Precess interactionism, Kurt Lewin's personality psychology
Transcript of Precess interactionism, Kurt Lewin's personality psychology
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7'he .Jlipanese Jburnal of Personatity
1995, Vol, 3, No. 1.fi g
Precess interactionism, process analysis, and self process:
An extension of Kurt Lewin's approach to personality psychology
Kaoru Kurosawa
Dapartment of Behavioral SbiencesFZicultly of Letters, Chiba Uhiversit:y1-33 lhyoi-cho, J)tage-ku, Chiba Citrv 263
With ideas and suggestions from Kurt Lewin's approach to psychology (1935), a new approach
to personality psychology is proposed. It i$ argued that modeis of internal processes and their
parameters should be central for our understanding of personality. Kurt Lewin]s view of human
behavior as a function of the person and situation is deseribed and named here as processinteractionism. Personality variables of our new paradigm are person and process variables. Person
variables are indices of internal individual differences, and process variables are those measured
to tap the processes within the person that reflect situational changes pestulated in Lewin's
interactionism. The variables then are analyzed to examine possible mediational and moderational
models. Finally, self theories in the framework of `social
psychology of self process' (Nakamura,1990) are reviewed, and their characteristics and limitations discussed. It is suggested that we
need models of internal motivational and self-regulutory processes in order to understand the self
in partlcular, and uur personality in general.
Key words: personality, Kurt Lewin, internal process, process analysis, mediation
In this paper, a new approach te personality
psychology i$ proposed., First, Kurt Lewin's
approach to psychology is briefly reviewed.
The sections to fellow present what is expected
of per$onality psychology as a scientific disci-
pline, and then outline a new conception of
persenality, which is the basis fbr a new `pro-
cess interactionist' approach. Also, new data
analytical methods, now availab}e and already
shown compatible and useful in explicating and
testing internal-process models of the new ap-
proach, are described. Finally, from the new
perspective, various theories of self in the
framework of `social
psychology of self process'
(Nakamura, 1990) are briefiy reviewed and dis-
cussed as an example, Before discussing our
new approach, we shall first look at implicit
'I'he author wishes to thiink the anonymous reviewers fer
their valuable suggestions.
and naive theories, as opposed to scientific and
expert theories, and then Lewinian approach to
psychology, in order to understand why a new
approach is necessary and what it should aim
to achieve.
Lay and expert theories
Human beings are eminently social and cog-
nitive in nature, and each possesses an enor-
mous amount of knowledge about oneself and
others. We can readily describe and explain
what we are like, what we do, how and why
we do what we do, and so on. We can de-
scribe and explain, not only people in general
but also someone in particular, and even pre-
dict or control others' behavior. Moreover,
most people do these without any formal educa-
tion or training in psychology. All of us are,
so to speak, a lay psychologist, specializing in
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personality and social psychology. At the basis
of our knowledge about people is implicit perso-nality theory (Schneider, 1973), and what we
practice ls usually called naive psychology
(Heider, 1958).
However, since people do not normally use
scientific or formal research methodology,
implicit personality theory on people and naive
psychology of social behavior are eften faulty,
with full ef errors and biases (see Nisbett &
Ross, 1980). In contrast, personality and social
psychologists must base their psychology on sci-
entific, empirical knowleclge, aithough their
staning point might be a hunch or intuition
from their own impiicit personality theory and
naive psychology. In a sense, we could eval-
uate an `expert'
theory in the fieid in terrns of
the extent to which it departs from the implicit
and naive, and strives to reach the formal and
scientifie. Needless to say, validity and accura-
cy of an expert psychological theory have to be
superior to those of a lay theory, Many
problems of contemporary personality and social
psychology appear due to failures on the partof researchers to sufficiently distinguish implicit
personality theory and naive psychology on the
ene hand and scientifie psychology pn the eth-
er.
Although Aristotle has often been called the
first social psychologist, Kurt I.ewin (1935)criticized Aristotelian mode of theught as unsei-
entific, and praised and promoted Galileianmode of thought. Perhaps, the readers might
not be famMar with these two medes of
thought; however, they may not be very wrong
if they take these modes as referring to }ay and
seientific psyehology, respectively. This state-
ment is net meant to derogate or denounce im-
plicit persenality theory or naive psychology persq although all of us would certainly be better
off if lay psychology were more valid and accu-
rate. Instead, we scientific psychologists should
be rnore mindful of implicit and naive theories
presented and practiced by fellow `experts.'
The problern of pseudo-・scientific theories,
Process interactionism67
which in reality are nothing but thinly disguisedIay theories in Aristotelian mode of thought, ap-
pears far more serious and consequential in the
field of personality and social psychology.
Lewinian approach to psychology
Let us briefly review and summarize Kurt
Lewin's approach to psycholegy (1935) here.
In addition, some problems of professional
psychelogists' Aristotelian theories, which seems
to have been surprisingly prevalent and tena-
cious since the days of Lewin, shall be dis-
cussed when necessary in the sections to fo11ow
as we discuss the new approach. HewGalileian psychelogy has since become, or howAristotelian it still remains, the readers are
asked to judge for themselves.Classification versus construction: First ;
Lewin (1935) thought that Aristotelian psychol-
ogy classified whole groups of processes accord-
ing to the value of their products, instead of
the nature of the psychological processes in-
volved. Let us loQk at a concrete example by
Lewin. In psychology of Lewin's days, "the
faet that three-year-old children are quite often
negative is considered evidence that negativism
is inherent in the nature of three-year-olds,
and the eoncept of a negativistic age or stage
is then regarded as an explanation for the ap-
pearance of negativism in a given particularcase!" (Lewin, 1935). Notice that similar
theories to what Lewin criticized almost sixty
years ago do not seem unknown among
present-day developmental psychologists, and
that many concepts of personality traits are no
better, in that they too are similarly circular.
We may concede that psychology of personality
traits has probably remained mostly Aristoteli-
an, merely measuring, labelmg, and grouping
people according to certain trait, dimension, or
whatever other schemes. Such procedures
themselves have become the purpose, rather
than the means, of this kind of psychology,
Lewin told us that a psychological theory
should be built through an essentially concrete
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constructive method, rather than abstract clas-
sificatory procedure C1935); such an approach
would be necessary for avoiding circular
theories and concepts, for example. In other
words, we need to have what Lewin called
`genotypic'
constructs rather than pay too much
attention to surface phenomena, whieh are
`phenotypic.'
For Galileo, the same,law governs
the courses of the stars, the falling of stones,
the thght of birds, and the flowing and ebbing
tides. These are phenotypic phenomena, each
appearing to be significant on its own and not
at all related to the others; however, the same
genotypic law of gravitation can be applied to
all of ・them, What we psychologists need are
genotypie constructs and theories that can be
generally applied to human behavior, just as
Galileian laws to physics.
Overly emphasizing observable overt behav-
ior, as a behaviorist wQuld, we could easily
loose sight of the need to have a genotypic
psychological law. We need a theory that we
are able to apply to as many surface phepom-
ena as posslble, and at the same time, explain
them with one underlying principle. Another
related argument may be that empirical laws
are phenotypic in Lewinian terms; an empirical
Iaw is sernething to be explained by a theor}J,
rather than becoming a basis for a psycholog-
ical theory, to explain something else. In addi-
tion, we sltould seek construct validity; conver-
gent and discriminant validity of psychological
measures, while certainly desirable, are not
good enough for our purpose (see below). As
we shall presently see, our new approach posits
that personality is a construet, and that person-
ality as a sum of internal processes be studied,
in order to construct genotypic psychological
}aws.
Statics versus dynamics: Lewin was interested
in deep-process dynamie psychology, and not
surface-pbenomenal changes themse]ves. His
field theory has often been called a psychedy-
namic approach, but it has almost nothing to do
with psychodynamics of the psychoanalytical ap-
proach. For I.ewin (1935), dynamic psychologymeans scientific study of psychological proces-ses. and his theory is dynamic because it triedto incorporate the concepts ef time and change.
He tried to learn as much from Galileian and
contemporary physics as pessible, and make his
theory as scientific. In modern physics, Lewin
said, the existenee of a physical veetor always
depends upon the mutua] relations of several
physical facts, especially upon the relation of
the object (e. g., the person) to its environrnellt.
Accordingly, he tried to understand psycholog-
ical processes in terms of obiects, forces, and
locomotions, represented in his concept of lijb
space. From the last concept, it is pessibie to
infer that the psychological processes he had in
his mind were inside the person.
Lewin (l935) also wrote that "if
we try to
deduce the dynamics of a process, particularly
the vectors which direct it, from the actual
event, we are compelled te resort to process
differentials." Despite Lewin's arguments, most
present-day psychological theories of human be-havior may be characterized as static, and
psychologists do not seem to have learned howto incQrporate time and change, let alone
`pro-
cess differentials,' in their theories. We know
that much remains for us psychelogists to do in
order to make our theories dynamic, and to re-
alize the Lewinian idea} of a truly psychological
theory. Our approach, process interactionism,
as outlined in the sections to follow, may be a
step in the right direction, and should help us
conceive and buiid theories that are truly dy-
namlc,Reductionism
versus wholism: In spite of
Lewin's affinity and enthusiasm for Galileian
and contemporary physics, it is wrong to as-
sume that he was a reductionist. On the con-
trary, he was strongly opposed to biological,
biochemical, or physical explanatiens for any
psychological phenomena. Psychologieal phe-nemena could be understood only through the
psychologieal approach. As noted above, al-
though he used such terms as obiects, forces,
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and locomotions, they were representations inlife space, and proeesses involved were com-
pletely psychelogical <Lewin, 1935). In other
words, phenomenology of the person was very
important in his approach, but it was also cog-
nitive even by today's standards without becom-ing overly introspective, emphasizing the signif-
icance of internal processes. Our new ap-
proach naturally attempts to fellow Lewin's
view of the human mind.
The dynamics of the internal processes is
always to be derived from the relation of the
concrete individual to the concrete situation,
and so far as internal forces are concerned,
from the mutual relations of the various func-
tional systems 6. e.. interna] processes) that
make up the individual (Lewin, 1935). On the
other hand, in Aristotelian psychology, the vec-
tors which determine a person's movements do
not depend upon the retation of the person to
the envirenment, and they belong to himf'her
once for all. irrespective of his/her surround-
ings at any given time; we may refer to such
conceptualization as Aristote]ian main-effeet
psychology. Lewin as a personality psychol-
ogist explained that his view of dynamics did
not mean that the nature of the person be-
cornes insignificant (1935). In addition, he was
not only an interactionist. but also an anti--
structuralist, insisting on study,ing the person in
situation, referring as the starting point to the
totality of the concrete whole situation. If we
break the whoie into cornponents, as a strue-
turaiist would, we loose something in the pro-
eess. A Gestalt psychologist, Lewin was nat-
urally inclined toward a wholistie approach; life
space could not be conceptualized as a simple
sum of its component parts.Historical versus systematic: Lewin also ex-
plained (1935) that Aristotelian mode of thought
required eonfirmation by historical regularity.
Here, a iiistorical approaeh means theorizing
based on the Aristotelian lawfulness: those
things which occur without exception and which
occur frequent]y are la"rful and conceptually in-
Process interactionisrnew
telligible. Notice that regularity and partic-
ularity can only be understood entirely in his-torical terrns. Lewin wanted us to refer to the
full concreteness of the particular situations,
which should mean the objective aspects as
well, instead of a reference to the abstract av-
erage of as many historically given cases as
possible. Opposing the historica] Aristotelian
appreach, Lewin's field theory may be charac-
terized as systematic; the systematic nature of
life space with its full cDncreteness should bestudied, for 1)ehavior is a functfon of the personand the situation at the moment it occurs, and
of nothing else.
Statistics versus lawfulness: Aristotelian con-
cept of lawfulness had a quasl-statistieal charac-
ter, and the approach did not regard exceptions
as counter-arguments, so Iong as their frequen-
cy was not too great, Lewin explained. Sueh
an approach would inevitably exclude a vast
amount of events as unlawful, and such exclu-
sion was unacceptable as a science. Alse, the
statistical procedure, at least its coinmonest ap-
plication in psychology <of Lewin's days) was
the most striking expression of Aristetelian
mode of thinking (Lewin, 1935). In order to
exhibit the common features of a given groupof facts, the average was calculated, This av-
erage acquired a representative value, and was
then used to characterize the properties of the
group. Lewin argued that the content of a law
could not be determined by the caleulation of
averages of historically given cases. Galileianconcepts, on the contrary, which regard histor-ical frequency as accident, must alse consider it
a matter of chance which properties one arrives
at by taking averages of historical cases, It is
often forgotten that there just is no sueh thing
as an "average
situation" any more than an av-
erage child. In Lewin's view, however, the
critical point was not that statistical methods
were applied, but how they were applied and,
especially, what cases were combined inte
groups. In his approach, everything was law-
ful, not only those that were regular or fre-
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quent, and generally, no exceptions were al-
lowed fer psychological laws,
From the preceding arguments, we may
conclude that Aristotelian laws would not con-
ceive exeeptions at phenotypic levels, while
Lewinian laws would not allow exceptions at
genotypic, theoretieal levels. In a sense,
Lewin's view is unusually strict, ior he thought
that the thesis of general validity permitted no
exceptions in the entire realm of the psychic,
whether of child or adult, whether in normal or
pathological psychology (Lewin, 1935). This
view may be equated with understanding and
predicting behavior for "all
the people all the
time" (cf. Bem & Allen, 1974; Bem & Funder,
1978). We contemporary psychologists are cer-
tainly facile with complex statistieal techniques.
Lewin seemed to warn us that statistics was no
substitute fer theory, and that exceptions in the
ferm ef error or residual variances might mean
we are excluding a vast number of cases as
unlawful, meaningless, or otherwise unac-
ceunted for. In Lewinian view, such exclusion,
which has probably becorne iar greater in ex-
tent than Lewin's days, and theorizing based
on it, are thoroughly Aristotelian, .and therefore,
unaeceptable as a science, Our use of stat-
istical techniques seems to need a careful ex-
amination.
In the exceptionless approach, since law and
individual are no longer antitheses, nothing
prevents us from relying for proof upon histor-
ically unusual, rare, and transitory events, such
as most physical experiments are (Lewin, 1935).
Indeed, in a certain sense, the law refers only
to cases that are never realized, or only approx-
imately realized, in the actual course of events.
Only in experiment, that is, under anificially
constructed conditions, do c;ases occur which
approximate the event with which the law is
concerned. The propositions of modern phys-
ics, which are often considered to be anti-spec-
ulative and empirical, in comparison with Aris-
totelian empiricism, unquestionably have a much
less empirical, a much more constructive char-
acter than the Aristotelian concepts that are
based immediately upon historical actuality
(Lewin, 1935). So, we have te be aware that
people's naive views of sciences, theories, ex-
periments, and empiricism are frequently not
what they really should be. For instance, a
scientific theory is not induetively derived from
observable facts, as often believed, but is de-
ductively tested against them. And, we now
come around finally to Lewin's insistence on
the use of experimental paradigm to investigate
the dynamics and complexity of the human
mind. The use of experiments in the sciences
is not only desirable, but also inevitable.
In conclusion, the suggestions and argu-
ments made by Lewin {1935) may be sum-
marized as fo11ows. Lewin told us to build a
theory through a constructive method, rather
than by classification like categorizing, labeling,
and averaging. Rather than statistical averages
from phenotypic phenomena, what we need are
genot)pic constructs and theories that can be
generally applied for human behavior, just likeGalileian laws for physics, Lewin's emphasis
was on dynamic processes, which he tried to
represent in terms of objects, forces, and
locomotions in life space. He also opposed
reductionism; psychological phenomena can be
understoed only through psychology. Lewin
denounced the Aristotelian historical view as
unscientific, and stressed that the tetality of the
concrete whole situation was important, He
was foremost an interactionis4 believing behav-
ior was a function of the person and the sit-
uation as it occurs; moreover, his view was sys-
tematic as well as zvholistic and anti-struc-
turaldst His approach was phenomenologicalbut net entirely or overly introspective, and em-
phasized the significance Qf internal processes.
Also, while Aristotelian laws would rule out
exceptions at phenotypic observable levels,
Lewinian laws would not allow exceptions at
genotypic, theoretical levels; f6r Lewin, the the-
sis of general validity permitted no excaptions
to PsycholQg'ical laTvs, Related to this, Lewin
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warned us that statistics was no substitute fortheorTB and our use of statistical techniques
certainly needs scrutiny. Lewin believed thttt
emperiments were necessary, if we tried to
build a theory through a constructive method,
but we also know that his is very different
from Aristotelian or naive empiricism. His
theories are derived, not through inductions
from observable iacts, but deductiens from
proposition and testing. In addition, it is also
well known that Lewin advocated the use of
formal lagic and mathematics, particularly ge-ometry and topology, in psychological theories,
counseled us to the slow-butLsteady successiwe
approximation approach, and admonished us of
the scientific as well as practical value of a
good theory.
Tasks of personality psycholegy
Without first defining the werd `personality,'
let us enumerate what the field of personality
psychology is expected to do. First, personality
psychology describes and explains the whole
personality of an individual. What are the
characteristics of the person? In what ways, is
this particular person different from, and com-
mon to others that are eharacteristic of hirn/
her? What are the aspects of `personellity,'
what
are they eaeh like, and how are they combined
to make the whole personality of an individual?
Obviously, the iirst task of persenality psychol-ogy presupposes individual differences in peo-
ple; if there were no individuality and everyone
were the same, there would be no personality.
The second task of personality psychology is
assessment of the person with regards te indi-
vidual differences. What kind of in$truments
are we to use for such measurements, and how
good are such instruments? What we measure
in this way may not necessarily be the whole
personality, but most likely fragmented aspects
of the individual's personaiity, and we are again
faced with the question of how such quantitiesshould be combined to characterize and under-
stand the whole persen.
Process interactionismn
If an individual difference, i. e., an aspect of
personality, that is assessed in the second task
is to be reliable and valid, it should be able to
predict the person's behavior, or more accu-
rately, to explain his/her behavior in the eon-
text of individual differences in human behavior.
Prediction of behavior becomes the third task of
personality psychelogy: prediction in the sense
whether we could explain and understand why
certain behavior does or does not occur fer cer-
tain persons in certain situations, A related
question may be how regular and consistent a
person's behavior is; if behavior is not very sta-
ble, cressLsituationally or temporally, its accu-
rate prediction may well be very limited, if not
impossible (cf., Mischel, 1990).
We may also want to know how an
individual's personality is formed and main-
tained, and alternately, how it could be
changed and how changeable it is. If person-ality is not someihing we are born with, at
least not with all of it, it then is shaped grad-
ually as we grow. What changes personality,
and how and why? The fourth task concerns
personality development and change. It is
also related to personal adaptation to life situa-
tions, and to treatment of personality problems,
if any. If the third task, prediction and expla-
nation of behavior, requires close collaboration
and prevides common grounds between persQn-ality and social psychologists, the fburth task of
$tudying personality development and change
links the field of personality psychology to
developmental and clinical psychology. Clinical
psychologists, for instance, look expectantly to
personality psychology, whose task it is to pro-
vide theoretical frarneworks for assessment and
treatment of psycholegical problerns.
In sum, the four tasks just mentioned are a
minimum of what personality psychology is ex-
pected to do. In addition to dealing more or
less with all of them, any successful personalitytheory or approach should have coherence and
consistency to what it does concerning the fbur.For instance, a theory might postulate some in-
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ner dynamics to account for individual differen-
ces in how the person behaves a$ well as how
he/she adjusts to his/her environment; learning
or cognitive factors might be at the center of
other approaches. Each needs to explain in its
own way how individuality comes about, and
how it could be best measured, A personalitytheory inevitably becomes rather comprehensive,
because the goal of the field is nothing less
than understanding the whole person. A prob-
lem with the lay approach to personality may
be that it often fails to realize the scope of the
field: Laypersons frequently assume that per-sonality simply means personality types or
traits. Of course, it might be a gross Qver-
simplifieation to view tlie layperson as a global
trait theorist who relies exclusively on situation-
free global traits in social perception (Mischel,1990). However, sinee not a few personality
psychelogists themselves appear to have a view
not very different from the lay approach, it
seems worth repeating: Personality psyehologyis not merely psychology of personality types
or tralts,
Even if personality psychelogy were to ex-
plain only how people differ in terrns of typesand/or traits, simple measurements of individual
differences would not be sufficient, because in
science what is measured needs to be meaning-
ful and u$eful. In other words, personality
variables need to be consequential and praeti-
cal. Simply put, being consequential and prac-tical means that what is measured and under-
stood of the individual in relation to persenality
sheuld have something to do with reality, which
sheuld inevitably rnean behavioral prediction or
explanation. Lay psychologists are known to
use `pseude-psychelogical
schemes' that are
completely detached from reaiity, and similarly,
there are not a few Aristotelian personality`schemes
and measurements' that are used by
professional psychologists. Rather subtle ex-
amples may be found in word-by-word trans-
lated versions of personality measures, which
might have been carefully constructed overseas,
but totally lacking in validation and standard-
ization in this country.
For another example, some believers in
ABO blood-typing, which as lay psychology is
quite popular among the general populace in
Japan, might advocate the use of blood-type in-formation in personnel selection, ameng ethers.
However, as a personality theory, blood-typing
has not been shown to be consequential or use-
ful (Ohmura, 1990); even if used accurately and
reliably, such a practice prescribed by the `the-
ory' should make no difference in the outcome.
We also have to be mindful that a wreng the-
ory does not always produce wrong predictions
or results, but is merely irrelevant and inconse-
quential; it therefore is not easy to disprove
such a theory, because cases of apparent suc-
cess are bound to exist. The belief in ABO
blood-typing is an example of inconsequentialtheories, and it is rather disheartening to find
quite a few `expert'
psychelogists who cannot
tell why such a `theory'
is not meaningful or
useful, nor whether their own pet theorie$ are
any better than such an inconsequential lay the-
ory of personality. Personality psychologists are
advised to keep asking whether their theories
are truly consequential and practical. A good
theory is consequential, and Lewin's famous
dictum has said this best: Nothing is more
practical than a good theoay.
We should also argue that lay persenality
types and traits cannot serve, in principle, as
useful concepts in scientiiic personality psychol-ogy. Lay persenality traits are those in implicit
personality theoTy, and are almost always tauto-
logical, in that they are no more or less than
description$ of behavior, semetimes global and
other times situation-specific. Not a few per-senality psychologists appear to make the same
mistake; their Aristotelian personality variables
are merely lay personality traits with scientific-
sounding labels. Tautological lay personalitytraits cannot be useful, because overt behaviors,
albeit important, are but one basis for a scien-
tific personality theory. Besides, people are no-
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toriously poor and unreliable observers of overt
behavier (cf., Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
Sometimes, personality measures are tested
with behavior as criteria. Personality variables
with cencurrent er predictive validity would be
far mure desirable and better than those with-
out any such validity, but unfortunately, there
are not many with clear criterion validity of this
kind (Mischel, 1990). However, criterion valid-
ity, which could be regarded as a sort of em-
pirical law, is a necessary but not sufficient
eondition that we have a good personalitymeasure. As already noted, an empirical law
cannot substitute a theory; it is something to be
explained by a scientific theory, rather than ex-
plaining something else. In other words, even
these measures that are seemingly consequen-
tial in terms of relevant behavior, are not good
enough. What is neecled is construct validity,
which must include behavior-reievant criterion
validity, because it clearly means a theery be-
hind it. Such a theory makes an expert per-
sonality variable different from lay personaiity
traits or those personality measures that are
solely based on mere empirical law$. As al-
ready mentiened, `expert'
theories could be
evaluated in terms of the extent to whieh they
depart from the implicit and naive, and strive to
reach the formal and seientific. Construct valid-
ity should be the sign that a personality meas-
ure has sufficiently achieved a iormal and sci-
entific status.
What is personality?: A new conception
If the tasks ef personality psychology and
necessary characteristics of its theories and
measures discussed in the preceding section are
taken seriously, it should be ebvious that the
concept of `personality'
cannot be defined as
Cregularities and consistencies in the behavior of
individuals in their Iives' (cf., Snyder & lckes,
1985, whe see it mainly from the social psycho-
logica] side). The term `personality'
should be
used for explaining and understanding not
merely behavior, but the whole person. Most
Process interactienism Z3
important, personality cannot be static
characteristics of behavior, or even oi the indi-
vidual. As already rnentioned in the preceding
section, personality cannot be equated with per-
sonality types or traits. Neither can it be ex-
plained in terms of relatively stable and endur-
ing propensities (e. g., dispositions, needs, mo-
tives, attitudes) that reside "within"
individuals
(Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Dispositional strategy,
which attempts to explain people's behavior in
terms of people's dispositions alone (Snyder &
Ickes, 1985), has failed; they do not predict or
explain our behavior very well. In this regard,
many dispositions and related concepts in ex-
pert psychology are no better than the lay per-sonality types and traits, and therefore could beregarded as Aristotelian.
Instead of relatively stable and enduring
propensities, the new approach turns to inter-
naZ processes of・the person as central to hisl
her personality, It is important to note that
these internal proces$es, by definition dynamic
and ongoing, should be seen as psychological,
and not as biologically or physiologically real in-
side the person. In other words, personality in
the new approach is a psychological construct,
or a set of such constructs, This view is dif-
ferent from a traditional approach that has
defined personali4)) traits as constructs. A be-
haviorist would criticize such a construct, argu-
ing that defining kindne$s, for instance, as the
trait of someone whe behaves kindly toward
others is circular and meaningless, It is exactly
the same as instinct eorrcepts, which are thor-
oughly Aristotelian and no longer popularamong psychologists, that seemingly label and
at the same time explain behavior, but accom-
plish little as concepts to explain why an organ-
ism shouid behave the way it does.
Our new approach proposes that personalityshould be understood in terms of models of in-
ternal processes and their parameters. It fol-lows that the appreach sees individual differen-ces in terms of variations in the model
parameters. Personality of an individual should
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be mea$ured, understood, and described in
terms of such individual differences. Individual
behavioral variations should then beeome pre-
dictable and explainable with the same individ-
ual differences. Personality development and
change could be conceptualized in terms of
graclual or sudden changes in the individual's
internal parameters. We would like to urge
personality psychologists to study models of in-
ternal processes, their parameters, and related
individual differences, instead of the worn-out
concept of personality types and traits.
The paradigmatic model of the new ap-
proach is T-P-O; antecedent Treatment vari-
ables are the cause ef intervening Proeess vari-
ables, which in turn determine subsequent Out-
eome variables. For exarnple, in cognitive in-
terference theory for test anxiety perforrnance
effect (see Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, in press;
and beiow), situation and trait test anxiety as
treatment variables might jointly determine the
amount of cognitive activity, a process variable;
cognitive activity in turn might adversely affect
the performance level as an eutcome. The T-
P-O model should sound familiar to many
psychologists; it is much the same as the old S
-O-R model of neobehaviorism. Curiously,
though, such propensities as dispositions, traits,
needs, motives, and attitudes `within
individuals'
seem most often to have taken the role of the
intervening variable O in our field's theoretical
thinking and research.
As we are currently arguing, such propen-
sities, if proven behavierally consequential, are
not influenced by experimental treatments {e. g., situational rnanipulations), but jointly with such
treatments would influence an internal process,
Such a process, dynamic and ongoing by def-
inition, should be measured with the interven-
ing variable O. Therefore, it appears that the
intervening variable O in the S-O-R model has
not been fully examined and explored in per-
sonality and social psychology. The variable
has largely remained only a coniecture of the
researcher, and has rarely been studied. Even
1.
if such a variable is ever measured, the causal
link between it and outcome variables has al-
most never been examined. Thus, models of
the current paradigm in our field most eften
test enly the main and interaction effects of
treatment variables on outcome variables in
analyses of variance, completely neglecting the
role of process variables.
At present, few specifics of our internal
processes are known, since no systematic re-
search has been undertaken. However, it is
probably Mischel's social-cognitive factors (1990)that come closest to the conception of
parameters in the new approach. Briefly, helists competenci.es, personal constructs and en-
coding strategies, expectancies, subiective
values, preferences, goals, and self-regulations,
as the variables to understand an individual's
personality (Mischel, 1990). Broadly defined,
these could be the personalitpu variables of our
new paradigm. However, we should peint out
that these personality variables of Mischel's in-
clude both person and process warz'abJes. Per-
son variables, such as preferences and goals,are thought to be antecedent to process vari-
ables, such as expectancies. Of course, it is
the theorist in his/her model who determines
which variable is anteeedent and which one
subsequent; and making as explicit as possible
models and processes, which have so far
remained Iargely implicit, is the crucial argu-
ment made by the new approach.
In the new paradigrn, situational manipula-
tions and person variables are the treatment
variables. Person variables, which would influ-
ence process variables -
our intervening vari-
ables -
in concert with situation$, serve as in-
dices of individual differences in the model
parameters of affected internal processes. Sev-
eral existing personality variables should be
able to serve as person variables of the new
approaeh; some of them are listed by Mischel:
eompetencies, goals, values, and preferences.We may add internalized social norms and at-
titudes, as well as self-esteem, self-conscious-
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ness, self--monitoring, and other self variables
{see below}. And possible internal processes of
our interest may be information processing (e.g., attentional, interpretatienal, and judgmental),metivatiena] (e. g., preferential, intentional, and
emotionai), and selfLregulatery (e. g., concerning
aspiration, expectaney, and effort) processes.
What processes are involved, and what should
be measured and thus beceme modei
parameters, should be $uggested by models to
be proposed.
By now, the consensus ameng personality
and social psychologists is that our behavior
should be approached and understood from an
interactionist perspective (Mischel, 1990;
Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Our new approach is
in agreement with this consensus; behavior is a
function of both the person and the situation,
as Kurt Lewin (1935) taught us long tlme ago.
In its $implest form, the approach suggests that
the two kinds of treatment variabies: situational
rnanipulation and person variable, determine the
level ef process variables in an interaction of
the two. Subsequently, behavior is determined
as a main effect of the process variables in-
volved. In a more complex model, interaction
effects among the treatment and precess vari-
ables too should be examined in order to un-
derstand the whole process. Theref6re, for this
reason and ethers, ours is an interactionist ap-
proach, but is somewhat different frem those
that have been known. Our process interac-
tionist approach, as well as details of models
and analyses, are discussed rnore fully below.
Approaches to person-situation interac-
tion
In part/ because of the arguments made by
Walter Mischel (1968; 19ee), who wrote that
traditional personality measures are poor predie-
tors of behavior, and that people's behavior ap-
parently lacks cross-・situational consistency, in-
teractionist approaches to behavior became pop-
ular among personality and social psychologists.
However, laypersons seem to find an interaction
Process interactionismre
theory hard to understand; in a sense, it is
charaeteristic of lay psychologists to try to pre-dict and explain people's behavior in terms of
the person main effect alone, and doggedly
pursue the discredited dispositional appreach.
Kurt Lewin (1935) already rejected such con-
ception of behavier as Aristotelian. This well-
known underestimation, or even neglect, of
situational infiuences on behavior common in
naive psychology is called the fundamental attri-
butien error (Nisbett & Ross, 19801 Ross,l977).
Even personality psychologists are not im-
mune to this kind ef `error'
(Nisbett & Ross,
1980); professional journals are replete with
main-effect hypotheses, stating this-or-that trait
predicts this-or-that behavior, regardless of
situations. For instanee, a hypothesis might
state that "peeple
,high on public self-conscious-
ness confonn more to social pressure than
those low," with no mentien of situation at all.
The procedure to establish convergent and dis-
criminant validity of a new personality measure
may be another example; correlation coefficients
are calculated between the scores of new and
related personality variables, with situatioRal
factors put aside, How meaningful is such a
procedure? Obviously, to the extent that Aristo-
telian main--effect psychology, which is not at
all different from lay psychology, is meaningful
and useful. However, as we all know, the cor-
relational procedure is the state of the art in
personality psychology, and many if not most of
us mindlessly use it and report its results as`evidence
of validity' for the new persenalitymeasures. We professional psychologistsshould remember that any person variable that
purports to transcend situational factors is al-
ready suspect, because no such person vari-
ables are likely to exist.
So far, three types of person-situation inter-
actionism are known, and each will be
de$cribed briefly. The first type sees an inter-
action as situational modifications of the disposi-
tional strategy. As already mentioned, the dis-
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positional strategy assumes that some meaning-
ful amount of the regularities and censistencies
in social behavior can be accounted for in terms
of relatively stabie and encluring propensities
that reside within individuals (Snyder & Ickes,
1985). In order to save the dispositional con-
cepts of the strategy, which alone could not
work well, the first interaetion approach might
have been proposed. It may be best ex-
emplified by Christie's view (1978): In one sit-
uation, where per$on and situation are exactly
matched, near perfect prediction of behavior is
possible from the person variable, but in anoth-
er, the person variable rnight be cornpletely
useless. This and the second approach below
are somewhat simiiar, but it is not statistical
but rather determini$tic; specifie person in spe-
cific situation could mean specific behavior. A
corollary to this approach may be that the psy-
cholegist should use only those personality
measures that are meaningful when used in as-
sociation with situatiens. Mischel's `conditienal
view of dispositions' (1990> might be classified
under this interactional approach.
The second is statistical or mechanical (see Snyder & Ickes. 1985). We may conduct an
experiment with a person-by-situation factorial
design, and in the resultant analysis of var-
iance, this approach helds, more behavioral var-
iance would be accounted for by the person by
situation interaction effect than either of the
main effects. The term `situation'
seems to be
used here in a generic sense; therefore, unlike
the first, this approach might implicitly assume
cross-situational consistency in our behavior.
The situation factor cannot be ignored, but
could be conveniently treated statistically. So,
this approach is net very far apart from the ag-
gregate approach te behavioral consistency; lf
aggregate measures of dispositions as well as
behaviors are taken, the correlations between
them should be considerable (see Snyder &
Ickes, 1985>. In this sense, `situation'
in the
statistieal er rnechanical approach could
paradoxicaliy become a generic and ab$tract
1.
concept.
It is obvious that the two approaches justdescribed follow the traditional research par-
adigm of persenality and social psychology; forthem, the factorially designed experiment i$
good enough to study the causes of people'ssocial behavior. In contrast, the third, which
may be called active or dynamic interaction ap-
proach (Snyder & Ickes, 1985), sees differently.
The person in this approach is seen as active,
in that she actively seeks situation$ where her
personality could be fully expressed. This view
is anathema to the experimental approach, for
an experiment specifically precludes expressions
of individual tendencies, personality for one,
through the actor's selection of situations.
Therefore, those who endorse the active inter-
action approach see experimental methodelogy
as semething that is too restrictive and not
ecologically valid. (For other shortcomings and
limitations of interactional approaches, see
Snyder and Ickes, 1985,)
For example, an introductory textbook (At-kinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bem, & Hilgard,
1990) tells us that person-situation interaction
occurs, not only because of reactive interaction
due to each individual's phenomenological inter-
pretation of situat.ions, but also of ewocative in-
teraction, through which each individual's per-sonality evokes distinctive responses frem
others, and proactive interaction, where the
person seeks out some situatiens and avoids
others or else reshapes the situation he enters.
Evocative and proactive interactions are specif-
ically precludedi in our experimental paradigm,
not allowing personality's major manifestations
(Atkinson, et ai., 1990). Similarly, Snyder &
Ickes (1985) argue for their situational strategy,
a version of dynamic interactionism, that stres-
ses an interactional process in which persons
and situations form an inextrieably interwoven
structure, From this perspective, competitive
individuals are defined as those who choose
whenever possible to enter competuive situa-
tions ttnd who act whenever possib}e te max-
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imize the competitive character of the situation
they are in. The reguiarities and consistencies
in these individuals' competitive behavior are to
be regarded as the product of regularities and
consistencies in the competitive social situations
within which they (choose to) live their lives.
Hence, this view i$ called the situational strat-
egy (Snyder & Ickes, 1985) to understand
people's social behavior,
A prob]em with the active or dynamic ap-
proach might be that without careful thoughts
and strict methedelogy, it eould become another
form of main-effect psychology; at first, situu-
tions s ¢ em all important, but in the end they
do not matter much, for the person somehow
expresses her true self by skirting and negating
the effeets of situational ferces. Even the situa-
tional strategy (Snyder & Ickes, 1985) could re-
main circular and atheoretical; situations could
be defin¢ d in terms of preferences expressed
and modifications iriade by people of certain
personality characteristics, Another problemmight be the complexity of eausal models; most
psychologists have so far ehosen either of the
first two approaches, and not the third, ebvi-
ously because of the conceptual parsimony and
psychonietrie economy promised by the assump-
tion of linearity and unidireetionality of the
hypothesized causa] relation$hips (Snyder &
Ickes, 1985) in the first two. We know and
understand weEl that these processes eould be
complex; what we need are models and re-
search methodelogy to disentangle such com-
plexity, J'Iowever, the third appreaeh has not
yet provided us, as we have reviewed, with
productive causal models or research methedol-
ogy.
Process interactionism
Kurt Lewin's formula, B=f(R E), has al-
ways been the best known symbol of the inter-
action approach. As already mentioned, Lewin
(1935) was against main--effect theories of be-
havior, and wrote that "oniy
by the cencrete
whole whieh cemprises the object and the sit-
Process interactionism77
uation are the vectors which determine the dy-
namics of the event defined," the object in this
sentence meaning the person in the situation.
Careful reading of Lewin]s writing indicatesthat his interactionism is none of the three al-
ready mentioned. Lewin saw human beings as
active, not merely responding to outer stimuli,
which is similar to the active or dynamic inter-
actionist view, But we have to remember that
he also insisted on the use of experiment to in-
vestigate the dynamics and complexity of the
human mind,
Lewin's interaction approach may best be il-
lustrated with ene of his examples. In Figure
1, a child stands before two attractive objects.
In Lewin's field theory, the valence of each eb-
ject becomes a field force, each impelling the
child {I.ewin, 1935}. And a resulting force Rshould rnake the child to move toward one di-
rection. This description is only for the child
and situation at the onset, and if our analysis
here were complete and offered nothing more
for us to examine, we would have to conclude
that the child reach neither Toy nor Cheeolate.
In reality, however, such a conclusion would
certainly prove wrong. for even if the vector
has the direction R at the moment of starting,
it does not mean the vector's strength and
direction permanently remains the same
Tov Chocolate
o
Figure 1. Initial forces and the child's
lecomotion.
Adopted from Fig. 1 & 2
1, Lewin, 1935
course of
of Chapter
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throughout the actual process. Instead, the
whole situation changes with the process,
thus changing aiso, in both strength and di-
rection, the vectors that detemine the dynamics
at each mement. Thus, because of changes in
the situation, the actual process will always fi-
nally bring the child to one or the other of the
attractive objects (Lewin, 1935).
The example in Figure 1 should impress on
us that psychology's current research paradigm
is just like trying to predict outcomes from
initial conditions alone, ignoring processes inter-
vening between them. No wonder psycholo-
gists' efforts so far have not been plentifully
rewarded. If we followed the whole process
from initial conditions to outcemes, our under-
standing of the dynamic$ of mind and behavior
might be reasonably complete. But such a real
-・time
analysis of situation and behavior might
be unrealistic and may well b.e impossible.
However, we could trlJ to tap at least one of
intervening stages or internal processes; such a
stage or process should possibly refiect the sit-
uation surrounding the acter, which for him!her
is phenomenologically and continually (or per-
haps suddenly) changing. We argue here that
a process variable could provide us with useful
information regarding the intervening stages
and internal processe$.
The approach just discussed, process inter-
aetionism, does not require the complex models
or methodology that might be expected of the
active or dynamic interaction approach. Rather,
for better understanding and prediction of
people's behaviQr, it attempts to present an al-
ternative view that is based on the assumption
of causal linearity and unidirectionality, thus still
simpie enough and compatible with the tradi-
tional experimental paradigm, and at the same
time able to overcome some of the shortcom-
ings and limitations of person-situation interae-
tionisms (cf., Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Altheugh
the arguments made by the proponents of the
active or dynamic interaction approach (e. g., Snyder & Ickes, 1985) are cogent, the jump
from psychology's current research paradigrn to
a new unestablished one might be considerable.
It could be so big and drastic that the new
paradigm might have almost no continuity with
our current approach. Would such a radieal
change be necessar}i or desirable? Just adding
a few intervening process variables, or even
one, we argue, sheuld help us understand
people's secial behavior far better than we de
now.
Also, the situationag strategy (Snyder &
Ickes, 1985), though perhaps not as complex as
we tend to conceive it to be, might not be very
useful for understanding the person because of
its inherent cifcularity, although behavioral pre-diction might be atheoretically improved. In
addition, while based on new thinking, the ap-
proach might not be dynamic enough. A the-
ory does not automatically become dynamic, be-
cause it purports to study dynamic processes; it
becomes dynamic because it incorporates the
concepts of time and change in it. However
complex a theory may become, it could still re-
main static if time and change factors are left
out. As in the traditienal methodology, twe
points in time, i. e., the initial and outcome
stages, or measurements of independent and
dependent variables, are prebably not enough
to make a model `dynamic.'
At least another
point in time is necessary, which intervening
process variables could easily and nieely pro-vide, It is not certain that simply turning a de-
pendent variable into one of the independent
variables of the subsequent causal stage, or
chaining one causal stage after anQther, as dy-
namic or active interactionism might suggests,
would make a model dynamic.
In sum, we are proposing a different ap-
proach, which we shall call process interac-
tionism for twe obvious reasons: Kurt LewinJs
exhortation to examine, not only initial condi-
tions and final outcomes, but also the whole
pertinent processes in between, and our re-
sponse to include process variables in order to
implement his proposal.
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Pro ¢ ess models and mediation
We are now ready to discuss new models
and analyses, which particularly suit and cem-
plernent the new approach, process interac-
tionism. First, the model of traditional ap-
proach is depicted in Figure 2, a and b. In
the rnodel, the outcome (O), such as behavior,
is determined by the treatment variables of in-
dividual differences (I) and situations (S), In
the traditional interactionism described above,
an interaction of person by situation (IxS)should have a significant effect on the outeome
{O). Alternately, the interaction effect can be
described as either situation (S) moderating a
person (I) effect on the outcome (O) (see Figure2b, left), or person (I) moderating a situation
{S) effect <Figure 2b, right). In an interaction,
if one predicter is theoretically mere important
or otherwise more centraliy positioned, the re-
searcher may decide to call the other predictora rnoderator; moderation occurs when the effect
of a rnain predictor does not remain constant,
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Person Variable (I)
(O) Behavior
Situation Variable (S)
(S) {I}
(i)k
<o)(s)->L>(o>
(I)
<p)e (o}
Process Variable (s)
(s}
x (Ie {P> pt CO>
Figure2. Varieus causal models, and
moderation and mediation
Process interactienism 79
but changes systematically with the value of an-
other predictor (i. e., moderator).
A mediation model is shown in Figure 2, c
and d. If the mediator variable measures a
postulated internal process within the persen,we call it a process variable. Therefore, a pre-cess variable in the new approach is a type of
mediator; psychologically, it may well be the
most important type of mediator. In Figure 2c,
an intervening process (P) is determined as a
function ef the treatment variables, perso.n (I)and situation (S), and in turn inffuences the
outcome (O), such as behavior, performance, or
other resulting states. If an interaction of per-
son by situation (IxS) has an effect on the pro-cess variable (P), it can be described that sit-
uation (S) moderates a person (I) effect on the
process (P>, as shown in Figure 2d, or vice
versa, in the same ways as shown in Figure
2b, left and right.
Mediation occurs when the effects of treat-
ment variables go through a mediator to reach
outcome variables. Mediation can be whole,
with all the influence of the treatment on the
outcome going through the mediator, or partial,in which case, the treatment variables have ef-
fects on the outcome in addition to the medi-
ation. In other words, partial or no mediation
means that there exists a direct, unknown path
from the treatment to the outcome, independent
and parallel to the mediation path, Mediation,
therefore, can provide a theoretical explanation
why and how the treatment variables influence
the outcome variable. To the extent an effect
is going through a mediator rather than unspec-
ified paths, the mediator and mediation models
illuminate and help us understand complex phe-nomena (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Judd &
Kenny, 1981).
Mediational analyses of process models
In order to test whether or not mediation
through a process variable has indeed taken
place, a process or mediational analy$i$ has to
be performed. Let us illustrate such an anal-
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ysis with a mode] of four variables: two treat-
ment variables, a mediator, and an outcome
variable. The model could be more complex,
but the basic proceduTe remains the same, re-
gardless of the number of variables involved.
It has been known in test anxiety literature,
for example, that performance is jointly deter-
mined by the person's trait test anxiety and the
situation hefshe is in (see Kurosawa &
Harackiewicz, in press). Here, trait test anxiety
is the individual difference person variable (I); whether situation is evaluative or not, the sit-
uation (S}; and performanee measured with test
scores, the outcome (O>. In addition, if a the-
ory argues that cognitive activity in the form of
extraneous thoughts during the task period in-
terferes with efficient perfermance, and is thus
responsible for the joint effeet on the test score
of the person and situation factors, we have to
measure cognitive activity, which is a prQcess
var,iable (P), to test the theory, In order for
the proposed theory to be supported, mediation
of the test anxiety perforrnance effect needs to
take place; cognitive activity has to be the me-
diator of the treatment effect {s) on the test
scere.
To examine a possible mediational precess
requires a set of four regressions (cf., Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981; see also
Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, in press). The first
step is a simple test ef treatment effects on
outcome. In our example, we would perform
an ANOVA on the test score, with the main
effects of trait test anxiety (I) and situation (S), as well as the predicted interaction effect of the
two (IxS). Such an interaction may be
described as the I effect moderated by S, in
the terminology of Baron & Kenny (1986); i. e.,
the effect of trait test anxiety weuld be different
depending on the nature of situations. Specif-
ica}ly, trait test anxiety shoulcl have a negative
effect on the test score in an evaluative sit-
uation, and a positive er no effect under a non
-evaluative
condition. It is important to remem-
ber that if we find no effect of treatment vari-
ables on the outcome variable, failing in this in-
itial step of mediational analysis, we have no
effect that needs to be mediated, or explained,
by a rnediator.
In the second step, the process variable (P)is regressed on the treatment predictors. We
would perform an ANOVA on cognitive activ-
ity, which could be measured as the ameunt of
$elf-reported extraneous thoughts during task
performance (e. g., Kurosawa & Harackiewicz,
in press; Sarason, 1984; Sarason & Stoops,
1978), with the main effects of trait test anxiety
(I) and situation (S), and the interaction effect
of the two (IxS) in the model. In order to me-
diate the treatment .effects on the outcome, the
process variable itself needs to be affected bythe treatment factorsl otherwise, no mediation
would be possible. If the person by situation
interaction effect en the outcome, of Step 1, is
to be explained, an interaction effect of the
same pattern is usually required on the process
variable. However, even if such an interaction
is not found, more eomplex models that might
sti11 explain the interaction effect on the out-
come are possible; such models can be tested
in Step 4, as explained below,
For the third step, we add the main effect
of the process variable in the Step 1 ANOVA
equation. If its effect on the outcome is signif-
icant, controlling for the effects of all other
predictors in the equation, we may cenclude
that mediation through the process variable has
been established. And if a treatment effect, in-cluding the interaction effect, on the outceme
that has been significant, beeomes now nonsig-
nificant, whole mediation of the now-nonsig-
nificant effect can be inferred. On the other
hand, if such an effect remains significant, par-
tial mediation has occurred; some direct effect
of the treatment effect exists alongside the
mediated effect. It is important to remember
that these estirnations and significance testings
be done with the effects of all other factors
controlled for, in order to make such inferences.
In our example, if the person aRd situation (i.
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e., treatmenO variables have an interaction ef-
fect en both the process and outcome variables,
and the process variable affects the outcome in
the Step 3 equation, controlling for the direct
person-by-situation interaction effect, then and
only then is the hypethesized mediation model
established, and the cQgnitive interference the-
ory described above supported. The model
described here, a derivation from the theory, is
of the type called mediated moderation
(Baron & Kenny, l986).
Our !process analysis might be eomplete with
a fourth step; adding interaction effects of IxP,
SxP, and IxSxP to the Step 3 equation enables
us to test interactional mediation (Judd &
Kenny, 1981) or moderated mediation (Baron &Kenny, 1986) models. Even if the lxS interac-
tion effect en the process variable is not signif-
icant in Step 2, one of the Step--4 interaction
effects may still mediate (i. e., explain) the IxS
interaction effect on the outcome variable found
in Step 1, if we also have found a main effect
on the precess variable in Step 2. For in-
stance, a situation main effect on cognitive ac-
tivity rnay mean that the evaluation situation
produces more extraneous thoughts. 1'hen the
ameunt of extraneous thoughts might interact
with trait test anxiety (i. e., a significant IxP in-
teraction on the outcome in Step 4), in that the
higher cognitive activity level is particularly
debilitating for those who are high on trait test
anxiety, On the other hand, a main effect of
trait test anxiety might be found on cognitive
activity: the higher the trait, the more the ex-
traneous thoughts, The $ituation variable
would then moderate the effect of extraneous
theughts on the outcome (a significant SxP in-
teractien effect in Step 4}; in an evaluative sit-
uation, such thoughts could become especially
detrimental to the person's efficient perform-ance, while in the non-evaluative situation, no
such deterioration might occur. An even more
complex IxSxP interaction effect might be
found, which ceuld subsume both IxP and SxP
interactien effects.
Process interactionism 81
Notice that the complete model of Step 4 is
none other than the three-way factorialANOVA on the outcome, with I, S, and P as
the predictor variables. However, the complete
model is too complicated for simple illustratien,
and Figure 3 is used instead, where all the
possible paths are included. In the figure, the
individual difference person variable (I) is
shown to possibly influence both the process
(P) and outcome (O) variables. In addition, the
process variable has a potential path to the out-
come, as well as a probable moderating infiu-
ence on the I effect on O, as shown in the fig-
ure. The situation variable not ineluded in the
figure is then examined to see whether it
moderate$ each of the paths (i.e., arrows) inthe figure, as well as whether its own main ef-
fects on the process and outcome variables are
significant.
Figure 3 could be useful when testing the
whole model with structural analysis, using
LISRELTM, for instance. Since Csituatien' is
usually a grouping variable, a variance/
covariance matrix for each situation is com-
puted, the matrices simultaneously entered as
input data, and the model estimated without the
equality constraint across the situations for each
of the paths, The equality constraint then isadded, and the worsening ef the model fit, in-
dexed by the goodness-of-fit X2, is tested. If
the change by such an alteration is significantly
more than chance would produce, we prefer the
model that includes the situation interaction ef-
fect to the simple main-effect model of Figure
{I)
(O)
Figure 3. A complete model
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3. While such structural analysis should pro-duce identical results to the ANOVA or gen-
eral linear model procedure described here, the
causal diagram may be especially helpful in un-
derstanding and summarizing a mediation rnod-
el. Whenever an arrow goes from Variable A
to Variabie B, then frem Variable B to Variable
C in the diagram, Variab}e A has an effect on
Variable C, which is mediated by Variable B.
If there is no other path, it is whole mediation.
In sum, structural equation models are very
useful for mediational analysis, and should be
used more frequently.
While nermally the four steps described
here are sufficient, we might want to test an-
other model, which is depicted in Figure 4; the
situation variable is not shown here again, but
should be treated as in Figure 3, The model
is non-recursive, and the persen variable (I) in-fluences both the process (P> and outcome <O)variables, similarly to the models described
above. However, in this model, the processand outcome variables have reciprocal influen-
ces on each other. In our example, cognitive
activity increases as level of perfdrmance
decreases, and vice versa, Therefore, cognitive
activity simultaneously serves as process and
outcome variables, Exactly the same can be
said of test score; it partially determines and is
determined by cognitive activity. The mutual
causal paths are indicatecl with the two arrows
El
cp)
(I)
<o)
E2
Figure 4. A non-recursive model
between them in the figure. A special model
like this requires structural analysis for estima-
tion and testing, rather than ANOVA or multi-
ple regression of the general linear model.
Structural equation modeling or structural anal-
ysis is perhaps the most exciting development
in data analysis in the social sciences during
the 1970s (Kenny, 1985).
The non-recursive model shown in Figure 4
requires not only a special analytical technique,
but additional data as well. If we have meas-
ured only the three variables, I, P, and O, the
model is under-identified, meaning it cannot be
solved uniquely. In addition, we need the so-
called in$trumental variables to estimate such a
non-recursive model. Instrumental variables
are indicated in the figure as El and E2; they
should be conceptually and operationally distinct
from the person variable (I), and at the same
time affect only one of the reciprocally infiuenc-
ing variables, Only when we have such a
model, and necessary data for its estimation,
are we able te intelligibly and empirically dis-
cuss mutual causal influences.
We have argued in the section on interac-
tionism above that a theory involving only inde-
pendent and dependent variables should no
longer be acceptable. A theory with more ・than
the two kinds Qf variables inevitably requires a
careful causal specification, as discussed so far
in this section, in order for it to be intelligible.
While there have been sorne theories and re-
search that have involved more than independ-
ent and dependent variables, their causal spec-
ification has most often remained implicit. We
should no lenger tolerate ambiguous theory
$tatements, Process and mediational models
force us to make theoretical models explicit (e.f., Kenny, 1985}; if not sufficiently explicit, we
cannot collect data, let alone analyzing them.
There are four tasks or issue$ fbr model
construction and data analysis in social sciences
(Kenny, 1985). The first is model specification;
we need to translate theoretical statements, and
specify a statistical or causal model to math-
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ematically or graphically represent them as ac-
curately and precisely as possible, indicating
which variable sheuld influence which. Certain-
ly, specification is necessary for any theoretical
statement; however, written in prose, a theory
could be implicit, ambiguous, or sometimes
even outright illogical, A causal diagram could
easily help us avoid such an elementary and
unnecessary problem. Even when a model is
clearly and unequivocally specified, its
parameters may not always be possible to esti-
mate; identification is the next issue that we
have to deal with.
Identification refers to whether there is suffi-
cient information available so that estimation of
a specified model can neces$arily be made po$-
sibie. If we have properly specified causal
relations among variables, and have sufficient
data and informatioR te estimate them, the task
of identification is complete. An example of
identification problem may be illustrated with
the model in Figure 4; without the instrumental
variabies, we cannot uniquely solve the equa-
tions. Kenny (1985) has・ another example; if
we are interested in estimating a treatment ef-
fect or testing whether it is non-zero, a control
group is absolutely necessary. Tg claim that
treatment cattses outcome er treatment is effec-
tive, we need a proper experimental design,
whieh indeed mean$ valid model specification
and identification we are now discussing.
It is often mistakenly believed that structural
analysis, or path anatysis which is structural
analysis of a model whose variables are stan-
dardized, can prove causal relationships among
variables. On the contrary, eausal relationships
have to be specified first, in order for model
estimation to be made possible, If we de not
know whether Variable A affects Variable B or
vice versa, and want to let the data decide the
forrn of eausal relationship between them, we
have an under-identification problem. If the
model is under-identified, it needs to be re-
specified so that its estimation becomes possi-
ble, meanlng we have to redesign our research.
Process interactionism 83
While identification problem might appear tricky
and not easy for the uninitiated to understand,
it should not be; in most cases where exper-
imental methodology is appropriately applied,
and ANOVA or multiple regression analysis
can be used, we have no identification preblem.On the other hand, it is also probably true that
we psychologists have not been careful enough
about theoretical statements, and quite a few
eausal conclusions seem to have been drawnfrom studies using only correlational rnethods,
as if data by themselves could decisively prevea causal relationship.
When our model is properly identified, we
try to obtain the best estimates for model
parameters, which is referred to as estimation.
Model parameters include effects in ANOVA
and coefficients in multiple regression. In the
figures ef the current paper, each arrow has a
parameter, which is an effect or coefficient,
with an appropriate positive or negative sign.
We are usually interested in such parameters,
while we pay little attention to error or residual
variances, which too are necessary parameters
of a model. Normally, methods with least
squares or maximum likelihood criteria are used
for estimation of model parameters. And com-
puters with data analytical packages are now
widely and conveniently used for this stage of
empirical research. Kenny (1985) says that ex-
amination of the parameter estimates should bethe essential aspect of data analysis, Perhapsthe most common mistake is the failure to care-
fully study the estimates. Instead, we are fre-
quently more interested in and concerned for
the parameters' significance level, which is re-
lated to the next issue,
We are usually interested in determining
whether a parameter, or its associated causaL
path, is dispensable. Normally, as in ANOVA
or multiple regression, we test a null hypothesisthat an effect or coefficient is really zero, byfirst assuming no effect, and then computing
the probability that given data is obtained un-
der such an assumption. The logic is that we
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should reject the null hypothesis if the prob-
ability is sufficiently small. This proeedure is
logically identicai to the model modification ap-
proach for testing whether a parameter is nec-
essary. As already deseribed above, first a
measure of model fit, such as X2 or R2, is
computed vis-a-vis the actual data obtained,
and then modification to the model is made one
by one. If an alteration causes the model fit to
the data to worsen $ignificantly more than
chance would produce, we conclude that the
parameter and its associated path are necessary
for our model, and the modification should not
be made,
For example, a person-by-situation interac-
tion model may be estimated first, and its mod-
el fit computed with R2. Then, a main-effect
model of persc)n variabie may be estimated,
with interaetion parameters combined by equal-
ity constraint, which means only one parameter
is retained, For the model, R2 is recomputed,
whieh should necessarily be lower with a
smaller number of predictors. If it decreases
more than chanee deletion of parameters weuld
cause, then the pararneters, and the associated
interaction, are statisticaily significant. In that
case, we deeide that we need the parameters,
and the interaction effect is indispensable for
the modei, Normally, the number of parame-
ters removed becomes the degree of freedom
for significance testing.
There are other problems not discussed so
far, but related to issues of specification, identi-
fication, estimation, and testing. Comments are
in order fer twe of them in particular: power
and measurement error issues. Briefiy, the
power issue means that psychologists most of-
ten do not have a large enough number of par-
ticipants in their study. The issue becomes
particularly troublesome for process analysis, for
we could simply fail to detect mediation if the
pewer of the experiment is not sufficient. The
only solution to this problem, which also should
not be particularly esoteric to come up with, i$
having a large number of participants. Meas-
urement errors too make the detection of medi-
ation more difficult, since they lower the ceiling
of correlation coefficients ameng variables. Al-
though there are ways to make correction for
the ceiling eifect, basically we need to improve
our measurements so that they contain less er-
rors. Also, the latent variable approach with
multiple indieaters could be used; such a meas-
urement model should conceivably have more
construct validity as well, Finally, there are
also careless mistakes (see Kenny, 1985) in
data analysis, as in any area of empirical re-
search; needl'ess to say, the researchers should
make every effQrt to eliminate them from their
reports.
In this section, process models and media-
tional analyses are briefly described a$ only one
example, albeit perhaps the most important, of
the statistical procedures that should be increas-
ingly used in the process interactionist ap-
proach. The statistical models and analyses
described here are discussed in greater details
by Kenny and his colleagues (e, g,, Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Judd & Kenny, 1981; Kenny,
1985). Arguments are made that results from
mediational analyses are particularly informative;
these analyses could be used more for tracli-
tional research as well. At the same time, the
issues in model construction and data analysis,
for example, should impress on us that re-
search design and data analysis ef the field
have not suMciently become formal and scientif-
ic, Our use of statistical techniques surely
needs scrutiny. As Lewin warned us, statistics
is no substitute for theory, and the content of a
psychological law cannet be simply determined
by parameter estimates. However, the critical
point is not that statistical methods are used,
but how they were applied. Causal modeling
in particular is recommended, for structurai
analysis has major advantages (Kenny, 1985),
and is particularly useful for process interac-
tionism, our new approach. With it, we could
be conceivably more mindful of Lewin's ad-
monltlons,
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Self theories and self processes
In the new approaeh, internal processes of
the person are central to his/her personality,and personality is to be described and under-
stood in terms of models of internal processesand their parameters. As already mentioned, a
view that comes close to the eurrent theoretical
pesition is Misehel's cognitive-social learningapproach (1990). His approach ealls for a con-
ditional view ef dispositions rather than a per-spective based on global traits inferred from be-
havior, and thus proposes a particular form of
person-・situation interactionism, in which the
person's cognition und affect too are taken into
consideration. Each of Mischel's person vari-
ables may be cenceptualized as the product of
the individual's social-cognitive development up
to the time; it also may be conceptualized in
terms of a relevant psychological precess at the
time of behavior. Thus, each variable ha$ both
a struetural and a func:tiona] aspect (Mischel,1990).
A number of self theories too suggest prob-able internal prucesses and related person vari-
ables that could readl}y become useful com-
ponents of the new approach. Psyclloiogists in
general used to see `selP
as a concept that was
at best vague, ambiguous, or otherwise not well
defined, and therefore among the lea6t amena・
ble to empirical research. Situations seem to
have ehanged, and not only have studies of self
increased ln experimental social psyehology and
become popular among personality psychologistsas well, but also intensive and extensive re-
search in the area during the l980s seems to
have made substantiai progress (Nakamura,1990). The concept might still remain vague
and ambiguous for serne psychologists' taste,
but variables related to self are increasingly
employed in empirical research. In order to
make the current revlew coherent and man-
ageable, we shall make use ef the framework
that has been proposed to cover systematically
a wide variety of self theories.
`Social
psychology of self process'
Processinteractionism 85
(Nakamura, 1990) attempts a synthesis of a
number of research areas related to self, which
so far have mostly been conducted independ-
ently and remained theoretically unrelated to
each other. The self may be conceptualized as
process or structure, and Nakamura (1990) cau-
tions that despite the term `self
process,' the
authors have not wholly embraced the thesisthat se4f' is process, and that their approach
might better be characterized as more structural
in its orientation. Psychological processes relat-
ing to selL especially phenomenal processes,
could be called self process, and they could be
conceptually organized into four phases
(Nakamura, 1990}. These four constituents ef
self process have a specific order to appear,
and the orderly sequence as a whele could be
a process, and at the same tSme, the structure
of self should emerge from the orderly and ce-
herent relationship among the four. Nakamura
(1990) identifies them as attention, comprehen-
sion, evaluation, and expression phases; a num-
ber of studies for each of the four have so far
separately been conducted by varieus theorists
and researchers, as already mentioned.
In the first stage, we pay attention to our
own existence, appearance, or internal states.
In other words, we become conscious of our
self and state; this is the phase of self-focused
attention. Starting with theory of obiective
self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), a
great number of experiments have been con-
ducted to study the state of self-awareness,
Our attention may be wholly directed toward
self or toward external events, the theory as-
sumes CDuval & Wicklund, 1972); and self-
focused attention typically is aversive or oth-
erwise areusing, motivating the person to act in
certaln ways.
Now there are several theories concerning
the effects of self-awareness on the persen's in-ternal states and behavior (e. g., Carver &
Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wieklund, 1972; Gib-
bons, 1990; Hull & Levy, 1979; Wicklund,
1975). In addition, a related trait of self-con-
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sciousness is introduced; the SelfLConsciousness
Seale measures the dispositional tendency to
beeome self-focused (Fenigstein, Scheier, &
Buss, 1975). The scale has three subscales
derived from erthogonal factors: private and
public $elf-"eonsciousness, as well as social anx-
iety. The three-factor structure has also been
replicated in a Japanese version (Kurosawa,1992; see also 1993). Research continues on
how people become self-aware, what is the
characteristic of the self-focused state, and
what are its consequences.
Self-focused attention may result in a clear
image and profile of our self, which we may be
able to capture in the second stage; we come
to know and understand ourselves (Nakamura,1990). It is the phase of self knowledge and
comprehension, and ,various concepts like self-
image and self-eoncept, as well as actuallideal
selves and ego-identity, have traditionally been
the targets of empirical research of the second
phase. Newer interests seem largely to have
taken over, although older concepts have not
faded away completely. For instance, `self-con-
cept' has been recast as self-schema (e. g.,Markus, 1977> from informatien processing ap-
proach. Processing of self-relevant information
becomes one of the more exciting topics of the
second phase, but studies of self-concept are
still alive and welL
Now there are a number of approaches one
could take concerning the question ef "how
we
come to know and understand ourselves"; per-
haps the rnost prevocative may be self-percep-
tion theory (Bem, 1972). We ceme to know
ourselves just as we do anyone else: observa-
tion of overt behavior (Bem, 1972). Such a
view at first must have sounded counter-intu-
itive and controversial, but more and more
psychologists are appreciative and supponive of
the perspective, The reason for this change
may be found in the popularity ef social cogni-
tion researeh, which started during the 1970s.
Seff-perception may best be understood in the
context of attribution theory; ironically, attribu-
tion theory is as cognitive as Bem was be-
havioristic (and therefore anti-cognitive> in his
proposal of the theory. And even a theory of
emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schachter,
1964) is now cast and understood in the frame-
work of self"perception and attribution.
Our knowledge and understanding of our-
selves seem to lead us to the next phase: eval-
uation (Nakamura, 1990). We have a powerfultendency to evaluate our opinions, abilities, and
self as a whole; Festinger (1954) posited such a
tendency as the basis of his theory of social
comparison. Social comparison, others' opinions
of the self, and internal standards including ide-
al self may be involved in the process of self-
evaluation. And self-esteem can be defined as
the outcome of the evaluative process concern-
ing the self as a whole; Rosenberg's self-es-
teem scale (1965) measures the direction, favor-
able or unfavorable, and strength of the atti-
tude toward oneself, Related concepts may in-
clude self--wonh, self-value, inferiority, self-sat-
isfaction, and self-aeceptance; they have tradi-
tionally been topical concepts of the third phase
in self process.
Interestingly, social anxiety of the Self Con-
sciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975) is related to self--esteem. When items of
the scale were factor analyzed (Kurosawa, !985)
together with Eagly's version {1967) ef the Janis--Field
Feelings of Inadequacy Scale as well as
the Cheek and Buss self-esteem scale (Buss,1980), four orthogonal factors emerged. Two ef
them substantially replicated the private and
public subscales of self consciousness. On the
other hand, the Eagly scale, which has beenfrequently used as a self-esteern scale, split up
into two, one faetor for non-social self-esteem
factor along with the Cheek-Buss items, and
the other for social self-esteem, with social anx-
iety items of the Self Consciousness Scale load-
ing negatively (Kurosawa, 1985). Exactly the
same factor structure has now been replicated
with a Japanese version with Japanese college
students as respQndents (Kurosawa, 1992).
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Therefore, evaluation of the self has (at least)two aspects; ene of the self in the context that
is free of social implications, and the other in
social situations, which is reversely related to
socia] anxiety (Kurosawa, 1985; 1992}, There
are now studies that indicate two dimensions
for self-esteem: social and non-social factors (orinner vs. outer self-esteern; see Briggs &
Cheek, 1986).
Finally, the self may be cenceptualized as
what is expressed by the person in social set-
tings; self expression is the fburth phase of self
process {Nakamura, 1990). Goffman (1959) saw
human social behavior in everyday life as pres-entation of the self, i. e., role-playing or dis-
playing the soeial self. An aspect of the fourth
phase is impression management; people may
behave in a social setting in order to create a
certain impression Qf the self, more likely favor-
able one, on others. For instance, self-hand-
icapping is a strategy to avuid an internal, sta-
ble attribution of unfavorable outcomes
(Berglas & Jones, 1978; Snyder & Wicklund,
1981), Another aspeet may be self-disclosure;
you may verbally disclose your personal infor-
mation in a social interaction, letting your part-ner know your true self better, deeper and
wider. While self-diselesure may not necessari-
ly be related to manipulation or management of
your impression, it nonetheless expresse$ your
self and creates on the other person certain im-
ages or impressions of you.
Related to self presentation, self-monitoring
<SMI Snyder, 1979) is a broader concept than
lmpresslon management; a person may monltor
hislher own behavior in soeial settings, and at-
tempt to censtruct a pattern of social behavior
appropriate to particular social settings. In-
dividuals differ in the extent to which they rely
on two sources ef information for their cues for
appropriateness of their behavior: situational or
interpersonal information vs. that from inner
states, dispositions, and attitudes, The selfi
monitoring scale measures the individual differ-
ence to monitor and control one's social behav-
Precess interactioni$m 87
Comprehension
Attrib
,8 Private ut
S .g
<public
Disclosure Prese
Expression
Figure 5. Four phases of self process
ior; a high SM individual is assumed to pay
particular attentien to situatienal information,
and a low SM person is thought to attune his/
her behavior more te personal characteristics
and inner states CSnyder, 1979). Therefore, so-
cial behavior of the high SM persons should bemore changeable depending on the situation,
while the low tend to be cross-situationally con-
sistent in their behavior (Snyder & Ickes,1985).
Figure 5 summarizes and shows the four
phases of self process just discussed. While
reverting to a preceding phase might be a pos-sibility, the four phases of the self in generalappear in the fixed order, without skipping
(Nakamura, 1990). Therefore, the four steps as
a whele could be a process, and at the same
time, the sequence becomes a structure as well,
giving both a functional and structural aspects
to the self (cf., Mischel, 199e). The structure
is represented here as circular; a new cycle
would begin as the fourth phase of self-expres-
sion ends, and self-focused attention occurs
anew. However, the circular `self
process'depicted in the figure is most likely only one of
the processes related to the self; each phase
must include a number of relevant internal
processes, although not many self theories so
far seem to have explicitly pesited such proces-
ses, A hierarchical model of internal processes
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might be possible, fer instance, with the circu-
lar self proeess at the top of several levels of
various self processes.
This brief exposition of `social
psychology of
self process' <Nakamura, 1990) hopefully helps
the readers realize the importance of self
processes not only in social psychelogy, but
alse in personality psychology. For our new
approach, personality processes are central to
our understanding of psychology of the person;
his/her personality is understood and described
in terms of mode]s of internal processes and
their parameters. Although the model of self
suggested by Figure 5 is based on a perspec-
tive not wholly proeess-oriented (Nakamura, 1990), it is pessible to conceive the self as all
relevant {i. e., psychelogieal} internal processes
of the person. There should be no preblem
defining and treating self-related processes as
kind of personality 'processes;
a'nd no person-
ality variable is likely to be conceptualized or
operationalized totally without relating it to the
concept of self, if it is process--oriented and has
semething to do with social behavior. In this
centext, theerizing and understanding self
processes become one of the most important
goals of the new approach to personality.
There are other reasons why research in
seif theeries and variables should preve to be
valuable for the new approach. First, self as a
construet can be operationalized so that self
variables are related to internal but measurable
processes; recent self research has taken this
approach, and we believe that it should become
standard procedure for personality research in
general as well. In such a conceptualization, a
self-related variable may serve as an independ-
ent, dependent, or process variable of the
study. We have argued that we should best
avoid traditional concepts like personality type
and trait. Self variables are coneeptually supe-
rior to such coneepts; while those traditional
concepts are mostly atheoretical as already
pointed out, it is very hard tQ imagine a self
variable that is atheoretical to the extent as a
1.
trait would be. We should resist by all means
the temptation to make traits or traitlike con-
cepts out of self variables, e. g., self censcious-
ness and self monitoring. Fortunately, most
self variables do not seem very intuitive as a
psycholegical concept, and have not appeared
much in lay psychoiogy; therefore, se]f could
potentially generate totally new personality vari-
ables without being encumbered with irnplicit
personality theory and naive psychology.
Having discussed the necessities and merits
of studying self theories from the current the-
oreticai perspective, let us briefiy review their
other characteristics. These characteristics are
naturally refiected in `social psychology of self
process' (Nakamura, 1990), First, when we Iook
at self theories, we are impressed with their
great number and variety. In a sense, this
might be inevitable, for we each have many so-
cial selves, and each self has many aspects as
well. Self theories as a whole are multi-faceted
and deal with various phenomena; on the other
hand, each theory deals piecerneal with only a
tiny part of the self, and no comprehensive the-
ory of the whole self exists. Incidentally, it is
somewhat similar to the state of social psychol-ogy, which does not have one single theory that
is central or comprehensive when explaining so-
cial behavior. That is why higher Ievel
theories, like `self process' (Nakamura, 1990),
become all the more important, when trying te
understand the totality of the self.
Another characteristic of recent self theories
is that many of them are eognitive, rather than
motivational, in their orientation. Lewin's ap-
proach to personality (1935) may also be charae-
terized as cognitive, but it has motivational and
behavioral aspects as well, and the person is
seen as active. In contrast, many recent self
theories are merely cognitive; psychologists are
more interested in cognition than behavior, and
the image of the person is rather passive and
reactive. Cognitive approaeh to psychology in
general, and infQrmation processing approach in
particular, is known for its emphasis of internal
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processes; curiously, with a few exceptions, self
theories have not beceme process-oriented, and
although cognitive, contents and outcomes of
pTocesses rather than processes themselves are
studied. At any rate, cognitive and information
proeessing approaches are usually devoid of
motivational constructs. And because they are
currently popular among psychologists, finding a
new good motivational theery in psychology is
not easy recently, and self research seems to
be no exception.
Many of the recent self theories are based
on the phenomenological self: i. e,, the self
known, not the knower. Social psychology of
self process (Nakamura, 199e) defines psycho-
logical processes relating to self, especially phe-
nomenal processes, as Cself
process.' While the
person may be concerned with hislher objective
self (i. e., becoming objectively self aware), the
psychologist is interested in such a
phenemenological and experiential state of the
person, and tries to study the effects of the
state. In other words, to a large extent, phe-nomenology and subiective feelings and
knowledges have become central to recent self
research. This tendency may have something
to do with a trend in personality,and social
psychology; scientific study of lay psychologyhas beceme popular, including attribution and
implicit personality theories. For instance, fac-
ter structures of personality traits are studied,
and five factors are generally found (Goldberg,1993}, Notice that the structure is of
phenotypic persenality traits seen by lay people
(i. e., based on implicit personality theory), and
generally not by expert psychologists. Recent
self researeh has similar data sources.
Self theories could be more obiective and
functional, and the data may come from other
sources than self--reports about the self. In
such a approach, what the person explicitly or
implicitly thinks er feels about the self is not
central, and the p$ychologist tries to obiectively
see the self as serving certain psychological
functions for the person. In other words, self
Process interactionism 89
in such an approach is a construct being stud-
ied by the psychologist, rather than what is felt
by the person who is being studied as in a
phenomenological appreach. An example of ob-
jective and functional approaches may beAronson's selftiustification theory (1992), which
is a reinterpretation ef Festinger's cognitive dis-
sonance theory (1957). Another exarnple may
be the totalitarian ege of Greenwald (1980);here the ego is seen as an organizer of person-al knowledge. Similarly, Hull and Levy (1979)see the rele of self-awareness in terms of or-
ganizational functions in information proeessing.
In each case, the objective and functional as-
pect of the self or ego, rather than the ex-
periential and subiective aspect, is emphasized
and theorized. Altheugh Lewin's approach too
is phenomenological, it also has obiective and
functional aspects with motivational and be-havioral concepts; at least we know that
Lewin's psychology does not rely much on in-
trospection for empirical research.
It is not always possible to tell whether
some of the self `theories'
are mere de$criptions
ef self-related phenomena or theoretical ex-
planations of such phenomena (Nakamura,1990). As already argued, there is no such
thing as a descriptive theory, and an empirical
law is no theory, Aiso, not many theories are
very explicit about the processes involved; we
sometimes wonder whether a theory is abeut
the whoie process, from tl)e beginning to theend, or only some part of it in between, e, g.,the mediational process, Although a p$ycholog-
ical state based on self-reports is presumablystudied, we are not informed whether the per-
sen is assumed to be able to become conscious,
or otherwise knowledgeable, of the processes
under investigation. A theory may be equiv-
ocal about the consequences of self-awareness
or self-reports; sometimes, it presumably in-
fluences an outcome, and other times, it may
become totally epiphenomenal. These and
many other confusions need clarification; for a
coherent perspective that incorporates those var-
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90 T7ie Jdpanese Jburnal of PeTsonalit.y 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1. '
iou$ self theories, we seem to neeti great more
work,
Finally, we may ask whether any aspect of
the self is missing from `social
psychology of
self process' (Nakamura, 1990>. As we have
already peinted out, the $elf precess perspective
centers around information processing and phe-
nomenal processesl the processes included in
the per$pective appear in general te be
phenotypic and superficial, in Lewinian terms.
Perhaps, a group of important concepts, among
others, that are missing from the perspeetivemay center around the concept of
`control'.
These surface phenornena are manifestations, it
can be argued, of some core or genotypical
processes of self, which probably concerns the
relation of the self to the non-self or outer
world. We appear to need, in other words,
motivational and self--regulatory processes,which should accoUnt for the processes of the
self process approach. The core or genotypical
processes of self, which supposedly take place
deep inside the person, are shown as a `?'
in
the center of Figure 5.
There are a number of concepts in this as-
pect of the self; for instanee, control and mas-
tery, self-efficacy, self-acceptance, self-reliance,
and self-control come readily to mind. Similar
and related concepts may be primary and sec-
ondary control, iocus of control, and intrinsic
motivation and self-actualization on the one
hand, and defense mechanisms, illusion of con-
trol, and learned helplessness on the other. In
sum, while the social psychology of self process
(Nakamura, 1990) is provocative and eonstruc-
tive, and self theories included in it are partic-
ularly interesting and should be useful for our
new approach, we need great more work to
make them fit the requirements of the new pro-
cess approach, In particular, we should paymore attention to motivational and self-
regulatory aspects of the self, which are also
important in Lewinian approach, and which
should provide us with more genotypical the-
oretical variables to understund the whole self.
Summary
In this paper, a new approach to personality
psychology is discussed. First, it is argued that
expert psycholegy should be different and `bet-
ter' than lay psychelogy. Personality psycholo-
gists are asked how better their psychelogy is
than a lay psycholegy; hew far advanced it is
from common sense; and what it could offer to
other fields of psychology. In the same con-
text, Lewinian approach to psychology is brieflyreviewed and sumrnarized, and why a new ap-
proach is necessary is diseussed. Then, the
tasks of personality psychelogy are redefined,
and a new eoncept of personality proposed.
Specifically, internal precesses of the personare put at the center of the new approach.
The approach proposes that personality should
be understood in terms of models of internal
processes and their parameters. Possible inter-
nal preeesses of our interest may be, among
others, information processing, rnotivational, and
self--regulatory processes. The parameters of
internal processes, rather than static
characteristics ef the person, should become
personality variables of the new approach. Per-
sonality variables of our new paradigm include
both person and process variabZes. Psycholo-
gists should measure interna} parameters to ob-
tain person variables, which should replace
such traditional personality variables as traits
and types. Individual differences can be
defined in terms of variations in model
parameters, Personality development and
change could then be conceptualized as chan-
ges in the individual's internal parameters,
Also, various interaction approaches concern-
ing the relation between personality and behav-
ior are reviewed. It is argued that Lewin's in-
teractionism, called here as process interac-
tionism, is different from others, in that it em-
phasizes the importance of process. Aecording
to him, the situation changes with the process,
thus changing also the forees that determine
the dynamics at each moment, It is suggested
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that process variabies should be measured to
tap the situational changes postulated in
Lewinian process interactienism. The variables
then may be analyzed to examine whether they
mediate the effects of the treatment variables
on the outcome variables. Process models and
mediational analyses are briefly described as an
example of statistical procedures that partic-ularly suit our new paradigm. Mediational
analyses illuminate and help us understand
eomplex phenomena (Baron & Kenny, 1986;
Judd & Kenny, 1981); the new models and
data analyses would be very useful for building
new theories of personality.
Finally, self theeries in the framework of
`self process' (Nakamura, l.990) are reviewed
from the viewpoint of the new approach to per-
sonality psychology. Se]f related processes are
a kind of personality process; therefore, study-
ing them should be one of the most important
goals of the new personality psychology. Self
theories as a whole lack a coherent framework,
it is argued, and many theories are merely cog-
nitive and' phenomenological. It is also argued
that self theories need not be so, but could be
more objective and functional. There may be
sorne aspects ef the self that is rnissing from
the se]f process perspective (Nakamura, 1990).
The perspective centers around informatien
processing and phenomenal processes, and the
processes involved may be phenotypic and su-
perficial, in Lewinian terms. It is suggested
that what we may need most is the concept of
`control';
self theories need mere motivatienal
and seif-regulatory processes. While the social
psycholegy of self process <Nakamura, 1990) is
provocative and compatible with the new ap-
proach, we seem te need great more work,
with more genotypic, as opposed to phenotypic,variables to understand the whole self.
As we all probably agree, of all fields of
psychology, personality psychology comes
closest te lay people's image of psychology,
Perhaps, personality psychologists have a dilem-
ma: if they try to be scientific ancl formal, their
Process interactionism 91
theory tends to become eseteric and not very
intuitive, and therefore not very popular among
lay people. On the other hand, if they try to
make their theory intuitively and readily under-
standable to the general public, it tends to be-
come unscientific. It may be the high expecta-
tions of professional and lay people alike that
personality psychology suffers from. However,
personality psychologists' choice should be
clear; the field sti11 needs to be more rigorously
scientific and formal. Carefully studying
Lewin's approach to psyehology and following
his advices may very well provide the guidance
we need at the moment.
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(Reeeived Sep, 10, 1993; accepted Feb.6, 1995)