presidential foreignpolicy decisions, paved the way for the policies of President Reagan.3Indeed, apart from a small group of moderate Republicans centred aroundSenators Lowell Weicker (R. Conn.) and Charles Mathias (R. Md.),

Reagan's foreign policy aims had the support of most GOP senators. Forexample, even Senator Charles Percy (R. 111.), who as Chairman of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee was more moderate than most of hisRepublican colleagues, endorsed the Administration's policy of militaryand economic aid to the government of El Salvador. Senator Percydeclared that, "I think those outside forces should be on notice that thisnation will do whatever is necessary to prevent a communist state takeover in El Salvador. "4 Similar support was expressed for most aspects ofReagan's foreign policy.This consensus on foreign policy issues among Republican senators,which to a large extent reflected a more general shift to the right in publicopinion following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan, was obviously a vital aspect in determining therelationship between President Reagan and the Republican-controlledSenate.5 Of perhaps more importance, however, was a changing perceptionamong senators of their proper role in the foreign policy making process.

One consequence of the elections of 1978 and 1980 was the defeat of manyof the leaders of the congressional revolution of the early 1970s. In 1978Senator Dick Clark (D. Iowa), the sponsor of the 1975 amendment whichprohibited the C.I.A. from giving covert aid to guerillas fighting theMarxist regime inAngola, was defeated in his bid for re-election. Defeated

2 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 13May 1978, n 80.3 John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Dilemma (New York :CBS College Publishing, 1982), 85.4 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reportl, 21 Feb. 1981, 359.5 For an interesting account of the changing nature of American public opinion onforeign policy issues during the late 1970s see Joshua Muravchik, "The Senate andNational Security: A New Mood," in David M. Abshine and Ralph D. N?rnberger,eds., The Growing Power of Congress (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1981), 261?264.



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981-1986 169in 1980 were Senator Jacob Javits (R. NY), a co-sponsor of the War

Powers Resolution, Senator Frank Church (D. Idaho), who had led themovement to stop the bombing of Cambodia and was largely responsiblefor introducing greater oversight of the intelligence services, SenatorGeorge McGovern (D. S.D.), who had co-sponsored the Harkin Amendment of 1975 which prohibited U.S. aid to countries which violated humanrights, and Senator John Culver (D.Iowa), who had introduced theresolution banning the sale of AWACS to Iran in 1977.6 The defeat of thesesenators deprived the Senate of much of its leadership on foreign policyissues, and left a vacuum which President Reagan seemed capable of filling.

Rather than wishing to confront the executive as their Democraticpredecessors had done, the new Republican leaders of the Senate went onrecord to express their feeling that the President should be given morefreedom of action to conduct foreign policy. Writing in Foreign PolicySenator Percy argued that: "the pendulum that has swung toward thelegislative branch since 1970 ought now to swing back toward a middle

ground that could contribute to greater efficiency in U.S. foreign policymaking. "7 Senator John Tower (R. Texas), Chairman of the Senate'sArmed Service Committee, echoed this sentiment when he wrote inForeignAffairs that, "By . . . [the mid-1970s] . . . the two branches were lockedin a struggle for control of American foreign policy. To a certain extentCongress won, and the balance between Congress and the President hasswung dangerously to the legislative side with unfavourable consequencesfor American foreign policy. "8 In amanner which reflected these concernsSenator Percy declared that his highest priority as Chairman of the Foreign

Relations Committee was "to determine not only how we can have abipartisan foreign policy, but one that meshes with the administration. "9

During the initial months of the first Reagan Administration the Senaterelaxed some of the restrictions which had been placedon the President's

freedom to give direct aid to countries which violated human rights, andin September 1981 voted to repeal the Clark Amendment which prohibitedaid to Angola when it adopted an amendment prepared by Senator NancyKassebaum (R. Kansas) to the Fiscal 1982 Foreign Aid Authorization Bill(S. 1196). " Ifwe're aworld power, we need muscle in the President's office

6 For an examination of the issues with which these senators were concerned in thepost-Vietnam period see Jacob Javits, Who Makes War? The President Versus The Congress(New York: Morrow, 1973).7 Charles H. Percy, "The Partisan Gap," in Foreign Policy, 45 (1981-82), 9.8John G. Tower, "Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 60, 2 (1981/82), 230.9 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 14March 1981, 477.



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170 Christopher J'. Baileyto act like a world power" stated Senator Barry Goldwater (R. Ariz.),Chairman of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence.10

Explicit in the arguments of Senators Percy, Tower, and Goldwater wasa belief that the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy had been underminedby the decade of congressional assertion. Not only were the proceduresof Congress too open and cumbersome to allow it to move swiftly andwith secrecy to meet any threat to American security, but its interventionin foreign affairs during the 1970s had deprived U.S. policy of much ofits coherence. As Senator Tower wrote, "Five hundred and thirty-fiveCongressmen with different regional interests and objectives in mindcannot forge a unified foreign policy that reflects the interests of the UnitedStates as a whole. "n Recognition of this point had, in fact, been gainingground during the late 1970s and had led Senators Jesse Helms (R.N.C.),Paul Tsongas (D. Mass.), and Jacob Javits to introduce an amendmentseeking the repeal of the Clark Amendment in June 1980.12 That such ameasure had the support of Senators as ideologically diverse as these threeis indicative of the extent of the feeling in the Senate that the executivehad been reined in too much by the curbs of the early 1970s.In addition to the concern that the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policyhad been impaired by the congressional activism of the 1970s, Senatorsalso had a much more practical reason for allowing the executive morefreedom to conduct affairs. Writing in 1973 Richard Fenno had quotedone member of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee as stating thata concern for foreign policy was :a political liability . . .You have no constituency. In my re-election campaign lastFall, the main thing they used against me was that because of my interest in foreignrelations, I was more interested in what happened to the people of Abyssinia and

Afghanistan than in what happened to the good people of my state.13

During the late 1970s developments in electioneering, such as theincreased use of negative advertising by Political Action Committeesassociated with the New Right, served to accentuate the electoral liabilityof too great a concern with foreign affairs. In the 1980 elections, forexample, four of the five members of the Foreign Relations Committee

who were seeking re-election were defeated.14 Senators Church and10New York Times, i Oct. 1981, A9.11 Tower, 233. 12 See Joshua Muravchik, 235-36.13 Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 141.14

These were Frank Church (D.Idaho), Jacob Javits (R.N.Y.), George McGovern(D.S.D.), and Richard Stone (D. Fla.). The only member to gain re-election was JohnGlenn (D. Ohio).



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, i981-1986 171McGovern, in particular, suffered from their interest in foreign affairs withthe National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) runningtelevision and radio commercials which suggested that the Senators wereneglecting their states for the sake of countries such as Cuba. Onetelevision commercial showed a basketball player dribbling a ball whilea voice-over declared that:

Globetrotter is a great name for a basketball team, but it's a lousy name for asenator. While the energy crisis was brewing, George McGovern was touringCuba with Fidel Castro. He also took a one month junket to Africa. All at thetaxpayers' expense. No wonder he lost touch with South Dakota. With so many

problems at home, we need a senator and not a globetrotter.15Increasingly senators found that foreign policy concerns were politically

expensive, and as a result, were generally unwilling to undertake majorinitiatives. Developments in electioneering during the late 1970s thusserved to weaken the effectiveness of the Senate's earlier initiatives toregain its role in foreign policy-making in the aftermath of Vietnam.At the centre of most of the Senate's attempts to reassert its foreignpolicy role during the early 1970s was a belief that many of its constitutionalprerogatives, particularly that of war-making, had been usurped by theexecutive. One result of this concern was the passage of the War PowersResolutions of 1973, which attempted to limit the President's ability tocommit U.S. armed forces to action. Section 3 of the Resolution providedthat the President "shall consult with Congress before introducing UnitedStates armed forces into hostilities." Section 4 required the President tosubmit awritten report to the leader of each house of Congress wheneverU.S. armed forces were introduced into hostilities. Finally, Section 5required the President to terminate the use of armed forces within sixtydays of his initial war powers report, unless Congress authorized anextension. Although these requirements had been largely ignored byPresidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and the provisions of theWar Powers

Resolution never invoked, the reaction in the Senate to use of the armedforces by the President provides a useful barometer of the state ofexecutive?senatorial relations. For example, throughout the 1970s the useof armed force by the President usually provoked an angry response fromsenators claiming that the War Powers Resolution had been ignored.Senator Thomas Eagleton (D. Mo) criticized the Nixon Administrationfor ignoring the Resolution when evacuating U.S. citizens from Cyprusin 1974. Senator Eagleton was joined by Senator Robert Byrd (D.W.Va.)

15New York Times, 24 March 1980, 136.



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172 Christopher J. Baileyinmaking a similar criticism of President Ford over the evacuation of U.S.citizens from Saigon in 1975, while Senator Javits expressed concern overthe evacuation of Phnom Penh. The use of armed force by Presidents Fordand Carter in attempts to rescue the crew of theMayague^ in 1975 and thehostages held in Iran in 1980 were also condemned as having violated the

War Powers Resolution.16Notwithstanding the statement by Senator Claiborne Pell (D. R. I.), the

ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, that "I'd like to seethe committee play the same role it did during the Vietnam War days when,I think, we played a major role in the country," the tension over constitutional prerogatives between the Senate and the executive appearedto have disappeared at the beginning of the first Reagan Administration.17More typical of the new mood was Senator Tower's description of theWar Powers Resolution as "probably the most potentially damaging ofthe 1970s legislation."18 The first major attempt to cite the War PowersResolution did not occur until the 8March 1982, when in response toa growing concern that the U.S. was being dragged into a war inEl Salvador, Minority Leader Senator Robert Byrd introduced S. 2179to prohibit the use of U.S. armed forces in El Salvador. A careful distinction, however, should be made between Senator Byrd's citing of theWarPowers Resolution and the criticisms made of the "unauthorized" use offorce by Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. The former was an attack onthe substance of U.S. foreign policy while the latter called into question theconstitutionality of a course of action. Not until the decision to send marinesinto Lebanon did senators begin to query the procedures of a foreignpolicy decision.The decision to deploy a contingent of marines as part of an internationalforce to supervise the peaceful departure of PLO forces from Lebanon wastaken in response to a request for help from the Lebanese government.As the marines had been invited by the legitimate government of thecountry the Reagan Administration took the view that they were not beingintroduced into a hostile situation, and therefore there was no need tomeetthe reporting requirements of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution.This view was challenged by Senators Percy and Pell who wrote to thePresident on 20 August 1982 urging him to make a report.19 Unwilling16 For an excellent study of the background, provisions, and history of the War Powers

Provision, see Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution : Its Implementation in 'Theoryand Practice (Philadelphia, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1983).17 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 14March 1981, 479. 18 Tower, 2*8.19 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 28 Aug. 1982, 2158.



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981?1986 173to concede the possibility of hostilities, but anxious to avoid a confrontation with Congress, Reagan promptly submitted an ambiguously wordedreport. This report stated that:consistent with the War Powers Resolution, I am hereby providing a report on thedeployment and mission of these members of the United States ArmedForces ... I want to emphasize that there is no intention or expectation that U.S.Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities . . . this deployment ... is beingundertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conductof oreign relations and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces. [Myemphasis.]

As the report was received during the August congressional recess therewas little immediate reaction, and the marines were withdrawn on 10September following the completion of their mission. On the 20 September, however, the Lebanese Cabinet asked for their redeployment to helpkeep the peace following the assassination of President Gemayel. SenatorsPercy and Pell again wrote to the President asking him to cite the WarPowers Resolution before deployment.21 On 29 September Reagan complied with the wishes of Percy and Pell, and submitted a report almostidentical to the one in August. It declared that, "In carrying out their

mission the American force will not engage on conflict . . . [andthat] . . . there is no intention or expectation that U.S. Armed Forces willbecome involved in hostilities. "22

Congressional reaction to the second deployment was subdued, and itwas not until a year later when the U.S. forces came under fire from Druzemilitiamen that the War Powers issue once again rose to prominence.Following the death of two marines on 29 August 1983 Senators Percyand Byrd urged Reagan to cite the War Powers Resolution, with Byrddeclaring that, "American forces are clearly involved in hostilities withinthe meaning of Section 4 . . .of the War Powers Resolution.

"23 On the15 September 1983, following the death of two marines and the shelling

of Moslem artillery positions by U.S. warships, the Senate Democraticcaucus voted 29-0 to introduce a resolution invoking the War PowersResolution. After much discussion between President Reagan and Senator

Baker a compromise resolution, S. J. Res. 159, was eventually drafted andpassed by the Senate in a 54?46 vote. S. J. Res. 159 invoked the WarPowers Resolution and set an eighteen month limit on the deployment of

20 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers 1982, Vol. 2, 1078-79.21 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 2 Oct. 1982, 2464.22 Ronald Reagan, 1238.23 Congressional Quarterly 1983 Almanac, 114.



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174 Christopher J. Baileythe marines, but also allowed President Reagan to declare in writing thefact that he did not recognize the constitutionality of the War Powers

Resolution.24What differentiated the debate over S. J. Res. 159 from the calls in 1982

by Senator Byrd to place restraints on the use of U.S. troops in El Salvadorwas the general agreement in the Senate over the content of PresidentReagan's policy towards Lebanon. In a letter to the New York TimesSenator Mathias stated that the purpose of the Senate's attempts to invokethe War Powers Resolution was to make clear the support for Reagan'spolicy: "the President is running a serious risk that the American peoplewill not support our commitment in Lebanon if it remains a narrow policyof the Administration without a clear expression of Congressionalsupport. "25 This view was shared by Senator Ted Stevens (R. Alaska)who said, "The sensitivity of the Congress to the president's compliancewith the War Powers Act is the issue?more than the presence of themarines in Lebanon. "26 Senator Byrd expressed his belief that at the heartof the debate was a constitutional rather than a foreign policy question :"There are few issues of greater importance than the issue confrontingus ? the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches.

This issue is bigger than political parties, bigger than personalities, biggerthan any particular office of the United States. "27 The consensus on theforeign policy question was further shown by the failure of a resolution(S. J. Res. 190) introduced by Senators Alan Dixon (D. 111.), Edward

Kennedy (D. Mass.), and Thomas Eagleton on the 28October 1983 whichproposed limiting the marines to three more months in Lebanon. Themeasure was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee where it wasblocked by Senator Percy.28The passage of S. J. Res. 159 was, in fact, the only example of majorconstitutional conflict between President Reagan and the Senate over aforeign policy issue between 1981 and 1986. Immediately after the invasionof Grenada the Senate attached an amendment sponsored by Senator GaryHart (D. Colo.) to an unrelated bill raising the public debt ceiling(H. J. Res. 308) which stated that U.S. forces must be withdrawn fromthe island within ninety days unless an extension was granted by Congress.The Hart Amendment died, however, when H. J. Res. 308 was defeated

24 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, i Oct. 1983, 2015.25New York Times, 7 Sept. 1983, A23.26 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 Sept. 1983, 1919.27New York Times, 17 Sept. 1983, A4.28 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 Nov. 1983, 2359.



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981-1986 175on the floor of the Senate. Further concern over institutional prerogativessurfaced in April 1984 when Senator Goldwater expressed considerableirritation that the members of the Senate Intelligence Committee "werenot given the information we were entitled to receive" about the C.I.A.'smining of Nicaraguan harbours.29 In a letter he sharply rebuked WilliamJ. Casey, the Director of the C.I.A., for failing to brief the committee onthe issue, but continued to support the Administration's programme ofcovert actions against Nicaragua. The Intelligence Committee's actions,in fact, reflected a much more general pattern. With the exception ofLebanon, the major conflicts between President Reagan and the Senateover foreign policy tended to reflect constituency concerns rather thanconstitutional matters.

To a certain extent this primacy of constituency concerns over constitutional matters is hardly surprising. Constituency pressures have alwaystended to be far more important than constitutional conflicts in definingthe nature of the relationship between the President and the Senate. AsBen W. Heineman and Curtis A. Hessles have pointed out, with theexception of Watergate and Vietnam "the tension between the Presidentand Congress has not been between different conceptions of theirconstitutional roles, but between the nationalism of the President's view,and the pluralism that is the sum of Congress's parts."30 While thePresident can claim to speak for all Americans, senators, in the words ofJames Madison, "will likely attach themselves too much to localobjects . . .measures will too often be decided according to their probableeffect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices,interests, and pursuits of the government and people of individualstates. "31Most conflicts between the President and the Senate over foreign

policy have therefore occurred on those occasions when the President'sprogramme has affected part of a senator's constituency. This point wasnoted by John Rourke who wrote: "Any issue of foreign policy whichcauses reaction in a segment or among a cross-section of a congressman'spolitical base is apt to stimulate interest and activity on his part. "32 Forexample, pressure from German and Irish Americans upon their senators

29 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 14 April 1984, 833.30 Ben W. Heineman and Curtis A. Hessles, Memorandum for the President (New York :Random House, 1980), 91.31 James Madison, "Federalist Paper No. 46", in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison,and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New AmericanLibrary, 1961), 296.32 John Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policy making (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1983), 239.



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176 Christopher J. Baileyhindered American support for Britain and France during the First World

War, and in the early 1940s, the pro-German senator, Burton K. Wheeler(D. Mont.) attempted to block passage of the Lend?Lease Acts.The revolution in campaign technology during the 1970s accentuatedthe need for senators to be aware of the desires and requirements of theirconstituencies. While this development led to a greater reliance on

presidential initiatives in foreign policy, it also meant that such initiativeswere subject to much greater scrutiny by senators for their domesticimplications. During the Carter Administration, for example, senatorsrepresenting states with large Jewish and Greek voting blocs voted againstthe President's plans to sell military aircraft to Egypt and Saudia Arabia,and to repeal an arms embargo on Turkey. Senator Clifford Case (R.N.J.)even went so far as to make an impassioned defence of Israel, well awarethat 6 percent of New Jersey's electorate was Jewish: "The existenceof Israel, its strength to defend itself, is essential to the preservation oftheWest, to the preservation of NATO, and inevitably, in the end, to thepreservation of the United States. More than that, it is essential to thepreservation of the moderate Arab regimes. "33 The pressure on senatorssuch as Clifford Case from powerful ethnic blocs was usually focussed onpolicies which were perceived as damaging to a particular foreign country.Other forms of constituency pressure reflected economic interests, or, asin the case of the Vietnam War, a general concern over the direction ofAmerican foreign policy. During the first Reagan Administration both ofthese forms of constituency pressure had an important impact in deter

mining the nature of executive-senatorial relations. While concern wasexpressed over President Reagan's policies towards Central Americabecause of fears that the United States would be dragged into aVietnamtype war and a general reluctance to see the United States associated withcountries which abused human rights, the attempt to build a new"strategic consensus" in the Middle East was frustrated through theefforts of the Jewish lobby.Concern over the Reagan Administration's policies towards CentralAmerica was expressed sporadically in the Senate during this period. In

May 1981, for example, the Senate put conditions on the provision of U.S.military aid to El Salvador when it passed an amendment proposed bySenator Christopher J. Dodd (D. Conn.) which required President Reaganto make a regular report to Congress certifying that the ruling junta hadmade progress on economic and political reforms. A concern for human

33 Congressional Record, 95th Congress, 2nd sess., 15May 1978, S. 7378.



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981?1986 177

rights, in fact, was at the heart of the Senate's reaction to PresidentReagan's policy towards El Salvador. On the 24 September 1981 the Senatevoted to suspend U.S. military aid to El Salvador unless the junta protectedhuman rights and pursued economic and political reforms, and in the Fiscal1982 Foreign Aid Authorization Bill listed progress on land reform as oneof the annual conditions which El Salvador had to meet in order to

continue receiving U.S. military aid. When the Constituent Assembly ofEl Salvador voted on 18May 1982 to suspend a land reform programmebacked by the United States, Senator Percy declared that if the reformswere abrogated "not one cent of funds shall go to the government ofEl Salvador."34 In February 1983 Senator Dodd stated his belief thatthe certification law is "turning into a farce because the administration iscertifying to Congress things that it knows not to be true" and inMarchthe Foreign Relations Committee approved only half of President Reagan'srequest for a further ?60 million aid for El Salvador.35 Only when

Napolean Duarte was elected president of El Salvador inMay 1984, andpromised to initiate a series of wide-ranging reforms, did the question ofaid to El Salvador become a non-controversial issue.

The Senate's concern with human rights was also reflected in the 13-4vote of the Foreign Relations Committee to recommend that the Senaterefuse to confirm Ernest W. Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State forHuman Rights. The central issue during Lefever's confirmation hearingswas the nature of President Reagan's human rights policy. Lefever, likeJeanne Kirkpatrick, believed that President Carter's human rights policyhad alienated friendly authoritarian regimes while overlooking greaterabuses by totalitarian regimes like the U.S.S.R.36 The best way of reducingthe human rights abuses of anti-communist regimes, he argued, was notby isolating them, but by offering their leaders the security of U.S.friendship and then quietly using the influence thus gained to push forreforms. These arguments were bitterly attacked in the Senate, especiallyby Democratic senators, with Senator Pell stating that if Lefever wereconfirmed, "The message to the world would be that the U.S. hasslackened its concern for human rights around the world. "37 With only34 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 22 May 1982, n 80.35 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 Feb. 1983, 344.36 Jeanne Kirkpatrick's views on human rights policies and foreign policy in general arecontained in two collections of her essays. See Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Dictatorship andDouble Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster,

198 2) ;and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy(Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 1983).37 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 May 1981, 900.



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178 Christopher J. BaileySenators Baker, Helms, Hayakawa, and Lugar voting against reportingthe nomination unfavourably, Lefever withdrew his nomination, and thusgave the Reagan Administration its first important foreign policy defeat.The failure of Lefever's nomination, and the Senate's attacks onReagan's policy towards El Salvador, reflected a general mood of apprehension in the United States about the nature of the Administration'spolicies which was not expressed again until the issue of South Africa roseto prominence in 1985, when the growing antipathy of many Americanstowards the Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" withSouth Africa began to be reflected in the Senate. In July 1985 the Senatepassed S. 995 imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, and therebyinitiated a battle over a foreign policy issue which was to last for overa year. By October 1986 concern in the Senate over apartheid was greatenough for senators to override President Reagan's veto of a broadpackage of sanctions against South Africa by a vote of 78-21, inflictingupon the Reagan Administration its worst foreign policy reverse.The South African vote reflected a widespread discontent over thedirection of one aspect of American foreign policy and a desire to courtblack voters. This point was made by Senator Richard Lugar when hestated:

"A large majority of senators would like to take some action onSouth Africa. They would like to cast a vote that indicates their un

happiness."38 As such the vote differed from the conflicts between theSenate and Reagan over the Administration's policy towards the MiddleEast, particularly the policy of support for the moderate Arab states, whichwere largely the result of pressure from ethnic voting blocs. Indeed, thefirst major test of foreign policy power between the Reagan Administrationand the Senate occurred over the proposed sale of AWACS to SaudiaArabia in 1981. Within days of the announcement of the sale inApril 1981preliminary vote counts in the Senate suggested that there were onlytwelve senators in favour of the sale while 65, led by Senator BobPackwood (R. Ore), opposed it.39 On the 24 June Senator Packwood sentReagan a letter expressing "deep concern" over the sale, and stating that,"It is our strong belief that this sale is not in the best interests of the U.S.and therefore recommend that you refrain from sending this proposal toCongress. "40

Opposition to the sale was largely the result of a strong and open38 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 July 1986, 1606.39 See I. M. Destler, "The Evolution of Reagan's Foreign Policy," in Fred I. Greenstein,

ed., The Reagan Presidency (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 122-23.40 Cited by Alexander Haig, Caveat (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), 185.



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981-1986 179condemnation of the proposal by the Israeli government, JewishAmerican groups such as the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee(AIPAC), and their supporters in the Senate. Typical was Senator OrrinHatch's (R. Utah) declaration that the sale would force the Israelis to buy

more arms, engender an arms race in the Middle-East, and have direconsequences for Israel's economy.

" An arms spiral would be an economicdisaster for inflation-plagued Israel," he stated.41 To counter thesearguments Reagan wrote a letter to the Senate containing assurances thathe had obtained agreements from the Saudis aimed at preventing the useof the AWACs against Israel. He also reaffirmed that the United States

would continue to ensure Israeli military superiority in the region.Reagan's intervention in the debate was important because by counteringthe arguments of the Jewish lobby, he was able to "change the focus ofthe debate to include presidential prestige, his ability to carry on foreignaffairs, and the ability of foreign leaders to rely on a steady Americanforeign policy. "42 In doing so he was able to take advantage of the newview among senators of their role in the foreign policy making process.Not only did the leadership of the Senate lobby hard on Reagan's behalf,but eight of the fifty senators who had originally co-sponsored the resolution disapproving of the sale changed their minds.43 The controversy"changed the stakes involved" by putting the President's prestige on theline, stated Senator Roger Jepsen (R. Iowa), one of the eight.44As a result of these factors the Senate rejected the resolution (H.Con. Res. 194) disapproving of the sale by a 48?5 2 vote. This early success,

however, was not sustained in later votes on arms sales to Arab countries.The successful passage of the AWACs deal was largely predicated uponPresident Reagan's active involvement in the issue, and on other occasionswhen he was either unable, or unwilling, to devote as much time to

lobbying senators, pressure from the Jewish lobby helped defeat four ofhis arms sales proposals. First, in October 1983 the Senate rejected aReagan proposal to arm and support two brigades of the Jordanian armyas a rapid deployment "strike force" in the Middle East. Senator DanielMoynihan (D.N. Y.) declared that Congress "would never vote for such

41 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, n April 1981, 632.42 Rourke, Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policy making, 259.43 The eight senators who changed their minds were: Mark Andrews (R.N.D.), WilliamCohn (R. Mi.), Slade Gorkin (R. Wash.), Orrin Hatch (R. Utah), Roger Jepsen(R. Iowa), Larry Pressler (R. S.D.), Alan Simpson (R. Wyo.), and Edward Zorinsky(D. Neb.).44New York Times, 28 Oct. 1981, Ai.



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18o Christopher J. Baileya monstrous measure if that vote were to be known to constituents. "45

Second, inMarch 1984 pressure from Senator Packwood caused PresidentReagan to withdraw a proposal to sell Stinger anti-aircraft missiles toJordan and Saudia Arabia. Third, in October 1985 the Senate passedS. J. Res. 228 blocking the Administration's plan to sell advanced warplanes worth $1-5-2 billion to Jordan unless Jordan and Israel had begun"direct and meaningful" peace talks. Fourth, in May 1986 the Senatepassed S. J. Res. 316 to block President Reagan's plan to sell $354 millionworth of missiles to Saudia Arabia. Similar pressure from the Irish lobbyled to attempts to block a new extradition treaty between Britain and theUnited States, which would have made it easier for Britain to extraditeI.R.A. terrorists. Heavy pressure from the Reagan Administration, however, eventually ensured the ratification of the treaty in July 1986 by a87?10 vote despite the opposition of senators such as John Kerry(D. Mass.), Christopher Dodd (D. Conn.), and Joseph Biden (D. Del.).The defeat of the proposals to sell weapons to Jordan and Saudia Arabiacan be regarded as fairly minor, and the fact that President Reagan suffered

only one major foreign policy reverse in the Senate between 1981 and 1986is indicative of the extent of presidential ascendancy in this area. UnlikePresidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, Reagan was fortunate in being ableto deal with a Senate whose members were generally in agreement withhis foreign policy aims, and equally important, were willing to allow himsome leeway in achieving those aims. This situation changed dramaticallyfollowing the congressional elections of 1986 and the gradual emergenceof the Irangate scandal. Not only did the Democratic takeover in theSenate remove the basis of President Reagan's support in the chamber,but Irangate presented senators with amuch needed opportunity to injectthemselves into a dispute with the Administration. As with Vietnam inthe late 1960s and early 1970s, the issue provided a focus for oppositionto the Administration's foreign policy and forced its supporters on to the

defensive.It is somewhat ironic, however, that it should have been the Irangatedisclosures which signalled the end of a period of senatorial deference to

presidential foreign policy-making. Rather than being an "aberration" asthe Tower Commission reported, the Irangate affair owed as much to thefailure of Congress to perform its oversight function as it did to problemsof management in the National Security Council. By failing to challengeother aspects of President Reagan's foreign policy, the Senate facilitated45 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5Nov. 1983, 2291.



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President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy, 1981-1986 181the growth of a complacent attitude within the Administration whichultimately led to measures such as the arms sales to Iran and the diversionof funds to the Contras. In amore challenging environment, where foreignpolicy proposals were subjected to greater scrutiny by both the Senate andthe Executive, it is unlikely that either of these measures would have beenimplemented.The events of the first six years of the Reagan Presidency, in fact, raiseserious questions about the role of a legislature in the foreign policy

making process. During the late 1970s and early 1980s advocates of the" strong presidency " argued that successful foreign policy requires secrecy,firm leadership, and a national rather than a parochial perspective, and thatonly the president was in a position to provide these attributes.46 Theexperience of the Reagan Administration, however, seems to suggest thatthese are not the only qualities necessary for successful foreign policy. Theefficacy of foreign policy is also dependent upon the calibre of the inputinto the system. By deferring to President Reagan, and failing to make any

major contribution to the making of policy, the Senate ensured thatAmerican foreign policy was formulated without due consideration of allthe issues involved. If there is any lesson to be learned from the first sixyears of the Reagan Presidency, and Irangate in particular, itwould seemto be that the "advice and consent" of the Senate should be an importantpart of the foreign policy-making process.46 See John Spanier and John Nogee, eds., Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign

Policy (New York: Pergamon, 1981).

President Reagan, the U.S. Senate, and American Foreign Policy

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