Pragati Issue 21 Dec2008

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INDIAS STRATEGIC RESPONSE

HURDLES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

ANTICIPATING OBAMAJOINING THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

THE FRONTLINE ALLY

ISSN 0973-8460

ALSO


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play right into the hands of the Pakistani militaryestablishment, which for its part, is certain to usethe smallest opportunity to wind down its reluc-tant operations against the Taliban militants on itswestern borders. Some Pakistani strategists arecounting on the artificial, US-enforced antagonism

between their army and the Taliban to dissolveinto a recharged insurgency that would, ulti-

mately, defeat yet another superpower. How canrecreating the old jihadi breeding ground be inIndias interests? And this is regardless of the out-come of a military confrontation along the India-Pakistan border, and even very merits of it duringan unprecedented global economic downturn.

As Sushant K Singh argues in an article in thisissue, Indias strategic response must be to engagethe jihadi adversary in Afghanistan. A significantmilitary presence there would boost the strengthof the Afghan and US forces fighting elements that

are inimical to Indias interests, and are aligned, ifnot associated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba that issuspected to be the organisation that carried outthe Mumbai attacks. The Indian government musturgently engage in a diplomatic initiative thatbrings the United States and Iran together to ad-dress the security challenges in Afghanistan. Theelection of Barack Obamawho wants to win thewar in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and is amenable toengaging Iranopens up the opportunity, butonly if the United States can also grasp that this is

the only way to win that war.India, the United States and Afghanistan sharea common interest in restructuring Pakistans mili-tary establishment. This is the single most impor-tant factor determining peace and stability in theregion. It cannot come about unless the Talibaninsurgency is defeated.

The home front

The fact that a small number of terrorists couldbring one of Indias biggest cities to a standstill forthree days will not be lost on potential terrorists in

the country, and indeed around the world. It is toIndias credit that all the terrorists save one wereeliminated, something that will to discourage all but the most committed. But that still wont suf-

fice. The Indian state must reassert its monopolyover violence and severely punish those who useviolence as a political tool.

Obviously, this means evolving a nationalcounter-terrorism policy (and, in the followingarticle, Ajit Kumar Doval explains the difficulties

of getting there). However, it also means loweringthe threshold of tolerance to various kinds ofpolitical violence, that have especially mush-roomed over the last few years. From the spread ofNaxalism, to the battles in Nandigram, to the Gu- jjar agitation. to homegrown jihadi attacks andfinally down to extremist Hindutva terrorism,political violence is on the ascendent.

B R Ambedkar had rejected even non-violentsatyagraha as the grammar of anarchy in an in-dependent democratic India. It is hard to hold citi-

zens to constitutionalism when they observe thatviolence is more rewarding. Even as the Indiangovernment contemplates setting up a new federalagency to combat terrorism, it is by vigourouslyenforcing the rule of law across the board that itcan contain it more effectively. The existence of bad laws, however, prevents the enforcement ofgood ones. Should the police be used to preventterrorism or to enforce a Victorian morality on citi-zens? The answer should be clear after November26th, 2008. Wasting public funds on moral policingnot only wastes limited resources, it also sustains

organised crime syndicates, some of which areintimately connected to jihadi terrorism.

After the last bullet was fired in Mumbai,bringing one nightmare to an end, a section of theangry population took to the streets of Mumbai toprotest against a political leadership that hadwholly mismanaged internal security. But a gov-ernment that could not protect citizens from mon-soon rainsa relatively predictable phenome-noncan hardly be expected to protect its citizensfrom terrorist attacks. Unless Indian citizens chan-

nel their anger and outrage into improving theoverall quality of governance, and demandingmore from their political representatives and hold-ing them accountable for quotidian public serv-ices, it is almost certain that the state will be in-creasingly less effective in providing basic security.For the fundamental problem is that India's gov-ernance capability has so fallen short of its eco-nomic, geopolitical and internal security circum-stances that the impact of even minor events, leavealone massive terrorist attacks, will be increasinglydestabilising.

Nitin Pai is editor of Pragati and blogs at The Acorn(acorn.nationalinterest.in).

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A government that cannot protect citizensagainst monsoon rains can hardly be ex-pected to protect them against terrorist at-tacks. An overall improvement in govern-ance is necessary.


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COUNTER-TERRORISM

The elusive national counter-terrorism policy

A problem of political vision, federal structure & the nature of the threat

AJIT KUMAR DOVAL

THAT THE absence of a coherent and time-consistent policy is responsible for Indias failureon the counter-terrorist front is a common refrainof many well meaning critics. The parallels withUnited States success in securing its homelandfollowing the 9/11 attacks, as against repetitiveattacks in India, are largely attributed to this in-firmity. While the logic of the two comparisons is

faulty on the fundamentals, it cannot be deniedthat despite having bled profusely, Indias re-sponse to terrorism has not been in pursuance of agrand policy.

The Indian response generally has been epi-sodic and disjointed, mostly reacting to situationalchallenges in the aftermath of major terrorist ac-tions. Short-term and tactical, the response is pri-marily driven by an anxiety to reduce politicalcosts in the wake of popular resentment and me-dia onslaught, achieve quick results in identifying

and neutralising the culprits and dish out bravestatements to boost public morale, all in the hopethat these will be seen as governments bold newpolicy initiatives.

Arguably, this is the time for fast and smarttactical actions to generate heat on the terroristsand not for policy-making which is a long andcumbersome exercise of defining objectives, build-ing capacities, re-defining inter-agency role andresponsibilities and restructuring systems. Whileone can justify the immediate taking precedenceover the important to meet the problem at hand, itis baffling that even after the initial outburst sub-sides the important continues to remain as elusiveas before. The system settles down to the rut of theroutine till the next event triggers the cycle all overagain.

People start believing that the governmentlacks the intention, capability or the both to ad-dress the problem. Once their expectations of thegovernment grappling the problem from a higherplane with a long term policy perspective, strate-gic vision and systems-driven co-ordination are

belied, widespread cynicism sets in.It would be absurd to presume that any gov-

ernment in power would not wish to deliveriffor no other reason than for its own political bene-fit. It also can not simply be attributed to bureau-

cratic apathy or insensitivity of the security appa-ratus. The latter are perhaps the worst sufferers ofnon-policy and would very much like to be led bydefinitive policy guidelines, if they only had thecapability and opportunity of having one. Thequestion that begs an answer is why does thishappen in a country that is the worlds biggestvictim of terrorism. There has to be something

more fundamentally amiss in the Indian systemwhich is responsible for this. It is important toidentify these causes to bring about the requiredcorrectives.

Policy-making in government is a processthrough which those in power translate theirpolitical vision into plans and programmes toachieve certain defined objectives. Existence of

political vision is thus at the centre of policy-making. Yet in the fractious contemporary Indianpolity, political vision has been overcast by elec-toral calculations and the need to pander to theperceived sensitivity of vote-banks. Maximisingelectoral advantages by serving the national inter-est best is no more considered to be the politicsthat pays. Commitment to the national good andideological convictions, visible in early years ofindependence, has been taken over by politics ofcompromise and short-term expediency. In recent

times, coalition compulsions have further accentu-ated the problem, constricting policy making onlyto a small residual area which does not hurtpolitical interests of even a small constituent, aswithdrawal of parliamentary support could lead

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PRAGATI - THE INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST REVIEW 4

Existence of political vision is at the centre ofpolicy-making. Yet in the fractious contempo-rary Indian polity, political vision has been

overcast by electoral calculations and theneed to pander to the perceived sensitivityof vote-banks.


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to collapse of the government. This minimal areaof consensus is too small to formulate policies inrespect of challenges which require national re-sponse at maximal level. As many security issues,

including terrorism, fall in this category they havebeen the worst hit.For instance, the North-East is Indias most

vulnerable strategic region with more than 99 per-cent of its boundary being international. Over 88percent of this international border is with coun-tries with which India faces one or the other secu-rity related problem. Due to geo-historical reasons,the area is still secluded from national mainstreamand has witnessed more than two dozen insurgen-cies since Indias independence. It also provides aneasy route for smuggling of weapons from Pacific-

rim countries and drugs from Golden Trianglearea. In this setting, securing its borders and mak-ing them impregnable should have been nationsprime security priority.

However, what we did was just the opposite. In1984, Assam which was worst hit by the massivedemographic invasion was taken out of the pur-view of Foreigners Act through enactment of Ille-gal Migrants Determination by Tribunal Act(IMDT Act). The Act facilitated uninterrupted ille-gal migration of Bangladeshis into Assam and,

from there, to rest of the country.The illegal immigration also provided an op-

portunity to jihadi terrorists to find easy access toIndia. These illegal immigrants were constitutedinto a major vote bank, a consideration which for

the Congress Party took precedence over nationalsecurity interests.

Twenty-one years after this Act was passed, theSupreme Court in 2005 observed that it was

wholly unconstitutional and must be struckdown. Calling it as an aggression, it added thatthe presence of such a large number of illegal mi-grants from Bangladesh, which runs into millions,is in fact an aggression on the state of Assam andhas also contributed significantly in causing seri-ous internal disturbances in the shape of insur-gency of alarming proportions. The IMDT Act andRules had been so made that innumerable and in-surmountable difficulties are created in identifica-tion and deportation of the illegal migrants.

The serious security implications of millions of

illegal immigrants settling down in a region, chal-lenged by high internal and external threats waseclipsed by electoral considerations. More alarm-ing was the fact that immediately after such a se-vere indictment by the Supreme Court, the UPAgovernment issued the Foreigners Tribunal Orderin February 2006, reintroducing the provisions ofthe IMDT Act through the back door. It took an-other Supreme Court intervention on a public in-terest litigation to strike down the order.

Political vision, bipartisan approachThere can no effective policy making in securitymatters unless those in power develop a politicalvision in which national security takes precedenceover short-term political gains. In a competitive

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Photo:VinuRanganathan


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electoral politics, this will entail pursuing a bipar-tisan approach so that the national interest doesnot become politically unaffordable. A politicaldiscourse at a higher plane among major politicalparties on critical security issues, including terror-ism, would be necessary for achieving this objec-

tive.Even in the settings where political will and

vision exists, policy making does not accrue as anautomatic by-product. It requires an institutional-ised knowledge base, expertise both of the issuesinvolved and the art of policy-making, the capac-ity to optimally leverage given constants and vari-ables to nations best advantage and a highly com-petent and committed civil service. The Indiansecurity management system is deficient in thisrespect. Though there are individuals with high

capabilities and commitments, but as a system,they are not able to achieve what the nation oth-erwise is capable of. This invites snide remarks ofIndia being a soft-state implying that its policy-making and policy-executing capacities are dis-proportionately low to the sum total of its com-prehensive state power.

Both policy-making and policy-execution inIndia is mired in a bureaucratic morass wherethere are more brakes than accelerators. Policy-making has to pass through cumbersome proc-esses which are slow, militate against change, are

fettered by antiquated rules and procedures whoserationale has long been lost, and is beleaguered byinter-department rivalries. Worst still, at differentstages, it is handled by people who lack the re-quired knowledge, skills and decision-making ca-pabilities, and are not accountable. They are notstakeholders in the success or failure of policies, aburden that has to be borne by the executive agen-cies. They are safe as long as they do not violaterules and procedures.

While policy-making has evolved into a fine

professional discipline changes have eluded theIndian system of governance. To compound mat-ters, modern security issues are no more uni-dimensional in character and require multi-disciplinary understanding and application. Forinstance, tackling of terrorism in India would re-quire a sound understanding of plans and strate-gies of neighbouring countries sponsoring terror-ism, the nuances of their intricate politico-strategicrelations with India, the ideological and collabora-tive linkages of terrorist groups, inter- and intra-group relationships, tactics and technology of

modern-day terrorists, and an understanding ofcentre-state relations and legal frameworks, toname just a few.

Moreover, there is a plethora of knowledge and

ideas outside the government which should befactored in imaginatively for good policy-making.In a democracy this should further include trendsin public thinking, views of political rivals andinterest groups, opinions of think tanks and such-like. With the declining standards of governance, a

perceptible decline in these capabilities is discerni- ble at a time when security challenges have be-come most acute.

A federal fix

The second challenge to counter-terrorist policy-making emanates from the structural architectureof Indias legal-constitutional framework itself.When designed, it did not foresee the type of com-plex internal security problems, like terrorism,emerging with trans-national and inter-state con-

nectivities. With wars increasingly becoming costineffective and unpredictable instruments ofachieving politico-strategic objectives, the modernworld is witnessing emergence of fourth genera-tion warfarewhere the enemy is invisibleas asubstitute. Even the small and weaker states cantake on their more powerful adversaries in thisasymmetric warfare which largely targets internalsecurity, with terrorism as its most favouredweapon. India has been witnessing the Pakistanionslaught of covert action now for nearly there

decades.In India, while national security, including in-ternal security, is the responsibility of the Centre,most of the instrumentslike powers to maintainlaw and order, the criminal administration system,police and prisonsare controlled by the constitu-ent states. The states, keen to preserve their turfand apprehensive of the central governmentspolitical interference are unwilling to provide anyspace to the Centre that could empower it to takedirect action in security related matters. This ren-ders the task of a holistic tackling of internal secu-

rity threats difficult.While the states lack capabilities to cope with

these threats on their own they are unwilling toallow any direct intervention by the Centre. This

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Those in power must develop a political visionin which national security takes precedenceover short-term political gains. This calls for abipartisan approach so that the national inter-est does not become politically unaffordable.


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seriously limits the Centres ability to formulate,execute, monitor and resource national counterterrorist policies in an effective and comprehensivemanner. In this setting while the Centres actionsget confined to dishing out advisories, apprisingthe states of the threats in a generic way and pro-

viding funds for capacity building, the states oper-ate in a tactical mode aimed at maintaining the lawand order. This leaves little scope and space forformulating comprehensive national level counter-terrorist policies. To make the matters worse, attimes, the Centre sees even the bonafide requestsof the states through a political prism undermin-ing their genuine efforts towards capacity build-

ing. The Centres refusal for over four years toclear the state legislations against organised crimes

in Gujarat and some other BJP ruled states is illus-trative. Incidentally, the draft Acts sent by them forapproval was similar to an Act that exists in Ma-harashtra, a Congress-ruled state.

Framing the counter-terrorism problem

Thirdly, the very nature of the terrorist phenome-non makes policy-making difficult. The first taskof policy making is defining the objectives in tan-gible and positive terms that are sought to beachieved. But in fighting terrorism, the state

largely achieve negative goalspreventing whatthe terrorists wish to do from happening. This listmay include for instance, averting dismember-ment or degradation of the state, preventing break-down of the constitutional machinery, frustratingterrorist plans to kill citizens and their leader, and

striking at vital installations. It will appear ridicu-lous for a government to claim all that has nothappened as the list of their achievements. Successcan not be computed on the basic of political goalsdenied, the innocent citizens who the terroristscould not kill, the leaders who were not attacked

and vital installations which the terrorists wantedto destroy but could not.

Terrorist dont kill in the hope that their depre-dations will lead to attainment of their politicalgoals, they kill to break the will of the government.Correlation between the policy initiatives taken bythe government and their real impact on terrorismis also vague, diffused and a matter of subjectiveinterpretation. For example, the efficacy ofcounter-terrorist laws, structural changes in thesecurity apparatus, role of diplomatic initiatives,

political engagement are all difficult to determine,at least in a short run. This provides scope forpolitical decision-makers to take positions onpolitical considerations as there are no clear policyrights and wrongs in the battle against terrorists.

The impediments and problems notwithstand-ing, gravity of the threat and its grave implica-tions for Indias security demand a policy-drivencomprehensive national response. To make it hap-pen there is a need for the two major political par-ties to develop a bipartisan approach towards re-sponse to terrorism. These parties should also take

upon themselves the responsibility of convincingthe state governments where they are in power tosupport legislative measures that could enable theCentre to play a more active role in handling ter-rorism and allied threats. A serious national debatewas already overdue before November 26th, 2008.It has become vital now.

Ajit Kumar Doval was formerly the head of Indias In-telligence Bureau

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While the states lack capabilities to cope with

hese threats on their own they are unwilling toallow any direct intervention by the Centre. Thiseriously limits the Centres ability to formulate,

execute, monitor and resource national countererrorist policies in an effective and comprehen-ive manner.

Listen to this issue. Tune in to our podcasts

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COUNTER-TERRORISM

Dont blame the constitution

The central government is not impaired from acting against terrorism

VIVEK REDDY

AFTER THE Mumbai carnage, the Prime Ministerhas finally announced that a federal investigativeagency to deal with terrorism will be established.The UPA government has cited the Indian consti-tution as the only obstacle for the creation of sucha national agency. The government asserts thatsince the entries police and public order are in

the State List of the Indian constitution, the centrecannot create a national agency to deal with acts ofterror without amending the constitution.

Even the Leader of the Opposition agrees. Inhis autobiography, My Country, My Life , L K Ad-vani asserts that we must liberate ourselves fromthe law and order mindset and only a constitu-tional amendment would allow the centre to dealwith federal crimes like terrorism. This approachunderestimates the constitutional powers given tothe Union government. Although India is federalin structure, it has a strong unitary bias in favourof the centre. There are three distinct constitutionalsources of power which would enable the Centreto create a national agency to deal with terrorism.

First, although the Indian constitution has cre-

ated a list in the Seventh Schedule which can belegislated exclusively by the state government, italso confers certain superior legislative powerson parliament to make inroads into the exclusivedomain of the state government. One such supe-

rior legislative power arises in the context of aninternational treaty or resolution. Article 253 en-ables Parliament to make a law for the whole orany part of India to implement any treaty, agree-ment or convention with any other country orcountries or any decision made at any interna-tional conference, association or other body, even

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The government asserts that since the entriespolice and public order are in the StateList of the Indian constitution, the centre can-not create a national agency to deal with actsof terror without amending the constitution.

Photo:VNishantDesai


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if the subject matter of the law forms part of theState List. The Government of India has enteredinto numerous multilateral and regional treaties onterrorism and was a party to several United Na-tions resolutions and decisions taken at interna-tional conferences condemning terrorism and re-

solving itself along with other countries to punishacts of terror. The UN General Assembly Resolu-tion on Measures to eliminate international ter-rorism, December 1994 has urged all states totake all appropriate measures at the national andinternational levels to eliminate terrorism. TheInternational Convention on the Suppression ofTerrorist Bombings, December 1997 criminalises anact of using a lethal or explosive device to causephysical or economic injury and obligates states totake measures to deal with terrorist bombings.

Pursuant to these treaties and resolutions, parlia-

ment can invoke its superior and overriding legis-lative power under Article 253 to pass a law pun-ishing acts of terror and create a national agency todeal with acts of terror, even though it intrudesinto the State List. A Constitution Bench of Su-preme Court way back in 1969 inMaganbhai v. Un-ion of India has categorically ruled that a parlia-mentary law pursuant to an international treatycannot be challenged even though it intrudes intothe exclusive legislative domain of the states.

Second, the centre can also create a nationalanti-terror agency without invoking its superiorlegislative power. With some creative constitu-tional thinking, the centre can use its existingpowers to create this institution. The constitutionconfers exclusive legislative domain on the centrewith respect to Arms, firearms, ammunition andexplosives. Since every terrorist act involves theselethal devices, the centre can create an anti-terroragency to investigate and regulate the unlawfuluse of these devices. The Supreme Court of Indiahas invoked the Doctrine of Pith and Substancewhile interpreting legislative entries. This doctrine

mandates that as long as the essence of the law canbe traced back to a legislative entry on which par-liament can legislate, it should be upheld even if itincidentally encroaches on the State List. The cen-

tre can create a national agency which can investi-gate acts of terror by focusing on the use of armsand explosives, even if this intrudes into the statedomain of maintaining public order.

Third, our constitution was drafted on the as-sumption that law and order would be handled by

the state and external defence would be handled by the Union. But inter-state and inter-countrycrimes do not fit into this neat bifurcation since theplace where the criminal plan is hatched, pre-pared, financed and executed do not fall withinone state and even within one country. This is achallenge for the investigating authorities since thestate legislatures are constitutionally precludedfrom passing a law which would be effective be-yond the state boundaries. But parliament suffersfrom no such impediment. A law passed by Par-

liament cannot be challenged even if it operatesoutside the country (Article 245). Therefore, inter-state crimes would not and cannot fall within ex-clusive legislative power of the state. Since there isno other entry in the Seventh Schedule in the con-stitution, it would necessarily come within theambit of the residuary power. Unlike the Ameri-can constitution, the residuary power to framelaws with respect to matters not enumerated in theSeventh Schedule in India has been assigned to thecentre instead of the states (Article 248). The par-liament can certainly invoke this residuary power

to create a federal agency to investigate and prose-cute inter-state crimes like terrorist acts.

The constitution is certainly not an obstacle todeal with terrorism. And on the contrary, it makesa categorical declaration in Article 355 that it shall be the duty of the Union to protect every Stateagainst external aggression and internal distur-bance. Despite such explicit constitutional powerconferred on the centre, the centre still cites theconstitution as an excuse to deal with terrorism. Itis no small irony that the UPA government does

not feel any constitutional constraint when itcomes to invoking Article 356, but suddenly de-velops a respect for the federal character when itcomes to dealing with terrorism. Constitutionalmodesty is not a desirable virtue when the securityof the country is at peril.

Vivek Reddy is a practising lawyer and blogs at Law andOther Things (lawandotherthings.blogspot.com)

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9 No 21 | Dec 2008

Despite explicit constitutional power con-ferred on the centre, the centre still cites theconstitution as an excuse to deal with terror-ism.


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parsed from the statements of Mr Obama and hiskey advisers, his platform with respect to India isnot yet set in stone: the president-elect is still be-ing briefed by US intelligence, his administrationhas not yet tested the resistance offered by agencybureaucracies, nor has he felt the structural limi-

tations imposed by the international system onAmerican foreign policy. There is also the ques-tion of personal dynamics; the appointment ofthe specific individuals to key national securitypositions could alter the tenor of the US-Indiarelationship, for better or for worse.

At the same time, there are several reasons toexpect a period of cooling in bilateral ties. Withthe exception of the US-led wars in Iraq and Af-ghanistan, foreign policy in general is unlikely tobe a high priority for the next administration, and

within foreign policy, India is unlikely to featurein the first, or even second tier of priorities. Inaddition, theObamacampaigns policy team onSouth Asia was remarkably thin on India-specificexpertise, with the larger number of Pakistan andAfghanistan experts somewhat indicative ofwhere the emphasis was being placed in the re-

gion. Mostdisconcertingly, however, Mr Obama'sthink tank appears not to have adopted a strate-gic vision of the US-India relationship. Thismeans each measureevery arms transaction,

every dialogue, every trade agreementwill betreated on its own merits, not as part of a coher-ent whole.

While Mr Obama is by no means anti-Indian,there are several other reasons for India to bewary of hisglobal agenda. First, he has given offmixed signals concerning his commitment to theglobal flow of goods and capital. On the onehand, he has often described himself as an ardentsupporter of globalisation, and appointed cen-trists to key positions in his campaign and transi-tion economic teams. At the same time, he has

been critical of both outsourcing and free tradeagreements. While some of this (such as his at-tacks on NAFTA) can be attributed to what MrObama admitted was "overheated" campaign

rhetoric, his Senate record on these mattershardly inspires confidence, particularly hispublicly-articulated concerns regarding pendingfree trade agreements with Colombia and SouthKorea. With US-India bilateral trade and invest-ment still nowhere near its potential, Mr Obamas

ambiguity might not bode well for India Inc.Second, the burgeoning US-India strategic

partnership under Mr Obama will be based, inpart, on the prisms of third countries. Chiefamong these is China, where his advisers haveindicated broad continuity with the Bush admini-strations approach of hedging.Obamas willing-ness to talk to Irandespite the concerns of sev-eral domestic constituenciesis another welcomesign for New Delhi, as is his rejection of JohnMcCains bellicosity towards Russia. Yet it re-

mains unclear how an Obama administration islikely to approach the thorny issue of Pakistan,especially given its certain prioritisation of thewar in Afghanistan. The liberal interventionistleanings of some of Obama's advisory corpscould also accentuate conflicting positions be-tween the United States and India on Myanmar.

In the context of strategic ties, renewed dip-lomatic interventionism on Kashmir remains an-other significant worry, having already receivedconsiderable attention in the Indian media. Thetheory of a Kashmir solution increasing Paki-

stan's ability to fight militancy on its North-westfrontierhas clearly filtered up to Mr Obama him-self, and to the wider Democratic foreign policycommunity. The focus on Kashmirseem to reflectthe Obama team's obsession with terrorism inPakistan's as the most significant regional secu-rity issue, trumping all others. [See next article]

Climate change, which is a clear priority forthe Democrats, may prove another area of dis-agreement between the United States and India inthe next four years. India has been enthusiasticabout harnessing technological advancements tocurb carbon emissions, but is loath to commit to averifiable regime that places a strict caps, viewingit as a limitation to the country's development.Mr Obama, meanwhile, is likely to pursue exactlythat, having indicated that climate change will beone of his administration's highest priorities.

Finally, despite the culmination of the US-India nuclear agreement in October, non-proliferation will likely continue to bedevil theUS-India relationship. Fears in some quarters thatan Obama administration might attempt to re-

verse the nuclear agreement have been exagger-ated. Although Mr Obama andhis adviserssharescruples about the agreement, the costs of re-bottling the genie unleashed by the Nuclear Sup-

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Obama's think tank appears not to haveadopted a strategic vision of the US-Indiarelationship. This means each meas-ureevery arms transaction, every dia-logue, every trade agreementwill betreated on its own merits, and not as part ofa coherent whole.


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pliers Groups unanimous exemption for Indiawill be too high to overturn. However MrObama, with the co-operation of the Democraticleadership in Congress, is likely to push for theUnited States' ratification of the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty, which will place increased pres-

sure on India to sign. More critically, Mr Obamamay attempt to initiate negotiations towards aglobal, verifiable fissile material cut-off, some-thing which the Indian government will almostcertainly oppose.

US-India interactions over the past decadehave provided a fascinating, and possibly unique,spectacle in recent international politics. Twolarge, vibrant democracies with frequently over-lapping interests have been attempting to forge aco-operative relationship. The key actors in both

states appreciate the goal of a mutually-beneficial

partnership, and have also identified the broadareas for potential co-operation. The real de-batewithin both countries and between themhas been upon what terms that relationshipshould be formed. Should India acquiesce to US-sponsored international norms and institutions?

Or does India's size and allure mean that it de-serves special treatment from Washington? Inother words, how badly does each side need theother, and how far is each willing to go to realisetheir partnership? Barack Obama's election addsa new chapter to the manoeuvring between thetwo states, one in which the expectation by theUnited States will be on India to meet it morethan halfway.

Dhruva Jaishankar is a research assistant in foreign

policy studies at the Brookings Institution.

GLOBAL TERRORISM

The problem is in Pakistan, not Kashmir

The solve Kashmir to solve Afghanistan idea is an old red herring

SUSHANT K SINGH

A FEW days before he won the 2008 US presiden-tial elections, Barack Obama raised not a few hack-les in the subcontinent by revealing that he con-sidered appointing Bill Clinton as a special envoyon Kashmir. After it emerged that Hillary Clintonis the front-runner for the office of secretary ofstate, Henry Kissinger dismissed the idea of MrClintons appointment saying there is a limit tothe number of Clintons you can appoint at onetime.

Now, key officials of the Bush administra-tionfrom the defence secretary to the intelligencechiefnot to mention Mr Obama himself, haveidentified Afghanistan and Pakistan as their top-most priority. However some commentators havetried to deflect the attention from the real is-suePakistans reluctance to act against jihadimilitantsby dragging Kashmir and imaginaryfears of Indian aggression into the debate. The ter-rorist attacks on Mumbai put paid to this theoryby demonstrating how it is the jihadis that are the

true cause of Pakistans insecurities.In a report published in early November, theCenter for American Progress (CAP), a think-tankheaded by John Podesta, co-chairman of theObama transition team, contends that any re-

gional approach must address Pakistan's securityconcerns with India, specifically related toKashmir and Afghanistan. This argument is onlypartially true: it rightly holds that the cause of in-stability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan. But the im-plied corollary that Pakistan needs jihadis to ame-liorate its military handicap vis-a-vis India isfallacious.Pakistani Armys relationship with the jihadis

The root cause of Pakistan indifference to fightingterror is not India, but the institutional interests ofthe Pakistani military establishment. The Pakistaniarmy is unwilling to take on Islamic militantgroups because they have been used to wageproxy wars against India and Afghanistan. Theincontrovertible proof of an ISI hand in the bomb-ing of Indian embassy in Kabul, where the Karzaigovernment is perceived to be close to New Delhi,is testimony to Pakistani armys belief that it canget away with the use of Islamic terrorists for

political and diplomatic purposes.The relationship with the Taliban is part of thePakistani military establishment's "strategicgames." The military brass remains obsessed withthe prospect of Indian domination of Afghanistan

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should US and NATO forces leave the country. TheTaliban are seen as a counterweight to Indian in-fluence and Pakistan wants to hedge its options byturning a blind eye towards the jihadi elements.The Pakistan military establishment nurtured thisrelationship with the jihadis believing that it canmanage the militants, but numerous terrorist inci-dents targeting the armed forces after the stormingof Islamabads Lal Masjid in 2007 suggest that this belief is misplaced. Yet, the feeling in the armysofficer corps, as in the rank-and-file, is to rational-

ise the jihadi fury as wages of Pakistans relation-ship with the US.

Another reason for the tacit Pakistani supportto Islamic militants is to play up the threat of Tali-ban and other jihadi elements for financial gains.This allows the Pakistani military to garner bil-lions of dollars in aid, part of which is then used toimprove conventional military capabilities. The USCongressional Research Service has noted withconcern that a lot of the military assistance has been much more useful for a potential war with

India. A CAP report of July 2008 has assessed that70 percent of US military aid has been misspenton purchasing systems that are inappropriate forthe counterinsurgency struggle.

Indeed, if it panders to purported Pakistaniconcerns over Kashmir and India, the Obama ad-ministration would legitimise, sanction and pro-mote the fraternising of an already radicalisedPakistani army with Islamic militants. On the con-trary, the United States should focus on disabusingIslamabad of its use of terrorism as a diplomaticand military tool. Pakistani society is already be-ginning to be convinced about the dangers of con-tinuing with this dangerous liaison. This is a wel-come development that both the Obama admini-stration and the next Indian government should

seek to reinforce.An Islamised and unprofessional army

Many Western experts have been taken in by theportrayal of the Pakistani army as a modern andprofessional force. This is no longer the case, with

the growing Islamisation of its rank and file. Thisreligious indoctrination of the officers and soldiers,which metastasised in the Zia-ul-Haq era, can beforcefully leveraged by the military leadershipagainst its Hindu enemy, India. However thesenior Pakistani military leadership, despite undertremendous pressure from the United States, findsit difficult to mobilise the army and ISI to actagainst the Taliban and other Islamic militants in-side the country.

The Pakistani army has lost every single war it

has ever fought, and, in periods of military rule, itsrecord has been far from glorious. Moreover, thePakistani army isn't trained for counterinsurgencyoperations. Its record in the counterinsurgencyoperations in tribal areas since 2004 has been pa-thetic. Indeed, the Pakistani army views the battlesit is fighting against the extremists very differentlyfrom Western strategists and policy-makerswiththe sole aim to do as little as possibleonly tomaintain its primacy as the premier instrument ofthe state and to secure its own political and eco-nomic interests.

The incoming Democratic administration mustrecognise the fundamental truth that even if thePakistani army somehow miraculously generatesthe intention to take on the Islamic insurgents in-side its own borders, it no longer has the capabilityto undertake effective counterinsurgency opera-tions. Thus the expediency of placating the Paki-stani army to meet short-term security goals, asopposed to the long-term plans for strengtheningPakistani society, polity and economy, is deeplyflawed and a recipe for another US foreign policy

disaster.The long-term goal of Obama administration totransform Pakistan into a modern, democraticstate can only begin with an unconditional dis-owning of jihadis, religious fundamentalism,commercial interests and political overreach by thePakistani army. In their present state, neither thePakistani army in general nor the ISI in particularcan be a part of any viable short-term or medium-term solution, whereas a long-term solution islargely about dismantling and then recreatingthese institutions from scratch.

MD Nalapat, professor of geopolitics at Mani-pal University, rightly suggests that despite theobvious history, the Pakistan army's desires are been once again sought to be equated with the

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Photo: Keith D McGrew/US Army


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needs of the entire nation. What the army seeksand what Pakistan needs are totally different. Thishyphenation of the army with the people of Paki-stan is the source of many a flawed policy. The in-coming Obama administration must recognise andstay away from this fundamental fallacy.Afghanistan, not Kashmir

The contention that Kashmir lies at the core ofPakistani nationhood and the Pakistani army will brook no changes is an overused notion that hasbeen carried over from the previous century. It haslittle significance in the geopolitics of the twenty-first century and the existing ground realities.

Many previous Democratic administrationshave tried to draw comparisons between Kashmirand the Middle East or Northern Ireland peace

processes. These parallels are not apt as today, nei-ther India nor Pakistan desire outside intervention.In fact, substantial progress has been made in re-cent years as a result of bilateral negotiationsthecurrent back-channel negotiations between Indiaand Pakistan are the first since 1962-63. A US in-tervention will rapidly shrink the domesticpolitical space for India in its negotiations withKashmiri political leaders. In fact, perceptions ofUS prodding could well vitiate the entire spectrumof India-US exchanges, to the detriment of bothsides.

The fact is that Kashmir is no longer the epicen-tre of instability in South Asia. The successful con-duct of assembly elections in Kashmir against thecalls of the separatists is a sign of normalcy thatUS officials in charge of Iraq and Afghanistanwould perhaps give their right arm for. Militancyand infiltration figures have dipped in the state,the ceasefire is holding and initiatives to soften borders in Kashmir by facilitating cross-bordertrade and movement are gaining greater traction.

There is a risk that all these gains will be lost if

the new US administration shifts its focus fromAfghanistan to Kashmir. Hopes of US incentivesbeing offered on Kashmir are bound to encouragethe Pakistan army to harden its stance against thecurrent peace process with India. It will result inthe Pakistani army and its jihadis cohorts control-ling developments on both frontsAfghanistanand Kashmir.

Another related idea that has been recently do-ing the rounds is to assuage Pakistani fears bygarnering an Indian security guarantee underwrit-ten by the United States. Yet, a better guarantee

already exists, implicitly in the deterrence pro-vided by the nuclear weapons. The idea that Paki-stani army is unable to focus on insurgency due to

threats of an Indian aggression is absurd whenthere are nuclear weapons on both sides.

A security guarantee causes a moral hazardproblem. It encourages the Pakistani army to un-dertake another misadventure against India inKashmir, just as a perceived guarantee of interna-

tional intervention factored in Pakistans initiationof wars against India in 1965, 1971 and 1999. Thesame was at play during the recent Georgia-Russiaconflict, which was instigated by the Georgiansacting under the assumption of NATO or EU secu-rity guarantees.

The road ahead

To succeed in Afghanistan, the Obama administra-tion must initiate and see through a comprehen-sive reform of Pakistani army. The economic and

development assistance plan, under the Biden

plan, will be effective only if it is tied to this goal.Otherwise, as Jim Hoagland put it, it will merelyamount to dropping cash from helicopters.

An objective reading of the subcontinents geo-political reality suggests that Indian and US inter-ests are closely aligned over Afghanistan. TheObama administration should court greater Indiansupport in Afghanistan, including facilitation of a

co-operative relationship with Iran (which pro-vides an alternative land corridor to Afghanistan).Kashmir is a red herring which could derail aemerging India-US strategic partnership. Finally, ifthe US does not keep India on its side in Afghani-stan, then who has it left?

Sushant K Singh is a resident commentator on the In-dian National Interest.

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Despite the obvious history, the Pakistanarmy's desires are been once again sought tobe equated with the needs of the entire na-tion. What the army seeks and what Pakistanneeds are totally different. This hyphenationof the army with the people of Pakistan is the

source of many a flawed policy.


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NUCLEAR ENERGY

Joining the nuclear renaissance

How it looks to a man from Mars

DAN YURMAN

IN OCTOBER 2008 India's relationship with theglobal nuclear industry changed fundamentally

after the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the in-ternational body that controls commerce in ura-nium for nuclear reactors, agreed for the first timeto allow India to acquire nuclear fuel for its civil-ian reactors. In a closely linked event, the US Sen-ate voted 86-13 to allow US firms to export nuclearfuel and technology to India.

These two events have created tremendous op-portunities for India to open the door to interna-tional investments in new nuclear energy infra-structure. Building a nuclear energy industry in

India to support 20-40 GW of new power over thenext two to three decades will take every bit ofingenuity and wisdom the nation can muster. It'smore than a moon shot. It is a trip to Mars.

Until October, India had lived for more thanthree decades outside the Nuclear Non-

proliferation Treaty (NPT). This status severelylimited its ability to get nuclear fuel for its in-stalled base of less than 4 GW of nuclear power.None of its plants are larger than 500 MW, all areolder and less efficient than current designs, andsome have operated at half capacity, or even closeddown, due to fuel shortages.

On a recent visit to India, Hugh MacDiarmid,chief executive officer of AECL, a Canadian nu-clear technology company, told the Globe & Mailthat India's history of isolation meant it has not

kept pace with western nuclear technology. Indiahas also paid a price with rapid increases in fossilfueled plants and accompanying air pollution aswell as greenhouse gases.

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Photo:RonParker


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The nuclear renaissance

What will India's nuclear energy program looklike a decade from now and what must it do tocapitalise on tremendous opportunities to buildand operate a dozen or more new nuclear powerplants? To answer this question, it is useful to take

the point of view of a metaphorical 'Man fromMars'.

The first thing he will see is that there has beena world-wide nuclear renaissance in which coun-tries as close as China and as far away as theUnited States are reviving the nuclear energy in-dustry as an answer to the global warming crisis.

For instance, in the past year China hassigneddeals for two giant Areva European PressurisedReactors (EPRs), four Westinghouse AP1000 Pres-surised Water Reactors (PWRs) andtwo new reac-tors of Russian design.

It has also built

new capabilities in uranium enrichment and developed

plans for spent fuel reprocessing.In the United States there has been a rush of

applications for licenses at the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission for projects worth at least $120 bil-lion. In Europe two 1,600 MW Areva EPRs are un-der construction with one, the plant at Flaman-ville, scheduled to enter revenue service in 2012.

The Man from Mars may conclude that India isnow ready to join this renaissance.

Sceptics warn of 'hype' about nuclear energyNot everyone agrees with that thisrosy view ap-plies to India's case. Michael Krepon of the HenryStimson Center, a US non-proliferation think tank believes that the promise of big dollars for newnuclear power stations is "pure fantasy." BrahmaChellaney, a professor of strategic studies at theNew Delhi Centre for Policy Research agrees,be-lieving that "from a commercial energystandpoint,...will turn out to be more hype thanreality."

Full steam ahead for a fresh start

How would our Man from Mars apply these con-flicting observations to India? Is it just hype? ForIndia, now that the doors to uranium imports havebeen flung open, the country is likely to push fullsteam ahead to join the global nuclear renaissanceto power its economy and reduce its greenhousegas emissions. Looking at India's small, frag-mented, and government-controlled nuclear en-ergy industry, the key question is, "what must In-dia do to get a fresh start with nuclear energy?"

According to an October 2008 assessment at theWorld Nuclear Organisation, India has set a nu-clear power development target of 40 GW over thenext several decades. To achieve this objective, the

Man from Mars would set out the followingagenda:

Nuclear reactors. To get to 40 GW of nuclearpower over the next 40 years, India could take apage from China's playbook. It could negotiatewith international reactor vendors to transfer de-

sign information, via licensing and fee payments,to develop an indigenous reactor. Both Westing-house and Areva have made deals with China, tovarying degrees,along these lines. China is devel-oping a localised design of the WestinghouseAP1000.

A standard design of 1,000 MW for India willyield huge efficiencies in terms of quickly traininga workforce, maintenance, and most importantly,construction of economies of scale for long leadtime reactor components. A standard design will

also lower the cost per unit after the first two orthree are built as a result of on-the-job learningthat will take place with engineering procurementcontractors. For an example of how this works,India should study Southwest Airlines in its singu-

lar use of the Boeing 737 aircraft for all revenueservice.

Nuclear fuel. One of the chief concerns of theNSG is that India not develop domestic uraniumenrichment capabilities because of the obvious

implications for destabilising its relationships withPakistan and China. It is also a concern for theprecedent it would set with the West in attemptingto control Iran's rush to develop nuclear weapons.India will need to import finished nuclear fuel forthe current and future nuclear reactors that it as-signs for civilian use. This will be costly, but thereis a way to pay for it from the back end of the nu-clear fuel cycle.

Trained workforce. It takes time to train nuclearreactor operators. It takes even more time to trainnuclear engineers. One of the strategies adopted

by South Africa in its drive for a new nuclear buildof 20 GW is that it is requiring international reactorvendors bidding on these contracts to include intheir bids training of local workers to build and

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India's entry into the global nuclear renais-sance is certainlya big deal.But the chal-lenges and opportunities that await the na-tion will take decades to work themselvesout.


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for new nuclear power plants and sharing the benefits of electricity generation across the socialand economic spectrum.

There are undoubtedly other significant barri-ers, but these issues will likely make anyone'sshort list. India will need to address them, and

soon, to move quickly down the road toward itsgoals.On the road to a renaissance

To its credit India's political leadership has wastedno time hitting the road to promote co-operationfor nuclear infrastructure development. India hassigned bilateral agreements with France, Rus-sia,and other nations, and held talks to buy ura-nium from diverse nations including South Africaand Brazil.

In the United States, Westinghouse has men-tioned that

it hopes to sell $5-7 billion in nu-clearfuel, components, and servicesto India in the

near term. In November, India closed a deal withRussia's RosAtom to build four 1,000 MW Water-Water Energetic Reactors (WWER/VVER) reactorsat Kudankulam.

Also in November, a high level US delegationincluding US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionChairman Dale Klein, met the Prime Minis-ter's special envoy Shyam Saran. Mr Klein alsometmembers of India's nuclear establishment and

committed to quick reviews of applications forexport licenses from US nuclear firms seeking todo business in India.

An American trade delegation is planning atrip in December in pursuit of $175 billion in newnuclear business over the next two decades. Ron

Somers, the group's director, believesthat India'sentry into the nuclear renaissance, "is one of thosehistoric, important, tectonic shifts in relations withanother country."

India's entry into the global nuclear renaissanceis certainlya big deal.But the challenges and op-portunities that await the nation will take decadesto work themselves out.

Politicians are well known for visions limitedtothe next election, while the nation building pro-gram for nuclear energycould span more than onelifetime. The hope is India will have a few Menfrom Mars coming around to keep things on track.The last advice the 'Man from Mars' has for Indiais: "Don't try to do everything yourself. Get helpfrom the global nuclear industry. Use it wisely, anduse it in peace."

Dan Yurman blogs on nuclear energy at Idaho Samizdat(djysrv.blogspot.com) and has extensively covered theNSGs deliberations on Indias nuclear programme.

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For daily analysis, commentary and discussions. Visit our blogs

For everything on the Indian National Interest visit http://www.nationalinterest.in/


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actly that.However, the Indian leadership has in recent

times given an impression that the role it sees forIndia in global security is not shaped by its ownassessment of its interests and values but rather bythe judgements of global institutions like the UN.

The Indian armed forces remain concerned withChina and Pakistan while the civilian leadershiplacks any substantive and sophisticated under-standing of the role of force in foreign and securitypolicy.

Military power, more often than not, affects thesuccess with which other instruments of state-craftare employed as it always lurks in the backgroundof inter-state relations, even when nations are atpeace with each other. Military power remainscentral to the course of international politics as

force retains its role as the final arbiter amongstates in an anarchical international system. Statesmay not always need to resort to the actual use offorce but military power vitally affects the mannerin which states deal with each other even duringpeace time despite what the protagonists ofglobalisation and international institutions mightclaim.

A states diplomatic posture will lack effective-ness if it is not backed by a credible militaryposture. In the words of Thomas Schelling, Likethe threat of a strike in industrial relations, the

threat of divorce in a family dispute, or the threatof bolting the party at a political convention, thethreat of violence continuously circumscribes in-ternational politics. Even in the age of nuclearweapons, contrary to suggestions in some quartersthat the utility of force has declined, military strat-egy has merely morphed into the art of coercion, ofintimidation, a contest of nerves and risk-takingand what has been termed as the diplomacy ofviolence.

Such diplomacy of violence, however, has been

systematically factored out of Indian foreign policyand national security matrix with the resultingambiguity about Indias ability to withstand majorthreats of the future. Few nations face the kind ofsecurity challenges that confront India. Yet, sinceindependence, military power was never seen as acentral instrument in the achievement of Indiannational priorities, with the tendency of Indianpolitical elites to downplay its importance. Eventhough the policy-makers themselves had littleknowledge of critical defence issues, the armedforces had little or no role in the formulation of

defence policy till 1962. Divorcing foreign policyfrom military power was a recipe for disaster asIndia realised in 1962 when even Nehru wasforced to concede that military weakness has

been a temptation, and a little military strengthmay be a deterrent. A states legitimacy is tied toits ability to monopolise the use of force and oper-ate effectively in an international strategic envi-ronment and India had lacked clarity on this rela-tionship between the use of force and its foreign

policy priorities.A lot of attention is being paid to the fact that

India will be spending around $40 billion on mili-tary modernisation in the next five years and is buying military hardwaresuch as C-130 trans-port planes, airborne refuelling tankers, and air-craft carriersuseful for projection of power far beyond its shores. But such purchases in and ofthemselves does not imply a clear sense of pur-pose. Indian armed forces are today operating in astrategic void under a weak leadership unable to

fully comprehend the changing strategic and op-erational milieu. At a time when Indian interests

are becoming global in nature, India cannot con-tinue with its moribund approach of yore. It is upto the civilian leadership to come up with a credi-ble policy on the use of armed forces and it is up tothe military leadership to provide them soundguidance.

India has always been a nation of great ambi-tion but today more than ever it needs to answer

the question: What is the purpose behind its ambi-tion? India wants to rise, but what for? Its notclear if Indias political elite understand the impli-cations of their nations rise. India can no longerafford to sit on the sidelines of unfolding globalevents that impinge directly on vital Indian inter-ests.

Harsh V Pant teaches at Kings College London.

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Military power remains central to the course ofinternational politics as force retains its role asthe final arbiter among states in an anarchicalinternational system. A states diplomatic pos-ture will lack effectiveness if it is not backed by

a credible military posture.


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THE MIDDLE EAST

Qatar compact

A quiet arrangement in the Middle EastSUSHANT K SINGH

DURING MANMOHAN Singhs visit to Qatar inthe first week of November, the two countriessigned a defence co-operation pact. One Indianofficial labelled the agreementon joint trainingexercises, training of personnel and maritime co-operationas just short of stationing troops (inthe region). This agreement is the only one of thekind that India has signed with any country.

To be sure, Qatar joins a list of countries withwhich India has signed defence co-operationagreements in recent yearsUnited States, UnitedKingdom, France, South Africa, Australia, Singa-pore, Germany and Japan. It is, however, the firstcountry in the Middle East to sign such a pact withIndia.

Qatar has a large body of US troops stationedon its soil but it had been pursuing this deal withIndia since 2005. This agreement means that India

has committed to protect Qatars considerableeconomic and geopolitical assetsoil & gas fieldsand sea lanesif the need arises. India and Qatarhad earlier agreed in June 2007 to jointly produceweapons and military equipment. This defence co-operation pact signed now will pave the way forjoint production of weapons at Indian facilities.

Qatars geostrategic importance

Qatar is of immense strategic importance due to itsown enormous energy reserves and its geographi-cal location in central Persian Gulf near major pe-

troleum reserves. Its neighbourhood comprises ofstates that contribute to its insecurity, notwith-standing the presence of a large US base on its soil.It is from this Al Udeid basewhere the opera-

tional headquarters of US Central Command werelocated during the Second Gulf Warthat the USmonitors a potentially-nuclear Iran, an unstableIraq and Chinas growing footprint in the region,especially activity in the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

Qatar is the richest country in the world byWorld Bank per-capita estimates. Al Jazeera, whichis based in and backed by Qatar, has ruffled manyfeathers in the region with its unique brand oflively reportage and critical commentary not onlyof Israel and the United States, but many Islamicregimes including Saudi Arabia.

Qatar has had a vexed relationship with theUnited States in the recent past. Relations took anosedive over the issue of Al Jazeera. The UnitedStates felt that Al Jazeera was promoting radicalviewpoints and supporting terrorism. FollowingHamass election victory in 2006, Qatar publicly

rebuked the United States for working to under-mine the results of the democratic process in Pales-tine. As host of the annual summit of Gulf Arableaders this year, Doha invited the Iranian presi-dent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to attend. The rela-tions soured further when the United States foundit difficult to convince Qatar to support the Ameri-can position on some sensitive issues during thelatters tenure as a member of the UN SecurityCouncil. However, there are signs that the ties be-tween Qatar and the United States are again

warming up.The difficult relationship between Qatar andSaudi Arabia has also been repaired in the recentmonths. Besides objections to the portrayal of theSaudi royal family by Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia hadearlier also taken offence at Qatars relationshipwith Israel. Qatar, on the eve of accepting thechairmanship of the Organisation of Islamic Con-ference (OIC) in November 2000, closed the Israelitrade office in Doha. Many observers have notedthat Saudi Arabia also did not like the special se-curity relationship Qatar had developed with the

United States. It meant that the United States hadacquired more flexibility for launching militaryoperations in the region, thereby underminingSaudi Arabias key strategic importance in the re-

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With India and China emerging as a major con-ituents of the global energy market, the India-

Qatar pact is the first step in redesigning thenergy security architecture in Asia.


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gion. However, a three-day visit of the SaudiCrown Prince to Doha earlier this year has sug-gested a normalisation of relations between Qatarand Saudis.

Redesigning the energy security architecture

Qatar, with the third-largest reserves of natural gas

in the world, has identified India as a big marketfor its natural gas. RasGas of Qatar signed a 25-year deal for shipping 7.5 million tonnes of lique-fied natural gas (LNG) annually to terminals inDahej, Gujarat and in Kochi, Kerala. The ex-shipprice of $2.53 per million British thermal unit(mmBtu) is considered a steal in current timeswhen LNG prices are breaching $20 per mmBtu.Earlier, Qatar had rescued India by supplying 1.5million tonnes of more LNG on a short-term con-tract basis to recommence the beleaguered Dabhol

power plant in Maharashtra, when other nationssought to review gas prices following an increasein price of crude oil.

India has a distinct stake in the Middle East,particularly in the Gulf region because nearly two-thirds of its energy imports originate from thisarea, and India meets nearly 80 percent of its oildemands from imports. Moreover, as India (alongwith China) constitutes the leading component ofAsian demand from the region, it becomes an im-portant destination for the Gulf countries too.

In fact, the shift of global energy trade towards

Asian economies has its own geostrategic implica-tions as energy relations, despite being shaped bymarkets, continue to be driven by geopolitical con-cerns. Nearly 15 percent of the worlds super

tanker capacity transits from the Gulf to SouthEast Asia. The United States has been the custo-dian of the energy security regime in the region sofar. With India and China emerging as a majorconstituents of the global energy market, the India-Qatar pact is the first step in redesigning the en-ergy security architecture in Asia.

The maritime co-operation agreement providesIndia with a strategic naval base in the Gulf region.The US-led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150) iscurrently the dominant naval presence in the areasurrounding the Gulf of Aden. It includes the US,UK, France, Germany, Australia and Pakistan, andoperates from bases in Djibouti and Bahrain.

The maritime security initiative will provideIndia and Qatar with a capacity to counter mari-time threats against their commercial interests.India, with a bigger and stronger navy, will have a

dominant role to play in mobilising responsesagainst risks associated with energy transactions,be it safety of trade routes or repelling attacks byterrorists. This is a clear declaration of the Indianintent to be the pre-eminent power between thePersian Gulf and the Malacca Strait.

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The India-Qatar agreement chal-lenges the argument that Washing-ton was furthering its relations with

New Delhi only to use India as acountervailing force to a risingChina.

Photo:RichardMessenger


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Juggling and aligningAfter a similar pact with Japan a few months ago,Indias signing of a defence pact with Qatar is in-dicative of the growing comfort levels between theUnited States and India. Both these pacts withstaunch US allies could not have been signed

without Washingtons tacit support. Unlike thepact with Japan, which was perceived by many asa US scheme of an India-Japan alliance to strategi-cally contain China, the India-Qatar pact is lessrelated to China. It challenges the argument thatWashington was furthering its relations with NewDelhi only to use India as a countervailing force toa rising China.

Interestingly, this pact not only provides anopportunity for greater military co-operation be-tween India and the US but also indicates a closer

conjunction of their strategic interests in the re-gion. The greater Indian naval presence in the Gulfwill provide the US the freedom to shift its mili-tary focus to its highest priority areasAfghani-stan and Pakistan.

However there is a big downside to the India-Qatar pact. Indias relationship with Iran, whichhad weakened considerably after the Indian voteagainst Iran at the IAEA, has now hit a nadir. NewDelhi needs to deftly navigate the relationship

with Iran, despite the robust growth of its ties withthe US on a parallel track.

The most visible effort that India can make tosignal the revival of its strong ties with Iran is toresume serious discussions purchasing naturalgas. An improved relationship with Iran would

allow India to align its geostrategic interests withthose of Iran, as well as the United States, in stabi-lising Afghanistan.

Many experts have identified the strengtheningof the links between the Gulf and India as one ofthe most important trends in international geopoli-tics today. India has legitimate interests in ensur-ing regions security. It is essential for New Delhito invest not just in economic relations but also insecurity co-operation with countries in the region.The India-Qatar security pact is a beginning in the

right direction.

Sushant K Singh is a resident commentator on The In-dian National Interest.

BANGLADESH

Another restoration of democracy

Towards meaningful democracy or back to confrontational politics?

PLABAN MAHMUD

BANGLADESH IS at a critical juncture as it walkstowards the long awaited election in Decemberwhich is expected to put democracy back on track.The military-backed caretaker government iscommitted to hold the electionby end-2008 (thereis also a court order ordering them to) but therewas much uncertainty whether all parties wouldparticipate. While most of the parties are preparedto contest the election, the Bangladesh NationalistParty (BNP) and its coalition partner Jamaat-e-Islamihas allegedthat Election Commission (EC)has deprived themof a level playing field.Bangladeshi democracy hadsuffered a derail-ment on 11th January 2007 (referred to as 1/11)when a parliamentary election under a non-partisan caretaker government was cancelled and

a military backed government took power. A stateof emergency was declared and elections were de-ferred.

But what led to this situation? 2001-2006 wasBNP's second term in power after parliamentarydemocracy was reinstated in 1991. Most of the par-liamentary sessions were boycotted by the opposi-tion Awami League (AL), making them ineffective.The Awami League complained that because BNPand its alliance hada majority, most of the opposi-tion demands were either ignored or sidelined.

Meanwhile, the country reeled under constantstrikes and political acrimony.

The era saw the rise of fundamentalist forces,who received political backing. There were many bomb attacks, reaching its peak in 2005. On 21st

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August 2004 , grenades were thrownat an AwamiLeague rally targeting Mrs Hasina. Twenty-onepeople were killed, including Ivy Rahman, theparty's secretaryfor women affairs.Awami Leagueleaders like former finance minister Shah AMS

Kibria and Ahsanullah Master wereassassinated.

The Awami League alleged a long term plan of theKhaleda-Nizami led BNP-Jamaat government toannihilate its leadership. Investigations into the-se assassinations were politically compromised.The caretaker government filed charges against 22persons including top Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami(HUJI) leader Mufti Abdul Hannan and BNPleader and former deputy minister Abdus SalamPintu.

The fact that the attackers had held two meet-ings at the BNP minister's residence to take a deci-

sion about the attackproves that a section of BNPwas involved in the assassinations. Towards theend of the BNP coalition tenure, the governmenttried to ensure its re-election bypoliticising all im-portant government posts.

It is alleged that the main players behind the 1/11 bloodless coup were a mixture of some localintellectuals and ambassadors of some foreigncountries. They facilitated the change of govern-ment usingthe armed forcesto prevent the coun-try's descent into chaos, with the Awami Leagueboycotting the election,

accusing the BNP's set-upofengineering the elections.At the same time the

kingmakers couldrestrain the armywith the threatthat lucrative UN mission jobs would disappearifthere was as military dictatorship.

The new caretaker government took somepopulist measures like cracking down on politi-cians on charges of corruption. The revampedanti-corruption commission has investigated and brought hundreds of charges against politicians,

businessmen and bureaucrats. Some of them werearrested, tried, and convicted.A big step wastakento cleanse the election process of corruption. Anew national ID-card cum voter-ID project wasinitiated.

But its measures were not free of controversy.Most of the arrests were made under the emer-gency act, without charges. Proper investigationand charges against the accusedwould have beenmore effective in securing convictions. In theevent, manyof the arrestedfound their way out ofthe jails after the judicial process.

The caretakers also tried to reform the mainpolitical parties. Their much criticised 'minus twotheory' was to keep the two begums out of theleaderships of the main two parties. Former primeministers Khaleda Zia and Mrs Hasina were ar-rested on different politically motivated chargesand detained. Family members and relatives ofboth the members were also put behind bars. But because of protests and their own resilience, thegovernment was forced to release themon bail.

The Awami League is now in the position theDemocrats were in during the US elections

in No-vember. People want to see a change of govern-

ment. Some believe that General Moeen U Ahmed,the army chief, supports the League. The AwamiLeague leaders, however, may be overconfident

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about their prospects and have not vigourouslycountered BNP propaganda.

Meanwhile many pro-BNP and Jamaati sup-porters are alleging a conspiracy to bring theAwami League to power. Redrawing the constitu-encies according to demography by the Election

Commission has affected the BNP adversely. Therevised Representation of People Ordinance (RPO)2008 enacted by the caretaker government barsthose individuals who have defaulted on utility

bills, have been convicted or are war criminals;from standing for elections. The BNP and the Ja-maat are vehemently opposing it because some oftheir potential candidates will be disqualified. Themain problem of the BNP is that most of its top

leaders are either behind bars on corruptioncharges or are on the run. Sources of their wealthare in question, their bank accounts frozen or un-der scrutiny by the government, and they willneedtime to clearthe mess. There are feuds withinthe party structure in almost all local divisions.Many of their leaders are not hopeful of winning.Leave alonea majority, they are not sure whetherthey will be able toform astrong opposition. In-deed, they are not even sure of their ability to postenough strong candidates in 300 seats across the

country.This is where BNP's coalition partner Jamaat-e-

Islami comes into the picture. In the recent years ithas gained poise and strength when most of the

leaders of BNP and Awami League were reel-ingunder charges of corruption. It is now bargain-ing with BNP to post at least 100 candidates for thecoalition and if it wins most of those seats, the coa-lition will move to the far-right.

The other players in the political field, like the

former dictator Hussein Mohammed Ershad's Ja-tiyo party, and ex-president, veteran ex-BNPleader Badruddoza Chowdhury's Bikalpa Dhara orKamal Hossain's Gono forum are not seen as alter-nativesto those three main political parties.

The BNP,having realised that they have no op-tion but to participate in the election, proposedthat if electionwas deferred for 10 days to Decem- ber 28th and their three point demands are metthen they will participate. Their three points in-clude abrogationof Section 91E of RPO act whichstates that Election Commission can cancel thecandidature of anyone who, on investigation, isfound violating the electoral code of conduct.These measures had been put in place to add moreteeth to the hitherto un-enforced code of conduct.

The Election Commission acceded to the de-mands. It announced that the general elec-tionwould be postponed to December 29th. Thedate for submission of nomination papers was alsoextended giving the undecided parties some moretime to prepare for the election. The governmenthad no other option: for if the BNP and the Jamaat

did not take part in the election thenstrikes andviolence would returnto the streets of Bangladesh,makingthe incumbent government dysfunctional.

So what future awaits Bangladesh? Will thevoters allow these two begums to regain the con-trol of Bangladesh politics? Will Bangladeshis beable to disengage from the confrontational andpolarised politics of Bangladesh? The final deci-sion, wonderfully, lies in the hands of the voters.

Plaban Mahmud is a EU-based commentator on Bangla-deshi current affairs.

ROUNDUP

25 No 21 | Dec 2008

Some believe that the army chief supports theAwami League. The Awami League leaders,however, may be overconfident about their

prospects. The BNP is in a disarray and thereis a chance that Jamaat-e-Islami will move thecoalition to the far-right.


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REVIEW

The state of the FATWAT

How Pakistan has fared as a Frontline Ally in The War Against Terror

SALIL TRIPATHI

IT MAY seem incredibly arro-gant to wonder about Paki-

stan's fate when the city ofmy birththe one I still callBombayis in flames. Butsuch is my task as I reflect ontwo recent books about Paki-stanmy former colleagueAhmed Rashid's book, De-scent Into Chaos , which is anaccount of the post-9/11 his-tory of Afghanistan and Paki-stan, and The Duel, Tariq Ali'spolemical take on the state of

Pakistan, in particular its rela-tions with the United States.

Pakistanis have some justification in wonderingat the apparently disproportionate attention: why

does an attack on theirpremier hotelthe Marri-

ott in Islamabad in Sep-temberlead people toquestion Pakistan's future,when a similar attack onthe Taj Mahal Hotel inBombay in late Novem- berdoes not provokesuch a reaction about In-dia. Is it due to a bias? Orsmugness?Mr Ali's book offers someanswers. While he is not a

fan of India's democrats,he values its democracy. He recognises early, thatunlike Pakistan's leaders, India's founding fathershad earned the credibility of the masses by leading

BOOKS


Review

Descent into Chaos

by Ahmed RashidViking, 484 pages, 2008

Photo:MuzaffarBukhari

Review

The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Pathof American Power

by Tariq AliScribner, 304 pages, 2008


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the country's freedom struggle. They went to jail,and in the eyes of millions of Indians, they wereheroes. In contrast, Pakistan's leaders had notearned such adoration from the people, and as MrAli points out, few had a coherent idea of what afaith-based nation-state might look like. (Some

wanted separation in order to avoid being domi-nated by Hindu businessmen; others had notthought through the impact of Muslim migrantswho would come from India.) And because theyhad no mass base, it became easy for the militaryto intervene whenever it willed. The result is a de-based polity.

An unaccountable military was able to divertresources to its uses, and the venality and corrup-tion of its civilian leaders made many Pakistanishanker for the firm rule of the army. With neither

the military nor the politicians able to provide amoral core, many Pakistanis turned to the peopleMr Ali refers to as "bearded lunatics", or funda-mentalists. The result has been catastrophic dys-functionality.

And that dysfunctional nature is responsiblefor the chaos that prevails over Pakistan's western

border. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979gave some Pakistani generals the access and

power they had not dreamt ofof being able todictate events way beyond their borders, drivingin "unmarked cars" and armed with "a packet ofDunhill", as the novelist Mohammed Haneefmemorably describes Pakistan's ISI. Some feltproud in creating a genie they'd hopefully tame the Talibanthe others delighted in being "pin-upgenerals" from Leavenworth, as Mr Ali describesthem.

Mr Rashid does not forecast a break-up of Paki-stan, but the future he describes is bleak. Mr Alihas been forecasting Pakistan's break-up for a long

time nowsince the 1980s, when after the separa-tion of Bangladesh, he asked: Can Pakistan Survive?(For those sins, his books were banned in Paki-stan). Not daunted by that, he has continued to

raise questions about Pakistan's future, challeng-ing the government and exposing its follies.

Mr Ali has been a left-wing activist, a provoca-tive columnist and a muckraking writer whowrites with lan and conviction. Well-connected inPakistan, he is able to report intimate conversa-

tions with several Pakistani politicians, includingthe Bhuttos. While an admirer of Zulfiqar Ali'searly radicalism and Benazir's bravery, he is dis-mayed by the father's cynicism and the daughter'sfailure to distance herself from her husband.

But Mr Ali is angrier with the moustachioedmen in khaki who never let democracy prevail inPakistan. Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, ZiaUl-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf together ruledPakistan for 34 of its 60 years and militarised thesociety. Defence budgets were no longer scruti-

nised, and resources were diverted for the militaryeven as illiteracy rose and inequality widened.At its founding, Mohammed Ali Jinnah wanted

a different Pakistan. Speaking to the ConstituentAssembly in 1947, Jinnah told his new nation: "Youare free to go to your temples, you are free to go toyour mosques or to any other place of worship inthis State of Pakistan. You may belong to any relig-ion or caste or creed that has nothing to do withthe business of the State... you will find that incourse of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus andMuslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the relig-

ious sense, because that is the personal faith ofeach individual, but in the political sense as citi-zens of the State." (In Mr Ali's book, though, evenJinnah does not come off too well).

Mr Ali doubts if such a Pakistan is possible. Hisquestion now is: Can Pakistan be recycled?

But that is not easy, given the mayhem alongthe western front, as Mr Rashid reminds us. With-out Mr Ali's rhetoric, Mr Rashid shows howAmerican interests have unduly influenced Paki-stan's leaders, and decisions America has made

has had far-reaching consequences in Pakistan. Tobe fair, he does not blame President Bush for all ofPakistan's contemporary problemsrather, he re-minds us of some of the neglect during PresidentClinton's time in the White House. Mr Clinton didnot have a coherent strategy in dealing with Paki-stan or the Taliban, he says. But the Bush Admin-istrationand in particular, the Rumsfeld Penta-gondoes not escape blame. Mr Rumsfeld en-abled the warlords to re-enter politics; he blockedmore troops or more aid from reaching Afghani-stan, because that great diversionIraqdomi-

nated his thinking.Mr Rashid wants more western engagement in

Afghanistanmoney, aid, weapons, soldiers. Andhe fears that it will fall off the map, one more time.

BOOKS

27 No 21 | Dec 2008

Ahmed Rashid would like the United States to

ntervene in Kashmir and act as an envoy. Thedesirability of such an initiative apart, it is lessikely now, if only because India's strategic im-portance has grown, and containing India isno longer in American interests.


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Pragati Issue 21 Dec2008

Documents

Transcript of Pragati Issue 21 Dec2008