PR-1246 - Emergency Procedure Part III, Contingency Plans ...

Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

Emergency Response Document

Part III Contingency Plan

Volume 14: Government Gas System

Document ID PR-1246

Document Type Procedure

Security Unrestricted

Discipline Government Gas Operation

Owner Government Gas Operation Manager (GGO)

Issue Date June 2013

Version 10.0

This page was intentionally left blank

Keywords: This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior written consent of the owner.

Petroleum Development Oman LLC Revision:10.0Effective: June 13

Authorised For Issue June, 2013

Version 10.0

June, 2013

Revision Record:

Version No. Date Custodian Scope / Remarks

Rev 6 June 99 GGO/2 Post - Asset Management update

Rev 7 July 2003 GGO/1 Updated to reflect changes in responsibilities due to re-organisation and OGC taking over part of GGS lines. Some changes in Technical content and emergency materials.

Rev 8 Mar 2006 GGO/61 Update to incorporate new changes in the organisation, telephone numbers and add new assets.

Rev 9 Nov 2008 GGO/61 Updated to reflect changes in organisation add new facilities and update telephone numbers.

Rev 10 June 2013 GGO/61 Updated to reflect changes in organisation add new facilities and update telephone numbers.

Reviewed By:

Terminology:In the documents of the PDO Emergency Response Management System the following words are used to express the level of requirement for actions described within the text:

Shall, Will : Means mandatory. Such actions must be followed

Should : Means strongly recommended

May : Means acceptable and to be considered

Government Gas System Emergency Response Procedure Printed 04/07/13

The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.


Distribution Target Audience

This document is available in Livelink. If you do not have access to Livelink contact GGO/61 to obtain a copy. The following staff will receive hard copies:

GGO, GGO/6 & GGO/61 UIC/4 & UIC GGE/3 LECC’s via Production Co-ordinators Corporate Emergency Control Centre (CECC) via UIC

Nominated Government Gas Adviser(s) (GGA)List of nominated GGA can be obtained from UIC/42.




Contents1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................7

1.1 Objectives of the Emergency Response Management System...............................................................................71.2 Purpose of the Document.......................................................................................................................................71.3 Scope......................................................................................................................................................................71.4 Structure of this Document.....................................................................................................................................71.5 Document Ownership and Maintenance.................................................................................................................81.6 Review and Update.................................................................................................................................................8

2 Emergency Procedure..................................................................................................................................................92.1 PDO Emergency Response.....................................................................................................................................9

2.1.1 Additional Instructions for GGS Emergencies...............................................................................................92.2 Strategy for Gas Pipelines Failures........................................................................................................................92.3 Area Safeguarding and Access Control..................................................................................................................9

2.3.1 Locating the Site of the Leak..........................................................................................................................92.3.2 Gas Testing & Area Isolation.......................................................................................................................102.3.3 Emergency Site Communications................................................................................................................102.3.4 Leak Isolation...............................................................................................................................................102.3.5 Emergency Equipment.................................................................................................................................102.3.6 Emergency Material.....................................................................................................................................11

2.4 Assessment of Leaks............................................................................................................................................112.5 Stand Down of the Emergency Team...................................................................................................................112.6 Contingency Scenarios.........................................................................................................................................11

2.6.1 Failure with No Gas Release........................................................................................................................112.6.2 Failure with Gas Release..............................................................................................................................12

2.7 Risk Assessment...................................................................................................................................................122.7.1 People...........................................................................................................................................................122.7.2 Environment.................................................................................................................................................122.7.3 Assets............................................................................................................................................................122.7.4 Supply...........................................................................................................................................................13

3 Government Gas System Technical Details.............................................................................................................153.1 Overview of Government Gas Operations...........................................................................................................153.2 Assets....................................................................................................................................................................15

3.2.1 Pipelines........................................................................................................................................................153.2.2 Block Valve Stations (BVS).........................................................................................................................16

3.3 Pipeline Technical Data........................................................................................................................................173.3.1 Pipeline Operating Data................................................................................................................................173.3.2 Distance, vol and max gas content between Block Valve Stations on 48” Pipeline....................................18

3.4 Gas Consumers.....................................................................................................................................................193.5 Service Contracts..................................................................................................................................................19

4 Emergency Repairs.....................................................................................................................................................234.1 System Preparation...............................................................................................................................................23

4.1.1 Line Isolation and Depressurisation.............................................................................................................234.1.2 Line Degassing.............................................................................................................................................23

4.2 Repair Methods.....................................................................................................................................................234.2.1 Temporary Repairs.......................................................................................................................................234.2.2 Permanent Repairs........................................................................................................................................244.2.3 Hot Tapping and Stoppling...........................................................................................................................244.2.4 Outline Procedure for In Line Block Valve Removal..................................................................................254.2.5 Outline Procedure for In Line Pipe Spool Removal.....................................................................................264.2.6 Line Re-Commissioning...............................................................................................................................28

5 Business Resumption Plan.........................................................................................................................................295.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................295.2 Objectives.............................................................................................................................................................295.3 Action Plan...........................................................................................................................................................295.4 Business Resumption Process..............................................................................................................................30

6 APPENDICES.............................................................................................................................................................326.1 Abbreviations........................................................................................................................................................326.2 Emergency Telephone Numbers GGS.................................................................................................................336.3 User Feedback......................................................................................................................................................35




Tables and FiguresTable 1: Hazardous Areas vs. Leak Rates....................................................................................................................14Table 2: Gas Pipelines Operating Data.........................................................................................................................17Table 3: Volumes between BV’s, 48” QA to Sur Line................................................................................................18Table 4: Gas Customers................................................................................................................................................19Figure 1: Emergency Demarcation Points....................................................................................................................20Figure 2: Schematic of Gas Distribution System in Oman..........................................................................................21Figure 4.2.4a Installing Pressure Testing Flange for Inline BV Removal...................................................................25Figure 4.2.4b Install Bypass for Inline BV Removal...................................................................................................26Figure 4.2.4c Hot Tapping for Inline BV Removal......................................................................................................26Figure 4.2.4d Removing Inline Block Valve................................................................................................................26Figure 4.2.5a Bypass Installation for Inline Pipe Spool...............................................................................................27Figure 4.2.5b Hot Tapping for Inline Pipe Spool.........................................................................................................27Figure 4.2.5c Pipe Cutting for Inline Pipe Spool.........................................................................................................27




1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives of the Emergency Response Management SystemA prime objective of PDO in emergencies is to ensure that activities are carried out with the following priorities:

Safeguard Lives. Personnel P

Protect the Environment. Environment E

Protect Company or Third Party Assets. Assets A

Maintain the Company Image/Reputation. Reputation R

Personnel involved in dealing with emergency shall follow these priorities when making decisions and developing action plans.

1.2 Purpose of the DocumentThis document describes specific response and recovery arrangements for emergencies occurring on the Government-owned, PDO-operated gas pipeline system.

The initial response to emergencies involving Government Gas Assets will be managed by area emergency control teams. This document details actions over and above generic emergency response activities which need to be considered by emergency response personnel when responding to an emergency on the GGS.

1.3 ScopeThis manual covers the Government-owned, PDO-operated, gas pipeline system that consists of:

48” gas pipeline from Saih-Rawl Central Processing Plant (CPP) to the Liquefied Natural Gas Company (OLNG) in SUR.

48” loopline from Saih Nihaydha Gas Plant to Al-kamil BVS-9A

10” Al-Kamil Power Plant Spur-line connected from the 48” line near BVS-9.

12” OMIFCO and 3” Sur PRT Spurlines.

30” Sur IPP Spur line.

20” and 36” pipeline from Yibal Government Gas Plant (GGP) to Fahud BVS-2.

28” Inter-link Pipeline from Saih-Rawl CPP to Fahud BVS-2.

10” and 16” SOGL inter-connector from 48” line to Saih-Nihaydah.

36” gas pipeline from Kauther to FHD BVS-2.

1.4 Structure of this DocumentThis document is designed to be used in conjunction with Part II Company Procedure PR-1065 which details the PDO emergency call out system and generic roles and responsibilities for Area Emergency Control teams. The manual is structured as follows:

Specific emergency procedures for the Government Gas Pipelines.

Government Gas Pipeline System Technical Details.

Emergency Repairs.

Business Resumption Plan.

This manual does not include the detailed repair for pipelines. Reference should be made to:

Pipeline Emergency Repair Manual GU379.

SP-1210 & SP-1211.

PR-1659

1.5 Document Ownership and Maintenance Government Gas System Emergency Response Procedure Printed 04/07/13



Document Owner

Document Owner is the Government Gas Operations Manager [GGO]. GGO is responsible for: Approval of the document following review and revision. 2 yearly Confirmation to UIC that the plan is still ‘Fit for Purpose’. Ensuring the document defines an organisation and identifies resources to enable

PDO to adequately respond to identified scenarios. Document Holder

Document Holder is the Maintenance Support Team Leader GGO/6. GGO/6 is responsible for: The technical accuracy of the document. Ensuring the update, review and revision of the document is carried out not later than every 2 years and

whenever there are significant changes to the company organisation, resources or assets addressed in the document.

Delegation of maintenance and implementation of the document is via a document Custodian.

Document Custodian

The Custodian of this document is the Government Gas Pipeline / Flow line / Static Support Engineer (GGO/61). On behalf of the document holder, GGO/61 is responsible for maintenance and implementation of this document. This includes: Ensuring updates are distributed. Implementing review and update. Planning and executing emergency response exercises.

Related FormsUsers who identify errors, inaccuracies or ambiguities in this document are requested to advise the custodian by returning the Change Control form (Appendix D) and a copy of the relevant page(s) with their comments.

Related Business Control Documents Code of Practice Emergency Response Document part I. CP-123Procedure Emergency Response Document part II, Company

Procedure.PR-1065

Procedure Emergency Response Document part III, Contingency Plan, Vol. III Production Operations.

PR-1066

Procedure Emergency Response Document part III, Contingency Plan, Vol. 14, Government Gas System.

PR-1246

Procedure Emergency Response Document part III, Contingency Plan, Vol.5, Terminal & Tank Farm.

PR-1068

Specification Pipeline Repairs. SP-1235

1.6 Review and UpdateThis document will be reviewed following major changes to the asset, PDO or Government Gas organisations or operations process. Notwithstanding the above, as a minimum it is required that it should be reviewed not later than every two years.

Any proposals for review or revision must be presented to the document custodian GGO/61 and agreed by the document holder GGO/6.Any user who identifies an inaccuracy, error or ambiguity is requested to notify the custodian so that appropriate action can be taken. The user is requested to return the User Feedback Page, (see Appendix 7.5), fully completed, indicating precisely the amendment(s) required.




2 Emergency Procedure

2.1 PDO Emergency ResponsePDO have local emergency control centres (LECC’s) to manage emergencies. For gas pipeline emergencies, the LECC of the area within which the emergency site is located will provide the response to the emergency.

MaF LECC: Shall respond to emergencies on the 48” pipelines, from BVS-5 to OLNG including the Al-Kamil, OMIFCO, Sur PRT and Sur IPP spur-lines.

Qarn Alam LECC: Shall respond to emergencies for the 48” pipelines from CPP/ SNGP to and including BVS-5 and SOGL 10” Interconnector, the 28” pipeline up to 28” BVS-2 (Km 66 from CPP).

Yibal LECC: Shall respond to emergencies for the 20” and 36” pipelines up to and including BVS-1 (Km 29 from GGP) and 36” Kauther pipeline up to and including BVS-1.

Fahud LECC: Shall respond to emergencies downstream of 20” and 36” BVS-1 to Fahud BVS-2; And downstream of 28” BVS-2 to Fahud BVS-2, and downstream of 36”Kauther line BVS-1 to the receiver end near Fahud BVS-2.

View Figure 1, page 18, for the interfaces.

2.1.1 Additional Instructions for GGS EmergenciesIn addition to generic emergency response actions as detailed in Part II Company Procedure PR-1065, the following actions are required to be taken for emergencies involving GGS assets:

LEBC to inform the duty GGA of the emergency. GGA to provide technical support to LEBC. GGA calls out government gas personnel to assist as required. GGA notifies consumers if there is any interruption of supply. GGA will be responsible to notify consumers

in the Sharqiyah region and OGC for affected OGC supply.

2.2 Strategy for Gas Pipelines FailuresThe strategy for a confirmed leak is to stop all input sources of the gas, then isolate the leak by closing the adjacent upstream and downstream block valves.

The public are to be prevented from approaching the area and all ignition sources must be eliminated. When site control is established, recovery, repair and clean-up can proceed.

Stop gas resources. Isolate leaking section. Prepare area for safe working. Repair leak. Resume operation. Clean up and restore.

2.3 Area Safeguarding and Access Control2.3.1 Locating the Site of the Leak

The search team will approach the area of the suspected leak using extreme caution depending on the nature of the leak as follows:

Leak location obvious with ignition; i.e. when ignition has occurred, the search vehicle shall park a safe distance upwind or crosswind from the site of the leak or flame front and approach the leak area with care to try and ascertain the approximate dimension of the leak..

Leak location is obvious but no ignition; then the search team will park upwind or crosswind so that the search vehicle will not enter the gas release envelope. Personnel shall use breathing apparatus and using gas




detectors try and establish the approximate edges of the gas cloud at ground level. If practical and but only if deemed safe to do so, an attempt may be made to ascertain the size of the hole in the pipeline.

Leak location not obvious; a search will be undertaken using the following procedures as relevant:

Gas Testing Procedure PR-1154. Entry into a Confined Space Procedure PR-1148

Note in any doubt about the extent of any gas leak immediately stop vehicles and switch off the engines and proceed on foot donning breathing apparatus and gas detectors.

Detecting the leak will depend upon the size and location of the leak. A large leak from a medium or full line rupture, or a leak which has ignited, will be easy to detect. A small leak from a pinhole or mechanical joint in a remote area could be located during a gas leak detection survey or during routine inspections on the terminals. Leaks will be detected by the sound of gas escaping, disturbance of the ground within the vicinity of a pipeline or by ignition of gas.

The 48” pipeline system has a leak detection system (LDS) installed. Pipeline monitoring is performed by the LDS workstation. Field data is passed from the SCADA system to the LDS which performs calculations and returns the results to the SCADA system.

2.3.2 Gas Testing & Area IsolationIn the event of a leak, the surrounding area must be cordoned off AS SOON AS POSSIBLE with hazard warning tape, signs or whatever other means are available.

The affected area will be tested for the presence of toxic or explosive gas and the boundaries will be assessed for possible ignition sources. Wind direction and speed will be monitored and taken account of in the zone isolation. Gas testing, and atmospheric conditions will continue to be monitored throughout the activity period and the hazard boundaries and restrictions modified accordingly. As a minimum, the surrounding area will be cordoned off in accordance with the Leak Rate Table 1.0

Following initial safeguarding activities, the area will be restricted to Emergency Response / Recovery Personnel. If required, enlist the ROP for controlling access to the site.

2.3.3 Emergency Site CommunicationsWith a gas pipeline leak it will generally take some time to implement a complete repair, it is therefore advised at the earliest opportunity to mobilise a "Communications Container" as a forward command post. The communications containers are situated at Nimr, Bahja, Fahud and MaF.

2.3.4 Leak IsolationOnce the emergency site is secure, the leak is isolated by closing in adjacent upstream and downstream block valve stations. The gas will be allowed to disperse through the rupture during the isolation and depressurising phase of the emergency. Once closed, the block valves will be injected with sealant to prevent any gas passing. If this is unsuccessful, then GGO and UIP will be consulted for additional actions to be taken.

2.3.5 Emergency EquipmentEquipment Qty Location FunctionVehicle Number C98101 1 MaF Transportation personnel & equipmentPDO Journey Management Map 1 In vehicle C20535Air Compressor 1 On vehicle C20535 Power air toolsAmplitorque 2 On vehicle C20535High Pressure Hose 1 Outside Stores Connect to each AmplitorqueHigh Pressure Sealant Gun 1 Stores Seal passing valves Sealant Gun Delivery Hose 1 On vehicle C20535Sealant Gun Air Hose 1 Stores




2.3.6 Emergency MaterialThe emergency material available to Government Gas Operations is listed in the PR-1799 Emergency Pipeline Repair Material Stock Management, held by UIPT/43. The content and fit for purpose of emergency materials shall be checked by GGO/61 on annual basis.

For 48” line, the following materials can be found:

Material Quantity LocationAt least 40 pipes (15 pipes WT 23.2mm, 5 pipes WT 19.4 mm, 51 pipes WT 16.1 mm)

MAF & CPP Yard (Q.A)

Vent Stacks 2 CPP Yard (QA)

48” Main valve, actuator, 4 gaskets (stud & nut) 1 MAF

48” split sleeve clamp + weld end couplings 1

2.4 Assessment of LeaksLeaks shall be initially assessed on the basis of the following criteria:

Gas release ignited or not? proximity of PDO or Contractor facilities or PDO roads proximity of 3rd Party habitation / public roads

2.5 Stand Down of the Emergency TeamOnce a stand-down of the Emergency Team has been initiated, the LEBC will hand over the emergency to GGO who will manage the business recovery activities.

2.6 Contingency Scenarios2.6.1 Failure with No Gas Release

The most likely cause for this scenario is a third party impact on the pipeline, via a road traffic accident or mechanised excavation which, results in surface damage such as gouges or dents. The damage may reduce the pipeline wall thickness or increase / produce local stress profiles.

The levels of severity of such damage are as follows and will be assessed initially by the On-Scene Commander/GGO with a final assessment by UEOC team. This assessment is based on the Pipeline Emergency Repair Manual (GU-379) chapter 2.2, Level II emergency defects (Rev. 4.0 dated Nov, 2004), and forms an input to determine if temporary or immediate repairs are required.

Slight Damage: Slight damage, such as dents, non leaking cracks and gouges (<12% pipe wall), is defined as damage which will not reduce the Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline or gas supply, and can be ground out to smooth the contour or sleeved using epoxy grouted sleeves. Gouges associated with dents will initiate a "Moderate" or Severe" damage scenario.

Moderate Damage: Moderate damage is defined as damage, which could possibly result in a pipeline rupture but which is not located in a highly populated area, and will not reduce the MAOP of the pipeline or the gas supply. This level of damage will require a partial shutdown of the line but will not affect the operations of consumers of strategic or economic importance.




Severe Damage: Severe damage is defined as damage, which could possibly result in a pipeline rupture and which is located in a highly populated area, or will reduce the MAOP of the pipeline or gas supply. This level of damage will require a partial or total shutdown of the pipeline, and will affect the operations of consumers of strategic or economic importance.

The results of the damage assessment will be submitted to GGA, who will follow the appropriate action plans.

2.6.2 Failure with Gas ReleaseDispersion calculations have been performed for different leak scenarios based on the SIEP calculation programme “FRED” (Fire, Releases, Explosion, and Dispersion) version 2.2 dated 22.11.95.

The calculated leak rates and the hazardous areas for different wind velocities and gas releases with and without ignition have been determined.

a) The area beyond which an ignition source is likely to cause an explosion.

b) The affected area in case of explosion.

c) The affected area in case of an ignited gas release.

Tabulated results from FRED can be referenced in Table 1.0

2.7 Risk Assessment2.7.1 People

In the event of damage to a gas pipeline, the threat to PDO personnel and the general public is potentially severe particularly if escaping gas is not ignited. The risks are inhalation of the gas and ignition of the gas cloud with consequent generation of a large flame front or an explosion.

In highly populated areas such as Sur, there is a high probability of the gas igniting due to the numerous ignition sources. In such cases the leak area will have to be isolated and emergency services put on standby for evacuation, medical assistance and fire fighting.

In unpopulated areas the result of a gas leak would be low, but the area would still have to be isolated.

2.7.2 EnvironmentThe local environmental impact due to a gas leak would be dependent on the size of the leak, length of time the leak went undetected and whether the leak is ignited. The global impact may be significant, (e.g. ozone layer destruction and build-up of greenhouse gases), if a major leak went undetected for a considerable period of time. Generally leaks which are detected in the short term will have minimal environmental impact.

2.7.3 AssetsFailures of pipelines may have an impact on associated assets, e.g. pressure reduction terminals, consumers' facilities and public property, due to gas being released at high pressures. Gas releases without ignition will only damage assets within or close to the ROW corridor.

Gas releases with ignition will start with an explosion. In these circumstances explosion zones and radiation zones must also be considered when evaluating risks to assets.




2.7.4 SupplyThe location of the incident and the pipeline section to be isolated will determine the gas supply situation for consumers. Supply may be reduced or, in the worst case, halted. If the gas supply capacity is reduced, supplies to consumers of strategic or economic importance to the nation should be maintained for as long as possible.

Third party consumers of strategic or economic importance, in ranked order, are:

1) Power supply demand to be met.2) Desalination Plants.3) The remaining volumes to be distributed evenly amongst all the other customers based on equal proportion of their nominations: OLNG QLNG OMIFCO SOGL Cement Factories The above is in accordance with MOG Gas supply agreements to all customers.

Most consumers have alternative fuel supplies and will require time to switch over. As these supplies are limited and are more expensive than gas, it is essential that the supply to consumers is maintained for as long as possible and that repair times are kept to a minimum. Consumers should be provided with details of times and durations of supply interruptions.



Petroleum Development Oman LLC Revision: 10.0Effective: June 13

Table 1: Hazardous Areas vs. Leak Rates

Size of leak Scenario Pressure

Estimated Leak rate

LFL distances from leak source (m)not Ignited (*)

Distance from cloud centre (m)Explosion (1)

Distance from leak (m) Ignited

(inches) (bar) (kg/s) Wind Velocity (m/s), Pasquill Category Wind Velocity (m/s)1, F 5, B 10, C 15, D P = 0.02 bar 0 5 10 15

48” 70 13769 -20 / 60 -20 / 67 -60 / 76 -10 / 78 170 820 1030 1100 110024” 70 2898 -10 / 26 -10 / 29 -30 / 37 -5 / 34 100 400 530 530 55020” 70 2015 -10 / 17 -7 / 25 -31 / 25 -5 / 29 80 350 450 450 4505” 70 126 -2 / 5 - 2 / 6 -6 / 9 -1 / 7 30 90 120 130 13048” 80 15736 -20 / 64 -20 / 71 -60 / 80 -10 / 84 190 900 1180 1180 120024” 80 3312 -10 / 28 -10 / 31 -30 / 39 -5 / 36 95 450 560 580 59020” 80 2302 -10 / 23 -5 / 26 -25 / 33 -5 / 31 80 350 480 490 5005” 80 144 -3 / 5 -2 / 7 -6 / 9 -1 / 7 30 90 140 140 14048” 90 17703 -20 / 68 -20 / 79 -60 / 84 -10 / 90 190 1000 1200 1250 125024” 90 3725 -10 / 30 -10 / 33 -30 / 41 -5 / 38 100 450 590 600 60020” 90 2590 -10 / 25 -7 / 28 -25 / 35 -5 /34 85 400 500 510 5105” 90 162 -3 / 5 -2 / 7 -6 / 10 -2 / 8 30 100 140 140 140

* Consequences evaluations have been computed using the FRED modelLFL = Low Flammable LimitsLeak source positioned in the centreline of the pipeline. Negative figures are the distance upwind, positive figures are the distance downwind of the release source.

IN CASE THE LEAK IS UN-IGNITED, ALL PERSONNEL SHALL BE EVACUATED AT LEAST 2 KM AWAY FROM THE LEAK SOURCE.IF THE LEAK IS IGNITED THEN THE SAFE DISTANCE SHOULD BE 1 KM FROM THE LEAK SOURCE.

*) The distances listed are indicating areas below the lower explosion limit 1) This distance shall be used to determine the safe area around a leak

The shape and dimension of the explosive cloud has been evaluated on the basis of AREOPLUME model described in the FRED program for vertical release. Additional assumptions used in the calculations were as follows: vapour cloud composed by pure methane; area completely open; fuel factor equal to 0.6 according to [FRED]




3 Government Gas System Technical Details

3.1 Overview of Government Gas OperationsEffective January 1, 2002, Oman Gas Company (OGC) is incorporated under the laws of Oman. OGC is the holder of a concession to own, operate, maintain, repair and augment gas transportation facilities (GTF).

The transportation facilities are connected with facilities operated by PDO at the following points:

Fahud Interconnection Point located immediately downstream of BVS-2. Saih-Rawl Interconnection Point located immediately downstream of the tie-in location of the 24” Salalah

pipeline to the 28” Interlink.Gas from Yibal wells flows through flow-lines to the Government Gas Plant. The treated gas is then sent to a delivery point at Fahud BVS-2 where Oman Gas Company assumes responsibility for transporting the gas to customers via the pipelines referred to as the GGS (Government Gas System).

Treated gas from the Central Processing Plant at Saih Rawl and Saih Nihayda Gas Plant flow through two 48” pipelines that interconnect at BVS-9 in Al-Kamil. The major customer using the 48” pipeline is OLNG.

The main transport gas pipelines are interlinked with a 28” pipeline from Saih-Rawl CPP to Fahud BVS-2. (See Figure 1.0)

On 2007, Kauther gas plant started producing gas through a 36” line tapped to the 20” and 36” GGP- FHD BVS-2 pipelines.

3.2 Assets3.2.1 Pipelines

Associated/non-associated gas from the Yibal production wells is fed to the Government Gas Plant (GGP) for treatment to reduce the dew point of the gas to pipeline transmission quality and compresses the gas up to 6700 kPag for export. The treated and compressed gas is transported to BVS-2 by means of two 56 km long pipelines of 20" and 36" diameter.

At the Saih Rawl processing plant (CPP), produced fluids and gas from Barik pass through a common process where condensate and water is separated from the gas. After further treatment, the dry gas is compressed and transported to Sur in a 353 km, 48” inch underground pipeline which is operated at a pressure of 9000 kPag.

At Saih Nihayda Gas Plant (SNGP) gas is processed from Saih Nihayda wells and transported through a 269 Km loopline that ends at BVS-9 near Al-Kamil and is interconnected with the existing 48” line.

Kauther gas is processed and delivered to the 20” and 36” lines coming from Yibal through a 100 Km long 36” pipeline.

All pipelines, including pig traps and associated piping, are designed in accordance with ASME Code of Practice B31.8 - Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems and PDO design standards. Where the pipeline runs through areas of very low population density, it has been designated Class 1. Where the pipeline runs in the vicinity of medium density population areas the pipeline has been designated as Class 2 and in highly populated areas, or areas with high activity the pipeline has been designated as Class 3.

The maximum allowable pressure has been set in accordance with the design code ANSI B31.8. Current Government Gas pipelines MAOP are as per table in Section 3.3.1

The estimated volume per kilometre between block valve stations at operating pressures is as follows:

36" Pipeline contains 43,000 (st) m3 of gas at 66 bar. 20" Pipeline contains 13,000 (st) m3 of gas at 66 bar. 48" Pipeline contains 104,000 (st) m3 of gas at 90 bar. 28" Pipeline contains 35,000 (st) m3 of gas at 90 bar.

The pipelines are constructed of steel to API 5L-X70 and X52 for 48”, 36”, 28” and 20” respectively. All pipelines are externally coated. The 48”, 28”, 20" and the first phase of 36" pipeline are internally coated with a flow coat and epoxy. The pipelines are laid underground to a covered depth of 0.7 to 1.0 meter with a windrow




piled above for additional protection. A graded Right of Way (ROW) inspection road also runs alongside the pipeline routes.

A Cathodic Protection system has been installed along the pipelines and at most of the gas terminals to protect the external surface of buried pipelines against corrosion where defects in the coating occur. Protection is achieved by impressed current supplied from the CP stations.

A strip of land 25 metres wide on either side of any pipeline is designated as a restricted area "Corridor". The boundary lines of this corridor (Right of Way) are marked by 1 metre high, 0.08 metres diameter yellow posts at distances between 50 and 500 metres.

The purpose of the Right of Way is:

Enable the public to identify the route of the pipeline and to minimise their exposure to the potential hazards associated with high-pressure gas lines,

To protect the pipelines and their associated equipment from external damage, To give access for pipeline maintenance crews and equipment

Over each pipeline a technical marker system is installed (including aerial and crossing markers) to locate and identify the system for operational purposes. These markers show the name of the Operating Company and an emergency telephone contact. Additional pipeline signs are installed along the pipeline in areas of development and growth to protect the system from encroachment. Critical areas are also protected with barriers.

3.2.2 Block Valve Stations (BVS) BVSs are provided on the pipelines at intervals of approximately 30 Km to facilitate isolation of sections for repair/emergency. Bypass lines for integrity checks and vent valves for depressurising are provided.

The boundaries of a block valve station are the fenced-in plot above a pipeline block valve. The design of the block valve station is such that it can be used either in liquid or gas service. The main purpose of a pipeline BVS is to provide a means of isolating a section of a pipeline to:

Minimise loss of product and all related hazards in the event of a pipeline failure; Improve the possibilities for pipeline maintenance and repair; Facilitate operational flexibility in a looped pipeline system.

In addition, a BVS should also allow for:

Periodic checking of the block valve operation without interrupting the flow in the pipeline; Pressurising, depressurising, venting/draining and purging a single pipeline section; Equalising pressure in two adjacent sections prior to opening the block valve.

Block Valve Stations contains the under-ground Main Ball Valve (Buried or In a Pit); over ground bypass line which has 2 Ball Valves and 1 Globe Valves mainly used as a throttling control when pressurizing the line.




Drawing of a Typical Block Valve Configuration

3.3 Pipeline Technical Data3.3.1 Pipeline Operating Data

The Government Gas Pipelines operate at the pressures indicated below.

SECTIONPRESSURE kPa

MAOP OP36" Line from G.G.P Yibal to Fahud BVS-2. 8300 670020" Line from G.G.P. Yibal to Fahud BVS-2. 8300 670036” Line from Kauther to Fahud BVS-2 8300 670048" Line from Saih Rawl (CPP). to Sur 9200 905048” Loop-line from SNGP to BVS-9 9200 905028" Line from Saih Rawl (CPP) to Fahud BVS-2 9200 9050

Table 2: Gas Pipelines Operating Data




3.3.2 Distance, vol and max gas content between Block Valve Stations on 48” Pipeline

Table 3: Volumes between BV’s, 48” QA to Sur Line



Location KP Partial Dist. Volume Maximum(km) (m3) Mass content (tons)

Lauching trap 0.0000032.20241 35635 2533.1

BVS-01 32.2024132.11893 35543 2565.1

BVS-02 64.3213432.11723 35541 2596.8

BVS-03 96.4385731.31504 34653 2558.6

BVS-04 127.7536133.06239 36587 2724.8

BVS-05 160.8160032.02714 35441 2655.1

BVS-06 192.8431432.58585 36060 2706.6

BVS-07 225.4289931.72809 35110 2647.8

BVS-08 257.1570831.36760 34711 2641.5

BVS-09 288.5246828.85714 31933 2453.0

BVS-10 317.3818216.71964 18062 1400.8

BVS-11 334.1014619.00484 20531 1602.5

Receiving trap 353.10630


3.4 Gas Consumers

Gas Consumers/ Customers

Pressure (bar) Daily Gas Consumption (MMSM³/D)

SpurlineInlet to CustomerMin Max High

DemandLow

DemandSize (in) Length (km)

OLNG 48” 65 91 48 28 N/A N/A

OGC (through 36”, 32” and 20” lines)

5965 for

20”& 36”65 for 32”

30 12 N/A N/A

OGC (through Salalah line)

61 83 13 2 N/A N/A

SOGL 67 91 3.5 1.2 10

Al-Kamil Power Plant 30 91 1.8 0.6 10 0.75OMIFCO 64 91 4.1 3.6 12 1.5SURIPP 30 91 4 0.3 30 N/A

Table 4: Gas Customers

3.5 Service ContractsGGE/3 have, in place, service contracts (EMC Contractor) for emergency repair of damaged pipelines.




Figure 1: Emergency Demarcation Points




Figure 2: Schematic of Gas Distribution System in Oman




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4 Emergency Repairs

4.1 System PreparationGovernment Gas Operations personnel will perform all activities related to system preparation. Subsequent work e.g. earth moving will be performed only when authorised by the on scene commander.

Before any work can be carried out on a pipeline, the pipeline is required to be made safe.

4.1.1 Line Isolation and DepressurisationTo isolate the pipeline effectively, the upstream and downstream block and by-pass valves closest to the leak need to be closed and sealed. To enhance safety during the emergency repair, the next nearest upstream and downstream block and by-pass valves will also be closed and sealed giving double blocks upstream and downstream of the leak area. If positive isolation cannot be achieved, GGA will be informed. The GGA will determine additional requirements to obtain full isolation.

Depressurisation of the isolation zone will commence on the instruction from GGA via the on scene commander. All venting will be carried out at suitable block valve station by-pass locations, where no danger exists to personnel within the venting area from the vented gas. The isolated section will then be depressurised by installing a vent stack on the block valve station vent valve and then opening the vent valve. If possible, station vents on both the upstream and downstream block valves should be used to decrease blow-down times.

4.1.2 Line DegassingBefore any repair work (e.g. to allow the installation of a PLIDCO clamp) can proceed, the isolated pipeline section must be confirmed gas free unless agreed otherwise by the GGA. There must be no explosive mixtures of gas and air. The gas inventory in the isolated section will be removed using air-powered blowers located at the block valve station vents. Ideally, air blowers should be located at both block valve stations and the air allowed to escape through the rupture. If only one air-powered blower is used, the other block valve station vent should be open to increase the amount of air drawn into the pipeline.

An alternative approach will be to purge the isolated line section with nitrogen. If the line is leaking, nitrogen shall be injected at the upstream and downstream block valve station and merged from these two locations towards the ruptured section.

The leak location and block valve station vents will then be tested for gas . Only when all three locations indicate no gas can the line be declared gas free. Continuous gas testing must be performed throughout the period of the repair. In case of a small leak, the nitrogen can be supplied via the bypass line (vent stack connection) of the valve station and vented at the other isolation valve.

4.2 Repair MethodsAll emergency repairs to a Government Gas Pipelines will be performed in accordance with the Emergency Repair Manual by EMC contractor working under GGE/3 with guidance/ technical assistant provided by UIPT/2 (UEL) and UEOC team.

Emergency repairs can be either temporary or permanent.

Prior to any cutting of a pipeline, the Cathodic Protection system has to be isolated or a bonding cable attached to the pipe on either side of the damaged section.

4.2.1 Temporary RepairsIf the rupture is small, a clamp (e.g. Plidco Split + Sleeve), may be fitted to contain the leak until the system can be prepared for a permanent repair. The clamp comprises two halves which are bolted together and contain a packing which forms a seal around the pipe. The standard Plidco Split + Sleeve can be used on corrosion pit leaks and ruptures up to 200 mm (7.9”) long and pressures up to 68.96 kPa. Special Plidco Split + Sleeves are also available for use on longer ruptures and at higher pressures. Manufacturer’s documentation states that the clamps can be welded and become a permanent fixture, however these clamps are only considered temporary on a Government Gas pipeline.

A Plidco Smith + Clamp is available to seal pinhole leaks; this type of clamp consists of a steel force screw which is located in the leak and held in position by a steel clamp. The Plidco Weld + Cap are similar to the Smith + Clamp but have a weld cap instead of the force screw.




4.2.2 Permanent RepairsPermanent repair involves removing the damaged section of pipeline and replacing it with a new section of the same grade and wall thickness. The line has to be cut initially using a cold cutting machine so that cylindrical stopper air bags can be installed inside the pipe to ensure that no gas is present in the repair area. Before the pipeline is cut it should be restrained to ensure that there is no movement due to possible stresses in the pipeline.

The replacement section will be welded in place using PDO approved welding procedures and the welds shall be subject to 100% radiography. The air bags should be removed through nozzles previously welded onto the pipeline.

The "Clamped Spool Piece Repair with End Couplings" can also be used as a permanent repair method, if approved by the Asset Holder.

The repair with Weld End Couplings and Pipe Spool is recommended on a rupture where the extent (length) of the pipe damage is beyond the length established by the split sleeve manufacturer. The seal is created when the elastomer packing is compressed against the carrier pipe by the tightening of the thrust screws. Production can be resumed as soon as the bolting of the weld and coupling is completed. Once the surrounding area has been properly cleaned, welding can be safely undertaken.

Detailed execution of the repair methods is detailed in:

Pipeline Emergency Repair Manual GU379

4.2.3 Hot Tapping and StopplingHot tapping (see Pipeline Hot Tap Management procedure, PR-1506) is used to install new branch connections onto an existing pipeline without interrupting the normal operating conditions.

The hot tap machine consists of the tapping machine, which can be either pneumatically or hydraulically driven a cutter and a pilot. The coupon, which is cut out of the pipe wall, should be forced out of the pipe by the pressure of the process fluid and retained in the cutter; this can also be achieved by fitting a coupon catcher to the cutter assembly.

The hot tap is achieved by welding a weldolet or split tee on to the pipeline, then installing a valve onto the new branch. The sequence of activities is as follows:

pressure test new branch fitting and valve install the hot tap machine on the branch assembly pressure test the assembly open the valve lower the hot tap cutter through the valve until the pilot penetrates the pipe wall allow the assembly to fill up with process fluid by opening the hot tap machine vent; once full, close the

vent continue to lower the cutter until it has completely penetrated the pipeline withdraw the cutter up into the hot tap machine and close the valve Remove the hot tap machine

Loc-O-Ring flange and plug can be installed and a wafer valve used when a valve is not required on the branch. The Loc-O-Ring plug is installed after the hot tap is completed by using the hot tapping machine to lower the plug through the valve, then positioning the plug in the Loc-O-Ring flange and tightening the retaining screws on the flange. This seals the branch and allows the hot tapping machine and wafer valve to be removed. The plug can be removed by reversing the installation procedure.

Stoppling is performed in conjunction with hot tapping. Once the hot tap has been completed the hot tapping machine is replaced by the stoppling machine, which consists of a hydraulic cylinder and a housing containing a fold away plug assembly. When the plug assembly is lowered into the pipe, the assembly unfolds and forms a plug inside the pipe. By using two stoppling machines a section of pipeline can be isolated and removed or worked on.




4.2.4 Outline Procedure for In Line Block Valve RemovalPrior to block valve removal, a full line sized bypass must be installed. Due to the small fenced area which typically surrounds the main line block valve stations, the connections for this bypass must be located outside the fenced area.

The necessary bypass and stoppling connections will be provided by means of hot tapping into the main gas line. After hot tapping has been completed, the connections for the bypass and the stoppling equipment may be left ready, complete with internal Loc-O-Ring sealing disc and conventional blind flange.

It is proposed that the spacing of the bypass piping connection hot taps around each block valve station be set at some standard distance to allow the repeated use of a standard by-pass piping configuration, as shown in figure 4.2.4 (a).

When it has been established that block valve replacement is required, the following procedure should be carried out:

After establishing the pressure integrity of the internal Loc-O-Ring seals, by means of a pressure assessment of the Loc-O-Ring / blind flange cavity, the line size bypass and stopple connection blind flanges can be removed.

The hot tap and stopple sandwich tapping valves can now be installed and the Loc-O-Ring seals subsequently removed.

Close hot tap sandwich tapping valves Install, test and commission line size bypass piping on the outer pair of hot tap sandwich tapping valves as

shown in Figure 4.2.4 (b) Install stopple equipment on the inner pair of the hot tap sandwich tapping valves and plug the main line

gas flow at both locations (downstream side first), as shown in Figure 4.2.4(c) Ensure the integrity of the line stopples Bleed off the internal pressure of the isolated section, venting the gas to a safe location, and thoroughly

purge with nitrogen, or other acceptable inert medium, as shown in Figure 4.2.4(d) Remove main line block valve

Inline Block Valve Removal

Figure 4.2.4a Installing Pressure Testing Flange for Inline BV Removal




Figure 4.2.4b Install Bypass for Inline BV Removal

Figure 4.2.4c Hot Tapping for Inline BV Removal

Figure 4.2.4d Removing Inline Block Valve

4.2.5 Outline Procedure for In Line Pipe Spool RemovalPrior to pipe spool removal, a full line sized bypass must be installed. Refer to Section 4.2.4

The necessary bypass and stoppling connections will be provided by hot tapping into the main gas line. (This can be carried out at the time of the required pipe spool removal, or may be carried out at some date prior to pipe spool removal). After hot tapping has been completed, the connections for the bypass and the stoppling equipment may be left ready, complete with internal Loc-O-Ring Sealing disc and conventional blind flange.

When it has been established that pipe spool replacement is required, the following outline procedure should be carried out:

After establishing the pressure integrity of the internal Loc-O-Ring seals, by means of a pressure assessment of the Loc-O-Ring / blind flange cavity, the line size bypass and stopple connection blind flanges can be removed.

The hot tap and stopple sandwich tapping valves can now be installed and the Loc-O-Ring seals subsequently removed.

Close hot tap sandwich tapping valves. Install, test and commission the line size bypass piping on the outer pair of hot tap sandwich tapping

valves as shown in Figure 4.2.5 (a) Install stopple equipment on the inner pair of hot tap sandwich tapping valves and plug the main line gas

flow at both locations (downstream side first) as shown in Figure 4.2.5 (b) Ensure the integrity of the line stopples.




Bleed off the internal pressure of the isolated section, venting the gas to a safe location and thoroughly purge with nitrogen or other acceptable inert medium as shown in Figure 4.2.5 (c)

Remove main line pipe spool.

Inline Pipe Spool Removal

Figure 4.2.5a Bypass Installation for Inline Pipe Spool

Figure 4.2.5b Hot Tapping for Inline Pipe Spool

Figure 4.2.5c Pipe Cutting for Inline Pipe Spool




4.2.6 Line Re-CommissioningFollowing repair, gas has to be introduced into the isolated section to ensure that there is not an explosive atmosphere within the section. This is achieved by closing the vent on the block valve station upstream (BVUS) of the repair site and locating a pedometer to measure the gas flow, as well as a gas detector at the downstream block valve station (BVDS) vent. Gas velocity should be maintained at between 3 and 7 m/s. The line can then be re-commissioned as follows:

Ensure vent at BVUS is closed Ensure vent at BVDS is open Open bypass on BVUS Continuously monitor velocity of and concentration of gas at BVDS vent Continuously gas test at leak site When 100% gas is indicated at the BVDS vent, close the vent Check the differential pressure across the block valves When the differential pressure across the block valves is 5 bar or less, open the block valves Remove all measuring equipment and ensure all vents are closed and that there is no gas leak at the vents

or leak siteIt is important to consider a balanced flow rate for decommissioning. Gas taken out of the up or downstream line section will cause a pressure drop in these systems.




5 Business Resumption Plan

5.1 IntroductionAn emergency on the Government Gas System may result in a partial or total shutdown of the system. This Business Resumption Plan is required to minimise the disruption of gas supply to consumers and to reinstate the system to its normal operating condition.

5.2 ObjectivesThe objectives of the plan are to:

Maintain supply to consumers of strategic or economic importance. Minimise the duration of the interruption. Return the system to full operational status. Provide consumers with information on the situation.

To achieve these objectives there must be close co-ordination between GGO, GGE/3, UEOC and UIPT personnel in developing the action plan:

To carry out the repair to the system in the shortest possible time; To re-configure the system to ensure that the supply capacity is maximised;

5.3 Action PlanOnce the emergency has been contained the LEBC will hand over the system to GGO. GGO will then assemble a team to develop and execute an action plan for preparing the system and carrying out repair, re-commissioning and re-instatement.

GGO will nominate a Government Gas Co-ordinator (GGC), who will proceed to site and take over from the On-Scene Commander who may be demobilised at the discretion of the LEBC. The GGC will normally be GGE/3 (dependant on the incident area). GGE/3 will be responsible for organising the relevant contractors and undertaking the repair. UEOC & UIPT personnel will continue to provide technical support to site particularly with regard to the method of repair, materials and resources in line with the Emergency Repair Manual.

GGO will be responsible for monitoring the overall situation and providing consumers with up-to-date information on the supply situation.

The GGC will be responsible for co-ordinating execution of the action plan and ensuring that a safe working environment is maintained throughout.

Note: Although this Business Resumption Plan is scheduled to commence following handover from the LEBC and once the leak site is made safe there is no reason why GGO cannot commence this procedure earlier, with the consent of the LEBC. This may be applicable for small leaks where vent time of the closed in section may take several hours. HOWEVER the incident site is still under the control of the On-Scene Commander until formal handover from the LEBC to GGO.




5.4 Business Resumption Process

Figure 5.4: Business Resumption Flow Diagram




Notes for Business Resumption Flow Diagram

1 LEBC hands over system to GGO

2 GGO assembles action team (GGO/(Q/YK)/2, 3, 6, GGE/3, UEOC and UIPT)

3 GGO nominates GGC. Normally it is GGE/3

4 GGO configures system to maintain maximum supply capacity

5 GGC proceeds to incident site and takes over from on-scene commander

6 Action team develop action plan for repair

7 GGO informs consumers of the situation

8 GGO mobilises support & repair teams via GGE/3.

9 GGO personnel prepare system for repair (Normally GGO/14, GGO/61 & UIPT/4 crew)

isolation - double block & bleed depressurisation degassing disconnect CP system

10 EMC contractor personnel carry out repair under GGE/3 supervision as per emergency repair manual and the repair action plan

earth moving line cutting section replacement welding radiography

11 GGC & GGO personnel ensure safe working conditions during repair

12 GGO monitors progress of repair against action plan

13 Repair complete

14 GGC & GGO personnel re-commission the system

gassing up pressurisation check for leaks remove line isolation reconnect CP system

15 Repair crew restore external coating & back fill pipeline

16 GGO reconfigures system for normal operation

17 GGC, UIPT, UEOC & GGO personnel clean up & demobilise

18 Resume normal operations




6 APPENDICES

6.1 Abbreviations

ANSI American National Standards Institute

BVS Block Valve Station

BVDS Down-Stream Block Valve

BVUS Up-Stream Block Valve

CECC Corporate Emergency Coordination Centre

CFDH Corporate Function Discipline Head

CP Cathodic Protection

CPP Central Processing Plant at Saih Rawl

DEP Design and Engineering Practices

ERD Engineering Reference Documents

GGA Government Gas Adviser

GGC Government Gas Coordinator

GGP Government Gas Plant at Yibal

GGS Government Gas System

GTF Gas Transport Facility

LEBC Local Emergency Base Controller

LECC Local Emergency Control Centre

MAF Mina Al Fahal

MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure

MOG Ministry of Oil and Gas

OGC Oman Gas Company

OLNG Oman Liquefied Natural Gas at Sur

ONO/1F Fahud Area Coordinator

ONO/1Q Qarn-Alam Area Coordinator

ONO/1Y Yibal Area Coordinator

OP Operating Pressure

OSC On Scene Commander

PR Procedure

ROP Royal Oman Police

ROW Right of Way

SOGL South Oman Gas Line

SNGP Saih Nihaydha Gas Plant




6.2 Emergency Telephone Numbers GGS

PDO Office G.S.M RemarksGovernment Gas OperationsGGO Government Gas Operations Manager 24675938 93895779 GGO Duty GGO Representative Pager No. 9124177GGO/6 Maintenance Strategy & Support TL 24678092 95330595 GGO/61 Pipeline / Flowline / Static Support 24677507 99377848 GGO/61Team

Government Gas Pipeline Technician 24678934 99366877 Mechanical24678540 99377066 Instrument24673550 99332988 R.O.W

GGO/Q Delivery Team Leader Gas 246776312 96726266

GGO/YQ Delivery Team Leader Gas 24677499 99323576

GGO/2 Production Strategy & Support T/L 24673434 99315457

GGO/3 Production Programming Team Leader 24671089 93239117 GGS HSE&SD Team Leader 24673325 99339109

Interior Gas OperationsGGO/1YK Gas Production Coordinator 24381249 99321656GGO/14YK Gas Production Supervisor 24381267ONO/1Y Production-Coordinator-Yibal 24381117Government Gas Plant (GGP) 24381220GGO/1Q Gas Production-Coordinator 24385750 99338742GGO/14Q Gas-Operation-Supervisor 24388233 24383478ONO/1Q Production Coordinator - QarnAlam 24385540CPP Control Room 24388255SNGP Control Room 24388160 24385827Fahud CCR 24384510 24384565 ONO/1F Production Coordinator - Fahud 24384790

Engineering SupportCFDH (UEL) Pipeline Corporate Function Discipline Head 24673956GGE Engineering Manager 24672708GGE/3 Head Projects EMC/ODC 24675458 99388015

Customers & Consumers

OLNG Oman Liquefied Natural Gas Control Room: 25547766 (24 Hrs)Shift Superintendent: 25547858 (24 Hrs)

OGC Oman Gas Company 1515OGC Oman Gas Company CCR 24681616

AKPC Al-Kamil Power Plant255638102556384725563820

OMIFCO Oman Indian Fertilizer Company 25532008 99275014 Operation M.

MOG Ministry Of Oil and Gas 24640556

Royal Oman PoliceR.O.P Yibal Area 24381202 24381040R.O.P Qarn Alam Area 24385559 24385556R.O.P Fahud Area 24384222 24384291R.O.P Sur Area 25540599R.O.P Al-Kamil Area 25557420R.O.P Al-Mudhaibi Area 25578099R.O.P Ibra Area 25570099R.O.P Bidiyah Area 25583099




Checklist for Duty GGAThis checklist should be followed, on taking over as the Duty Gas Adviser at 07:30 hours on Saturday:

1. Collect the Emergency Briefcase and Pager from the previous Gas duty advisor.

2. On receipt of the Emergency Briefcase, check that the contents include at least the following items: A Copy of these Procedures. Emergency Response Telephone Directory. Log sheets. Pocket-Book titled Emergency Procedures. ER Duty Rota. Gas pipeline HSE case Pager operating instructions. Pen and pencil. A spare Pager (Bleeper) battery. Mobile telephone plus charger and spare battery. Magnetic strip entry card to Coastal LECC in the Terminal Building.

3. The Pager must be switched ‘ON’ and retained at hand at all times when on duty. Immediately check the operation of the Pager, by dialling the number embossed on it. If it doesn’t work, inform the GGO/0 immediately to enable a substitute Pager to be supplied and a satisfactory test to be carried out. Routine checks of the pager are normally carried out on a Saturday.

4. On completion of the duty, hand over the Emergency Briefcase and Pager to the next Duty Person.

5. GGA action upon being pagedWhen paged, ring 24675555 to receive initial information and proceed to the Emergency Response Room in Coastal LECC in the Terminal Building and take the Emergency Briefcase.




6.3 User Feedback

Change Proposal / User Feedback Form

Any user of this 'Emergency Procedure', wishing to make change or correction, is to use the 'change Proposal' form attached hereto and forward this to the document custodian, so that appropriate action can be taken.

User Comment Form

Change Proposal FormOriginator:-- Date:--

Reference Indicator:-- CP Ref No:--

Operations Team Leader

GGO/61

Purpose of Revision: Update Existing Data ¨Delete Obsolete Data ¨Insert New Data ¨Other ¨

Proposed Change: Section(s) :

Page(s) :

Description:

Continue overleaf

Signed: Approved: Implemented:

Originator Operations Team Leader GGO/61



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