Precursor and Essential Chemicals in Illicit Drug Production€¦ · from obtaining the raw...

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Precursor and Essential Chemicalsin Illicit Drug Production:

Approaches to Enforcement

U.S. Department of JusticeOffice of Justice ProgramsNational Institute of Justice

Precursor and Essential Chemicalsin Illicit Drug Production:

Approaches to Enforcement

byJames R. Sevick

Jefferson Research, Inc.

October 1993

Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice is a publication series of the National Institute of Justice.Each report presents the program options and management issues in a topic area, based on areview of research and evaluation findings, operational experience, and expert opinion on thesubject. The intent is 10 provide information 10 make informed choices in planning, implement-ing, and improving programs and practice in criminal justice.


Michael J. RussellActing Director

Cheryl CrawfordProgram Monitor

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by Aht Associates Inc..under contract #OJP-89-C-009. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those ofthe author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Departmentof Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component nf the Otficc nf Justice Programs, which also includes the Rurcauof Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office nf Juvenile Justin; and Delinquency Prevention.and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Foreword

In the continuing struggle to control illegal drugs, onepromising tactic is to prevent illegal drug manufacturersfrom obtaining the raw materials of drug production—precursor and essential chemicals. Without these chemi-cals, illegal drugs cannot be produced. However, precursorand essential chemicals are also critical to many otherlegitimate industries. Thus, the control of illegal traffickingin these materials must not unduly hinder their use by legalbusinesses.

The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 gaveFederal law enforcement officials new means to controltheillicit trafficking in these chemicals, and many States havepassed their own legislation. This Issues and Practicesreport provides law enforcement officials with basic infor-mation about the role precursor and essential chem icals playin illegal drug trafficking and the role of law enforcementagencies in preventing the illegal trade in these substances.Law enforcement officers will most often confront theproblem of precursor and essential chemicals through theseizure of clandestine drug laboratories, which pose agrowing threat in rural areas.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) established theDomestic Chemical Action Group (DCAG) in 1991 toprovide support for the international Chem ical Action TaskForce (CATG) which had been called for at the 16th annualEconomicSummit of theG-7majorindustrialized countries

in 1990. One CATF goal was to recommend to the interna-tional community effective procedures to ensure that pre-cursor and essential chemicals are not diverted to manufac-ture illicit drugs in the international market.

NIJ's Domestic Chemical Action Group was composed ofrepresentatives of key State and local law enforcementagencies and organizations. One aim of DCAG was toensure that the concerns of domestic criminal justice agen-cies were represented in the comprehensive summary ofcurrent problems in preventing diversion of precursor chemi-cals within the United States. Much of the information inthis report summarizes the work of these two groups, whichhavebeen important in identifying the problem and offeringsolutions to illicit trafficking.

For many years, NIJ has supported research on drug traffick-ing and use and their close links with criminal activity.Additionally, NIJ has supported the drafting of model Statechemical control legislation to promote uniformity amongthe States in preventing illegal trafficking in precursor andessential chemicals. The prevention of the illegal diversionof precursor and essential chemicals is one more step in theeffort to control drugs and crime.

Michael J. RussellActing DirectorNational Institute of Justice

Foreword iii

Acknowledgements

Several people provided assistance and support in preparingthis Issues and Practices report. I would like to thank CherylCrawford, the NIJ program monitor, for her ideas andsupport throughout the project. She not only contributed agreat deal to the document's overall organization andstructure but also made many technical and editorial im-provements. Cathy Conly, the Abt Associates technicalreviewer, also reviewed the drafts and made many usefulcomments and suggestions. The Abt editor, StaciaLangenbahn, was very helpful in improving the report'sreadability and editorial consistency, and Olivia Goulbourneprovided word processing support. Ken Ronald of the DEA

provided a great deal of background information and wasquick to provide data not available from published sources.

I also interviewed several members of the Domestic Chemi-cal Action Group for this project, and they and their staffswere very helpful in pointing out the important issuessurrounding the topic.

Jim SevickJefferson Research. Inc.Potomac, Maryland

Acknowledgements v

Table of Contents

Page

Foreword iii

Acknowledgements v

Part I: IntroductionChapter 1: Purposes and Organization 3

Purposes 3Organization 3Background 4Endnotes 5

Chapter 2: The Problem of Precursor and Essential Chemicals...................................... 7

The Drug "Industry" 7Precursor and Essential Chemicals 7Endnotes 11

Part II: Trafficking and Diversion: Methods and Relevant LegislationChapter 3: Diversion and Its Prevention ..................................................................... 15

Methods of Diversion 15Approaches to Combat Diversion 18

Endnote 20

Chapter 4: Legislation and Policy 21

Overview of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act 21State Legislation on Precursor and Essential Chemicals 23Pertinent Federal Safety and Environmental Laws and Regulations 25Liability for Cleanup of Contaminated Property 26Endnotes 27

Part ill: Issues for Law EnforcementChapter 5: Clandestine Drug Labs ......... 31

Location and Composition of Clandestine Labs 31Hazards of Clandestine Drug Labs 32

Endnotes 34

Chapter 6 : Training . . . . . . . . 3 5

Law Enforcement Personnel 35Prosecutors and Judges 36Model Programs for Clan Lab Seizure and Cleanup 36

Page

Chapter 7: Data and Statistics 37

Data 37

Information Sharing Among Law Enforcement Agencies 37

Chapter 8: Additional Issues 39

Improved Technology 39Related Legal Devices 39Environmental and Occupational Regulations 39Financing of Clan Lab Seizures and Cleanups 40Endnote 40

Glossary of Technical and Legal Terms 41

List of Acronyms 43

Bibliography 45

Appendices

Appendix A: Sources of Diversion 47

Appendix B: CDTA Requirements for the Chemical Industry 51

Appendix C: Conducting a Seizure of a Clandestine Drug Lab 55

Appendix D: International Measures to Control Diversion 59

Appendix E: Information Sources 65

List of Figures

Figure 1: Diversion of Precursor Chemicals 48

List of Tables

Table 1: Comprehensive List of Chemicals Used in Clandestine Production of Illicit Drugs 9

Table 2: Worldwide Seizures of Chemicals Used in Cocaine Production, 1990 16

Table 3: Trade in Chemicals: Suspicious Factors 17

Table 4: CDTA Thresholds by Weight for Listed Chemicals 22

Table 5: Toxicity and Flammability of Selected Precursor and Essential Chemicals 33

Table 6: Chemicals Currently Listed in the U.N. Convention 61

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Purposes and Organization

The diversion of precursor and essential chemicals fromlegitimate uses in industry to the manufacture of illicit drugsis a critical part of the Nation's drug problem. Stopping thisdiversion is thus an essential part of U.S. drug controlstrategy. Law enforcement agencies throughout the countryneed to know about the issues that arise from diversion.Wherever interstate or international commerce occurs—which includes every highway in the United States—thepossibility exists that precursor and essential chemicals arebeing diverted for illicit use. Any place big enough to holda kitchen table is big enough to contain a clandestine drug-manufacturing laboratory. These clandestine laboratories,or "clan labs," are the places where illegally divertedchemicals are turned into illicit drugs.

In fact, due to increasingly stringent controls at the sites ofchemical manufacture, criminals are enlarging their illicitdiversion activities in those states with little manufacturingcapability and less rigorous regulation in order to obtainthese substances. In the same way, clandestine drug labs areoften located in rural and deserted sites, where less attentionwill be paid to their dangerous, polluting activities. So, evensmall rural law enforcement agencies far away from urbandrug markets have to be prepared to encounter the diversionof these substances.

Purposes

One purpose of this report is to inform U.S. law enforcementagencies about the diversion of these chemicals. Chemicaldiversion is a critical step in the manufacture of illicit drugs.

The second purpose of the report is to inform agencies aboutthe issues that they are likely to encounter in their efforts toenforce their own State laws concerning diversion and tocooperate with Federal and other law enforcement andenvironmental agencies in the control of this problem.

This report is based on the proceedings of the multinationalChemical Action Task Force (CATF). The CATF, estab-

lished by the heads of government of the Group of SevenIndustrialized Nations (G-7) in 1990, was given the man-date to describe the nature and extent of the diversion ofprecursor and essential chemicals around the world and toidentify international mechanisms for combating diversion.The United States' participation in the CATF was assistedby the Domestic Chemical Action Group (DCAG). TheDCAG consists of about 30 members of Federal, State, andlocal law enforcement agencies who are experts in dealingwith illegal diversion of chemicals. The DCAG also identi-fied several issues of importance to State and local lawenforcement agencies. These issues are also discussed inthis report.

OrganizationThe report is divided into four parts. Part I is an introductionto the subject of diversion. In addition to this organizationalchapter, it includes

• Chapter 2, which describes the drug "industry" andhow precursor and essential chemicals are used in themanufacture of illicit drugs.

Part II discusses methods of diversion and legislation tocontrol it. It consists of two chapters:

• Chapter 3 describes how precursor and essential chemi-cals are diverted for illegal purposes and how lawenforcement agencies control diversion.

Chapter 4 discusses Federal and State legislation thatdefines diversion as an illegal act. It also describes lawsin the areas of environmental control and occupationalsafety that law enforcement agencies must comply within their efforts to control diversion. (Seizures of clan-destine laboratories require law enforcement agenciesto be aware of a host of criminal, environmental, andoccupational laws and regulations that are seldomrequired in other areas of police work.)

Purposes and Organization 3

Part III describes the issues related to precursor and essentialchemicals that are important to law enforcement agencies.Local agencies most frequently encounter precursor andessential chemicals in the seizure of clandestine drugmanufacturing labs. In recent years, seizures of these clanlabs around the country have occurred at a rate of over twoper day:

Chapter 5 reviews several problems related to clan labseizures and accompanying legal concerns.

The DCAG identified several issues in the diversion ofprecursor and essential chemicals that must be addressed byall law enforcement and criminal justice agencies if theNation is to control this problem. The remainder of Part IIIreviews these issues:

* Chapter 6 discusses training, which is necessary toinform law enforcement personnel about the diversionof these chemicals. This knowledge is of great impor-tance, because of the toxic effects that can result frominadvertent exposure to precursor and essential chemi-cals.

* Chapter 7 discusses the development of data and statis-tics on precursor and essential chemicals. Reliablestatistics and information sharing among agencies canassist in the identification of illegal traffickers in thesesubstances and can help agencies plan how to controldiversion within their jurisdictions.

* Chapter 8 provides additional information about sev-eral other issues related to chemical diversion and itscontrol.

The final section of the report contains five appendices toassist law enforcement personnel who need more detailedinformation about various topics related to chemical diver-sion:

Appendix A presents an overview of the internationalaspects of drug trafficking and diversion.

Appendix B is a synopsis of the Drug EnforcementAdministration's guidelines for the seizure of clandes-tine drug labs.

Appendix C provides information on the reportingprocedures for the chemical industry required by theChemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988.

Appendix D is a summary of international treaties andagreements concerning diversion and trafficking.

Appendix E lists sources of further information andcontains a bibliography of additional documents on thediversion and trafficking of precursor and essentialchemicals.

BackgroundIn July 1990, representatives of the seven major industrial-ized countries—the G-7—met in Houston, Texas, for their16th annual Economic Summit. In addition to PresidentGeorge H. Bush of the United States, the heads of state andgovernment of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, andthe United Kingdom attended, as well as the president of theEuropean Commission (EC). The annual Economic Sum-mits provide the opportunity for the industrialized countriesto discuss, at the highest governmental levels, the mostimportant economic issues facing their countries and theworld.

The Chemical Action Task Force

At the Houston meeting, the Summit participants consid-ered the devastating effects of drug use and drug traffickingupon the world's societies. They agreed that a united stancemust be taken if the menace of drugs is to be controlled. Animportant part of this plan is regulating the flow of precursorand essential chemicals. The international nature of drugtrafficking contributes heavily to drug enforcement con-cerns in each individual country—both in the industrializedworld and in less developed countries. Thus when the G-7countries formed the CATF, it was given the followingmandate:

Effective procedures should be adopted to ensurethat precursor and essential chemicals are notdiverted to manufacture illicit drugs. A task forcesimilar to the FATF (Financial Action Task Force)should be created for this purpose, composed ofSummit participants and other countries that tradein these chemicals, with the involvement of repre-sentatives of the chemical industry. The task forceshould address the problems which concern co-caine, heroin and synthetic drugs and report withina year.1

The United States, as the Economic Summit's host, orga-nized the CATF under the auspices of the U.S. Departmentof Justice. In addition to the G-7 nations and the EC, 19 othercountries and international organizations accepted invita-tions to send representatives to the Task Force. These

Precursor and Essential Chemicals in Illicit Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement

*

4

included Argentina. Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,China, Colombia, Ecuador, Hungary, India, the Nether-lands, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thai-land, the International Narcotics Control Board, and theOrganization of American States.

The U.S. Department of Justice organized and chaired theCATF. During its first year, the chairman of the interna-tional group was William P. Barr, then the Deputy AttorneyGeneral and later Attorney General of the United States.Deputy Attorney General George J. Terwilliger III assumedthe chairmanship in the spring of 1992.

Between October 1990 and May 1992, the CATF met sixtimes in Washington, D.C. The meetings included over 100experts in chemical manufacturing and trade, as well asgovernment representatives in customs, commerce, justice,health and welfare, and law enforcement.

The Task Force members formed three working groups totackle the complex problems related to precursor and essen-tial chemicals. The Chemical Issues Working Group, chairedby Italy, reviewed the processes used in the manufacture ofillicit drugs, identifying those chemicals that are needed fortheir production and those most suitable for internationalregulation and control. The Diversion Issues WorkingGroup, with Canada as its chair, documented the methodsby which criminals divert precursor and essential chemicalsto illegal use. The Legal and Regulatory Issues WorkingGroup, chaired by France, recommended appropriate na-tional and international laws and regulations to address theproblems identified by the other two working groups.

The working groups each met several times to share ideasand collate data. Each prepared a report that summarized itsproceedings and findings.2 Based on the reports of theseworking groups, in April 1991 the CATF Plenary Groupdeveloped 46 recommendations for the improved nationaland international control of precursor and essential chemi-cals.3The group then met in Washington, D.C, onMay 13-14, 1992, to assess participants' progress in implementingthe 1991 recommendations.

The Domestic Chemical Action Group

The United States is a world leader in recognizing theproblem of chemical diversion and in controlling diversion

through laws and regulations. Thus, the U.S. delegation tothe CATF was important in providing the Task Force withinformation about its relatively advanced methods of con-trolling precursor and essential chemicals. To ensure thatthe U.S. delegation could provide the CATF with acomprehensive siimmary of current problems in preventingdiversion, the Department of Justice (through the NationalInstitute of Justice) convened the DCAG. The DCAG wascomposed of some of the country's leading experts in thefield. It included experts from the National Fraternal Orderof Police, the National Criminal Justice Association, theInternational Association of Chiefs of Police, the NationalAssociation of Attorneys General, the U.S. Conference ofMayors, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, and theNational District Attorneys Association. Law enforcementpractitioners from California, Colorado, Pennsylvania,Texas, and Washington, all of whom were experienced inthe control of diversion, also attended. In addition, the groupincluded representatives from several Department of Justicecomponents, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,the DrugEnforcement Administration (DEA), the CriminalDivision, and the Office of Justice Programs (including theNational Institute of Justice). Ken Eikenberry, attorneygeneral of Washington State, and Michael Scott, com-mander of the Texas Department of Public Safety NarcoticsService, were named spokespersons for the group, and theyjoined the U.S. delegation at CATF meetings.

The DCAG discussed issues that its members consideredcritical at the international level and shared methods cur-rently being used in the United States to control diversion.The problems and ideas raised by the DCAG were a crucialpart of the American delegation's contribution to the CATF.

Endnotes

1. Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action TaskForce Final Report (Washington, DC: CATF, 1991),p. i.

2. Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action TaskForce Working Group Reports (Washington, DC:CATF, 1991).

3. Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action TaskForce Final Report, pp. 17-28.

Purposes and Organization 5

Chapter 2

The Problem ofPrecursor and Essential Chemicals

Precursor and essential chemicals are critical to the manu-facture of illicit drugs. Controlling their diversion from licitcommerce is an important element of the national strategyto control the illicit drug industry.

The Drug "Industry"The control of illegal drugs has become an important part ofthe operations of law enforcement agencies across thecountry. Unlike many other crimes, the world of illegaldrugs somewhat resembles an industry. First, there is a"product," the drug itself. That product must be manufac-tured and then transported to the drug markets. It must be"marketed," or sold to buyers at the "retail" level. The needto distribute drugs widely also results in the need for"middlemen" who buy the substances from manufacturersand sell them to street-level drug dealers. Organized gangsoften act as "distribution networks" that can make themarketing and sale of illicit drugs much more efficient, Theprofits from drug sales must then be "invested" somewhere,often in other illegal activities.

When viewed on the national or international level, theworld of illegal drugs takes on an even stronger appearanceof an industry. In the United States alone in 1990, about662,000 people used cocaine frequently (at least once permonth), and another 4.1 million used it occasionally.1 Theorganization needed to produce, transport, and sell cocaineto these users is equally enormous. Although typical dosagesof cocaine and other illicit drugs are very small, the millionsof users and the frequency with which these drugs are usedresult in a total product that weighs many tons.

Cocaine is imported to the United States, primarily fromSouth America. The worldwide production of cocaine isbelieved to be at least 1,000 metric tons, or about 2.2 millionpounds.3 Cocaine is an extract from the coca leaf; many

pounds of these leaves are necessary to produce a smallamount of cocaine. This processing occurs in illegal "facto-ries," or clandestine drug laboratories. Domestically, clan-destine drug labs synthesize chemicals like methamphet-amine and LSD.

The war on drugs is a world war, and it has become a totalwar. No longer do law enforcement agencies simply try toarrest the local pusher and the drug kingpin. More and more,traditional methods of military operations—interdiction,intelligence coordination, and economic warfare—are be-ing used to control the drug problem. Furthermore, just asthe military uses bombing to destroy an enemy's war-making potential, so have law enforcement agencies begunattempts to destroy criminals' "drug-making potential."This is accomplished, first of all, by destroying drug facto-ries—the clandestine laboratories. Worldwide, law enforce-ment agencies reported seizing 2,843 clan labs in 1989. Ofthese, over 800 were in the United States, where mostproduced methamphetamine, amphetamine, and PCP.J Mostof the remainder were in South America, particularlyBolivia and Colombia. These latter labs primarily producedcocaine.

Second, drug-making potential can be destroyed by takingaway the "raw materials" of illicit drug production. In thefinal analysis, manufactured drugs are simply chemicalcompounds. They are produced by means similar to thoseused to produce legitimate chemical products. If clan labsare the factories for producing illegal drugs, then the rawmaterials are precursor and essential chemicals.

Precursor and Essential ChemicalsThe production of most drugs requires complex chemicalprocesses. For example, cocaine is present in the leaves ofthe coca plant in very small concentrations. Large amounts

The Problem of Precursor and Essential Chemicals 7

of leaves and solvents are required for the extraction pro-cess. The coca leaves are macerated in water, and a base,such as lime, is added. Kerosene or some other organicsolvent is used to extract the cocaine from the leaves. Adilute aqueous solution of an acid, such as sulfuric acid,separates the cocaine from the kerosene. Ammonia waterprecipitates the cocaine, which is dried as coca paste. Thecoca paste is then purified with an oxidizing agent, such aspotassium permanganate, and additional processing. Anacid, such as hydrochloric acid, produces the final product,cocaine hydrochloride.

All of the salts, solvents, and acids used in this process areknown as essential chemicals. They include reagents andcatalysts used in the manufacture of a controlled substance.Although they are essential to the manufacturing process,they do not become a part of the molecular structure of thedrug.

Another type of chemical of concern to law enforcementagencies is known as a precursor. A precursor chemical isused in the manufacture of a controlled substance, is criticalto its creation, and actually becomes part of the controlledsubstance's molecular structure.

For example, ephedrine, a substance commonly used in themanufacture of medicines like over-the-counter cold tabletsand diet pills, can be mixed with thionyl chloride andhydrogen to form methamphetamine. Ephedrine is aprecur-sor to the production of methamphetamine, because it isactually a part of the molecular structure of the substance.Essential chemicals, such as solvents and compounds, arealso used in the process to adjust the reaction conditions.

Manufactured drugs, including illicit drugs, require precur-sor or essential chemicals for their production. (Some drugs,like marijuana, are used in their natural state and do notrequire further processing.) This fact provides law enforce-ment agencies with one more way to combat the illegal drugproblem. Just as the production of airplanes and tanks canbe stopped or slowed by cutting off the supply of rawmaterials like steel and rubber, so can the production ofillicit drugs be slowed by inhibiting the availability ofprecursor and essential chemicals.

However, the control of precursor and essential chemicals isa complicated undertaking for three reasons. First, almostall of these chemicals have numerous uses in legitimateindustries. Many of the chemicals used in the processing of

cocaine—such as acetone, hydrochloric acid, and ammo-nia—have thousands of uses in dozens of industries and arefound in most homes. For example, acetone is used in nailpolish remover. Materials like ether, acetone, and methylethyl ketone (MEK) have hundreds of uses in productionprocesses for plastics, rubber, munitions, petrochemicals,and pharmaceuticals. Likewise, precursor chemicals usu-ally have uses in the production of medicines and otherlegitimate chemical products.

Second, because these chemicals arc so widespread, manyopportunities exist for illegal diversion. Many arc producedin dozens or hundreds of chemical plants around the world.The chemical industry makes hundreds of thousands of tonsof some of these products every year, and chemical manu-facturing is an important component of the economy ofmany countries, including the United States. In fact, in1988, the U.S. chemical industry employed over 1 millionworkers in 12,109factories.4 The industry grosses over $250billion per year, and almost 20 percent of this income is fromexports. It is thus critical that the control of precursor andessential chemicals not result in damage to the chemicalindustry through overregulation. It should be noted that U.S.chemical companies are highly supportive of current regu-lations, which are not viewed as an undue burden.

The third reason that it is difficult to control illicit trade inthese chemicals is the sheer size of the problem. Becausemany of these chemicals are so important to industry, theyare very easy to obtain. In addition, many can be manufac-tured using simple household chemicals or easily obtainedsubstances. Because drug manufacture is usually a standardchemical process, it is often easy to substitute similar,readily obtained acids, bases, or solvents for regulatedchemicals that are preferred in the manufacturing process.In 1988, 59,568 metric tons, or 131.1 million pounds, ofessential chemicals were exported by companies in theUnited States.5

The CATF's Chemical Issues Working Group devised acomprehensive list of chemicals used in the illicit produc-tion of drugs (table 1). This list was based on a survey of 17nations that have illicit drug production within their bor-ders. Table I also indicates whether each substance iscontrolled under U.S. Federal law. The list includes only themost crucial, least readily substituted chemicals used in theillicit manufacture of drugs.

Precursor and Essential Chemicals in Illicit Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement8

Chemical

Acetic acid

Acetic anhydride

Acetone

Acetyl chloride

N-Acetylanthranilic acid

Ammonium formate

Ammonium hydroxide

Anthranilic acid

Benzaldehyde

Benzene

Benzyl chloride

Benzyl cyanide

2-Butanone (MEK)*

Butyl acetate

N-Butyl alcohol

Calcium carbonate

Calcium oxide/hydroxide

Chloroform

Cyclohexanone

Diacetone alcohol

Diethylamine

Ephedrine

Ergometrine (ergonovine)

Ergotamine

Ethyl acetate

Ethyl alcohol

Ethyl amine

Ethyl ether

N-Ethy1ephedrine

Substances Produced

Phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P)/cocaine

Heroin/P-2 -P/methaqualone

Cocaine/heroin/others

Heroin

Methaqualone

Amphetamines

Cocaine/others

Methaqualone

Amphetamines

Cocaine

Methamphetamine

Methamphetamine

Cocaine

Cocaine

Cocaine

Cocaine/others

Cocaine/others

Cocaine/others

Phencyclidine (PCP)

Cocaine

Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)

Methamphetamine

LSD

LSD

Cocaine

Cocaine/others

Ethy lamphetamine/3,4-methylenedioxy-N-ethylamphetamine (MDE)


Ethy lamphetamine/MDE

Controlled underU.S. Federal Law?

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

NoNo

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

The Problem of Precursor and Essential Chemicals 9

*2-Butanone and methyl ethyl ketone are two names for the same substance.

Table 1

Comprehensive List of Chemicals Used In Clandestine Production of Illicit Drugs

N-Ethylpseudoephedrine

Formamide

Hexane

Hydriodic (hydriotic) acid

Hydrochloric acid

Isopropyl alcohol

Isosafrole

Kerosene

Lysergic acid

Methyl alcohol

Methylamine

Methylene chloride

3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone

N-Methylephedrine

N-Methylpseudoephedrine

Nitroethane

Norpseudoephedrine

Petroleum ether

Phenylacetic acid

Phenylpropanolamine

1 -Phenyl-2-propanone

Piperidine

Piperonal

Potassium carbonate

Potassium permanganate

Propionic anhydride

Pseudoephedrine

Pyridine

Ethylamphetamine/MDE

Amphetamines

Cocaine

Methamphetamine


Cocaine

Cocaine

Cocaine

LSD

Cocaine

Methamphetamine/3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)


3,4-MethyIenedioxyamphetamine(MDA)/MDMA/MDE

Amphetamines

Amphetamines

Amphetamines

4-Methylaminorex

Cocaine/others

Phenyl-2-propanone

Amphetamines/4-methylaminorex

Amphetamines/methamphetamine

PCP

MDA/MDMA/MDE

Cocaine

Cocaine

Fentanyl analogues

Methamphetamine

Heroin

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes*

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

10 Precursor and Essential Chemicals tn Illicit Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement

Table 1 (Continued)

Comprehensive List of Chemicals Used In Clandestine Production of Illicit Drugs

Chemical Substances ProducedControlled underU.S. Federal Law?

*Exports to certain countries subject to provisions of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act.

Chemical

Safrole

Sodium acetate

Sodium bicarbonate

Sodium carbonate

Sodium cyanide

Sodium hydroxide

Sodium suifate

Sulfuric acid

Toluene

ortho-Toluidine

Xylenes

Substances Produced

MDA/MDMA/MDE

P-2-P

Cocaine/others

Cocaine/others

PCP

Cocaine/others

Cocaine/others

Cocaine/others

Cocaine

Methaqualone

Cocaine

Controlled underUS. Federal Law?

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes*

Yes

No

No

Endnotes

1. National Institute on Drug Abuse, National HouseholdSurvey on Drug Abuse (Rockville, MD: NIDA, 1990).

2. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National DrugControl Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1991), p. 79.

3. Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action TaskForce WorkingGroupReports(Washington,DC:CATF,1991), p. C3.

4. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991 (Wash-ington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce), Tables657 and 1303.

5. U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on NarcoticsAbuse and Control, Flow of Precursor Chemicals andAssault Weaponsfrom the UnitedStatesinto the AndeanNations, Hearings, November 1, 1989, Statement byJohn R. Hess, National Association of Chemical Dis-tributors.

The Problem of Precursor and Essential Chemicals

Table 1 (Continued)

Comprehensive List of Chemicals Used in Clandestine Production of Illicit Drugs

*Exports to certain countries subject to provisions of the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act.

Source: Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action Task Force Working Group Reports (Washington, DC:CATF, 1991), pp. C20-21, and 21 CFR 1310.05, as revised to April 1,1992.

11

PART II

TRAFFICKING AND DIVERSION:METHODS AND RELEVANT LEGISLATION

Chapter 3

Diversion and Its Prevention

As law enforcement agencies have become increasinglyaware of the diversion of precursor and essential chemicalsfor use in the illicit drug trade, they have become more activein preventing this diversion. As a result, it is increasinglydifficult for an illicit drug manufacturer to purchase chemi-cals without fear of detection and prosecution.

Nevertheless, as law enforcement has become more effec-tive in slowing down the diversion of these chemicals,criminals have become more resourceful in their efforts tofind sources for their illicit drug production. The CATFdevoted one of its three working groups to the identificationof methods of diversion. Law enforcement agencies shouldbe aware of the sources and methods of diversion used byillicit drug manufacturers worldwide.

Law enforcement agencies throughout the world are dealingwith the illicit diversion of precursor and essential chemi-cals. Table 2 indicates the total amount of precursor andessential chemicals seized in chemical-manufacturing coun-tries and those countries in which cocaine is producedillicitly. The extent of the problem is reflected in the millionsof liters of essential chemicals seized.

Methods of DiversionThe CATF identified numerous methods by which crimi-nals worldwide successfully divert precursor and essentialchemicals to illicit use. As mentioned previously, the chemi-cal industry is one of the largest U.S. manufacturing indus-tries, employing over a million workers in thousands offactories. Furthermore, these chemicals are sold throughthousands of companies and transported by even moretrucks, railway cars, and ships. Thus, many opportunitiesexist for illicit drug manufacturers to illegally obtain precur-sor and essential chemicals.

The CATF developed a list of suspicious circumstances thatmight indicate unwarranted use of a precursor or essentialchemical. This list, presented in table 3, is meant to assist

law enforcement officers and chemical suppliers in identi-fying suspicious practices possibly involving the diversionof precursor and essential chemicals.

The CATF also developed a diagram showing the variouspoints in the chemical distribution network at which diver-sion can occur (appendix A, figure 1).

Theft

Theft of licit chemicals remains a frequent and relativelyeasy method for criminals to obtain these products. This isparticularly true when wholesale, retail, and export-importcompanies hold shipments of these products without ad-equate security measures.

Substitution

Chemical processes are widely known and well understoodby both legitimate and illicit users of these products. If a drugmanufacturer cannot obtain the precise materials he or sheneeds for the production of an illicit drug, it may be possibleto substitute other materials for the needed precursor oressential chemicals. (For example, hydrochloric acid maybe replaced by another acid with similar chemical proper-ties.) The wide variety of chemical mixtures and extractsmakes it possible for a criminal, in effect, to manufactureprecursor and essential chemicals. It is important to under-stand that as chemical controls close one process for synthe-sizing an illicit drug, manufacturers can often move toanother method using uncontrolled chemicals.

Circuitous Routes

Similar to the methods used in money laundering, circuitousrouting of controlled chemicals involves passing materialsamong many owners and middlemen in many States, mak-ing it difficult to detect illicit use. The volume of trade is suchthat law enforcement agencies have difficulty following thetrails of these shipments. In addition, differences in State

Diversion and its Prevention 15

Chemical

Acetone

Ammonia

Benzene

Calcium oxide (lime)

Diesel fuel

Ethyl ether

Gasoline

Hexane

Hydrochloric acid

Kerosene

Methyl ethyl ketone

Petroleum ether


Sodium carbonate

Sodium hydroxide

Sulfuric acid

Type

Solvent

Alkali

Solvent

Alkali

Solvent

Solvent

Solvent

Solvent

Acid

Solvent

Solvent

Solvent

Oxidizer

Alkali 1

Alkali

Acid

Amount Seized

2,352,788 L

1,263 L

760 L

17,722 kg

4,946 L

2,186,633 L

1,910 L

6,720 L

88,308 L

4,410 L

633,464 L

920 L

1,309 kg

8,972 kg

10,958 kg

161,216 L

reporting requirements for precursor and essential chemi-cals make circuitous routing of these substances an effectivemethod of diversion.

Use of Warehouses

Criminals may also warehouse precursor and essentialmaterials for long periods of time. Even if law enforcementagencies are suspicious that a shipment may be directedtoward an illegal end user, specific proof may not beavailable. Law enforcement officers may not have theresources to frequently check the warehoused materials tosee if they have been moved or used

Smuggling

Smuggling precursor or essential chemicals into a countryor state avoids recording requirements pertaining to trans-actions in these chemicals.

Relabeling or Mislabeling Containers

Most police officers and customs officials are not trained inthe quick identification of chemical substances. Thus, it maybe possible for criminals to relabel containers, so thatinspectors may not detect that the chemical in the containeris not the one described on the label. Furthermore, manychemicals are sold under trade names. This further compli-

16 Precursor and Essential Chemicals in Illicit Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement

Source: Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action Task Force Working Group Reports (Washington, DC:CATF, 1991), Annex C-6.

Table 2

Worldwide Seizures of Chemicals Used in Cocaine Production, 1990

Table 3

Trade in Chemicals: Suspicious Factors

This list was prepared to assist chemical suppliers in identifying suspicious orders and enquiries for chemicalsthat may be used in the illicit manufacture of drugs. The list is not exhaustive but highlights areas in whichsuppliers need to exercise greater vigilance.

Customer's Identity

New customerWalk-in customerFailure or unwillingness to supply telephone number or addressNo business stationeryOrders from companies that are not known or that cannot be easily traced in trade directoriesCustomer not a member of a trade or business association

Business Practices

Private house or post office box number as the address from which the order is made or to which goods areto be delivered

Irregular ordering patternsPayment by cash, cashier's check, or postal money orderOrders from abroad in which the proposed method of payment is not consistent with financial transactions

relating to that part of the worldOrders from universities or well-known companies in which normal arrangements for ordering goods are

used but delivery is requested to a specific individualUse of a freight forwarder as ultimate consigneeDelivery requested to an intermediary whose location and/or business is incompatible with the purported

business of the end user

Method of Delivery

Collection of goods in a private vehiclePurchase of goods in small containers when goods are claimed to be for industrial useRequest for delivery by air freightDelivery requested via a dubious transit routeOrders for chemicals in which the cost of delivery or routing exceeds cost of the merchandise

Use of Goods

Unusual quantities orderedIndication of intended use inconsistent with the chemicals or goods orderedExport to countries where there is no real manufacturing requirement for the chemicals orderedOrders or purchases by companies with no obvious needOrders for more than one precursor or essential chemicalOrders in which scheduled chemicals appear in a lengthy list of unscheduled chemicals

Source: Chemical Action Task Force, Diversion Working Group, Chemical Action Task Force Final Report(Washington. DC: CATF. 1991), Annex I.

Diversion and Its Prevention 17

cates the identification of these substances, because tradenames are even less likely to be known by police andinspectors than chemical names.

Smurfing

"Smurfing" refers to the practice of buying amounts ofprecursor and essential chemicals that are under the limitsat which a supplier is required to report the transaction.Smurfing allows criminals to gain access to necessaryprecursor and essential chemicals without engaging inoutright illegal activity. Nevertheless, with vigilance, manu-facturers and middlemen should be able to identify suspi-cious customers who frequently purchase small amounts ofthe listed chemicals.

Front Companies

Front companies may be established by illicit drugmanufacturers to cover their illegitimate use of these sub-stances. Front companies may cany on a legitimate businessbut make their profit from illegal activities.

Bribery and Coercion

The use of chemical products by thousands of legitimatemanufacturing companies provides numerous opportuni-ties for criminals to exploit this industry for illicit purposes.At the same time, the huge profits from the illicit drug trademake it possible for these criminals to bribe law enforcementofficials, customs officials, and others engaged in the con-trol and use of these chemicals. By bribing a worker in alarge chemical plant, for example, a criminal may obtain asteady source of a needed chemical. The law enforcementsystem would have great difficulty identifying the source ofsuch precursor chemicals.

Cash-and-Carry Transactions

Cash-and-carry transactions pose a problem, particularlywhen only relatively small amounts of illicit substances arebought. Any cash transaction should be considered ques-tionable, since the chemical industry and legitimate usersgenerally do not operate with cash sales.

Diversion in the International Arena

In addition to the diversion methods discussed above, whichcan apply to both domestic and international transactions,several diversion methods are only possible in internationalcommerce.

Misusing or abusing opportunities afforded by internation-al trade. Free trade zones and free ports are established bycountries to facilitate international trade. The United Stateshas 165 free or foreign trade zones. Many are in seaportcities, while others are associated with airports. For ex-ample, Kansas City, located a thousand miles from anyocean, is designated as a foreign trade zone.

In foreign trade zones, imported goods are still consideredto be outside U.S. Customs territory. They may thus behandled, repacked or relabeled, and processed prior torelease into U.S. markets. While foreign trade zones aremeant to ease the red tape involved with trade in the UnitedStates, this ease of use also means that controls on exchangeare less strict, and illegal operations, often involved withrepackaging and relabeling, are more likely to occur in theseareas. There is also more opportunity for smuggling.

Misdescribinggoods on commercial or customs documents.Illicit drug manufacturers can obtain precursor and essen-tial chemicals by fraudulently misidentifying these materi-als on commercial and customs documents. Because of thenumber of chemical products that can be sold in barrels ortankers, most law enforcement officers and customs agentscannot easily recognize a substance by its physical at-tributes, such as its appearance or aroma. As a result,criminals often can transport these goods across nationalboundaries without much fear ofbeing caught. The falsifieddocuments might be obtained by theft, fraud, or bribery.

Changing ownership after shipment, or floating exports.The American free enterprise system and the internationalsystem of trade permit frequent changes of ownership forany product in commerce. This is particularly true ofchemical products, which may be owned or controlled bynumerous middlemen in the system of distribution betweenmanufacturer and end user, especially in internationaltransactions. Each transfer of ownership may result inrelabeling. Many chemicals are not sold under their chemi-cal name but under trade names. These changes of namesand labels make the tracking of listed chemicals much moredifficult for investigators.

Approaches to Combat DiversionThe CATF identified 10 approaches that should be used tocombat diversion throughout the chemical industry and itsdistribution system.1 The CATF urged law enforcementagencies in countries that produce and use these chemicalsto be vigilant in ensuring that industry makes serious effortsto implement these approaches.


Increase Awareness

A lack of awareness of the use of precursor and essentialchemicals in the illicit drug trade remains a critical problem.Many in industry, as well as in the law enforcement commu-nity, are unaware that these chemicals play an integral partin the production of illegal drugs. Chemical companies andlaw enforcement agencies must continually train theiremployees and officers to increase their knowledge of howthese chemicals are used and how to prevent their diversionto criminal drug manufacturers.

Improve Labeling of Chemicals

Consistent and complete labeling of chemicals can facilitatethe investigation of illegal drug manufacturing. The use oftrade names and the lack of information describing all thechemicals in a mixture permits criminals access to precursorand essential substances without the knowledge of lawenforcement and customs officials.

Establish EffectiveProcedures to Prevent Smuggling

Smuggling remains an important method for criminals toobtain precursor and essential chemicals. Countries in-volved in the import and export of these chemicals mustincrease their efforts to identify smuggling rings, not onlyof the illicit drugs themselves, but also of their precursors.

Require Identification of Customers

All commercial operators in the chemical distribution chainmust know who their customers are and why they need thelisted chemicals. Due to the large number of middlemenwho are often involved in chemical transactions, it is criticalthat commercial operators know not only the purposes of thedistributors of their products, but also those of the ultimateconsignee who will use the shipment of the listed chemicals.

Improve Record Keeping

Companies involved in the chemical trade should developa system of records that carefully documents the sale,import, export, transshipment, and transit of listed chemi-cals. Furthermore, these records must be available to theauthorities who control and investigate the illicit use of thesesubstances. This is particularly important because everycompany needs to be able to identify the theft of regulated

chemicals by outside criminals or their own employees. Inaddition, the records can enable law enforcement officials totrack the transit of these substances from manufacturer toillegal user and thus to disrupt the illegal distribution ofprecursor and essential chemicals.

Increase Knowledge andAwareness in Law Enforcement

Law enforcement agencies must become more aware of therole of precursor and essential chemicals in the drug trade.They must become familiar with chemical producers andmiddlemen in their jurisdictions and understand how totrace these chemicals in the investigation of clandestinelaboratories and other illegal drug operations.

Approaches Affecting International Trade

Several approaches can control illicit international transac-tions involving precursor and essential chemicals.

Advance authorization or notification for certain chemicalshipments. To prevent the shipment of these substances toillicit manufacturers, countries can require advance autho-rization to (or at least notification of) appropriate authoritiesof shipments of certain listed chemicals. This is particularlyrelevant for shipments to individuals or organizations thatare not known to the company making the sale. Advanceauthorization would give the law enforcement agencies timeto investigate the new buyers and to contact law enforcementagencies in other jurisdictions or other countries to verify thelegitimacy of unknown buyers.

Advance authorization also enables law enforcement agen-cies to maintain closer surveillance of critical shipments asthey travel from manufacturer to legitimate user. This canprevent illicit drug manufacturers from obtaining access toprecursor and essential chemicals.

Authority to suspend shipments and seize chemicals. TheCATF also recommended that appropriate authorities needto have the power to suspend shipments and to seizesubstances when there is adequate evidence that they mayfall into the hands of illicit drug producers. Coupled withadvance notification of shipment, suspension gives lawenforcement authorities a powerful tool for enforcing otherregulations concerning the identification of the buyers ofthese goods.

Effective controls in free trade zones and free ports. Thelarge number of free trade zones and free ports, established

Diversion and Its Prevention 19

to increase world trade, unfortunately increases the diffi-culty of controlling precursor and essential chemicals. Freetrade zones can enable criminal users to store these chemi-cals without effective customs controls and increase theiropportunities to alter documents and shipments and thusescape detection. Authorities in these zones must exercisespecial caution to prevent the illegal transfer of precursorand essential chemicals to drug manufacturers.

Effective interregional and international cooperation amonglaw enforcement authorities. Due to the nature of chemicalproduction, it is almost inevitable that the production ofillegal drugs will require the transport of raw materials, aswell as the final product, between countries or at leastbetween jurisdictions within a country. This is particularlytrue of cocaine production, which usually involves theimport of essential chemicals to the drug producing coun-tries and the export of the drug to countries where users arelocated. This requires law enforcement agencies to workcooperatively to detect and prosecute the illegal shipment ofthese substances. Cooperation is needed both on an interna-tional and a national level; for example, in the United States,cooperation will be necessary among Federal, State, andlocal agencies. In addition, cooperation must not extendonly to police departments but also to other administrative

and legal levels such as customs, agencies related to inter-state trade and commerce, and the courts.

The C ATF also warned that, as the enforcement and controlnets tighten to limit access to precursor and essentialchemicals, criminals will undoubtedly find new ways to plytheir trade. Not only will new processes of drug manufacturedevelop so that different precursor chemicals can be used,but new methods of diversion will appear as well, ascriminals attempt to obtain these substances in any way theycan to maintain their production of deadly drugs.

Endnote1. The CATF also recommended the addition of 10 chemi-

cals to the regulatory system in the U.N. convention (thisrecommendation has been adopted) and ratification andimplementation of the 1988 U.N. Convention AgainstIllicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-stances by all U.N. member nations. Chemical ActionTask Force, Chemical Action Task Force Final Report(Washington, DC: CATF, 1991), p. 10.


Chapter 4

Legislation and Policy

Law enforcement officials have known about the problem ofprecursor and essential chemicals for many years. In 1988,the U.S. Congress passed the Chemical Diversion andTrafficking Act (CDTA).1 This act was meant to controldiversion, principally by requiring chemical manufacturersand suppliers to report and keep records of transactionsinvolving these substances. The first section of this chapterprovides an overview of this legislation. In addition, a moredetailed discussion of the chemical handlers' requirementsfor reporting and record keeping is contained in appendix B.

Individual States have also passed laws similar to theFederal legislation. The second section of this chapterdescribes some of the principal requirements of these laws.

In addition, this chapter discusses environmental and occu-pational health and safety laws associated with illegaldiversion. Many of the precursor and essential chemicalscontrolled by the CDTA and State laws are extremely toxic.They are thus included in numerous environmental lawsthat govern the use, storage, cleanup, and disposal ofhazardous chemicals. When law enforcement agenciescome into possession of these substances, they can becomeresponsible for their cleanup and disposal. Thus, law en-forcement agencies must understand their responsibilitiesunder this legislation. Furthermore, law enforcement offic-ers who arc involved in the seizure or handling of thesesubstances are covered by occupational health and safetylegislation. This legislation is meant to protect employeeswho come into contact with toxic substances, and it neces-sitates not only the use of equipment and practices designedto limit exposure but also monitoring of the health of officerswho are routinely exposed to toxic substances. These occu-pational requirements are discussed in the third section ofthis chapter. The chapter concludes with a discussion ofpotential agency liability for the cleanup of seized contami-nated property

Overview of the ChemicalDiversion and Trafficking ActThe Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 is apart of the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988. TheCDTA gives the DEA the authority to regulate the domesticsales, as well as the import and export, of 20 precursor andessential chemicals necessary for producing cocaine, heroin,methamphetamine, LSD, and other illicit drugs. The Actalso regulates the sale of machinery required in drugmanufacture, such as tableting and encapsulating ma-chines. Representatives of industry, including the ChemicalManufacturers Association, were consulted during draftingof the law, and they strongly support the law's goals.

Industry is central to the control of these chemicals. Allchemical handlers (including manufacturers, distributors,importers, and exporters) must maintain records of anytransaction involving a listed chemical that exceeds anestablished threshold amount. These records must be kept ina form that is retrievable by DEA. They must also obtainproof of identity from all purchasers of listed chemicals, andmust notify the DEA of any unusual or suspicious orders. Forinternational shipments, the DEA must be notified at least15 days prior to shipment for any shipment over thethreshold amount. The Act also requires that exporters andimporters of listed chemicals report the transaction bymeans of DEA Form 486, the Import/Export Declaration.

The CDTA originally identified 20 precursor and essentialchemicals to be regulated. The 1990 amendments to theCDTA added 11 more chemicals, and the DEA also hasadded two more chemicals, hydrochloric acid and sulfuricacid, by administrative action.2 Thus, the United States nowregulates a total of 33 precursor and essential chemicals.The listed chemicals are shown in table 4.

Legislation and Policy 21

Chemical

PrecursorsAnthranilic acid and its salts

N-Acetylanthranilic acid and its salts

Benzyl cyanide

D-lysergic acid, its salts, optical isomers, and saltsof optical isomers

Ephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of optical isomers

Ergonovine and its salts

Ergotamine and its salts

Ethylamine and its salts

N-Ethylephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and saltsof optical isomers

N-Ethylpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts ofits optical isomers

Hydriodic Acid

lsosafrole

Methylamine and its salts

3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone

N-Methylephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and saltsof optical isomers

N-Methylpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers. and salts ofits optical isomers

Norpseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts ofits optical isomers

Phenylacetic acid and its salts

Phenylpropanolamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts ofits optical isomers

Piperidine and its salts

Piperonal anhydride

Propionic anhydride

Pseudoephedrine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts ofits optical isomers

Safrole

DomesticDistribution

30 kg

40 kg

1 kg

10 g

1 kg

10 g

10 g

1 kg

I kg

1 kg

1.7 kg

4 kg

1 kg

1 kg

1 kg

1 kg

2.5 kg

1 kg

2.5 kg

4 kg

1 g

1 g

1 kg

4 kg

Import and ExportDistribution

30 kg

40 kg

1 kg

10 g

1 kg

10 g

10 g

1 kg

1 kg

1 kg

1.7 kg

4 kg

1 kg

1 kg

1 kg

1 kg

2.5 kg

1 kg

2-5 kg

4 kg

I g

1 g

1 kg

4 kg


Table 4

CDTA Thresholds by Weight for Listed Chemicals

Chemical

Essentials

Acetic anhydride

Acetone

Benzyl chloride

2-Butanone (MEK)*

Ethyl ether

Hydriodic acid (anhydrous)


Sulfiiric Acid

Toluene

DomesticDistribution

1,023 kg

150 kg

1 kg

145 kg

135.8 kg

No Limit

55 kg

No Limit

159 kg

Import and ExportDistribution

1,023 kg

1,500 kg

4 kg

1,455 kg

1,364 kg

27 kg

500 kg

50 gal

1,591 kg

Effectiveness of the CDTA

The CDTA and related regulations have already provenremarkably effective in controlling the production of illicitdrugs in the United States and overseas. Domestically, thenumber of clan labs seized decreased significantly (about 35percent) in 1990 and by an additional 28 percent in 1991.3

This indicates that criminals are having a more difficulttime obtaining the precursor chemicals required for illicitdrug manufacture, resulting in fewer clan labs for police toseize.

The legislation had notable impact on use levels of metham-phetamine. According to data from the Drug Abuse Warn-ing Network (DAWN) of the National Institute on DrugAbuse, the number of hospital emergency room episodesresulting from adverse reactions to methamphetaminedropped from 8,823 in 1989 to 5,257 in 1990/ This 40percent decrease in emergency room visits probably reflectsthe lower availability of methamphetamine on the streets.

Internationally, as of April 1990, the DEA accepted 165companies in South America as legitimate dealers in thesesubstances and rejected 42, or about 20 percent of the total.

In some cocaine producing regions, the rejection rate wasover 50 percent. The export of several essential chemicals tococaine producing countries correspondingly plummeted.For example, in 1988, prior to passage of the CDTA, 90,852metric tons of acetone, ethyl ether, methyl ethyl ketone, andtoluene were exported from the United States to SouthAmerican countries. In 1989, the year the CDTA went intoeffect, this amount had declined by over half, to 40,464metric tons.5

The chemical industry has shown a strong interest incooperating with the DEA. By doing so, it not only preservesits integrity but also assists law enforcement authorities incontrolling the drug problem in the United States. Theinitial success of the CDTA resulted in large part from thequick adoption of its requirements by industry.

State Legislation onPrecursor and Essential ChemicalsAlthough the Federal Chemical Diversion and TraffickingAct provides an overall national framework for the control


Table 4 (Continue)CBTA Thresholds by Weight for Listed Chemicals

•2-Butanone and methyl ethyl ketone are two names for the same substance.

Source: 21 CFR 1310, as amended at 57 FR 184, Sept. 22,1992, pp. 43614-15.

of precursor and essential chemicals, many States have notpassed corresponding legislation on this topic. As a result,criminals can move to States with less stringent laws onchemical diversion. For example, the implementation ofstrict laws and penalties in California, New Jersey, andTexas resulted in a flurry of clan lab activity in adjacentStates.

At least 37 States have some limited legislation that refer-ence the distribution and use of precursor chemicals in illicitdrug production. In 32 of these States, some precursorcompounds are placed on Schedules II or III of the Federalscheduling system for drugs. Schedule I substances arenarcotics that have no accepted medical use in the UnitedStates. Schedules II and III contain substances that haveaccepted medical uses but have either a high abuse potentialwith severe psychological or physical dependence (Sched-ule II) or an abuse potential with dependence liability(Schedule III). Schedule IV substances have less potentialfor abuse and include prescription drugs like Valium andDarvon. Schedule V substances have even less abuse poten-tial and are often available over the counter.6 Penalties forthe illegal possession and use of precursor substances wouldthus correspond to those for other substances on the sameschedules.7

Most of the 3 7 States only regulate the immediate precursorsof amphetamines and methamphetamine. However, only 18States have enacted detailed chemical tracking legislation,according to a study by the American Prosecutors ResearchInstitute (APRI).8 These States are cited by APRI as havingadequate provisions to regulate the use and flow of precursorchemicals by legal producers and users. These provisionsgenerally require manufacturers, transporters, and sellers toobtain licenses or permits from State law enforcementagencies or the pharmaceutical control board. They alsoparallel the CDTA by requiring detailed reporting andrecord keeping, and reporting of thefts, shortages, or lossesof a listed chemical.

The 16 States that still do not regulate immediate precursorchemicals (as of 1991) are Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia,Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-setts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevadat Pennsylva-nia, South Dakota, and Vermont.

Critics note two types of problems with current Statelegislation. The first is that 16 States remain withoutprecursor chemical legislation and thus have no recordkeeping or notification provisions. Criminals can exploitthese gaps to conceal illegal chemical transactions.

Secondly, differences in regulations across States can beexploited. Illicit drug manufacturers can acquire chemicalsin States where they arc not listed, or they can use Slateborders to conceal transactions. In addition, some States arerelatively slow in adding chemicals to their lists of precur-sors; this is particularly a problem in controlling new"designer" drugs. It has been suggested that State con-trolled substances legislation should be written to include intheir precursor chemical lists all federally listed chemicals,with a clause that permits rapid inclusion of new substancesthat are added to the Federal list, without a separate andextended State review process.

Some States have been creative in providing for controlswhile still affording the minimum possible reporting re-quirements for businesses dealing in precursor chemicals.For example, the State of Washington relaxes reportingrequirements when there is a pattern of regular business oran established record of lawful purposes for using thesubstance.9 Washington'scode also requires the State Boardof Pharmacy to report annually to the legislature concerningsubstances that should be added or subtracted from the list.

Model Legislation

The National Institute of Justice, in cooperation with theDEA, funded a project to develop model State legislation forcontrolling precursor and essential chemicals. This project,cited above, was conducted by the American ProsecutorsResearch Institute, an affiliate of the National DistrictAttorneys Association. The project included the develop-ment of a Model State Chemical Control Act. The Act wasdeveloped by a team of investigators and prosecutors fromfive States, as well as Department of Justice staff. IndividualStates can use this model as the framework for their ownchemical control legislation.

The Act provides a model for a regulatory structure tocontrol precursor chemicals, and accommodates businessneeds without sacrificing the State's ability to preventillegal chemical diversion. The model Act addresses thefollowing requirements for adequate control:

• Authority to regulate. The Act establishes a state'sauthority to regulate transactions involving 32 chemi-cals. The list of chemicals is almost identical to theFederal list. Unlike the Federal legislation, no thresh-old amounts are contained in the model Act.

• Registration and permits. The model Act requires an-nual registration of all manufacturers and distributors

24 Precursor and Essential Chemicals in IHicrt Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement

of the listed chemicals. A permit is also required of anyperson who buys or possesses these substances.

Reports, records, and purchaser identification. Suspi-cious transactions or circumstances, such as cash pay-ments, thefts, and discrepancies in shipments, must bereported by manufacturers, distributors, and possess-ors. Also, ail persons or organizations trading in thelisted chemicals must provide monthly reports of trans-actions.

• Additional safeguards against diversion. Convicteddrug offenders and minors are ineligible to apply forregistrations and permits. The Act also provides proce-dures for denial, suspension, and revocation of regis-trants and permit holders.

• Investigatory and enforcement powers. The modellegislation provides authority for State officials toidentify and adequately respond to noncompliance,including administrative inspections of inventories andrecords. It authorizes fines, imprisonment, and specialcivil assessments, including forfeiture of assets underseparate State forfeiture laws.

Offsets for administrative expenses. The Act providesfor the financing of State expenses through the use offines and forfeitures, as well as reasonable fees forregistration and permits.

Protections for legitimate commerce. Common carri-ers, pharmacists, physicians, and other authorizedpractitioners are exempted from the Act's require-ments. Special provisions for publicly held corpora-tions and for regular legitimate users all aim at mini-mizing the reporting burden on legal manufacturersand users.

An information package that includes a copy of the ModelState Chemical Control Act and sample State regulations isavailable from APRI. The address can be found in appendixE.

Pertinent FederalSafety and EnvironmentalLaws and RegulationsToxic materials and toxic waste are subject to a variety ofFederal and State safety and environmental laws and regu-lations. Because numerous precursor and essential chemi-cals are toxic or hazardous, they too are covered by the samelaws. Any law enforcement agency that deals with thesesubstances may be subject to applicable environmental and

occupational health and safety laws. The seizure of a clan labsite, for example, can make the agency responsible for thecleanup and storage of toxic materials. When the materialsare transported away from the clan lab site, laws on thetransport of toxic and hazardous waste may come into effect.Even the storage of samples in evidence rooms may besubject to these laws and regulations.

This section summarizes the liability under Federal lawsand regulations of local law enforcement agencies that seizeclan labs.

It should be noted that many State and local governmentshave additional safety and environmental laws and regula-tions that are more stringent than current Federal require-ments. Law enforcement agencies should consult with localand State environmental and occupational health and safetyagencies to determine local requirements.

It is thus critical that every agency that conducts clan labseizures understand and follow both Federal and localrequirements. These regulations are in place to protectemployees and the public from harm resulting from theillegal contamination of the environment. However, it isexpensive to conform to these regulations, and the lawenforcement agency may be held liable for the costs. (Forexample, one police department recently paid $70,000 forthe cleanup of a single clan lab site.) However, failure tofollow relevant regulations is illegal, and agencies can beheldaccountable. For example, asmall police department inOregon recently was fined by the court for failing to followoccupational health requirements during a clan lab sei-zure.10

OSHA Regulations

The Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administra-tion (OSHA) is responsible for regulating safety in theworkplace. Its authorizing legislation also establishes anemployee's "right to know" about toxic and hazardoussubstances to which he or she may be exposed. Because lawenforcement officers conducting clan lab investigationsmay be exposed to hazardous substances, their employingagency must follow the appropriate safety regulations," asoutlined below:

• The employer (law enforcement agency) must commu-nicate clear and unambiguous warnings about thehazards and dangers of chemical substances encoun-tered during employment. Ordinarily, training and/oreducation on toxic substances is required not only forpolice officers conducting raids but also for others who


come into contact with the toxic substances. For ex-ample, investigators, crime lab technicians, and chem-ists who work at the site of the seizure or with thechemicals are probably covered under this regulation.

All employees who may be exposed to hazardouschemicals must receive training on potential hazards,the use of protective equipment, safe work practices,and other safety measures. This is ordinarily inter-preted to mean that officers should have 40 hours ofinitial training and 3 days of field experience, as well as8 hours per year of refresher courses. Training must becertified according to OSHA standards.

• All employees must be issued proper protective equip-ment, which must meet National Institute of Occupa-tional Safety and Health standards for exposure levels.

• Employees who are exposed to hazardous substancesmust undergo continuous medical surveillance. Expo-sures must be documented for future medical reference.

Federal EnvironmentalStatutes and Regulations

Several Federal statutes address environmental pollution.Each statute has a significant body of regulations detailingthe requirements for compliance. Relevant statutes includethe following:

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amendedby the Hazardous and Solid Waste Act,12 which governsthe transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardouswastes.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amendedby the Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act,13

which governs emergency responses to releases ofhazardous substances into the environment and thecleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act,'4 which regu-lates the packaging, marking, labeling, and transporta-tion of hazardous materials, including hazardous wastes.

Because these regulations are very detailed, law enforce-ment agencies ordinarily turn to certified hazardous wastecontractors to complete the cleanup, transport, and disposalof toxic wastes from clan lab sites.

Liability for Cleanup ofContaminated PropertyThe Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) was intended toplace the burden of cleanup of toxic sites and spills on theparty or parties responsible for the spill or benefiting fromthe activity resulting in the spill.1- The statute permits theFederal government to remove hazardous materials andtake remedial action to clean up a release of hazardoussubstances and to collect the cost of the cleanup from "anyresponsible party." Responsible parties may include theowners of the property', the legal tenant who caused thecontamination, the local law enforcement agency that seizesthe laboratory, a contractor or environmental agency thatperforms the initial removal, or any other entity or contrac-tor involved in the transport, disposal, and cleanup of thewaste materials.16 The law requires that liability be appor-tioned according to which parlies materially gained fromthe release of the toxic material. However, practicallyspeaking, the clan lab "cooker" (the criminal manufacturer)who gained the most from the lab probably cannot beidentified or else is in jail or otherwise without assets.Liability in such a case may fall upon the property owner,although court decisions in these circumstances are unclear.Additional legislation has been proposed to ease the liabilityof the "innocent owner" who was not aware that the site wasused as a drug lab.17

It is clear that spills, releases, and other contaminationresultingfrom the actions or omissions of a law enforcementagency makes the agency liable for cleanup and other costs.For this reason, law enforcement agencies must be verycareful that the clan lab seizure and cleanup is carried outin such a way as to make releases of or exposures to toxicsubstances from the lab impossible.

Seizure and disposal of property under asset forfeiture.Asset forfeiture laws may leave local agencies liable forcleanup costs. For example, in Federal forfeitures, section120(h) of the Superfund Amendment and ReauthorizationAct of 1986 specifically requires a Federal agency that sellscontaminated property to "warrant prior necessary remedialaction and to agree to perform any future remedial actionthat becomes necessary after the transfer."18

The DEA uses the proceeds from forfeited assets to financeits cleanup activities at clan lab sites. It also has created amodel forfeiture program that States can use as a guide increating their own programs.19


Local law enforcement agencies should consult with theappropriate State and local regulatory agencies and withtheir legal counsels to identify any liabilities that may resultfrom clan lab seizures or resulting asset forfeitures.

Endnotes

1. Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act, Subtitle A ofthe Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments of 1988 (Title VI—Public Law 100-670), which amended the ControlledSubstances Act and the Controlled Substances Importand Export Act (21 U.S.C. 802 et seq.)

2.21 CFRPart 1310 as amended at 57 FR 184, Sept. 22,1992, pp. 43614-15.

3. Chemical Operations Section, Drug Enforcement Ad-ministration, Department of Justice, unpublished data.

4. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug Abuse WarningNetwork, unpublished data, 1991.

5. Chemical Action Task Force, Diversion Working Group,Chemical Action Task Force Working Group Reports(Washington, DC: CATF, 1991), p. H-3.

6. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(l), 841(b)(l),(c).

7. National Criminal Justice Association,^ Guide to StateControlled Substances Acts (Washington, DC: Na-tional Criminal Justice Association, 1991), pp. 15-19.

8. Sherry Green, ''Preventing Illegal Diversion of Chemi-cals," Research in Brief (Washington DC: NationalInstitute of Justice, forthcoming).

9. 69.43 RCW.

10. E. F. Conners, "Hazardous Chemicals from ClandestineLabs Pose Threat to Law Enforcement," Police Chief57,1 (January 1990): 37-41.

11.29CFR1910etseq.

12. 2 U.S.C. 6905,6912(a), 6921-6927,6930,6934-6935,6937-6939, 6974; 40 CFR 260-299,

13. Public Law 96-510 and amendments; 40 CFR 300; 42U.S.C. 9605,9620; 33 U.S.C. 1321 (c)(2); 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp. p. 793; 3 CFR, 1987 Comp. p. 193.

14. 49 U.S.C. Appendix 1801 et seq.; 49 CFR 386.

15. T. B. Maher, "Legal Liabilities Faced by Owners ofProperty Contaminated by Clandestine Methamphet-amine Laboratories: The Oregon Approach," WillametteLw Review 27 (1991): 325.

16. Ibid.

17. The Federal regulations concerning the liability ofproperty owners (and, indirectly, agencies that seizeproperty) are covered by two regulations. The descrip-tion of an "innocent landowner" can be found in theFederal Register, August 18, 1989, Vol. 54, p. 34235.Further regulations on landowner liability are in theFederal Register, April 29, 1992, Vol. 57, p. 18344.

18. Ibid.

19. U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin-istration, Model Forfeiture of Drug Profits Act (Wash-ington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1981).


PART III

ISSUES FORLAW ENFORCEMENT

Chapter 5

Clandestine Drug Labs

Local criminal justice agencies in the United States mostoften will confront the problem of precursor and essentialchemicals through the seizure of clan labs. These seizuresgrew at an exponential rate during the 1980s. The DEA hasreported that clan lab seizures increased from 226 in 1983to 775 in 1987 and 784 in 1988. As mentioned previously,the implementation of the Chemical Diversion and Traffick-ing Act of 1988 has resulted in some success in limitingclandestine drug labs, as indicated by the number of reportedclandestine laboratory seizures. The number of seizuresdeclined by about 35 percent in 1990 and by an additional28 percent in 1991. The increased difficulty criminals hadin obtaining needed chemicals as a result of the CDTA andState legislation clearly was a major factor in this decline.However, the problem is still not under control. Over 350seizures occurred in 1991, and the growing sophistication ofdrug manufacturers in avoiding detection may have contrib-uted to the lower seizure rates. Some local law enforcementofficials believe that these national statistics underreport theactual number of seizures, although this theory is notsupported by corresponding increases in other drug useindicators (such as data on drug related emergency roomvisits).

In regions of the country where clan lab activity is high,seizures place a significant burden on the entire criminaljustice system. For example, the U.S. Attorney's Office inEugene, Oregon had no cases of clandestine drug lab activityin 1980. In 1982 and 1983,the office had onecase involvingclan labs. By 1988, lab seizures represented 50 to 70 percentof the entire caseload of the office.1

The Western United States has been the principal region ofthe country for clan lab activity; the States with the highestnumber of reported seizures in 1991 were California, Texas,Colorado, and Oregon. These four States were responsiblefor 71 percent of the seizures reported to the DEA in thatyear.2 However, seizures have occurred in most States, andincreasing enforcement efforts against illicit producers bylaw enforcement in Western States may have resulted in themovement of producers to less populous States.

The vast majority of clan labs in the United States producemethamphetamine and related drugs. An examination of asample of seized labs indicated that 82 percent producedmethamphetamine, 10 percent amphetamines, and2.5 per-cent PCP.3

The profits resulting from illicit drug production are im-mense. It has been estimated that, in 18 hours, with $200 ofraw materials, a clan lab can produce drugs with a streetvalue of $92,000. The total annual production of metham-phetamine by domestic clandestine labs is believed to be 25tons, with a street value of $3 billion.4

The ease with which a lab can be set up makes it an attractivebusiness for both first-time offenders and organized crimi-nal gangs. The knowledge of chemistry needed to set up andoperate a lab is about equivalent to that learned in a highschool. Instructions for operating a lab are available throughmany illegal and legal sources, including several books andmagazine articles written by people in favor of legalizingdrug use.

The seizure of clan labs causes unique problems for lawenforcement agencies. Many agencies have never con-fronted these types of problems before, because they have notpreviously had to deal with environmental and healthregulations. The costs of cleanup operations, and the possi-bility that the seizing agency may be responsible for thesecosts, also may inhibit agencies from pursuing a policy ofactively seizing clan labs.

Location andComposition of Clandestine LabsAlthough drug lab seizures have been most frequent in a fewStates, they have occurred in practically every State in theUnion. Most of the illicit drugs produced in America, suchas methamphetamine, LSD, and PCP, require a relativelysmall volume of materials. Thus, clan labs do not require alarge amount of space, equipment, or raw materials. In fact,

Clandestine Drug Labs 31

a lab to synthesize these substances can be set up on anordinary kitchen table. As a result, clan labs have been foundin a variety of locations. Some have been seized in rentalvans along the highway. Vans are particularly advantageousto "cookers" (criminal manufacturers), because they candrive to deserted locations to set up the lab and then leavewastes and residues at the site, precluding the necessity fordisposal and cleanup.

California and Oregon have recently been home to themajority of lab seizures, but the mobility of these illegal labsis such that any State may develop a problem. As mentionedearlier, Texas traditionally has had a relatively large clan labproblem. In response, the Texas Legislature passed toughlaws to control the problem. As a result, clan lab activity inOklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana increased Other Slatesthat have recently noted increased clan lab activity includeIdaho, Kansas, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and SouthDakota.s

Rural sites are particularly desirable for illicit manufactur-ers because of the lower probability of detection. There arefewer people to see the lab and to smell the strong odorsproduced by the precursor and essential chemicals used indrug production. Rural sites also permit easier transport,storage, and disposal of containers of raw materials, whichmight arouse suspicion in an urban setting. Due to lack ofresources and personnel, rural law enforcement officers insome areas are less likely to be trained to recognize theindications of clan labs and thus may be less likely toinvestigate suspicious activities. Nevertheless, clan labsalso have been discovered in city apartments and suburbanhomes. Many labs are detected as the result of fires andexplosions that occur during the synthesis of the drugs.

Clan labs usually are set up on rental property, because mostcriminals are not willing to risk detection in their ownhomes. Use of rental property also permits the site to beabandoned without the need for removing wastes andequipment. This adds to the problems of law enforcementofficers, because the site is usually contaminated with toxicchemicals when discovered by officers.

The equipment needed for manufacturing illicit drugs doesnot differ appreciably from that required for any standardchemistry lab. Beakers, test tubes, burners, and glasswarefor distillation and other processes are sufficient to operatea clan lab.

Hazards of Clandestine Drug Labs

Seizing a clan lab is a risky operation, even if its users arelong gone. The dangerous chemicals used in the production

of illicit drugs expose officers to a range of health risks notordinarily associated with law enforcement. These risksinclude explosions, inhalation of toxic substances, andbooby traps, as well as the risks associated with dismantlinglabs and disposing of toxins.

Explosion and Inhalation

The manufacture of illicit drugs involves the use of manydangerous and toxic substances. Table 5 lists some of thetoxic effects of chemicals used in clan labs. Many volatileand explosive solvents are employed for most chemicalprocesses. Solvents include materials like acetone, benzene,ether, and Freon™. They irritate the skin, eyes, and mucousmembranes and also cause mild intoxication.

Other classes of chemicals include acids and bases that arecorrosive or irritating to human tissues. Inhaled, theyirritate mucous membranes in the nose, throat, and lungs.They can also cause nausea, headache, and dizziness.

Criminals seldom use proper safety procedures for handlingtoxic substances in clan labs. Because they almost alwaysuse rental property and therefore are ready to move out at amoment's notice, they often store dangerous chemicalsimproperly. In addition, because odors can make neighborssuspicious, adequate ventilation of volatile substances isseldom provided. This means that explosive amounts of thesubstances may be present in the lab. Thus, if a forced entryisbeing made by officers of an occupied lab, it is possible forthese substances to explode due to punctures of their con-tainers by gunfire or the breakage of equipment.

Other, less documented, dangers from clan labs result fromthe residues of many toxic substances and the capability ofvery small amounts of these substances to do damage.Untrained officers may routinely transport toxic evidence incar trunks, and resulting leakage may cause symptoms inofficers who later use the car. The storage of evidencecontaminated with toxic substances in evidence rooms canpollute a building's air circulation system. As a result,building occupants not connected with the evidence maydevelop symptoms of exposure to these substances.

Booby traps. The National Sheriffs Association has re-ported the results of 70 raids selected randomly to determinetypical dangers encountered by law enforcement officers.About 10 percent of the labs seized were booby-trapped.6

The traps have included shotguns and incendiary devices.They are set on doors, refrigerators, and cabinets containingflammable substances. Their purpose isboth to harm person-nel and to destroy evidence. About 30 percent of seized labs


Chemical

Acetic anhydride

Benzene

Chloroform

Ethanol

Hydriodic acid

Hydrochloric acid

Hydrogen cyanide

Lead acetate

Lithium aluminum

Mercury chloride

Methylamine

Petroleum ether

Phenylacetic acid

Phosphine

Red phosphorous

Sodium

Thioxyl chloride

Acute Toxicity Flammabilitv

Moderate

Moderate to high

Moderate

Low

High

High

Extreme

High

hydride Moderate

High

High

Low

Low

High

Low

High

High

Moderate

High

Low

High

LowLow

Low

Low

High

Low

Extreme

Extreme

Low

Extreme

LowLow

Low

Other Properties

Irritant, corrosive

Carcinogen, blood disorders

Incoordination, probably acarcinogen

Incoordination

Corrosive, irritantCorrosive, irritantRapid asphyxiation

Blood disorders

Water reactive, explosive

Corrosive, irritant

Corrosive

Incoordination

Irritant

Rapid asphyxiation

Reactive, explosive



also employed sophisticated electronic countermeasures todetect entry. In these 70 raids, 13 fire fighters and 4 policeofficers required hospitalization for medical treatment, andthere were numerous minor injuries not requiring hospitaliza-tion.7

Disposal Methods. Criminal drug manufacturers usuallyeither neglect to dispose of clan lab waste materials or do soillegally. Wastes may be poured into the septic system, intolocal streams or lakes, or onto the floor or ground around theclan lab. All these places thus become polluted and danger-ous to law enforcement officers and others who come intocontact with them.

Dangerous residues of toxic chemicals can remain in soiland on other surfaces for long periods of time and oftenrequire special cleanup methods for their removal or neu-tralization.

Dismantling. Dismantling a clandestine drug lab requirescompliance with several laws involving the disposal of toxicsubstances. By seizing the clan lab, the law enforcementagency becomes liable for assuring that these laws andregulations are followed. Ordinarily, this requires that allequipment and waste materials be transported and disposedso as not to threaten the environment. Most law enforcementagencies employ private contractors that specialize in the

Clandestine Drug Labs

Table 5

Toxicity and Flammability ofSelected Precursor and Essential Chemicals

Source: National Fire Protection Association, National Fire Protection Standard#30 (flammable liquids) (Quincy,MA: NFPA, 1990).

33

disposal of toxic and hazardous waste to dismantle clan labs.Some police departments in large cities use "HAZMAT"(hazardous materials) teams, that are either a part of thedepartment or are in the environmental protection depart-ment of the local junsdiction. Agencies without access to aHAZMAT team usually use chemists familiar with han-dling toxic substances to dismantle the lab.

By seizing the lab, the law enforcement agency may also beresponsible for decontaminating the property. This alsorequires the services of a professional hazardous wastemanagement company.

Endnotes1 T. B. Maher, "Legal Liabilities Faced by Owners of

Property Contaminated by Clandestine Methamphet-amine Laboratories: The Oregon Approach," WillametteLaw Review 27 (1991): 325.

2. Chemical Operations Section, Drug Enforcement Ad-ministration. Department of Justice, unpublished data.

3. U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin-istration, Guidelines for the Cleanup of ClandestineDrug Laboratories (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1990), p. 2.

4. A. T. Laszlo. "Clandestine Drug Laboratories: Con-fronting a Growing National Crisis," National Sheriff41, 4 (1989): 9-14.

5. E. F. Conners, "Hazardous Chemicals from ClandestineLabs Pose Threat to Law Enforcement," Police Chief57, 1 (January 1990): 37-38.

6. Laszlo, "Clandestine Drug Laboratories," pp. 10-11.

7. Ibid, p. 9.


Chapter 6

Training

Training in how to control diversion of precursor andessential chemicals as well as in how to seize clan labs isnecessary at various levels in the justice system.

Law Enforcement PersonnelLaw enforcement officers who are involved in seizures ofclandestine drug laboratories need special training. Notonly is training required under the occupational health lawsand regulations mentioned in chapter 4, but it is alsonecessary for protecting officers from injury. Some evidencesuggests that a lack of knowledge about clan labs andchemicals among officers who have not received specialtraining can lead to injury and loss of life, as well as to thepossibility of legal liability for environmental pollutionresulting from the use of untrained officers in clan labseizures. Law enforcement officers sometimes happen uponclan lab operations and expose themselves to toxic sub-stances because of their lack of knowledge about the dangersinherent in the operations. Lack of knowledge about both thedangers and the legal requirements has resulted in impropertransport and storage of evidence from clan labs. Forexample, law enforcement officers sometimes transporthazardous substances in the trunks of agency cars, and storesubstances in evidence rooms without following properprocedures to assure against leakage and pollution throughair circulation systems.

Law enforcement officers also may not have a full under-standing of the long-term health dangers resulting fromexposure to the toxic and hazardous substances routinelyused in clan labs. Some officers may take a nonchalantattitude toward exposure to these substances and may fail towear adequate protective clothing and respiratory equip-ment. They may also fail to report exposures and undergoroutine medical examinations. Ignorance of or improperattention to environmental and occupational regulations bylaw enforcement officers and supervisory personnel may

leave the department exposed to legal liability resultingfrom injury or environmental damage due to the use ofimproper procedures in clan lab seizures.

As mentioned previously, OSHA regulations require at least40 hours of initial training for employees who come intocontact with toxic substances as a routine part of their work.Although most law enforcement officers do not routinelycome into contact with these chemicals, they should beaware of the dangers involved in the seizure of a clan lab.

Investigators

Investigators also require training to inform them aboutlaws to prevent diversion of precursor and essential chemi-cals, methods of diversion, and methods of detecting thesecrimes. Because it may be important to follow paper trailsrelated to reporting requirements under the Chemical Di-version and Trafficking Act, investigators who specialize inwhite-collar crime also should receive training. It is impor-tant to involve chemists in investigations of clan lab activi-ties because they are more likely to understand the chemicalindustry, chemical processes, and the dangers of chemicalexposure than investigators who are not trained in chemistryor other sciences.

Evidence Technicians

Evidence technicians and others who may be on the clan labsite require training in evidentiary procedures for seizures,as well as extensive training in chemical hazards.

Management and Supervisory Personnel

Managers and supervisory personnel need training to in-form them of the importance of controlling chemical diver-sion, as well as of the legal and regulatory requirementsconcerning occupational hazards, environmental safety,

Training 35

and financing and liability issues related to clan lab seizures.Management should also be able to identify other local andState environmental and occupational safety agencies thatmay be of assistance in the processing and cleanup of clanlab sites.

Rural Law Enforcement Officers

Rural law enforcement officers are particularly in need oftraining about clan labs and chemicals. Law enforcementagencies serving rural areas are more likely to encounterclan labs than their urban counterparts. Illegal drug produc-ers are more likely to select rural areas due to their isolation.Also, rural sites offer more opportunities for the conceal-ment of chemicals and the disposal of toxic wastes.

Prosecutors and JudgesIn many jurisdictions, because prosecutors are not fullyaware of the importance of chemical diversion in illicit drugmanufacture and trafficking, they are less likely to prosecuteoffenses related to these crimes. Similarly, judges may beless likely to impose maximum penalties in these cases.Both prosecutors and judges may therefore need training tounderstand the problem, and prosecutors should learn pro-cedures for investigating and prosecuting chemical diver-sion under various State and Federal controlled substancesacts.

Model Programs forClan Lab Seizure and CleanupNot all law enforcement agencies have developed adequate,efficient procedures for clan lab seizures. Such seizures areusually haphazard in terms of planning, interagency coor-

dination, and cleanup. DCAG members called for modelprograms that describe the best methods for conducting clanlab seizures and disposing of toxic wastes from these sites.

The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assis-tance (BJA) is currently funding five sites in a Clan LabModel Enforcement Program, including the CaliforniaDepartment of Justice, the Washington State Patrol, the cityof Portland, Oregon, the Pennsylvania State AttorneyGeneral's Office, and the New Jersey State Police. Theobjectives of this program are (1) to assess the effectivenessand safety of approaches to clan lab enforcement, (2) todisseminate these approaches to agencies that wish toaddress the problems of clan labs in their jurisdictions, (3)to assess existing clan lab operations, (4) to develop a"model" approach to the investigation and prosecution ofclan labs, (5) to develop training and technical assistancematerials to transfer the model to other sites, and (6) toassess the BJA-funded demonstration sites and disseminatethe results.

BJA, in cooperation with the DEA, is also supporting a ClanLab Cleanup Program. This program is funding modelcleanup programs through the California Department ofToxic Waste Control, the Washington State Department ofEcology, and the Portland (Oregon) Fire Bureau. Theobjectives of this program are similar to those listed above.Reports on the model seizure and cleanup programs shouldbe available in 1993. (See appendix E for more informationon this program.)


Chapter 7

Data and Statistics

DataNationwide, there is a lack of accurate data on clandestinedrug labs and on efforts to control precursor and essentialchemicals, such as the number of investigations and pros-ecutions related to the CDTA and State legislation. Cur-rently, the DE A can only report seizures that its own agentsconduct or those that are voluntarily reported by State andlocal agencies. State and local agencies are not required toreport seizures to the DEA. Furthermore, there are noaccepted national criteria or definitions for classifying aclan lab. The DEA, for example, distinguishes clan labs thatare operational at the time of seizure from those that aredismantled, boxed, stored, or abandoned. Other jurisdic-tions may not consider the seizure of an abandoned or boxedlab as an actual seizure. Thus, even in jurisdictions thatreport seizures to the DEA, underreporting may result fromdifferent definitions of what constitutes a seizure.

Accurate statistics are necessary to understand the extent ofthe clan lab and chemical diversion problem. A betterunderstanding of the size of the problem can help lawenforcement agencies in planning and committing resources.It would also assist law enforcement in working with Stateand local legislatures to obtain stronger legislation forcontrolling diversion and adequate financial resources topay for the costs resulting from conforming to occupationalsafety and environmental protection regulations.

Information Sharing AmongLaw Enforcement AgenciesSharing of information about precursor and essential chemi-cals is also extremely important. Many of the cases confront-ed by State and local law enforcement agencies involve the

procurement of precursor chemicals from manufacturers inother States. The investigation of these cases thereforeinvolves contact with other State law enforcement depart-ments, as well as with the DEA and FBI. In these cases, thedifferences in legislation for controlling precursor andessential chemicals add to the difficulty of the investigationprocess.

Law enforcement agencies need better mechanisms forsharing information, as well as increased joint investigationefforts including the DEA, State and local law enforcement,and regulatory agencies. Some suggest that other State andfederal agencies, such as departments of transportation andenvironmental regulatory agencies, should also maintainrecords on the manufacture and transport of precursor andessential chemicals.

Greater contact with international law enforcement authori-ties and law enforcement agencies in other countries mayalso be of assistance in investigating cases involving theimport and export of these substances. (Internationalinvestigations should be referred to the Office of Interna-tional Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Jus-tice.)

Often, the emphasis placed upon traditional clandestinelaboratory enforcement actions—that is, the arrest of clanlab operators—overshadows the significance associatedwith denying operators access to precursor chemicals. De-nial of access to regulated chemicals and the prosecution ofchemical supply companies in violation of the CDTA andState legislation should be viewed as useful enforcementtools. Therefore, it is important that all intelligence infor-mation regarding the source of chemicals seized in clan labsbe documented and shared with all concerned agencies foractionable follow-up.

Data and Statistics 37

Chapter 8

Additional Issues

Improved TechnologyAdditional research and development of technology for usein detecting and prosecuting crimes involving precursor andessential chemicals are also needed. A variety of potentialdevices, such as chemical "sniffers" that could detect minuteamounts of precursors, could be helpful in controllingdiversion. Some suggested that modern scientific tech-niques such as gas chromatography and mass spectroscopycould be useful in tracing shipments of listed chemicals tospecific manufacturers. Testing devices that could quicklydetermine the toxic substances present at the scene of a clanlab seizure would also be useful.

Other devices needed by law enforcement include protectiveclothing that is better designed for use during clan labseizures. Improved features might include less bulky suitsthat would permit greater maneuverability in dangeroussituations and would accommodate body armor.

Better methods of storing and retrieving data on chemicalmanufacture and transactions would also assist in theinvestigation of crimes involving chemical diversion.

Related Legal DevicesSome diversion experts are interested in exploring otherlegal mechanisms for approaching crimes involving chemi-cal diversion. The application of environmental protectionand even occupational safety laws to operators of clan labsmight be an additional deterrent to these crimes, as well asanother way of prosecuting them.

In addition, some DCAG members were interested in thepossible application of the Racketeer-Influenced and Cor-rupt Organizations (RICO) Act of 19701 to chemical diver-sion. Organized crime organizations and gangs are heavilyinvolved in the manufacture of illicit drugs, as well as inproviding precursor and essential chemicals to foreign drugproducers. The RICO Act makes it a crime to engage in "a

pattern of racketeering activity." Two definitions of rack-eteering activity, among others, are (1) any State law offenseinvolving narcotic or dangerous drugs punishable by morethan one year imprisonment and (2) any Federal felonyinvolving the "manufacturer, importation, receiving, con-cealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcoticor dangerous drugs." Because trafficking in precursor andessential chemicals is in violation of the Federal ChemicalDiversion and Trafficking Act, as well as numerous Statelaws, this activity may be considered racketeering and thusmay be chargeable under the RICO Act.

Other State and local laws not related to drug control canoften be applied to clandestine laboratory operators. Forexample, California prosecutors charge lab operators withviolations of child endangerment laws.

Environmental andOccupational RegulationsLaw enforcement agencies also need assistance in dealingwith the body of Federal, State, and local regulations thatrestrict environmental pollution and assure occupationalsafety as they affect clandestine drug lab seizure and cleanup.Some law enforcement agencies may be out of compliancewith Federal and other statutes and regulations, becausethey do not understand either the requirements of theregulations or their applicability to law enforcement agen-cies.

Nevertheless, the DCAG generally agreed that these provi-sions are applicable to law enforcement agencies, althoughactual court cases in this area are relatively rare. DCAGmembers warned that agencies might suffer the injury ordeath of exposed officers, as well as legal liability forenvironmental exposures to hazardous substances, if theydo not institute training programs to teach their officers therequirements for handling and disposing of wastes fromclan lab seizures.

Additional Issues 39

Financing of Clan LabSeizures and CleanupsDCAG members also considered the financing of environ-mental cleanup and occupational safety costs of drug labseizures a priority problem. Some law enforcement agencieshave already confronted bills of $ 100,000 and higher for thecleanup of single clan lab sites. Particularly contaminatedsites may require cleanup costs of hundreds of thousands ofdollars.

Some experts suggest that the recent decline in clan labseizures was not only due to better control of precursorchemicals but also to the reticence of law enforcementagencies to seize labs, because of the high cleanup costs forwhich they might be liable. (However, as mentioned previ-ously, other indicators of the use of drugs manufactured inclan labs also suggest that clan lab activity is decreasing.)Several methods have been suggested for financing clan labcleanups, ranging from joint Federal/State financing toState andFederal laws exemptinglawenforcementagenciesfrom bearing the cleanup costs and transferring these coststo environmental protection agencies. Others suggest thatasset forfeiture programs could be used to pay for clan labcleanup.

assure that illegal drugs do not reach the streets. However,preventing diversion also requires that law enforcementagencies acquire new capabilities for addressing environ-mental regulation and occupational safety requirements, forunderstanding interstate commerce and the chemical indus-try, and for promoting interagency cooperation amongnumerous local, State, and Federal law enforcement agen-cies.

The ever-changing nature of the drug problem also neces-sitates constant vigilance against chemical diversion. New"designer" drugs and manufacturing processes may requirethe control of new precursor and essential chemicals. Ascontrol of diversion becomes more effective, illegal drugproducers will undoubtedly seek new ways to obtain precur-sor and essential chemicals and to conceal their clandestinelabs. Law enforcement agencies can combat these problemsby increasing their knowledge of the role of precursor andessential chemicals in illicit drug production.

Endnote1. Part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Public

Law91-452; 84U.S.C. 922, 941-948; 18U.S.C. 1961et seq.

Preventing the diversion of precursor and essential chemi-cals can be an effective new tool for controlling illegal drugs.By blocking criminals' access to the raw materials of drugproduction, law enforcement agencies, and the courts can


Glossary of Technical and Legal Terms

Acute toxicity. Adverse health effects resulting from abriefexposure to a chemical substance or mixture. The effectmay be reversible or irreversible.

Assessment. Determination of immediate safety or healthrisks and reduction, if possible, of any imminent haz-ards to law enforcement personnel in later stages of aseizure operation.

By-product Chemical substance remaining after synthesisof illicit drugs.

Bulk chemicals. Drums, containers, or packages of precur-sor chemicals, reagents, solvents, by-products, or illicitdrugs that should be taken for evidence or removed toa permitted waste disposal facility after a seizure.

Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988. SubtitleA of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which placesunder Federal control selected precursor and essentialchemicals as well as the distribution of tableting andencapsulating machines. It also requires that all manu-facturers, distributors, importers, and exporters of thesechemicals maintain retrievable receipts and distribu-tion records for a period of four years for precursorchemicals and machines and two years for essentialchemicals.

Chronic toxicity. Adverse health effects resulting fromcontinuous or intermittent exposure to low levels ordoses of a chemical substance or mixture over a longperiod of time (weeks to years).

Clan lab. Clandestine drug laboratory.

Clandestine drug laboratory. Any operation that is en-gaged in the manufacture of illegal drugs as defined bythe Controlled Substances Act.

Cleanup. The process(es) of removing materials contami-nated with hazardous substances or decontaminatingtheir surfaces.

Condemnation. The legal act of declaring a property unfitfor use by the public.

Controlled Substances Act Public Law 91-513. It providesthe legal basis for drug law enforcement in the UnitedStates and establishes regulations and activities gov-erning controlled substances.

Corrosive. A substance is corrosive if it corrodes metal(e.g., steel) under certain conditions or if it exhibitsstrongly acidic or alkaline pH that would enable it toharm human tissue or aquatic life.

Decontamination. The process of removing chemical con-tamination from surfaces by washing or by chemicaltreatment.

Designer drug. A chemical derivative of a known illicitdrug; controlled substance analog.

Disposal contractor. An individual or company that isappropriately qualified (and registered with the State,if necessary) to dispose of hazardous or toxic wastes inapproved facilities.

Emergency response. The process, initiated by calling theNational Response Center (NRC, 1-800-424-8802), ofevaluating, and if necessary, taking actions to reduce orprevent the release into the environment of a hazardoussubstance that may pose an imminent and substantialthreat to public health or the environment.

Essential chemical. Essential chemicals are necessary inthe production process of drugs but do not become a partof the molecular structure of the drug. They includesolvents, reagents, and catalysts used in the drug manu-facturing process.

Evidentiary samples. Samples of drugs and other itemscollected by a certified chemist at a clan lab site to beused as evidence against the perpetrators). Samplesare taken prior to bulk disposal of the chemicals andother materials.

Explosimeter. An instrument that measures the concentra-tion of a flammable gas or vapor as a percentage of thelower explosive limit (LEL).

Glossary of Technical and Legal Terms 41

Explosive. A material producing a sudden, almost instan-taneous release of pressure, gas, and heat when sub-jected to abrupt shock, pressure, or high temperature.

Flash point The lowest temperature at which a substancegives off flammable vapor to form an ignitable mixturewith air near its surface or within a vessel.

Generator. Any person whose act or process produceshazardous waste identified or listed in USEPA RCRAregulations, or whose act first causes a hazardous wasteto become subject to regulation. By seizing a clan laband its property, alaw enforcement agency may becomea hazardous waste generator.

Hazardous substance. Chemical substances, elements,mixtures, or solutions variously defined or listed undera number of Federal or State regulations.

Irri tant A chemical substance which produces reversibleredness, swelling, or soreness when in contact with skinor mucous membranes.

Lead agency. A State-appointed agency (State or local)responsible for supervising, coordinating, and facilitat-ing the cleanup of clandestine drug laboratories withinthe given State in cooperation with law enforcementpersonnel.

Lower explosive limit (LEL). Refers to the lowest concen-tration of gas or vapor (percent volume in air) that willburn or explode at ambient temperatures if an ignitionsource is present.

Notification letter. Letters from law enforcement or healthagencies to appropriate parties regarding the status ofa clan lab site relative to legal and health or safetyissues.

Organic vapor analyzer. A device that detects thepresenceand concentration of organic vapors in the air that maypose an acute health or safety hazard.

Personal protective equipment Various types of clothing(e.g., suits, gloves, hats, boots) or apparatus (e.g., facemasks, respirators, radios, etc.) designed to preventinhalation, skin contact, or ingestion of hazardouschemicals. Various "levels" of protection have beendeveloped to correspond to different degrees of adversehealth risks.

Precursor chemical. A chemical substance required for thesynthesis of an illicit drug which is ultimately incorpo-rated into the drug's molecular structure. Some precur-sors are hazardous in their own right and are regulatedthrough Federal and State substance abuse and chemi-cal diversion laws.

Reactive. Substances that are normally unstable and havea tendency to react violently with water or to explodeduring handling.

Reagent A chemical required for the synthesis of an illicitdrug substance but which is not incorporated into thefinal chemical product. Reagents used in illicit drugproduction are called essential chemicals.

Regulated person. Any individual, corporation, partner-ship, association, or other legal entity who manufac-tures, distributes, imports, or exports a precursor oressential chemical listed in the CDTA.

Regulated transaction. A distribution, receipt, sale, im-portation, or exportation by a regulated person whichmeets or exceeds the threshold amount of a CDTA-listed chemical, or the import, export or domesticdistribution of a tableting or encapsulating machine.All regulated persons engaged in any of these transac-tions are subject to the record keeping and reportingrequirements of the CDTA.

Residual contamination. Small amounts of chemical con-tamination that remain inside a laboratory or its con-tents or on the grounds surrounding the clan lab site thatmay pose a public health or environmental risk.

Seizure. The act of taking control of a clandestine druglaboratory, which involves planning, initial entry, as-sessment, processing, exit, and follow-up.

Solvent An organic liquid used in various chemical reac-tions or extraction procedures to dissolve or separateprecursor chemicals, reagents, or drug substances butwhich is not incorporated into the final product. Sol-vents used in illicit drug production are called essentialchemicals.

Toxicity. The quality or degree of being poisonous to plant,animal, or human life as the result of exposure (inges-tion, inhalation, or skin contact) to a hazardous chemi-cal, mixture, or illicit drug.


jffi.S

List of Acronyms

AFRI

BJA

CATF

CDTA

CERCLA

CFR

DAWN

DCAG

DEA

EC

EPA

FATF

G-7

American Prosecutors Research Institute

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Chemical Action Task Force

Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Actof 1988

Comprehensive Environmental Response,Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund)

Code of Federal Regulations

Drug Abuse Warning Network

Domestic Chemical Action Group

Drug Enforcement Administration

European Commission or EuropeanCommunity

Environmental Protection Agency

Financial Action Task Force

Group of Seven Industrialized Nations

HSWA

kg

L

LEL

MEK

NU

OJP

OSHA

P-2-P

RCRA

RICO

SCBA

U.S.C.

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments(amends the Resource Conservation andRecovery Act)

Kilograms

Liters

Lower explosive limit

Methyl ethyl ketone, also called 2-butanone


Office of Justice Programs

Occupational Safety and HealthAdministration

Phenyl-2-propanone

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Racketeer-Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act of 1970

Self-contained breathing apparatus

United States Code

List of Acronyms 43

Bibliography

California Office of the Attorney General. ClandestineDrug Labs: Kitchens ofDeath. RanchoCordiva: Cal-ImageMarketing, 1989. Videotape.

Chemical Action Task Force. Chemical Action Task ForceFinal Report. Washington, DC: CATF, 1991.

Chemical Action Task Force. Chemical Action Task ForceWorking Group Reports. Washington, DC: CATF, 1991.

Chemical Action Task Force. Status Report for the 1992Economic Summit. Washington, DC: CATF, 1992.

Conners, E.F. "Hazardous Chemicals from ClandestineLabs Pose Threat to Law Enforcement." Police Chief 57,1(January 1990): 37-41.

James, R.D. "Hazards of Clandestine Drug Laboratories."FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 58,4 (1989); 16-21.

Laszlo, A.T. "Clandestine Drug Laboratories: Confrontinga Growing National Crisis." National Sheriff 41,4 (1989):10-14.

Maher, T.B. "Legal Liabilities Faced by Owners of PropertyContaminated by Clandestine Methamphetamine Labora-tories: The Oregon Approach." Willamette Law Review 27(1991): 325-353.

National Criminal Justice Association. A Guide to StateControlledSubstancesActs.'Wash.mgton,DC:'NCJA, 1991.

National Fire Protection Association. National Fire Protec-tion Standard^30(flammableiiquids).Quincy,MA: NFPA,1990.

Office of National Drug Control Policy. National DrugControl Strategy: 1991. Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1991.

Stromberg, L. and A.C. Maehly. Advances in ChemicalSignature Analyses of Drugs. Linkokin, Sweden: LinkopingUniversity Forensic Science Center, 1979.

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Opera-tions. Clandestine Manufacture of Illicit Drugs. Hearingsbefore a subcommittee, September 24 and December 5,1985. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 1985.

U. S. Congress, House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuseand Control. Flow of Precursor Chemicals and AssaultWeapons from the United States into the Andean Nations.Hearings before the House Select Committee, November 1,1989. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, 1990.

U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administra-tion. Chemical Handler's Manual: An Information Outlineof the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988.Washington, DC: DEA, 1990.

U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administra-tion. Conference Report on the Drug Enforcement Admin-istration and Chemical Industry National Conference.Washington, DC: DEA, 1989.

U. S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administra-tion. Guidelines for the Cleanup of Clandestine DrugLaboratories. Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1990.

U. S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administra-tion. Model State Chemical Act. Washington, DC: DEA,1990.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Narcotics Matters.International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washi ng-ton, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1991.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Implementation of theChemical Diversion and Trafficking A ct of 1988, Washing-ton, DC: GAO, 1991.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Stronger CrackdownNeeded on Clandestine Laboratories Manufacturing Dan-gerous Drugs. Washington, DC: GAO, 1981.

Bibliography 45

Appendix A

Sources of Diversion

The worldwide manufacturing and distribution network forchemicals affords criminals many opportunities to divertprecursor and essential chemicals from legitimate use toillicit drug production. The CATF identified eight specificsources of diversion; these are displayed in figure 1. Thefollowing sections enumerate those sources as well as themajor factors at each source that lead to diversion.

ManufacturersThe manufacturers' own plants or warehouses present thefirst opportunity for diversion. Inaccurate production recordscan enable the theft of large amounts of chemicals withoutthe manufacturers' knowledge. (It should be noted that thegreat majority of chemical manufacturers and handlers arecomplying satisfactorily with CDTA requirements.)

Manufacturers can also unwittingly ease the diversion ofchemicals through ineffective customer identification. Thuscriminals, posing as legitimate users of these products, canbuy them directly from the manufacturer. Unless the manu-facturer follows the procedures required by U.S. law toensure that the customer has a legitimate need for thechemical product, the possibility of diversion exists.

Wholesalers and RetailersA variety of companies sell chemicals on a wholesale andretail basis. These companies provide a second source ofdiversion for illicit drug manufacturers. Wholesale andretail companies car be set up as fronts to serve as a conduitfrom the manufacture of these chemicals to their use as rawmaterials in the drug production process. In some cases,front companies can actually sell precursor chemicals, aswell as a variety of other chemicals, to legitimate clients.The vast profits available from the illegal drug trade makeit possible to support these front companies, which may

operate at a loss. In other cases, the front company is nothingbut a name and address on business stationery, which thedrug manufacturer uses to directly buy from the chemicalmanufacturer. The possibility of selling to such front com-panies is the principal reason why manufacturers mustattempt to identify their customers' legitimate need for theprecursor and essential chemicals.

In addition, wholesalers and retailers, like manufacturers,may unwittingly sell these chemicals directly to criminals orindirectly through intermediaries working as agents for thedrug manufacturers.

Freight Forwarders, Agents,Brokers, and the Spot MarketThe chemical market also includes a wide variety of middle-men. These include freight forwarders, who assist importersand exporters in packaging, warehousing, and shippingproducts; agents who are representatives of the seller andwho try to identify customers for the chemical products; andbrokers who attempt to match clients who may be lookingto buy or sell chemical materials. All of these persons maybe involved in a spot market, a term that refers to informalsales of a product when a surplus exists.

All of these professions greatly complicate the control ofillegal diversion of precursor and essential chemicals. As achemical works its way through the distribution system, itmay easily have 5 or even 10 different owners. Thesechanges in ownership and control make tracking divertedchemicals very difficult and afford many opportunities forcriminals to obtain control of shipments.

Furthermore, shipments may be stored in warehouses orother areas that have little or no security, making theft aneasy task.

Appendix A 47

Point of Export Illicit End UserAll countries require that the export of manufactured goodsor raw materials be controlled at all points of entry into andexit out of the country. However, the vast amount ofmaterials that enter and leave at these points make it easy forcriminals to successfully divert chemicals needed for themanufacture of illicit drugs. Customs officials seldom havethe time or ability to test and certify that a barrel contains thechemical that its accompanying label and documentationclaim it holds. Thus, inaccurate or false export documentscan be utilized to divert precursor and essential chemicalsto illegal use.

Furthermore, illicit chemical shipments may be able to passthrough points of export by being intermingled with legalones. In addition, bribery of customs officials and otherexport controllers is also a possibility.

Free Zones, Free Ports, and Transit

Many international shipments of chemicals stop at the portsor travel over the roads of several countries. For example, achemical may be manufactured in Germany and then placedon a truck that travels through Austria, Switzerland, andItaly on its way to the port of Marseilles, France. From thereit may be loaded onto a ship that stops at ports in Spain andBrazil before being unloaded in Colombia.

At each of these intermediate stops, as weil as while they areon board ships and other vehicles, chemicals can be divertedby several methods. Illicit chemicals can be substituted inlegal shipments, or chemicals can be repackaged or relabeledto obscure the true contents of the shipment. Finally, the lackof physical checks on the materials, due to the volume oftraffic through free zones and free ports, may permit otherforms of diversion.

Point of Import

Problems at the point of import are similar to those at thepoint of export. Required documentation can be forged orotherwise falsified, resulting in the entry of illicit precursorsand essentials into a country. Manufacturers that exportchemicals may unwittingly deal with front companies in theforeign country. These front companies would directlyimport precursors and essentials and provide them to illicitdrug manufacturers. Finally, illicit precursor and essentialchemicals can arrive in a country through smuggling.

The illicit end user—the illicit drug manufacturer—hasseveral other means at his or her disposal for divertingprecursor and essential chemicals. Because chemical pro-cesses are widely understood, the manufacturer can substi-tute listed chemicals needed for drug manufacture withother substances. Because many of the precursor chemicalsdiscussed here are simple acids, bases, and salts, it ispossible for a drug manufacturer to substitute other varietiesof these substances for those on the controlled list. Drugmanufacturers, may, in essence, manufacture their ownprecursor and essential chemicals by mixing or extractingthe needed chemicals from other chemical products that arenot on the controlled list.

Illicit drug manufacturers can also divert chemicals bymaking multiple purchases each of which is under thethreshold limit required for reporting. This method iscommonly known as "smurfing." Smurfing may be aneffective means of diversion in the short run, but as time goesby, smurfers arouse suspicion because of their frequent,small purchases, oftenfrom numerous manufacturers, whole-salers, and retailers.

Disposal and Recycling

Criminals can also gain access to precursors and essentialsby recycling their own materials or the waste materials ofother companies. As listed substances become harder toobtain, illicit users are becoming more careful in their useof the products and are less likely to simply throw away usedprecursor chemicals. Instead, they attempt to recycle sol-vents, acids, and other substances necessary in the manufac-ture of the drug. They may also process the waste productsof legitimate manufacturers into the precursors needed fortheir own illicit drug production. For this reason, it isimportant that companies that use precursors and essentialchemicals ensure that the companies that dispose of theirwastes are also legitimate, so these materials do not acciden-tally fall into the hands of illicit drug manufacturers.

Loopholes in the LawIn addition, the Drug Enforcement Agency reports thatloopholes in existing laws also contribute to diversion. Forexample, the CDTA specifically exempts any chemical thatis contained in a drug that may be marketed or distributed

Appendix A 49

lawfully in the United States under the Federal Food, Drug,and Cosmetic Act. Violators have consistently used thisloophole to divert minions of 25 mg units of ephedrinetablets for use by clandestine laboratory operators. Legisla-tion to close this loophole is pending in Congress.

50 Precursor and Essential Chemicals in illicit Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement

Appendix B

CDTA Requirementsfor the Chemical Industry

This appendix provides a detailed explanation of require-ments for chemical handlers (manufacturers and sellers) ofprecursor and essential chemicals.1

office in the area where the operator does business. (TheDEA has 19 division offices located in major cities acrossthe United States. For a listing of these offices, see appendix

Record KeepingThe CDTA has several record-keeping requirements formanufacturers and distributors of precursor and essentialchemicals. All records of transactions must be maintainedfor four years following the transaction date for precursorchemicals andfor twoyearsfor essential chemicals. Recordsfrom the sale of tabieting machinery must also be kept forfour years. Records must be kept at the business locationwhere the sale occurred or at a central location in the caseof larger firms. Firms with many places of business mustalso keep records to identify multiple purchases, which maybe an attempt to circumvent the threshold limit.

Records of each transaction must include the following: thenames and addresses of the buyer and seller; the date of thetransaction; the name, quantity, and form of packaging forthe substance in question; the method of transportation usedto transfer the substance; and the type of identificationprovided by the purchaser and its unique identifying num-ber.

Operators may use their normal business records for thesepurposes, as long as the information contained above isincluded, and as long as the information is retrievable forDEA investigations.

Reporting to the DrugEnforcement AdministrationIn certain circumstances, operators must make special oralreports to the special agent in charge of the DEA division

These circumstances are:

Any transaction involving a large quantity of thechemical, an uncommon method of payment, an un-usual method of delivery, or any situation that causesthe chemical supplier to believe that the chemical mightbe used for an illegitimate purpose.

Any transaction that involves a person whose descrip-tion or identifying characteristics have been provided tothe operator by the DEA. (It is unlawful, according tothe CDTA, for a supplier to sell a listed chemical to sucha person unless the DEA has approved the transaction.Violations of this requirement can result in a fine of upto $25,000 and imprisonment for up to 1 year.)

Any unusual or excessive loss or disappearance of alisted chemical.

Any domestic transaction involving a tabieting orencapsulating machine.

Suspicious Orders

Reports involving suspicious orders should be made whena customer pays in cash or another unusual manner, fails toprovide adequate information about his or her business andthe purpose of the chemical purchase, or otherwise is evasiveor nonresponsive regarding the purchase.

Appendix B 51

Contents of Reports

Reports to the DEA regarding suspicious transactions orother suspicious circumstances must be made "at the earliestpractical opportunity." The oral report must be followed bya written report to the same DEA division office, and mustinclude the following information:

The name, address, and telephone number of eachparty, if available.

The date of the intended transaction.

The name, quantity, description, and form of packag-ing of each chemical or machine.

The method of transfer (truck, delivery, etc.).

The type of identification used by the customer and anyunique identifying number.

Special circumstances that caused the operator to reportthe suspicious order.

If the report is for a loss or theft of a listed chemical, thereport should contain the date, the type of chemical missing,and a description of the circumstances.

Proof of Identity

All transactions involving these chemicals require proof ofidentity. For companies, proof of identity requires thesupplier to check the customer's documentation (businessstationery, order forms, etc.) and then to validate that it is alegitimate company by checking local directories, creditbureaus, chambers of commerce, etc. Customers that cannotbe validated should be reported to the DEA.

For new customers, operators must also establish thecompany's authorized purchasing agents, to prevent fraudu-lent purchases by unauthorized employees. For each cus-tomer, the operator must keep on file the names andsignatures of authorized purchasing agents and any elec-tronic passwords or other encoding methods used by thecustomer to insure the authenticity of the purchaser. This listof agents is required by law to be updated annually.

Any domestic transaction by an individual must also beaccompanied by the purchaser's signature, driver's license,or other legitimate identification. The DEA suggests thatany purchase by an individual with cash is by naturesuspicious.

Export and ImportReporting RequirementsThe principal mechanism for reporting international transac-tions of listed chemicals is DEA Form 486, the Import/Export Declaration for Precursor and Essential Chemicals.Any operator who imports or exports a listed chemical mustsubmit this form to the DEA at least 15 days prior toshipment. Waivers of the 15-day requirement may be ob-tained from the DEA for regular customers, but the formmust still be submitted prior to or on the date of the shipment.

Form 486 requires information on the size and descriptionof each shipment, the name of the exporter, the name of thebroker or forwarding agent, the method of shipment, and thename and address of the consignee and any intermediateconsignees.

Establishing a Regular Customer List

Prior to the October 30,1989 implementation of the CDTAimport and export provisions, chemical exporters wererequired by law to furnish DEA with the names of theirforeign regular customers. DEA either granted or deniedregular customer status to each of these foreign customers,based upon investigative results. The 15-day advance noti-fication requirement is waived for any export to an approvedregular customer. An export to a customer not on a company' sregular customer list, subsequent to the October 30, 1989implementation date, requires 15-day advance notificationto DEA via Form 486. If the exporter is not notified to thecontrary after expiration of the 15 days, authorization isgranted to export, and the customer automatically becomesa regular customer for future chemical transactions. Thecustomer list serves principally to identify legitimate for-eign sources and end users of precursor and essentialchemicals. The DEA has the authority to remove a customerfrom a supplier's regular customer list; in which case, foreach sale to this customer, Form 486 must again be submit-ted at least 15 days prior to shipment.

Complying With Foreign Import Restrictions

All exporters of precursor and essential chemicals mustdetermine whether importing a substance into a foreigncountry is restricted by the laws and regulations of thatcountry. The DEA periodically publishes a list of countriesthat have laws and regulations on the importation of listedchemicals. It is important for American exporters to main-


tain a current knowledge of these foreign laws, because if ashipment is found to be in violation of the laws of a foreigncountry, the U.S. exporter is subject to a penalty of up to 10years imprisonment.2 For each violation, individuals arealso liable to a fine of up to $250,000, and organizations areliable for up to $500,O0O.3

Special CircumstancesThe CDT A also requires actions by manufacturers and otheroperators in special circumstances regarding the sale andshipment of listed chemicals.

Transshipment Through the United States

Transshipment is the transport through the United States oflisted chemicals that are destined for immediate exportationto a foreign purchaser. Like imports and exports, transship-ments must also be reported to the DEA, although not onForm 486. These notices must be submitted at least 15 daysprior to the shipment date and must contain the followinginformation: the name of the chemical; a description of thesize and weight of the shipment; the name, address, andtelephone or telex of the foreign exporter, the foreign portof exportation; the approximate date of export; a descriptionof the ship or other carrier; the name, address, and telephonenumber of the transshipped the U.S. port of entry; theapproximate date of entry; the name, address, and telephonenumber of the foreign port of entry; the shipping route fromthe U. S. port of exportation to the ultimate port of entry; andthe approximate date of receipt at the foreign port of entry.

Returned Exports

If an export of a listed chemical is returned to the UnitedStates, written notification must be provided to the DEAexplaining the circumstances of the return.

Suspension of Shipments

The DEA has the authority' to suspend any export or importof a listed chemical based on evidence that the chemical maybe diverted for use in the clandestine manufacture of acontrolled substance. The importer or exporter may requestan administrative hearing to determine the issues involvedin the suspension of the shipment, under the AdministrativeProcedure Act.4

Inspection Authority

The CDTA gives the DEA the authority to inspect achemical firm subject to the Act. The purpose of theseinspections is to assure that the required records and reportsare being maintained and that the firm is complying with thepurpose and intent of the legislation.

Confidentiality

Information obtained under the CDTA is considered confi-dential business information and is exempt from disclosurethrough the Freedom of Information Act.5 However, theinformation may be disclosed in any investigation or pro-ceeding under the CDTA, in State or local investigationsunder State or local legislation concerning chemical diver-sion, or to foreign law enforcement agencies in compliancewith obligations of the United States under treaties or otherinternational agreements. The DEA maintains strict proce-dures for the handling of confidential business information.

Voluntary CooperationBetween Business and GovernmentThe DEA has also suggested areas in which voluntarycooperation between chemical operators and the DEA canassist in achieving the objectives of the CDTA. Althoughthese voluntary actions are not required by law, the DEArecognizes that each chemical company is in the bestposition to know its own customers, and any informationthat can identify suspicious use might assist in the controlof illicit diversion. The voluntary actions suggested by theDEA include the following:

Advance Notification of anExport of a Listed Chemical

Although the law requires a 15-day prior notice of exports,the DEA would prefer as much advance notice as possible,so it can contact foreign DEA offices and foreign authoritiesabout the shipment.

Background Information on the Customer

Although the law requires that the operator identify eachcustomer, additional information on the legitimate need of

Appendix B 53

the customer for the substance(s), and information onconsignees for the listed chemical(s), would also be helpfulfor investigative purposes.

Changes in Patterns of Distribution

The reason for changes in the type and quantity of routinepurchases are most easily determined by the operator.Sudden increases in the orders of precursor or essentialchemicals should be verified by the operator to determinethat the increase is for a legitimate commercial, industrial,or scientific use.

Subsidiary Companies

The DBA encourages manufacturers that export listedchemicals to foreign subsidiaries to teach employees of theforeign subsidiaries about the chemical diversion problemand about implementing voluntary controls on these chemi-cals.

Sales to Brokers and Other Exporters

Firms using brokers and other exporters should attempt todetermine that foreign consignees receiving listed chemi-cals have legitimate needs for these products.

Availability of Previous Records

The DEA would also be assisted by the provision, whenrequested, of information regarding listed chemical salesand transactions prior to enactment of the CDTA.

Endnotes1. Information contained in this appendix is taken prima-

rily from the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforce-ment Administration, Chemical Handler's Manual: AnInformational Outline of the Chemical Diversion andTrafficking Act of 1988 (Washington, DC: Drug En-forcement Administration, 1990).

2.21U.S.C. 960(d).

3. 18U.S.C. 3571.

4. 5 U.S.C. 551-559, 21 CFR 1313.52-.S7.

5.5U.S.C. 552.


Appendix C

Conducting a Seizureof a Clandestine Drug Lab

The DE A and State and local authorities have been involvedin developing manuals and other training materials to assistlaw enforcement agencies in conducting clan lab seizures.'Extensive training is necessary to prepare law enforcementofficers to conduct safe and effective seizures. Agenciesinterested in obtaining such training are urged to contact theDEA, professional associations, and their State criminaljustice agencies. (See appendix E for more informationabout training.)

The DEA recommends a six-step procedure for seizing aclan lab: (1) planning, (2) initial entry, (3) assessment, (4)processing, (5) exit, and (6) follow-up.1 These steps aresummarized below.

PlanningPlanning a raid requires several steps. The first is todetermine the hazards that might be encountered. Officersshould obtain as much intelligence information as possibleto ascertain the types of drugs being produced. This knowl-edge will indicate the nature of the chemical hazard that willconfront the officers. Information about the perpetrators canindicate whether there is a likelihood of encounteringviolence, booby traps, and other dangers during the raid.The law enforcement agent in charge of the operation mustbe responsible for obtaining and disseminating this infor-mation to the officers involved in the seizure.

Other agencies should routinely be informed of the raidduring the planning phase. The fire department should beable to provide assistance in determining the nature of toxicchemicals found on the site. Fire department personnel areusually well trained in the identification and handling ofhazardous materials, due to their involvement in the controlofthese substances during spills and fires. Many larger firedepartments have special teams, such as bomb squads and

hazardous materials teams, to deal with toxic emergencies.These teams should also be notified.

Ambulance and hospital emergency room personnel shouldbe warned to prepare for possible chemical injuries. Equip-ment should be close by to provide emergency first aid andfire extinguishing capabilities during and immediately afterthe raid. Some jurisdictions have mobile units for hazardouswaste disposal, with all the necessary protective clothingand equipment available, as well as facilities for decontami-nation of personnel and equipment.

Equipment and protective clothing are also factors to con-sider in planning a raid. The DEA has developed four levelsof protection to be implemented during raid and cleanupoperations. The highest level of protection is for situationsin which the hazards are unknown or the site is known tocontain toxic corrosivechemicals.Inthis case, the followingequipment is suggested: pressure-demand, full face-piece,self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA); fully encapsu-lated chemical-resistant suits; inner-lined chemical-resis-tant gloves; chemical-resistant safety boots; hard hats; andtwo-way radio communications.1

For sites in which the type of chemical is known to have lesspotential for exposure to corrosive or inflammable sub-stances, less protective clothing is necessary. However, anycleanup of a clan lab should include the use of coveralls,safety boots, safety goggles, and hard hats. Respirators andother chemical-resistant equipment should also be on hand.

These precautions are not simply suggestions to guaranteesafety; training, safety equipment, and medical follow-upare mandated by various environmental and occupationalsafety laws.

Selection of personnel to conduct the raid must take intoaccount the need for specialized training in these opera-tions. The raiding team should include a forensic chemist to

Appendix C 55

identify toxic substances and collect evidence. A site safetyofficer is needed to help avoid injury to officers during entry,assessment, and processing of the site. The safety officer isresponsible for ensuring that officers wear protective cloth-ing and follow safety procedures. The safety officer can alsocoordinate backup fire and emergency medical units, as wellas oversee decontamination, transport of toxic wastes, andcleanup.

Initial Entry

Entry into the clan lab site requires the useofbody armor andother protective equipment, including fire-retardant cloth-ing. Initial entry should not be accomplished while wearingSCBA gear, because the gear impairs vision, mobility, andbreathing, and may explode if exposed to gunfire or extremeheat.4

The inside of a clan lab presents dozens of hazards for theuntrained police officer. The presence of booby traps isalways a possibility, and the toxic nature of the storedchemicals makes any activity that may ignite or release themhighly dangerous. The use of shotguns should be avoided,because their wide shot pattern makes them more likely tocause the unintentional release of toxic substances. Inaddition, diversionary devices such as tear gas, smokegrenades, or flashbulbs should not be used. In addition,officers must be trained to avoid any activity that results ina spark or flame. This includes turning light switches on oroff, smoking cigarettes, moving canisters of potentiallyexplosive materials, or using flashbulbs. Untrained person-nel should also avoid opening doors to refrigerators andovens, because these are routinely booby-trapped or used forthe storage of hazardous substances.

Officers must also be warned to avoid touching or movingcanisters and other equipment, because they might bebooby-trapped. In addition, they should not touch, taste, orsmell anything in the lab, because any substance could betoxic, and any container or surface could be contaminated bya toxic substance. People on the scene also must not touchtheir hands to their eyes or to mucous membranes such astheir nose and mouth, nor eat food or drink liquids, becauseresidues of any chemicals accidentally touched can behazardous.

Following the initial entry, personnel not involved in theassessment or cleanup should be decontaminated and thenleave the scene. Prisoners should also be decontaminatedon-site.

Assessment

Once the site is secured and the immediate dangers ofexposure controlled, an assessment of the clan lab operationshould begin. The assessment team must be trained in theoperation and maintenance of devices such as explosimeters.organic vapor analyzers, air-sampling pumps, and similarair-monitoring instruments. Equipment used on all raidsmust be intrinsically safe; that is, they must be designed tosuppress sparks that may cause explosions during testing.

The assessment team should include a forensic chemist inprotective gear to conduct an initial assessment of healthand safety risks. This includes shutting down all activechemical procedures, ventilating the area, and making aninitial determination of the types of substances in the lab. Ifa hazardous substance has been released, it is necessary tonotify the National Response Center of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency (1-800-424-8802) with information onthe nature of the incident, the material spilled or released,the cause of the release, the quantity discharged, localweather conditions, injuries resulting from the release, andother information. Bomb squad personnel, in full protectiveequipment, should follow the forensic chemist and examinethe entire area for booby traps.

Explosimeters and oxygen measuring devices should beused to determine whether the atmosphere of the lab ishazardous. The DEA suggests that the oxygen level readingbe between 19.5 and 25 percent, and the concentration of anycombustible gas be less than 25 percent of its lower explosivelimit before operations continue. The concentration oforganic vapors and gases should be less than the permissibleexposure limit. (The forensic chemist must be trained in theuse of these machines and must be aware of the explosiveand exposure limits.) If these thresholds are not achieved,the area must be ventilated, and personnel who are notevacuated must be in full protective gear. For some labs,such as those producing LSD, the area should not beventilated, because toxic dust may contaminate peopleoutside the lab.

Processing

The gathering of evidence from clan labs also requiresspecial training. Anyone working on the collection ofevidence, especially fingerprint technicians, must be trainedin clan lab hazards, due to the possibility of contact withtoxic substances.


The DEA suggests that a photographic or videotape recordbe made of the entire crime scene, including general over-views of the area, close-ups of specific items in the inven-tory, as well as documentation of the sample-taking proce-dure, the original containers from which the samples aretaken, and any visible contamination. Photographic andother equipment used in processing should be capable ofbeing decontaminated.

An inventory of items on the scene should include allequipment, with descriptions of the quantity, type, size,manufacturer' s serial numbers, condition, and location; andeach chemical at the site, by type, concentration, andquantity. Unknown substances should be described accord-ing to their locations, color, volume, and general appear-ance. Samples of all substances should be taken as evidence.

It should be noted that samples are sufficient for evidence incourt. Samples from each substance found at the sceneshould be collected, and the remainder of all containersshould be disposed of in accordance with the proceduresmentioned below. The DEA considers all equipment used inthe lab to be hazardous waste, and it too must be disposed ofproperly.

Exit and Follow-Up

Exit and follow-up from the clan lab scene must alwaysassure that the environmental cleanup of the site is carriedout. The residual toxic chemicals remaining at a clandestinelab site hold great dangers for people who may come intocontact with the site. Criminals who create these clandestinelabs are noted for failing to follow any generally acceptedprocedures for lab safety or environmental safety. Thus, thedangers can persist not only long after the site is seized butalso at great distances from the lab site. Therefore, the siteitself and all remaining fixtures and furnishings must becleaned or neutralized prior to any use or occupation of thesite. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, law enforce-ment agencies may have legal responsibilities to clean up aseized lab site prior to its return to public or private use.Thus, cleanup of the site, and of areas surrounding the sitethat may have been contaminated, are a critical part of theseizure process.

Residual dangers following a clan lab seizure include thefollowing:

Processing areas that leach into water runoffs andsewage systems. Particularly in rural areas, toxic wastes

may simply be directed into the nearest stream or river,thus contaminating these, as well as the local groundwater.

Disposal and dumping areas outside the site, in whichvarious toxic wastes may combine and result in sub-stances even more dangerous than those used in illicitdrug production.

Storage areas at the site, which may, because of spill-age, result in contamination of floors, eating surfaces,and shelving. Emissions of volatile substances may alsocontinue from drapes, carpeting, and other porousmaterials long after the site is seized.

Ventilation systems may send toxic fumes to other partsof the building in which the clan lab is located. This isparticularly important in sites located in apartment oroffice buildings.

Residual cleanup generally requires a qualified hazardouswaste disposal contractor. Some local governments main-tain their own hazardous and toxic waste disposal agenciesor have existing contracts for this work. Law enforcementagencies involved in clan lab seizures should consult withthe proper State and local health, safety, and environmentalagencies prior to the seizure, to arrange for cleanup anddecontamination.

Additional Exit Activities

In addition to arranging for decontamination, the exitprocess from the clan lab seizure should include a finalinspection by the agent in charge, the signing of appropriatedocuments for environmental cleanup, and the posting ofwarning signs.

Transport and Disposal of Hazardous Waste

Law enforcement agencies must be aware that the transportof toxic and hazardous wastes is controlled by variousenvironmental laws. Most law enforcement agencies utilizecontractors experienced in the transport of hazardous wastefor this aspect of clan lab cleanup. However, many munici-pal governments and otherlocal authorities have environmen-tal agencies that are responsible for the cleanup or transportand disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes. Fire depart-ments usually are aware of regulations and methods for thetransport and disposal of toxic wastes within a jurisdiction.DEA Division Offices may also be able to advise lawenforcement officers about transporting and disposing oftoxic and hazardous wastes.

Appendix C 57

Preparing to transport wastes involves calculating the typesand quantities of the toxic substances and obtaining an EPAidentification number. A manifest must be prepared, and adisposal site must be selected that is pennitted to accept thetype of toxic substance(s) being transported. Packaging,marking, and labeling of the wastes is also controlled byFederal law; placards describing the substances being trans-ported are also often required on the truck.

Follow-Up

Clandestine drug labs should be reported to the DE A specialagent in charge at the appropriate DEA Division Office.Also, notification letters must be sent to the owner ofproperty on which a lab was seized as well as to local healthand environmental regulatory agencies. In seizures withDEA involvement, the DEA special agent in charge accom-plishes this step. DEA Field Division Offices are listed inappendix E..

Endnotes

1. U.S. Department of Justice. Drug Enforcement Admin-istration, Guidelines for the Cleanup of ClandestineDrug Laboratories (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office. 1990).

2. Ibid, pp. 5-6.

3. Ibid, p. 4

4. It should be noted that important issues such as respira-tory protection must be resolved by the agency involved.Some agencies contend that the lack of respiratoryprotection is a greater hazard for initial entry officers.Managers setting up clan lab seizure teams should bepresented with al! options for protecting their personnel.


Appendix D

International Measuresto Control Diversion

The efforts of the United States to control the illegaldiversion of precursor and essential chemicals will haveonly a limited effect if other countries do not join in the effortto stop the illicit trade in these chemicals. Fortunately, theworld community has demonstrated its commitment tocontrolling illicit drugs through numerous recent measuresdesigned to prevent diversion. This appendix reviews exist-ing United Nations and other international measures tocontrol diversion. It also summarizes the 46 recommenda-tions of the Chemical Action Task Force for the control ofdiversion.

International andRegional Control of DiversionRecent years have seen a variety of international efforts toprevent diversion. Since 1988, three major internationalorganizations—the United Nations, the Organization ofAmerican States, and the European Commission—havepromulgated various international agreements to controldiversion. Although these agreements have not yet fullycome into effect among member nations, the next few yearsshould witness stronger international control of precursorand essential chemicals, due to these international efforts.

The 1988 UN Convention

The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficin Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances is thefoundation of international regulation of precursor andessential chemicals and is meant to be the "baseline inter-national agreement to bring the diversion of chemicals to theillicit production of drugs under international control."1

More than 65 nations are parties to the Convention. In

addition, the International Narcotics Control Board, theCustoms Cooperation Council, and the International Crimi-nal Police Organization (Interpol), as well as the Organiza-tion of American States and the European Community haveall issued cooperative regulatory measures or have devel-oped and encouraged the use of model regulations by theirmember nations.

The Convention originally named l2chemicals(seetable6)that should immediately be brought under internationalcontrol. Parties to the Convention have several obligationsin regard to the manufacture and trade of these chemicals.As one of the signatories, the United States is required toimplement a variety of measures to control the illicit use ofthese chemicals:

Article 3 requires parties to criminalize the intentionalmanufacture, transport, or distribution of the 12 listedmaterials for use in or for the illicit cultivation, production,or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic sub-stances, as well as the possession of these substances for thesame illicit purposes. (The number of listed materials hasbeen expanded to 22.)

Article 9 mandates that parties should cooperate in lawenforcement efforts to suppress the commission of theoffenses listed in Article 3 and requires training programsfor customs officials and other law enforcement personnelon monitoring the import and export of these substances.

Article 12 requires the parties to take appropriate measuresto monitor the manufacture and distribution of these sub-stances, as well as their international trade, and to notify theauthorities of the signatories about any suspicious transac-tions. It also requires proper labeling and documentation ofimports and exports.

Appendix D 59

Article 13 provides that parties should take appropriatemeasures to prevent the illicit trade in and diversion of thesesubstances and to cooperate with each other toward this end.

Article 14 stipulates that parties may take measures todestroy or otherwise dispose of illicit shipments that areseized or confiscated.

Article 18 requires the application of controls in free portsand free trade zones that are no less stringent than those inother parts of the country.

Article 19 controls postal shipments of these substances.

Regional Instruments and Models

In 1990, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commis-sion of the Organization of American States adopted theirModel Regulations to Control Precursor Chemicals andChemical Substances, Machines and Materials. These modelregulations were suggested for adoption by members of theOrganization, which includes the United States. The sug-gestions stipulated an increase in the number of chemicalscontrolled from the UN Convention's 12 to 36, as well as theadoption of stringent record-keeping, reporting, export-import, and transit requirements. The United States isalready in conformance with these model regulations. Anumber of other nations in the Americas, including Argen-tina, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Peru, and Uruguay, haveadopted or are considering the adoption of legislation orregulations based on this model.

In 1990, the European Community (EC) adopted CouncilRegulation No. 3677/90, which specifies measures to dis-courage the diversion of precursor and essential chemicals.The regulation requires that chemical manufacturers andoperators notify authorities about any suspicious circum-stances that might suggest the diversion of chemicals toillicit drug production. EC members are also required tonotify authorities of the export of some chemicals at least 15days before the completion of a custtfms export declaration.In addition, appropriate documentation, record keeping,and labeling are required of operators. A 1992 amendingregulation strengthened EC compliance with the CATFrecommendations.

Recommendations of the CATFAs mentioned previously, the CATF has issued a series of 46recommendations to control diversion. Its final report also

stressed the need for "an international regime to preventdiversion."2 Critical in this prevention effort is the need foractions not only among chemical-producing nations butalso among transshipping and consuming countries.

The recommendations included actions affecting everyaspect of diversion, including suspension of shipments,tighter controls on free trade zones, monitoring transactionsin listed chemicals, access to information, sanctions, indus-try practices, and law enforcement. The CATF also madeseveral recommendations about expanding the UN Conven-tion and increasing the number of chemicals recommendedfor control.

Increasing theEffectiveness of the UN Convention

The CATF recommended several changes to the 1988 UNConvention, while recognizing that the Convention is themost significant mechanism for the control of diversion.The specific recommendations of the CATF included ex-pansion of the number of signatories, increased implemen-tation of the Convention's requirements by the existingsignatories, and the adoption of the CATF's other recom-mendations by the signatories.

The CATF also suggested an increase in the number ofchemicals controlled by the Convention. The expansion ofthe list of 12 chemicals in the UN Convention to 22 wasbased on the chemicals' suitability for use in illicit drugproduction, the amounts seized, the availability of thechemicals in international trade, and the importation ofthese chemicals into drug manufacturing countries in sig-nificantly greater amounts than are needed for legitimatecommercial practices. In April 1992, the Commission onDangerous Drugs of the United Nations approved theaddition of these five precursor chemicals and five essentialchemicals.

The CATF arranged the substances into three categories.Category 1 precursor chemicals are those used in themanufacture of synthetic drugs and have few other legiti-mate applications. Category 2 includes chemicals that areused in the production of synthetic drugs but that have widerlegitimate uses. Category 3 includes chemicals that areessential to the production of cocaine and heroin. A list ofthe chemicals in each category is contained in table 6. Thosechemicals marked with an asterisk were suggested foraddition by the CATF.


Category 1

N-Acetylanthranilic acid*

Ephedrine

Ergometrine

Ergotamine

Lysergic acid

Category 2

Acetic anhydride

Anthranilic acid

Isosafrol (cis- and trans-)*

Phenylacetic acid

Piperidine

3,4-Methylene-dioxyphenyl-2-propanone* Piperonal*

l-Phenyi-2-propanone

Pseudoephedrine

Safrole*

Category 3

Acetone

Ethyl ether

Hydrochloric acid*

Methyl ethyl ketone (MEK)*

Potassium permanganate*

Sulfiiric acid*

Toluene*

Creating a Framework for Control

In its effort to provide a general framework for the controlof diversion, the CATF delineated five measures that shouldbe critical in national and international efforts. Theseinclude:

• Vigilance on the Part of Operators. The first line ofdefense against diversion must be the manufacturers,sellers, and shippers of these substances. Vigilancemust be aimed primarily at detecting suspicious orunusual transactions, because these are the most likelyto result in the transfer of chemicals to illicit drugmanufacturers. The CATF urged that countries notonly develop protocols to track chemical transactionsbut also to promote the training of operators to informthem of the threat of diversion and to teach them howto detect suspicious circumstances.

• Administrative Surveillance Based on Recording ofOrders and Transactions. The CATF also recom-mended that countries require the maintenance ofrecords, including administrative and commercial docu-ments, so that law enforcement authorities can identifyand track illegal transactions. A two-year minimum forrecord maintenance was suggested.

Registration and A uthorization ofOperators. A licens-ing system to identify and track all manufacturers,shippers, traders, and distributors of precursor andessential chemicals, based on the operators' compe-tence and integrity, is another important measure forcontrolling diversion.

Export Authorization. Export permits should be man-datory for any trade in these chemicals. The CATF alsosuggested that the export permit be made contingentupon possession of an import permit from the receivingcountry. The CATF recommended that exporters shouldbe required to indicate not only the ultimate consigneeof the shipment but also any intermediate consigneesand brokers and to give details of the itinerary andmeans of transport for the shipment. Without such areport, the exporting country should deny permissionfor the export of the shipment.

• Import Authorization. Strict diligence should be exer-cised in the issuance of permits to import these sub-stances.

The CATF suggested different levels of application of thesefive measures for the three categories of chemicals describedin table 6. For Category 1 chemicals, countries should

Appendix D 61

Table 6

Chemicals Currently Listed in the UN Convention

*Added in 1992 as a result of CATF recommendations.

Source; Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action Task Force Final Report (Washington, DC: CATF, 1991),p. 10, and Chemical Action Task Force, Status Report for the 1992 Economic Summit (Washington, DC: CATF, 1992),a l .

implement all five measures. For Category 2 chemicals, allfive should apply "to the extent necessary for effectivecontrol of international transactions." For Category 3chemicals, the CATF suggested that vigilance (Measure 1)and surveillance (Measure 2) be applied, with export andimport authorizations (Measures 4 and 5) also being appliedfor shipments headed for known cocaine- and heroin-producing countries.

Delineating Specific Practices

The CATF's other recommendations deal with specificaspects of the chemical distribution process and with actionsthat law enforcement agencies can take to prevent the illicitflow of these chemicals:

Free ports and trade zones. The CATF recommendedthat suitable regulatory measures be applied to everystage of trade in the subject chemicals in free tradezones and free ports, as well as in other sensitive areas,like bonded warehouses.

Monitoring systems. The CATF called for each countryto implement a monitoring system to scrutinize trade inthe subject chemicals and to identify new chemicalsused for illicit purposes. Monitoring was particularlyurged for the export trade in these substances. TheCATF also called for the development of discrete tariffcodes for precursor and essential chemicals, so thesubstances can be identified more easily in interna-tional trade.

Access to information. The CATF made several sug-gestions about access to data on the subject chemicals.Governments were urged to establish the authority toaccess information on precursor and provider chemi-cals and to establish mechanisms to gain access to thefacilities of chemical operators in order to collectevidence of irregularities. The CATF also recommendedthat rights to commercial secrecy must be respected andthat confidential business information must not be usedfor purposes other than the control of chemical diver-sion; however, such commercial secrecy constraintsmust not be invoked to prevent the collection of infor-mation, access to facilities, or to restrain the applicationof control measures in an investigation of suspectedchemical diversion.

Sanctions. The CATF recommended that to be effec-tive, all measures adopted by countries to controldiversion should be accompanied by sanctions. Thesemight include revocation and suspension of licenses

and seizure or confiscation of chemical shipments. Italso recommended that, in addition to penalties forindividual liability for actions related to diversion,countries should consider adopting civil, administra-tive, and criminal penalties and sanctions for corporateliability in diversion cases.

• Industry and commercial practices. Principal CATFrecommendations for industry involved the under-standing that individual companies are the first line ofdefense against chemical diversion. Industry employ-ees are in the best position to know their customers andboth to track shipments through the distribution systemand to recognize suspicious transactions. The CATFtherefore recommended that chemical industry andcommercial entities be required to establish the identi-ties and bona fides of their customers, as well as theultimate destination of each consignment of the subjectchemicals. The CATF also called for each country todevelop a mechanism to alert authorities of any suspi-cious circumstances involving a shipment of chemi-cals. Each country was also urged to develop trainingmechanisms and instructional booklets to inform em-ployees of chemical companies of the dangers of diver-sion and to teach them how to prevent it.

• Lawenforcementandinternationalcooperation. Twelveof the CATF's 46 recommendations involved lawenforcement and international cooperation among lawenforcement agencies. The CATF called for collabora-tive investigations, training programs, and technicalassistance among nations. To improve control of im-port-export trade, each country was encouraged todevelop "white lists" of approved chemical users anddealers and to share these with other nations' lawenforcement agencies. Differences among the devel-oped nations and the less developed nations that harbormany drug manufacturers were of concern to the CATF.Its members called for developed countries, as well asthe United Nations International Drug Control Pro-gram, to provide resources for improving communica-tions, equipment, and training in diversion control. Italso recommended that developed countries providetraining, special facilities, equipment, clothing, andother assistance in kind for use in the physical exami-nation of chemical shipments. Research in developingbetter methods of testing and identifying these sub-stances was also encouraged.

Several other recommendations concerned increased coop-eration and information sharing among international orga-


nizations such as the International Narcotics Control Board,Interpol, and the Customs Cooperation Council.

International mechanisms. The CATF called for anincrease in the number of formal and informal mecha-nisms for diversion control, including regional agree-ments, executive agreements, agency-to-agency datasharing, and cooperative agreements. The Task Forcewarned that these efforts should involve not only pro-ducing and consuming countries, but also other coun-tries that transship chemicals, because these third-partycountries often greatly complicate the tracking of chemi-cal shipments.

Finally, the CATF made recommendations concerningfollow-up activities resulting from its own deliberations. Itcalled for the adoption of its recommendations by both

CATF participants and nonparticipants. It recommendedthat subgroups of CATF representatives make presentationsabout its proceedings to countries not represented on theCATF, especially those in Asia and Africa. It also recom-mended that additional meetings of the CATF be held in1992 and 1993 to follow up on the recommendations and toidentify additional areas of concern.

Endnotes1. Chemical Action Task Force, Chemical Action Task

Force Final Report (Washington. DC: CATF, 1991).p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 17.

Appendix D 63

Appendix E

Information Sources

Model State LegislationFor those who wish to learn more about how States canaddress chemical diversion, APRI has assembled an infor-mation package. It includes the Model State ChemicalControl Act and accompanying commentary; sample Statestatutes, regulations, and forms; and a chart of State chemi-cal control requirements. Interested parties should contact:

Ms. Sherry GreenSenior AttorneyAPRINational Drug Prosecution Center1033 Fairfax StreetSuite 200Alexandria, VA 22134(703) 549-6790

Information and Training

Drug Enforcement Administration

The DEA operates a Clandestine Laboratory Safety Certifi-cation Program through a grant from the Bureau of JusticeAssistance. The program provides a week-long curriculumon safety aspects of clan lab seizures. State and local lawenforcement officers are eligible to attend the training andreceive a certification in clan lab safety. Although thetraining itself is free, participants' jurisdictions must pay fortravel and per diem expenses. Prior to attending, traineesmust also have a complete medical screening in compliancewith the worker protection rule for hazardous waste opera-tions and emergency response. (29 CFR 1910.120) Toobtain additional information about this course, contact:

DEA Office of TrainingClan Lab Unit/TRDSFBI AcademyQuantico. VA 22135(703) 640-7369

The DEA operates its own Hazardous Waste Disposal Unit,which is also involved with BJA's Clan Lab CleanupProgram. Contact:

Rolf HillChief, Hazardous Waste Disposal UnitDEA Office of Forensic Sciences700 Army-Navy DriveArlington, VA 22202ATTN: AFSH(202) 307-8833

The DEA maintains 19 field offices in major cities through-out the country. These offices may assist local and Statejurisdictions in clan lab investigations and seizures. Theaddresses and telephone numbers of these offices are listedbelow. Any law enforcement agency should feel free tocontact the local field office to discuss how the DEA canassist in investigations of chemical diversion.

Drug EnforcementAdministration Division Offices

Atlanta Field DivisionRussell Federal Building75 Spring St., S.W., Room 740Atlanta, GA 30303(404)331-4401

Boston Field Division50 Staniford St., Suite 200Boston, MA 02114(617)557-2100

Chicago Field Division500 Dirksen Federal Building219 S. Dearborn St.Chicago, IL 60604(312)353-7875

Appendix E 65

Dallas Field Division1880 Regal RowDallas, TX 75235(214)767-7151

Denver Field Division115 Inverness Drive E.Englewood, CA 80112(303) 784-6300

Detroit Field Division357 Federal Building231 West LafayetteDetroit, MI 48226(313)226-7290

Houston Field DivisionSuite 300333 West Loop NorthHouston, TX 77024(713)681-1771

Los Angeles Field DivisionEdward Roybal Federal Building255 East Temple, 20th FloorLos Angeles, CA 90012(213)894-2650

Miami Field Division8400 N.W. 53rd St.Miami, FL 33166(305)591-4870

Newark Field Division806 Federal Office Building970 Broad St.Newark, NJ 07102(201) 645-6060

New Orleans Field Division3838 N. Causeway Blvd.Suite 1800New Orleans, LA 70002(504)840-1100

New York Field Division99 Tenth AvenueNew York, NY 10011(212)337-3900

Philadelphia Field Division10224 Green Federal Building600 Arch St.Philadelphia, PA 19106(215) 597-9530

Phoenix Field DivisionSuite 3013010 N. Second St.Phoenix, AZ 85012(602) 640-5700

San Diego Field Division402 W. 35th St.National City, CA 92050(619)585-4200

San Francisco Field Division450 Golden Gate Ave.P.O. Box 36035San Francisco, CA 94102(415) 556-6771

Seattle Field DivisionSuite 301220 West MercerSeattle, WA 98119(206) 442-5443

St. Louis Field DivisionSuite 5007911 Forsythe Blvd.St. Louis, MO 63105(314)425-3241

Washington DX. Field OfficeRoom 2558400 Sixth St., S.W.Washington, DC 20024(202) 401-7834

Environmental Protection Agency

Every State, and many municipalities, have environmentalprotection offices, which should be contacted to determinelocal law enforcement responsibilities for clan lab cleanupsand waste disposal. The U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency maintains regional offices that can provide law

66 Precursor and Essential Chemicals in Illicrt Drug Production: Approaches to Enforcement

enforcement agencies with information on Federal require-ments, as well as putting them in contact with State and localauthorities. The appropriate EPA regional offices are listedbelow.

EPA Hazardous Waste Regional Contacts

Region I (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)DirectorWaste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region I (HAA-1903)JFK Federal Building, Rm. 2203One Congress StreetBoston, MA 02203(617)565-3420

Region II (NJ, NY, PR, VI)DirectorAir & Waste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region II (AWM)26 Federal Plaza, Room 900New York, NY 10278(212)265-2657

Region III (DC, DE, MD, PA, VA, WV)DirectorU.S. EPA Region III (3HW)841 Chestnut St.Philadelphia, PA 19107(215)597-9800

Region IV (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN)DirectorWaste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region IV345 Courtland St., N.E.Atlanta, GA 30365(404) 347-4727

Region V (IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI)DirectorWaste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region V77 West Jackson Blvd.Chicago, IL 60604-3507(312)353-2000

Region VI (AR, LA, NM, OK, TX)DirectorAir & Waste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region VI (6H)1445 Ross Ave., Suite 1200Dallas, TX 75202(214)655-6444

Region VII (IA, KS, MO, NE)DirectorWaste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region VII (WSTM)726 Minnesota Ave.Kansas City, KS 66101(913)551-7000

Region VIII (CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY)DirectorWaste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region VIII (8HWM)999 18th St., Suite 500Denver, CO 80202-2405(303)293-1603

Region IX (AZ, CA, HI, NV,American Samoa, Guam)DirectorWaste Management DivisionU.S. EPA Region IX75 Hawthorne StreetSan Francisco, CA 94105(415)744-1305

Region X (AK, ID, OR, WA)DirectorHazardous Waste DivisionU.S. EPA Region X (HW-11)1200 Sixth Ave.Seattle, WA 98101(206) 553-4973

National Sheriffs Association

The National Sheriffs Association has conducted trainingon clan lab seizures for its members. It may be contacted at:

National Sheriffs Association1450 Duke St.Alexandria. VA 22314(703) 836-7827

Appendix E 67

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