Presentazione Bisin Giornate Noisefromamerika 2011

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    The economics of civil wars:A survey

    Free interpretative arrangements; mostly from: C. Blattman and E. Miguel (2010),

    Civil wars,Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 3-57.

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    UCDP Armed Conflict Database

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    Incidence of civil war/conflict by

    duration: 1960-2006

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    Incidence of civil war/conflict by per

    capita GDP: 1960-2006

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    Modeling: methodology

    Group rationality and strategic behavior of

    insurgents/counterinsurgents/state

    Appropriation vs pro uction - contest successfunction:

    We (economists) do not do this! Ohhh no!

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    Modeling: Individual participation

    Individual choice:

    1. opportunity costs of fighting and expected benefits theoretical

    implications for per capita income are uncertain2. individuals place inherent value on retaliation against an unjust state

    Principal agent:

    1. rebel leaders use material incentives/ethnic appeals to motivate citizens -

    socialbetween the leader and the recruit2. threats and punishments as selective incentives, in the absence of a shared

    social basis for mobilizing support - rationale for using coercion on lowproductivity recruits (especially children)

    Coalition formation:

    1. Along racial/ethnic groups to commit not to defect to winner

    2. Along pre-existing networks for efficient informationtransmission/coordination of violent enforcement

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    Modeling: War as rational conflict resolution

    mechanism

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    Correlations with civil war incidence:

    Cross-country evidence

    Correlation:

    slow current growth

    per capita income

    Income shocks

    natural resources/total exports

    rough terrain

    population size

    Uncorrelated after conditioning:

    ethnic fractionalization

    income inequality

    democracy

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    Correlation/causation caveatExample: civil wars ---------- per capita income

    1. low per capita income civil war (via smallopportunity cost of fighting)

    1. civil war low per capita income (via destruction ofphysical, human, and social capital)

    1. ethnic fragmentation low per capita income

    civil war

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    Natural experiments, IVs, better

    measurement rainfall as IV for income shocks (yes! but possibly: via govt

    resources and opportunity costs of farmers)

    import-export price shocks as IV for income shocks (no) more precise measures of natural resources: oil, diamonds (yes!)

    better theoretically grounded measures: income polarization forine ualit es! , ethnic/reli ious fractionalization ?

    political institutions and governance from case studies: enclaveproduction, weakness of democratic institutions from polity IV, newvs established democracies, inclusiveness of political institutions,geographic concentration of power, state control over thegeographic periphery, direct taxation for state efficiency (unclear!)

    related lhs variables: length (correlated with ethnicfractionalization), termination

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    Descriptive factors from case studies external financing to sustain insurgencies

    earlier state repression

    persistent ethnic or elite class dominance

    peripheral regions with weak central government

    Institutional historical transformations: the nineteenth

    century incorporation of most of Africa and Asia intoEuropean empires, and mid-twentieth century formation ofnation-states in those regions

    contagion from neighboring countries

    refugee flows foreign aid

    Cold War interventions

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    Missing (?)

    models of spread of rebellion, social

    (global/local) interactions, networks,

    (across individuals, not countries and I am not talking

    about Twitter and Facebook)

    micro-data appropriate to test and estimate

    these models

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    Off-topic:

    qualms between academic disciplines

    Why didnt anybody complain about the

    inability of political scientists to accurately

    about economists and the 2008 financial

    crisis?

    Dedicato a Giovanni Sartori e ai suoi bravi