Power and Values in a Changing Asia: Debating Australia's Strategic Future

8/4/2019 Power and Values in a Changing Asia: Debating Australia's Strategic Future

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Democratic asia anD the West PaPer series 2011

PoWer anD Values in a changing asiaDb a s F

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Cover photo: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (L) and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard walk past a guard o honor

during a welcoming ceremony held at the Great Hall o the People in Beijing, 26 April 2011.Photo Diego Azubel/epa/Corbis.


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Power and Values in a Changing Asia:Debating Australias Strategic Future

Democratic Asia and The West Paper Series

September 2011

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A v y Ly I. S A S, U W: T U.S. A- A N E S Uy, Ly I I Py, Syy, A .


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Power and Values in a Changing Asia: Debating Australias Strategic Future 1

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tamping down regio

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national resources development rathe

than to costly spen

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were spectacular.

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For the first time in

our history, we face

the situation where

our largest trading

partner is neither a

developed nation, nor

a democracy, nor partf the Western alliance.

Increasingly our

trategic commentators

are seeing our alliance

obligations clashing

with, or at a minimum

diverging from, our

longer-term economic

interests.


6/14


Since 2008, the

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respondents who

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to Australia in the n

two decades.

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The alliance could play

a similar enabling role

in the development of

a successful Australianrelationship with

China in the first half

of the 21st century

to the pivotal one it

played with respect to

our highly successful

ngagement with Japan

during the second half

of the 20th century.


8/14


Australia and other

countries should w

as hard as possible

to avoid China-U.S.

competition escala

out of control. But t

idea that we could

somehow stand as

from such a conflic

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9/14


s Chinas power grows,

the most effective way

for Western nations to

influence its behavior

will be to work together.

Chinas behavior for

decades to come could

be shaped by how we

deal with it and what

e let it get away with

in the next few years.

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10/14


What we are seeing

is an increasing lev

of de facto integrat

of Australias defen

capabilities with th

of the United States

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11/14


As Asias strategicndscape changes, the

United States is looking

to diversify its regional

military footprint, with

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bases in Northeast

sia and more on other

orms of access further

south and west. This is

bringing Australia into

he frame as a possibleocation for supporting

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12/14


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Endnotes M Ck, R H, Ry M, AS, Power and choice: Asian security futures. Syy, LyI I Py, J , . 8.

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030.C, A D D, 9.

3 F H,Australia and the world: public opinion andforeign policy. Syy, Ly I I Py,, . .

4 I. . 3.

5 I. . 4.

6 H,Australia and the world: public opinion and foreignpolicy, . 4.

7 I. . 5.

8 I. . 7.9 I. . .

I. . 4.

H W, P : A W- Bj. Quarterly Essay 39 , . 8.

A S, Sweet and sour: Australian public attitudestowards China. Syy, Ly I I Py,A , . .

3 Ck, H, M S, Power and choice:Asian security futures, . 7.

4 S x S S, A C -. Taipei Times 3 Jy , . 8; Dv H,C . Sydney Morning Herald9 Jy; H W. U.S.-C: N y . The Inter-

preter, 7 Jy : ://.y.///7/7/US-C-N-y--.x.

5 P G R C, China seen overtaking US asglobal superpower: 23-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 3Jy , C. 4.

6 J H, Lazarus rising. Syy, HC, ,. 57.

7 J G, G v k C .Sydney Morning Herald A , . .

8 M G, T T C G: y A y. Security Challenges () 5, . -4.

9 G S, The partnership: the inside story of the U.S.-Australian alliance under Howard and Bush. Syy, UNSWP, 6, . 3.

AUSMIN 2010 Joint Communiqu. M, 8 Nv, . -3.

T Y, Resident power: the case for an enhanced U.S.military presence in Australia. S S. Syy, LyI I Py, Jy , . .

S, x, C D ExA , C, Jy 9[5], D 6 H, J A (.), Documents on Australian


13/14


foreign policy: the ANZUS Treaty 1951 , . .

3 T D Sy G NATO. Wall Street Journal J : ://.j.///6//---y-----/.

4 H,Australia and the world: public opinion and foreignpolicy, . .


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Power and Values in a Changing Asia: Debating Australia's Strategic Future

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