Postnationalism and the Challenges to European Integration in Greece: The Transformative Power of...

Postnationalism and the Challengesto European Integration in Greece

Kostas Maronitis

Postnationalismand the Challenges

to EuropeanIntegrationin Greece

The Transformative Power of Immigration

Kostas MaronitisLeeds Trinity UniversityLeeds, United Kingdom

ISBN 978-3-319-46345-2 ISBN 978-3-319-46346-9 (eBook)DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46346-9

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How Can One Take Delight in the World Unless One Fliesto it for Refuge?

Franz KafkaThe Zürau Aphorisms

Thanks to the morbid estrangement which the lunacy of nationality hasproduced and continues to produce between the peoples of Europe, thanks

likewise to the shortsighted and hast-handed politicians who are with its aidon top today and have not the slightest notion to what extent the politics ofdisintegration they pursue must necessarily be only an interlude—thanks toall this, and to much else that is altogether unmentionable today, the mostunambiguous signs are now being overlooked, or arbitrarily and lyingly

misinterpreted, which declare that Europe wants to become one.

Friedrich NietzscheBeyond Good and Evil

For my mother Sofia

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the first instance, I would like to thank the editors at Palgrave-Macmillan for the enthusiasm they expressed in the book and for theirhelp throughout its publication. I would also like to thank the anonymousreviewers for their useful insights and recommendations. Nothing wouldhave been possible without the intellectual input and moral support ofAlev Adil who has followed every step of the book’s research and writing.

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CONTENTS

1 Introduction 1Is This Europe? 1Why Greece? 5The Plan of the Book 7

2 European Unification and Exclusion Regimes 9The Immigration Crisis as European Crisis 9The EU between Euro-sceptics and Europhiles 16The EU between Utopia and Dystopia 18Utopia and its Opposites 20

3 Immigration Policies and the Control of Mobility 27The Geography of Mobility and Immigration Policy 27Immigration Policy in Greece: Reorganising the Social/Defending National Culture 31The Law as a Mechanism of Exclusion and Uncertainty 40Precarisation and State Racism 44

4 European Civilisation, National Power, and the Detentionof Immigrants 47Protecting Citizens and Excluding Immigrants 47The Material and Territorial Power of the Detention Centre 49Administering Detention 53

xi

“Special Facilities”: The Violenceon Rights and the Right to Violence 55The Meaning of Detention Centres in Greece 60

5 The New Subjectivity of Nationalism 65The Project of Nationalist Subjectivity 65The Integrating Capacitiesof Society and the Freedom of the Subject 66The Contemporary Nationalist Subject in Greece: BetweenDenial and Ideological Dominance 68The Anti-Subject: Nationalist Subjectivity and Violence 72Food and Blood: Nationalism, Racism and Welfare 75The Legitimation Process of the New Right or Howthe Nationalist Subject Asserts Itself 77Social Values, Evil and Punishment 82

6 The Social Process of Integration and Tolerance 85Managing the Presence of the Immigrant/PromotingSocial Cohesion 85Manifestations and Implementations of Integration 88The Limitations of National Models of Integration:Convergence and Lack of Coordination 91Making the Invisible Visible: Integration, ReligiousDiversity and the Building of a Mosque in Athens 92Tolerance and Integration 97

7 Postnationalism, Solidarity and European Citizenship:Recognising the Transformative Power of Immigration 103Escaping State Thought: Recognition and Rights 103Coercion and Negative Integration 106The Recognition of Unregulated Immigrants and Refugeesas Part of the People 109EU Citizenship and the Democratisation of Europe throughImmigration 114

xii CONTENTS

References 121

Index 137

CONTENTS xiii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract The book coheres around a series of case studies and theoreticaldebates. Immigration and the presence of migrants and refugees appear inthis book, both as an objective medium through which the reorganisationof the European Union (EU) and Greece can be observed and analysedand as a conceptual tool for the purpose of contesting political narratives,ideological perceptions of otherness and illegality.

Keywords Immigration � EU � Greece � Hope � Fear � Populism �Methodological nationalism

IS THIS EUROPE?“You’re telling me this is Europe?” (The Economist 2015). This is one ofthe most common questions refugees and unregulated immigrants askwhen they arrive at the shores of Europe. Some of the immigrants arevictims of unsuccessful political and military interventions in their coun-tries. Others are victims of political and religious tensions that their coun-tries cannot control. The immigration flows Europe is dealing with arecompared to the persecutions and devastations of the Second World War.Yet, these flows are extremely vulnerable to statistical inconsistencies andmiscalculations. Millions are coming, thousands are dying and thousandsare missing. Perhaps, it is this vulnerability that causes politicians andcommentators to frequently use the words “fear” and “hope”.

© The Author(s) 2017K. Maronitis, Postnationalism and the Challenges to EuropeanIntegration in Greece, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46346-9_1

1

Immigrants hope to come to Europe; immigrants feared to be dead;citizens fear the uncontrolled flow of immigrants and Europeans hope tofind a solution to the problem of immigration (Pantaleone 2015; Kingsley2015a). The European Union (EU) is struggling to come up with policiesand suggestions to respond humanely to an inflow of immigrants withoutencouraging them to move to Europe.

In an interview with Agence France-Presse, the President of theEuropean Commission Jean-Claude Juncker accused EU member statesof behaving in a “populist fashion” in refusing to accept greater number ofrefugees (Agence France-Presse 2015). Juncker’s intervention regardingthe absence of a political consensus came as approximately 200 immigrantsdrowned on 5 August 2015 attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Forthe European Commission the only viable solution was to proceed to amandatory quota plan for the relocation of 120,000 refugees. “Togetherwe must show the world that the Union is capable of managing this crisis.Doing so requires all Member States to play their part to ensure that thebalance between solidarity and responsibility is maintained” (EuropeanCommission 2015b, a). Despite proclamations of togetherness and soli-darity Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Czech Republic voted againstthis predominantly French and German plan. Usually EU member statesare allowed to veto but the inability of states such as Greece and Italy todeal with large numbers of unregulated immigrants and refugees, and thevehement opposition of the Visegrád countries to accommodate refugeesforced the EU to proceed to majority voting. Under EU rules all memberstates must abide by the rules and accept the compulsory quotas despitethreats for legally challenging this decision and calling it irrational(Chakellian 2015). At the same time, the EU plans to secure even furtherits external borders in order to avert the arrival of more refugees andunregulated immigrants.

For the most part, European officials and citizens ignore the journey ofimmigrants and refugees until they reach a European border such as theGreek islands of Kos, Chios, Rhodes and Lesbos; the English Channel; theGreece–Republic of Macedonia border; the Hungary–Serbia border andthe Hungary–Croatia border. Only then immigration becomes immigra-tion crisis and the subsequent scenes of destitute, desperation and deathmake both immigrants and European citizens raise the question oncemore: “you’re telling me this is Europe?” While Europe fears, hopes andbarricades itself behind immigration detention centres and fences like theones built in Hungary and Bulgaria, and accepts the “jungle” of Calais as a

2 POSTNATIONALISM AND THE CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN…

consequence of the political and religious troubles outside Europe, immi-grants are still convinced that they will be treated better in Europe.Immigrants and refugees want to live and work in Europe, but Europe’sonly response is the construction of anti-Europe—a land of exclusion,immobility and violence. Europe is investing both politically and econom-ically on the construction of a dystopia in order to avert the immigrants’utopian imaginings of a prosperous and fair land.

The European project is at risk if the immigration crisis is not addressedas a quintessentially European crisis. Jean-Claude Juncker’s attack on popu-lism should not be translated only as an indication of poor political leader-ship but also as a lack of political imagination. The prosperous, safe, cleanand healthy continent Europe is perceived to be by Europeans and non-Europeans is overwhelmed by a cacophony of nationalist politics, suspicionand fear. Nationalist parties have misappropriated the immigration crisis asthe most representative problem of everything that is wrong in the EU,which they see as undermining sovereignty as well as marginalising theimportance of national identity and cultural cohesion (BBC News 2014).The popularity of these parties should not be measured exclusively by thenumber of votes they receive in national and European elections but ratherby their way of introducing and normalising certain beliefs and anxietiesabout their respective countries and peoples (European Parliament 2014).1

The anti-immigration parties also known within political and media dis-courses as far right, extreme right, Euro-sceptic, Europhobic and populistpoint out the historical failures of every EU member state and of the EU ingeneral to demonstrate any sign of respect for and recognition of “thosewho were here before” in their attempt to maintain a balance betweenembracing the common market, open borders and protecting social cohe-sion and national identity.

In this political environment, immigration appears as a threatening phe-nomenon that demands first and foremost limitation and control by policeand army forces, the identification of unregulated immigrants popularlyknown as “illegal immigrants” and their subsequent deportation.

The desire of immigrants and refugees to pursue a better life in Europeand the desire of Europeans to preserve their own standards of living, valuesand identities by excluding the immigrants are interwoven in our contem-porary culture and politics and vary from policy documents regardingemployment, welfare and citizenship, political campaigns, elections andprotests to conceptions of social and cultural cohesion and of the goodand ethical life. The turn to culture for the understanding of European

1 INTRODUCTION 3

integration and disintegration, homogeneity and diversity, equality andinequality, inclusion and exclusion has generated an interest in the socio-logical aspects of the EU (Favell and Guirandon 2009). Such aspectsindicate a certain kind of scepticism towards rationalist political approachesto political analysis exclusively through the study of treaties, policies andvoting. The aim of a sociological analysis of the EU is to (re)introduce thestudy of the EU and its responses to immigration as social processes andto raise relevant sociological themes and concerns to mainstream politicalanalyses. Class and identity, hope and fear, utopia and dystopia, mobilityand detention, distribution and recognition, governance and markets,immigration and citizenship are some of the concerns raised for the explora-tion of the possibility of reimagining and constructing a European society.

In an explicit or implicit manner the present exploration challengeswhat Ulrich Beck (2003) describes as “methodological nationalism”.Methodological nationalism supposes the association of society withthe nation state and views the division and organisation of the world bya number of nations competing with each other as a natural world orderby turning a blind eye to cultural flows, transnational commercial net-works and mobilities. Whereas methodological nationalism refers to alimited sociological imagination informed by the nation state, Beck(ibid.) distinguishes it from “normative nationalism” in which thenation’s right to sovereignty as well as to organisation and territory ispolitically and morally substantiated by its own cultural distinctivenessin relation to other nations. By confining society to the state there isstrong insinuation that there are nationally defined and organisedsocieties and the existence of a society, namely a European society, isan impossible project. In turn, the state presents itself as the mostlegitimate provider of law and order and at the same time providesthe means for the analysis of society through official statistics andsocio-political framing. The point of convergence between methodo-logical and normative nationalisms is the point where nationalism isneutralised—where the liberal EU member state does not acknowledgethe input of nationalism concerning conceptions of natives and stran-gers, and of differentiations between “us” and “them”.

By pointing out the dominance and limitations of methodologicalnationalism in an age of supranational mobility, European governanceand institutions, the book does not aspire to provide a blueprint for apostnational (European) society but to rethink European politicsbeyond the nation state, identify the condition of postnationalism in


contemporary exclusion regimes and to explore the possibility ofbelonging and the constitution of the people outside of the nationalstate yet inside the infrastructure of the EU.

WHY GREECE?Even though the book examines the possibilities of a postnational con-dition, its empirical part is largely based on Greece and, in particular, onthe country’s experience to harmonise and integrate itself with the EUand at the same time to deal with immigration and asylum on a nationalas well as on a European level. Here, the aim is to present Greece as anexpanded case study for the analysis of the dynamic relationship betweencore and periphery as structured by the unregulated mobility of people.To paraphrase Lukács’ (1967) observations on Marx’s commodityexchange, what is at issue here is the question: how far are immigrationflows together with their structural consequences able to influence thetotal outer and inner life of Europe?2 The relationship between peripheryand core is vital for Marx when considering social changes on qualitativelevel. Commercial activities and barter, Marx argues, do not originatewithin communities, but where they end, on their border and where theyare closer to other communities: “and from here it strikes back into theinterior of the community, decomposing it” (Marx, 1904, p. 53). In asimilar fashion, the book proceeds from a theoretical and qualitativeanalysis of immigration in Greece to its repercussions on the EU andits political project and then considers how EU policies and directives aretranslated and implemented by citizens and immigration authorities inGreece.

Greece has a complex and ambiguous relationship with Europeanpolitics and culture. Located at the borderlands of the EU, Greece occu-pies a strange position between EU federalism and inward-looking socialformations where membership depends on blood relations. The focus onGreece is determined by specific political and sociological considerationsbased on its citizens’ perception and understanding of the Europeanproject and its Others, namely economic immigrants, unregulated immi-grants and refugees. In drawing the greater part of the material for thisbook from contemporary media and political discourses on immigration inGreece, we will be examining a society and culture where membership andattachment to a federal EU goes hand in hand with the politics and cultureof national superiority, fear and exclusion.

1 INTRODUCTION 5

Greece, a member state of the EU since 1981, was officially declared acountry of immigration soon after the process of liberalisation of stateeconomies was initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, therehas been a great inconsistency on the subject of what constitutes immigra-tion towards Greece. Since its formation as nation state in 1830, Greecehas experienced many diverse forms of migratory movements. Forinstance, Georgoulas (2001) mentions the 1 million of non-natives whoarrived in Greece during the Balkan wars; the 25,000 people whomigrated from Bulgaria to Greece within the context of the 1919Convention for Emigration of Minorities (Dragostinova 2009); theuprooting of 1.4 million Greeks from Asia Minor, Cappadocia and theBlack Sea soon after the failure of Greek expansionism in the area (Clark2007) and the 350,000 Greeks of Istanbul as well as great proportion ofthe Greek community of Egypt after Farouk’s fall in 1952 (Petrakou2001). Even during the mass migratory movement of Greeks to NorthAmerica and to the industrially advanced countries of Europe in the mid-twentieth century, Greece was receiving a significant number of guestworkers from Africa and Asia.

Greek governments started to acknowledge immigration as a significantissue as soon as migratory movements towards Greece ceased to be deter-mined solely on macro political and economic level. This meant thatdiverse groups of people wishing to enter and/or to settle in Greecehave forced the Greek state and its citizens to reconsider issues of tradi-tion, racism, tolerance, integration and national identity. Ultimately, thesemigratory movements characterised as “uncontrolled” and “illegal”initiated a process of reorganisation of Greek society and of reconsidera-tion of the relationship with the EU.

The main obstacle for approaching immigration and its repercussions inthe sphere of European and national politics is its institutional definition asa problem rather than a social phenomenon. Immigration in Greece hasbeen theorised as a problem caused by factors external to the nation statesuch as EU’s fault immigration policies, lack of efficient border controland the dismantlement of the national economies of the immigrants’countries of origin. According to this theorisation, the problem of immi-gration is rooted in the presence of immigrants in a nationally definedspace.

By dismissing the conceptualisation of immigration as a problem, thefocus needs to be redirected at the illuminating and organising qualities ofimmigration. To speak of these qualities is to understand immigration as a


constitutive factor. This theoretical framework challenges the economictheory of immigration manifested in the push–pull principle and thehistorical–structural theory (Castles and Miller 2003), where immigrationis seen as a way of mobilising cheap labour for capital. Useful as thesetheories might be, they tend to immobilise all components involved inimmigration as movement, especially the figure of the immigrant whereshe/he is presented as an adaptable worker, a victim or a potential crim-inal. Immigration needs to be defined as a social relationship and asprocess in order to contextualise and deconstruct its perception frommobility of peoples to “useful”, “illegal”, “uncontrolled” and as a “desta-bilising force of society”.

THE PLAN OF THE BOOK

The book coheres around a series of case studies and theoretical debates.Immigration and the presence of immigrants and refugees appear in thisbook, both as an objective medium through which the reorganisation ofthe EU and Greece can be observed and analysed and as a conceptual toolfor the purpose of contesting political narratives, ideological perceptionsof otherness and illegality.

Chapter 2 deploys the concepts of utopia and dystopia in order toprovide a critical narrative of European unification. Here, the binaryopposition between Europhiles and Euro-sceptics is deemed inadequatefor encapsulating immigration into the current debates on the EU.

Chapter 3 analyses how immigrants are categorised according to theirethnicity, age, gender and skills. By providing an analysis of immigrationpolicy documents in conjunction with census findings, the chapter reflectsthe way policy, police operations and national citizenship respond todemographic changes and perceptions of immigration.

Chapter 4 examines the political and cultural meanings of detention forundocumented immigrants in Greece. Central to this examination are thetheoretical elaborations of Carl Schmitt and Wendy Brown on territorialdivision, the state of exception and waning sovereignty in conjunctionwith reports from the Human Rights Watch and the Greek Council forRefugees.

Following the conclusions of Chap. 4 on detention, isolation and fearof coexistence, Chap. 5 reflects upon the formation and presence of the farright in Europe. The chapter deals with the violent activities and commu-nicative practices of the Greek neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn. Michel

1 INTRODUCTION 7

Wieviorka and Alain Touraine’s theorisation of the subject provides aplatform to examine the emergence of the nationalist subject as a rejectionof liberal parliamentary politics.

Chapter 6 deals with the regulation of dystopia and utopia, exclusionregimes and postnationalism. The freedom of religious practice and thetroubled history of building a mosque in Athens provide the setting for theexamination of the concept and process of integration and tolerance.

Chapter 7 aims at an intervention to the differentiation between “us”and “them”. The chapter explores the possibilities of a postnational EUand acknowledges that all policies and debates on immigration are shapedby what Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad call “state thought”. Inorder to escape the confines of “state thought”, the chapter engages withthe theoretical and practical dimensions of recognition and postnationalcitizenship.

NOTES

1. Populist anti-EU parties were very successful in the European elections of2014 at the expense of the European federation project envisioned primarilyby the Social Democrats and the European People’s Party, respectively. TheFront National won in France, the UK Independence Party led the polls inthe UK, the Danish People’s party triumphed in Denmark, Jobbik did wellin Hungary and neo-Nazi party of Greece Golden Dawn established them-selves as the third most popular party and as a considerable political force byattracting 9.6 % of the vote (McDonald-Gibson and Lichfield 2014).

2. György Lukács’ original text focuses on modern capitalism, commodityexchange and commodity relations: “what is at issue here, however, is thequestion: how far is commodity exchange together with its structural con-sequences able to influence the total outer and inner life of society?” (Lukács1967, p. 83).


CHAPTER 2

European Unification and ExclusionRegimes

Abstract The chapter deploys the concepts of utopia and dystopia inorder to provide a critical narrative of European unification. Here, thebinary opposition between Europhiles and Euro-sceptics is deemed inade-quate for encapsulating immigration into the current debates on theEuropean Union (EU).

Keywords Dublin regulation � EU integration � Europia � Postnationalism �Euro-sceptics and Europhiles � Utopia

THE IMMIGRATION CRISIS AS EUROPEAN CRISIS

The monetary and financial aspects of the European Union (EU) havedominated the political and media discourses of the recent crisis inEurope. On one level, the European crisis revolves around debts, budgetdeficits and financial consolidation. But on another level, the crisis manifestsitself with questions about Europe’s ability to act as a single political entitybeyond national divisions. The common currency is not the only testingground for European integration, solidarity and cooperation. Besides themonetary union and its subsequent problems, the EU is struggling to cometo terms with changing patterns of population, immigration flows and thecontrol of mobility in its external and internal borders.

Even though the immigration crisis Europe is facing has been over-shadowed by the current financial crisis, the former has managed to


9

intensify its impact on the way the European project is both perceived andexperienced. More specifically, the immigration crisis constructs mobilityand asylum as objects of fear and in turn presents them as vital parametersfor the constitution of living in and belonging to the EU.

Since its inception as an economic and political entity, the EU hasbeen trying to dilute its internal borders through the free movement ofthe citizens of its member states and protecting its external borders withpolicing and border controls. In 1957 Belgium, the Federal Republic ofGermany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed thefounding treaty of the European Economic Community (ECC). TheTreaty of Rome established the main principles for an ever-closer unionand solidarity among the peoples of Europe. Such a union aimed at thewell-being of European peoples by strengthening their economies andby ensuring a harmonious development between countries and theirrespective regions. One of the major forces towards the main objectivesof the treaty was the free movement of capital within Europe, but alsothe free movement of people. Article 3 of the treaty illustrates that thecommunity’s integration depends on a common market that allows “theabolition, as member states, of obstacles to freedom of movement forpersons, services and capital” (European Commission a). The objectivewas not only that labour should be perceived and treated as one of thecommodities traded across the borders of member states but also thatthis freedom of movement should contribute towards the popularacceptance of an increasingly unified Europe.1

As a result of the abolition of borders between member states and thefreedom of movement, a certain distinction between immigrants andEuropeans started to develop. In the 1970s, immigration to Europebecame practically impossible and at the same time the rights of non-Europeans residing in Europe, categorised as third country nationals,differed significantly from those immigrants with nationalities from themember states. The consideration of a borderless Europe generated secur-ity and cultural anxieties of uncontrolled flows of non-European immi-grants crossing the frontiers of this economic community.

The membership of Greece in 1980 and of Spain and Portugal, respec-tively, in 1986 on one hand enlarged the community both geographicallyand culturally but on the other hand it signalled the transition of these newmember states from countries of emigration to countries of immigration.In turn, this transition authorised west and north European states todemand combined policing of the external borders of Europe. Countries

10 POSTNATIONALISM AND THE CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN . . .

like Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal were asked to introduce coherentimmigration controls and policies for the first time in their history asnation states. As Teresa Hayter (2004) notes, these requests were nevera product of planning and intergovernmental cooperation. That means theEuropean parliament was not given the chance to question the methodsand practicalities of subsequent border policing and controls.

South member states were reluctant to relinquish any control of theirnational borders, which they believed to be imperative for the articula-tion of their national narratives and the defence of national sovereignty.Yet, at the same time the very principle of abolishing obstacles to the freemovement of people, services and capital was formalised in 1985, atSchengen, Luxembourg. The treaty signed by five of the then 10 mem-ber states of the ECC proposed the gradual abolition of border checksand the establishment of common borders. Proposed measures includedthe harmonisation of visa policies among the signatory member statesand allowing residents in border areas to cross borders away from fixedcheckpoints. The agreement constituted an area known as the Schengenarea that operated like a single state with respect to international travelpurposes, external border controls for entering and exiting the area butwith no internal border controls. Since 1999, Schengen is a core part ofEU law and all member states apart from the ones who opted out,namely Ireland and the UK, are legally obliged to be part of as soon asall technical requirements have been met.2

With no control at the international borders of this newly designatedarea, a certain mechanism was needed for determining responsibility forasylum applications submitted to the member states. Such a mechanismwould ensure access to all processes leading to the granting of refugee statusbut at the same time would prevent the abuse of the asylum system throughthe submission of multiple applications to multiple member states. Initially,the arrangements for determining and delegating responsibilities for asylumapplications were part of the intergovernmental Schengen convention.These arrangements were later replaced with the most effective yet con-troversial agreement in terms of securing the external borders of Europe—the Dublin Convention and its future manifestation the Dublin Regulationmostly known as Dublin II. The Dublin Convention was signed in Dublin,Ireland on 15 June 1990, and it was first implemented on 1 September1997 by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK and later on by Austria, Swedenand Finland as well as by non-EU member states such as Norway,

2 EUROPEAN UNIFICATION AND EXCLUSION REGIMES 11

Switzerland and Iceland. The Dublin Regulation was certified in 2003seemingly replacing theDublinConvention. TheDublinRegulation,mostlyknown as Dublin II, is a EU law (Council Regulation 2003/342/CE) thatestablishes the criteria for determining which member states are responsibleto deal with specific asylum seekers as individual cases seeking internationalprotection under the Geneva Convention and the EU QualificationDirective within the EU.Dublin II establishes the principle that the memberstate in question, not the EU, is responsible for examining an asylumapplication. Dublin II constitutes a response to asylum seekers breakingthe law by travelling illegally from country to country often relying on highlypaid smugglers to help them. Paragraph 1, Article 31 of the InternationalConvention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that certain asylumseekers may have to or even forced to use illicit means of entry into safecountries such as evasion of customs and immigration checks and passportcontrols and in turn hosting countries should not impose penalties on themfor their mode of entry. But with the creation of the single border by theSchengen Treaty, asylum seekers and other undocumented immigrants whoenter the EU “illegally” have come to be seen as threat to EU’s security. Theassociation of asylum seeking with illegality leads to the presumption thatmost asylum cases are fabricated and the extreme exclusionary measures arejustified. Yet, plenty of immigrants at the gates of Europe do not qualifyas refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Convention. Poverty and chronicunemployment push people in search for employment to the functioningeconomies of the West. Like legal immigrants, undocumented immigrantsfollow growing labour markets but in order to do so they have to share themobility patterns of asylum seekers: identify unguarded spaces of entry,use the same smugglers and being accommodate in the same detentioncentres. There is no stipulation in the Geneva Convention for economicimmigrants and consequently their legal integration into the world economyis almost impossible. Restrictions on freedom of movement with regard toimmigrants other than asylum seekers highlight complex issues regardingthe character and organisation of the EU. Freedom to enter a new placeshould be exercised in a way that accommodates equally the claims of bothimmigrants and the citizens of the host societies. The claim that freedom ofmovement towards the EU should be restricted due to welfare and securityanxieties is indisputable across the political spectrum. Considerations overwelfare, public order and social cohesion provide a sense of guidance oncertain principles that must be in place in order to ensure proper distributionof benefits and management of third country nationals.


In order to eliminate the abuse of the asylum system and unregulatedimmigration, the primary objectives of Dublin II were to prevent an asylumapplicant from submitting applications in multiple member states and toreduce the number of people seeking asylum by travelling from memberstate to member state. Since the member state that a person first entered isresponsible for dealing with the application all countries on the borderlandsof the EU are on immense economic, administrative and social pressure.Immigration and Dublin II construct a Europe with varying standards ofreception facilities and social conditions where refugees and economicimmigrants are frequently treated as people with less or no rights at all.

From the Greek–Turkish border in the east to the Spanish Canary islandsoff the west coast of Africa to the Italian island of Lampedusa, the arrival ofthousands of refugees from Syria, Eritrea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bangladeshand Somalia is posing serious challenges to the EU’s commitment to theprotection of human rights. Amongst EU member states there is the beliefthat the act of granting asylum is an indispensable part of European valuesand European identity. This belief has come under scrutiny as the commit-ment to welcome and protect people fleeing civil wars and persecution isincreasingly perceived as a financial and administrative burden. In addition,the EU is implicitly questioning the relevance of this otherwise establishedbelief by raising suspicions over the legitimacy of asylum applications andthe motives of applicants, which in effect might undermine the wholeprocess of granting asylum in EU member states. Moreover, a series ofresearchers (Samers 2004; Schuster 2011) in conjunction with reportsfrom Human Rights Watch and United Nations High Commssioner forRefugees (UNHCR) have raised concerns over three issues regarding EU’smanagement of asylum applications: the inefficiency of Dublin II withrespect to lack of coordination between member states and the absence ofa pan-European immigration policy; the injustice inflicted on asylum seekersregarding their living conditions in reception and detention centres and theinability or unwillingness of member states to adhere to the standards set bythe Dublin Regulation.

Member states are hesitant to undertake administrative duties for immi-grants who arrive at the east and south gates of Europe. Within the southand southeast Europe, thousands of immigrants and asylum seekers aretrapped in a bureaucratic web woven by lack of resources, xenophobia andlack of coordinated policy. Dublin II has forced immigrants and asylumseekers to remain in countries, which they seldom grant asylum and mostimportantly their lack of experience and resources prevents them from


developing coherent asylum systems. The main issues for asylum appli-cants within the parameters of the Dublin procedure are access to recep-tion conditions and the standard of the services provided. As a result,thousands of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers have beenreduced to homelessness, deprivation and subjected to racist violence.

Greece is at the forefront of these criticisms and concerns over therelationship between Dublin II and member states. Although the cred-ibility and efficiency of Dublin II depends on the harmonisation of stan-dards of protection and reception, the UNHCR (2009) has reported thatin Greece a considerable number of asylum seekers are not being treatedaccording to set standards of protection and legal representation. Thecentral areas of concern in Greece are the impenetrable bureaucraticstructures with respect to the asylum application, the risk of deportationto the closest country of entry (most likely Turkey) and the appalling livingconditions in the reception and detention centres where police harassmentis commonplace.3

The inability of Greece to adhere to the standards of processing anddetention set up by the EU and the preoccupation of member states ofreducing the “asylum burden” instead of sharing it (Schuster 2011) haveled to the revision of Dublin II with the constitution of Dublin III. InJanuary 2014, Dublin III came into effect as EU law (CouncilRegulation 2013/604/CE). The latest manifestation of the DublinRegulation largely maintained the same principles and processes of theprevious ones but introduced some improvements concerning the posi-tion of asylum seekers. These improvements can be found in the wayinformation about the Dublin Regulation needs to be communicatedclearly to asylum seekers in the shape of a formal interview prior to theinterview regarding asylum; the right of the asylum seeker to appealagainst a Dublin decision; the need to detain asylum seekers only ifthere is a genuine risk of absconding and that the member state wherean asylum seeker is present has 3 months from the time immigration andasylum authorities have become aware of their presence to make atransfer request to another EU member state. While the intention ofDublin III was to accelerate the process of assessing asylum applicationsand transfers of applicants within the Dublin cooperating states, it didnot consider the sharp increase of migration flows towards Europe andpersistent lack of cooperation between member states. As a result, noneof the improvements stated in Dublin III have been implemented simplybecause EU member states like Greece and Italy do not have the


resources to implement them. The structural deficiencies of the DublinRegulation in all its administrative and legal manifestations and the use ofviolence as a means to apprehend migratory flows have led the GermanFederal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in August 2015 toissue internal instructions suspending all procedures related to theDublin Regulation with respect to Syrian refugees. According to theseinstructions, Dublin procedures such as the two interviews, filing andassessment of asylum applications in relation to Syrian nationals are to becancelled in order for Germany to become the EU member state respon-sible for processing their claims (BAMF 2015).

EU’s exclusionary immigration policies initially aspired to formaliseasylum applications, control tumultuous immigration flows, provide asolution to incidents of xenophobia and contribute to further integrationof member states. While the Eurozone crisis has given rise to what UlrichBeck (2013, p. 38) calls the “Europe builders” pushing towards a closereconomic integration between Eurozone members, the immigration crisisis creating the exact opposite effect—a disintegration of the EU and theproliferation of nationalism and xenophobia. Dublin II was struck amidthe economic and monetary enthusiasm of 2003 but since 2008 appears tobe as flawed as the constitution of the Eurozone. It is drawing an uneveneconomic and social map that allows attractive immigrant destinationssuch as Britain, France and Germany to push off on to peripheral EUcountries such as Greece, economic, administrative and policing tasks andobligations that they could not afford even before the financial crisis. In2007, the European Commission acknowledged that Dublin II may “defacto result in additional burdens of member states that have limitedreception and absorption capacities and that find themselves under parti-cular migratory pressures because of their geographical location”(Ngalikimpa and Hennessy 2013, p. 15).

The perception of certain EU countries as attractive yet unreachabledestinations in conjunction with the uneven distribution of tasks and obli-gations regarding immigration has contributed to the political, economicand cultural fragmentation of the EU. With respect to a traditional config-uration of the EU that reflects power and decision-making there is a cleardistinction between centres of power and periphery. In this sense, the centreof the EU is in Brussels, Strasbourg, or in Germany and France as the mostpowerful member states and most attractive destinations for non-Europeanimmigrants. On the economic level, there is a rift between the rich northand the poor south, between creditor and debtor member states. The latter


have no alternative but accepting a certain set of policies for evaluating thestatus of immigrants and requesting financial help for their subsequentmanagement. On the cultural level the periphery of Europe is seen asincompetent—as people who lack decisiveness and organisational skills inorder to overcome corruption, shadow labour markets and undocumentedimmigration. Following through these types of fragmentation the EUappears to contain two major types of outsiders. The first type consists ofthe peripheral member states, which depend on the financial assistance aswell as on the political will and expertise of the core member states inexchange of their sovereignty. The second type consists of asylum seekersand undocumented immigrants who either exist under the radar of policeforces and political authorities or live as detainees in anticipation of theirasylum application and immigrant status.

Even though the Schengen Treaty, the Dublin Convention and theirrepercussions do not necessarily explain or determine what sort of politicalentity the EU is, it is now so complex and encompassing that it may bedescribed as some kind of “polity” (Mair 2005, p. 6) or in a more generalsense a “political system” (Hix and Høyland 2005, p. 12). Whether thispolity or political system should exist and how many competencies itshould have and to what extent they should contest the role of the nationstate are questions of constant debate and political division.

THE EU BETWEEN EURO-SCEPTICS AND EUROPHILES

The process of European integration based on the free movement of goods,services and people between member states in tandem with the immigrationcrisis have spawned a major political binary opposition evident in the ideasand practices of Euro-sceptics and Europhiles, respectively.4

Euro-scepticism as a political stance exists according to the principles ofeconomic, political and cultural opposition to European integration. Euro-scepticism is not an isolated idea but rather a response to the uncertain statusof the EU and the relationship between its member states. Parties, protestgroups and citizens may oppose European integration for the defence oftheir national sovereignty and community and/or for the rejection of theEU’s common market-oriented policies. Far right political formations andparties capitalise on feelings of cultural loss and insecurity and raise identityconcerns to reject further integration and open borders between memberstates. On the other hand, communist parties and other left-wing formationsexpress their opposition to EU on the basis of neo-liberal economic policies


and labour flexibility that the common market advocates. Euro-scepticismhas been excessively used as an explanatory term for the opposition to thefederalist aspirations of EU technocrats as providing an identity to politicalparties who oppose certain aspects of EU policies and projects. Szczerbiakand Taggart (2008) formalise this general application of the term by differ-entiating between “hard” and “soft”Euro-scepticism.HardEuro-scepticismadvocates withdrawal from the EU and the re-emergence of the nationstate as the most dominant institution in international politics. Soft Euro-scepticism does not target the European project in its entirety but insteadexpresses anxieties and puts forward certain critiques of specific EU poli-cies such as monetary union and Dublin II. This, in turn, suggests thatEuro-scepticism is not a marginal phenomenon but ironically is a productof the EU’s democratisation process because it contests the administrativeand legislative capacities of the EU and questions the integrity of its actors.

Despite the gradual popularity of Euro-scepticism, the default positionof most parties is to support reluctantly integration and cooperation.Politics in the EU is still characterised by “a distinct pro-integration coreof Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats that are ideologi-cally inclined to endorse further steps of integration both economicallyand politically” (Crum 2007, p. 65). The EU exercises a strong influenceon the character of national democratic politics and by association onnational political parties. One of the most obvious effects of this influenceis the homogenisation of politics and the subsequent elimination of anyideological differences between political parties. Peter Mair (2013, p. 10)observes that the demand for policy harmonisation amongst nationalgovernments and EU institutions has limited the space where parties candifferentiate themselves in terms of ideology and policy. Furthermore, thepower of national governments to implement any policy of their own islimited by the primacy of European policies over national ones such asfiscal consolidation policies devised by the European Central Bank (ECB)and immigration and asylum policies formulated by the Dublin Regulation.

The great contradiction of this immigration crisis is that it manifestsitself both as crisis of the existing nation states and as a crisis of a stateyet to materialise, which is the ideal conclusion of the constitution of afederal Europe. As Balibar (2011) notes, it is towards that non-materi-alised state or perhaps the bureaucratic structures, which stand for itsabsence that an increasing number of decisions of economic, adminis-trative and economic nature have shifted. Whereas, according to Weber(2009), the traditional state defines itself by its monopoly over the


means and exercise of violence, the EU attempts to define itself by itsmonopoly over the movement of EU citizens and third countrynationals. The definition of the state through its monopoly over powerand of an emerging state like the EU through its monopoly overmobility enables citizens and policymakers to differentiate between posi-tive power and negative power as well as positive mobility and negativemobility. If EU institutions and citizens wish to maintain an unrestrictedflow of goods, people and services they must identify flows of goods,people and services which are harmful and decide how to protectthemselves against them. The European single border and the freedomof mobility pose a problem of “a dangerous excess” (Huysmans 2006,p. 88). It is the definition and regularisation of this dangerous excessthat to some extent designate the European space of free movement andassociation. Consequently, as Huysmans (2006) suggests Europe iswitnessing the development of a structure in which the relation betweenfreedom and security is competitive and functional at the same time.Regulation of migration and detention of immigrants control the free-dom of movement and as a result limit the capacity of people to pursuetheir ends freely. On the other hand, regulation and detention arenecessary preconditions for freedom to exist in a particular politicaland economic space such as the EU. Such practices protect the freedomof EU citizens against the danger of being subjugated by the unrest-ricted freedom of others.

THE EU BETWEEN UTOPIA AND DYSTOPIA

The EU and its member states acknowledge that the rules for a controlledimmigration inflow and an ordered presence of immigrants derive fromcollective values and their respective economic needs, but they seldomconsider how sentiments towards immigration contribute to the forma-tion of these policies and to the reconstitution of national identities andnarratives. In the past, the debate about European integration was exem-plified by the binary discourses of Euro-sceptics and Europhiles. On thecontrary, the current debate raises the questions if and how the project canbe saved. Useful as the binary between Euro-sceptics and Europhilesmight be, it has reached its analytical limits and it cannot encapsulate thelived experience of migration and the anxieties it generates. First, thisbinary is inadequate because it explicitly refers to Europeans citizens butsystematically excludes those who reside in the EU but they are not


officially part of it, namely refugees, immigrants and undocumented immi-grants. Second, it refers only to official aspects of the experience ofimmigration in Europe but fails to address specific social and culturalcontexts. Third, it fails to address the ambiguities of national andEuropean identities and how these identities are conceptualised and nar-rated outside institutions and official discourses. Fourth, it does not con-tribute to a narrative about the European project but instead it assesses thesuccess and failure of institutions, policies and treaties.

In this book, I want to introduce the term Europia a term that encap-sulates different theoretical positions regarding the experience of immi-gration and its impact on the European project. Europia shifts the debatefrom the binary of Euro-sceptics and Europhiles to the capacity of immi-gration to create dystopian and utopian visions about the Europeanproject. Europia perceives and addresses the EU as a coherent yet multi-faceted political entity and contextualises immigration as a constitutiveforce towards exclusion regimes as well as postnationalism. With the shiftto the potential of immigration to create utopian and dystopian environ-ments, the book wants to assess the possibility or impossibility ofEuropean citizenship and open borders; to examine how notions such asnative and stranger, domestic and international have become increasinglyblurred; to address all identities as ambiguous identities and trace thenarratives of utopia and dystopia, and to identify the contemporary narra-tors of Europe.

The prospects for immigrants and asylum seekers arriving in the EUare closely related with the constitutive components of Europia,namely of dystopian and utopian imaginations of Europe. The EU incollaboration with its member states collect data on the irregularmobility of people by considering ethnicity, religion, gender and age,and devise policies on the legitimate exclusion and inclusion of immi-grants. Nonetheless, policies on citizenship, labour, welfare and resi-dence exist within a specific ideological and political environment andall solutions to the immigration crisis inevitably correspond to andsupport this environment. At the same time, we have to take intoaccount approaches and attitudes, which do not necessarily disregardpolicy but their main concern is the reimagination and reconstitutionof this political environment. These are utopian/dystopian approachesto the immigration crisis and evaluate immigration and policy accord-ing to an imagined political community that extends beyond institu-tional directives and frameworks.


UTOPIA AND ITS OPPOSITES

Is it not utopia a problematic term? Is it not a concept associated with thepolitics of the great ideological divisions? Between Left and Right? BetweenEast and West? By the end of the twentieth century, utopia had come to beperceived as parochial, illusory and dangerous. Moreover, the last few yearsthe term has resurfaced in political and media discourses with respect toterrorism and Islamic fundamentalism (Jacoby 2000). Liberal intellectualssuch as Karl Popper (1986), Isaiah Berlin (Davis 2001), andHannah Arendt(1976) associated utopia with totalitarianism and pointed the discrepancybetween the requirements of a utopian project and the human condition; theurge for centrally imposed cultural and social perfection inevitably leads todespotic regimes. The ideological gap between utopia and liberalism remainsrelevant within the conflict between religious and political movements andthe rational approaches of contemporary capitalism. However, this rathersimplistic view of utopia as the opposite to rationalism and liberal valuesprevents the contextualisation of utopia as a particular mode of thought thatcontributed to the formation of the nation state as “an original spatial, socialand cultural form” (Wegner 2002, p. xvi). Indeed, the influence of thisparticular utopian vision can be viewed in the desire of the EU to acquirethe organisational aspects, values, status of the nation state and particular toconstitute a “social base, founded upon representation and a mediation ofcollective conflicts, which had gradually come to bestow legitimacy upondemocratic nation states” (Balibar 2011, p. 48).

Amidst the decline of and even aversion to utopian ideas, certain theoristshave attempted to redefineutopia according to contemporary ideological andcultural conflicts, and when possible to salvage any positive aspects that theconceptmight contain. ForRussell Jacoby (2000)utopia has beendissociatedfrom any sense of ordered living and is now strongly linked with politicalthreats, dictatorships and ethnic and social engineering. Jacoby introduces adistinction between “blueprint utopias” (Jacoby 2000, p. 166) and utopiasassociated with “revolutions in imagination” (Jacoby 2000, p. 180) in orderto distance himself from the utopian totalitarian thought of the twentiethcentury. “Blueprint” are the type of utopias concerned with every detailregarding identity formation, socialmobility and cultural activitywhile “revo-lutionary” utopias are concerned with the realisation of a superior society yetthey do not cohere around precise cultural and social measurements.

Similarly, David Harvey (2000, p. 182) develops a different kind ofdistinction between utopias. Informed by Thomas More’s utopia, the first


kind are “utopias of spatial form”, which venerate certain types of values,social interaction and organisation structured around the narrative of theideal city of a manageable size and population. On the other hand, there are“utopias of process”, conceived according to historical dynamics that even-tually resolve conflicts in the future without explicitly reaching a telos orreferring to a final state of affairs. Here Harvey has in mind Marx’s classstruggle as an indication of a processual utopia. As class consciousness leadsto class struggle history reaches the stage of a post-revolutionary classlesssociety where even the state would eventually fade away. “Whereas Moregives the spatial form but not the process Marx gives us the distinctiveversion of the temporal process, but not the ultimate spatial form” (Harvey2000, p. 174). Even though Harvey favours Marx’s processual utopia isquick to note that utopias of process tend to romanticise infinite openprojects that never reach a point of closure within space and place.

Yet, a total utopia that combines both spatial and temporal processes isfor Jeffrey Alexander (2001) incommensurable with contemporary plur-alistic and multicultural societies. Alexander welcomes the demise of totalutopias as illustrated in revolutionary theory and practice and acknowl-edges the importance of multiple self-limiting utopias. Feminism, ecology,multiculturalism might signal the end of revolution as such but thoseissues and movements are limited utopias of a different kind. Every aspira-tion to equality and recognition produces a more civil society. The con-cept of utopia for Alexander needs to be reconsidered as a “self-limitingcivil utopia” where different utopias compete with each other. “It is whatmakes them self-limited, and it makes totalisation and totalitarianismimpossible” (Alexander 2001, p. 581). By that he means that criticalthinking and not necessarily radical social and institutional change is anactual practice of utopia.

In this sense, utopia can be a relevant and meaningful concept if andwhen it serves as an inspiration for envisioning alternative forms of socialstatus, dynamics and socialisation instead of well-designed and calculatedsocial plans. As Wegner (2002, p. 115) poignantly asserts, “utopia pre-sents a narrative of history-in-formation rather than the historical descrip-tion of a fully formed historical situation”.

Despite the epistemological and theoretical differences of the above-mentioned conceptions of utopia, what they actually share is Ernst Bloch’s(1995, 2000) suspicion of utopia as trouble-free world and as conceptnecessarily tied with the future. For Bloch, utopia is not only a rationalistconstruction and projection into the future but also something evident in


the here and now although available in traces of cultural projections,political rhetoric and participation. Moreover, as Bloch (1995) pointsout, these traces do not always correspond to the politics of social justice,equality and economic redistribution but also to the politics of fascism inits attempt to construct anti-capitalist and nationalistic values.

However, what remains absent from contemporary reflections on thephilosophical tradition of utopia is the notion of movement (Couton andLópez 2009). Surely, processual utopias as discussed by Harvey do notnecessarily neglect movement but they only consider movement in timeand not in space. Similarly, spatial utopias fail to address the journey—themovement in space—towards a particular place or society possessing theperfect qualities of being and association. Current configurations of utopiaas viewed through the prism of immigration emphasise movement and inparticular the movement of people towards the functioning democraticpolities and economies of the EU. These configurations also constitutethese destinations as places of detection, restriction and exclusion, asplaces of dystopia where nationalism, xenophobia and racism becomedefence mechanisms against a postnational and borderless world.Therefore, the concept of Europia can be found in a series of actions,attitudes and mentalities concerning the way the EU, member states andimmigration authorities consciously construct a dystopian environmentfor immigrants and aspiring EU citizens; the way nation states understandethnic and cultural homogeneity as a political and organisational utopia;the way the arrival of legal and undocumented immigrants as well asasylum seekers contributes to a dystopia of a torn social fabric and socialunrest and how immigrants and aspiring EU citizens view Europe as autopia of active promotion of peace, rule of law, rights of democraticparticipation, freedom and equality.

Of interest to this book is how the spectres of utopia and dystopiaintertwined with immigration and illustrated in the concept of Europiaconstitute an organising device for the character of the EU and of Greece asits member state. The concept of Europia exists between the sociologicalanalysis of immigration in Europe and an imaginary future of the EUviewed through the prism of immigration. The space Europia occupiesbetween sociological analysis and utopian/dystopian imaginations requiresthe application of two distinctive yet interconnected methods for theanalysis of the transformative power of immigration.

First, Europia needs to be placed along two axes according to Deleuzeand Guatarri’s (1988, pp. 3–4; see also DeLanda 2006, pp. 8–13)


theorisation of “territorialisation and deterritorialisation”. The first axisinvolves discursive and non-discursive components while the second axisinvolves all processes and mobility, which reinforce, legitimise or challengethese components. The discursive components of the first axis are policies,statistics and public opinion polls whereas the non-discursive componentsare social and political theories, narratives of Greek and European identity,sentiments towards immigrants and the immigration policy framework.On this axis, both the discursive and the non-discursive components playan expressive and constructive role, which means they do not only expressa reality regarding the European and Greek immigration crisis but theyalso have the capacity to construct such a reality. On the second axis thereexist processes and unregulated mobilities of people, which stabilise anddestabilise the emergent reality expressed and constructed on the first axis.Immigration characterised by national governments and EU officials aseither legal or illegal liberates political and cultural flows, which exceed thecurrent frameworks of social organisation and political formations.

Yesterday, the socialisation of children, or migrants involved learning thenational historical narrative; today, migrants and their children contribute tochanging this narrative, forcing the nation to recognize the less gloriouspages of its past, its areas of darkness and practices of violence and brutality.(Wieviorka 2012, p. 9)

However, if the EU can only function by liberating mobility that deterri-torialises citizenship, national identity, communal bonds and otherness, itconstantly seeks to incorporate (reterritorialise) them into the existingframeworks of ethnic hierarchies, detention and racial profiling, integra-tion and national values.

Second, the processes of “territorialisation and deterritorialisation” inthis book refer to and operate within two socio-political extremes: exclusionregimes and postnationalism. The immigration crisis enters the domains ofpolitical administration and of utopian and dystopian imaginations throughspecific strategies and responses. Whereas exclusion regimes clearly refer tosocial and political exclusion, detention, prohibitive immigration policiesand racist violence, postnationalism demands further clarification. Thetransformative power of immigration questions traditional frameworks ofcitizenship and suggests new theoretical and empirical models of belongingand membership to national and intranational polities. The aim of nation-alism is to create a normative socio-political order determined by the


primacy of national culture, economy and identity. When such order isunder threat, nationalism can become violent and expansionary for itsdefence. Immigration and EU integration have played a significant part inthe development of the discourse of postnationalism. Immigration chal-lenges the national character of polities in both demographic and culturalterms. Regardless of processes of immigrant integration and exclusion,national governments are forced to acknowledge the presence of peoplewith different ethnicities and cultural patterns, which may not always be insynch with nationalism’s normative order. Additionally, the EU is the onlypolity with the potential to participate in the discourse of postnationalism.Despite EU’s intranational character, in which national cultures and citizen-ship are meant to be respected, preserved and occasionally celebrated, thefederal aspirations of the “Europe builders” (Beck 2013, p. 38) indicate thediminishing relevance of the nation state and the need for intense coopera-tion between member states for terminating national rivalries and providingintranational solutions to national problems. To speak of postnationalismdoes not necessarily indicate an epoch in which the nation and its symbols ofidentification have been surpassed by homogenising cultural processes andintranational administration. More exactly, the prefix “post” indicates a newsocio-political condition and formation that is temporally after but not overthe dominance of the nation. As Brown (2012, p. 39) reasons with respectto the post-Westphalian order, “we use the term ‘post’ only for a presentwhose past continues to capture and structure it”. The prefix “post” pro-vides us with aWeltanschauung for the critical examination of the role of thenation and nationality for immigration policies, attitudes towards immigra-tion, and the way immigrants see the EU and its member states.

The focus on these two extremes makes it possible to grasp the utopianand dystopian character of attitudes to immigration and immigrants,policies and control and how they all contribute to certain imaginationsregarding the EU project and Greece as its member state. Europia as aconcept neither aspires to a normative understanding of the EU nornecessarily aims at the improvement of immigration policy. Instead,Europia aims at the problematisation of categories such as “better”, “use-ful”, “productive”, “civilised”, “illegal” and “uncontrolled” as these areunderstood and deployed in the present social order. Europia has as itsstarting point-specific social phenomena and problems and works towardsan explanation of how they came about. In relation to the past, it asksprecisely how the emergence of nationalist, intranational and postnationalformations came to be projected as necessary and universal. In relation to


the present, it examines the way these formations are deployed as defencemechanisms against immigration and then in turn the theoretical dis-courses which, either support or reject such deployment. As for the future,it aims at the construction of a theoretical and social framework, whichdoes not only challenge existing socio-political arrangements but alsoprovides the means for the understanding of immigration beyond thebinaries of “us” and “them”, “national” and “foreigner”, “native” and“stranger”.

NOTES

1. The European single market was perceived as the great antidote to the direeconomic condition of many European countries. Even though there werecountries, such as the UK opposed to common defence policy, commoncurrency and generally to the federalisation of Europe they endorsed thesingle market as a step towards the establishment of trade liberalisation.

2. The Trevi agreement can be described as a political and operational pre-cursor to the Schengen agreement. Trevi was established in 1957 and was anintergovernmental network independent of the European Community. Itstipulated the exchange of information about terrorism but ministers andpolice authorities soon after used the same infrastructure for tackling crim-inal activities in general.

3. Turkey and Greece have a bilateral readmittance agreement allowing eachcountry to send back people found travelling without documents and out-side of the legal channels of travel and transportation. Nevertheless, whenconsidering asylum seekers this aforementioned agreement cannot be imple-mented because Greece as an EU member state is obliged to interviewasylum seekers and assess their applications.

4. Before EU, federal aspirations started to be perceived by many as a threat tonational sovereignty the debate on the state of the EU was dominated by the“realists” and federalists. While the federal position has more or lessremained unchanged, the first form of opposition to European federalismwas constituted by political figures advocating a form of intergovernment-alism where distinctive member states with distinctive national governmentscan work together on a number of set projects.


CHAPTER 3

Immigration Policies and the Controlof Mobility

Abstract The chapter analyses how immigrants are categorised accordingto their ethnicity, age, gender and skills. By providing an analysis ofimmigration policy documents in conjunction with census findings, thechapter reflects the way policy, police operations and national citizenshiprespond to demographic changes and perceptions of immigration.

Keywords Immigration policy � Greece � South Europe � New countriesof immigration � Frontex � Policing � State racism � Precarisation

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MOBILITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY

The responses of a society to people who enter its sovereign territory with orwithout legal authorisation indicate to a great extent how that societyconceives itself and its Others. The issue of these responses becomes extre-mely complicated when the countries of South Europe and especiallyGreece are examined through the prism of immigration. FollowingCastles and Miller (2003), and Geddes (2007) this indicates that not onlyEurope’s immigration frontiers have moved south since the 1980s but alsothat new types of responses have emerged. The spatial dimension of thisdistinction points out to the geographical position of these countries andtheir close proximity to the troubled countries of the former Soviet Union,North Africa and the Middle East. In effect, this geographical and politicaltransformation has led whole countries of Europe to become borderlands


27

themselves. The temporal dimension and especially the reference to the“new countries of immigration” (Castles and Miller 2003, pp. 82–83),becomes quite problematic since it implies an efficiency deficit and a“catch up” process (Geddes 2007, p. 149) with the older, west and northEuropean Union (EU) member states. In the first instance, this distinctionappears to be parochial since everything that characterised immigration inSouth European countries in the past, namely weak border controls andreluctance regarding regularisation of immigrants amongst other things, hasgiven its place to strict border controls, building of reception and detentioncentres in an attempt of harmonisation with EU directives. Nevertheless,this distinction would not have existed if the alleged new countries ofimmigration of South Europe did not express great anxieties about theirethnic homogeneity in the form of poor policy, violent practices and con-sistent criminalisation of immigration and immigrants.

Immigration in Greece is often associated with criminality and illegalityand often (re)presented as uncontrolled. In Colette Guillamin’s words, theemphasis on illegality and order implies “wildness and savagery . . . savagescoming into the country” (Guillamin 1995, p. 109). Even though theseterms and characterisations hardly figure in the official political discoursethey are often implied and communicated outside of it. The illegality thatcharacterises immigration denotes, much like citizenship, a juridical statusthat necessitates a socio-political relation with the state. The immigrant or inmore general terms the alien in European soil is constructed in Europeanand national immigration policies as an informal subject with no specificrights and agency yet charged with negative content. Similarly, immigrationhas been made into a formal socio-political topic capable of causing com-munity tensions, and destabilising the labour market. The discrepancybetween the legal depiction of the immigrant as an informal subject withthe acknowledgement of immigration as a formal object of social andpolitical concern, illuminates the struggles of the nation state to assert itssovereignty in the context of a postnational condition characterised byimmigration flows and tensions between EU and national governance,respectively.

In order to redefine the role of the state, political parties channel theanxieties of national identity, social and cultural cohesion through thephenomenon of immigration and its management. The interests, considera-tions and anxieties, which determine immigration policy in the EU, can becharacterised as multifaceted. They involve a wide range of components onnational and international level, which actively participate in immigration


policy and are quite often divided regarding the effect of immigration onthe economic, social and political terrain. Debates on immigration in SouthEurope and in Greece, more specifically, are cast in a rather differentmanner. Distrust towards the government to promote and secure nationalinterests along with the informal character of the employment procedures ofimmigrant workers, and of the assessment of asylum applications constituteimmigration to Greece as an issue of legal and security concern. Very often,political representatives and policymakers take advantage of the divisivepotential of immigration in order to promote and support policies ofteninformed by nationalistic and racist ideologies capitalising on fear andinsecurity. The great paradox of immigration policies, as Papademetriou(2003) and Calavita (2005) indicate is the realisation of governments andpolicymakers alike that restrictive and often xenophobic policies are anti-thetical to the demographic and economic problems that they meant toaddress. However, such paradoxes are not meant to be resolved, but ratherthey constitute a dominant feature of any immigration policy in Greece.

By policy I suggest both the legal framework in which immigration isunderstood and managed and the practices of Greek authorities such asthe police, governmental and non-governmental organisations regardingimmigration and immigrants. Immigration policy is not only determinedby the obligations and commitments of Greece to the EU but also by thepatterns of immigration, the number of immigrants and their ethniccharacteristics. In particular, any immigration policy is concerned withthe identity of the immigrants, the reasons of their immigration, theirexpectations regarding the host society and, most importantly, theresponse of the host society towards the immigrants.

Before I proceed to an examination of past and present legal frame-works, I would like to highlight the importance of the immigrants’(ethnic, national and cultural) identity in relation to the social andeconomic problems that the national population faces for thecomposition of any immigration policy. Such an identity is subject toconstant transformation by ethnic and historical ties between visiting andhost populations as well as political and military events such as religiousfundamentalism and terrorism. The Greek state and its citizens were forseveral years concerned with immigrants coming over from Albania,Bulgaria and countries of the former Soviet Union but the religion andreligious practices of immigrants was never a major concern. Morerecently and in particular in the aftermath of the political upheavals inNorth Africa and the Middle East, the current defining term for

3 IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND THE CONTROL OF MOBILITY 29

immigrants and refugees is Muslim. The settlement patterns, activities,customs and rituals of the Muslim population have become crucialfactors for interpreting migration flows as a migration crisis.

Following Rose and Miller (1992), I argue that policies should not onlybe analysed in terms of their rationalities, objectives and moral justificationsof their specific ways of exercising power but also in terms of their technol-ogies: these are programmes, calculations, texts and procedures throughwhich policymakers and other agencies seek to intervene, rectify or improvesocial problems according to specific criteria. The distinction betweenpolitical rationality and governmental technologies should not be under-stood as a mental–manual distinction. Governmental technologies refer tothe mechanisms by which the domain and object of policy becomes knownand available to policymakers and authorities. For Rose and Miller (1992)this is not a matter of actualisation of ideal schemes regarding the manage-ment and composition of society but rather an assemblage of legal, manage-rial, educational economical and historical forces in which individuals,groups, organisations, social phenomena and problems are understoodand controlled. Techniques, devices, calculations and assessment such asregularisation programmes, censuses and work permit documents bringgovernmental policy to life. The representation of what and who is to begoverned is an active process. Through particular technologies, the govern-ment has the ability to transform social phenomena into data. Mobility,exclusion, immigration, employment and criminality are turned into specificforms in which they can be diagnosed, debated and ultimately controlled.This process takes place through what Bruno Latour (1988, p. 232) calls“inscription devices” and is by no means an objective, non-ideologicalactivity. It is an operation upon phenomena under consideration in orderto make them available for calculation, evaluation and interference. In asimilar fashion, Charles Hirschman (1987, pp. 164–165) points out that the“identity categories” of successive censuses from the late nineteenth centuryup to the recent past demonstrate a series of changes, in which categoriesare constantly reinvented, combined and mixed, whereas the politicallydominant category leads the list.

To keep with Latour (1988, p. 215), it needs to be mentioned that“inscription devices” exist and operate in centres of calculation such asministries, and national and intranational organisations. Contrary to theunderstanding of government as a centralised locus and form of power,Rose andMiller (1992) argue for the existence of multiple loci, and how thecalculations and evaluations of one locus affect the existence of another.


Immigration services, the police, the ministries of labour, national economyand public order create and process information and intervene individuallyor collectively according to the volume and character of the problem.

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN GREECE: REORGANISING

THE SOCIAL/DEFENDING NATIONAL CULTURE

The first policy introduced relating to the phenomenon of immigration inGreece was the Law No. 1975/1991. Under the title “Entry-Exit,Sojourn, Employment, Deportation of Aliens, Recognition Procedure ofForeign Refugees and Other Provisions” this immigration law concen-trated on efficient police control within Greece and around its borders.The introductory paragraph states:

Suddenly Greece became a country full of foreigners, who by entering,staying and working illegally they create enormous social problems; and atthe same time they try to solve their inevitable problems by resorting tocrime such as drug trafficking, robbery and theft. (Law No. 1975/1991)

This introductory statement neatly sums up the way immigration wasviewed as a social problem. The hesitation of policymakers to manageimmigration as a long-term feature if not a permanent one was initiallyinterpreted as lack of experience in dealing with a novel situation. Theconstitution of a policy framework that neglects the multidimensionalityof immigration and its focus on short-term solutions such as policing,deportation and the perception of the immigrant as a potential criminalunderlines a complex relationship between the ethnic and cultural defini-tion of Greek national identity and the way immigrants are conceived andcategorised legally and culturally.

By the mid-1990s the Greek government redirected its policy focus ona functional relationship with Albania regarding the inflow of immigrants.The Law 2404/1996 signalled a new phase in the way immigration toGreece is perceived and managed due to a general acceptance that Greecehas become an immigrant destination (Antonopoulos 2006; Geddes2007). The law neither focused on the immigrants residing in Greecenor on procedures regarding their assimilation or status. Instead, anagreement was established between the governments of Greece andAlbania concerning Albanian workers coming to work on a seasonalbasis mainly in the agricultural sector of the economy.


In addition to these immigration policies of that period, a body thatwould police the borders of Greece was established under the nameBorder Guards. The establishment of such a body was one of the majorconcerns of the first immigration law (1975/1991), but was only imple-mented after a series of proposals by the Ministry of Public Orderregarding “illegal immigration” in 1994. Border Guards became fullyoperational in 1998 and its sole purpose was the prevention of “illegal”entrance into Greece and the apprehension of those who facilitateillegal entrance and undocumented employment, namely immigrationsmugglers.

The 2001 Census attempted to record all immigrants regardless oftheir residence status. According to the 2001 data there were 762,191foreign residents in Greece including EU nationals (Hellenic StatisticalAuthority 2001). Considering the lack of policy initiatives in integration,residence and citizenship, immigration policies were required to engagewith the actual immigrant population of Greece and their subsequentlegal rights and obligations. The 2001 Census was followed by anotherimmigration law coupled with a regularisation procedure for undocu-mented immigrants. A noticeable shift in the Law 2910/2001 is thatimmigration becomes a topic of concern for other ministries and govern-mental bodies apart from the Ministry of Public Order such as theMinistry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Defence,Finance, Justice, Health, Education and Local Government. Two majorfactors differentiate this law from previous attempts at formalising andcontrolling immigration in Greece. First, since the commencement of theTreaty of Amsterdam in 1997, migration policies are largely determined bythe EU and have become an integral part of the criteria of Copenhagen,which member states have to implement (European Commission b).Second, the law provides legal rights as well as access to the welfare stateand more specifically social security, the right to double nationality forAlbanian immigrants of Greek descent, and compulsory 9-year educationfor all children of immigrant parents. In addition, the deportation ofundocumented immigrants conformed to the standards set by the EU andmany immigrants were given the chance to abandon their “illegal” status byregistering and obtaining a work permit. The European Commissionpointed out that the return policy (repatriation) is an integral and crucialpart of the fight against illegal immigration. “Return policy needs to bebased on three elements: common principles, common standards and


common measures” (European Commission 2005). Despite this turn inimmigration policy regarding legal rights and obligations, many immigrantsat the time preferred the uncertain status of undocumented residencebecause of the immense bureaucracy involved in obtaining a resident’spermit.

The principal concern of successive immigration policies was the elim-ination of long bureaucratic procedures, which previously preventedimmigrants to obtain a resident’s status. The immigration Law 3386/2005 unified the work permit and the residence permit into a singledocument in order to encourage undocumented immigrants to take partin the regularisation procedures. Furthermore, the Law 3386/2005 madeit easier for immigrants to renew their resident permits by allowing themto buy out 20 % of the revenue stamps required.

The Residence Permit has been a document surrounded by confusionand administrative ambivalence (Cabot 2012). Initially titled “pinkcard”, it is provided to refugees applying for asylum in Greece butunregulated immigrants quickly appropriated it as a document thatensures a basic form of legality within a rather fluid immigration policyframework. The pink card is issued by The Aliens and ImmigrationDirectorate of Athens and the Prefecture of Attika, where immigrantscan apply for asylum. As Cabot (ibid.) illustrates, the impenetrablebureaucratic structures of the Greek asylum system have contributedto a precarious state of living and at the same time have generatedmultiple uses for the pink card: it is an instrument for immigrationauthorities to have a general idea of the number of immigrants theyare dealing with; it is a document that provides a sense of formality withrespect to the asylum procedure in Greece and it is a document that asignificant number of immigrants regardless of status aspired to obtainin order to legalise their presence in Greece.

The aforementioned laws were supplemented by government cam-paigns against the employment of undocumented immigrants andby the introduction of the European Agency for the Management ofOperational Cooperation at the External Borders of the member statesof the EU, known as FRONTEX (a contraction of the FrenchFrontières Extèrieures). The EU did not conceive FRONTEX as anactive policymaking agency but instead as a facilitator for cooperationbetween EU member states on issues of border management andenforcement.


At the December 2001 meeting in Laeken, the European Council urgedmember states to “manage better the Union’s external border controls so asto combat more effectively terrorism, illegal immigration and human traf-ficking”. Considering the unregulated mobility of people and objects theEuropean Council expressed the need for:

The most wide-ranging definition of “security of external borders” with theexception of military defence. It thus calls on Member States also to takeinto consideration at external borders the magnitude of crime, terrorism,crimes against children, arms trafficking, corruption and fraud in accordancewith Article 29 of the European Union Treaty. (SCADPlus 2004, cited inFeldman 2012, p. 84)

The main activities of FRONTEX are coordination, research and surveil-lance. FRONTEX was established in October 2004, started operating in2005 and was the first EU agency to be based in one of the new EUmemberstates, Poland. FRONTEX engages with these assignments not through thesetting of a new border control infrastructure but instead though the coop-eration and coordination of various agencies such as European Police Office(EUROPOL), the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), the EuropeanDefence Agency (EDA), the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Centre for DiseaseControl (ECDC). The coordination and cooperation of these rather diverseEuropean agencies aspires to the complete and comprehensive surveillanceof EU’s external borders. The overall approach is defined by FRONTEX as a“network approach” (Feldman 2012, p. 83) and the guidelines for suchapproach are found in what the EU has called “integrated border manage-ment” (ibid.). The constitution of FRONTEX not only attests to the needfor international and coordinated action against undocumented migrationbut also highlights the limitations of member states to deal with migration asisolated legal and political entities. As Gil Fernadéz, deputy executive direc-tor of FRONTEX told the Human Rights Watch in December 2010: “weare always explaining what is somewhat difficult to explain. Our role is one ofcoordinator. We act as a facilitator between states for resources. The opera-tions are always led by the host state”. Although EU insists that FRONTEXis more of a coordinator than an actor in the field of immigration, ithas rapidly morphed into a significant actor that plays a key role indetermining and enforcing EU immigration policy. The budget allocatedto FRONTEX is indicative of its current transformation. From a budget of


€6.2 million in 2004 to a budget of €88 million in 2010, FRONTEX hasmanaged to employ 272 seconded national experts, temporary and per-manent employees and to coordinate joint maritime operations for thecontrol of migration involving non-EU countries such as Senegal. In2007, the FRONTEX regulation was accompanied and reinforced by theRABIT Regulation with the mission to create “Rapid Border InterventionTeams” in order to stop the massive flows of undocumented migration tothe EU. The Southern EU member states were the first to express objec-tions regarding the isolation and subsequent lack of resources for prevent-ing unregulated immigration. Considering these complaints and theperceived threat of unregulated immigration, the European Parliamentvoted in favour of the constitution of such a team. The constitution ofRABIT signalled in a clear manner the contextualisation of undocumentedmigration as an illegal and criminal activity. Members of the RABITRegulation were authorised to bear arms and to use force with the consentof member states.

The risks and threats posed by unregulated migration are divided byFRONTEX into two sectors: “short-term operations and long term plan-ning” (Feldman 2012, p. 90). Short-term operations focus on the locationof possible threats posed by unregulated and undocumented migration.West Africa to Canary Islands, Ukraine to Poland, Turkey to Greece aresome of FRONTEX’s foci for the design of its operations. On the otherhand, long-term analyses deal with statistics, different types of researchmethodologies, Geographical Information Systems in order to identifyflows, trends and patterns, which in turn they will be deployed by theEuropean Commission and Council for the design of relevant policies.

Greece as a cooperating EU member state has been the recipient of EUpersonnel and resources through the RABIT deployment. The first knownFRONTEX mission began in October 2010 at the request of the Greekgovernment for help in preventing unregulated immigration in Greece’snortheast borders with Turkey. FRONTEX deployed 175 RABIT officersfrom 24 EU countries along the border between the area of Orestiada andAlexandroupolis. Further to standard procedures of surveillance, RABITofficers interviewed undocumented immigrants in order to identify theircountry or origin, their causes of their mobility towards the EU and tocollect information regarding with respect to trafficking and smugglingnetworks.

Greece’s geographical position along with the difficulties it faces avert-ing and regulating immigration have qualified FRONTEX to establish a


permanent office in the Greek coastguard headquarters in Piraeus port asthe principal headquarters for all operations in the East Mediterraneanarea. The presence and activities of FRONTEX contribute to two majorcontradictions regarding its character and the legal framework in which itoperates. First, most of the activities of FRONTEX involve the integrationof already existing national security infrastructures and operations buildingand maintaining a “Fortress Europe”—a designated area out of the reachof unregulated immigrants and asylum seekers. FRONTEX officials admittheir activities are military in character but insist that FRONTEX is notguided by the aspiration to criminalise immigration and militarise themeans for its regulation but instead they are guided by the principles ofhumanitarianism and legalism even when they confront illegal practices,traffickers and smugglers (FRONTEX 2014a, p. 13). Second, while theFRONTEX regulation specifies that EU member states are solely respon-sible for the control and surveillance of their external borders, the regula-tion also states that FRONTEX is a community body with full autonomyand independence able to exercise the implementing powers designated bythe regulation. Consequently, FRONTEX operates and exists both as anomnipresent immigration manager and as an actor with legal autonomy.The legal authority of FRONTEX derives from the FRONTEX regulation(2011), which illustrates the main tasks of the agency: to coordinateoperational cooperation between member states in managing externalborders; to assists member states in the training of national border guards;to carry out risk analyses and surveillance of external borders; to providemember states increased technical and operational assistance at externalborders when necessary; to support member states by organising jointreturn operations (FRONTEX 2014b, pp. 20–21).1

The limitations of EU member states to regulate immigration flowsand police their borders in conjunction with the presence of regulatedand unregulated immigrants problematise established notions of nationalgovernance and membership and provide the legal as well as socialconditions for the reconceptualisation of a citizenship that is historically,politically and culturally specific. The most recent action towards thepolitical and social inclusion of the immigrant population in Greece wastaken in 2010. When the social democratic party, PASOK, came topower in 2009, it decided to change the existing legal frameworkof citizenship. In May 2010, the Greek parliament voted in a newlaw on citizenship and political participation. The Law 3838/2010titled “Contemporary Provisions for Greek Citizenship and Political


Participation of Co-Ethnics and Legally Residing Immigrants” amendsthe legal understanding of nationality based on the Ius Sanguinis prin-ciple (right based on blood). In particular, the law states that “immi-grants’ children who were born in Greece and whose parents have beenresiding in Greece for more than 5 years are eligible for the Greekcitizenship”. In addition, immigrants’ children who have successfullycompleted six levels of the Greek education system and reside perma-nently and legally in Greece are eligible for the Greek citizenship (Law3838/2010, Article 1A). Predominantly, the most radical reconceptua-lisation of Greek citizenship comes from the provision regarding theparticipation of immigrants in the local elections as long as they are18 years old or older; have no criminal convictions; possess identitycard or long residence permit; are parents of Greek minor citizens andthey have completed 5 years of residence in Greece and have beenrecognised as political refugees. By contrast to previous immigrationlaws, the authorities responsible for the assessment of citizenship appli-cations are required to reply within a certain timeframe, and to justifytheir decision.

While the extension of local voting rights to a previously excludedportion of the immigrant population had been warmly received by thepolitical parties of the Left as well as by NGOs and immigrants’ associa-tions, its impact on political participation had been rather minimal. Thetotal number of immigrants who registered for the local elections ofNovember 2010 was 10,097, alongside 2,665 Albanians of Greek ethni-city. Even though it is important that more than 12,000 immigrants wereable to exercise their political rights, it needs to be noted that this numberaccording to the Ministry of Interior was a fraction of the estimated60,000 potential voters.

However, the social and political inclusion of the immigrant populationof Greece as illustrated in this particular law (3838/2010) was short-lived.Perceived by members of the public and right-wing opposition parties ascareless and inconsiderate towards the anxieties of Greek citizens regard-ing illegal immigration and limited welfare funds due to the unpopularausterity measures, the law and in particular its provisions on citizenshipand political participation were declared as “unconstitutional” by the StateCouncil. The decision of the State Council is informed by the generalcharacter of voting rights and the Constitution’s disregard of any differ-ences between local and national (legislative) elections. In addition,the State Council sustained new provisions for citizenship of first- or


second-generation immigrants are against the Constitution because theyignore that the naturalisation of a foreigner can only happen if there is a“real bond” between the foreigner and the Greek nation. In turn, this“real bond” is impossible to be identified or even established by formallegal requirements such as place of birth, residence and education. Right-and extreme right-wing parties perceived the Council’s decision as a“victory” against the “dehellenisation of Greek people” and effectivelyagainst an externally imposed postnational order. Ius Solis (right based onresidence) is therefore regarded as less authentic and legitimate than IusSanguinis (right based on blood). Eventually, under the aegis of theconservative-led coalition government of Greece immigrants need toreside legally in Greece for 10 years before they are eligible for a citizen-ship application; immigrants’ children can obtain Greek citizenship if theirparents reside legally in Greece for 8 years and all immigrant populationcannot participate in local elections.

The findings of the census that followed the 3838/2010 ImmigrationLaw illustrated the transformation of Greece into a multicultural and diversesociety and emphasised the need for a social and political participation of theimmigrant population of Greece. The 2011 Census found a total of10,815,197 people living in Greece, the vast majority of who (91.6 %)were Greek citizens (Hellenic Statistical Authority 2011). Foreigners makeup 8.4 % of the country’s population. According to the figures madeavailable by the Hellenic Statistical Authority 708,003 (6.5 %) residentswere born outside the EU compared to 199,101 (1.8 %) who were bornin an EU country other than Greece. In addition, the nationality of4,825 people was unspecified. However, the OECD’s 2010 InternationalMigration Outlook challenges the recording process of the Greek state bycoming to the conclusion that there are 1,259,258 immigrants living inGreece nearly half of them are undocumented (OECD 2010).

The uncertainty caused by diverse estimations regarding the immi-grant population of Greece along with rising concerns over nationaland cultural homogeneity have led the government and the police todrastic actions. Such actions aim at demonstrating to Greek citizensthat the state not only sympathises with their concerns but also that isdetermined to be vigilant in order to restate a balance between resi-dence and entry rights. In August 2012, Greek police implemented theoperation Hospitable Zeus in Athens, and in the northeast borders ofGreece in Evros. Even though the name of the operation HospitableZeus refers to the Greek God Zeus and his role as protector of


travellers, and contextualises hospitality as a quintessential Greek vir-tue, the objectives of the operation were irrelevant to any notion ofhospitality and accommodation. According to the Greek police, theobjectives of “Hospitable Zeus” are: “to deter illegal immigrants andto seal the national borders; the return of illegal immigrants to theircountry of origin; Athens to become a metropolis with a rule of lawand appropriate standards of living for its residents as well as for itsvisitors” (Vithoulkas 2012).

Under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection(former Ministry of Public Order), and the police, the operation entailedthe deployment of 2000 policemen in Athens, and 2500 policemen inEvros for the detection and arrest of illegally residing immigrants. Arrestedimmigrants were later detained in the detention centre of Amygdalezawaiting for deportation to their respective country of origin. The predo-minant criterion for the arrest and detention of immigrants was the colourof their skin. Even when the arrested immigrants were in possession of therelative documents regarding their residence in Greece, the police deemedtheir arrest necessary in order to verify the validity of their documents. TheHuman Rights Watch characterised the whole operation a direct responseto the Greek public’s resentment at immigration—a response that aimedto equal the rising popularity of extreme right-wings parties such as theGolden Dawn (HRW 2012). From 4 August 2012, the day the operationstarted up until 22 February 2013, the date the Ministry of Public Orderand Citizen Protection ceased to publish statistics on the number ofimmigrants prosecuted, arrested, detained and deported only 4435 immi-grants were arrested out of 77,527 prosecutions (Kathimerini 2013). Thisgovernmental crackdown on immigration has attracted criticism from theHuman Rights Watch and other national and international NGOs notonly for the racist and violent approach of the police but also for itsinefficiency. Yet, the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protectioncalled the operation “a success” because it made Greek citizens feel safefrom criminal activities associated with illegal immigration and improvedGreece’s credibility with its EU counterparts as a guardian of the Union’seastern border. “It’s not so much about the number of immigrants thathave gone, but the common understanding now that Athens is a safe andwell organized city” (Dendias quoted by Hope 2013). The press officer ofthe Greek Police believed that that in order of such operations to beeffective and successful in the long term there needs to be an awarenesscampaign in emigration countries notifying prospective immigrants that


Greek borders are closed and there is no chance for them to enterEuropean territories. The press officer also added that immigrants shouldnot be misinformed about the living conditions and standards in Europe,and believe that “our country is the ‘promised land’ ” (Bozaninou 2013).

THE LAW AS A MECHANISM OF EXCLUSION AND UNCERTAINTY

The historical overview of immigration policies is the aggregate of stateinterventions on the constitution and character of the national population.These interventions are not necessarily part of a cohesive national strategybut rather part of an attempt to present state power as objective andrational. Law in conjunction with popular perceptions of immigrationdesignate a sense of shared history and commonality predominantlybased on blood relations. Rights and solidarity based on blood have alwaysbeen “an integral part of the ideology of European culture” (Schneider1984, p. 17). Arthur de Gobineau, perceived by many as the intellectualprecursor of Nazi racial politics, believed that the superiority of Europeannations stems from the “Teutonic blood” in their veins without which“our civilisation cannot flourish” (1984, p. 280, quoted in Herzfeld 1992,p. 24). Blood in Gobineaus’s (1984) understanding is the source of anation’s character and should not be mixed or contaminated with theblood of inferior peoples. Michael Herzfeld (1992) notes that the impor-tance of blood as a symbol of national ideas and values has not and cannotbe applied uniformly to all racist and nationalist ideologies and practices.Blood as a symbol of solidarity as well as a medium of exclusion is anempty signifier ready to be filled with a wide range of nationalisms andracisms manifested in immigration policies and conceptualisations ofnational identity.

The immigration policies devised and implemented by successive Greekgovernments of different ideological inclinations can be broadly charac-terised as defence mechanisms against a postnational order generated byimmigration flows. The abovementioned immigration policies are nation-alist policies mainly because they express the view that sovereign statesshould be in position to devise their immigration policies according tonational interest constructed and communicated by political morality andempirical assumptions.

Admission and exclusion are at the core of communal dependence. Theysuggest the deepest meaning of self-determination. Without them, there


could not be communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associa-tions of men and women with some special commitment to one another andsome special sense of their common life (Walzer 1983, p. 62).

The main features of past and present immigration policies in Greece arethe temporary character of the immigrants’ settlement; their contextuali-sation as workers (for jobs the national population do not wish to do) andnot as citizens with access to institutions and active participation in thesocial and political sphere and, finally, the persistence of policymakers andauthorities to perceive immigration as an illegal activity.

Calculations, evaluations and policies constitute a matrix in which publicauthorities articulate their aspirations about national homogeneity andanxieties over the presence of foreigners. However, immigration policiesand the establishment of border police on national and intranational levelshave never been considered successful in terms of halting undocumentedimmigration to Greece and social and politically integrating immigrants.“The gap between the goals of national immigration policies . . . and theactual results of policies in these area (policy outcomes) is wide and growingwide” (Cornelius et al. 1994, cited in Castles 2004, p. 857).

In all Greek immigration policies, there is a strong emphasis on the roleof the police concerning administrative and legal aspects. Deportation ofunruly or undocumented immigrants to their country of origin appears asa form of punishment. However, the role of the police should not neces-sarily be regarded as an inseparable part of immigration policies.

Rather the “law” of the police really marks the point at which the state,whether from impotence or because of the immanent connections withinany legal system, can no longer guarantee through the legal system theempirical ends that it desires at any price to attain. (Benjamin 1986, citedin Agamben 2000, p. 104)

The main features of past and present immigration policies in Greece arethe temporary character of the immigrants’ settlement; their contextualisa-tion as workers (for jobs the national population do not wish to do) and notas citizens with access to institutions and active participation in the publicsphere and, finally, the persistence of policymakers and authorities toperceive immigration as an illegal activity. The temporary character of theimmigrants’ settlement in Greece is closely associated with their depen-dence upon employers they are working for. As Georgoulas (2001)


indicates, work permits, which determine the immigrants’ residence, aregranted for a certain period of time (usually when there is demand forlabour from the agricultural and construction sectors), for a certain type ofwork, location and employer. These factors as predominantly manifested inthe first two immigration laws not only do they articulate a monolithic viewregarding the immigrants’ recent past concerning their “illegal” status andthe danger they posit to public order but they also determine the immi-grants’ near future since their mobility and social associations are limited toworking environments, which are created and coordinated by employers,international labour agreements and legal documents. As a result, immi-grants in Greece constitute a new working class linked with undesired jobs,whereas there is no space in which they can project their rights anddemands. Article 19 of the 2910/2001 Law stated that an “alien must beallowed to enter Greece in order to work for a particular employer and atparticular employment, if s/he is granted a work permit by the prefect”.Immigration was perceived as static where any mobility is strictly directedby the employment sector and social associations are determined by ethni-city and labour shortage.2

Immigration policies mark an attempt to reorganise and reimagineinstitutional and conceptual boundaries of national societies in such amanner that authority for the exclusion of non-nationals is justified. Inthe pages of every immigration policy document the immigrant appears tobe the “perfect embodiment of otherness” (Sayad 2007, p. 168). Theimmigrant is always part of a different ethnic group, different nationalculture and also someone from an inferior background mainly becausethey originate from countries with social and economic problems.Immigration policies associate the immigrant with two categories: thecriminal, and the worker. The immediate threat that immigrants pose topublic order and national homogeneity is confronted by control of mobi-lity and associations formalised by restricted political rights, employmentregulations and permits. The relationship between immigration andemployment when examined in relation to the immigrants’ status andmobility gains different significance. Sayad (2007, p. 166) goes as far asto equate the presence of the immigrant with that of an unskilled worker;the immigrant becomes “specialised worker for life” (Ouvrier Specialisé).Although the social types of the specialised worker and of the immigrantappeared to be different and dissociated from each other, they havebecome interchangeable not only in the immigrants’ consciousness but


in all of those who are involved in the study and management of immigra-tion and immigrants.

Since the unfolding of the financial crisis in the EU, Greece’s immigra-tion policy has been an afterthought amidst constant negotiations withcreditors over the implementation of austerity measures and fiscal con-solidation. Yet, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) as the leadingparty in Greece’s last two coalition governments (26 January 2015–20August 2015 and 21 September-Present) with a mandate to renegotiatethe terms of austerity, presented their citizenship and immigration policiesas part of a wider debate on Europe’s social and political direction. Thenew policy framework focuses on the immigrants’ children or morebroadly on second generation of immigrants in Greece, and stipulatesthree preconditions for acquisition of Greek citizenship: a 5-year legalresidence in Greece for at least one of the child’s parents; the child musthave been born during the 5-year residence of the parent and the childmust be registered to a primary school and attending classes by the timethe citizenship application is submitted. Moreover, the Greek governmentis planning to grant citizenship to all adult immigrants who have finishedprimary, secondary or/and higher education in Greece. The Minister forImmigration Policy estimated that more than 100,000 people couldacquire Greek citizenship in the near future.

Despite the government’s audacious plans to redefine Greek citizenshipand to address the chronic marginalisation of thousands of people living inGreece there is an explicit differentiation between old and new immi-grants. According to the Minister for Immigration of the first SYRIZAcoalition government, all plans concern “old immigrants” who have beenregularised through various immigration policies and decrees and not“new immigrants” whose residence in Greece is determined by impene-trable bureaucratic structures and who wish to reside in other Europeancountries.

It appears that the goal of immigration policies in Greece is, on onehand, to reproduce the illegal character of both immigrants and immigra-tion, which in turn justifies the necessity for repressive and exclusionarymeasures, and on the other hand, to illustrate a dystopian picture of thehost country fully equipped to apprehend and penalise the unregulatedimmigrant where police violence is morally and legally legitimised. Theillegality that is supposed to be minimised or even eradicated thenbecomes, as Balibar (2004, p. 62) states, the “raison d’être” of a security


apparatus contributing to an “insecurity syndrome” (ibid.) experience thataffects both national citizens and immigrants.

PRECARISATION AND STATE RACISM

In addition to the established rule of managing immigration and asylumthrough policing and violence which, demand obedience to an otherwiseincoherent rule of law, the Greek state asserts its authority over immi-grants and refugees through social insecurity and instability. Here, wenotice the formation of a reciprocal relationship between the precariousstate of immigrants and refugees with governmental technologies. ForIsabel Lorey (2015, p. 100) the “precarious” usually refers to “insecurity”,“vulnerability”, “destabilisation” and “endangerment”, but as far as weare concerned with immigration these emotional and social states tend tobe more normal than exceptional.

Lorey (ibid.) outlines three dimensions of the precarious for the theo-retical and empirical substantiation of its normalisation. The first dimen-sion is precariousness and refers to a condition shared by all living beings.Precariousness is “existentially shared” (Lorey 2015, p. 12; see also Butler2009) but it varies according to different historical and geographicalconditions. The second dimension of the precarious is precarity anddemarcates the social, political and legal aspects of this condition.Precarity refers to the way precariousness is distributed across populationsand its implications on issues of equality, membership and political parti-cipation. Effectively, precarity becomes a medium for viewing which seg-ments of the population are more exposed to precariousness and thelatter’s effects on social hierarchies and otherness. The third dimensionoutlined by Lorey (2015) is governmental precarisation. This dimension isassociated with forms of governing and formally introduces precariousnessto political rhetoric, decision-making and policymaking. National govern-ments within the mechanisms of policing and of the welfare state need toprovide certain guarantees for the protection of citizens from the condi-tion of precarity. However, Lorey (2015) following Foucault, highlightsthe productive aspects of governmental precarisation. The refugees andimmigrants who do not meet the cultural standards of Greekness by lawneed to be precarised—they need to be categorised as Others to a nationalpopulation entitled to protection. Even though Lorey’s analysis of theproductive aspects of governmental precarisation focuses on the pro-duction of subjectivities, we also need to consider the production of


conditions in which this precarisation takes place. The relationshipbetween utopia and dystopia, political rationality and imagining thatEuropia embodies becomes an integral part of governmental precarisation.Governmental precarisation aspires to the creation of a dystopian socialenvironment in order to maintain a sense of security for national citizensand to apprehend any utopian imaginings that immigrants and refugeesmight have in terms of living in a more secure and just social environment.The distinction between utopia and dystopia and between people entitledto social security and people who are not entitled to social security derivesfrom a legitimate type of racism.

The Greek state’s rejection of a provisional closure on citizenshipbased on education and residence, its insistence on a permanentclosure of citizenship where immigrants are excluded from politicalparticipation and representation, and inability to process asylum appli-cations are realised through what Foucault (2004, p. 254) calls “stateracism”. Foucault indicates that racism as a prerequisite feature ofthe modern state introduces a break into the domain where power isexercised, namely the population. As soon as the population is strati-fied and classified according to different criteria such as sex, age,nationality and ethnicity by the census and other governmental tech-nologies, state racism creates the conditions for the perception of thepopulation as a mixture of races that needs to be differentiated into“us” and “them” and in turn to be governed. State racism also func-tions as a licence “to kill in order to live”—to take the other’s life forthe common good and the national interest. The “death of the other”,Foucault points out, does not necessarily guarantee the well-being of“us” but of life in general. It needs to be noted at this point that thewords “killing” and “death” used by Foucault are also applicable to“indirect forms” (Foucault 2004, p. 256) of murder such as exclusion,rejection and isolation. In this Foucauldian formulation, the state existsfor the protection of the dominant race—it becomes “the shepherdlooking after its flock” (Foucault 2010, p. 304). However, it becomesevident from the reintroduction of Ius Sanguinis concerning Greekcitizenship, the legislative and political rejection of multiculturalismand the protection of the Greek nation from foreigners who do nothave a real bond with the nation that not only democracy is under-mined, but that the shepherd’s job extends from taking care of thesheep to “kill” the wolves who threaten the country’s security, welfareand homogeneity.


NOTES

1. Throughout the yeas FRONTEX has managed to perform a hegemonic roleover the management of immigration on both national and European levels.In November 2014, Italy decided to terminate the OperationMare Nostrum,namely a search and rescue operation for all migrants entering theMediterranean in an unregulated manner. Mare Nostrum has been replacedby a FRONTEX-supported operation called Triton. Triton’s scope is limited;it addresses the flows of migrants towards Italy and not in the Mediterraneanin general and most importantly is a border patrol and surveillance operationwith no mandate to rescue any migrants who lives are in danger.

2. According to Mike Davis (2006, p. 62) the management of this typemigrant labour can be found in the city state of Dubai where workers aregranted “modular liberties based on the rigorous spatial segregation ofeconomic functions and ethnically circumscribed social classes”. Total99 % of the private workforce in Dubai is deportable non-citizens and theyare legally bound to a single employer. See Mike Davis “Fear and Money inDubai”, New Left Review, 41.


CHAPTER 4

European Civilisation, National Power,and the Detention of Immigrants

Abstract The chapter examines the political and cultural meanings ofdetention for undocumented migrants in Greece. Central to this examina-tion are the theoretical elaborations of Carl Schmitt and Wendy Brown onterritorial division, the state of exception and waning sovereignty in con-junction with reports from the Human Rights Watch and the GreekCouncil for Refugees.

Keywords Detention centres � Governmentality � State of exception �Sovereignty � European civilisation

PROTECTING CITIZENS AND EXCLUDING IMMIGRANTS

Even though governmental precarisation proceeds by producing Othersto Greek national citizens and by producing a bureaucratic dystopia inorder to defend a utopian understanding of identity and cohesion, it doesnot mean that the Greek sovereign subject remains intact. As mentioned inthe previous chapter, the function of the precarious is normalised. Thismeans that governmental precarisation is not only exclusively addressed tothe immigrant but also to the sovereign subject. Actually, sovereignty itselfdepends on this precarisation and in particular on the perceived threats ofimmigration. Sovereignty continues to be an integral feature, or as Sassen(2006, p. 415) calls it a “systemic property”, of the nation state but itslegitimation within the boundaries of the law has become complex and


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volatile. The need for protecting the vulnerable sovereign subject is apriority with repercussions on the role of state and on the distinctionbetween legal and illegal, civilised and uncivilised practices. Due to thefact that precarisation has been normalised and concerns both nationalcitizens and immigrants, it means that its extent must be carefully mana-ged in order to maintain the existing order and avoid disobedience

Notions of life and of the living in legal frameworks concerning immi-gration appear in a situation of constant exposure to danger and socialdisintegration. Due to transnational immigration flows and the apparentdangers that immigrants pose to public order and national culture, thestate needs to represent its space of jurisdiction as ordered and safe. “Thestate is a community instituted for the sake of the living and the well livingof men in it” (Marsilious of Padua quoted in Agamben 2000, p. 4). Inorder to protect the life and well-being of its inhabitants, the state createszones of safety and exclusion for legitimate and illegitimate residents,respectively. Considering the presence of FRONTEX in Greece’s nationalborders, the European Union (EU) directives regarding coordinatedmigration policies, the decision of many undocumented immigrants toremain undocumented despite numerous regularisation calls and proce-dures and the persistent phenomenon of the irregular crossing of theGreek borders, Greece as a EU member state and sovereign nation statecan neither delineate the political terrain of migration nor monopolise itsmanagement through policy and policing. Nevertheless, the role left toplay exclusively by member states and Greece, in particular, is the role ofnational and cultural identification.

Foucault (2008) terms the power to manage and categorise the popu-lation as “governmentality” and constitutes the main way state powervitalises itself. As Butler (2004) points out, it is interesting that Foucaultrefers explicitly to the vitalisation of the state instead of its legitimation.Here, Foucault insinuates that the state without governmentality wouldgradually deteriorate. Yet, the state’s dependence on governmentality is amodern political phenomenon and practice. Traditionally, sovereigntyprovided legitimacy for the rule of law. But as sovereignty in that tradi-tional context has lost authority, governmentality has emerged as a form ofpower capable of providing meaning to the state’s exclusion and disciplin-ary techniques. Foucault (2008) contextualises the concept of powerwithin an historical analysis of the emergence of national governmentand administration and the emergence of forms of knowledge presentedto the governed as public policy. Therefore, governmentality broadly


understood as a mode of power dealing with the control and mobility ofpeople provides useful insights for examining the weakening role of thestate. EU mechanisms for regulating immigration and asylum, and thediminishing role of nation states in defending and controlling their bor-ders are embodied in the presence and function of immigration detentioncentres. For Brown (2012) the gradual weakening of the nation state hasprovided a fertile ground for the building of detention centres and fencesas means towards the minimisation and management of unregulatedmigration and the subsequent distinction between eligible and ineligible,legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate. The purpose of this chapter isto establish the political and cultural meaning of the detention centres inGreece by considering the weakening role of the nation state in themanagement of immigration as well as the legal and cultural frameworksdetention centers both construct and dismantle at the same time.

THE MATERIAL AND TERRITORIAL POWER

OF THE DETENTION CENTRE

The prevalence of state politics for the perception of immigration and itsmanagement appears like a direct exercise of power rather than a moresophisticated exercise of assessment of asylum applications and integra-tion policies. Even if countries like Greece are prone to confront immi-gration through exclusion, policing and violence it does not necessarilymean that they can claim authority over their territory. Rather thanmanifestations of the nation state’s overarching control over the inflowof immigrants and their subsequent integration, these detention centresand walls are part of an emergent landscape shaped by uncontrolled andundetected immigration flows, humanitarian crises outside the EU,security and fear. For European political leaders, the initial sense of acultural and trade utopia prompted by the softening of borders wasquickly substituted by nostalgia for national homogeneity, sovereigntyand stricter migration controls. As the EU were in the process of remov-ing their internal boundaries, they developed an increasing concernabout the strengthening of their external borders in order to preventmigration flows from the East and South by building walls and detentioncentres. Papadopoulos et al. (2008) argue that the EU’s policies stillfocus on the freedom of movement between EU citizens, the conditionaland partial integration of third country nationals, and on a commonrestrictive policy for immigrants who are not in possession of documents

4 EUROPEAN CIVILISATION, NATIONAL POWER . . . 49

(sans papier). Nevertheless, these policies have also been extended to “newforms and strategies of mobility control” (Papadopoulos et al. 2008,p. 165). These forms and strategies generate and sustain new spaces at thelimits of the EU such as Morocco, Mauritania and Libya, where mobilitycontrol depends on nationality and international relations. Their purpose isnot only to block and regulate undocumented migration but also to hosttemporarily all these strangers in order to register and categorise thembefore their entry to the national territory in question. In other words,detention centres are spaces of transition in which immigrants can becategorised according to their ethnicity, race, gender, age, religion andeducation. While all categories can be very important for the process ofcategorisation, ethnicity has emerged as the most important one for immi-gration authorities. In Greece, Syrians are prioritised because the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has advised thegovernments of member states that they should be initially received asgenuine asylum seekers, which means they should be granted instant huma-nitarian aid because they are fleeing war. (Stevis and Mesco 2015).1

Conceptually, the geographical and political borders detention centresattempt to establish cannot be approached from a strictly national point ofview. “Borders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localisationand their function, they are being thinned out and doubled . . . the quanti-tative relation between ‘border’ and ‘territory’ is being inverted” (Balibar1998 in Rumford 2006, p. 156). These transformations with regard toproliferation of borders and to the control of mobility through detentionand categorisation have led Bryan S. Turner (2007a) and Ronen Shamir(2005) to talk about the “enclave society” and the “mobility regime”respectively. Their responses are mainly addressed to certain theorisationsof globalisation in terms of social openness and freedom of movement. Inparticular, both Turner (2007a) and Shamir (2005) are doubtful of con-cepts and terms such as “networks” and “fluids” theorists tend to use inorder to define and analyse a new social order. The imagery of a borderlessworld whether it is deployed for antiglobalisation activism, culturalexchanges or corporate and financial transactions appears to dominateour contemporary theoretical imagination. However, the theoretical out-puts of theorists like John Urry in Global Complexities (Urry 2005),Manuel Castells in The Rise of the Network Society (Castells 2010) andAnthony Giddens (2007) in Europe in the Global Age indicates thatglobalisation is not theorised as a homogeneous process. Of specific inter-est to Turner and Shamir is that the aforementioned theorists somehow


neglect the fact that territory and the re-territorialisation of “flows” and“fluids” are crucial factors in all global formations and processes. Theprincipal causes for the resurgence of territory and re-territorialisation intimes of immense flows of capital and people are the development of thepolitics of securitisation, terrorist threats and negative sentiments towardsimmigration. By having these causes in mind, Turner suggests that in the“enclave society” governments and other agencies seek to regulate spaces,and where necessary to immobilise flows of people, ideas, goods andservices. Even though the war on terror and various pandemics areincluded in Turner’s long list of examples, which demonstrate his thesison the enclave society, he focuses on immigration and the new xenophobiagenerated by what Shamir (2005) calls “suspicion”. By suspicion Shamirmeans that “the primary principle for determining ‘the licence to move’both across borders and in public spaces within borders has to do with thedegree which the agents of mobility are suspected of representing thethreats of crime and immigration” (Shamir 2005, p. 201).

Located in abandoned police stations and army camps or purposefullymade of steel and concrete, run by governments or private companies,detention centres tend to be a significant feature in the contemporaryEuropean landscape. Usually, the presence of detention centres is justifiedas part of national or supranational strategies against potential terroristthreats, unregulated immigration or at least differentiating between wel-comed and unwelcomed immigrants. Due to their material presence,detention centres aspire to communicate in the most visible way thepower of the state by focusing on the detention and administration ofstateless individuals. The proliferation of detention centres for immigrantsin Europe stands as a constant reminder that every action towards aborderless and unified Europe is accompanied by fear of outsiders andanxieties regarding sovereignty, law and order within nationally definedboundaries. Here, Europia both as state of affairs and as an analytic termembodies the utopia of a unified federal Europe and the world of flows,networks and cultural exchanges produces and at the same time a dystopiaof fear, detention, restriction of movement and violation of human rights.

The general consensus amongst politicians, citizens and policing autho-rities on the necessity of detention centres in Europe does not mean thatthere are not any noticeable differences regarding the type of immigrantsdetained, the use of disciplinary technologies, and the ideas and beliefs,which inform the building of these centres and their management. Beforeillustrating the specific function of detention centres in Greece and their


relationship with the European project of tackling undocumented migra-tion and securing EU’s border, it would be useful to highlight some oftheir common characteristics. First, they are the creation of a commonmigration and asylum policy tackling the mobility of people who havechosen not to be represented by their own states. Second, detentioncentres aim at the protection of EU member states from the pressureunregulated immigrants and asylum seekers might put on the labourmarket and the quality of service of the state. In addition, member statesare increasingly concerned with the effects of unregulated immigration hason social and cultural cohesion. Overall, detention centres in Europecommunicate through their physical presence in various central and per-ipheral European locations and through their disciplinary technologies adistinction between the European and the non-European, between what isinside Europe and what is outside of Europe. This distinction is notnecessarily based on nationality, citizenship or membership but rather onentitlement regarding free mobility within the European borders and on adesperate attempt to preserve and defend the idea of Europe understoodthrough freedom of movement, cultural heritage and access to welfare.The main objective of the detention of undocumented non-Europeans isnot primary their punishment but to demonstrate to the receiving memberstate’s population that uncontrolled migration is tackled and undocumen-ted immigrants are effectively managed, and to convince potential immi-grants that Europe is not the utopia that they might think it is.

Detention centres in Europe are classified according to the purposesthey serve and the type of non-Europeans they detain. There are detentioncentres for those wishing to apply for asylum commonly categorised asasylum seekers, and for immigrants initially refused entry to their countryof choice and waiting evaluation of their situation. After this evaluation theapplicants would either be admitted to the territory of member state orreturned to the post/border, which they initially entered. There are alsodetention centres for non-Europeans who have committed an illegal act inthe territory of a member state other than “illegal migration” and areawaiting deportation. However, most detention centres in the EU and inGreece in particular are used to detain asylum seekers, immigrants waitingevaluation of their application and non-Europeans involved in illegalactivities. These detention centres also serve the function of identifyingand screening undocumented immigrants.

In the past, immigration and its effects were treated as criminal activitiesbut nowadays are associated with and depicted by the vocabulary of


terrorist threats, wars and military invasions. It is this particular under-standing of immigration in Europe that allows EU member states toproceed to human rights violations in terms of the living conditions inthe detention centres, absence of screening services, lack of legal repre-sentation and ill treatment by the police.2

ADMINISTERING DETENTION

Since 2011, successive Greek governments have begun constructing newphysical barriers in the region of river Evros,—a 130-km long moat and aborder fence in order to keep any immigrants from entering Greek andEuropean territory. By 2010, the Evros region had become the main entrypoint to Europe for immigrants where 250 to 300 arrivals could berecorded on a daily basis. The length of Greece’s border is 1228 km.The river Evros constitutes more than 190 km of the borderline betweenGreece and Turkey, whereas the total border length is 206 km. 125 km ofland is not demarcated by the river Evros, which elsewhere marks anddefends the land border between Greece and Turkey. This is a designatedpiece of land by the Greek government and FRONTEX for building afence that will prevent undocumented entry to Greek and Europeanterritory. This land is also one of the last remaining mined areas ofEurope—a military and historical relic of the Greek–Turkish tensions.Even though the Greek government announced in 2009 that completeda clearance of mines in the 57 mined areas along the border with Turkeyand signposted in English and in Greek all formerly mined areas theCommissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe expressedconcerns over Greece’s inadequacy to avert more deaths.

In 2012, the governing parties of the Right and the Centre Left votedon the bill for the construction of detention centres in various locationsaround Greece. Parties of the Left and the Far Right were against thebuilding of these centres for different political and ideological reasons. Inparticular, the parties of the Left, raised concerns regarding the protectionof the detainees’ human rights, living conditions and access to legalrepresentation whereas parties of the Far Right such as the neo-Naziparty Golden Dawn were of the view that all immigrants should leavethe country regardless of the conditions of their detention. The bill for theconstruction of the detention centres was preceded by a Memorandum ofCooperation between Greece and FRONTEX, which effectively upgradedGreece’s position within EU’s overarching plan to tackle undocumented


migration. The Memorandum stipulates Greece’s participation in theelectronic information exchange pilot platform of the European ExternalBorder Surveillance System (EUROSUR), which is designed to supportEU member states in their attempt to reduce the number of undocumen-ted immigrants entering the EU by improving the technological andpolicing infrastructure at their external borders.

Despite the determination of political parties and intranational organi-sations to proceed with the building of detention centres in Greece, localauthorities and citizens were on principle opposed to them. Althoughauthorities and citizens alike perceive immigration as a major problem,the presence of detention centres and ultimately of a great number ofspatially confined immigrants raises concerns over public health and order.The detention centres of Tychero, Feres, Soufli and Fylakio in the area ofEvros in conjunction with the building of the fence do not preventimmigrants from attempting to cross the border but instead they contri-bute to an increasing number of fatal accidents. For immigrants who hadmanaged to avoid capture in the northern border area of Greece, there aredetention centres in greater Athens and in neighbouring towns such as thecentres of Petrou Rali, Korinthos and Amygdaleza. In addition, 20 deten-tion centres have been built around Greece for the purposes of screening,and evaluation of asylum applications and deportation.

According to Article 13 of the Presidential Decree 114/2010 (PD114/2010), asylum seekers may be detained for 3 months maximum from the dateof the registration of their asylum application. Moreover, the same articlestipulates that “a third country national or stateless person who applies forinternational protection shall not be held in detention for the sole that he/sheenters and remains illegally in the country”. The applicant canonly bedetainedin exceptional circumstances especially when alternative measures cannot beapplied. An applicant can be detained for one of the following reasons: theapplicant does not possess or has destroyed his/her travel documents and it isnecessary to determine the identity, the circumstances of entry and realinformation of his/her origin, in particular in the case of mass illegal immigra-tion; the applicant constitutes a danger for national security or public order;detention is considered necessary for the prompt and effective completion ofthe application. Article 13 continues by emphasising that detention of asylumseekers and undocumented immigrants should be limited to the maximumduration required and should not exceed in any case 90 days. If an applicanthas already been detained in view of a deportation order, the total detentionduration must not exceed 180 days.


Almost all undocumented immigrants captured in the area of Evros, onthe north-eastern borders of Greece and on the Greek–Turkish border onthe Aegean, are detained with the objective of deportation or redirectionto another member state. The most common argument regarding thedetention of undocumented immigrants is the apparent danger ofabsconding. In practice, the authorities in charge do not treat the detai-nees as individuals and they disregard their respective status and needs.The duration of the detention can be extended to a maximum of 6 monthsand in certain circumstances to 18 months and depends on the possibilityof deportation and in turn on the nationality assessment. In addition tothese parameters, the overcrowding of detention is a contributive factor inthe duration of detention. Detainees assigned to be of certain nationalitiessuch as Iraqi, Syrian, Georgian, Turkish and Iranian are detained for anextended period until they are sent back to Turkey, or until the maximumdetention period of 6 months has expired. Another group of detaineesassigned to be among others, Nigerian or Dominican, stay in detention inorder to be deported via Athens. Either they will be directly transferred tothe airport or they will be detained in one of greater Athens’ detentioncentres for an extended period of 6 or 18 months and then deported. Themain criterion that determines detention is the feasibility of deportation. Ifdeportation is not feasible then detainees could be released. However, theprocedure for determining the feasibility or non-feasibility of deportationas well as the duration of the detention is not clearly defined.

“SPECIAL FACILITIES”: THE VIOLENCE ON RIGHTS

AND THE RIGHT TO VIOLENCE

On 21 September 2001, UNHCR declared the asylum situation in Greece a“humanitarian crisis”. According to the UNHCR, Greece’s lack of anappropriate social and political infrastructure regarding its asylum systemhas “important implications for the wider EU” (quoted in Human RightsWatch 2011, pp. 21–22). The humanitarian crisis described by theUNHCR had been developing for a number of years, as Greece becamethe major gateway for asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants intothe EU. Greece’s geographical location, its porous northern, eastern andcoastal borders in tandem with its inadequate immigration policies andinsufficient asylum system contributed to the unfolding of an emergencysituation pivoting around resources, public sentiments, politics and policies.


In response to this emergency, the government redirected its focus on amicro level in order to minimise the flow of undocumented immigrantsinto Greece. The main measure adopted out of this change in scale andpolicy was the extension of the detention period of asylum seekers and ofthose whose deportation is feasible. This resulted in overcrowded deten-tion centres, deterioration of the living conditions in them as well as aseries of violation of human rights with respect to legal representation andaccess to bureaucratic procedures.

The official terms used by the Greek authorities to describe thesedetention centres are “special areas for hosting foreigners” and “specialfacilities for aliens” (Law 3386/2005, Article 81). The umbrella termsof “special areas” and “special facilities” include two main types ofdetention centres. First, there are the police and border guard stations,which were initially set up for short-term detention and screening ofdetained undocumented immigrants. Second, there are detention cen-tres proper, which are for detaining foreign nationals awaiting deporta-tion. Due to overcrowding, the distinction between those two types hasnever been experienced by detainees or practiced by immigration autho-rities (Cheliotis 2013). The use of this umbrella term derives by theGreek government’s lack of administrative capacity to distinguishbetween unregulated immigrants and refugees and at the same time toavoid criticism over the mistreatment of the latter. Precisely because theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has theright to liberty and protection from arbitrary detention, governmentsand immigration authorities cannot detain refugees who enter theirterritory without authorisation.

A plethora of reports by domestic and foreign media (To Vima,2013; Smith, 2014) as well as by organisations (United AgainstRacism; Human Rights Watch; Greek Council for Refugees) have illu-strated that the detention of immigrants in Greece involves prolongedexposure to poor living standards and humiliating treatment.Overcrowding is so common that detainees often have to share bedsand sleep in shifts, or alternatively they sleep on floors using sleepingbags usually provided by NGOs. In some detention centers sleeping isonly possible in a sitting position or in non-designated sleeping areassuch as toilets. Other commonly reported problems include lack ofventilation, limited or non-existent sanitation, extreme room tempera-tures and poor hygiene. In addition to the aforementioned problems,medical provision is minimal due to lack of medical staff and facilities in


the detention centers. The vast majority of the detainees in Greece aresuffering from skin diseases, infections and depression, which are mostlylinked to the long duration of the detention under these particularconditions (PRO ASYL 2012, p.41).

The deplorable living conditions of the detainees are intensified by theviolent treatment, which they are subjected to by the detention centre staff.Violence in Greece’s detention centres varies: from racist verbal abuse,destruction of religious symbols, to forceful body searches, direct physicalattacks, sexual harassment and torture, the detention centres’ staff havecaused serious mental and bodily injuries (ibid.). In the absence of a crediblecomplaints procedure, legal representation for detainees and well-sourcedand independent inspection bodies, violence in the detention centres isenacted with impunity. After a comprehensive review and evaluation ofreports condemning the living conditions in Greece’s detention centres,the European Court of Human Rights (2009, in ECtHR-M.M.S v Belgiumand Greece) concluded:

All the centers visited by bodies and organisations that produced thereports . . .describe a similar situation to varying degrees of gravity: over-crowding, dirt, lack of ventilation little or no possibility of taking a walk, noplace to relax, insufficient mattresses, no free access to toilets, inadequatesanitary facilities, no privacy, limited access to care. Many of the peopleinterviewed also complained of insults, particularly racist insults, profferedby staff and the use of physical violence by guards.

Deplorable living conditions, police violence and lack of transparencyregarding the duration of detention and legal representation have ledmany of the detainees to diverse forms of protest such as hunger strikes,self-harm and setting mattresses and blankets on fire as well as someattempt to escape. The protests of detainees hardy feature in nationaland international media due to attempts by the police and immigrationauthorities to cover up or tone down any incident of unrest that mighthighlight violations of human rights and the overall inadequacy of theGreek state to deal with the phenomenon of immigration and asylum.3

Frequently, protesters and hunger strikers are either isolated from otherdetainees or transferred to other detention centres around Greece waitingtheir deportation. The few incidents of unrest and protest, which havebeen reported by the media involved large-scale police operations andwere stigmatised by injuries and arrests. On 10 August 2013, at the


detention centre of Amygdaleza in the area of Attiki, detainees started aprotest over the duration of their detention by setting fire on mattressesand by attacking their guards. Forty-one detainees were charged withviolent conduct and destruction of public property while 10 detaineesmanaged to escape (To Vima 2013). On 28 August of the same year theNGOUnited Against Racism reported that 400 detainees at the detentioncentre of Orestiada in Northern Greece proceeded to a hunger strike overthe duration of their detention. Many of the strikers were in detention forover a year and they were told that they have to wait for at least 18 monthsfor the assessment of the asylum application (Movement Against Racismand Fascist Threat 2013). At the detention centre of Komonti, in northernGreece, three detainees proceeded to hunger strike and the sewing shut oftheir mouths in order to draw their guards and immigration authorities’attention to the lack hygiene and functioning facilities in the centres(ibid.).

The responses of the Greek state to pressures for improvement of livingconditions in the detention centres are informed and substantiated by thefinancial and immigration crisis in Europe as well as by the mentality ofcreating a hostile environment for all undocumented immigrants aspiringto enter EU territories. Greek governments consistently attempt toabsolve themselves of certain responsibilities by referring to three differentyet interconnected issues. First, the number and actions of undocumentedimmigrants are the major contributive factors towards low standards ofliving during detention. Greek authorities point out to the high ratio ofdetainees to staff due to the Dublin Regulation, which renders the situa-tion inside the centres incontrollable. Second, for authorities and inparticular for the detention centre staffs the substandard detention condi-tions are attributable to the detainees’ violent protests and their lack ofrespect for their living space. Third, immigration authorities are keen toremind NGOs and Human Rights organisations that the recent financialcrisis in the EU has affected their funding and by extension their resourcesfor the better treatment of detainees.

However, several governmental actions regarding the apprehension anddetention of undocumented immigrants contradict the reasons providedby the same authorities for inadequate detention conditions. Due to theidiosyncrasies of the Dublin Regulation, Greece has been the recipient ofsubstantial EU funding for immigration and asylum management. In2012, EU funding was made available specifically for the developmentand improvement of detention conditions including legal representation


and screening procedures. Yet, the use of these funds by the Greek state hasbeen very limited and selective. The state continues to prioritise the con-struction of detention centres and walls and the militarisation of the Greekborders and systematically neglects the improvement of living conditioninside the detention centres. Furthermore, the Greek state’s formal com-mitment to improve detention conditions following the guidelines of theEuropean Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Human Rights Watch(HRW) and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture havebeen called into question by the very same organisations with respect to theofficial rhetoric of immigration services, which effectively justifies poordetention conditions and violence. In particular, the Greek governmentand immigration authorities have contextualised the dire detention condi-tions as part of a wider governmental strategy to project the image of Greeceas an “unfriendly destination” for those wishing to enter its territory illeg-ally. In direct opposition to the abovementioned criticisms, Nikos Dendias,the then Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection stated thatdetention centres in Greece function according to the European standardsand explained that detention conditions stand at the “lowest acceptablecivilised minimum” in order to deter unregulated immigrants by sending amessage that Greece is “unfriendly” to them (quoted in Cheliotis 2013).

The statement of the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protectionthat Greek detention centres operate according to the European standardsof apprehension of unregulated immigration and detention not onlyindicates the active role of the EU in the construction of an immigrantcrisis and its subsequent management but also its problematic relationshipwith the member states regarding immigration. The EU is critical ofGreece’s asylum system, immigration policies and detention conditionsas demonstrated by the ECHR condemnation but at the same it crimina-lises immigration and militarises the border through the support andfunding of fences detention centres and the overall activities ofFRONTEX. On both the national and EU levels, respectively, the legalframework around “illegal” immigration and its management aims atdissociating the EU from any collective responsibility with respect to theprotection of human rights and at the same time delegates responsibility toGreece as a member state regardless of its capacity and will to train andinspect guards, and provide legal representation, and medical facilities.

Most importantly, it needs to be acknowledged that the unwillingnessand inability to respect human rights in conditions of detention derives fromthe perception of detainees as a “mass phenomenon” (Agamben 2000, p. 18)


and not as individual cases with particular problems and needs. However, wehave to look further than bureaucratic structures and financial problems forthe inability and unwillingness to respect human rights and perceive detaineesas individual cases. Agamben, following Arendt’s (1976) reflections on therights of man, notes that the waning of the nation state signals the lack ofrespect for human rights. Human rights, Arendt (ibid.) argues, cannot beconceived through the prism of the human beings as such—naked life inAgamben’s lexicon—because human rights are the rights of the citizen ofstate. Themodern nation state, Arendt highlights, does not provide the (legal)space for the legitimate existence of people no longer represented by particularnation states. In that case, detainees constitute an unsettling factor in the orderof the nation state because they principally challenge the Ius Sanguinis and IusSolis principles but also because citizenship understood as membership toparticular state entailing certain rights and obligations are inadequate forcomprehending the growing number of stateless, unrepresentable residentsof Greece.

THE MEANING OF DETENTION CENTRES IN GREECE

The detention centre represents a particular type of rationality—a perfectorder where only staff and detainees can be flawed and their actions can andshould be rectified. Herzfeld (1992) observes that the rationality of thenation state is always dissociated from belief but at the same time thisrationality commands unquestioned faith. The focus on the rationality,function and legal structure of detention centres can only allow an analysisof what creates the meaning of detention centres but does not necessarilyprovide an answer to the question what detention centres mean for bothGreek citizens and unregulated immigrants. The exertion to secure theborders of the EU and to protect EU citizens from unregulated immigrants,as well as protecting asylum seekers from smugglers, is deeply rooted in therhetoric of just and unjust, friend and enemy, order and chaos, health andillness, utopia and dystopia. These binary oppositions are not merely abstractideas about the constitution of a well-ordered polity, they are also sentimentscommunicated by politicians, citizens, migration authorities and immigrants.

The rhetoric of EU officials and immigration authorities such asFRONTEX is part of a cultural structure that remains largely impercep-tible to all actors involved. Jeffrey Alexander (2003) points out thatcultural structures are not only external but also internal—they contain ameaning and this meaning needs to be made perceptible. The internal


dimension of these structures does not provide any space for rational andinstrumental political action. Instead, it constitutes “an ideal resource thatpartially enables and partially constraints, providing for both routine andcreativity and allowing for the reproduction and transformation of cul-ture” (Alexander 2003, p. 12). Intranational organisations and nationsates have an ideal foundation that shapes their aims and actions. Everyaction towards the apprehension of unregulated immigration, regardlessof how objective and instrumental it is, or how it is shaped and informedby relevant data provides a particular meaning. What is needed is a theo-retical analysis of the rhetoric and symbols that create and sustain themeaning of immigration detention centres in Greece.

The building of detention centres in EU member states takes placeson the premise of a state of emergency—a state both created andexplained by the unregulated immigration flows to Europe. Even thoughthis state of emergency is supposed to be temporary the presence ofdetention centres and the militarisation of the border indicate a perma-nent state of emergency exemplified by an immigration crisis that goeshand in hand with a crisis of the European and Greek territories. InNomos of the Earth Carl Schmitt (2003, p. 194) states “the territory ofthe state is the theatre of rule” yet the state has ceased been a protagonistin the design and implementation of immigration policies and bordersecurity and its territory is in dispute. The building of detention centresfor unregulated immigrants is an explicit attempt to reinstate the EUmember state as a “total state” where it can discern between friend andenemy and rule by limiting or eliminating forces (such as the presence ofunregulated immigrants and stateless people) that might develop in itsinterior. However, this rule does not depend on the implementation ofthe law as illustrated by immigration policies and directives but on itssuspension. The detention centre manifests itself both physically andpolitically when the suspension of the law acquires a permanent territor-ial arrangement and consequently remains outside the normal state of thelaw—outside of the state of organised interests and associations such asthe ECHR and NGOs. “The camp is the space that opens up when thestate of exception starts to become the rule” (Agamben 2000, p. 39,emphasis original).

According to Agamben’s (2005, p. 24) reading of Schmitt the under-standing of the state of exception is determined by its “localisation(or illocalisation)”. At the outset a spatial distinction between what isinside and what is outside of the law on immigration appears to be


inadequate for explanation of the meaning of detention. Is it possible forthis state of lawlessness inside the detention centre to be accommodatedby the legal order? Is it possible for law to accommodate its own suspen-sion during exceptional moments—moments of crisis? On one hand,Agamben (2005, p. 23) points towards the perception of the state ofexception, as “an integral part of positive law because the necessity thatgrounds it is an autonomous source of law”. On the other hand, the stateof exception can be perceived as “essentially extrajuridical” (ibid.), some-thing that precedes the legal order of the state or exists outside of it.4

However, both of these understandings are insufficient for the under-standing and positioning of the state of exception. The state of exceptioncannot be found inside or outside the state’s legal order but instead withina “zone of indifference where inside and outside do not exclude each otherbut blur with one another” (ibid.). Correspondingly, the suspension ofthe law in the detention centre is neither external nor internal to existingimmigration policies but instead mentalities and practices inside and out-side the detention centre redefine the limits of the legal order in relation tounregulated immigrants and their lives.

The redefinition of practices and mentalities and ultimately the recog-nition of what exists outside the law can be appropriated by immigrationauthorities as part of the law contribute to a restrictive yet productivenarrative for Europe and Greek national identity. First, detention centresdue to their implicit permanent presence perform a symbolic role withrespect to the reconceptualisation of borders. Such a reconceptualisation isnot limited to material borders, but addresses the very limits of civilisation.Considering the incorporation of what exists outside the law into the law,the violation of human rights as legal practice and the Minister’s admissionthat detention centres need to operate at the “lowest acceptable civilisedminimum” the new conceptualisation of borders defines not only whereEuropean civilised practices end (inside European territory) but also wherethe cruelty of the sovereign, the immigration authorities and the civilisedsubject is permitted. Second, detention centres produce new politicalsubjectivities. Officially built for the protection of citizens, social cohesionand of the welfare state detention centres produce collective subjectivitiesinside and outside of their confines. In the name of security and protec-tion, detention centres safeguard the national subject from the territorialand social threats unregulated immigration poses and at the same timeproduce a defensive national subject in fear of being contaminated by thearrival of anonymous stateless people. Consequently, detention centres do


not only exclude unregulated immigrants from entering the nation statebut they also produce its content by shaping a particular type of nationaland nationalist subjectivity.

NOTES

1. After immense pressure from the European Commission for cooperationand solidarity, certain governments are arguing that only Christian refugeesshould receive protection because they share the values of their respectivenational population. In August 2015, the Slovak government declared thatit would only provide aid to Christian Syrian refugees but it did not explainhow such a process of religious identification will take place.

2. Amidst harsh criticisms from campaign groups and a damning report on thetreatment immigrants in the detention centres of the UK led by the formerPrison and Probation Ombudsman, the UK Home Secretary, Theresa Maystated: “Immigration detention is a vital tool in helping ensure those withno right to remain in the UK are returned to their home country. But I takethe welfare of those in government’s care very seriously and I want to ensurethe health and well being of all detainees, some of whom may be vulnerableis safeguarded at all times” (Patrick Wintour in The Guardian 2015).

3. In February 2011, as the Greek economy and society were recalibrating theirpriorities and needs according to the austerity measures and fiscal consolida-tion unregulated migrants living outside detention centres yet restricted byharsh and inhumane work conditions went on a long hunger strike. Thesemigrants mainly from Africa were told that due to the new economic realityGreece is facing their labour is no longer needed and they have to voluntarilygo back to their countries, which they fled from or they will be deported.After 35 days of hunger strike many migrants were hospitalised with organfailure. See Costas Douzinas, “The Hunger Strikers are the Martyrs ofGreece”. The Guardian, 28 February 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/28/hunger-strikers-greece-asylum-seekers. Accessed 26 August 2015.

4. In the third chapter of his commentaries on Paul’s Letter to the Romans,The Time That Remains, Giorgio Agamben writes that “the fundamentallogic of the law is division” (2005, p. 47). In the Jewish tradition, the Torahis understood by Agamben as a “dividing wall” or a fence that separates Jewsfrom non-Jews (Agamben 2005, p. 7) or in Paul’s words between “Ioudaoiand ethnē ”(Agamben 2005, p. 47). Ioudaoi are members of the nation ofIsrael, the elected people and the status of being Jewish is defined by beingsubject to God’s Law.


http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/28/hunger-strikers-greece-asylum-seekers



CHAPTER 5

The New Subjectivity of Nationalism

Abstract Following the conclusions of Chapter 4 on detention, isolationand fear of coexistence, the chapter reflects upon the formation andpresence of the far right in Europe. The chapter deals with the violentactivities and communicative practices of the Greek neo-Nazi partyGolden Dawn. Michel Wieviorka and Alain Touraine’s theorisation ofthe subject provides a platform to examine the emergence of the nation-alist subject as a rejection of liberal parliamentary politics.

Keywords Nationalist subject � Golden dawn � New right � Welfare �Racism � Xenophobia

THE PROJECT OF NATIONALIST SUBJECTIVITY

The national subject produced by the immigration detention centrescannot be understood and assessed strictly through structuralist theori-sations of subjectivity. The existence and actions of the national subjectwithin the legal, political and cultural frameworks of immigrationdemand a theoretical elaboration that encapsulates both political actionand ideological structure. Following Michel Wieviorka’s (2012) rework-ing of the notion of subjectivity in social theory, this chapter willidentify and locate the nationalist subject in Greece. In this chapter,the nationalist subject is presented as a composition of individuals and


65

political formations that have the will and capacity to apprehend theforces of postnationalism and transform the immigration and refugeecrisis into a coherent socio-political project of national values and ideals.Most notably, the nationalist subject in Greece manifests itself throughthe neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn and its attempt to present nationalismas an ideology of free action and personal achievement.

To speak of a nationalist subject within the context of recent socio-logical theories and developments is an oxymoron for two reasons. First,sociological theory has invested in the positive if not liberating qualities ofthe subject in the attempt of many sociologists and political theorists tohighlight the shortcomings of structuralism. As a result, nationalism andits increasing popularity in Europe are incompatible with the contempor-ary understanding of the subject. Second, nationalism usually relies on theassignation of predetermined identities and not necessarily on the con-struction of new ones. In the work of Wieviorka (2012) and Touraine(2000, 2010) the subject is the product of personal gestures againststructures, dominant ideologies, primordial identities and economicsystems.

The main task of this chapter is to situate the Greek nationalistsubject in the terrain of the sociology of the subject and at the sametime to provide an account of its legitimation with respect to theincreasing acceptance and popularity of the far right in Europe and inGreece.

THE INTEGRATING CAPACITIES OF SOCIETY AND THE FREEDOM

OF THE SUBJECT

At the heart of this sociological theorisation of the subject lies a deepscepticism of the relevance of mass society and its integrating capacities.According to Alain Touraine (2000) the dominant social models of thenation state and of mass society have begun to disintegrate and instru-mental rationality and bureaucracy are not in position anymore to con-struct a lifeworld (Lebenswelt) for individuals. The imposition of identitybased on duties, obligations and shared history as well as membership to apre-existing national and ethnic community prioritise the mass and con-tribute to the impossibility of formulating an “I”. The Subject appearsboth in social theory and practice when there is a rejection of instrumen-tality and of identification processes. “The Subject is an individual’s quest


for the conditions that will allow him to become the actor of his ownhistory” (Touraine 2000, p. 56).

It is important to stress that Touraine does not reject modernity whole-sale but only a conventional image of it that dictates the representation ofsociety as a coherent whole constituted by codependent parts workingtowards its preservation as such. This dominant image of society manifestsitself in two ways: first, in the inherent capacity of society to integrate itsmembers and adapt to change caused by exogenous factors, and second, inthe correlation of social organisation with the implementation of powerand domination. On the other hand, Touraine wishes to shed light onanother aspect of modernity by advocating a “sociology upside down”(Touraine 2010, p. 14). Besides the dominance of rationality and socialorganisation, modernity also provides the means to realise the transitionfrom “systems to subjects” (ibid.) and the importance of the subject forthe reconstruction of the social and political fields. The notion of thesubject is not necessarily introduced or rather reintroduced as a defencemechanism against the all-encompassing powers of rationalisation andidentification, but as a form of struggle either against the co-option ofsocial life by the market or its replacement by communitarian regimes.

Touraine’s (2000, 2010) positioning of the subject in the social andpolitical fields indicates its defensive and constructive aspects, respectively.The subject has a defensive aspect because it resists process of rationalisa-tion and identification, and a constructive aspect because of its capacity toconstruct experiences and establishing a status of autonomy outside ofsocio-political confines. Yet, Touraine’s (ibid.) emphasis on autonomydoes not point towards the social isolation of the subject. The subjectcan relate only to another subject who also partakes in defence andconstruction. The relationship with the Other is based on sympathy,empathy and on an understanding of an Other partially existing in thesame processes of rationalisation and identification and at the same time ispartially different. Touraine (2000) asserts that relations between subjectsare not ordinary because common principles of relation such as member-ship, citizenship and shared culture give their place to the mutual effort ofsubjects to constitute themselves as subjects. The recognition of the Otherdelineates and strengthens a relation different to the relations establishedin professional and economic terrains. The understanding and recognitionof the Other construct an alternative civil society that addresses its mem-bers not as citizens but as actors who resist the powers of rationalisationand massification.

5 THE NEW SUBJECTIVITY OF NATIONALISM 67

The theoretical formulation of the subject and its subsequent contex-tualisation within the repressive integrating capacities of society as well aswithin its inherent inclination towards the recognition of the Other tackleshead on issues of social organisation and eventually raises the question “ifwe can live together” (Touraine 2000). For Touraine (2000, 2010), andWieviorka (2012), subjectivation is not necessarily an existential attackagainst all process of socialisation but more accurately, an unusual form ofsocialisation that acknowledges the importance of the individual overinstitutions. On the other hand, several theoretical and empirical problemsarise when subjectivation appears to be an unusual form of nationalisationinstead of socialisation; in other words, when the nation substitutes thesocial as the principal platform for defending against process of rationalisa-tion and dominant forms of identification, and at the same time establish-ing autonomy outside socio-political confines. When the subject becomesthe nationalist subject it disregards the principle that any human beingmust also be able to be or to become one. The formation and popularity ofnationalist and neo-Nazi parties across Europe indicate that the nationalistsubject defends the idea of the nation and of the individual againstprogrammes of immigrant regularisation, integration and free movementof people across the EU.

THE CONTEMPORARY NATIONALIST SUBJECT IN GREECE:BETWEEN DENIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DOMINANCE

The end of a series of military juntas in Greece in 1974 indicated a newepoch for the country, and for Europe where authoritarianism and nation-alism were perceived as offensive and counterproductive ideologies(Triantafyllidou and Kouki 2014; Georgiadou 2013; Ellinas 2013). Theprocess of Europeanising Greece entailed the establishment of parliamen-tary democracy and the harmonisation of Greece with other Europeandemocratic polities with respect to liberal economics and tolerance.Extreme right parties occupied marginal positions in society and in theelectorate and quite often, extreme right formations were co-opted andgradually dissolved by the mainstream right-wing party New Democracy(Ellinas 2010, 2013). These political formations such as the NationalCamp, active in 1977, and National Political Union, active in the 1980s,were preoccupied with the ideological conflicts of the Cold War, thelegalisation of the Communist Party after the fall of the junta in 1974,


and the subsequent expansion of communist ideas. By that time, immi-gration flows and the presence of immigrants in Greece were not yet partof the discourse on security, cohesion and loss of national and culturalidentity.

The first extreme right political formation with governing aspirationsand a direct focus on immigration as a social and cultural problem wasLAOS, an acronym for Popular Orthodox Alarm and a pun for the Greekword for people. LAOS was founded in 2000 after its leader GeorgiosKaratzaferis left the mainstream right-wing party New Democracy due toits ideological inconsistencies and lack of aggressive policy towards issuesof foreign policy and immigration. From the outset LAOS defined itself asthe guardian of Christian Orthodoxy and Greek national culture byarguing for the protection of the Greek nation and its ChristianOrthodox identity (Ellinas 2010, p. 137). In synch with other extremeright political formations in Europe such as the Sweden Democrats(Sverigedemokraterna, SD) and the Finns Party (formerly known as TrueFinns, Perussuomalaiset, PS), LAOS explicitly connected immigration tocriminality, insecurity and unemployment. LAOS was one of the firstpolitical formations engaging with the politics of fear and targeting immi-grants as a demographic and cultural threat: “I don’t want them. This iswhere I stand. I don’t want them to become a majority”, while he thoughtthat the detention of undocumented immigrants in the islands wherecommunists were exiled would be a “good solution” (Kathimerini2012). In a post-Cold War world, LAOS formed an antiglobalisationand anti-American agenda and accused the political establishment of ser-ving American as well as Jewish political and economic interests. Despiteits distinctive right-wing political mission, LAOS never wished to alienatevoters of the left and quite often presented the image of a party at war withmultinational corporations.1 In 2004, LAOS won 2.2 % of the vote in theNational Elections and 4.1 % in the European elections. In 2007, LAOSwon 3.8 % of the vote in the National elections and 5.6 % in the Nationalelections of 2009 (Ministry of Interior, Greece 2009).

The momentum of LAOS came to a halt with the eruption of theGreek financial crisis and the subsequent collapse of the political partyduopoly between the Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) and NewDemocracy (ND). LAOS was stripped off its anti-establishment promi-nence as soon as it became a co-signatory to the memorandum ofunderstanding between the Troika (comprised of the InternationalMonetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the EU) and the


Greek Government. LAOS participated in the coalition government ledby Loukas Papadimos for the implementation of the terms of thebailout, which mainly involved economic reforms such as privatisationand severe austerity. As a result, the party received 2.9 % of the vote inthe National elections of May 2012 (Ministry of Interior, Greece2012a) and 1.6 % in elections in June of the same year (Ministry ofInterior, Greece 2012b), lost all its parliamentary seats and many of itsleading members defected to New Democracy. It needs to be men-tioned that since then LAOS has removed all references to anti-American and anti-Jewish sentiments from the statute of the party,the focus is on the independence of Greece from financial administra-tors as well as on equality and prosperity amongst Greek citizens.

The void left by the increasing unpopularity of LAOS was soon tobe filled by a party with a clear racist and nationalist manifesto. GoldenDawn was founded on 14 February 1983 by its current and nowimprisoned leader, Nikos Michaloliakos. At its initial phase GoldenDawn was a journal and a study group focusing on the promotion ofEuropean civilisation. Communism, Internationalism, Liberalism,Cosmopolitanism and the Abrahamic religions were identified asthreats to European civilisation and as potential target for the group’sintellectual activities. Members of the group maintained distrusttowards politics but as soon as Golden Dawn became a political partyall founding members of the journal and of the research group becameparty activists (Georgiadou 2013). The symbol of the party is a Greekmeander resembling a Nazi swastika and its fundamental ideology isnationalism. According to the party’s social and political ideas, institut-ing a nationalist state means “a new society and a new type of humanbeing (emphasis mine)” (Golden Dawn Political Theses). Against the“parliamentarian dictatorship” of right- and left-wing politiciansGolden Dawn envisions a true democracy emanating from “the powerof the demos” and in the party’s lexicon only “the people from thesame genous and nation can be part of the demos” (ibid.).2

Golden Dawn as a political party became active in 1994, desperatelytrying to position itself at the foreground of a nationalist outburst overMacedonia and the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as anindependent nation state. From the mid-1990s onwards Golden Dawnhas become more of a Greek nationalist party than explicitly a neo-Naziparty while retaining paramilitary reputation by being active on streetsattacking immigrants and activists from the left.


When Golden Dawn decided in 2007 to contest the local, national andEuropean elections the rhetoric remained inflammatory but mostly preoc-cupied with domestic issues and in particular with immigration. Whereas,other extreme right parties such as LAOS were pointing out the cultural anddemographic threats immigration poses to Greece, Golden Dawn opposedimmigration according to the national socialist principles of race, blood andancestry. In this regard, immigration is a threat to the racial and biologicalpurity of the nation and immigrants must be expelled from the country. Theparty failed to make any sort of political impact in the 2009 Europeanand national elections, receiving 0.46 and 0.29 % of the vote,respectively (Ministry of Interior, Greece 2009). Golden Dawn’s leap intomainstream politics came in the 2010 local elections. For a long time, theunderlying xenophobia of the Greek electorate had remained unexploitedby the mainstream parties and there was a denial with respect to thecentrality of immigration in social life. Golden Dawn was best ideologicallyand chronologically placed to exploit the growing anti-immigration senti-ments. A self-proclaimed anti-establishment party and disengaged fromparliamentary procedures for most of its political life, Golden Dawn pre-sented itself as the defender of national integrity and interests. “GoldenDawn”, the leader of the party Michaloliakos argues, “are the only patriots,the only ones who haven’t dipped their hands in the honeypot” (Baboulias2012). The economic crisis and the administration of Greek finances by theTroika had already constituted a framework in which the political establish-ment were seen as morally bankrupt and politically inept while suspicion offoreign politicians and administrators and repulsion of undocumentedimmigrants were perceived as a shrewd defence mechanism against povertyand loss of sovereignty.

The high concentration of immigrants in the centre of Athens and, inparticular, in areas like Agios Panteleimon in conjunction with the appar-ent desertion of the city by state authorities led to 5.29 % of the vote and aseat in the city’s council. In an explicit manner, immigration was used as anall-encompassing issue in order to address the state’s neglect of impover-ished urban areas, rising criminality, decline of living standards and thenation’s lack of influence in European politics. Golden Dawn was defend-ing the country against an “unorganised army” who “decomposes thesocial structure and alienates people from their national identity” (GoldenDawn, Political Theses).

The years that followed Golden Dawn’s moderate success in thelocal elections of 2007 signalled the end of mainstream politics in


Greece, the birth of a new political subjectivity and the legitimationof racism and racist violence.

THE ANTI-SUBJECT: NATIONALIST SUBJECTIVITY AND VIOLENCE

For more than 30 years, Golden Dawn existed on the fringes ofparliamentary democracy. After a series of unsuccessful campaigns,the party received a record number of votes in the parliamentaryelections of 6 May 2012 and 17 June 2012, respectively. After theinconclusive elections of 6 May 2012, there was a widespread beliefthat the Greek electorate were unaware of Golden Dawn as a neo-Naziparty; the slapping of a female rival politician on television, orderingjournalists to stand to attention, smiling next to an Auschwitz oven,threats to throw immigrants and their children out of hospital beds andviolent attacks on foreign workers in the streets or urban areas shedlight to the non-parliamentary activity of the party (Henley and Davies2012). Despite polls predicting Golden Dawn’s share of the votewould collapse following the explicit demonstration of its activitiesand ideas as well as its precipitous political upsurge, support forGreece’s far-right, anti-immigration party remained at the same levels.In the elections of June 2012, Golden Dawn received 425,970 votes(Ministry of Interior, Greece 2012b) compared with 441,018 of theelections in May 2012 (Ministry of Interior, Greece 2012a). That gavethe party a 6.92 % of the vote, marginally less than the 6.97 % of theMay 2012 elections.

The electoral triumph of Golden Dawn can be attributed to the bigchange in the political preferences of the Greek electorate and to the directimplementation of political ideologies and programmes in the streets.First, the change in political preferences favoured the ideological extremesof the political spectrum. The national elections of 2012, characterised as a“political revolution” (Lowen 2012), concluded with immense losses forthe two ruling parties. The Social Democrats, PASOK lost more than two-thirds of their votes between the elections of 2009 and the elections of2012, while the Conservatives, New Democracy lost almost half of theirvoters. Within the same time frame the Coalition of the Radical Left,SYRIZA managed to increase fourfold its vote share. Second, cities andneighbourhoods became the platform for Golden Dawn to promote andexercise its ideologies and programs by the way of disregarding the impor-tance and relevance of the Greek parliament.


We feel disgusted in the parliament. If they want us to, we can abandon it atany given moment and take to the streets. There they will see what theGolden Dawn is really about, they will see what battle means, they will seewhat struggle means, they will see what bayonets sharpened every nightmean. (N. Michaloliakos, in Baboulias 2012)

Golden Dawn wants to present itself as a party that truly belongs to thestreets and not in parliament. Representative politics and liberal democ-racy are deployed as a Trojan horse for the promotion and subsequentproliferation of nationalism as the only ideology and political systemcapable of establishing welfare, law and order, cultural and national cohe-sion. Moreover the non-parliamentary, or to be more precise, streetactivity of the party aspires to rebuild the Greek state and society accordingto its own ideological principles. For Golden Dawn, law and order asviewed through racial and politico-ideological hierarchies is paramountfor Greece as a country to “regain its national vision and values”(Michaloliakos 2014).

In a report issued soon after the Greek national election of June 2012,Human Rights Watch documented the rising violence in the streets ofurban areas of Greece against immigrants and people of different politicalaffiliations or inclinations. Despite the visibility of racist violence thereseem be to several problems with respect to the official definition of racistviolence. Even though racism and racist violence are officially lamentableas mentalities and practices in all jurisdictions of the EU member statesthere is no specific legal definition of what constitutes racist violence. ForGoodey (2007) the lack of a common definition of racist violence isindicative of the wide range of understandings of social justice in Europeand subsequently each specific understanding is a product of each memberstate’s national culture and history. The true extent of racist violence inGreece is unknown. Statistics provided by the government are untrust-worthy because of the failure or inadequacy of the police and other lawenforcement agencies to respond to, identify, investigate racist crimes andprosecute the perpetrators. Underreporting by victims especially thoseclassified as undocumented immigrants is also a significant factor towardslack of data. Fear of detention, prosecution or repatriation are the mainreasons why undocumented immigrants are reluctant to approach thepolice and report any violence inflicted on them or others. Even thoughEU member states have in place official mechanisms for the prevention,recording and persecution of racist crimes it is very hard to define what is a


racist crime and how to differentiate it from a popular indignation towardsthe presence and activities of the foreign population. Indeed, both thepresence and activities of Golden Dawn were part of and substantiated bypopular indignation towards national decay and rising criminality.

For a number of years, racist violence has ceased to exist as a series ofisolated incidents usually involving a small number of individuals. Instead,racist violent has morphed into an organised and formalised activity thataddresses the perpetrators as defenders of values and territory. A recentmanifestation of this type of violence is the formation of “citizens’ groups”in specific areas of Athens with a significant number of immigrant residentssuch as Aghios Panteleimon and Attiki. These groups aspire to reinstatelaw and order in areas where the police cannot help Greek citizens fromthe apparent dangers of mass immigration and settlement of immigrants.“The steal, they sell drugs. The police know and everyday the police comeshere and they are trying to do their best” [sic] (TVXS 2013). In addition,the way these citizens’ groups have replaced police authorities does notconstitute a legal problem. On the contrary, the authorities are relievedthat there are groups who are willing to deal with the problems and fearsof the locals. Besides patrolling the streets and restricting admission ofnon-Greeks to public spaces such as locking the gates of a playground,citizens’ groups have been very vocal regarding their sentiments towardsimmigrants and Islam. A group called Citizens of Athens launched itscampaign to reclaim Attika Square from the immigrant residents by pro-ducing a poster that communicates the sentiments of the locals regardingimmigration and public administration:

RETURN TO YOUR COUNTRY NOW . . .We are angry with this govern-ment and all politicians that brought you here and support you and defendyou and WE ARE DETERMINED TO PUNISH THEM AND YOU.From now on, we will take every necessary action in order to force youand the TRAITORS-POLITICIANS that help you GET OUT OF THISCOUNTRY (or what you left of it). YOU HAVE NO FUTURE INGREECE.GO HOME NOW [sic](ibid).

In other places, posters were calling Greeks to realise what sort of religionIslam is: “This is the religion that always seeks to expand. These are thepeople who steal, rape and kill Greeks. Greeks, Wake up!”

The street activity and communicative practices of the “citizens’groups” demonstrate the multiple dimensions of urban space. Echoing


the ethnographic work of Elijah Anderson on racial and urban divisions(Anderson 1990; Alexander 2013a), the streets of Athens resemble abattlefield demarcated by racial and ethnic categories and respective senti-ments. Fear of the immigrant population neither occurs as a matter of factnor is a product of the actual experience of living with immigrants. ForAnderson distrust towards the Other requires “tremendous energy” and inline with Touraine’s subjectivity can also be considered as an “achieve-ment” (Anderson in Alexander 2013a, p. 89) that extends beyond livedexperience and manages to categorise people according to their religionand ethnicity.

While there is no apparent official connection between the citizens’groups and Golden Dawn there are many similarities regarding the actionand the rhetoric. “There is no organic relationship between Golden Dawnand these groups, we support their activities. Not illegal activities,however . . .Many of their members voted for us, and members ofGolden Dawn belong to these groups, but the crimes don’t come fromthese groups” (Nikos Michaloliakos, in Human Rights Watch 2012,p. 40).

FOOD AND BLOOD: NATIONALISM, RACISM AND WELFARE

Law and order is not the only domain where the nationalist subject assertsitself as the defender and protector values, ideas and most importantly thenation. Golden Dawn has been active in highlighting issues of welfareduring the financial and immigration crises in Greece. In an attempt topresent themselves as a party capable of expressing and defending theinterests of all Greeks, Golden Dawn organised “food hand-outs forGreeks only” regardless of their ideological and political affiliations. On24 July 2013, the day the Greek Republic celebrated the 39th anniversaryof the restoration of democracy after 7 years of military junta, GoldenDawn organised a “food hand-out for Greeks only”. Initially, the eventwas planned to take place in Attiki Square in order for party activists andpotential voters to declare their presence and reclaim authority in an areawith a significant number of immigrants and refugees. City authoritiesbanned the staging of the event and the police blocked the wider area withthe intention of preventing any clashes between Golden Dawn activistsand other opposition groups. The leader of Golden Dawn was quick toexploit the decision of city authorities by arguing that there is a biasagainst Greek people by the government and authorities. “The crime we


committed was that we wanted to hand out food to Greeks only. If we’dhanded it out to Pakistanis and blacks, there would have been no pro-blem” (Michaloliakos in Enet 2013). Eventually, Golden Dawn staged thefood hand-out outside of the party’s headquarters; while impoverishedGreek nationals with their identification documents in hand were queuingup for food and clothing the chosen soundtrack by the party’s activists forthis nationally and racially oriented philanthropic event was a Greek ver-sion of a Nazi anthem titled Horst Wessel translated in Greek as Ortho toLavaro (The Flag on High). Whereas the original version of the anthem isbanned in Germany, Golden Dawn uploaded a video of the event wherethe song is audible. “We didn’t chose this day by coincidence. They saythey are celebrating the return of democracy. But they are really celebrat-ing state thievery, scandals, and treason.” (ibid)

The “food hand-outs for Greeks only” were accompanied by anothersymbolically charged stunt of Golden Dawn that of blood donations. In2013, the party organised “blood donations for Greeks only” around thecountry. Activists, members and voters of the party visited hospitalsaround Greece to donate blood with the stipulation that their blood canonly be donated to Greek patients who need it. With Greek flags andbanners reading “the whole of Greece donates blood” the marching blooddonors dismissed politicians and public administrators as “stray dogs whohave done nothing for the country” (Golden Dawn 2013a). In the islandof Samos, hospital staff refused to collaborate with the Golden Dawnactivists because they are a neo-Nazi organisation and also because theyviolate “the existing legal framework and medical ethics, which do notallow any racial discrimination concerning blood donation” (iefimerida 23August 2013). As a result, hospital staff that refused to accept blood werearrested by a public prosecutor and were called by Golden Dawn“Bolsheviks and ethno-nihilists” (ibid.). In November of the same year,Golden Dawn organised a blood donation in memory of two of theirfellow activists who got murdered by an urban guerrilla opposition group.The conservative-led coalition government tried to block the whole pro-cedure with limited effect. Activists visited local hospitals and criticised thegovernment for “refusing their blood while Greek hospitals import bloodin very high prices from abroad” (Golden Dawn 2013b).

The food hand-outs and blood donations hosted and organised byGolden Dawn are not limited to the provision of welfare in an EUmember state riddled with financial problems and corrupt politicians.The welfare activity of Golden Dawn aspires to literally reinstate the right


of blood (jus sanguinis). Here the right of blood is not limited to issuesconcerning citizenship but to life itself. Food and blood become veryeffective means to reimagine a nationalist utopia where all foreigners arepermanently and lawfully excluded.

THE LEGITIMATION PROCESS OF THE NEW RIGHT OR HOW

THE NATIONALIST SUBJECT ASSERTS ITSELFThe nationalist subject of Greece as embodied by Golden Dawn defines adystopian environment, whereas violence is a necessary practice againstimmigration, and against a state incapable of protecting its citizens.Golden Dawn has managed to legitimise violent practices and rhetoric,and present themselves as a party whose parliamentary status is only atransitory stage towards the racial and cultural homogenisation of Greece.The legitimation of Nazi politics in Greece entails the processes of reject-ing the liberal state as the sole defender of national interests by commu-nicating a notion of authority; deploying the historical and mythologicalnarrative of the Greek state and by differentiating between xenophobiaand racism.

The Greek nationalist subject cannot be examined according to histor-ical understandings of fascism and Nazism. The nationalist subject in thewider context of the financial and immigration crises appears to be aversatile subject capable of adjusting its position with regard to culturaltraditions and narratives, public opinion and public mood. Golden Dawnprovides a space for activists and voters to recognise themselves as truedemocrats and as a viable opposition to the political establishment. ForGolden Dawn, violence against the immigrant population is not necessa-rily a product of racist views but of the social injustice inflicted on Greeks.Similarly, the citizens’ groups formed in the neighbourhoods of Athenssee themselves as activists who dare to shed light on the problems Greekcitizens face from mass and unregulated immigration. The target here isstate authorities for allowing immigration to become a problem and forundermining the importance of cultural homogeneity. Indeed, the unwill-ingness and inability of the Greek state to protect its own citizens isperceived as racism against the Greeks.

Golden Dawn bypass and ultimately reject the authority of the state bycommunicating a different notion of authority to Greek citizens.Authority for Alexandre Kojève (2014) exists in times of change and is


exercised over to people who can react or change to authoritarian com-mands. While authority is a social relationship and usually involves “anagent and a patient” (Kojève 2014, p. 8), there exist specific socialdynamics that prevent the patients to act against the agent despite beingable to do so. The establishment of these social dynamics explains why andhow certain types of authority are recognised and accepted. With respectto the establishment of a nationalist and racist authority against theauthority of the liberal state, we have to turn to Kojève’s (ibid.) readingof Aristotelian mastery and submission. The master earns the right toexercise an authority over the slave because he can anticipate the future,whereas slaves are confined in the interpretation of present situations. Thedialectic of utopia and dystopia places authority within the context of theimmigration crisis. Golden Dawn assert themselves as the authoritariansubject not only because they can anticipate the apparent dystopia of thecurrent immigration policies but also because they can anticipate theapparent utopia realised by the elimination of anything foreign thatmight jeopardise racial superiority and cohesion.

The anticipation of dystopia and utopia for the establishment of GoldenDawn’s authority does not only dependent on the Greek citizens’ experi-ence of the immigration crisis. Golden Dawn’s authority is supplementedby an interpretation of the Greek state’s historical and mythological roots.Even though the Greek nationalist subject declares its autonomy from thecontemporary processes of integration and socialisation it is not immunefrom what Wieviorka (2012, p. 99) calls “a very classical definition” of thesubject. Fear of immigrants as well as racially and ethnic Others derivesfrom the conscious deployment of historically rooted understandings ofnational identity and hereditary enemies. The Greek state has always beenan active component in the process of linking contemporary Greeknational identity to antiquity. The narrative of the Greek nation is pre-sented in a linear form, and any geopolitical, cultural and religious rup-tures are either presented as temporal anomalies or events whose characterhas been shaped by the universal appeal of Greek culture. Consequently,the Greek nation is represented as a homogeneous entity throughouthistory (Kitromilidis 1989) and the Greek nationality as a product andexpression of genealogical descent and of Greek antiquity. While thisunderstanding of the nation and the process of formulating a Greeknational identity point towards Smith’s (1999) “ethnic nations”, whichare not necessarily “territorial”, Golden Dawn’s response to immigrationand the street activity of its members highlight the necessity of territory


and its subsequent defence from its perceived enemies. Golden Dawn andother activists are subjected to a dominant national narrative of Greekculture and state formation that incorporates antiquity, modernity andChristianity. The composition of Greek national identity and conscious-ness were a direct product of the eighteenth-century European printcapitalism and the integration of Greece into the expanding Europeaneconomy (Friedman 1994; Carras 2004). During the development ofEuropean culture and economy, Greece and in particular what it wasknown as ancient Greece, was increasingly perceived by intellectual move-ments such as philelhenism and neoclassisim as a legitimate ancestor ofEurope (Dimou 2009). By the middle of the eighteenth century, theattempt of English, French and German scholars to make availablethrough mass prints a plethora of Greek classical texts recreated a glitteringancient Greek civilisation. Towards the end of the century, this gloriouspast became accessible to Greek-speaking Christian intellectuals and stu-dents most of whom had lived or studied outside of the confines of theOttoman Empire. Exemplary of this process is the speech delivered in1803 in Paris by one of the most distinguished figures of theEnlightenment in Greece and forefather of Greek nationalism,Adamantios Koraes:

For the first time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of the ignoranceand trembles in measuring with the eye the distance separating it from itsancestors; glory. This painful discovery, however, does not precipitate theGreeks into despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly toldthemselves, we must either try to become again worthy of this name, or wemust not bear it. (Koraes 1803, quoted in Anderson 2006, p. 72)

The eventual formation of the Greek nation state consciously con-structed a national and civic identity based on admiration for antiquity.However, while the initial rediscovery for antiquity through theEnlightenment project sustained a political programme for the purposeof liberation its appropriation was increasingly depoliticised to the extentof creating “a cult like awe towards the legacy of the ancestors” (Dimou2009, p. 319). Consequently, the self-understanding of one’s ownnation was transformed into an ideological mechanism for devaluingother nations and excluding minorities.

In fact, Golden Dawn and other activists align themselves with thiswidely accepted ideological mechanism in order to recontextualise the


importance of ancestry and purity in times of transnational governance andspatial mobility. However, as Jenkins and Sofos (1996) argue, the startingpoint for examining nationalism is not the accurate and legitimate exis-tence of the nation but instead how the concept of the nation is deployedand mobilised by political forces and citizens alike. As we saw in previouschapters, political parties in Greece have always been keen in deploying thenation as medium for viewing social and political problems. In thatrespect, Golden Dawn is not much different to most of the political partiesin Greece. What differentiates Golden Dawn from the other parties is theall-encompassing deployment of the nation as an analytical category,means of defence and attack and, most importantly, the foundation forthe constitution of an ethnic and racial utopia.

Political theory predominantly contextualises nationalism according toprimordial and modern theorisations, respectively. In primordialism,nations are understood as natural divisions of humanity and nationalismis a universal and pervasive mode of thought and existence. For thetheoretical advocates of primordialism, differences in power amongstnations and nationalism can be found in the strong bonds of nationswith kinship, ethnicity and (biological) genealogy. On the other hand,modern theorisations of the nation rely on historical, cultural and eco-nomic processes. According to the modern theorisation of the nation,primordialism is one of many manifestations of nationalism and not thetheoretical and empirical basis for examining nations and their power. Thenation is quintessentially modern and coincides with the modernisation ofeconomics and language in Europe. We can identify two main strands ofmodern theorisations of nationalism. The first one has social and eco-nomic concerns as its basis. Nations and nationalism emerge out ofcapitalism’s inequalities. Political theorists like Michael Hechter (2000)argue that the exploitation of peripheries by political and economic centresof power creates the conditions for the production of nationalism as a formof protest against elites. The second strand of the modern theorisation ofnationalism deals with the homogenisation of languages by print capital-ism. In preprint Europe and elsewhere in the world, Anderson (2006)observes that the diversity of spoken languages was so immense that it wasnot possible for publishers to exploit every single one of them. Whathappened instead was a fusion of all those idiolects into far fewer printlanguages. These print languages provide the platform for national con-sciousness and they create a unified field of communication and culturalexchange. The nation is an “imagined community” (Anderson 2006) and


due to the common communication platforms all social inequalities givetheir place to “a deep horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 2006, p. 7).

The political and social presence of Golden dawn demonstrates thatthese theorisations are not mutually exclusive and that can be appliedimplicitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously for the projection ofthe nation as a utopia and for the immigration crisis as a dystopia. GoldenDawn accepts the nation as matter of a biological fact and as a naturalmedium for dividing and classifying populations. At the same time,Golden Dawn acknowledges that this recent surge in nationalism is aform of protest against the uneven impact of European immigrationpolicies on the Greek economy and society. Furthermore, the rhetoricand activities of Golden Dawn construct a homogeneous language, whichreduces the debate on immigration into the dividing line between Greeksand immigrants, and at the same time all social inequalities amongst Greeknationals are erased by their love of their country and common hatred ofimmigrants.

Is it possible to consider all Golden Dawn voters and activists as con-scious social actors producing and reproducing exclusion and social injus-tice directed towards the immigrant population? A starting point forunderstanding the legitimation of the nationalist subject is the differentia-tion (albeit a superficial one) between racism and xenophobia. The popu-larity and legitimation of Golden Dawn does not necessarily depend onracism as a coherent ideology but rather on xenophobia. In this case,xenophobia should be understood etymologically—as the fear caused bystrangers. If there are any hostile and violent attitudes they derive fromgroups of people who cause the fear and not from the ones who feel thefear. The superficiality of the distinction between racism and xenophobiacan be confronted by the assertion that xenophobes may well be accusedof unjustified fear. However, the electorate success of Golden Dawn andthe mobilisation of citizens demonstrate that those who should heldresponsible for the violent tactics against immigrants are not the Greekcitizens but those who allow and support the presence of immigrants inthe country.

In political theory, the emotion of fear is predominantly understoodeither as an instrument for control and consent or as a symptom of ourtimes (Ahmed 2004; Furedi 2005; Bauman 2007). Fear of punishment oras Hobbes (1679/1983) argues fear of returning to lawlessness - to astate of nature - makes subjects to conform to power. Considering morerecent political and theoretical developments, fear appears as a symptom of


modern everyday life—a symptom that becomes evident in political rheto-ric, behaviour and consumer habits. Yet, the relationship between immi-gration and the formation of far-right politics in Greece enables us to viewfear as an emotion capable of making distinctions based on race, nation-ality and culture. Sara Ahmed (2004) suggests the language of fear has thecapacity to intensify threats and in turn creates “a distinction betweenthose who are ‘under threat’ and those who threaten” (Ahmed 2004,p. 72). Through the generation and intensification of threats, fear arrangesbodies with and against others. The perceived threats of immigration toracial purity, civil order and welfare provision arrange the nationalist bodyagainst the immigrant body and at the same time allow the nationalistbody to inhabit or more accurately to invade the public space and restrictthe mobility of the immigrant body. The legitimation of Golden Dawncannot possibly be substantiated only by the way fear constructs immi-grants as those who threaten and the Greek national citizens as those whoare under threat. Ahmed (2004) also points towards the direction that fearcan take for those who are under threat and more specifically how “experi-ences of fear became lived as patriotic declarations of love” (Ahmed 2004,p. 73). Golden Dawn as political party, aspires to represent those who areunder threat but ultimately the experience of this fear and the actionstaken for its apprehension are communicated as declarations of love for thecountry.

SOCIAL VALUES, EVIL AND PUNISHMENT

Despite its increasing popularity and impact on the understandings ofthreat, governance and national identity Golden Dawn tactics proved tobe incompatible with the existing legal framework and parliamentary rules.After the killing of an anti-fascist rapper named Pavlos Fyssas also knownas Killah P by a Golden Dawn activist on 18 September 2013, the Greekgovernment decided to minimise the party’s parliamentary and streetactivities by imprisoning several of its members including the leader, andthe media spokesman as orchestrators of a “criminal and terrorist organi-sation” (Euronews 2013). More specifically, the then Minister of CitizenProtection and Public Order, Nikos Dendias, expanded the existing anti-terrorist legal framework in order to include all Golden Dawn activities ascrimes. Even though the Greek constitution does not allow the illegalisa-tion of a political party as such, political leaders can be charged andimprisoned as criminals. In a television statement, the then Prime


Minister Antonis Samaras, pled for calm and insisted that he will stop “thedescendants of the Nazis from poisoning our social life, to act criminally,to terrorize and to undermine the foundations of the country which gavebirth to democracy” (ibid.).

All ruptures and deviations regarding social values are characterised as“negative” and treated as a “residual category” (Alexander 2003, p. 109).The crimes committed by Golden Dawn are being depicted by the gov-ernment as a deviation from what Alexander refers to as “the culturalconstruction of the good” (ibid.). In order to understand the govern-ment’s decision to imprison the Golden Dawn members and at the sametime to refer to the social values of Greece as the exact opposite there hasto be a social isolation of what is considered as evil. In Alexander’stheoretical framework, evil is not conceived as the direct product of valuesnecessarily antithetical to the dominant social values but rather as anisolated dissociation from those values. The presence and activities ofGolden Dawn signify the inability of certain individuals but notably notthe Golden Dawn voters to harmonise themselves with what the PrimeMinister calls “our social life”. Evil, as it becomes apparent in the crimescommitted by Golden Dawn activists is not a product of immigration andausterity policies but instead is strongly associated with the symbolicformulation and institutional maintenance of the good.

Here, the invocation to “our social life” and to “the country, whichgave birth to democracy” constitutes a platform for both the Greekgovernment and Golden Dawn to name their enemies and communicatetheir affiliations and ideological beliefs. The crucial point is not the qua-litative differentiation of evil but rather the social processes of maintaininga general differentiation between good and evil, between utopia anddystopia, between friend and enemy. The notion of punishment can bevery useful here for considering further the impact social evil can have onsocial organisation and national identity. For Durkheim (1984) a criminalact is perceived as criminal only when it offends the collective conscienceand punishment becomes society’s main tool for the distinction betweennormative and deviant behaviour. With the imprisonment of the GoldenDawn members, the Greek state aspired to remain the only legitimatepower that can distinguish between good and evil acts. However, GoldenDawn’s rhetoric, activities and subsequent popularity demonstrate that thegap between nation and state is getting wider and the current governingliberal parties are not in position to bridge it. After the arrest of prominentGolden Dawn members, mainstream parties and citizens expected support


to militant racist politics would begin to diminish. But Golden Dawn isnot only actively competing with elected national and local governmentsover the monopoly of distinguishing between good and evil but also overthe links between nation and state, present and future. Under the slogan“the only national choice”, Golden Dawn (2015) deployed children in itstelevision advertisements to voice current and popular anxieties. One byone, boys and girls face the camera and express their desires and fears: “Iwant to have a job when I grow up”; “I want to learn my historycorrectly”; “I don’t want them selling off my future”; “I don’t want tobecome a minority in my own country”. The advertisement concludeswith all children shouting in synch “we want Greece to belong to theGreeks”!

Since 2012, Golden Dawn has established itself as the third politicalforce in Greece by receiving 7 % of the vote in the national elections ofJanuary 2015 and September 2015, respectively. Golden Dawn’s transi-tion from a party of protest to a party capable of shaping the collectiveconscience indicates that immigration and lack of nationalist sentimentsare the crimes that must be punished.

NOTES

1. Alain de Benoist’s “metapolitical” conceptualisation of the European “NewRight” (Nouvelle Droit) which, appropriates a left-wing rhetoric againstAmericanisation, capitalism and global cultural domination has becomethe norm for the extreme Right parties of Greece. For the birth of theNew Right and its contemporary existence see Alain de Benoist andCharles Champetier “The French New Right in the Year 2000”.

2. Even though the Golden Dawn rhetoric has constructed representativedemocracy as synonymous with the ideology of the ruling political elitestheir understanding of participatory democracy as decentralised power andthe involvement of the people (the demos) in decision-making is at oddswith the image of a party resembling an army whose general is also a politicalleader.


CHAPTER 6

The Social Process of Integrationand Tolerance

Abstract The chapter deals with the regulation of dystopia and utopia,exclusion regimes and postnationalism. The freedom of religious practiceand the troubled history of building a mosque in Athens provide thesetting for the examination of the concept and process of integrationand tolerance.

Keywords Tolerance � Integration � Religion � Islam � Mosques �Multiculturalism

MANAGING THE PRESENCE OF THE IMMIGRANT/PROMOTING

SOCIAL COHESION

The presence of immigrants and asylum seekers in the margins of Greeksociety, and the violent tactics of nationalist and racist groupings raiseconcerns for Greece’s mechanisms of integration. Tensions betweenimmigration, social cohesion and cultural homogeneity are often high-lighted by civil disorders, especially in areas densely populated by immi-grants. Such tensions signal according to Duprez (2009), the limits andincompatibilities of existing integration models as practiced by govern-ments in their attempt to avoid the marginalisation of immigrants.

The tension between immigration and social cohesion does not limititself to incidents of civil disorder but also expands into the field of policyand in particular the conflict and discrepancies between the EU and


85

national policies. Member states following European Commission direc-tives with regard to border policy and management of the existing immi-grant population, have exhibited a strong tendency to come to terms withthe permanent presence of ethnically and culturally diverse populations.The European Council at its meeting in Tampere 1999, provided a blue-print for integration policy amongst the member states. An importantfeature of this common integration policy is the development of a vigorousintegration process, which it will be able to ensure for all immigrants inEurope rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens(European Council 1999).

The EU acknowledged the imperative to proceed to a common inte-gration policy amongst member states at the conclusion of the Greek EUpresidency in June 2003 and during the Dutch presidency in the followingyear (Spencer 2006; Penninx 2006). Different views on the definition andgoals of integration and on the appropriate strategies to achieve it inconjunction with member states’ insistence that decisions should, whenpossible, be taken on a national level restrain EU attempts to implementan overarching integration policy. Within this institutional framework,member states remain responsible for the development and implementa-tion of an integration policy, which corresponds to the particularities ofimmigration patterns and immigrant population, and the reception of thelatter by the public, media and political leaders. As a result, the EuropeanCommission considers that an adoption of an “open method of coordina-tion” would be the most appropriate way to support the development ofcommon integration policy (ibid.).

Before I proceed to the various manifestations of the term “integra-tion” and its adaptation to the Greek context, I would like to step backand consider both the significance and the definition of integration as it isapplied to immigrants. Integration is often used as a term in various policydocuments but seldom defined as a concept. Integration is defined in theOxford English Dictionary as “the intermixing of peoples or groups pre-viously segregated”. By considering ethnically and culturally diverse popu-lations, integration refers to a process of mixing or incorporation offoreign groups of people with a nationally defined, pre-existing populationin a nation state. Following this figuration, this process can only becontradictory. The starting hypothesis in all EU and national policies isthat the external population in question does not participate at all in thesocial formations of the nation state or when it does it is from a marginalsocial position. Thus, the default position is that immigrants, or to be


more precise, groups of people of a recent immigrant origin, resident inthe member states should now be integrated into the host society by stateinitiatives and interventions. On the contrary, these populations have beena constitutive element of the society that they are part of. As Sayad (2007)illustrates, from the moment of their departure (and not arrival) immi-grants participate in the reorganisation of the welfare state, the law andorder system of the host country, the official and unofficial labour marketand of the educational system. In addition, immigrants organise socialrelations within which to secure their rights and reproduce their culturalidentity (Walzer 2004). While many of these practices are realised in aculturally distinctive manner, they are nevertheless an integral part of thehost country’s social formations. The immigrant populations are therefore“exteriorised” (Miles 1993, p. 157) in thought and in politics by thenotion of integration as understood by national and intranational policies.

The problematic and contradictory character of integration does notlimit itself to what exists or recently existed outside the borders of thenation state. It also extends to the society into which the immigrants aresupposed to be incorporated. According to Heckman and Schnapper(2003, p. 12) integration policies or more generally the process of inte-gration is determined by two major factors: first, by the “sense of nation-hood” and in particular by the legal and popular understanding ofcitizenship, membership and inclusion, and second, by the way the “immi-grant situation” is defined and perceived on a social level. With regard toimmigrants, the host society appears to be fully integrated where phenom-ena of internal division and socio-cultural marginalisation do not exist.The immigrant, in that case, is required to perform her/his belonging tothe host society in a culturally prescribed manner which is dictated bylanguage, national symbols, collective memory, political and educationalinstitutions. Integration, therefore, becomes a concept, which combinestwo different kinds of social cohesion: the “bureaucratic” kind of socialcohesion as exemplified by the European Commission initiatives and stateinterventions, and the “mythical” kind as manifested in acts of nationalcommemorations, nation building and symbols of ancestry (Sayad 2007,p. 217).

Both the technocratic and the mythical factors contribute equally to thecharacter and cohesion of a given society. Yet, the mythical kind, asarticulated in common beliefs and commemorative rituals constitutes themeans for assessing technocratic propositions and for mobilising the popu-lation regarding their respective support or rejection. Consequently, the

6 THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INTEGRATION AND TOLERANCE 87

concept of immigrant integration is a concept of identity and of the powerrelations between natives and newcomers. Following Sayad (2007, p. 216),integration needs to be examined as a process, which takes place betweenthe extremes of the “most radical alterity” to what is perceived as the “mosttotal identity”. Such a process can only be observed and the outcome of itcannot be dictated, directed or encouraged neither by political initiatives,state interventions nor by the will of the stranger and the native.Furthermore, contrary to the belief that immigrant integration can be theantidote to social exclusion and marginalisation, and a state of affairs whichminimises (if does not eradicate) violent confrontations between nationallyand ethnically divided groups of people, integration can be a violentprocess for all members of society which are directly involved in it.

MANIFESTATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS OF INTEGRATION

What is understood by the term integration is a combination of past andpresent attempts of managing the foreign population and promotingsocial cohesion. Each of these attempts declares a certain degree of noveltyand efficacy but from a critical distance they can be interpreted as differentmanifestations of the same problem in different contexts—that of thepresence of the stranger in a culturally homogeneous society. Thesedifferent responses to the presence of the immigrant correspond to differ-ent ethics regarding national belonging, hospitality and cultural autonomyand usually exist under the titles of the “differential exclusionary model”,the “assimilationist model” and the “multiculturalist model” (Castles andMiller 2003; Boswell 2003; Freeman 2008).

The differential exclusion model mainly exists in countries in whichthe nation is perceived as a community of birth and ancestry and thedominant ethnic group does not accept immigrants and their offspringas members of the nationally defined community. This rejection isexpressed through exclusionary immigration policies such as limitedpossibilities for family reunion, political representation and civic partici-pation. According to this model, immigrants can only be admitted tospecific social sectors, principally the labour market with employmentrights and security specifically designed in relation to their residentstatus. The differential exclusion model associates social class with ethnicorigin by categorising the immigrant worker with limited rights as amember of an ethnic minority. These immigrant integration conceptua-lisations and practices were mostly associated with post-war Germany


and the way immigrant labourers were differentiated under the title“guest worker” (Gastarbeiter) from the rest of the population. Thepopular postulation until the 1980s was those guest workers and theirfamilies would never be granted full membership of the German society.Even when their permanent residence became an irrefutable everydayreality, the German government remained hesitant to award nationalityand full citizenship rights (Brubaker 1989, 1992). Nevertheless, restric-tions on employment, residency, mobility and civil rights did not onlyappear as “anachronistic” but they were also “unfeasible” in an admin-istrative context (Castles and Miller 2003, p. 280).

The assimilationist model is best described as a state intervention forthe definition of dominant culture and the incorporation of the immi-grant population into the latter. In that case, the immigrant population isexpected to denounce its distinctive cultural characteristics and form anindispensable part of the nation and of the dominant culture. In theassimilationist model, the state needs to provide a platform on whichimmigrants will be encouraged not only to denounce their own particu-lar characteristics but also to adopt the nationally defined dominant onesas their own; the use of official language, an educational system commonto all, and the prohibition of visible religious symbols are some of themost common features of this model. In essence, the assimilationistmodel, which derives from the French conception of the republic andof the meaning of the citizen (citoyen), constitutes an exchange betweenthe particularities of the immigrant population and the dominant cultureas manifested in membership of the national community (Feldblum1999). The problem with the assimilative aspect of integration is thatthe qualities and characteristics of the immigrant characterised as incom-patible with the dominant cultural model remain intact leading to theassertion that “persons can be incorporated, but not their qualities”(Alexander 2013b, p. 532).

The integration of ethnically and culturally diverse populations broughttogether by postcolonial immigration introduced multiculturalism as themost adequate set of policies for addressing the dynamic relationshipbetween majority and minorities, dominant and peripheral cultures. Thestarting point for multiculturalism is the perception of diversity as a socialfact, and the implementation of policies, which aspire to tolerance towardsthis diversity. Central to the multiculturalist argument is the emphasis ondifferentiation within the so-called dominant culture as well as on thecultural construction over time of different forms of national belonging


(Modood 2000). In recent years, multiculturalism has been retracted bytwo major developments: immigration, and anxieties over national iden-tity. From this perspective, multiculturalism has started to be seen bycitizens and politicians alike as an obstacle for the building of cohesivesocieties, the sustainability of universal values and, the gradual margin-alisation of what once was perceived as the majority ethnic group.1 At thesame time, for national governments, multiculturalism became a hin-drance to the integration of minorities. The main line of argument againstmulticulturalism is that it presents various cultures more cohesive thanthey actually are, and creates impenetrable boundaries between differentcultural groups. As a result, members of distinctive ethnic groups find itreally hard or even impossible to either dissociate themselves from giventraditions and customs or to be part of new ones.

The tensions between immigration and welfare, and the inability ofnational governments to intervene in the affairs of minority institutionshas led to the rejection of multiculturalism by political leaders confront-ing the apparent loss of the alleged dominant culture. In 2011, theGerman Chancellor Angela Merkel, the British Prime Minister DavidCameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared the failureand end of multiculturalism as state strategy towards the managementof ethnic, religious and cultural minorities (The Telegraph 2011). Allthree political leaders aspired to the establishment of an assertive liberal-ism in order to confront the expansion of Islam in Europe and subse-quent terrorists activities, which endanger established cultures andtraditions.

While all the aforementioned integration models have been asso-ciated in the past with particular states and particular patterns of immi-gration as they were generated by colonialism and the rebuilding of postwar national economies (Penninx 2006), it would be safe to assume thatno state has ever exercised a truly distinctive and coherent integrationmodel (Freeman 2008). Depending on the importance, influence andefficiency of institutions the outcome of immigrant integration divergeseven in the same society. Although distinctive integration methods andapparatuses can be noticed in various countries, these are hard to beclassified as national integration models merely because they are notproducts of conscious attempts. Rather, they are the outcome of anuneven understanding of the national interest with regard to immigra-tion across institutions with which they are not always harmoniouslycoordinated.


THE LIMITATIONS OF NATIONAL MODELS OF INTEGRATION:CONVERGENCE AND LACK OF COORDINATION

The complex relationship between immigration and national interestaccentuates variations in the meaning and outcome of integration, andsuch variations are most evident in new immigration countries such asGreece. The integration policy indicators set by the Migrant IntegrationPolicy Index (MIPIX) demonstrate that the integration of the immigrantpopulation is not a homogeneous process in every member state and thelevels of integration differ significantly according to the presence and invol-vement of various institutions and authorities. The overview of Greece’sintegration policies and processes by the Migrant Integration Policy Indexcan be characterised as satisfactory considering the diminishing welfarebudget and fault European immigration policies such as the DublinRegulation. According to the index (2010), the integration policies imple-mented by Greece are now average compared to the rest of the EUmemberstates. When evaluated against “labour market mobility”, “education”,“long-term residence”, “anti-discrimination”, “family reunion”, “politicalparticipation” and access to “nationality”, the MIPIX (2010) concludesthat the integration policies implemented by Greece are “more coherent”with a clear improvement in policies around political participation andcitizenship. However, where most EU member states and, in particular,established countries of immigration have implemented successful policiesaround “family reunion”, “long-term residence” and “anti-discrimination”,Greece only meets the minimum EU standards of integration policy.

The need for the implementation of EU directives and initiatives regard-ing integration along with the particularities of the phenomenon of immi-gration, and the public perception in each member state comprise a“harmonious coexistence of a progressive rhetoric with reactionary prac-tice” (Tsiakalos 2007, p. 192). This discrepancy has become the norm forauthorities, institutions, political leaders and for a significant segment of thenational population when dealing with immigration in the contexts ofhuman rights, cultural autonomy, equality, national culture and traditions.

There is a prevalent fear in the EU with respect to Muslim immigrants andthe potential vulnerability and alteration of the liberal character of the receiv-ing member states. From this sense of fear of eroding values have followedrestraining cultural and political measures, which usually coincide with the riseof extreme anti-immigration parties as well as with popular outrage againstimmigrants incapable or unwilling to adapt to the cultural and political norms


of Europe. The presence and visibility of Islam in Europe runs parallel with aplethora of debates on immigration and the subsequent integration ofMuslimimmigrants into host societies. Since the beginning of the new millennium,the prime focus of these debates is on the religious and cultural ties Muslimimmigrants maintain to their religion, cultural patterns of socialisation and toIslamic organisations. In member states with a substantial experience in thereception and integration of Muslim immigrants the rejection of the latter isinformed by a “liberal, secular intolerance” (Triantafyllidou and Kouki 2013,p. 710). The ban on Muslim headscarves and other “conspicuous” religioussymbols, clothing that “obscures” the identity of the wearer, and suspicions offorced marriages, honour killings and the practice of Sharia law in Muslimcommunities importunately raise two kinds of questions: first, if Islam and inparticular Muslim immigrants are compatible with the law and values pertain-ing European nation states, and second, if the cultural and religious practicesofMuslims undermine the authority and cultural character of European states.Indeed, many anti-immigration parties and movements adjust their politicalstrategy to specific national and European values in order to present them-selves as defenders of citizens’ rights. Indicative of this ideological adjustmentis the formation of the movement PEGIDA, an acronym for PatriotischeEuropäer Gegen Die Islamisierung Des Abendlandes (Patriotic EuropeansAgainst the Islamisation of the Occident). Founded in Dresden, Germany in2014, PEGIDA have been organising demonstrations against what theyconsider the Islamisation of the Western world through uncontrolled immi-gration fromMuslim countries (Nye 2015). PEGIDA calls formore restrictiveimmigration polices similar to the ones implemented in Australia and SouthAfrica for “the protection ofGermany’s traditionally Judeo-Christian culture”.While the German Chancellor Angela Merkel has denounced the movementas “racist”, PEGIDA insists for the integration of all immigrants to the “BasicGerman Law”, the illegalisation of all “parallel societies” informed by “localtraditions and Sharia Law” and the “introduction of referenda” concerningthe cultural character of the country (PEGIDA 2014).2

MAKING THE INVISIBLE VISIBLE: INTEGRATION, RELIGIOUS

DIVERSITY AND THE BUILDING OF A MOSQUE IN ATHENS

The perception and management of religious diversity has entered a newphase evident in the material and aesthetic presence of Islam (Turner 2007b;Allievi 2009). This new phase entails a popular demand for the preservation


of a distinctive Christian and European tradition mostly manifested in urbanlandscapes, which should not accommodate mosques as formal spaces ofworship for a religion that appears to be incompatible with Western valuesand traditions. On the other side of this struggle, EU officials, nationalgovernments, local authorities and most importantly Muslims who live andwork in Europe argue that the presence and rights of the Muslin populationin Europe cannot be ignored any longer. The building of formal spaces ofworship will make Muslims visible to their fellow citizens and will placeIslam in the context of a Europe tolerant of religious and cultural diversity.

One of the first notable oppositions to this emerging diversity tookplace in Switzerland and was fronted by the popular initiative againstthe construction of minarets (Volksinitiative Gegen den Bau vónMinaretten). After a campaign that lasted almost a year, on 29November 2009, Swiss citizens alarmed Europeans by voting in areferendum to ban the construction of minarets on mosques locatedin Switzerland (Traynor 2009). The ban on minarets does not signal ahalt to the construction of mosques in Switzerland but explicitlyprohibits the minaret as an integral feature for the construction ofmosques in the future. For the majority of Swiss citizens, the aestheticqualities of the minaret do not only proclaim the presence of mosquesbut also constitute a symbol of religious extremism.3 The result of thereferendum was a significant political success for the far-right SwissPeople’s Party mainly for two reasons. First, the party presented itselfas the spearhead of the campaign against the minarets, and second,because they stood against the political, media and cultural establish-ment of Switzerland, namely the mainstream liberal political partiesand the national president, commercial newspapers, business lobbiesand the Vatican.

Whereas in Switzerland the debate and subsequent referendum was onthe aesthetic appearance and perception of the minarets, in Greece and inAthens in particular a public debate has been developing over the formalpresence and visibility of a mosque in the Athenian landscape. Athens isthe only capital city in the EU that does not provide a formal space ofworship for its Muslim population (Lowen 2012). Muslims pray in make-shift and temporary mosques usually located in garages, abandoned fac-tories and warehouses. These mosques are mostly hidden and thereforeinvisible to most of Athens’ inhabitants. The lack of a formal space ofworship led many Muslims living in Athens and elsewhere to protest in apeaceful yet very visible manner. On 18 November 2010, Muslims


gathered and prayed in public spaces, squares and at the courtyard of theUniversity of Athens’ main building at the time of the Eid celebrationshighlighting their size and presence to a society who insists to ignorereligious diversity (Triantafyllidou and Kouki 2013).

Pressed by the European Court of Human Rights and AmnestyInternational, and to a lesser extent by Muslims living in Greece, theGreek government approved the building of a mosque in Athens throughstate funding of almost 1 million euros within the context of Greece’sinternational obligations to respect cultural and religious diversity. Thedecision came as a relief for the 200,000 Muslims because existing mos-ques also function as spaces of congregation and deliberation concerningreligious and social issues. Despite the fact the building of the mosque wasapproved by the majority of the MPs from the right, left and centre of thepolitical spectrum, a fierce debate followed between liberals, conservativesand representatives of the far right regarding first and foremost Greece’scultural identity and secondary the obligations of the Greek state towardsnon-Christians and non-Greeks, especially in a period of severe economicausterity (Al Jazeera 2013).

Religious authorities, academics and army officers characterised thegovernment’s decision as unconstitutional and demanded a reassess-ment by the State Council, Greece’s supreme administrative court(Hekimoglou 2014). In the meantime, during the pre-election cam-paign for the local elections of 2014, Athens’ mosque became a con-tested issue regarding the candidates’ ideological profiles andadministrative abilities. The neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn urged theirvoters and activists to “fight until the bitter end” to block the plan(Ethnos 2013). The conservative candidate for Athens’ town hall, inorder to appeal to the extreme right voters praised the benefits ofparticipatory democracy and suggested a referendum for the buildingof the mosque inside or outside Athens’ jurisdiction while the currentmayor, and the left-wing candidate insisted that human rights cannotbe subjected to referenda and popularity competitions (Autodioikisi2013). In July 2014, the State Council of Greece ratified the govern-ment’s decision to build the mosque in Athens and in particular in thearea of Votanikos, near the city centre at a disused naval base sur-rounded by factories and car dealerships. The mosque as a topic ofcultural contestation is a manifestation of the confusion that surroundsimmigration and processes of integration and exclusion of the immi-grant population in the Greek society.


In the last 7 years refugees and irregular immigrants placed under thegeneral category “Muslim immigrant” have reconfigured the process andmeaning of integration. The settlement patterns, customs and rituals ofthe Muslim population have become crucial factors for interpreting con-temporary migration flows as a migration crisis. Despite the use of“Muslim” as an encompassing category of otherness, the Muslim popula-tion of Greece comprises different ethnic and linguistic groups such asMuslims of Turkish ethnic origin, Muslim Greeks, fragments of theRomani population and Pomaks. Yet, the vast majority of the abovemen-tionedMuslim groups do not reside in Athens but mainly in the north-eastof Greece (Antoniou 2003). It is the arrival and settlement of mostlyunregulated immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia and NorthAfrica that constitutes a problem on the subject of cultural homogeneityand respect for cultural and religious diversity.

For some Greek citizens, a mosque in the capital city would officiallydeclare in the most visible manner the presence of Muslims and Islam. Onone hand, the building of the mosque is framed by a regime of suspicionregarding gender equality and terrorist violence. The mosque, therefore, isseen as a place in which practitioners can openly challenge liberal values.On the other hand, opposition to the building of formal mosques isinformed by the aesthetic values of ancestry and cultural homogeneity.The building of the mosque will transform the Athenian landscape and therelationship of its inhabitants with it. On the contrary, the current numer-ous improvised and temporary mosques remain invisible to mostAthenians and as a result they retain their anodyne character.

Even though debates over the building of a mosque in Athens seem tobe part of the contemporary discourse on immigration and the risingpopularity of the far right in reality they date back in the nineteenthcentury. In 1890, under the Law 1851 the Greek government committedto allocate a 554 sqm plot in Piraeus, Greece’s main port to the Ottomangovernment for the construction of a mosque. Years later, in 1934, theLaw 6224 designated the allocation of 3350 sqm in Athens to theEgyptian government for the building of a mosque and an Egyptianinstitute (Hekimoglou 2014).

After years of political inactivity and indecisiveness the building of themosque was reintroduced to political and cultural discourse on the occa-sion of the 2004 Athens Olympics and the need as well as obligation forthe existence of an Islamic cultural centre in the city. According to the act2883, the mosque was about to be built 12 miles from the city centre


nearby Athens’ airport in an area that very few Muslims could actuallycommute to. As construction funded by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia wasabout to begin, local authorities supported by residents and the Churchstaged a campaign arguing for their limited resources to manage anunprecedented number of Muslims coming over to their area to pray.While the then foreign minister placed the whole project within thedemocratic and multicultural spirit of Europe, which Greece is part of,the locals and the Church were keen to remind everyone that 400 years ofOttoman occupation, and Greece’s Christian orthodox identity areincompatible with such ventures. At that time, the visibility of the mosquestarted becoming a political as well as an aesthetic issue. A mosque, for thethen Archbishop, built nearby Athens’ airport would give the wrongimpression about a country whose people are predominantly ChristianOrthodox. Instead, the government should fund the building of a churchin such a visible and prominent place (Smith 2003).

Recent arguments against the building of the mosque combine histor-ical and aesthetic anxieties with the moral dimension of a political decisionto build a mosque with public money in a time of austerity and socialunrest. These arguments are mostly communicated by the far right butthey have become generally accepted by citizens of various political per-suasions due to appeals to the state of the economy, the unpatriotic actionsof politicians, and by depicting Islamic countries as essentially undemo-cratic and barbaric. Soon after the announcement of the government’splan to build a mosque, the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn along with 700of their supporters demonstrated in the designated area of its construction.With the slogans “Greece belongs to the Greeks” and “Greece ofChristian Greeks” the demonstrators argued that a mosque in Athenswill effectively legitimise the presence of all “illegal” immigrants inGreece and at the same time it will erase the struggles of Hellenism againstthe Ottomans.

Popular opposition to the mosque declared its presence on socialmedia with Facebook communities alerting Greek citizens to one of the“greatest scandals Greek society has ever experienced”. The Facebookcommunity “No Mosque in Athens” deploys the debates over themosque and the presence of Muslims in Athens as a vehicle for target-ing Turkey and Turkish foreign policy and by association all Islamiccountries for “their business deals with American multinational compa-nies”, “lack for democracy”, “natural inclination to violence”, and fortheir “attacks to Christian peoples”. In a similar yet more dramatic


tone, the Facebook community “Mosque in Athens—The GreatestIrreversible Crime in Modern History” has a wider political and cul-tural agenda. The mosque again, is not the prime focus but rather partof the moral decay of the country evident in the gay pride parade, andcommunism.

The winner, and the runner-up of the local elections in Athens were thedefenders of the mosque in Athens. Their defence, albeit less intense anddramatic, was based on the association of human rights with religiousrights. For the current mayor of the city an official mosque does notonly harmonise Greece with the rest of the EU member states with respectto the freedom of religious practice but would also signal the end of all theimprovised mosques where the conditions of religious practice are unma-nageable by local authorities. The runner-up of the local elections inAthens and representative of the radical left pointed out the existence ofother places of worship such as synagogues, which have never been con-tested by citizens and authorities alike and also dissociated Islam withimmigration by referring to them small yet significant fraction of theGreek population who are practicing Muslims.

TOLERANCE AND INTEGRATION

Étienne Balibar (2004) argues that the emerging cultural and politicalidentities that the EU aspires to integrate, constitute a social and demo-graphic category capable of generating anxieties about public order, socialcohesion and cultural homogeneity. At the same time, the immigrantpopulation as the bearer of those identities invites new ways for citizensand governments to consider legitimate and effective ways for integrationas well as exclusion. However, these identities and the anxieties theygenerate are not always already established. These identities are producedand altered within the specific circumstances of every EU member stateand within ideological frameworks, which inform national belonging andexclusion. Immigrants as long as they remain immigrants—strangers inthe host country—constitute a reminder of the failure of every intra-governmental and governmental effort either to expel them in order tore-establish a homogeneous society or to integrate them in order topromote a diverse and tolerant society.

In the contemporary discourse of immigration, the concept of tol-erance plays an important role ranging from issues concerning thetolerance of ethnic, religious and cultural minorities within a state to


what has been called the global “clash of civilisations” (Huntington2002). For Michael Walzer (1997), the relationship between toleranceand the nation state is complicated and often at odds. On one hand,the nation state provides less space for tolerance towards minoritieswho might challenge its homogeneity. In this case, certain acts ofdiscrimination and exclusion are accepted and legitimised by nationalcitizens and intranational authorities and institutions. On the otherhand, nation states are often under pressure by NGOs, and by interna-tional institutions to become more inclusive and achieve a satisfactorydegree of diversity. In that case, the nation state may force its nationalcitizens through legislation to be more tolerant.

Within the political and cultural infrastructure of the nation state thereare prescribed ways of demonstrating and implementing tolerance. AsWalzer (1997) points out, national and cultural majorities tolerate differ-ence in the same way that governments are expected to deal with politicalopposition. Such an expectation presupposes the existence of a politicalenvironment where civil liberties and rights are protected by an indepen-dent judiciary. Accordingly, minority groups can organise themselves,protest for their rights and position their institutions, customs and tradi-tions in the mainstream of majoritarian culture. The distinction betweenweak and strong groups is essential for Walzer’s (1997, 2004) theorisationof tolerance. Weak minority groups will eventually be integrated by themajority and their cultural traits will either be eliminated or fully co-optedby the majority. Strong minority groups can assert their cultural practicesas legitimate and worthy of tolerance and recognition.

Even though tolerance appears as the perfect attitude towards a peace-ful coexistence whereas mutual recognition and equality exist, it can alsoimply domination and social exclusion. When speaking of tolerance weneed to be aware of its epistemological possibilities and limits. One of themost characteristic examples about the perception and uses of tolerance isJohn Locke’s (1698/Lock 1689) A Letter Concerning Toleration(Epistola de Tolerantia). In the letter, Locke, argues for mutual tolerationamong Christians (and in particular between Catholics and Protestants) intheir different religious practices.

The business of true religion is quite another thing. It is not instituted inorder to the erecting of an external pomp, nor to the exercising ofcompulsive force but to the regulating of men’s lives according to therules of virtue and piety. Whosoever will list himself under the banner of


Christ, must, in the first place and above all things make war upon hisown lasts and vices. It is in vain for any man to usurp the name Christian,without holiness of life, purity of manners, benignity and meekness ofspirit. (Lock 1689, p. 14)

Locke’s letter should not be understood in a limited religious context.Locke praises individual responsibility and acknowledges the limited yetimportant role institutions such as the Church and the state can play forleading an ethical life.4

On a different note, Goethe, by considering the positive aspects oftolerance for civic peace and individual responsibility argued for a differentunderstanding and practice of tolerance. For Goethe, tolerance towardsothers should not be a fixed and static attitude. “Tolerance should be atemporary attitude only: it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means toinsult” (Goethe, quoted in Forst 2012, p. 50). Goethe, unlike Locke, isaware that the Enlightenment doctrine of tolerance articulated throughvoluntary association and state neutrality is insufficient to create an envir-onment of equality and conviviality among different religious groups andto neutralise negative depictions of minorities. Yet, even within the samemode of thought, that of the Enlightenment, tolerance can appear as anobstacle towards individual and collective freedom. Emmanuel Kant in hisessay What is Enlightenment? (Kant 1784/1991) identified tolerance assomething that excludes reasoning, discussion, and freedom of thoughtfrom the public realm and only accepts it—tolerates it—in a private,hidden use. Conversely, Enlightenment praises reasoning and freedomof thought as universal values and accepts tolerance as something thatshould be exercised by individuals in the private sphere. Following thisKantian tradition, Herbert Marcuse in his essay Repressive Tolerance(Marcuse 1965) states that what is proclaimed and practiced as toleranceactually serves as a means for oppression. Tolerance according to Marcuseis not just a doctrine of cohabitation but extends to policies and modes ofbehaviour. Marcuse calls for intolerance towards that kind of tolerance notonly because it strengthens the majority but also because is threatening ifnot destroying any possibilities for a human existence freed from miseryand fear. “Tolerance toward that which is radically evil now appears asgood because it serves the cohesion of the whole on the road to affluenceand more affluence” (Marcuse 1965, p. 95).

None of these conceptions of tolerance can be universally applicableand at the same it is impossible to synthesise their best or more positive


aspects for an all-embracing conceptualisation of tolerance. Indeed, suchan attempt will ignore the political realities citizens and policymakers haveto confront in order to decide who needs to be tolerated and for whatpurpose; “it is an example of what might be called bad utopianism toimagine that we can reproduce or imitate the first and avoid the second”(Walzer 1997, p. 5).

However, the seventeenth-century model of tolerance as outlined byLocke is the model that dominates both public policy and popular under-standing. But the persistence of this model in a time of immense desirableor undesirable diversity creates certain complications with respect to theway we view the subjects who should be tolerated as well as the tolerantsubjects. The two main complications outlined by Walzer (1997) pivotaround the limits of religion concerning individuality and public life. First,Walzer observes there is a tendency to tolerate religious groups as homo-geneous groups and not necessarily as individuals. Second, Walzer (1997)points out that tolerance and intolerance towards minority religiousgroups usually extend beyond the confines of religious practice andreach aspects of public life.

Political parties, institutions and NGOs call for tolerance in their state-ments, interventions and comments. This suggests that what was onceconceived as an alternative stance to exclusion of and violence to ethnicand religious minorities has been elevated to a dominant discourse aspiringto constitute a fair and inclusive society. Wendy Brown (2008); suggests thatthe general acceptance of tolerance cannot and should not be perceivedmerely as moral stance but needs to be contextualised as part of the widerfield of governmentality (Foucault 2008; Dean 1999). Governmentalityrefers to two distinctive yet interconnected understandings of the notionof government (Dean 1999; Rose andMiller 1992). The first understandingassociates government with rationality: rationality entails any possible waysof perceiving, calculating and responding to a problem identified as such andtackled by formal bodies of knowledge and expertise. Dean (1999) pointsout that the association of government with rationality does not imply thehegemony of a particular reason for responding to and dealing with aproblem but rather remains “rationalist” because it prioritises technocraticmeans of integration and management of diversity over mythological andsymbolic. The second understanding associates government with mentality.Such an association distances itself from a strictly rationalist approach andconceives thinking and acting as a collective activity; it considers knowledge,expertise as well as belief and opinion.


The impact of tolerance as a particular mentality of government in relationto the phenomenon of immigration in Greece exceeds the function of con-trolling tensions between culturally diverse groups and the majority. By theway of responding to the presence and religious practices of the Other,tolerance actively participates in the formation of national identity and cultureby emphasising sameness and difference, belonging and exclusion, status andmarginality. Tolerance, therefore, does not only entail technocratic solutionsto problems arising out the lived experience of religious and cultural diversitybut embodies the interpretive qualities of Europia by projecting a utopian ordystopian condition within the parameters of this diversity.

While Muslim immigrants in Greece as objects of tolerance are per-ceived by institutions and national citizens either to be undesirable or atleast inadaptable to dominant cultural norms, we also need to consider thepolitical and cultural differentiation between tolerant and intolerant sub-jects. Tolerance does not necessarily provide a resolution to inequalitiescaused by perceptions of race, ethnicity and culture but most importantlyconstitutes a strategy for coping with the Muslim immigrant as the embo-diment of difference. Yet tolerance is a “precarious achievement” (Walzer1997, p. 13). For Brown (2008) the importance of tolerance as policy andas social behaviour does not lie in the multiple ways citizens, governmentsand institutions value and deploy it but in the way they need to refer to itin order to justify themselves as tolerant.5 As a means for social andcultural reward for tolerating difference, tolerant subjects position them-selves above the xenophobes incapable of living with the Other.

The tolerant subject asserts itself in the Greek public sphere as sociallysuperior in relation not only to the object of tolerance but also to theintolerant subject. The intolerant subject does not evaluate the call fortolerance according to policy frameworks where immigrants need and shouldbe accommodated and subsequently integrated in Greek society but insteadaccording to an imagined political community of cultural homogeneity thatextends beyond institutional directives and policies. This imagined politicalcommunity of Christian Greeks is under threat by immigrants as well as byinstitutions and citizens who want to harmonise themselves with pan-European approaches to tolerance and integration. The distance that theintolerant subject wants to maintain from the field of policy is part of twosimultaneous conflicts: a conflict between Greek nationals and Muslim immi-grants that unfolds within a framework of pre-ascribed and most importantlyincompatible biological and cultural characteristics, and a conflict betweentolerant and intolerant subjects over Greece’s cultural homogeneity.


NOTES

1. Reconsiderations over the future of multiculturalism and its applicability as aset of integration policies coincided with the European Commission’s 1994agenda regarding the legal status of third country nationals in the EU. TheCommission set a policy framework based on three major issues: reductionof migration pressure; control of migration flows; and enhancing the inte-gration processes for third country nationals. In effect, the Commission’spropositions were in synch with the view held by most of the member statesthat immigration flows should be controlled and limited, and the immigra-tion gradually marginalises the native population of the EU.

2. The presence and activities of PEGIDA signal a radical break with the recentpolitical past of Germany where organised and formalised outbursts ofxenophobia were absent. For PEGIDA the labels of racism, Nazism andIslamophobia attributed to the movement by the German political establish-ment indicate the impossibility to challenge the dominant discourse ofdenationalisation and immigration.

3. Two years before the referendum took place, the Swiss People’s Partymanaged to become the second most popular party in Switzerland despitebeing called a racist party by religious organisations and the United Nation(UN). The party presented itself as the true voice of the Swiss people whoseopinion must be taken seriously when issues of religious practice and culturalhomogeneity are concerned.

4. Against the Conservative conception of State and Church as one body wheremembership of one implies membership of the other, Locke in line with theWhigs argued for the separation of Church and State. See J.W Gough(1991) The Development of Locke’s Belief in Toleration.

5. Control of the Self (or self-subjection) pivots around the Foucauldiannotion of Ethics which is understood as the relationship you ought tohave with yourself. The formation of the self as an ethical self requires certainpractices of the self which Foucault calls them “technologies of the self”. SeeFoucault Michel (2000) “Technologies of the Self”, in Rabinow Paul (ed.),Ethics vol.1: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Michel Foucault1954–1984.


CHAPTER 7

Postnationalism, Solidarity and EuropeanCitizenship: Recognising the

Transformative Power of Immigration

Abstract The chapter aims at an intervention to the differentiationbetween “us” and “them”. The chapter explores the possibilities of apostnational EU and acknowledges that all policies and debates on immi-gration are shaped by what Pierre Bourdieu and Abdelmalek Sayad call“state thought”. In order to escape the confines of “state thought” thechapter engages with the theoretical and practical dimensions of recogni-tion and postnational citizenship.

Keywords State thought � Recognition � EU citizenship � Postnationalism �Political participation � Solidarity

ESCAPING STATE THOUGHT: RECOGNITION AND RIGHTS

Policy and public attitudes towards cultural compatibility, social order andbelonging are fundamentally based on the belief that the nation state is thenatural container of a nationally defined population, and the legitimate orga-nising principle concerning the population’s conduct with its Other. Thepurpose of this chapter is twofold: first, it explores the theoretical conceptionand political act of recognition by advocating that immigrants should berecognised as the bearers of human rights, and as the agents for the constitu-tion of a postnational Europe; second, it offers a postnational model of EUcitizenship for immigrants and refugees aiming at the democratisation ofEuropean demos beyond the national frameworks of belonging and political


103

participation. Whereas in previous chapters the utopian and dystopian visionsof Europe embodied in the concept of Europia served as descriptive analyticalterms, the present chapter proceeds by establishing a structure of ethicalnorms regarding equality, rights and political participation.

Debates about immigration in the EU and its repercussions havebeen presented thus far as a continuous struggle between the livedexperience of Greek nationals and immigrants as well as between poli-cies and theoretical frameworks, which have been deployed by socialactors and institutions in a conscious or unconscious manner. Theoriesand ideas about the presence, perception and management of immigra-tion do not always predate the latter but they are also conceived,developed and altered within it. By not acknowledging the mutualrelationship between social and political theory and the way immigra-tion has been part of public, political and academic discourses there isthe risk of ignoring the state as the main constitutive force regardingthe perception and analysis of immigration.

Immigration is always discussed with reference to national territoriesand to the people with the right to live in these territories even though itamounts to one of the main processes of globalisation along with tradeand cultural exchange (Bonham 2010). Immigration exhibits certaincharacteristics that constantly classify it as a social, economic and in thefinal analysis a national problem. These characteristics constitute anintellectual platform shared by theorists, institutions, policymakers andcitizens. Such a platform is the product and manifestation of “statethought” (Bourdieu 1994). According to Bourdieu (1994, pp. 1–2)“state thought” is a particular form of thought that reflects through itsown mental structures the structures of the state.1 Following Bourdieu’stheorisation (ibid.), the categories through which the phenomenon ofimmigration is analysed in this book (policy, detention, national subjec-tivity, integration) are basically national structures, which justify exclu-sion regimes and generate utopian and dystopian visions of the EU andof Greece. Yet, the limitations “state thought” poses on the analysis ofimmigration reveal the secret virtue of immigration: “it provides anintroduction, and perhaps the best introduction of all, to the sociologyof the state” (Sayad 2007, p. 279). Immigration highlights the state’spolitical and social limits by disturbing the national order, and by ques-tioning the legitimacy of exclusion regimes. Without these limits, whichare constantly renegotiated through processes of inclusion and exclusion,the nation state would not exist.


The perception of immigration as a national problem occurs as soon asimmigration creates the conditions to reconsider the modern conceptionof the state as a legally defined term, which refers to the totality of itsmembers—to “the people”, and their democratic participation within it.Escape from “state thought” and, the reconsideration of exclusionregimes as well as of “the people” of Europe requires an act of recogni-tion—recognition of those who challenge the legitimacy of exclusionregimes. Yet, this proposed recognition raises a series of questions con-cerning the type of recognition and what exactly should be recognised.Before proceeding to these questions it would be useful to situate recogni-tion in the contemporary political and social landscape. The right to beculturally different and the accommodation of diverse cultures havebecome dominant themes in conceptualisations of social justice whereasquestions of social class and of egalitarianism are increasingly diminishing.

Due to the great and often unregulated mobility of peoples, the adventof the global market, and the rise of the new right the concern for economicredistribution has been marginalised in favour of an increasing preoccupa-tion with the recognition of difference and identity (Fraser 2000, 2001;Bauman 2001; Beck 2005). Even though issues of identity have always beenconnected with the redistribution of wealth, equal opportunities to educa-tion and the labour market the displacement of redistribution by anxietiesover identity and difference becomes visible in contemporary debates aboutimmigration, integration and cultural homogeneity.

While the proponents of social justice through redistribution of wealthconsider recognition and the politics of identity as false consciousness, theproponents of recognition deem distributive politics as parochial material-ism that cannot encapsulate contemporary forms of injustice (Bauman2001). Axel Honneth (2001), as the main proponent of recognition, dis-misses any theory of social justice that ignores the significance of redistribu-tion and at the same time welcomes the recent shift in emphasis onrecognition by stating that recognition constitutes “the fundamental over-arching moral” (Fraser and Honneth 2003, pp. 2–3). Even thoughHonneth (2001) welcomes this shift, does not subscribe to identity politicsand in particular to its association with the concept of recognition nor doeshe consider the struggle for recognition of identity and difference as theresult of failed struggles against neo-liberal economics, and of the rise of thenew right. He rather attributes the emphasis on recognition to an increasein “moral sensibility” and to a tendency in “pluralism” and “fragmentation”(Honneth 2001, p. 44). Such tendency enables people to find a “certain

7 POSTNATIONALISM, SOLIDARITY AND EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP . . . 105

kind of social esteem in groups which are somewhat decoupled from thoseover-arching process of normative integration” (Honneth in Petersen andWilling 2002, pp. 271–272). The political model that Honneth aspires toformulate through the concept of recognition is a form of “ethical life”(Sittlichkeit), which extends beyond legal principles.

Honneth argues for a theory that focuses on the injustices caused byinstitutions “prior to and independent of political articulation by socialmovements” (Fraser and Honneth 2003, p. 117). The main requirementfor the elaboration of such theory is to examine social phenomena ofinjustice before their political and cultural articulation within the publicsphere. Such a theoretical manoeuvre enables Honneth to produce a“‘phenomenology’ of social experience of injustice” (Fraser and Honneth2003, p. 114). All experiences of suffering are the end result of an act ofmisrecognition: “the experience of the withdrawal of social recognition—of degradation and disrespect—must be at the center of a meaningfulconcept of socially caused suffering and injustice” (Fraser and Honneth2003, p. 132).

COERCION AND NEGATIVE INTEGRATION

The EU with a population of 500 million received more than a millionrefugees and unregulated immigrants in 2015. However, the lack of acommon immigration policy or even approach constitutes every immigra-tion flow towards Europe as part of an ever-expanding crisis. While nationalgovernments are trying to defend national interests the immigrant situationat the borderlands of Europe remains ominous. The death rate in theAegean Sea has soared with refuges disregarding weather conditions, warn-ings about poor facilities in the host countries, and intense border policing.In 2015, 7492 people lost their lives trying to reach the Greek shores butthe EU and its member states seem incapable of operating outside thepolitical frameworks of coercion and negative integration.

The EU aspires for greater control over its borders and considers a fullyoperational border and coast guard as a viable solution to the inflow ofimmigrants and refugees. This type of control entails the legal right to turnback asylum seekers and unregulated immigrants to Turkey as well as todeport those who do not qualify for asylum in the EU (EU Council2016).2 This rather more assertive approach to the immigration crisis ismaterially supported by the presence of North Atlantic TreatyOrganisation (NATO) in the Aegean. The EU in collaboration with


NATO have deployed a fleet of warships to conduct monitoring andsurveillance of illegal crossings in the Aegean. The target of this militaryoperation is not the refugees and unregulated immigrants as such, butsmugglers exploiting vulnerable and desperate people aspiring to reachEurope. This apparent unified approach to the immigration crisis evidentin the militarisation of borders once more raises questions over the valuesthe EU aspires to uphold as a political entity. While the EU and NATOidentify smugglers as their main targets of this wide military operation theyeffectively deny the right to asylum to innumerable refugees and, theydelegate administrative responsibilities to transit countries such as Turkey.The militarisation of the European borders is not only a response to thepresident of the European Council Donald Tusk’s declaration that “theEU no longer controls its borders” (quoted in Spiegel et al. 2015) but alsoan opportunity for the EU to officially acknowledge the inability ofmember states such as Italy and Greece to protect their national andEuropean borders, and consequently re-establish the old distinctionbetween the European South and the European North, between old andnew countries of immigration.

EU’s right to deny asylum is legally legitimised by the uncoupling ofinternational law from moral responsibility. Throughout this crisis, media,immigration authorities and political leaders have been arguing over thedefinition of people coming over to Europe. The main point of dispute isthe differentiation between refugees and economic immigrants. Nationalgovernments reluctant to cooperate with predominantly German initiativesregarding relocation quota schemes claim that the vast majority of peoplecoming to Europe in an irregular and undocumented way should be con-sidered as economic immigrants seeking a better life instead of refugeesfleeing conflict and persecution. As discussed in Chap. 1, under EU lawand the 1951 Geneva Convention, refugees are different to economicimmigrants. Immigration authorities have the right to deny entry to peoplewhose mobility is determined strictly by economic reasons. The EU and theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have urgednational governments and immigration authorities as well as the media toavoid the use of immigrant as an umbrella term because the confusion overimmigrants and refugees “takes attention away from the specific legal pro-tection refugees require” (quoted in Brunsden 2015). The reintroduction ofthe debate over the definition of people who are coming to Europe, thedistinction between refugees and immigrants and the subsequent prioritisa-tion of the former point towards two kinds of interlinked processes of


exclusion and inclusion. The otherness of the immigrant is constructedwithin the political environments of the EU and of the nation state, respec-tively. The financial crisis and implementation of austerity measures in manymember states and the volatile political climate that tends to favour nation-alist political formations are important factors for the exclusion of immi-grants. At the same time, the exclusion of immigrants is accompanied and inturn legitimised by the partial inclusion of the refugee as a more deservingtype of foreigner. As it has been examined throughout the book the imple-mentation of the rules of exclusion and inclusion is arbitrary and alwayssusceptible to bureaucratic structures and popular conceptions of belongingand otherness.

Common and coordinated approaches to the immigration crisis do notalways prioritise common European interests over national ones. EU’sprincipal policy of relocating refugees from Greece and Italy has led to aprocess of a European negative integration where member states find asense of unity by acting unilaterally in order to protect their values, cultureand to maintain law and order in their jurisdiction. The Austrian govern-ment agreed with Balkan EU member states Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgariaand non-EU member states Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and theRepublic of Macedonia to limit the number of immigrants crossing theborders by deploying military force and erecting fences. For the AustrianForeign Minister Sebastian Kurz, the absence of a viable European solu-tion makes it “necessary to take national solutions” and the president ofthe Republic of Macedonia Gjorge Ivanov substantiated the unilateralaction of its own country by arguing, “in times of crisis every governmentmust find its own solution. We can’t wait until Brussels makes a decision”(quoted in Murphy and Zuvela 2016). For Hungary’s prime ministerViktor Orbán (2016) EU’s policy of relocating refugees is part of a planto redraw his country’s “cultural, religious and ethnic landscape”. Orbánbelieves only Hungarians have the power to decide if their country can andshould accept refugees and he announced a referendum in order to mini-mise German and EU control over the management of the crisis.

The reluctance of European leaders to address the migration and refugeecrisis as a pan-European crisis forced the Italian Prime Minister MatteoRenzi (2015) to question the European vision and values his counterpartswish to communicate to their electorates and to the rest of the world: “ifthis is your idea of Europe you can keep it”. While Renzi believes thatpeople with no legitimate right to stay in Europe should be repatriated, he isadamant that racism and demagoguery cannot and should not be solutions


to the immigration crisis. A reversal of perspective is much needed andEuropeans need to see Europe not only as an economic coalition of nationsbut also through the prism of immigrants aspiring to live in Europe—a community of shared values and destiny. For Renzi, “responsibility andsolidarity go hand in hand” (ibid.). Considering the present circumstancessurrounding European integration and values, the concept of solidaritydemands further qualifications especially when evoked by political leadersand immigration authorities during a crisis. What does Renzi have in mindwhen he talks about solidarity amongst EU member states and what is thecontemporary understanding of solidarity? Renzi’s plea for solidarity can bejustified if solidarity is understood as a true political concept and notnecessarily as a moral or even a legal concept. Morality and the law alludeto the freedoms and responsibilities of all individuals while solidarity desig-nates “a joint involvement in a network of social relations” (Habermas2015, p. 23). For Habermas (ibid.) solidarity must be political and thefirst step towards its politicisation is its partial dissociation from justice. Eventhough justice and solidarity can be related concepts, for Habermas (ibid.),justice provides a regulatory practice that is in the equal interest of all actorsand parties involved. In order to move further from regulation, solidarityshould be understood and deployed as a vision for a “shared form of life thatincludes one’s well-being” (ibid.). Solidarity amongst Europeans concern-ing the immigration crisis is not just the provision of help to countries suchas Greece who are not capable of dealing with unregulated immigrationflows but the constitution of a political terrain of a genuine cooperationbetween member states based on shared values, which exceed legal texts andconventions. The postnationalism suggested by this Habermasian concep-tualisation of solidarity is constantly hindered by the primacy of the nationalover the European and as a result by appeals to national solidarity.

THE RECOGNITION OF UNREGULATED IMMIGRANTS

AND REFUGEES AS PART OF THE PEOPLE

Appeals to European solidarity and the primacy of nationalist politics overEuropean integration construct a contradictory understanding of belongingand identity for EU citizens, and immigrants and refugees, respectively.Even when the concept of recognition achieves a relative autonomy fromthe politics of redistribution and identity, respectively, questions regardingthe subject and object of recognition loom large. Recognition in Honneth’s


(2012) later work refers to two particular types of stance: on one hand,recognition affirms a quality or qualities a person already possesses and, onthe other hand, brings to the fore new qualities previously unrecognised byboth subjects and objects of recognition. Here, the unregulated immigrantsand refugees—those living in detention centres; those working in ethnicenclaves outside of any legal frameworks; those expected to be integratedand those who have to be excluded or tolerated can be recognised by EUinstitutions and citizens as the bearers of human rights and as the agents ofthe utopian vision of Europe.

The recognition of human rights in relation to otherness, “statethought”, and statelessness has always been a problematic proposition.Post-war federalist visions of Europe deployed the notion of human rightsin order to designate Europe as a political and geographical area signifi-cantly different to the administrative and political character of SovietUnion. Europe was seen as a political and cultural entity built on thevalues of respecting individual rights (Giddens 2014; Moyn 2012). On asimilar yet different note, the understanding and application of humanrights depend on political scope and ambition. On one hand, humanrights can be a powerful means for governments to assert their power inthe international community. In recent history, human rights have pro-vided support and justification for political conflicts and military interven-tions. On the other hand, there exist more modest propositions related topolitical participation, individuality and freedom. In the latter case, humanrights serve a regulatory function with respect to the power of institutionsover people and ultimately contribute to social cooperation and to a well-ordered society (Rawls 1999).

While the above theses suggest the implementation of human rights caneither have great geopolitical effects or regulatory functions, they seldomcontextualise it in different political and social contexts where deep divisionsexist within Europe and where institutions are not meant to serve certainpeople. Human rights are still seen as the solution to the accommodationand treatment of many stateless people residing or coming to Europe, butthey can also be one of the fundamental causes for the immigration crisisEurope is experiencing. To insinuate that the invocation and application ofhuman rights might actively contribute to the current immigration crisisdoes not necessarily mean that human rights should be disregarded com-pletely. For Hannah Arendt (1976), human rights contain a moral andpolitical paradox mainly because they rely on an abstract understanding ofthe human being. The very notion of human rights breaks down as soon as


states have to confront stateless people—people with no other qualitiesother than being human. When asylum seekers and unregulated immigrantsenter Greece, human rights do not apply to them. As long as people aredeprived of their citizenship they are not only deprived of their politicalstatus but most importantly of their humanity. The immigration crisis inEurope shows that humans do not have rights as humans but insteadhuman rights depend on membership to a political community and pre-ferably to a state. Here, Bourdieu’s (1994) and Sayad’s (2007) “statethought” conditions the relationship between rights and membership andleaves the notion of humanity oscillating between abstraction and legalframeworks conceived and supported by the state.

The calamity of the statelessness is not that they deprived of life, liberty,and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedomof opinion—formulas which were designed to solve problems withincommunities—but that they no longer belong to any community what-soever (Arendt 1976, p. 295).

Arendt (1976) attempts to break the link between political belonging andhuman rights by proceeding to a bold move: to dissociate rights fromabstract humanism as well as from the state. For Arendt (1976, p. 296)there is only one right and it is “the right to have rights” and such a rightdoes not depend on legal frameworks, race, religion or any other criteria.Arendt’s call for the right to have rights manifests itself only when statesand citizens are confronted with people dissociated from any knownorganised political communities and subsequently the only right thatmatters is to belong to a political community. The right to belonging isan act of recognition of one’s qualities irrespectively of any natural law andpolitical status. Such a right exists both logically and chronologically priorto the acceptance and implementation of human rights.

The attempt to escape “state thought” through Arendt’s formulationof “the right to have rights” poses some problems of theoretical andempirical character. Arendt’s (1976) assertion that there is one funda-mental right contradicts her initial doubt of the relevance and value ofhuman rights. If human rights depict an abstract human nature whereexactly “the right to have rights” should be placed? If “the right to haverights” precedes human rights are we not still talking about an abstractnatural right? Arendt manoeuvres her way out of this contradiction byarguing that even “the right to have rights” requires recognition and


agreement between states and communities. It is important to stress thatArendt is not trying to introduce an arch right but instead suggests amodest proposal where “the right to have rights” is the only right that canactually be guaranteed by the “comity of nations” (Arendt 1976, p. 391).Following Arendt’s theorisation, the EU and its member states instead ofexamining how a list of rights can apply to diverse groups such as eco-nomic immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, should be preoccupiedwith granting “the right to have rights” for all stateless people seeking abetter future and a new belonging in Europe. Even if we consider aradically different approach to government and foreign relations, statescannot be possibly viewed as political actors always in position to conformto one right before start implementing other rights. The state is bound byits obligation to protect its borders and its population. Moreover, staterepresentatives and authorities are confronted with certain limitationswhen expected to recognise people in need for work or asylum. Most ofthe times these limitations derive from interpreting citizens’ collectivesentiments and public opinion regarding the people in need for recogni-tion. Indeed, as we saw in previous chapters, misinterpretation of thenational populations’ sentiments about the preservation or even defenceof national identity and culture leads to the rise and political legitimationof far right movements.

Recognition as understood by Arendt should entail a particular struggleon behalf of the subject who needs to be recognised. Arendt’s productivetheoretical ambiguity leads to the second type of recognition discussedearlier in the chapter—recognition of immigrants as the agents ofEurope’s utopian postnational vision. Here, immigration flows and theimmigrant population intentionally or unintentionally change the consis-tency and character of the European population and challenge the verynotion of a nation or a multitude of nations being organised by specificstructures such as the EU or the nation state. The starting point for suchrecognition would be the recontextualisation of “the people” in responseto immigration and to the prevalent ethno-racial hierarchy of Greece.According to Jacques Rancière (1998, 2006, 2007, 2010) exclusionregimes contextualise politics as “police”, which in turn determine andlegitimise the distribution of parts and roles in a polity. On the other hand,“politics proper” (as Rancière frequently calls it) disrupts and overturnsthe order of the police in an intervention, which explores radical possibi-lities of equality and political participation. Consequently, the essence ofpolitics is “disagreement” (la mésentete) between an order that supports


and sustains inequality, and a disorder that explores notions of equality.The utopia suggested by human rights, Douzinas (2000) observes, isdifferent from the social imagining of theories of justice and from classicalutopian formulations. Unlike theories of social justice which are associatedwith top-bottom reforms, and classical utopian thought that aspires tocreate a new man or perhaps a model citizen that will be an integral part ofa new socio-political plan, human rights justify (Rancière’s) disagreementand imagine a world where exclusion and degradation do not exist.

Human rights are therefore a paradoxical double discourse, which recog-nises two types of intersubjectivity and community. They allow the experi-ence of freedom and the openness of language to become a political strategyand operate on the social. But at the same time they institutionalise theethics of alterity and the duty to respect the singular and unique existence ofthe other (Douzinas 2000, p. 356).

“Politics proper” aim at the constitution of a polity free from establishedforms of distribution of privileges evident in immigration and integrationpolicies and at the same time at creating a critical distance from theunderstanding of immigration as a cost-benefit analysis.

The recognition of the immigrant population of Europe as the agents ofa postnational polity cannot be understood as an accidental phenomenonbut needs to be accompanied by specific political gestures in the form ofpolicies on a pan-European level. Yet, as it has been examined thus far thisact of recognition poses fundamental questions regarding the character ofEU borders. Despite variations in the management of the migrant andrefugee crisis, there is a consensus that the EU and its member states areunable to preserve their social cohesion and cultural homogeneity byaccepting increasing numbers of immigrants and refugees. The realisationof Europe as a utopia through free movement can only be achieved whenmember states cease to have borders for delineating a distinctively Europeanjurisdiction—a jurisdiction that constitutes Europe as the desired destina-tion for refugees and economic migrants. On the other hand, the protectionof this distinctive jurisdiction and culture leads to the establishment andlegitimation of exclusion regimes.

The difficulty or even impossibility to untangle the relationship betweenutopian and dystopian visions, and between exclusion regimes and post-nationalism reinforces the equation of nationality with membership andreduces citizenship to a one-dimensional contract. If recognition of the


immigration population needs to be accompanied by specific political ges-tures then citizenship should be put forward as an overarching conceptcapable of addressing the immigrant as a human being and as an agent of apostnational utopian Europe. This renewed concept of citizenship will haveto be partially dissociated from its legal aspect in order to address the currentand emerging socio-political situation in Europe. For Balibar (2011, 2015)exclusion and what has been called exclusion regimes in this book havealways been essential components for the definition of citizenship. Thenation state needs to clearly distinguish between its members and its non-members, between their rights and obligations. Although immigration andasylum policies are preoccupied with the partial inclusion of immigrants andrefugees, and with the partial recognition of their rights the associationbetween nationality and membership to a political community reproducestheir alterity and marginalisation.

EU CITIZENSHIP AND THE DEMOCRATISATION

OF EUROPE THROUGH IMMIGRATION

The Greek landscape continues to provide the backdrop for this political andhumanitarian crisis. Immigrants and refugees in the detention centres con-tinue to suffer from poor health, lack of legal representation, and thousandsare enforced to stay in sports stadia like the ones in the island of Kos and inAthens controlled by the riot police (Kingsley 2015b). In synch with othermember states, Greece is anticipating funding from the EuropeanCommission for improving policing and reception facilities. The EuropeanCommission has awarded €12.7 million in emergency funding to Greece forsetting up reception facilities for refugees and unregulated migrants. Thisfunding comes from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)and will contribute to 8000 new reception places in greater Athens, in theislands bordering with Turkey and in Macedonia. The EuropeanCommission has specifically requested the creation of hotspots in the islandsof Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Leros and Kos for the prompt registration andscreening of refugees and immigrants, and the creation of new detentioncentres based in passenger terminals, disused sports centres and publicsquares in Athens, Kilkis, Thessaloniki and Evros for either the transportationof refugees to Germany or their deportation to their respective countries.

The dependence on detention and policing indicates EU’s inability toconceive and realise policies beyond exclusion. The European Commission


does not have any plans to allocate any part of the fund for the period2014–2020 to the integration of refugees in European societies. The prioritiesof the Commission are to “improve migration management, foster coopera-tion and make Europe safer from organised crime and terrorism for ourcitizens” (European Commission 2015b). Thus, far all actions taken onEuropean and national levels respectively pivot around deterrence of immi-gration flows, and security in the host countries. The EU, its member statesand their citizens are either driven by the politics of empathy—of savingpeople from drowning, and providing food and clothing or by the politicsof fear—of deploying detention and military force in order to deter the arrivalof strangers who might alter the racial and cultural composition of Europe.The short-lived makeshift camp for refugees and immigrants in Idomeni onthe border of Greece with the Republic of Macedonia became the visualmanifestation of the contradictory politics of empathy and fear. Due to theclosed borders in the Balkan Peninsula tens of thousands of people weretrapped in the village of Idomeni with the words “open the borders” sprayedin English on several tents scattered in muddy fields. On one hand, citizenswere participating in a relief effort providing food, clothing, and medical care.On the other hand, Macedonian police were firing teargas to disperse hun-dreds of immigrants attempting to bring down the barbered wire fence set upon the border.

The amplification of detention and border policing ignores the pre-sent and future state of Europe with respect to the temporary or perma-nent accommodation of people systematically presented as Others toEuropean citizens. Security and welfare policies have overlooked thepolitical agency of Europe’s newcomers. In other words, they have failedto raise the question if immigrants and refugees could and should acquirepolitical voice and effectively transform existing political institutions notonly by their presence but also by their political actions. The EU needs toredefine notions of inclusion and belonging in order to avert a new crisisof permanent exclusion and xenophobia. At this stage we should con-sider processes of exclusion and inclusion of immigrants and refugees asindicators of the instability of the meaning of citizenship and its relation-ship with the EU as well as with the nation state. The institution humanrights are mostly intertwined with is citizenship (Sassen 2006; Balibar2015). Even though the understanding and application of human rightscan be limited when articulated through citizenship due to the latter’sdependency on territory and national political frameworks, we need totake advantage of the recent political tensions and complexities


surrounding policy in order to universalise citizenship and particularisehuman rights. The possibility of reconceptualising citizenship outside ofthe confines of nationality for the immigrant population of the EU isinevitably impeded by the central role of the nation state in determiningmembership and belonging. As Rogers Brubaker (1992, p. 21) pointedout in the aftermath of the fall of the Iron Curtain, citizenship is at once“internally inclusive” and “externally exclusive”. While citizenship workstowards the elimination of vertical stratifications through the institu-tional creation of a political status shared by all members of a politicalcommunity, is very difficult to be extended to non-members residing in apolitical community. The institution of citizenship in order to be effec-tive needs to establish boundaries predominantly of political naturebetween members and non-members, between citizens and non-citizens.New exclusion regimes will have to be instituted and legitimatised for anew Other unsuitable of membership status. Citizenship as an officialform of political belonging mainly exists as an inherited or given condi-tion from the nation state to the subject. Even though intranationalpolities like the EU still depend on the relationship between the nationstate and its subjects the impact of immigration on topics such as nationalidentity, belonging and participation cannot be ignored.

Citizenship depends on and is shaped by the social and politicalconditions within which it is embedded. These conditions have chan-ged significantly but not in a formalised and constitutional manner.As discussed in previous chapters the nation state has changed sig-nificantly in terms of sovereignty, administration and forms of identi-fication but these changes are not necessarily reflected on theinstitution of citizenship. Is it possible to institute or even conceivea postnational identity as a supplement to the pre-existing nationalidentity? Moreover, official attempts to define and institutionaliseEuropean citizenship do not only attempt to establish new exclusionregimes but they acknowledge and rely on the already existing ones.The definition of EU citizenship by the European Commission in thedrafting of the Maastricht Treaty is indicative of the primacy ofnationality within intranational frameworks:

Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding thenationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship ofthe Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.(European Commission c: The Treaty of Maastricht, Article 8)


Yet, Kostakopoulou (2001) points out that the legal and political framing ofcitizenship by the Treaty of Maastricht questions the conventional theoriesand practices of citizenship in Europe. The formulation of European citizen-ship recognises that citizens can have multiple bonds with overlappingpolitical communities, namely national, intranational and occasionally ethnic;borders between member states should not be barriers but instead points ofpolitical and cultural exchange; and most importantly that the Europeandemos unlike national democracies should be considered as an open andalways incomplete process. The strong association of citizenship with nation-ality in tandem with the objective difficulties immigrants and refugees face tobe part of either the incomplete demos of the EU or the national communityof the member states prevent the institution of citizenship to reinvent itselfand overlooks a more dynamic conception of citizenship adept at challengingexclusion regimes while at the same time imagining a new political order.

Despite political andmilitary attempts to defend the exclusionary characterof citizenship in theEU, immigration is gradually challenging the ties betweencitizenship and the nation state and eventually leads to new conceptualisationsof a postnational membership. However, theoretical assertions like the onesput forward by Soysal (1994) and Jacobson (1996) regarding a condition ofpostnationalism due to the pressures of immigration on the nation state fail toacknowledge the importance of nationalism and the power of exclusionregimes. For both Jacobson (1996) and Soysal (1994) the establishedmodel of national citizenship has been displaced by other forms of member-ship, which pivot around individual rights and universal personhood. Thepostnationalism envisioned by Jacobson (1996) and Soysal (1994) requirescommon space, a sense of the common good, and institutional politicalgrounding. These requirements do not exist and the immigration and refugeecrisis has revealed a great gap between an abstract notion of commonEuropean values and the desire to defend national culture and territories. InHabermas’ (2015, p. 39) later writings on Europe the constitution of aEuropean people can only be realised through “European-wide politicalcommunication”. Yet, Habermas (2015) does not share the equivocal post-nationalism of Jacobson and Soysal and is quick to note that the nation statehas a place in a postnational democracy. The nation state for Habermas(2015) facilitates and promotes solidarity amongst citizens that can developand expand into a transnational democracy that exists above the organisa-tional framework of the state. For Habermas (2015) transnational democracyis closely associated with the idea of federalism but at the same he maintains acritical distance from the characteristics of a federal state. A transnational


democratic polity is not supposed to claim monopoly over the legitimate useof violence or control of mobility but to actively promote double sovereigntyand allow EUmember states to implement decrees, statues and other govern-mental guidelines. Considering the current political dynamics in the EU thenation state is the only political formation capable of taking effective actionbased on democratic will as well as protecting the well-being of its population.Having said that Habermas (2015) highlights the need for EUmember statesto realise a degree of political interconnectivity and interdependence inEurope, and the subsequent reformulation of national borders.

However, Habermas’ theoretical formulation on transnational democ-racy needs to consider the political consensus amongst national populationsand the European population as a whole, and the subsequent cultural andethnic diversities generated by immigration. The realisation of postnation-alism in the EU requires politics that are not limited to the protection ofrights and of established national identities. Following Chantal Mouffe’s(1999) theoretical elaborations on antagonism established identities andrights should be placed in a “precarious and always vulnerable terrain”(Mouffe 1999, p. 753). The goal here is not to eliminate established nationalidentities but to engage in a process of de-essentialisation of all identities andat the same time to acknowledge the importance of identity and the politicalsentiments it arouses. The process of de-essentialising identity and acknowl-edging its importance can lead to the construction of a political communitythat accommodates pluralism as well as European and national citizenship.

Challenging exclusion regimes and imagining a new political order is nota contradiction but in Balibar’s (2014, p. 6) words a dialectical relationshipbetween “insurrection” and “constitution” that should be evident in anycommunity. It is important to insist on the existence of a political commu-nity when articulating different conceptions of citizenship. Yet, this com-munity cannot be possibly based on an ataraxia—a permanent politicalconsensus manifested in the permanent acceptance of the present exclusionregimes and the rights and obligations of its citizens. In line with Ranciére’s“disagreement” and Mouffe’s “antagonism” the postnational communityenvisioned here will be determined by ruptures and continuous transforma-tion. Immigration manages to expose the vulnerability of citizenship andthe inability of the nation state to contain it within its legal and institutionalconfines. The way immigration problematises the notion of a nationalpeople provides the conditions for a conceptualisation of citizenship thatwill be historically, politically and culturally specific yet critical of its owncontext.


European citizenship without national citizenship for refugees and immi-grants will certainly create a Europe of two kinds of citizens where the holdersof national citizenship will be in a more privileged position with respect to thewelfare, protection and political participation that a member state can offer.However, following the steps of Bloch’s utopian thought, EU citizenshipindependent of national citizenship is a step towards the reimagining ofEurope as a postnational political community. The granting of Europeancitizenship signals a moment of political insurgence because it allows theexcluded to assert themselves as citizens of a given political community and atthe same time safeguards a future for the EU as an inclusive political com-munity. The reorganisation of intranational political communities and nationstates through immigration flows and the presence of immigrants provide thesocial and political conditions for certain segments of the European popula-tion to reassert themselves as active citizens by questioning and deconstruct-ing established notions of national narratives, identity and otherness whileothers, those are the immigrant population of Europe, can become citizensfor the first time. In other words, immigration and the presence of immi-grants and refugees prompt democracy as a political system of equality, rightsand obligations to be incorporated in its own process of “democratisation”(Balibar 2015, pp. 124–128). For Balibar (2015) the “democratisation” ofdemocracy actively deconstructs exclusions and discriminations that havebeen entrenched as legitimate means for its preservation.

What is at stake is the necessity not only of including in the social andpolitical order those excluded according to racial, ethnic and culturalcriteria but to create a collective social subjectivity that establishes andre-establishes a hierarchy based on political, social and mobility rights. It isthe responsibility of this collective subjectivity to confront any hierarchybased on nationality, ethnicity, memories and traditions by constantlyinventing and communicating new political rights, new social parts forthose with no part, and new spaces of mobility and expression.

NOTES

1. Bourdieu and Sayad’s “state thought” should be understood as a concept thatrefers to a particular mentality and not necessarily to the persistence ofnational governments to prioritise national concerns with tangible electoralrepercussions over European ones. However, national prioritisation can derivefrom “state thought” and often leads to what is known as “red line areas”between the EU and the member state.


2. EU and Turkey took the decision to terminate all irregular mobility toEurope in order to break the network of smugglers in the Middle Eastand to offer immigrants and refugees an alternative to the life threateningof crossing the Aegean Sea. All irregular immigrants will be returned toTurkey and in exchange the EU will accelerate the process of lifting visarequirements for all Turkish citizens visiting EU member states.


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INDEX

AAfghanistan, 13Agamben, Giorgio, 63n4Ahmed, Sara, 82Alexander, Jeffrey, 21, 61Amygdaleza, 39, 54, 58Anderson, Benedict, 80–81Arendt Hannah, 20, 110Assimilation, 31, 88, 89Asylum, 5, 10–17, 19, 22, 25n3, 29,

33, 36, 44, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54–60,85, 106–107, 110, 112, 114

Asylum, Migration and IntegrationFund (AMIF), 114

Asylum seekers, 12–14, 16, 19, 22,25n3, 36, 50, 52, 54–56, 60,85, 106, 110, 112

Austria, 11, 108

BBalibar, Etienne, 97Bangladesh, 13, 95Beck, Ulrich, 4, 15Belgium, 10, 11, 57Benjamin, Walter, 41Bloch, Ernst, 21Borders, 87Bourdieu, Pierre, 8

Brown, Wendy, 7, 100Butler, Judith, 48

CCabot, Heath, 33Castles, Stephen (and Mark

J. Miller), 7, 27, 28, 88, 89Castells, Manuel, 50Census, 7, 30, 32, 38, 45Centre, 2, 12–15, 28, 30, 34, 39,

49–62, 63n2, 63n3, 65, 71,80, 94, 95, 110, 114

Christian Democrats, 17Christians, 98Citizenship, 3, 4, 7, 8, 19, 23–24,

28, 32, 36–38, 43, 45, 52, 60,67, 77, 87, 89, 91, 103–120

Clark, Bruce, 6Coercion, 106Cohesion, 3, 12, 28, 47, 52, 62, 69,

73, 78, 85–88, 97, 99, 113Cold War, 68, 69Colette, Guillamin, 28Communism, 70, 97Community, 5, 6, 10, 16, 19, 25n2,

28, 36, 48, 66, 80, 88, 89,96–97, 101, 109–111, 114,116–119

© The Author(s) 2017K. Maronitis, Postnationalism and the Challenges to EuropeanIntegration in Greece, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-46346-9

137

Convergence, 4, 91–92Crum, Ben, 17

DDefence, 11, 16, 22, 24, 25,

25n1, 32, 34, 40, 67, 71,79, 80, 97, 112

Deleuze, Gilles, 22Denmark, 8n1, 11Detention, 2, 4, 7, 12–14, 18, 23,

28, 39, 47–64, 65, 69, 73, 104,110, 114–115

Detention centres, 2, 12–14, 28,49–62, 63n2, 63n3, 65,110, 114

Disintegration, 4, 15, 48Douzinas, Costas, 63n3Dublin Regulation (Dublin II,

Dublin III, DublinConvention), 11–15, 17,58, 91

Durkheim, Emile, 83Dystopia, 3, 4, 7, 8, 18–19, 22–24,

43, 45, 47, 51, 60, 77, 78,81, 83, 101, 104, 113

EECB (European central bank), 17, 69Education, 30, 32, 37, 38, 43,

45, 50, 87, 89, 91, 105Eritrea, 13Europe, 1–7, 9–19, 22, 24, 25n1,

27–28, 29, 36, 40, 51–53, 58,61, 62, 66, 68, 69, 73, 79, 80,86, 90, 92, 93, 96, 103–104,105–115, 117–118,119, 120n2

European Commission, 2, 15, 32, 35,63n1, 86, 87, 114–115, 116

European council, 34, 86, 107European Court of Human

Rights, 57, 94European Economic Community, 10European Parliament, 11, 35European Union/EU, 2–20, 22–25,

28, 29, 32–36, 38, 39, 43,48–50, 52–56, 58–61, 68,69, 73, 76, 85, 86, 91,93, 97, 102n1, 103, 104,106–110, 112–119, 120n2

Europhiles, 7, 16–19Europhobic, 3Europia, 19, 22, 24, 45, 51,

101, 104Eurosceptic, 16, 17Exclusion, 3–5, 8, 9–25, 30, 40–44,

45, 48–49, 81, 88, 94, 97, 98,100, 101, 104, 105, 108,112–119

Exclusionary, 12, 15, 43,88, 117

FFar right, extreme right, 3Fascism, 22, 77Favell, Adrian, 4Fear, 1–5, 7, 10, 29, 46n2,

49, 51, 62, 69, 73,75, 78, 81–82, 91, 99, 115

Federal, federalism, 5, 10, 15,17, 24, 25n1, 25n4, 51,110, 117

Felix, Guattari, 22Finland, 11Foucault, Michel, 102n5France, 2, 8n1, 10, 15Fraser, Nancy, 105, 106Frontex, 33–36, 46n1, 48,

53, 59, 61

138 INDEX

GGeddes, Andrew, 27–28, 31Geneva Convention, 12, 107German Federal Office for Migration

and Refugees (BAMF), 15Germany, 10, 11, 15, 76, 88, 92,

102n2, 114Giddens, Anthony, 50Gobineau, Arthur de, 40Golden Dawn, 7, 8n1, 39, 53, 66,

70–84, 84n2, 94, 96Government, 29–33, 35, 38, 43, 48,

53, 56, 59, 63n1, 70, 73, 75,76, 82, 83, 89, 94–96, 100,101, 108, 112

Governmentality, 48, 100Greece, 2, 5–11, 15, 22, 24,

25n3, 27–29, 31–43, 47–50,52–61, 65, 66, 68–77, 79,80, 82–85, 91, 93, 94–97,101, 104, 107–109, 111,112, 115

Guirandon, Virginie, 4

HHabermas, Jurgen, 109, 117–118Harvey, David, 20Health, 3, 32, 54, 60, 63n2Hechter, Michael, 80Hellenic Statistical Authority, 38Herzfeld, Michael, 40Hix, Simon, 16Homogeneity, 4, 22, 28, 38, 41, 42,

45, 49, 77, 85, 95, 97, 98, 101,102n3, 105, 113

Honneth, Axel, 105Hospitable Zeus, 38–39Human rights, 7, 13, 34, 39, 54–60,

62, 73, 75, 91, 94, 97, 103,110–111, 113, 115

Human Rights Watch, 7, 13, 34, 39,56, 73, 75

Huysmans, Jef, 18

IIceland, 12Identity, 3, 4, 6, 13, 16–17, 20, 23,

24, 28–31, 37, 40, 47, 54, 62,66, 69, 71, 78–79, 82, 83, 87,88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 101, 105,109, 112, 116, 118, 119

Ideology, 17, 40, 66, 70, 73, 81, 84n2Idomeni, 115Illegal, 3, 6, 7, 23, 24, 32, 34–37,

39, 41–42, 43, 48, 49, 52–53,54, 59, 75, 96, 107

Immigrants, 1–3, 5–7, 10, 12–16,18–19, 22–24, 28–33, 35–45,47–64, 69–75, 78, 81, 82,85–89, 91–92, 95–97, 101,103, 104, 106–110, 112–115,117, 119, 120n2

Immigration, 1–8, 9–19, 22–25,27–46, 47–59, 61–62, 63n2,65–66, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75,77, 78, 81–84, 85, 86, 88–92,94, 95, 97, 101, 101n2, 102n1,103–120

Integration, 4, 6, 8–10, 12, 15–18, 23,24, 32, 36, 48–49, 68, 78–79,85–102, 104–106, 108,109, 113

Iraq, 13, 55Ireland, 11Isaiah, Berlin, 20Islam, 20, 74, 90, 92–93, 95–97,

102n2Italy, 2, 10, 11, 14, 46n1, 107, 108Ius Sanguinis, 37, 38, 45, 60Ius Solis, 38, 60

INDEX 139

JJacobson, 117Jacoby, Russell, 20Jenkins, Brian, 80Juncker, Jean-Claude, 2, 3Justice, 22, 32, 73, 105, 109, 113

KKant, Emmanuel, 99Karl Marx, 5, 21Kojève, Alexandre, 77Kostakopoulou, Theodora, 117

LLabour, 7, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 28,

31, 42, 46n2, 52, 63n3, 87, 88,91, 105

Lampedusa, 13LAOS, 69–71Latour, Bruno, 30Law, 4, 11, 12, 15, 22, 31–33,

36–44, 47, 48, 51, 56, 60–62,63n4, 73–75, 77, 87,92, 95, 107–109, 111

Left, parties of the Left, 37, 53Legitimation, 47, 48, 66,

72, 77–82, 112, 113Liberalism, 20, 70, 90Liberals, 17, 94Locke, John, 98Lukacs, György, 8n2Luxembourg, 10, 11

MMair, Peter, 17Marcuse, Herbert, 99Merkel, Angela, 90, 92Middle East, 27, 29, 120n2

Migrant Integration PolicyIndex, 91

Miller, Peter, 30, 100Ministry of Interior, 32, 37, 69, 70Ministry of Public Order and Citizen

Protection, 39Moral, morality, 4, 30, 40, 43,

71, 96, 97, 100, 105, 107,109, 110

More, Thomas, 20Mosque, 8, 92–97Mouffe, Chantal, 118Multicultural, multiculturalism, 21,

38, 45, 88, 89–90,96, 102n1

Muslim/s, 30, 91–97, 101

NNationalism, 4, 15, 22–24,

65–84, 117NATO, 106–107Netherlands, 10, 11New Democracy, 68–70, 72NGOs, 37, 39, 56, 58, 61,

98, 100North Africa, 27, 29, 95Norway, 11

OOrganization for Economic

Cooperation and Development(OECD), 38

Other/otherness, 1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 12,16, 18, 21, 23, 27–28, 30–32,35, 38, 39, 42–45, 47, 50, 51,53, 55, 57, 62, 67–69, 71, 73–75,78–80, 82, 92, 93, 95, 97–99,101, 102n4, 103, 108,110–119

140 INDEX

PPASOK, 36, 69, 72PEGIDA, 92, 102n2Periphery, 5, 15–16Police, 3, 7, 16, 25n2, 29, 31,

32, 36, 38–39, 41, 43,51, 53, 56–57, 73–75, 92,112, 115

Policy (immigration), 7, 13, 23, 24,27–40, 42, 43, 106

Political participation, 36–38, 44, 45,91, 104, 110, 112, 119

Popper, Karl, 20Portugal, 10–11Postnationalism, 4, 8, 19, 23, 24, 66,

103–120Power, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 30, 36, 40,

45, 47–64, 67, 70, 80, 81, 83,84n2, 88, 103–120

Precarization, precarious,precarity, 33, 44–45, 47, 48,101, 118

Presidential Decree, 54Primordialism, 80Public order, 12, 31, 32, 39, 42, 48,

54, 59, 82, 97

RRABIT Regulation, 35Rancière, Jacques, 112Rawls, John, 110Redistribution, 22, 105, 109Refugees, 1–3, 5, 7, 11–13, 15,

19, 30, 31, 33, 37, 44,45, 56, 63n1, 75, 95,103, 106–110, 112–115, 117,119, 120n2

Regime, 5, 9–25, 50, 67, 95, 104,105, 112, 116–118

Renzi, Matteo, 108–109

Residence, 19, 32, 38–39, 42, 43,45, 89, 91

Residence permit, 33, 37Rose, Nikolas, 30, 100

SSamers, 13Sassen, Saskia, 47, 115Sayad, Abdelmalek, 8Schengen (Treaty of/Schengen

zone), 11, 12, 16, 25n2Schmitt, Carl, 7, 61Schuster, 13, 14Security, 10, 12, 16, 18, 29, 32,

34, 36, 43–45, 49, 54, 61, 62,69, 88, 115

Smith, Anthony D., 78Social Democrats, 8n1, 17, 36, 72Social justice, 22, 73, 105, 113Sofos, Spyros A., 80Solidarity, 2, 9, 10, 40, 63n1,

103–119Somalia, 13, 95Soviet Union, 27, 29, 110Spain, 10, 11State, 3–8, 11–18, 20–22, 24, 25n3,

28, 29, 32–35, 37, 38, 40, 41,44–45, 47–49, 51–53, 55, 57,58–63, 70, 71, 73, 77–79, 81, 83,84, 86–91, 94, 96–99, 103–106,108, 110–119

State Council, 37, 94Structuralism, 66Subject/subjectivity, 6, 8, 14, 28,

29, 44, 47–48, 57, 62, 63,65–84, 94, 95, 100, 101,104, 109, 110, 112, 113,116, 119

Suspicion, 3, 13, 21, 51, 71, 92, 95Sweden Democrats, 69

INDEX 141

Switzerland, 12, 93, 102n3Syria, 13, 15, 50, 55, 63n1SYRIZA, 43, 72Szczerbiak, Aleks, 17

TTaggart, Paul, 17Tampere, 86Terrorism, 20, 25n2, 29,

34, 115Tolerance, 6, 8, 68, 85–101Totalitarianism, 20, 21Touraine, Alain, 8, 66Treaty of Amsterdam, 32Treaty of Maastricht, 116Treaty of Rome, 10True Finns, 69Turner, Bryan S., 50

UUnited Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR), 13,50, 55

Urry, John, 50

Utopia, 3, 4, 7, 8, 18–24, 45, 47,49, 51, 52, 60, 77, 78, 80, 81,83, 85, 100, 101, 104, 110,112–113, 119

VViolence, 3, 15, 18, 23, 43, 44,

49, 55, 59, 72–75, 77, 95, 96,100, 118

Visegrád countries, 2

WWalzer, Michael, 98Weber, Max, 17Wegner, Philip E., 20, 21Welfare, 3, 12, 19, 32, 37, 44, 45,

52, 62, 63n2, 73, 75–77, 82,87, 90, 91, 115, 119

Wieviorka, Michel, 65

XXenophobia, 13, 15, 22, 51, 71, 77,

81, 102n2, 115

142 INDEX

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