Preliminary ConsiderationsREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs.JOSEFINA B. VDA. DE NERI, SPS. GRACIANO B. NERI, JR. and VICTORIA BABIERA, SPS. VICTORIA NERI and MARIO FERNANDEZ, RAMON NERI, SPS. TERESA NERI and ALBERTO YRASTORZA and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, respondents.G.R. No. 139588 March 4, 2004

A petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines through the Director of the Bureau of Lands before the Court seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC which dismissed the petitioners complaint for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0662 and reversion of Lot 2821 in Cagayan De Oro City to whom the heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr. filed an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title before the RTC of Misamis Oriental.The private respondents are owners of a certain parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro City and they alleged that they do not know any mortgage or encumbrances affecting such land or any other person has any estate or legal interest therein legal or equitable possession, remainder reversion or expectance and such land was inherited from late Graciano Neri and prayed before the Court that a Certificate of Title be issued in their favour under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Furthermore, they alleged that the Bureau of Forest and Development had classified the subject lot as alienable and disposable.Thereafter the applicants filed an amended application in the same case and the Court issued a notice of initial hearing addressed to the proper parties. On the designated time and date, no representative from the Office of the Solicitor General and the Bureau of Lands appeared in court. The court then issued an order allowing the applicants to adduce evidence ex parte. For failure of the Office of the Solicitor General and Director of the Bureau of Lands to appeal, the court rendered judgment granting the application.On January 5, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed with the court a quo a complaint for the annulment of OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of the property covered by the said title against the respondents on the merit that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the property by its failure to comply with the mandated requirement by Commonwealth Act No.141, Section 51 of a copy of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title served on the Director of Bureau of Lands and for the failure of the respondents to comply with Sections 2 and 3 of PD 239 requiring them to the plan to be re-verified and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.On March 18, 1985, the Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. On July 17, 1985, Leonel and 22 others filed a motion for leave to intervene praying that OCT No. 0662 be nullified on the grounds that they are occupying the property even before 1969 and made extensive improvements thereto and that they were never informed of Neris application in LRC Case No. N-531. The Court denied the motion and dismissed the complaint and the complaint-in-intervention for lack of jurisdiction and proceeded to a full-blown trial and to submit memoranda in support of the parties respective contentions.The court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint against the Republic of the Philippines for failure to prove actual averments and declaring as valid and legal all the proceedings taken by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental regarding OCT No. 0662. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court gravely erred in rendering a decision without holding a trial and giving an opportunity to appellant to present evidence because it rendered judgment based on the pleadings notwithstanding factual issues that were raised by the parties.Hence, the petitioner filed its petition for review on certiorari praying that the Court resolved the issues.ISSUE:Whether the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown trial, based solely on the pleadings of the parties and the documents appended to their memorandum?HELD:A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary evidence and thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence.The trial court dispensed with a full-blown trial because, precisely, the parties themselves agreed thereto, on the claim that the issues raised may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, the memoranda and the appended documents, without need of presenting witnesses thereon. A party may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary evidence and thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence. In this case, no less than the petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General through Special Attorney Vicente Seria, agreed to dispense with a full-blown trial.However, to prove the material allegations of its complaint as provided in Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which reads: Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Initially, the burden of proof is with the plaintiff who initiated the action. But in the final analysis, the party upon whom the ultimate burden lies is to be determined by the pleadings, not by who is the plaintiff or the defendant. The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain, and based on the result of an inquiry, which party would be successful if he offers no evidence.In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. All facts in issue and relevant facts must, as a general rule, be proven by evidence except the following:(1) Allegations contained in the complaint or answer immaterial to the issues.(2) Facts which are admitted or which are not denied in the answer, provided they have been sufficiently alleged.(3) Those which are the subject of an agreed statement of facts between the parties; as well as those admitted by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case.(4) Facts which are the subject of judicial notice.(5) Facts which are legally presumed.(6) Facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party.The Court nullified Original Certificate Title No. 0662 under the names of the private respondents and orders the reversion of the property covered by the said title to the petitioner due to failure of the respondents to comply with the requirements of PD 1529 before they filed their application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title and the evidence showed that they failed to append a survey plan duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands to their application.EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC., Petitioner, vs.BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP. and MITSUI SUM TOMO INSURANCE CO. LTD., Respondents.FACTS:On Aug. 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation shipped through MV Eastern Challenger, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., 31 steel sheets in coil from Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the consignee Calamba Steel Center Inc. The cargo was insured against all risk by Sumitomo with Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. On Sept. 6 2003, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila. Upon unloading from the vessel, 9 coils were in bad condition. The cargo was turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba Steels withdrawal of the goods. When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter rejected its damaged portion for being unfit for its intended purpose. On Sept. 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28 steel sheets in coil was made by Sumitomo through MV Eastern Challenger for transport and delivery again to Calamba Steel. This second shipment arrived at the port of Manila on Sept. 23, 2003. However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel, 11 coils were found damaged. The possession of the said cargo was then transferred to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal by Calamba Steel. When ATI delivered the goods, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion the same being unfit for its intended purpose. Lastly, on Sept. 29, 2003, Sumitomo again shipped 117 steel sheets in coil through MV Eastern Venus, again in favor of Calamba Steel. This third shipment was also insured by Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on Oct. 11, 2003. Upon its discharge, 6 coils in bad condition. Thereafter, the possession of the cargo was turned over to ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by Calamba Steel. The damaged portion of the goods being unfit for its intended purpose, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion upon ATIs delivery of the third shipment.

Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS), and the former was paid the sums of US$7,677.12, US$14,782.05 and US$7,751.15 for the damage suffered by all three shipments or for the total amount of US$30,210.32. On Aug. 31, 2004, as insurer and subrogee of Calamba Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a Complaint for Damages against petitioner and ATI. RTC rendered its decision against Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc. Aggrieved, Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and ATI appealed to the CA. CA in its decision affirmed with modification the RTCs findings and ruling, holding that both petitioner and ATI were very negligent in the handling of the cargoes. Petitioner and ATI filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA committed any reversible error in finding that petitioner is solidarily liable with ATI on account of the damage incurred by the goods.

RULING:

No, CA did not commit any error. In petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in issue, thus, questions of fact cannot be entertained (Sec. 1, Rule 45 Rules of Court).

A question of law, on one hand, exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. The resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI should be liable for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly impose upon this Court the task of reviewing, examining and evaluating or weighing all over again the probative value of the evidence presented.While it is true that the aforementioned rule admits of certain exceptions, SC finds that none are applicable in this case. The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC which were duly affirmed by the CA. Unanimous with the CA, the Court gives credence and accords respect to the factual findings of the RTC highlighting the solidary liability of both petitioner and ATI. In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the ruling of the RTC as to warrant the modification, much less the reversal of its assailed decision.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Rule 129

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR. vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINASG.R. No. 159507April 19, 2006Facts: Saludo is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines. AMEX, Inc. is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. Because of the great inconvenience and damages that Saludo had experienced from the bad faith, wanton, reckless and oppressive acts of respondents, he then prayed AMEX be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.Respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.Petitioner asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.The Court a quo decided in favor of the petitioner. The appellate court on the other hand ruled in favor of the respondents. Basing from Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff. Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province. The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.Issue:Whether the court may take a judicial notice of a matter within the locality where the court sitsRuling:Yes, it may. The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position, including that he was then a resident of the district which he was representing. Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, including its Constitution.The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits. Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.

CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs. PHILBANKING CORPORATIONG.R. No. 150731 September 14, 2007FACTSIn 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty Corporation involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and PhP 681,500 (PN No. 84-05). It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the loan it covered would earn an interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of 12% in case of non-payment by June 27, 1985, while the loan covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an interest of 18% per annum and 12% penalty if not paid by June 25, 1985. On August 8, 1986, these promissory notes were assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment.Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon maturity such that its obligation already amounted to PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993. Respondent filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the collection of said amount. In its Answer, petitioner raised the following defenses:

On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which ceded and conveyed petitioners property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the intention of totally extinguishing petitioners outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a Confirmation Statement dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of December 31, 1988 and that petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the property since the obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements in the latter months of 1989, which showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan. The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference. Thereafter, respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence, pointing out that the plaintiffs failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated petitioners obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition which alleged that the grounds relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not insufficiency of evidence.The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint.Respondent appealed.The appellate court ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the law. Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue. It added that the court a quo should have resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioners demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence.The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, respondent clearly had the right to proceed against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty. Petitioner asserts that its obligation to pay under the promissory notes was already extinguished as evidenced by the Dacion and Confirmation Statement. Petitioner submits that when it presented these documents in its Answer, respondent should have denied the same under oath. Since respondent failed to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution of said documents were deemed admitted, thus also admitting that the loan was already paid. On the other hand, respondent states that while it failed to file aReply, all the new matters were deemed controverted pursuant to Section 10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to another loan of petitioner amounting to PhP 3,921,750 which was obtained directly from the respondent as of August 1986. Furthermore, petitioner argued that assuming respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement, said admission was not all-encompassing as to include the allegations and defenses pleaded in petitioners Answer.

ISSUEShould judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence. If yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the complaint.

RULINGThe petition is partly meritorious.Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the plaintiffs evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The facts referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendants evidence.Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacionexcludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.In 1989, however, Rare Realty defaulted in its payment to respondent. Thus, respondent proceeded against the security assigned to it, that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner. Under these promissory notes, petitioner is liable for the amount of PhP 300,000 with an interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 27, 1985; and for the amount of PhP 681,500 with an interest of 18% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 25, 1985.WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Solidbank v. Mindanao FerroalloyGR. no. 153535, 464 SCRA 409July 28, 2005

Topic: Court may take judicial notice of bank proceedings

Facts: The Korean corporations namely, the Ssangyong Corporation, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company and the Dongil Industries Company, Ltd., together with the Maria Christina Chemical Industries (MCCI) decided to forge a joint venture and establish a corporation under the name of Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation (Corporation). Before the said Corporation started its operations it secured a loan from the Solidbank. As the business continued, its indebtedness became greater than its assets. It again secured a loan from the said bank through its representatives however, the former and the latter agreed to restructure the two loan availments. To secure payment of said loans, the Corporation, through its representatives, executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the Bank covering its rights, titles and interest over the Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. Tokyo for the account of Ssangyong Corporation. Aside from this, it executed an additional security by way of Quedan. However, after the execution of said deeds, the Corporation stopped its operations. It failed to pay its loan availments and afterwards, failed to comply with the series of demand for payment. As a result, the said bank filed a complaint against the respondents. The lower court decided in favor of the respondents stating that the petitioner failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove the personal liability of the said respondents. On the other hand, the petitioner interposed an appeal from the decision of the Court. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court and took judicial notice of the practice of the banks and financing institutions to investigate, examine, and assess all properties offered by borrowers as collateral , in order to determine the feasibility and advisability of granting loans.

Issue: Whether or not bank practices may be proper subject of judicial notice

Ruling:Yes, the court may take judicial notice of the bank proceedings as provided by the rules of court. The rules provide that while a court is not mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it nevertheless may do so under Section 2 of the same rule. The latter rule provides that a court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Thus, the court has taken judicial notice of the practices of banks and other financial institutions. Precisely, it has noted that it is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to investigate, examine, and assess would be borrowers credit standing or real estate offered as security for the loan applied for.

Rule 129. Topic on judicial contents of another case:Gener vs De Leon, GR No. 130730, October 19, 2001courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court, except when with the knowledge of the adverse party reference is made to these cases and the latter did not object thereto.Facts:Respondent De Leon filed a forcible entry case against petitioner Gener, alleging that he is the original claimant and actual possessor in good faith under a bona fide claim of ownership to a certain parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. The said land was part of the bed of the Angat River which was formerly adjacent to the boundary of lot that is covered by the Certificate of Title of De Leon. A flood caused that part of the river to develop and elevated and dried up land where De Leon extended occupation, planting and cultivating coconuts, bananas and vegetables. In May 1989, Gener allegedly through force, threat and intimidation unlawfully entered the property and deprived De Leon possession thereof. De Leon demand Gener to vacate the premises but was ignored. Efforts to settle the dispute amicably thru the brgy justice system did not prosper prompting De Leon to file an ejectment case against Gener.Gener on the other hand denied all allegations of the respondent and claimed to be the real owner of the property as evidenced by the notarized deed of sale which was executed in October 1988 by Benjamin Joaquin who is the heir of the former possessor of the land, Proceso Joaquin. The land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Gener and declared the land as private. De Leons father, in an affidavit, mentioned that P. Joaquin was the owner the neighboring lot in the east side of their lot.Gener further attested that it was De Leon who forcibly entered the lot in question as evidenced by two criminal cases on malicious mischief he filed against the workers of De Deleon who entered the disputed land and destroyed the planted trees thereon. He also invoked that the right to file an action for ejection already prescribed after filing the same beyond the 1 year prescription period. Trial ensued where Gener is the only witness to his defense while De Leon presented oral testimonies of witnesses who stated that he was the owner of the lot in dispute. Gener presented a deed of sale, a tax declaration of the land in his name and recalled the 2 criminal cases he filed on malicious mischief against the worker of De Leon. The MTC ruled in favor of De Leon but the decision was reversed by the RTC and dismissed the forcible entry case against Gener. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. A motion for reconsideration was then filed before the SC.Issue: Whether or not the ejectment case may lie against Gener?Ruling:The court ruled that in the ejectment case the issue to be resolved is who would be entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. Respondent De Leon has his claim founded from the presentation of testimonial evidence of various witnesses while Gener has his claim founded on documentary evidence which the MTC failed to appreciate during the trial. As against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon by respondents that they were forcibly ejected from the land by petitioner on May 8, 1989, the documentary evidence of petitioners prior possession, more particularly the evidence of the two (2) criminal charges he filed. Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence, especially when said documentary evidence is not opposed. The MTC should have taken judicial notice of the criminal cases presented by Gener. While as a general rule the court is not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such case is tried or pending on the same court, the exception to this rule is that in the absence of objection of the other party, the court may treat such evidence as part of the original record of the case when it is presented or referred to with the knowledge of the adverse party who fails to object thereto, the MTC should have taken judicial notice of such fact to resolve the case in an expedient manner. It can thus inferred that Gener took possession of the property earlier than Oct 1988 which was the date he first filed the criminal case on malicious mischief and De Leon filed the petition for forcible entry in April 1990, the cause of action already prescribed thus the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. The SC dismissed the complaint on forcible entry witout the prejudice to file an appropriate action in the RTC.

PEOPLE VS. POLICARPIOG.R. No. L-69844, February 23, 1988(the signing of a receipt is in the nature of an extrajudicial confession; inadmissible for having been given without assistance of counsels)Facts:In response to a tip from an informant, operatives of the Narcotic Command, Camp Crame proceeded to Bagong Bayan, Rizal to entrap the accused who is believed to be engaged in the sell and distribution of Marijuana. Pat. Mangila who posed as a buyer met up with the accused together with the informant. Upon receiving the marijuana leaves from the accused, Pat. Mangila tendered to the former the marked P20.00 bill. Pat. Mangila then made a signal to his companions and the accused was arrested. The marked bill was confiscated from the accused. The latter also led the operatives to his house where 6 small plastic bags of marijuana were confiscated. The accused, along with the confiscated prohibited drugs were then brought to Camp Crame. At the PC Headquarters, the accused signed a bond paper acknowledging that the six small plastic bags of marijuana leaves were confiscated from him. He likewise signed a document acknowledging the fact that the marked P20.00 bill was confiscated from him. Similarly, accused signed a sworn statement where he opted not to give statement until he is represented by a counsel. The RTC of Rizal convicted the accused with Violation of Section 4. Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended. Issue: Is the receipt of acknowledgement signed by the accused admissible in evidence?Ruling:No. The appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.

Rule 130PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITOG.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009DNA EvidenceFACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. he alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child herein after identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence. The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is a99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense admitted that if thevalue of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did notobject to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same. By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, andthat no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.